REAR AREA PROTECTION

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
APRIL 1967
FOREWORD

This manual provides interim guidance to commanders, staff officers, and other personnel concerned with rear area protection under the TAS-TA-70 concept of organization and operation. This information can be utilized to facilitate reorganization under the TASTA concept. Firm information on the organizational structure and composition of units will be as contained in TOE's when published. Although the basic TASTA-70 study has been approved by Department of the Army, detailed doctrine contained in this test field manual is under continuing development and review.

Readers are encouraged to submit comments and recommendations for changes that will improve clarity, accuracy, and completeness of the manual. Comments should be constructive in nature and reasons should be provided for each recommendation to insure understanding and to provide a valid basis for evaluation. Each comment should be keyed to a specific page, paragraph, and line of the text. Comments should be forwarded directly to the Commanding Officer, US Army Combat Developments Command Military Police Agency, Fort Gordon, Georgia 30905. An information copy of recommendations that propose changes to approved Army doctrine may be sent, through command channels, to the Commanding General, US Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and evaluation.
REAR AREA PROTECTION

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. General</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>3-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Operational concepts</td>
<td>11-12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Principles of rear area protection</td>
<td>13-22</td>
<td>8-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER 2. COMMAND AND CONTROL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Control of the land area and its people</td>
<td>23-28</td>
<td>11-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Command policies for RAP</td>
<td>29-43</td>
<td>19-23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER 3. RAP FORCE DEVELOPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Creating forces for RAP</td>
<td>44-51</td>
<td>24-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Command and control for RAP</td>
<td>52-58</td>
<td>33-36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER 4. OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. RAP operations</td>
<td>59-70</td>
<td>37-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Military intelligence support of RAP operations</td>
<td>71-74</td>
<td>50-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. RAP considerations in use of tactical air support</td>
<td>75-79</td>
<td>53-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Communications support for RAP</td>
<td>80-83</td>
<td>55-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. CBR functions and responsibilities in support of RAP</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Explosive ordnance disposal operations</td>
<td>85-94</td>
<td>60-64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER 5. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Area organization</td>
<td>95-99</td>
<td>65-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Administration and ADPS for RAP</td>
<td>100-104</td>
<td>68-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Organization and capabilities of units providing RAP potential</td>
<td>105-115</td>
<td>72-77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX A. REFERENCES | 78 |
B. STRUCTURES FOR RAP ADC TEAMS | 80 |
C. RAP SCENARIO | 88 |
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Section 1. GENERAL

1. Purpose

This manual develops a rear area protection (RAP) system to support the RAP concept under TASTA–70. It portrays principals, organization, operation, and administration for rear area protection envisioned for the FASCOM and TASCOM.

2. Mission and Functions

a. The responsibilities of a commander exercising area control will include the mission of protecting the resources of his area from interruptions caused by enemy activities or natural disaster (this does not, however, include provision for air defense or defense against major enemy actions).

b. Rear area protection (RAP) is executed by an area commander based on authority, procedures, and policies delineated by the TASCOM commander in the communications zone and by the FASCOM commander in the field army service area. RAP functions include—

(1) Influencing the deployment of the command and its elements to include RAP considerations. Defining subdivisions of the area to fit RAP responsibilities is a subtask.
(2) Promulgating command policies to control the people and resources within the area.
(3) Collecting and disseminating an integrated and accurate estimate of the friendly and enemy situation.
(4) Planning RAP measures and designating the forces to execute the plans.
(5) Exercising command and control over RAP forces when activated.
(6) Integrating or supporting tactical resources when committed to RAS missions.

3. Organization

a. The overall organization for rear area protection includes two types of elements—

(1) Those which are permanently assigned RAP responsibilities.
(2) Those which are assigned RAP responsibilities on an as required basis.

b. Elements permanently assigned RAP responsibilities are the FASCOM Army Support Brigade and its groups (for the field army service area) and TASCOM, ASCOM, and Area Support Groups (for the communications zone). TASCOM, ASCOM, FASCOM, and Army Support Brigade perform general guidance and long range planning functions and are currently adequately staffed and organized to execute these responsibilities.

c. Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC). The RAOC basic structure is shown in figure 1.

(1) In the TASCOM, a RAOC is assigned to each Area Support Group to keep the area commander informed of the situation in his area and of the resources available to cope with emergencies. The RAOC provides a planning capability for the area commander, as well as command and control over forces designated to handle RAP missions.

(2) In the FASCOM, a RAOC is assigned to each support group in the Army Support Brigade to provide similar services as for the Area Support Group in TASCOM.

(3) RAOC's are organized into four sections as follows:

(a) The Detachment Headquarters which provides supervision over and support to the other RAOC sections.
ORGANIC TO TOE OF RAOC

OPERATIONAL COMMAND OVER
DESIGNATED RAS OR ADC
POTENTIAL FROM REAR
AREA UNITS TOE

Figure 1. Organization of the rear area operations center.

(b) The Plans and Operations Section which services the area headquarters, all tenant units, and adjoining RAOC's with the type data discussed above.

(c) The Rear Area Security (RAP) Task Force Command Section which provides inspection, supervision, planning, and command control of RAP rear area security resources.

(d) The Area Damage Control (ADC) Task Force Command Section which provides inspection, supervision, planning, and command control of RAP area damage control resources.

(4) The RAOC normally is directly under an area commander and is further under the general staff supervision of the ACoFS or Director, Security, Plans, and Operations, as appropriate.

(5) Functions and responsibilities are as follows:

(a) Designates RAP forces, plans for their employment, and commands them when activated.

(b) The RAOC also collects, collates, and disseminates information pertaining to current operations of the area.

(6) The theater army signal communications system satisfies the majority of requirements for flexibility, reliability, survivability, redundancy, security, capacity, and quality to pass routine RAP and initial warning information. The RAOC TOE provides separate mobile tactical communications equipment for emergencies (fig. 2).
d. The Area Support Group commander and the support groups of the Army Support Brigade are provided one RAOC on the assumption that they will not subdivide their areas of responsibility. The group RAOC operates under general staff supervision of the Director of Security, Plans, and Operations.

e. Elements assigned RAP responsibilities on an as required basis include those combat service support and combat support elements normally occupying or operating in the field army service area or in the communications zone. These elements are discussed in more detail in chapter 3.

4. Command Relationships

a. Command relationships for rear area protection must provide unity of command while preserving simplicity. The urgency of RAP operations demands clear-cut authority understood by all. An area commander's mission is to support his functional tenants and, at the same time, to provide for their mutual protection. He must not, however, permit defense measures to interfere unnecessarily with mission operations.

b. Command for rear area security RAP measures is a territorial responsibility. The responsible area commander adjusts his command relationship with tenant units based on the situation (i.e., seriousness) (fig. 3).

c. Command for area damage control RAP operations is also a territorial responsibility based on the principle that the area commander
is provided the authority necessary for operational command over units in his area during emergency area damage control operations.

5. Preoperational Considerations

Prior to the conduct of military operations in any given geographical area, that area should be analyzed in terms of potential rear area protection problems and requirements. Normally, area-oriented information may be obtained for this purpose. This data is analyzed from an operational standpoint, but a separate and distinct analysis must be accomplished for isolating the threat to RAP functions and for defining the best possible countermeasures.

6. Planning

Rear area protection problems generally come about as tactical forces move forward and leave void areas far in excess of the geographical requirements of service support units. In addition, it is generally after completion of active combat operations in any given area that enemy organizations are formed to threaten service support resources in the rear. Although it is difficult to foresee exactly what the RAP requirements will be, planning must be generally aimed at countering the worst possible threat. The underlying reason is that it will be easier to cut back on requirements than to increase requirements on short notice.

7. Rear Area Security Conditions

Conditions in the rear have an impact on force structure and command arrangements for
rear area security RAP operations, as well as on command policies. The following conditions are examples for rear area security conditions and serve only as a basis for discussion (fig. 3).

a. Tranquil to Disorderly. In this condition, a high degree of area control exists and is interrupted only by a manageable number of individual, uncoordinated violations of laws, orders, and regulations.

b. Disorderly to Threatening. In this condition, the degree of disorderliness indicates a widespread contempt for civil forces controlling the area. Gangs or groups have formed and operate against civil institutions with impunity. No significant activities are directed against the military establishments.

c. Harassing Actions. Isolated, limited harassing actions are taken against military forces operating in the area. The actions are significant only because they represent the first overt resistance experienced by or against military forces. More frequent repetition of harassing actions may indicate a definite pattern of resistance. If the frequency requires deliberate defensive actions, these measures begin to detract from the full capabilities of service and support resources.

d. Prolonged Actions. In this situation, either frequent or infrequent sustained actions are taken against “soft” bases. These actions last for an hour or more and include minor holding actions against service support elements but not against tactical resources.

e. Severe Actions. Severe actions are clear attempts to attack and destroy a given base area. They include the short-term holding of an objective and force the commitment of emergency tactical resources.

f. Prolonged Severe Actions. A new combat area is established.

8. Numerical Relationship for Rear Area Security Conditions

Numerical relationships between military strengths and the conditions described above are estimated as follows:

a. Tranquil to Disorderly. Not more than 2 percent of the total military strength in any given area is involved in matters relevant to the maintenance of law and order. For area military police, however, this condition requires about 50 percent of their effort. In this situation, each base secures itself with less than 15 percent of its people involved in security for any given 24-hour period.

b. Disorderly to Threatening. In this condition, the major area military police effort is on law and order. About 3 percent of the troop population (75 to 85 percent of the military police effort) is devoted to this effort. There is no impact on other service support resources.

c. Harassing Actions. Here, 100 percent of the area military police effort is directed to security and population control. Service support resources begin to experience an adverse effect on their missions due to the need to provide additional local security. This adverse effect approximates a 10 percent reduction in services and support. If harassing actions become frequent, all area military police resources plus some tactical resources will be needed to keep the service support effort at 90 percent effectiveness.

d. Prolonged Actions. Here, bases are destroyed. In a given functional area, there is 100 per cent cessation of service support activities for up to 24 hours. There is 25 percent reduction in all other support functions in the vicinity for the same period of time because of the requirement to support the RAS mission.

e. Severe Actions. Here, tactical resources are required on a continuing basis to maintain the percentages in d above.

f. Prolonged Severe Actions. In this situation, there is generally a 25 percent reduction in all service support activities and significant tactical resources are required to prevent further reduction.

9. Area Damage Control Conditions

Area damage control conditions encompass a wide range of situations which may vary considerably in degree of destruction and its impact on the overall military effort. At the lower end of the scale, a local unit or installation may exercise full control over damage control operations utilizing its own available resources. At the other end of the scale, damage may be so severe as to require a complete outside damage control task force to satisfy necessary requirements.
10. Numerical Relationship for Area Damage Control Operations
The amount of effort required for effective area damage control operations will depend strictly on the extent and type of damage experienced.

Section II. OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

11. General
Rear area protection includes those short-term emergency actions which must be taken by rear area elements to preserve themselves. Such actions inevitably interfere to some degree with the primary mission of the elements involved. To avoid unnecessary interference, the following principles must be observed:

a. No Army element should be used in a role or configuration for which it is not principally designed unless such action is unavoidable.

b. When rear area elements are used for RAP purposes, they are normally employed for short periods of less than 24 hours for area damage control operations and less than 12 hours for rear area security operations.

c. Combat, combat support, and combat service support units are specifically allocated for rear area protection missions when hostile actions are frequent, prolonged, or severe.

12. Scope
Rear area protection includes all measures, taken by a commander prior to and during the occupation of a land area, that bear on the protection of the resources therein. For that commander to execute his RAP responsibilities, organizations and doctrine are set forth in the remainder of this manual.

Section III. PRINCIPLES OF REAR AREA PROTECTION

13. General
As with all basic military functions, there are fundamental principles which guide individuals and units involved in rear area protection. This section briefly outlines and discusses each of these principles.

14. Economy of Force
   a. Units and activities are better protected as additional resources for this purpose are allocated. However, extremes of RAP effort can divert units from their primary missions.

   b. Individual units in the rear, by design, normally do not have an organic capability to protect themselves against relatively large scale enemy actions. However, the combined resources of these units (RAP mutual support), properly directed, can provide area protection on a short-term basis.

15. Priority
   a. Resources available to protect personnel, supplies, and facilities must be allocated in consonance with the degree or risk involved. Usually enough personnel and material will not be available in the rear to provide the requisite degree of protection simultaneously to all echelons and activities in the area.

   b. An adversary usually will concentrate his resources on the most sensitive or vulnerable targets.

   c. The commander having a RAP responsibility must have a means of measuring the various risks he is undergoing and of equating one risk to another. By employing his resources in logical priorities, the commander can enhance his capability through effective use of manpower and materiel. Generally, RAP risk priorities are established by the area commander based on TASCOM/FASCOM guidance.

16. Integrated Protection
   a. All RAP measures must be part of an overall effort. The protection of a fuel dump without securing the means by which that fuel is delivered (i.e., pipelines, truck parks) would constitute a violation of the principle of integrated protection.
b. Whenever possible, indigenous police and paramilitary organizations, as well as the civilian population, are integrated into the total RAP effort.

17. Vulnerability

a. A major contributing factor to vulnerability in the rear area is the relatively fixed nature of operations. Anything stable for a period of time can be studied by an adversary, and that which can be studied can be compromised. This principle applies to overt defensive measures, such as fences and walls, as well as to covert measures, such as intrusion detection equipment.

b. Base commanders must continuously review their protection procedures. Alterations in these procedures will prevent an adversary from gaining the detailed knowledge necessary to compromise the base.

18. Offensive

All security measures must have as an inherent part some offensive capability. Generally, clandestine enemy elements operating in the rear are required to keep their numbers relatively small. Their strength is magnified by the surprise they attain and by their ability to blend back into their natural environment. An adversary gains an advantage when he realizes that his attack will not precipitate offensive counteraction. If he must plan on protecting himself from offensive counteraction, he must increase the size of his unit and the effectiveness of his materiel. He thus increases the possibility of being discovered prior to taking action against rear area activities.

19. Command

The success of RAP countermeasures hinges on the last minute binding together of diverse resources. This presents a potential problem involving confusion, indecision, and divisiveness. In order to attain a cohesive RAP effort, the following requirements must be met:

a. There must be a single responsible commander.

b. Geographic areas of responsibility must be clearly defined.

c. An area commander must know his area, including troop strengths, terrain data, intelligence information, and current operations. This information must be presented to the commander in a simple and usable form. His needs are for highly distilled, concrete data that will tell him at a glance his situation and his resources.

d. An area commander must be capable of communicating his desires throughout his area. This communications capability must be provided for in the total RAP planning effort. The chain of command will frequently change immediately upon the implementation of a RAP plan. Therefore, normal communications means that filter through various levels of command must be critically analyzed and tested to assure that they are responsive under given emergency conditions.

20. Responsiveness

a. All echelons assigned commitments in RAP situations have an automatic responsibility to fulfill that commitment rapidly and effectively.

b. Responsiveness may be attained by many different procedures, some of which are listed below.

(1) An area oriented communications system not dependent on normal command channels will provide a flexible warning alert system for a larger variation of situations.

(2) Continuous identification of employable resources will assist a responding echelon in determining which of its elements it is going to commit to an emergency RAP situation.

(3) Normally, first priority RAP elements should possess their own mobility. Responsiveness is lessened when mobility must be provided a responding element from nonorganic resources.

(4) Flexibility in employment tends to increase responsiveness. Thus, although the planned commitment of resources from a base might identify a team with a single function, that team might well have capabilities in several other areas and these capabilities should be known to both the unit and the RAOC. For example, a rifle platoon consisting basically of riflemen
from an engineer unit might also have the skills required to perform as a rescue or labor platoon in a damage control mission.

21. Planning

It is not feasible to plan for all conceivable contingencies in the rear area. The following precepts should guide all plans:

a. Plans must be kept as simple and as general as possible.

b. Only the minimum number of plans should exist. Large numbers of plans will confuse smaller elements and create delay and confusion.

c. Plans should be oriented toward the most effective organization of the service support forces present. The conduct of the forces subsequent to their creation generally is left to the designated commander.

22. Supervision

a. Because RAP generally is a secondary type mission for combat support and combat service support units, the headquarters charged with a RAP responsibility must insure that the RAP missions of these units are not neglected.

b. Supervision sometimes results in new administrative and operational procedures, complicated SOP's, and cumbersome plans. Supervision in RAP must maintain simplicity by making the minimum number of existing plans workable.
CHAPTER 2
COMMAND AND CONTROL

Section I. CONTROL OF THE LAND AREA AND ITS PEOPLE

23. General

a. The degree of control which U. S. Forces will have over indigenous authorities and populace will depend primarily upon the political conditions under which U. S. Forces entered the area. Generally, U. S. presence will occur in one of two political environments, either entry by force or arms or by invitation of the nation concerned. In either of these two environments, the extent of and limitations on U. S. control may be delineated and refined by international agreements to which the United States is a signatory. These agreements may be with other members of a multinational alliance or group of which the United States is a member; between the United States and the host nation; with a government in exile when a force-of-arms entry is for the purpose of liberation; or even with a defeated enemy nation where U. S. national interests so dictate.

b. The military commander, because of the variables previously indicated, may encounter a range of situations extending from total U. S. authority under conditions of military government to a host-guest relationship where U. S. Forces will have only such controls as may be given them by international agreement. In the latter circumstances, such agreements should include powers adequate for U. S. commanders to protect their installations and lines of communication. However, in some cases the commanders will have no power over the indigenous authorities and populace except that which they can exert through influence, persuasion, and coordination.

c. Regardless of the situation, the commander will have requirements for dealing with the indigenous authorities and populace. For this service he will rely upon the operations of supporting civil affairs units and personnel. The basic mission of civil affairs operations is to support the accomplishment of the military commander's mission by taking measures necessary to implement US national policy in the area; to discharge the commander's obligations and responsibilities pertaining to the civil populace; to assist in the accomplishment of military tasks through support or control of local agencies; and to conduct operations to assist in civil emergency situations. The civil affairs commander must create a program designed to achieve these objectives. In creating such a program, he must consider each of the seven major aspects of civil affairs, as follows:

   (1) Civilian support for and prevention of civil interference with operations.
   (2) Support for or exercise of governmental functions.
   (3) Populace and resources control.
   (4) Community relations.
   (5) Military civic action.
   (6) Military support of civil defense.
   (7) Psychological operations.

d. These 7 aspects of civil affairs, together with their supporting 20 basic functions, as discussed in FM 41–10, embrace the totality of relationships of a military commander with his civilian environment and are designed to provide flexible support to a military commander in performance of the civil affairs aspects of his mission. The political environment will influence the emphasis to be given one or another aspect and the techniques of performance. In a given political situation, a single aspect may overshadow all others as a matter of primary concern, and the others will be manipulated in such a manner as to provide support for that one. The political environment will not, how-
ever, alter the basic objective of any single aspect; that is, to take those measures necessary to facilitate performance of the commander’s mission.

e. As previously stated, the two general political situations under which U. S. Forces will enter an area are, first, by force of arms and, second, by invitation. Although there may be gradations of control in either situation, it is most likely that entry by force of arms will carry with it virtually complete power over the indigenous authorities and populace, while entry by invitation will permit the U. S. commander only that degree of power granted by international agreement. Subsequent paragraphs will consider civil affairs organization and operations within the framework of these two situations.

24. Organizational and Operational Concepts

a. Preliminary Civil Affairs Support.

(1) Regardless of the political circumstances under which US Forces enter a country, it is probable that certain CA elements will be operating in place prior to the arrival of the U. S. support group commander. These elements may consist of CA units which arrived with previously landed combat forces and have been pre-designated and trained for employment in specific locales. On the other hand, these elements may consist of no more than CA personnel who have been operating with the U. S. MAAG or mission in the host country. In the former case, the U. S. support group commander will find a functioning civil affairs organization prepared to afford him complete CA support in his area. In the latter situation, he will at least be able to obtain detailed information concerning political, sociological, and economic conditions in his area of responsibility, as well as orientation for CA supporting units upon their arrival.

(2) With the formalization of an area support structure, the supporting civil affairs organizations will be comprised of CA area support units as defined in FM 41–10. These organizations and their relationship to RAP are discussed below.

b. General Civil Affairs Support for RAP.

(1) The civil affairs structure in the communications zone consists of an Assistant Chief of Staff/Civil Affairs (ACofS/CA) at TASCOM and at TASCOM and at ASCOM and a civil affairs brigade assigned to ASCOM. The ACofS/CA at TASCOM and at ASCOM will perform their normal staff functions, preparing and recommending policy and guidance for civil affairs operations in the zone. They will coordinate with TASCOM and ASCOM staff elements charged with RAP responsibilities, render advice and recommendations on civil affairs aspects of RAP activities, and participate in RAP planning as required. In addition, the ACofS/CA at ASCOM will exercise normal staff supervision over the civil affairs brigade.

(2) The civil affairs structure in the field army service area consists of an ACofS/CA at FASCOM and a civil affairs brigade assigned to FASCOM. The ACofS/CA will perform normal staff functions, preparing and recommending policy and guidance for civil affairs operations in the area. He will coordinate with FASCOM staff elements charged with RAP responsibilities, render advice and recommendations on civil affairs activities, and participate in RAP planning as required. In addition, he will exercise normal staff supervision over the civil affairs brigade.

(3) The Area Support Groups in COMMZ and the support groups of the Army Support Brigade in the field army service area will receive support from CA units attached to the CA brigades assigned to ASCOM and FASCOM. These units will remain under the operational command of the brigade.
commander. The commander of the civil affairs subordinate units in a given area will establish liaison with the support group commander and appropriate members of his staff, and with the group RAOC. He will, on a continuing basis, provide general information, advice, and recommendations on civil affairs activities in the area, and will provide specific information, advice, and recommendations in support of RAP activities. He will assist, as required, in RAP planning and will be responsive to civil affairs missions in support of RAP activities. In addition, these units will make a significant contribution to RAP operations through the performance of normal civil affairs functions.

(4) Civil affairs units normally will be widely dispersed in small elements. For this reason, it is neither feasible nor desirable to assign them specific and continuing RAP responsibilities, nor to include them in RAP force structures.

25. Civil Affairs Operations in Support of RAP

a. All civil affairs operations will contribute to the support of RAP, to some degree, whether or not performed in specific support of RAP requirements or activities. The commander charged with RAP responsibilities will have particular interest in those aspects of civil affairs having the most direct and immediate bearing on his RAP activities in the environment. In some situations, normal performance of civil affairs functions with specific RAP orientation may suffice to satisfy RAP requirements; in others, civil affairs activities may require adaptation in order to provide specific support for RAP. Evaluation of the requirement is the responsibility of the civil affairs commander in the area. He must be particularly alert to identify and relate the aspects of civil affairs in a given environment to RAP activities, and adapt techniques as required.

b. The remainder of this section will consider civil affairs support operations for the support group commander and the performance of these operations as related to RAP in the two basic political environments previously discussed.

26. Initial Civil Affairs Support Activities

a. Upon establishment of the support group command, the commander of the CA elements in the area will develop a civil affairs estimate of the situation based on previously obtained information and will advise the commander of all significant civil affairs factors. In developing his estimate, the civil affairs commander will consider the mission, the friendly situation, enemy capabilities, area characteristics, and civil affairs courses of action. He will continuously revise and refine his estimate and advise the group commander as changes in the civil affairs situation occur (app VI, CA Commander's Estimate of the Situation, FM 41–10).

b. Matters of particular initial interest to the support group commander will include local attitudes toward U. S. Forces; capabilities and probabilities for sabotage, subversion, and passive resistance; capability of the area for self-support and extent of military supplement required, if any; and civilian resources available and suitable for U. S. use. The civil affairs commander will provide this information to the group commander and will point out those aspects having a particular or significant bearing on RAP and the mission of the area commander.

27. Entry by Force of Arms

a. General. Prior to the establishment of a support group command, US combat forces operating in the area will have been supported by command support and area support CA units. The latter will normally have remained in place after the departure of combat forces and will provide CA support to the incoming support group commander. Upon arrival, the commander should find that initial actions establishing the nature and extent of U. S. authority and promulgating basic directives of US Forces have already been accomplished. These actions include issuing of necessary proclamations concerning U. S. authority over
civil matters, curfew, movement control, public order, and similar matters. The civil affairs units in the area will supervise local compliance of these directives (FM 41–10).


(1) An essential measure for the security of a rear area is the prevention of infiltration by guerrillas, enemy agents, and other hostile elements. This is achieved by screening refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons; establishing collecting points; conducting searches, providing a documentation system, and establishing curfews and movement restrictions. Although they may be performed initially by military police, intelligence, or other type units, they are most effectively conducted by using friendly civil police and/or other reliable paramilitary organizations under the supervision of CA units. These controls must be applied with care to prevent alienation of people who are sympathetic to U. S. or allied objectives (FM 41–10).

(2) Control of the movement of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons, and establishing assembly areas and collecting points for these groups are essential to effective rear area security. CA units will supervise and administer these activities; however, they will use civilian police to the maximum extent feasible. Movement should employ every available means of transport and will require close coordination with the support group commander and military police. Assembly area and refugee and displaced person camps should be established in a manner designed to take maximum advantage of local facilities, such as public buildings, food, and fuel stocks. Another factor in camp location is the support group commander’s requirement for indigenous labor.

(3) The administration and operation of refugee and displaced persons camps is directed by appropriate CA units. However, maximum attention must be given to self-administration by the camp inmates within the limitations imposed by international law and rear area security requirements. Whenever practicable, a cadre of civilian personnel from public and private welfare organizations should be utilized.

c. Support for or Exercise of Governmental Functions.

(1) To prevent interference with military operations, particularly in the rear area where a disrupted and disturbed civil populace is most likely to be concentrated, it is essential that a civilian administration be reconstituted at the earliest practicable time and that constructive direction be given through civil authorities to the local populace. Dismissal, selection, and retention of public officials is accomplished in accordance with the directives of higher headquarters, and is normally within the discretion of the support group commander on advice of the CA unit commander. Control of governmental activities is exercised by the military commander through these officials (FM 41–10).

(2) The early reorganization and restoration of functioning civil police and fire facilities is of particular importance to RAP. This should be accomplished as rapidly as possible and the civilian force capabilities integrated in or coordinated with military activities in the fields of rear area security and area damage control (app IV, FM 41–10).

d. Populace and Resources Control.

(1) Members of underground and guerrilla organizations, and other disaffected elements cannot exist effectively without support from some population. This support may be voluntary or forced. Commanders charged with rear area protection roles must take every practicable action to prevent or minimize support from the
populace and to prevent supplies from reaching subversives or insurgents and their sympathizers.

(2) Among the measures for populace control, one of the most widespread and effective is documentation. Documents for identification purposes are in common use in all areas of the world in one form or another. Under CA direction, a thorough documentation system, utilizing a system in being, with appropriate modifications, can be an effective populace control measure (FM 41-10).

(3) Coupled with documentation controls, a second effective control measure is the use of cordon and search operations. These operations can take the form of raids, roadblocks, border and port checkpoints, and other similar activities. The techniques are discussed in Form 19-5 and FM 19-5.

(4) Resources control is, of course, enhanced by the measure previously described. Other measures directed toward the control of property include taxation, requisition, sequestration, allocation of labor and materials, licensing, regulations, and price controls. The CA commander in the area is responsible for economic planning and supervision of such measures (FM 41-10).

(5) Populace and resources control programs are, by their nature, unpopular and conducive to resentment and disaffection. They should be applied with discretion, and reduced and eliminated as soon as conditions warrant.

e. Community Relations.

(1) Notwithstanding the fact that the U. S. commander may have absolute authority over indigenous officials and populace in his area, under certain circumstances, he will find a community relations program will be of substantial assistance to the civil-military relationship. The program can assist in the accomplishment of other aspects of his civil-military relationship and may result in considerable personnel economies in the use of military personnel for labor and security duties.

(2) The public information aspects of the community relations program are essential. Releases to indigenous mass media must be carefully drawn and coordinated with consolidation psychological operations. The public information aspects are not in themselves sufficient for a community relations program, however. The program must be broadened by joint council meetings with key civilian officials, examination of the local situation for opportunities to assist the local community, and integration of projects within the capabilities of the command into a comprehensive effort (FM 41–10).

(3) Operating responsibilities for community relations should remain with those agencies of the support group command that have the operational capability and equipment to perform the specific mission. Exploitation should be undertaken by public information and psychological operations. Integration of any given action into the command civil-military relations program is a civil affairs responsibility.

f. Military Civic Action.

(1) Civic action provides the support group commander with a method to better his control, improve his civil-military relationships, and strengthen the socioeconomic posture of the area. Through civic actions, the military forces are able to reduce sources of civilian discontent and add materially to political stability and security. U. S. military units have the capability of participating in civic action projects; first, through planning and technical assistance to local government agencies and, second, through provision of additional resources in the development of their civic action projects (FM 41–10).
(2) Generally when conditions range from tranquil to disorderly, the support group commander should give priority to long-range projects assigned for the improvement of the economic infrastructure which will assist the war effort. In periods of more severe disorder, projects of immediate impact should receive higher priority. This rule cannot be used arbitrarily, however, as the needs and attitudes of the people must be considered in the time frame involved. The support group commander must also consider the demand upon his total military resources in a given situation. For example, in periods of severe disorder, he may be required to utilize all of his resources in performance of his RAP mission.

(3) Types of civic action projects which may be considered are discussed in FM 41–10.

g. Military Support of Civil Defense.

(1) Civil defense includes the mobilization, organization, and direction of the civilian populace designed to minimize the effects of enemy action against all aspects of civil life. The CA units in their role of planning and supervision must consider one primary factor, priority of effort must be in support of the support group commander's mission. The civil defense plan must be correlated with the support group commander's corresponding plan to prevent interference with military operations. Some of the same personnel and equipment may be employed to support both civil defense and area damage control plans. Specifically, it may be highly advantageous to pool civilian and military firefighting equipment, medical services, and labor potential. In repair and reconstruction activities, equipment, technicians, labor, and materiel of the troop units and the civilian populace should at least be coordinated to provide maximum recovery capability.

(2) The support group commander should coordinate his civil defense planning and measures for the control of the civilian populace with the area CA commander. The CA commander will coordinate his plans with appropriate support group commander. In his assigned area, the CA unit commander is responsible for implementation of civil defense plans and for coordination of control measures with the local government. To the maximum extent possible, local officials should be held responsible for organization of local civil defense activities and conduct of civil defense measures.

(3) Civil affairs planning for civil defense is not confined to protective measures against nuclear weapons in the mass destruction category, but should include measures against all types of warfare, and all forms of natural disaster. Civil affairs planning for civil defense should consider the matters listed in appendix IX, FM 41–10.

(4) The area CA commander, in the event of implementation of civil defense plans, will coordinate the activities of those agencies of the local government normally involved in such operations. These agencies will include police, fire, public health and welfare, CBR, information, rescue, utility and engineering, communications, and transportation. He will also plan for and coordinate the issue of equipment and supplies from military sources to the local government, if available.

h. Psychological Operation.

(1) As an integral part of CA operations, civil information and public education activities are conducted to render direct assistance to military operations, gain the support of the civilian populace, and facilitate the control and reorganization of occupied and liberated territories. United States policies and objectives are disseminated to the inhabitants through proclamations, ordinances, and other media.
The CA unit commander in the area has responsibility for civil information, public education, and consolidation psychological operations. Detailed planning and coordination with the support group commander is essential to avoid confusion and contradiction and to insure the effective integration of psychological warfare activities with CA and RAP operations.

The general capabilities of PSYOP units are discussed in FM 41–10.

28. Entry by Invitation  

a. General.

(1) In those situations where U. S. Forces are present by invitation, the same civil affairs problems will exist as in the situation previously described in paragraph 27. However, liaison, persuasion, and coordination become the dominant means of accomplishing the civil affairs mission. The commander's primary interest is still the provision of maximum civilian support for and the prevention of civil interference with this tactical and logistical operations. If it is feasible politically, it is desirable that the military commander have as much authority as is required over indigenous officials and peoples to provide protection for his installations and his lines of communication. It must be recognized that, however desirable, this will not always be available. When he has been granted this authority, he may proceed in almost the same fashion as if the United States had entered the area by force of arms. However, he must remember that such authority must be used in a manner which does not alienate indigenous authorities and peoples.

(2) In those situations where U. S. Forces are present by invitation, even if host nation civil authorities are willing to delegate powers over local officials and populations, they are likely to make such delegation to the military authorities of their own nation. In this situation, the U. S. area commander must coordinate with the indigenous military area commanders, but his military relations must be in conformance with US policy directives and requirements. In many situations, it may be that the indigenous military commander will take upon himself all the responsibility for patrol and security outside the confines of U. S. military installations, in which case the US military commander will be limited to interior guard and control within the confines of his installation. Even here, his authority over indigenous labor within his installation may not be complete. He probably will retain the authority to hire and to fire, and certain minimum civil service type disciplinary authority over such people, but he is unlikely to have criminal jurisdiction over them. In criminal matters such as sabotage or espionage, he may simply be authorized to detain such individuals for turn-over to indigenous authorities.

(3) The degree of control required by the area commander will vary with each of these matters. There are two basic problems to be considered. First, the degree of threat; i.e., the situation which is generally tranquil to mild disorderliness, the situation of disorderliness to an active enemy threat, and the situation where there are enemy harassing actions to frequent enemy actions against the area. Secondly, the degrees of interest which the commander has in the area. There are areas which are "critical" to his operation, areas which have "priority" for his operations, and those areas where he must exercise some general "control" but which are neither critical nor priority areas (for definitions, see para 34). The civil affairs element will attempt to negotiate for the commander maximum authority in "critical" and "pri-
oity" areas and at least minimum essential control in the "controlled" areas. Similarly, civil affairs agencies will attempt to negotiate at least standby authority for the commander which can be exerted as the enemy threat increases in magnitude or frequency. Thus, for example, in a situation where the host nation retains total control over its own paramilitary and police forces, there may be a willingness to grant temporary control authority to the area commander under specific threat situations. This situation would be facilitated by the addition of appropriate host nation liaison personnel within the RAOC. Civil affairs elements will attempt to negotiate, on behalf of the area commander, that degree of authority required to accomplish the mission.

b. Internal Defense. Even in the situation in which U. S. Forces are present by invitation, the United States may be given the authority to select, organize, equip, train, and command internal defense units for rear area protective measures, as well as for labor duties. Such organizations may be composed either of persons native to the area or of third country nations. Frequently, local authorities will be willing to allow these units to be organized by the United States from refugees or other persons not native to the country. Where the manpower supply for the organization of such units is present, their organization is probably indicated as a means of reducing U. S. military manpower requirements, both for labor purposes and rear area protection. The function of the civil affairs unit in such a situation is —

1. To determine the availability of such manpower, either indigenous or third country national.
2. To negotiate, where required, with indigenous authorities for the recruitment of such manpower.
3. To negotiate with indigenous authorities, where required, for housing and other locally available supplies.
4. To coordinate with indigenous authorities as to the powers and prerogatives of the members of such units.

C. Populace and Resources Control Operations. While the requirements for populace and resources control may be just as great in a situation where U. S. Forces are present by invitation as in any other situation, the authority of the area commander to impose such controls will be severely limited. He will depend upon his civil affairs unit commander to recommend to him those populace and resources control measures which appear dictated by the situation and necessary to achieve security of U. S. Forces, installations, and lines of communications. The civil affairs unit commander will, upon approval of the military commander, negotiate with the appropriate indigenous authorities for the imposition of such controls and the powers of U. S. Forces to participate in their execution.

d. Military Civic Action. Military civic action is probably the commander's most useful means of persuading local authorities and people to cooperate and assist U. S. Forces in the area. In addition to the purposes it serves as described in paragraph 27, military civic action is particularly vital in cold war situations or in operations in underdeveloped areas. Here, U. S. Forces can demonstrate their concern for the welfare of the people and at the same time work to remove actual root causes of insurgency. If the programs are successfully accomplished, they will gain the goodwill of the people and probably increase the flow of positive intelligence to the area commander. Further, the success of these programs will reduce the likelihood of the local populace willingly serving as a cover for the operations of insurgents or guerrillas.

e. Military Support of Civil Defense. In either developed or underdeveloped areas, military forces can demonstrate their concern for the welfare of the people who surround them by providing them the needed support for civil defense efforts. Even in the developed countries, there will be a lack of adequate civil defense organization and capability. U. S. military support for civil defense may vary from mere liaison and training to the provision of the actual equipment required, depending upon theater policy directives and agreements with the host.
country. The U. S. military commander in the area may provide technical assistance and support, usually in coordination and cooperation with the military and paramilitary forces of the host nation. In any event, he will inevitably be held responsible for civil defense of the indigenous labor force operating within his base areas. In order to insure cooperation of this indigenous labor force, he may also have to provide protective masks, clothing, and shelter for the families of the people working for him or generally for the entire surrounding population. It must be recognized that a U. S. military installation in an area makes a given area a more likely target for enemy activity which will lead to certain natural resentment against the U. S. Forces. This resentment can be alleviated, if not eliminated, by coordination and correlation of plans with the host country military forces as well as adequate US military support for civil defense activities.

f. Psychological Operations. Again, the power of U. S. military commanders to provide civil information type consolidation psychological operations to the populace in the area surrounding their units will depend upon agreement with the host nation. Where that agreement is not forthcoming, the commander will have to depend upon his civil affairs unit commander to negotiate with appropriate local authorities in an attempt to get the U. S. viewpoint successfully presented to the people through indigenous mass circulation media. The effective application of consolidation psychological operation may well be the key to the successful accomplishment of the area commander's mission.

Section II. COMMAND POLICIES FOR REAR AREA PROTECTION

29. General

Higher command echelons must constantly keep in mind that lower level units initially cannot be expected to possess detailed knowledge concerning the geographical area, political considerations, or mores in the area in which they are operating. Higher echelons must, therefore, issue clear, concise, and correct instructions to subordinate units so that a high degree of uniformity of conduct and treatment, particularly in relation to indigenous personnel, will exist throughout the entire national area under consideration unless exceptions to this policy are directed by competent authority.

30. Purpose

This section outlines the critical measures that should be taken by higher commands if stability in a geographical or national area is to be preserved.

31. Command

The maintenance of clear-cut lines of command and authority must be emphasized by higher headquarters. Normal byproducts of mixing military and political controls in an active operational situation are confusion and indecision brought about by the simple fact that it is difficult to determine who is in charge. There must, therefore, be clear-cut lines of authority and these lines must not only be understood by military personnel but must also be understood by the population as a whole.

32. Command Relationships

Within the TASCOM and FASCOM areas, there are tenant units that are subordinate to a commander other than the designated area commander. The area commander, however, is responsible for rear area protection measures for all units in his area. Relationships between the area commander and commanders of tenant units must be clearly promulgated by higher authority. This action is accomplished by the field army or Theater Army Support Command commander in a basic rear area protection policy document. The major consideration is that, unless otherwise excepted by priority designation (para 33), all units become responsive to an area commander when that commander declares an emergency.

33. Unit Priorities

The field army or Theater Army Support Command commander assigns RAP priorities to types of units. These priorities serve to in-
form area commanders of what degree of participation they may plan on for the various echelons tenanted in their areas. Priority designations normally used are as follows:

a. Priority RAP-I. Units, bases, or facilities in this category may be called on by area commanders to participate within reported capabilities and to provide assistance in other areas or subareas in rear area protection measures for periods of up to 24 hours. Normally, this priority designation and consequent authority presupposes that not more than 25 percent reduction in the unit’s service or support will result from its participation. However, in the case of certain engineer type units, a 100 percent degradation may result when the entire unit is activated as an ADC task force.

b. Priority RAP-II. Units, bases, or facilities in this category may be called on to participate in rear area protection measures but their participation cannot involve movement away from their bases. Thus, these units may be required to double or triple their local security measures for periods up to 24 hours in order to release forces provided by the area commander for higher priority missions.

c. Priority RAP-III. These units either do not have the capability or are of such a highly critical nature that their participation in rear area protection measures is not possible. The area commander must provide additional security and protection for these units.

34. Area Designation

a. Command policy must spell out the precise meaning of terms used to define areas. Suggested terminology or designations of areas are as follows:

(1) Critical area. Because of geography, terrain, deployment of units, or conduct of operations, this area is among the most sensitive. Its loss, neutralization, or interdiction allows no alternate operations and would significantly impact on major service support functions. If there are concrete indications of the enemy becoming active in this area, it is classified as an “unsafe critical area.”

(2) Priority area. Same as a critical area ((1) above) except that within an acceptable amount of time, functions can be taken over by an alternate area without an immediate significant impact on the total service support capability. If there are concrete indications of enemy activities, this area is classified as “unsafe priority area.”

(3) Controlled area. Primarily an access area through which supplies move. It is the best area for its purpose but rerouting through other areas offers no major problems. If there are concrete indications of enemy activities, the area is classified as “unsafe controlled area.” The term is flexible and, no matter how used, requires definition.

b. The definitions above may be applicable in insurgency operations as well as in conventional rear area protection operations. As an alternative, the definitions used in FM 31–16 may be applied during insurgency operations. Adjustments to any definitions used will be made in the basic RAP policy statement. In addition to defining the various types of areas, the field army and Theater Army Support Command commanders also spell out the impact each designation has in relation to the following considerations:

(1) Relationship between an area commander and tenant units, indigenous military authorities, and civilian authorities.

(2) Relationship between an area designation and the meaning assigned to previously defined priorities.

(3) Impact of each definition on population and resources control measures and the limits of U. S. authorities to impose such measures.

(4) Impact each definition has on minimum security requirements for both area commanders and tenant units.

(5) Impact each definition has on the existing command control arrangements for rear area protection as well as the transition from service support to tactical control.

35. Use of Tactical Resources

The basic command policy recognizes
that the use of combat service support resources for tactical security missions is uneconomical and that their use is made only because tactical resources are not normally available in the field army service area or in the communications zone. However, whenever tactical resources are situated where they provide a RAP potential, authority will be provided the area commander to call on these resources. Such authority, however, must be frequently modified by major commanders because tactical resources will not normally operate in any given area for a prolonged period. The command policy on utilization of tactical resources for RAP is normally promulgated by the assignment of an appropriate priority to these units (resources) each time they occupy a new base.

36. Transition of Command and Control for Rear Area Security Conditions

(Keep figure 3 in view.) The basic RAS command system in TASTA is functionally oriented. The area support system is designed to service and support tenant units as long as the area in which the tenants are operating is secure. There are degrees of security and, as the area becomes less secure, area command and RAS will become primary considerations as outlined below.

a. Tranquil to Disorderly. In this condition, the area commander controls both the RAOC and his military police. The RAOC plans and coordinates with the RAS potential elements possessed by units in the area and the military police plan and coordinate with the indigenous police, if applicable.

b. Disorderly to Threatening. Military police, if authorized, take full control of indigenous police operating in the area. This condition is the first sign that the local police are incapable of handling the threat and need additional support and control.

c. Harassing Actions. U. S. Forces in the rear are subjected to limited attacks. A small, integrated RAS response force is required. The RAOC takes over necessary area military police on a full-time basis and the RAS potential for specific incidents. Additional military police allocated from the MP brigade are required to serve either in a GS, DS, or attached role.

d. Frequent Harassing Actions. In this situation, it is uneconomical to use service support resources for other than their own local defense. The situation, however, may justify use of small tactical elements commanded by the RAOC.

e. Prolonged Actions. In this situation, RAS and tactical elements are too large for the RAOC to control. Control, therefore, is exercised directly by the area commander over both the RAOC and tactical elements. The RAOC serves as a tactical operations center (TOC) for the area commander.

f. Severe Actions. During severe actions, the Area Support Command commander or the FASCOM commander exercises operational command of all tactical, combat support, and combat service support elements in the affected area.

g. Prolonged Severe. This is essentially a second front. A tactical task force commander exercises operational command and control over all resources in the area.

37. Basic Assumptions

There may be considerable difference in the degree of emphasis placed on rear area protection by various area commanders. Such differences can arise because area commanders are widely separated and each possesses different unit structures and strength. To establish as high a degree of uniformity as feasible, command policy will include assumptions oriented to the conditions that might be expected to exist in each area involved. These assumptions include such matters as —

a. The most probable yield of nuclear weapons that will be used against resources in the army service area and in the communications zone.

b. The size of enemy ground attacks which area commanders are expected to counter with existing resources.

c. The frequency and duration of rear area incidents which combat service support resources must be able to handle.

d. The minimum amount of time that selected or predesignated deliberate tactical resources will require to relieve excessive pressure on rear area facilities.
38. Indigenous Personnel Policies

a. Senior command policies spell out the authority and limitations of area commanders in relation to indigenous personnel residing within their areas. Generally, these policies vary with the designation of a given area as critical, priority, or controlled. Considerations in establishing these policies are as follows:

(1) In critical or unsafe areas, the local area commander is given authority to establish curfew, circulation control, resources control, and similar policies as dictated by his requirements.

(2) In priority areas, the area commander has somewhat less authority but is still given only broad guidance in indigenous personnel matters.

(3) In controlled areas, the area commander pursues policies established by the highest authority feasible.

b. In addition to explaining the relationship between military forces and the indigenous population, command policy also reflects the priorities and degree of use of indigenous resources and personnel authorized within the previously defined areas. Examples in this respect are as follows:

(1) To the extent authorized, in critical and priority areas or any unsafe area, indigenous police elements are integrated as fully as possible into or coordinated with the military police effort in order to provide the area commander with a single integrated and responsive police effort.

(2) In controlled areas, indigenous police retain a higher degree of autonomy although a close and continuing relationship exists between them and the military police.

(3) In critical and priority areas, the priority for labor is given to the area commander for the purpose of security guard and construction of security barriers and devices.

(4) In controlled areas, the priority for labor goes to functional elements in consonance with policies recommended by the FASCOM and TASCOM commanders.

39. Allied Forces

a. Normally, theater or higher command pronounces in clear, concise terms the general relationships between forces of diverse allied nations occupying the same geographical area. At a minimum, a single RAP command structure is provided within any one area. This command structure attempts to unify the diverse forces to the maximum degree feasible. Its efforts in this regard are often hampered by language, communications, doctrinal, and philosophical differences. These problems and others may be overcome by —

(1) Recognizing national affinities and permitting homogenous elements to operate together.

(2) Combining units only where a clear and evident desire or requirement exists.

(3) Cross assigning of personnel when appropriate.

(4) Organizing area and subarea responsibilities along lines of national affinity.

(5) Capitalizing on the effects of a RAP situation resulting in adverse effects to tenants within an area.

(6) Effective liaison.

(7) Integrating, at a minimum, a mutually supporting warning system.

b. Forces of a host nation generally are effective in RAP missions. Their knowledge of an area, its language, and customs present a distinct advantage to an area commander. All possible efforts are taken to utilize this asset effectively.

40. Support to the Area Commander

The field army and Theater Army Support Command policies relative to rear area protection will outline the support that will be provided from resources not normally allocated to area commanders. For example, an area commander normally will not have sufficient resources to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance activities over the entire geographical area for which he is responsible. In this instance, command policies will provide for assistance are requested by the area commander.
41. Police Authority

The authority and limitations of the power of indigenous police forces will vary from complete control by the occupying power to coordination and liaison in allied or friendly areas. Command policy must recognize its authority and its limitations as to its relations with indigenous police forces. Police brutality, carelessness, or indifference to the people must never be tolerated in controlled areas and must be discouraged in other areas.

42. Protection of Property

Command policy must clearly establish procedures in controlled areas by which the property of cooperative individuals is protected. The records concerning land holdings, financial resources, and similar important documents must enjoy immunity from arbitrary police actions.

43. The Political Wedge

Overemphasis on the puerly mechanical techniques of isolation, such as blockades and patrols, will too often result in an expenditure of manpower to the degree that the enemy's objective is met. An essential part of the total action against enemy activities threatening rear area protection is the creation of a political wedge between those involved in these activities and the majority of the population. Recognizable results of this type of program will generally not be realized immediately. However, the program to create such a wedge must be vigorous and must be designed to prove that tranquil areas enjoy relatively high standards of living. The political wedge program must be aimed at problems of primary concern to the inhabitants of the area. Normally, local inhabitants want to be reassured concerning food, shelter, clothing, and social reforms.
CHAPTER 3
RAP FORCE DEVELOPMENT

Section 1. CREATING FORCES FOR REAR AREA PROTECTION

44. General

In creating forces for rear area protection, an area commander must first determine what is available and what is required. He then organizes the area RAP task forces using the RAP potentials expressed in the TOE’s of units located in his area (fig. 4). Normally, it is assumed that a unit will be able to provide its RAP potential unless an exception report is submitted to the rear area operations center (RAOC).

45. Determining Resources

When a military (DOD, Army, Navy, or Air Force) unit occupies a piece of ground in the COMMZ or field army service area, it reports its status to the RAOC controlling RAP measures for that area. This report for Army units is generally limited to identifying the unit, its TOE number, and its location. The RAOC performs manually or queries the data processing center on a routine, scheduled basis for an extract of preprogramed data expressing the normal rear area protection potential of that Army unit as well as its priority and current or modified potential. Other units and activities will provide their identify, location, rear area protection potential, and priority to the RAOC.

a. Operational considerations will modify the normal potential of units. Responsibility for
reporting such modifications rests with the unit rendering the report.

b. Where a unit is part of a base or group of units, it renders its status report through the commander or security officer of that group or base. The base commander develops the total base rear area protection status report as required and submits it to the RAOC.

c. A RAP element provided to a RAOC for rear area security is generally a platoon or larger force and contains its own leadership. When avoidable, individuals or squads are not called on by the ROAC for separate RAS employment.

d. A RAP element provided to a RAOC for rear area damage control is generally a squad, platoon, or company and contains its own leadership. Duties associated with normal functional mission are utilized whenever possible.

e. Unless otherwise reported by the parent unit, all RAP units possess their own command control, mobility, communications, and firepower.

46. Type RAP Elements

The three general classifications of RAP elements are rear area security, area damage control, and special area damage control. Although some service or support units have a potential to create more than one type of element, they are normally called on to activate only one element at any one time. Operations for these elements are discussed in chapter 4.

a. RAS Elements. Types of RAS units are shown in figures 5 through 8. Type rear area security companies thus formed are shown in figure 9. Standard security elements for rear area protection are relatively small in order to ease command control and communication problems created by the combining of diverse elements.

b. ADC Elements. These elements are structured based on anticipated requirements for damage control operations. Their structures are contained in detail in appendix B.

(1) Structure for area damage control party; section I, appendix B.
(2) Structure for area damage control light rescue team (squad or platoon); section II, appendix B.
(3) Structure for area damage control labor team (squad or platoon); section III, appendix B.

c. Special ADC Elements. These teams capitalize on the normal mission capability of the unit and would be activated only as needed for special ADC operations. Types of special ADC teams are shown in appendix B.

(1) Structure for area damage control heavy rescue team (squad or platoon); section IV, appendix B.
(2) Structure for transportation aviation area damage control teams; section V, appendix B.
(3) Structure for area damage control medical aid teams; section VI, appendix B.
(4) Structure for area damage control traffic control team; section VII, appendix B.
(5) Structure for area damage control CBR decontamination team; section VIII, appendix B.
(6) Structure for area damage control augmentation provisional firefighting team (class “A” fires); section IX, appendix B.
(7) Structure for area damage control munitions safety control (MSC) team; section X, appendix B.
(8) Structure for area damage control recovery team conventional/special ammunition; section XI, appendix B.
(9) Structure for area damage control recovery team heavy equipment general; section XII, appendix B.
(10) Structure for area damage control recovery team light equipment general; section XIII, appendix B.
(11) Structure for area damage control loudspeaker and leaflet team (light mobile); section XIV, appendix B.
(12) Structure for area damage control mobile radio team; section XV, appendix B.
(13) Structure for area damage control PSYOP control team; section XVI, appendix B.
(14) Structure for area damage control augmentation area floodlighting team; section XVII, appendix B.
MISSION.

To protect a base of operations and the essential land area surrounding it by engaging, delaying, repelling, and maintaining contact with the enemy.

CAPABILITIES.

A. Performs as an economy of force unit in above role for short periods of time against lightly armed forces.
B. Assists tactical relief elements in closing with and destroying or capturing the enemy.
C. Capitalizes on all forms of mobility.

MOBILITY.

100 percent mobile from existing unit resources.

RAS Rifle Platoon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTY POSITION</th>
<th>FS</th>
<th>RMK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Platoon Leader</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon SGT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RAS Platoon Headquarters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTY POSITION</th>
<th>FS</th>
<th>RMK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Platoon Leader</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platoon SGT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RAS Machine Gun Squad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTY POSITION</th>
<th>FS</th>
<th>RMK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squad Leader</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gunner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst Mach Gunner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RAS Rifle Squad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTY POSITION</th>
<th>FS</th>
<th>RMK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squad Leader</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenadier</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifleman</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EQUIPMENT

- Radio Set AN/PRC-25
- Radio Set AN/PRR-9
- Launcher Grenade 40mm
- Machine Gun Light Flex
- Pistol Auto Cal .45

Remarks:

All personnel armed with 7.62mm rifle unless otherwise indicated.
11 Armed with pistol automatic caliber .45.
12 Armed with launcher grenade 40mm and pistol automatic caliber .45.

Figure 5. Rear area security rifle platoon.
MISSION CAPABILITIES.

TO PROTECT A BASE OF OPERATIONS AND THE ESSENTIAL LAND AREA SURROUNDING IT BY ENGAGING, DELAYING, REPELLING, AND MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY.

A. PERFORMS AS AN ECONOMY OF FORCE UNIT IN ABOVE ROLE FOR SHORT PERIODS OF TIME AGAINST LIGHTLY ARMED FORCES.
B. ASSISTS TACTICAL RELIEF ELEMENTS IN CLOSING WITH AND DESTROYING OR CAPTURING THE ENEMY.
C. CAPITALIZES ON ALL FORMS OF MOBILITY.
D. SUPPORTS RAS RIFLE AND RECONNAISSANCE/ESCORT PLATOON BY FIRE.

100 PERCENT MOBILE FROM EXISTING UNIT RESOURCES.

MOBILITY.

**RAS ATTACK PLATOON**

- RAS PLATOON HEADQUARTERS
  - DUTY POSITION: FS
  - RANK: 1
  - EQUIPMENT: AN/PRC-25

- RAS 81 MM MORTAR SQUAD
  - DUTY POSITION: FS
  - RANK: 0
  - EQUIPMENT: AN/PRC-25

- RAS MACHINE GUN SQUAD
  - DUTY POSITION: FS
  - RANK: 0
  - EQUIPMENT: AN/PRC-25

- RAS RIFLE SQUAD
  - DUTY POSITION: FS
  - RANK: 0
  - EQUIPMENT: AN/PRC-25

**REMARKS**

- ALL PERSONNEL ARMED WITH 7.62MM RIFLE UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED.
- 01 ALSO LIGHT TRUCK DRIVER.
- 11 ARMED WITH PISTOL AUTOMATIC CALIBER .45.
- 12 ARMED WITH LAUNCHER GRENADE 40MM AND PISTOL AUTOMATIC CALIBER .45.
- 14 ALSO RADIO TELEPHONE OPERATOR.

**Figure 6.** Rear area security attack platoon.
MISSION. To provide security and perform reconnaissance for rear area security forces to which attached and to engage in offensive, defensive, or delaying action as an economy of force unit.

CAPABILITIES. A. Performs reconnaissance and provides light armored escort for unit supported.

B. Engages in offensive, defensive, or delaying actions.

C. Conducts independent action against lightly armed guerrilla elements.

MOBILITY. 100 percent mobile from existing unit resources.

---

**RAS Recon/ESC Platoon**

**Duty Position**

- **Platoon Leader**: 1
- **Platoon Sgt**: 1
- **Radio Set AN/GRC-125**: 1
- **Truck UT 1/4-Ton 4x4**: 1

**Equipment**

- **Radio Set AN/PRR-9**: 1
- **Launched Grenade 40mm**: 1
- **Machine Gun Lt Flex**: 2
- **PISTOL AUTO CAL .45**: 5
- **Truck CGO 3/4-TON 4x4**: 1

**Remarks**

- All personnel armed with 7.62mm rifle unless otherwise indicated.
- 11 armed with pistol automatic caliber .45.
- 12 armed with launcher grenade 40mm and pistol automatic caliber .45.
- 13 armed with submachine gun and pistol automatic caliber .45.

---

Figure 7. Rear area security reconnaissance/escort platoon.
MISSION.

EXERCISES COMMAND AND CONTROL OF FROM TWO TO FIVE REAR AREA SECURITY PLATOONS.

CAPABILITIES.

A. WHEN ACTING AS A COMMAND AND CONTROL ELEMENT, ASSUMES COMBINED CAPABILITIES OF PARTICIPATING RAS PLATOONS.

B. CONTROLS PLATOONS VIA VOICE RADIO AND MAINTAINS COMMUNICATIONS WITH RAC.

MOBILITY.

ONE HUNDRED PERCENT MOBILE FROM SPONSORING ELEMENT RESOURCES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DUTY POSITION</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>FS</th>
<th>RMK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMMANDER</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXEC OFFICER</td>
<td>LT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIAISON SGT</td>
<td>E-5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIREMAN</td>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT VEHICLE DR</td>
<td>E-3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOMENCLATURE</th>
<th>FS</th>
<th>RMK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-T 4x4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIO SET CONTROL AN/ GCA-39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIO SET AN/VRC-47</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIO SET AN/VRC-46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIO SET AN/GRC-106</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REEL EQUIPMENT CR-11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWITCHBOARD SB-953/GR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks:
- 04-ALSO SWITCHBOARD OP
- 11-ARMED W/FISTOL AUTO
- 549-MOUNTED IN DIFFERENT VEHICLES

Figure 8. Rear area security company command and control team.
(15) Structure for area damage control CBR reconnaissance team; section XVIII, appendix B.

(16) Structure for area damage control radiological survey team; section XIX, appendix B.

47. Tactical Resources

a. The TASCOM and FASCOM commanders request tactical resources when, in their judgment, the net effect of enemy rear area activities is beyond the limited capabilities of combat service support resources. Considerations affecting this decision include the following:

(1) Frequency of activities. Regardless of intensity, frequent RAS problems will require counteractions so often that service support missions may be hampered beyond an acceptable degree and out of proportion to the enemy effort or effectiveness.

(2) Intensity of activities. Service support resources cannot normally cope with intense activities. The firepower and combat skills necessary for complex and coordinated tactical operations are usually not found in service support units.

(3) Prolongation of activities. Enemy activities that require prolonged countermeasures will best be resolved by employment of tactical resources. Service support resources should only be used to eliminate the adversary quickly or to maintain contact with him until tactical counteractions can be employed.

b. When tactical resources are available for RAS purposes, special attention must be given to command and control. Considerations in this respect are as follows:

(1) Normally, in the initial stages of any RAS operation, the RAOC exercises command and control over all resources participating. When tactical activities and forces become the dominant consideration, however, the area commander personally directs both the RAOC (representing service support resources) and the tactical elements in the area.

(2) When tactical activities increase in scope, frequency, or intensity, rear area security operations are directed from the highest participating tactical element. The RAOC acts as a cooperating agency supporting tactical elements with information and resources. The RAOC also serves as a link between tactical forces and service support elements.

c. The transition of command and control for RAS operations to or from tactical resources is specified in command policies (para 24–43).

d. For an area commander to know the friendly and enemy situations, a reporting system is established as discussed in section II, chapter 5. Based on these situation reports, the area commander builds his "minuteman" (RAP) force to best meet his requirements.

48. Building the Task Force

a. The TOE of selected combat support and combat service units will reflect the normal rear area protection potential and identified additional RAP equipment requirements of that unit. The total RAP potential of all units in an area can then be determined by the RAOC normally through the automatic data processing center or, if necessary, by manual procedures.

b. Once the total area potential is determined and confirmed by coordination, the RAOC develops RAP companies or other suitable elements and organizes them into the overall RAP task force.

c. The RAP task force generally is two standby organizations; one for security and one for damage control. Many units and individuals may be members of both organizations; hence, from any one unit, either the damage control or the security echelon is activated, but seldom both.

49. Building the Rear Area Security RAP Company (fig. 9)

Platoons are formed to make companies of a task force. The company is designed by the RAOC. Command control of the company is provided by units charged with this responsibility in their TOE supplements. Critical con-
siderations in organizing these forces are as follows:

a. Unity of Command. In the creation of RAS forces, unrelated and unfamiliar groups are brought together. Every effort must be made to retain unit integrity while structuring task force companies. Steps that will assist in this regard are as follows:

1. When possible, a RAS company should consist of a number of platoons from one facility or element.
2. To facilitate coordination, training, and rehearsing of the company, platoons must have geographical proximity.
3. Platoons of the same branch can be combined more smoothly than those of different branches.

b. Priority. The platoons making up one RAS company must have the identical priority for employment. Diverse priorities may preclude activating the full company for a RAP mission at one time.

c. Vulnerability. When forming a RAS company, the area commander must consider the impact its activation will have on the vulnerability of the source units. To compensate for any increased vulnerability, the area commander may take such steps as the following:

1. Place priority II and priority III elements on workingstandby; i.e., the elements continue their missions but must be ready to respond to an emergency within the time specified by the area commander.
2. Increase patrolling and surveillance in particularly vulnerable areas.
3. Request that higher headquarters adjust requirements to meet current capabilities.
4. If authorized, relocate indigenous police resources in light of the new threat.
5. If authorized, tighten population control measures in the danger zone.

d. Offensive Potential. The main value of a RAS task force is its offensive potential. The newly created element is made from resources outside the area immediately affected by attack and, therefore, it has freedom to assemble, maneuver, and attack.

50. Indigenous Elements

Generally, rear area protection measures involve the use of indigenous police and paramilitary and military elements. To avoid confusion, early clarification of the positions, responsibilities, and authority of these elements in emergencies is mandatory. Many of the fundamentals outlined above apply. Additional special considerations are as follows:

a. Indigenous elements must be totally responsive to the task force commander.

b. Caution must be exercised in the assignment of indigenous elements to tasks requiring specialized equipment. These elements will seldom have protection from chemicals or training in radiation hazards. Area commanders will provide selected critical items of equipment as required to make an indigenous element responsive. Particular emphasis should be given to the following areas:

1. Communications, both for warning and operations.
2. Individual protection from radiation, chemicals, and severe weather.
3. Tools.
4. Rations and shelter during operations.
5. Requirements for indigenous labor.

c. Normally, the indigenous society in an area of military operations exists on an austere basis. Considerations of the impact the use of indigenous resources in RAP operations might have on the future tranquillity and viability of the society must not be overlooked. Critical resources are most generally as follows:

1. Medical personnel and facilities.
2. Police elements.
3. Public transport means.
4. Food, housing, and clothing.

d. Legal restrictions will vary widely depending on the status of the population. Area commanders should consult with judge advocate and civil affairs representatives to clarify these restrictions prior to integrating an indigenous effort into RAP functions (para 23–28).
51. Considerations in Building the Task Force

RAP task forces are constructed from military and indigenous subelements. The size and number of task forces are best determined by a projection of the most probable requirements indicated by intelligence and other reports. However, other considerations are critical in this determination, some of which are as follows:

a. A task force must be manageable by the command control resources available in the area.

b. In larger areas, separate and independent task forces can be formed to offset reduced response times brought about when units must travel great distances to react.

c. Each base or potential target must be covered by a task force or a plan. Normally, a task force has several bases or target areas for which it is responsible. However, the force is generally employed in only one area at a time. If area RAP resources cannot cover a base or target area, plans must provide for outside assistance.

d. Task forces should be made no larger than necessary. Regardless of their minuteman nature, the requirements placed on them represent a drain on the energy and resources of the area. This drain must be minimized to the point of meeting only the most realistic threats.

e. A task force is a melding of many elements from diverse sources and locations. Its basic nature, therefore, hampers responsiveness. Concrete steps must be taken in the initial structuring to overcome this potentially critical problem. Key points in this regard are as follows:

1. A task force must be able to act while it grows. It is not practical to delay action pending arrival of the slowest element.

2. The task force command control section must have the highest degree of responsiveness. As subelements arrive in an affected area, they must not be delayed by lack of a command structure. Similarly, allowing a RAP element to act in absence of its RAOC command structure may disrupt orderly progression of an integrated task force counteraction.

Section II. COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR RAP

52. Purpose

This section defines methods by which responsive command control is exercised by an area commander without unnecessary interference with the functional operation of service and support elements.

53. Command

a. One of the fundamental problems in rear area protection is the resolution of command authority. Before any plans, actions, or operations are initiated, this problem must be resolved. The major source of difficulty will stem from the fact that efficient service and support operations generally must be command oriented along the lines of the function being performed. For example, transportation units are generally commanded by other transportation units regardless of their geographical location. This type of arrangement is called “functional command lines.” Normally, functional command is not the best way to conduct tactical RAP actions as rear area protection is an area responsibility. Therefore, for RAP purposes, an area commander is provided the authority necessary for operational command over units involved in a RAP situation. The potential areas of conflict between the two command elements are resolved by an echelon senior to both. Subjects of concern include —

1. Unit priorities.
2. Training for RAP missions.
3. Communications.
4. Transition of control.

b. Operational command of functional units by an area commander is generally for brief periods and on an infrequent basis. Where the situation requires prolonged attention to RAP problems, tactical resources are provided to the area commander.
54. The Exercise of Command for Rear Area Security

a. Local Security. Each unit is responsible for its own local security. An area commander may establish groupings of units, facilities, or bases for mutual security. When this is necessary, he designates the commander of each grouping. Each subordinate commander, in turn, establishes a clear and simple security command structure. The officer in charge of the team is the security commander. His responsibilities in the total security system are manifold and critical. He serves his local commander with technical and tactical acuity, his area commander with a flow of critical data, and both commanders with a close monitorship of the adequacy of plans to preserve the viability of the base.

b. Base Defense. When a base, unit, or facility is under attack, the designated security commander of that element assumes operational command of all resources therein to conduct the defense.

c. Mutual Support. When service support units are required to provide RAP elements to a task force to assist in the defense of another base, command and control for each element is provided by the contributing unit.

d. Conflicts in Command/Control. Unless otherwise specified by the area commander, the RAOC Rear Area Security Task Force Command Section in an affected area assumes operational command of all resources in that area to include those of any base under attack. The ability of relief forces to maneuver will generally make them the most effective element participating in RAS measures. Counteractions to relieve the situation must be controlled by this most effective element.

55. The Exercise of Command for Area Damage Control

Area damage control encompasses a range of situations that may vary widely in degree of destruction and impact. At one end of the scale, the local unit or installation commander can still exercise control over damage control activities at the incident side by employment of local unit resources on a self-help basis perhaps with aid of some additional assistance provided by other nearby units. At the other end of the scale, the severity of damage or the magnitude of impact on the stricken unit or installation is such that effective command and control capability no longer exists. Problems of command and control arise generally at the interface between functionally oriented and area oriented lines of command responsibility. For purposes of application to area damage control, the commander of the affected unit or installation is assumed to be unable to exercise effective control over local damage control activities.

a. Responsibilities at the Disaster Site. When an incident occurs, the ADC task force command section of the RAOC or ADC party is dispatched to the site to assume responsibility for subsequent operations. Normally, the task force or ADC party commander, as incident officer, assumes control upon arrival at the disaster site. In some cases, the magnitude of the area damage control operation may require formation of a task force organization built upon specific TOE units of company or battalion size, such as engineer combat or construction units. Normally it would not be within the capability of the ADC task force command section or ADC party to exercise effective command and control responsibilities over an area damage control force of this size and nature. Appropriately, control should be exercised by the commander of the unit that comprises the major element of the task force. The ADC task force command section, if available, would provide advice to the commander and liaison and communications with the RAOC.

b. Initial Phase. Usually the ADC task force or party commander, as incident officer, will be in command at the site during the initial phase. The ADC task force or ADC party is initially dispatched at direction of the RAOC to establish control, assess damage, and determine what additional assistance may be required. Requests for additional assistance indicate the requirement in terms of functional type and magnitude of the operation. Area damage control teams, provided in response to requests for assistance where damage control tasks involve technical specialists or general labor, report to the incident command post upon their arrival at the site. They are at-
attached for operational command to the head-
quarters exercising command and control over
ADC activities at the site.

c. Emergency Operations Phase. During the
entire period of emergency operations, there
should be a single responsibility for exercise of
command and control functions at the dis-
aster site. This responsibility for area damage
control must not be divided. Commanders of
special area damage control teams performing
highly technical functions would act as profes-
sional advisors to the responsible commander.
Where the scope of the operations is beyond
the capability of the ADC task force command
section or ADC party and ADC teams, a larger
damage control task force may be formed on
the basis of using a company or larger size
unit to comprise its major element. Upon
arrival at the site, the larger (i.e., battalion)
task force commander assumes command and
control responsibility from the commander of
the ADC task force section or party. In either
event, the area commander retains his general
responsibility for supervision and execution of
area damage control activities and exercises
overall operational control through the RAOC
for purposes of coordination. As soon as the
emergency has ended, the area commander is
responsible for prompt release and return to
their parent units or commands of those forces
which have been provided by units and instal-
lations assigned to other major commands.

d. Termination of Emergency Phase. The
term “termination of emergency phase” identi-
fies the period of transition from emergency
operations, concerned with area damage control
at a disaster area, to recovery, rehabilitation,
and reconstruction operations concerned with
early restoration of capabilities to the stricken
installation or unit to perform its normal com-
bat service support functions. The area com-
mander, upon advice of the ADC incident officer
or commander of area damage control forces
at the site, will determine when the emergency
has ended and the ADC task force elements
can be released for return to parent units.
When the affected installation commander is
capable of resuming control or as soon as con-
tral can be effectively established by other
service activities, the ADC task force or party
elements should be relieved. Augmentation
teams and other elements temporarily attached
for operational command will also be released,
although not necessarily all at once. In cases
of disagreement as to when such units should
be released for return, the parent units may
appeal through command channels for a deter-
mination to end the emergency.

e. Recovery, Rehabilitation, and Emergency
Reconstruction. There is a transition from
tasks performed which essentially limited or
controlled the spread of damage and prevented
it from becoming worse to tasks involving
similar skills and equipment which are per-
formed essentially for restoration of admini-
strative support capabilities to the affected
unit or installations. For planning and area
damage control purposes, the emergency period
is assumed to extend for not over 24 hours
in situations where the total requirement for
area damage control forces is less than company
size. In situations where TOE units of com-
pany or battalion size are required, the duration
of the emergency period may extend from 24
hours to 48 or more hours. Although the dura-
tion of the emergency period cannot be pre-
dicted with certainty, it is assumed that most
damage control situations can be brought under
control in 12 to 24 hours. Those of a magni-
tude that require diverting company or bat-
talion size units from their primary mission of
combat service support would necessarily take
more time to bring under control. As soon as
effective control can be resumed by the affected
service support unit or be assumed by its re-
placement, the task of restoration of admini-
strative support begins. It is frequently diffi-
cult to make a clear distinction between those
tasks intended to prevent further loss or spread
of damage and those tasks that lead to restora-
tion and recovery of the damaged combat ser-
vice support capability. However, such dis-
inction must be made in order to insure timely
release of an ADC task force or ADC party
for possible employment elsewhere and of sup-
porting ADC augmentation teams for return
to parent units to resume their primary mission
functions. Tasks of rehabilitation, repair, and
reconstruction may frequently find the same
combat support and combat service support
units, especially in the case of engineers, back
again at the same site but working under pri-
orities established by the appropriate higher headquarters concerned. Area damage control support requirements make heavy demands for employment of equipment, skills, and trained personnel, which are characteristic of engineer combat and construction units. As a result, conflicts may be induced between secondary emergency missions for area damage control and primary engineer combat support and combat service support missions that can only be resolved by assigning appropriate priorities to each type function.

56. The Commander's Data Base

To assist an area commander in performing his RAP missions, he maintains a link with FASCOM or ASCOM using digital data input equipment. This link is part of the design for the automation of combat service support and is related to the operational and intelligence subsystems. Basically, the commander's data base provides (see para 52-58, for further detail)—

a. Summary data on forces and resources. This is provided automatically as a result of manipulating—
   (1) TOE/TD/TA files.
   (2) Unit status reports.
   (3) Command SOP.

b. Situational and operational summaries provided by—
   (1) Unit operational reports.
   (2) Military police and other spot reports.
   (3) Intelligence reports to include weather.
   (4) Movement control center and traffic control reports.
   (5) CBRE reports.
   (6) Tactical priorities and requirements disseminated by operational and functional headquarters.
   (7) Civil affairs reports.

c. Rear area protection requirements and plans provided by—
   (1) Base and facility status reports.
   (2) Staff security survey reports.
   (3) RAOC operational plans to include summaries from adjoining areas.

57. Assistance to Tenant Units

In addition to providing the information necessary for effective emergency control, the area commander also provides functional elements with the information they need to conduct routine operations. This data flows directly from the RAOC to adjacent RAOC's and to tenant units and includes—

a. Highway strip maps showing road conditions, locations of units, military police security and support operations, refueling points, distances, emergency repair and wrecker facilities, medical facilities, rest stops, and reroutes.

b. Scheduled and actual ground movements to include locations of convoys or critical vehicles.

c. Weather, terrain, and critical intelligence data.

d. Area communications means available to units, convoys, or personnel on the move.

e. CBRE readings.

f. Answers to critical questions, such as—
   (1) How to contact military police?
   (2) How to get EOD support?
   (3) How to report an emergency?

58. The Data Base

The RAOC is in a position to make plans for rear area protection based upon information compiled. Because of the RAOC structure, it is also in a position to execute these plans. The information available for RAP purposes is translated to an estimate of the situation. To the degree possible, the estimate is accomplished by data processing procedures. The normal sequence for development and use of the data base follows:

a. Units, agencies, and staffs are required to provide input data to the data processing center.

b. The data processing center provides each RAOC with a compilation of the total situation.

c. The RAOC makes plans based on the requirements of the situation and the resources available.

d. The RAOC issues plans with execution instruction to all units in the RAOC area.

e. The RAOC modifies or updates plans as required by operational and spot reports.

f. When required, the RAOC orders execution of a plan and provides the command section for the forces involved.
CHAPTER 4
OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT

Section I. RAP OPERATIONS

59. Proper Site Selection

a. The requirements of service support operations generally do not correspond to the requirements for security. A service support base needs a good road net, ready source of labor, shelter, and many other qualities that lead to placement in a congested area, the security of which is extremely difficult to maintain. The best site from a security standpoint is in the middle of a completely cleared area, occupying high ground with sufficient vegetation to conceal at least portions of the base from aerial observation. The worst site from a security standpoint is a congested or jungle area where observation is extremely limited. The commander must weigh these various considerations in selecting a site. The fact that enemy or clandestine elements have not been active in an area must not be given much weight. The lack of a target rather than the capabilities of the adversary may have caused this inactivity.

b. In the selection of a site, one of the first questions that should be answered is "what will have to be defended?" An apparently acceptable site often carries unreasonable security requirements with it. The most common tendency is to take the low ground through which most roads run. Generally, the cost, time, and manpower needed to relocate a site to more defensible terrain is well justified by the requirement to provide prolonged security for a poor position. Nuclear warfare may favor terrain offering cover from blast, and the risks inherent in this respect must also be evaluated.

60. Alternate Positions

If the exigencies of service support requirements dictate the occupation of a high-risk area, the commander should select an alternate and more acceptable site and make every effort to phase into it as operations permit. The prolonged occupation of any area will make subsequent relocation extremely difficult.

61. Security of the Site

A site normally is highly vulnerable the first few days after its establishment. Time permits the improvement of security measures up to the point at which a stable security system is established. From this point on, time tends to reduce security as the stability of the system lends itself to scrutiny of convert elements. In addition, the maintenance of a combat psychology in a stable and prolonged situation becomes extremely difficult. In order to offset these points, all personnel must actively participate in a total security effort and this effort must be frequently modified.

a. Prior to occupying a site, a review is made of all information available about the general area. Normally, this data is provided by intelligence, civil affairs, and military and indigenous police. In addition, summary data will be available at RAOC’s.

b. Subsequent to a brief review of prepared data, a general aerial reconnaissance is conducted over the area.

c. Aerial reconnaissance will isolate more specific areas requiring detailed ground surveillance.

d. If clandestine forces are active, it is preferable to occupy a new site during daylight hours. The steps to this occupation include, in order—

(1) Establishment of perimeter guards.
(2) Patrolling outside the perimeter.
(3) Preparation of secure points for personnel and supplies.
Deliberate, unconfused phasing in of base resources.

Maximum security effort for the initial period.

e. Initial security steps after occupation of a site require, in order—

(1) Establishment of communications with the RAOC.

(2) Establishment of circulation control procedures in which all personnel participate to the maximum degree compatible with mission requirements.

(3) Improvement of the perimeter barrier.

(4) Establishment of the area fire support plan.

(5) Improvement of the patrol plan.

f. During these initial steps, the area commander gives special security consideration to the highly vulnerable status of the base. These considerations include—

(1) Increased military police patrolling in the vicinity of the site.

(2) Increased aerial reconnaissance activities in the vicinity of the site.

(3) Review of emergency plans for their adequacy in relation to the new site.

(4) Temporary allocation of additional security resources or their redeployment to be more responsive to the new site.

62. Base Security

Base security operations are normally divided into three parts as follows:

a. Local security operations.

b. Base defense operations.

c. RAP operations.

63. Local Security

In addition to meeting the traditional requirements for interior and perimeter guard, local security operations include the immediate response capability essential to neutralize or destroy an enemy element. Where feasible, guard personnel are backed up by a ready RAP force. In addition, local security measures include—

a. Strict control over the circulation of individuals.

b. Complete integration of local security and base defense plans. In this respect, local security measures support the base defense plan requirements.

c. Integration and coordination with area patrols.

d. Coordination with the local civil and military police effort.

e. Installation and inspection of barriers, fences, and security devices.

f. Inspection and review of security procedures.

g. Preparation of local security plans, to include frequent alterations to reduce vulnerability.

64. Base Defense

The mission of a base engaged in a base defense situation is to prevent the destruction or minimize damage to the base.

a. Whenever a base is attacked, it immediately notifies the nearest RAOC. Time is not lost by attempting to determine the extent of the attack.

b. Resources within a base under attack are totally employed for defense purposes. All service support activities will normally cease.

c. The base commander normally exercises command and control of the defense through his full-time security element commander.

d. Throughout the planning and conduct of a base defense, an aggressive attitude is retained and offensive actions are initiated as soon as practicable.

e. Security of base defense plans is critical. Generally an adversary will conduct his overt actions on what he knows about planned countermeasures. Any given plan should be executed only once.

65. RAP Operations

Rear area protection measures are divided into three phases as discussed below.

a. Phase I measures are taken before any actual occupation of terrain takes place. These measures are aimed at minimizing RAP problems through proper planning. Phase I steps include—

(1) Developing intelligence requirements that will provide the information necessary to locate bases, activities, and facilities properly.
Planning for the grouping of service support forces in relation to their RAP capabilities and requirements.

Planning for the dispersion of grouped activities as dictated by the nuclear threat.

Coordinating communications and tactical support requirements.

Delineating area boundaries.

Phase II RAP operations range from initial planning to reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, surveillance, and counterintelligence operations. Essential measures include forming installation local security and area damage control elements; designating units as rear area protection forces, organizing units designated for these missions, assigning sectors to rear area protection forces, and establishing communication and warning systems. Dispersion, denial of information to the enemy, and provision of protective shelter are the principal preventive measures to reduce the effects of mass destruction weapons. Dispersion, protective shelter, and proper selection of terrain are the principal preventive measures to reduce the effects of natural disaster. Security and area damage control SOP's are developed and rehearsed. The forces patrol normal and cross-country routes and may provide escort for convoys. Counterintelligence units and personnel are used fully.

c. Phase III operations include defense of units, installations, and convoys against enemy ground attack; relief of units under attack; location, pursuit, attack, and destruction of hostile forces. Area damage control operations begin when an attack, major accident, or natural disaster has occurred.

66. Forms of RAP Security

A stable base, facility, or compound permits the concentration of security defensive measures. The four basic forms of this type security are point, base, area, and remote. These forms can be used singularly or in any combination. If possible, the form or forms used should be altered to reduce vulnerability characteristics.

a. Point security is oriented toward the protection of a single facility or activity within a defense area. Normally, it is employed to guarantee the protection of the most likely target within that area on the assumption that a small covert effort is the most probable enemy action against it. Both passive and active measures are employed.

b. Base security is oriented toward protecting all of a base within a given perimeter. Due to resource limitations, it is adopted as the only feasible course of action other than point security.

c. Area security is oriented toward retaining key facilities and terrain surrounding a given base which an enemy would have to occupy in order to conduct effective overt offensive actions.

d. Remote security is protecting a base or a number of bases by possessing a capability to bring fire within 500 meters of its perimeter, or to move forces into its general vicinity very rapidly. All bases normally are protected by remote security in addition to one or more of the other forms.

67. Combinations of Forms

a. The most thorough security system consists of a combination of the four basic forms. In this posture, the base provides point security to key targets and perimeter security for the base and backs these up by controlling key terrain surrounding the base. Either by local coordination or through the area commander, remote security is provided by another element (RAP task force) and gives the necessary offensive capability. This complete system is used whenever resources permit.

b. The combining of point security with base and remote security represents the best posture when highly critical items or activities are in a base and sufficient resources do not exist to take area security measures.

c. The minimum security posture is remote security. This is used by itself only in well controlled areas or where resources do not permit any of the other forms.

68. Planning Security

a. In planning for RAP operations, it is normal to plan for maximum requirements. Once a basic plan is set in motion, it is pos-
sible to cut back but rarely possible to increase requirements within the time frame encompassed by RAP actions.

b. Plans must be monitored continuously. When they are executed, adjustments will invariably be necessary. The RAOC must be in a position to know how and what to adjust and participants must be keyed to expect these adjustments.

c. The first positive security action of a base security command element is to plan local security measures. From this basic plan, local security measures are provided that will permit execution of the basic plan. No security orders from higher headquarters are needed. Occupation of a base carries the responsibility to secure a base.

69. Linear Security Operations

A different form of security from that required for stable facilities is required for protection of linear routes. A tenuous line of communications, whether it be rail, pipeline, highway, or waterway, presents one of the greatest security problems in a rear area. A stable base, facility, or compound permits the concentration of defensive resources. Linear security, on the other hand, offers to an enemy an almost infinite number of points which he can attack with fair assurance that, at best, delayed reaction will be his greatest threat. This paragraph discusses ways to secure a line of communications to include advantages and disadvantages when compared to a given set of conditions.

a. Forces Required. Normally, military police are best employed on linear security missions. RAS forces (i.e., the RAS potential of service support units) are not suited, either by position or organization, for this normally extensive and continuing type of operation. When ASCOM or FASCOM military police resources are inadequate to the tasks, tactical (combat) resources are allocated to the ASCOM or FASCOM commander for this purpose.

b. Types of Linear Security. The types of linear security discussed herein are—

(1) Passive security.
(2) Remote security.
(3) Reconnaissance security.
(4) Patrol security.

(5) Escort security.
(6) Strong point security.
(7) Combat security.

c. Fundamentals of Linear Security. The principles of RAP actions discussed in chapter 1 apply to linear security. Their relationship is discussed below.

(1) Economy of force. This principle will be served to the maximum at the time a route is selected. The tendency to select the shortest distance between two points or the heaviest line on a map as the line of communications often creates unnecessary security problems that violate the principle of economy of force. Particularly in well-developed areas, there is generally more than one route connecting two points. All possible routes should be analyzed from the standpoint of the probable requirements each will present in the area of security. Mountainous roads, roads with numerous bridges, and roads passing through numerous villages or dense jungle areas present potential security requirements far greater than relatively flat roads traversing wide open spaces. Economy of force is also served by the proper location of depots and other facilities along a line of communication, as well as by the deployment of forces in relation to the threat.

(2) Priority. Not all routes have the same priority. Lines of communication with the highest priority must be secured first. By the same token, not all points along any given route have the same priority. On any given route, there are those points that are more susceptible to enemy activities than other points. Such resources as are available for the security of the route must be employed in accordance with this analysis.

(3) Integrated protection. An inherent requirement in the security of a given route is to provide for bypassing any and all segments along that route on
the assumption that natural disaster or enemy activities may temporarily prohibit their use. Security efforts must be totally integrated with the logistical flow, activities of military police, and the bonus effects obtainable through the normal activities of aviation, transportation, and other elements habitually traversing the line of communications.

(4) *Vulnerability*. One of the most vulnerable configurations found in a field army service area or in a Theater Army Support Command are the lines of communications. Generally, they are similar to geographical configurations. They are fixed, can be moved but only with great difficulty, and because of their extreme length are easily susceptible to enemy attack. Unless an enemy enjoys a high degree of freedom in the service area or in the communications zone, he is more apt to attack points along a line of communication than a fixed facility, base, or depot. Vulnerability can be reduced somewhat by concentrating resources at the most critical points along a given route, possessing the capability to switch the flow of traffic or supplies from one route to another, or by changing the route completely to a less susceptible line.

(5) *Offensive*. Maintaining an effective offensive capability to secure a line of communications presents one of the most difficult challenges to security planners. While highly mobile heliborne and/or armored elements can meet some requirements in this regard, the positioning of these elements in a manner that will provide the necessary reaction to all points of a given line could well result in destroying the unit's integrity. Generally, adopting strongpoint security and combat security measures discussed below will give the initial rapid reaction capability necessary for offensive security operations.

(6) *Responsiveness*. This is the most critical principle in affording proper linear security. If it is possible to secure any point along a given route within a matter of minutes after the happening of an incident, then a route may be considered to be as secure as is feasibly possible. The objective of attacks along a linear route are generally to destroy supplies and materiel en route or to destroy a critical feature along that route, such as a bridge. Either of these actions takes a very short period of time and from this point on it merely becomes a race between an escaping force and a pursuing force. If the pursuing force can get to the scene of the action quick enough, its chances of destroying the adversary are, of course, much greater. This capability in itself would act as the most significant deterrent to a would-be adversary. Where it is not feasible to design responsiveness to destroy an adversary, it should be at least feasible to design responsiveness that will prohibit an adversary from capitalizing on his attack by looting critical supplies and facilities from a vehicle, railcar, vessel, or pipeline.

(7) *Planning*. In planning for linear security, the line of communication is divided up into degrees of vulnerability. Plans are then made for the most vulnerable of the areas. These plans include both counteractions to foreseeable incidents and reroute actions that will make unnecessary the temporary use of that particular section of the route. Plans to not usually envision the use of the RAS potential of functional elements for points of considerable distance from the RAS potential base. Generally, outlying areas of a linear route are secured by deliberate resources.

(8) *Supervision*. Units involved in linear security, particularly those in outlying areas, require constant super-
vision by proper authority. The nature of these duties is extremely boring and repetitive and a loss of combat psychology can be expected unless proper attention is paid to the supervisory aspects of this task.

d. **Passive Security.**

(1) Passive security is defined as those measures taken to achieve security without a significant expenditure of manpower or resources. In reference to linear security, these measures include—

(a) Camouflage.

(b) Formation of convoys.

(c) Proper selection of routes.

(d) Reroute planning.

(e) Capitalizing on bonus security offered by related activities taking place without regard to security requirements. These activities include—

1. Routine aerial operations traversing the line in question.

2. Maintenance activities along the line.

3. Training exercises or troop movements adjacent to or along the line.

4. Military and indigenous police traffic control activities.

5. Indigenous population activities.

(2) Passive linear security measures are used for all conditions or situations and as an adjunct to any other types of linear security employed. They are the product of a long term and continually improved program for an integrated security system.

e. **Remote Security.**

(1) It is normally not feasible to secure all points along a line of communications by physically allocating resources to the points on or segments of the line. Highly mobile heliborne or motorized units are often assigned a number of points or segments within an acceptable reaction time distance for which they plan security countermeasures. These units thereby afford a degree of remote security to these points or segments but are not necessarily prevented from performing other missions. This is similar to remote security functions for protection of stable facilities.

(2) Remote security may be afforded within reduced distances by RAS elements.

(3) Generally, tactical elements lose considerable combat effectiveness if they are dissipated over a lengthy line of communications. Therefore, unit integrity is maintained at a few points, with the combat potential at each point providing remote security to other points or segments along the line.

(4) A combination of passive and remote security is the most common pattern used over a generally secure line of communications.

f. **Reconnaissance Security.**

(1) This type security is seldom employed without the backup of passive plus one of the other forms of security. Reconnaissance security is defined as observing each point along the route at a frequency greater than the reaction time of the backup system. Thus, if the remote security system provides a segment of a line with a 60-minute delay in reaction, that segment should be under aerial or ground observation less than every 60 minutes. The purpose here is that the reconnaissance capability will always be within range to cover an affected point or segment prior to the arrival of the backup, i.e., remote security, element. This is important to linear security as it—

(a) Provides the backup force with a knowledgeable reconnaissance element.

(b) Assists the backup element in finitely locating the site of the incident.

(c) Offers a better possibility of maintaining contact with the adversary.

(2) Reconnaissance for a specific mission, i.e., a critical convoy, is planned to meet the special requirements of that
mission rather than the generalized requirement discussed above.

**g. Patrol Security.**

(1) Patrol security is the adding of some combat (firepower) capability to the reconnaissance effort. The frequency of the patrol effort is computed as with the frequency of the reconnaissance effort. However, patrols are afforded the time required to inspect in detail the critical points of their route segment and, therefore, a number of patrol segments are established for each reconnaissance segment. Segment oriented communications are maintained between patrol and reconnaissance and other linear security means.

(2) Patrol security includes both the line of communications in question and critical adjacent areas from which ambush type operations may be launched.

(3) Normally military police conduct patrol activities as an extension of their normal responsibilities. When additional support is required for this purpose, it is provided by the FASCOM or ASCOM military police brigade.

**h. Escort Security.** Escort security is normally provided by military police. Details on this form of security are contained in FM 19-25.

**i. Strongpoint Security.**

(1) Strongpoint security is defined as the securing of two points between which escort or patrol activities may operate and from which may be launched offensive actions sufficient to the situation.

(2) Strongpoint security requires a considerable expenditure of manpower and other resources. It is used only where a clear and evident requirement exists.

(3) The relatively fixed nature of a strongpoint coupled with its usual isolation presents special security and morale problems that require detailed consideration.

(4) Strongpoints dispatch patrols on a frequent but irregular schedule to other strongpoints. Personnel are rotated between duty at the strongpoint and duty on patrol.

(5) Normally, each strongpoint is at least a platoon sized element and is equipped with mortars, machineguns, good communications, and the best available ground surveillance equipment. Frequent contact is made with strongpoints via heliborne supervision and support resources.

(6) Distance between strongpoints is equated to the estimated “hold capability” of connecting patrols. A patrol should be designed to survive in its most probable contact environment until relief arrives from a strongpoint.

(7) Strongpoint security will do little to eliminate the causes that require its adoption. An inherent part of this severe and costly course of action is a series of parallel corrective actions, to include—

(a) Search for a new route.

(b) Vigorous activity to find and fix the enemy.

(c) Destruction of the enemy by overwhelming combat power.

(d) Saturation of the most dangerous areas with chemical and explosive munitions.

(e) Rigorously enforced circulation control measures over the indigenous population.

(f) Defoliation or other clearance of dense areas.

(g) Mass evacuation of towns and villages.

(h) Engineer construction to bypass dangerous areas.

(i) Repositioning of depots to permit better route selection.

(8) Loss of complete control over any given line is best recognized early. The continued investment of resources into a “lost route” merely serves the objectives of the adversary. The expenditure of resources and energy used for security in more profitable
corrective measures should be adopted whenever feasible.

j Combat Security. Combat security is defined as measures taken by combat arms resources to seize and hold the terrain necessary to permit use of the line of communications in question. This is the most costly form of linear security and, as it draws on the strength of the combat arms, it approaches the ideal response in the eyes of the enemy. Combat arms doctrine is sufficiently developed to cope with this phase of activity. Special considerations include—

(1) Coordination with segments manned by rear area resources.
(2) Integration of combat arms and military police activities with the RAOC.
(3) Clarification of command and control arrangements.

k. Classification of Linear Routes. The condition of a linear route may be described in the familiar traffic light descriptive terms as green, yellow, or red.

(1) Green lines. The lack of enemy activity along any given line or within segments of that line is not interpreted to mean security considerations are not important. When a line appears “green,” an asset of extreme importance exists and it must be preserved. Steps in this respect include—

(a) Passive measures discussed above.
(b) Selective and continuous measures to eliminate potentially dangerous points or segments.
(c) Vigorous intelligence aimed at predicting enemy interdiction activities.
(d) Frequent photographic reconnaissance and analysis.
(e) Prompt and thorough investigation of all suspicious developments.
(f) Establishment of a rapid system for reroute around any segment.
(g) Planning for the rapid and overwhelming introduction of combat power at any point or within any segment of the line.

(2) Yellow lines.
(a) A line or segment thereof is considered “yellow” when overt or covert indications exist that an enemy intends interdiction activities or when the situation and terrain favor enemy interdiction.
(b) At a minimum, patrol security is employed in conjunction with passive, remote, and reconnaissance security measures when this condition exists. Particularly dangerous segments are bolstered with escort security.
(c) An insecure line or segments thereof may require a task force type organization to constantly monitor and control the situation. Normally, this task is performed by military police units from the FASCOM or ASCOM military police brigade. These units are bolstered with aviation, photo reconnaissance, civil affairs, and intelligence support as required.
(d) When the line or segment in question is of immediate and direct interest to the area commander, the task force operates under the RAOC. When the objective area is of less direct or of remote interest, the task force operates under the military police brigade but in general support of the Area Support Group or subarea commanders concerned.

(3) Red lines.
(a) A line or segment thereof is considered “red” when enemy interdiction activities are actually taking place on a frequent basis.
(b) Increased security measures as described for “yellow lines” are instituted.
(c) Emphasis is placed on escort security and combat security.

70. Area Damage Control Operations

This paragraph provides information on area damage control considerations and procedures involved in planning, preparation, organization, coordination, control, and implementation. Area damage control operations consist of preventive and control measures taken prior to,
during, and after an enemy attack, major accident, or natural disaster to minimize the effects on combat service support and insure continuation of uninterrupted support of combat operations. Damage control does not include responsibility for reestablishment of disrupted combat service support. This remains a responsibility of the appropriate commander using available resources of the technical and administrative services involved. Because priorities for combat service support may be affected, it is necessary to distinguish between emergency measures that are undertaken to rescue trapped persons or limit continued spread of damage and post-emergency measures which involve similar tasks but are undertaken for recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.

a. General. Normally, area damage control and rear area security are but two functions of rear area protection. Both functions are responsibilities of the commander who exercises territorial control in a given geographical area.

b. Political Considerations. When an area includes national territory of an allied country, the host government may exercise its sovereign right to control rear area protection activities within its national boundaries. Relationship between national and local governments and tenant military forces must be clearly defined to insure coordinated and integrated operations.

c. Area Damage Control Concepts. In general, area damage control (ADC) is oriented on units, installations, activities, and things subject to physical damage. Area damage control operations are analogous to those of the fire and police departments of a city when employed at the scene of a disaster or widespread disorder. The purpose of ADC operations is to prevent the damage from becoming worse, seal off the affected area, save lives, and salvage equipment. The initiation of ADC operations may be triggered not only by enemy action but also by accidents and natural disasters. Area damage control does not include restoration of combat service support capabilities of the units and installations concerned. Such restoration is a responsibility of the parent organization or command.

(1) Objective. Located within the field army service area and the communications zone are many facilities and installations of such importance to combat service support of combat operations as to offer lucrative targets for enemy attack by mass destruction weapons. Detailed plans are required to minimize the effects of massive damage whether resulting from enemy attack, major accident, or natural disaster.

(2) Planning. To obtain maximum utilization of the same resources, planning and control of area damage control and rear area security are normally centralized (within one section or element) under either the ACofS/Director for Security, Plans, and Operations, or G2-GS, as appropriate. Area damage control plans are prepared on the basis of an assumed degree of damage in order to insure that effective means are provided to minimize personnel casualties and damage to installations resulting from effects of enemy action, major accident, or natural disaster. The plans are based upon the existing command organization. Their scope depends on size of area and location and size of installations, communications routes, and facilities. Subordinate commanders will prepare detailed plans for their units based upon the overall plan.

(3) Phase I operations. Prior to the establishment of an area, consideration is afforded location, dispersal, construction, and mutual support of facilities within a base area.

(4) Phase II operations. Prior to occurrence of an attack, major accident, or natural disaster, area damage control operations consist of preventive measures to avoid or minimize effects of enemy attacks, major accidents, or natural disaster, and of readiness measures to prepare for initiation of phase III operations.

(a) Preventive measures. Dispersion, denial of information to the enemy,
and provision of protective shelter are the principal preventive measures to reduce the effects of mass destruction weapons. Dispersion, protective shelter, and proper selection of terrain are the principal preventive measures to reduce the effects of natural disaster.

(b) Readiness measures. Prior to occurrence of mass destruction attacks, major accidents, or natural disaster, readiness measures will be undertaken to insure prompt and effective implementation of phase III activities. The area commander will establish and coordinate clear-cut lines of responsibility and operational control among commanders of co-equal commands located in his geographic area. Readiness measures include such tasks as provision of an ADC control element (RAOC); designating, organizing, and training ADC teams; designating areas of responsibility; establishing communications and warning systems; making preliminary fallout predictions; preparing plans to reestablish or replace damaged and destroyed service facilities (TASCOM and FASCOM level); and planning for care of mass casualties and disposition of the dead.

(c) Responsibilities of unit commanders. Unit commanders at all levels are responsible for preparation of plans and incorporation into the unit or command SOP of appropriate area damage control measures to be taken. During phase II, commanders of units of company size or larger insure that their units employ adequate preventive measures and readiness measures to reduce unit vulnerability and increase capability for self-help within unit resources. Unit plans will be compatible with the ADC plan for the area and will be coordinated by the area commander.

(5) Phase III operations. Phase III of area damage control operations begins when an attack, major accident, or natural disaster has occurred. Activities undertaken during and after the event include movement of RAOC ADC task force command section or ADC party and ADC teams to the scene of the accident; assumption of control of rescue operations; assessment of damage; firefighting; first aid; casualty evacuation; traffic control; emergency explosive ordnance and bomb disposal; and decontamination measures. Emergency supplies are distributed and communication is reestablished. The RAOC ADC task force command section or ADC party does not direct resumption of combat service support. They will be relieved to become available for employment elsewhere as soon as operational control can be effectively assumed by an appropriate service activity, either the originally affected unit or its successor.

(6) Employment of forces for area damage control. Comanders of units and installations and commanders at successively higher echelons in the organization for area damage control prepare their own damage control plans and supervise and coordinate planning at subordinate echelons. The area damage control plan prepared at each echelon is designed to avoid or minimize effects of damage which is beyond the recuperative ability of a subordinate echelon. In event of an accident; i.e., occurrence of damage to a unit or installation resulting from enemy attack, major accident, or natural disaster, plans for area damage control will provide for sending assistance to the stricken unit, installation, or area. The RAOC of the area comand, in which an area damage control incident has occurred, provides necessary assistance by sending its ADC task force command section or by activating an ADC party. Upon arrival at the site, the ADC task force
command section or ADC party assumes control over area damage control activities, initiates immediate damage assessment, and notifies the RAOC of additional assistance required. It also coordinates treatment and evacuation of casualties, accomplishes necessary chemical and radiological survey, and controls activities of ADC teams furnished by other units to assist at the site.

(a) Area damage control parties. Under certain conditions, where the RAOC may be too distant for rapid response, the area commander may divide the area into sectors or subareas and assign responsibility for providing area damage control parties within the subarea to designated combat support or combat service support units. The units so designated must have the appropriate RAP potential and priority. The capabilities and proposed organization for an ADC party are shown in section I, appendix B, and the units capable of providing an ADC party are identified in chapter 5.

(b) Area damage control teams. Combat support, combat service support, and tenant units will be designated to contribute the area damage control potential identified in their TOE. This support will be provisionally organized into functionally oriented ADC task forces. When committed, activities of ADC teams will be controlled by the ADC task force command section or ADC task force command section or ADC party commander at the scene. The rear area operations center coordinates requests for assistance and calls on appropriate previously designated units to furnish ADC or special ADC teams trained and equipped to perform required tasks in connection with firefighting, rescue, food service, billeting, medical sorting, decontamination, explosive ordnance disposal, or other services. Area damage control plans assign appropriate priorities for assistance to be furnished by each unit. ADC teams return to their primary mission assignment upon release by the area commander or the commander at the incident site who is responsible for bringing the emergency under control. The capabilities and composition of ADC teams are shown in sections II and III, appendix B. Units capable of providing this potential are identified in chapter 5.

(c) Special ADC teams. Due to the variety of skills and equipment required and the differences in application under various conditions, requirements can be stated for each special type of damage control support only with reference to a specific damage control situation. Resources in skills and equipment are employed in accordance with their application to the type of area damage control function involved, such as—

1. Firefighting. Quick response by local unit resources during the initial stages will permit most accidental fires to be brought under control while small and within the capability of the unit involved. However, massive fires beyond local unit control can result from enemy attack by nuclear or conventional weapons or from lightning and other accidental causes. Special techniques and equipment are required to bring such fires under control, particularly where extra hazard results from proximity of large quantities of inflammable materials, such as POL and ammunition stocks, or of dry forested areas. Available resources include specially trained firefighting teams equipped with firefighting trucks and trailers, water tank trucks and trailers, and brush fire trucks. These are organic to engineer firefighting platoons which
are assigned to the support brigade in FASCOM and Area Support or trailer-mounted firefighting Groups in TASCOM. Heavy truck-equipment is also organic to certain other types of units including ordnance ammunition, artillery missile, and Army aviation units, which use hazardous or flammable materials in their operations. Usually, these firefighting teams must be reinforced by locally available ADC labor teams equipped with handtools, such as axes, shovels, and picks. In disaster situations involving conflagrations, firefighting teams may be unable to extinguish the fires. They will direct their efforts to gaining control of the fire, evacuation of troops and equipment, and isolation of fires to allow them to burn themselves out.

2. **Heavy rescue.** Where personnel have been trapped by collapse of buildings, fortification, excavations, or equipment, or other damage effects resulting from enemy attack, major accident, or natural disaster, rescue operations will be undertaken. These teams retain their basic squad or platoon organizations and use organic unit handtools when participating in rescue operations. Where the magnitude of the rescue task requires use of heavy engineer mechanical equipment, engineer TOE units may be designated to furnish organic elements, such as squads, platoons, or companies, augmented with appropriate engineer equipment teams, which participate in rescue operations under engineer command and supervision. Engineer knowledge and professional judgment are needed at the site for effective utilization of engineer resources and safety in operation of engineer equipment.

3. **Earthmoving and rubble clearance.** Engineer equipment and techniques are required for rapid accomplishment of tasks involved in clearance and reopening of routes following nuclear attack, major accident, or natural disaster. Dozers and scooaloaders are used for earthmoving, rubble clearance, and reopening passage through areas blocked by tree blowdown or structural debris. Heavy objects may be lifted and move aside by cranes, shovels, wreckers, and some types of materiel handling equipment. Engineer units may be designated to furnish squads, platoons, or companies augmented with appropriate organic engineer equipment to perform rubble clearance, earthmoving, and route reopening tasks under engineer command and supervision.

4. **Service support of emergency operations.** The area commander is responsible for service support of the area damage control forces working in a disaster area. To execute this responsibility, specially trained personnel are provided, in accordance with pertinent area damage control plans, from specifically designated units selected on the basis of capabilities related to normal operational responsibilities. Water supply teams may be provided from nearby engineer installation support units and from engineer combat or construction battalions. Food service and billeting teams would be furnished, as designated in ADC plans, by the Area Support Group headquarters company or by the headquarters company of a nearby service support unit or installation of battalion size or larger. Additional labor required for these services may be provided from labor teams furnished by nearby combat service support units as designated under ADC plans. In general, ADC
teams are supported by their own parent units, at least initially, until such time as it appears desirable to establish temporary billets and a transient mess at the disaster site.

5. First aid. All military personnel are trained in first aid techniques and this function will ordinarily be performed as part of the rescue operation. In some cases, units may be designated to furnish first aid teams to augment rescue team operation. In some cases, units sorting and evacuation teams.

6. Medical sorting and evacuation. In disaster situations where heavy casualties have been incurred, medical service teams are organized and furnished from nearby medical installations. The surgeon determines the number, type, and size of these teams which will provide emergency medical treatment for casualties at medical sorting and evacuation stations to be established in the vicinity. Non-medical personnel perform functions of rescue, first aid, and movement of casualties to sorting stations. Medical personnel are responsible for providing subsequent necessary treatment and evacuation. The surgeon designates which hospital facilities will be used for patients requiring hospitalization.

7. Decontamination. In disasters resulting from accidental or deliberate detonation of nuclear weapons, there will probably be an associated problem of radiological contamination and fallout. A sophisticated enemy could also have the capability of hitting attacks with chemical, biological, and radiological weapons separately or in conjunction with other weapons. To accomplish decontamination measures and procedures, decontamination teams would be utilized to clear critical areas, supplies, and equipment. Decontamination teams of squad size or organized by each company size unit for clearing and decontamination of their own unit areas. The ADC task force command section has a capability to supervise and control augmentation teams engaged in decontamination measures at the disaster site and to perform necessary chemical, biological, or radiological survey to detect CBR hazards. In situations beyond the capability of the ADC task force to control, the RAOC will coordinate and arrange with appropriate chemical and other units to provide necessary assistance or augmentation for decontamination of the disaster areas. Military police will control movement of personnel into contaminated areas.

8. Emergency explosive ordnance disposal. This task will be performed by teams from the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) detachment which normally is responsible for explosive ordnance disposal support in the area. ADC plans will also indicate alternate units that may be called on if necessary in response to requests for EOD support coordinated through the RAOC. The commander at the disaster site will call for EOD support when it becomes apparent such assistance is required. The hazardous, highly technical nature of the EOD task requires that it be performed by specially trained, highly skilled personnel. Augmentation by labor teams furnished by other types of units may be required in cases where heavy clearance of debris, rubble, or wreckage is necessary before the EOD team can begin work. Military police direct the evacuation from the danger area of all personnel not needed for the operation.

9. Unit integrity of ADC teams. Most
of the functional services required for area damage control measures are handled most efficiently by the service or command responsible for that function under normal conditions. Special ADC teams are provided under pertinent plans on the basis of identified RAP potential of normal unit capabilities and responsibilities for the functional services required. They consist of organic elements or subdivisions, such as squads or platoons, to be furnished by the parent unit for performing functional, service oriented tasks under unit command in response to professional direction of the ADC task force or ADC party. Unit integrity is the key to efficient employment of these units in performing those tasks for which they had been trained in connection with their primary mission functions. Under such conditions, there would probably be less adverse impact on the normal service support function of the parent unit than if there existed a requirement to train personnel in a secondary ADC function not necessarily related to the primary mission function. Engineer type tasks would be best performed by engineer troop units. Similarly, emergency food service and POL resupply would be best performed by teams from supply and service units; transportation service for evacuation of personnel and movement of supplies by teams from transportation units; and emergency medical service by teams from medical units. Types of special ADC teams are shown in sections IV through XVIII, appendix B, and the units capable of providing these teams are identified in chapter 5.

Section II. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF RAP OPERATIONS

71. General TASCOM Support

TASCOM facilities and operations are threatened by hostile elements whose mission is to collect information, to disrupt lines of communication and destroy materiel, and to lower the morale of U.S. Forces personnel by harassing actions. These hostile activities support and are coordinated with the operations of the conventional hostile military forces. The hostile elements in the TASCOM area consist of military and/or civilian personnel who, acting singly or in groups, employ clandestine methods to collect intelligence information, commit acts of sabotage and subvert the indigenous population. The information which they collect may be used to provide target data, e.g., for air and missile attacks on TASCOM facilities, and to select likely drop and landing zones for hostile airborne operations. Larger groups, also military and/or civilian, may operate as guerrillas and conduct sudden attacks to destroy TASCOM installations or to disrupt and harass our lines of communication. To counter these hostile activities and to maintain adequate security of installations, units, and personnel within the TASCOM area, the ASCOM commander must have effective counterintelligence support. To provide this support, a Military Intelligence Group, Security, is assigned to ASCOM from which subordinate Military Intelligence Detachments, Security, are attached to Area Support Groups (see fig. 10). Details of organization and functions are contained in FM 54-6-1 (TEST), Area Support Command. This group consists primarily of trained counterintelligence specialist personnel.

72. Role of the Military Intelligence Group, Security

a. The headquarters of the Military Intelligence Group, Security, is located with the group functions under the staff supervision of the ACoFS, Security, Plans, and Operations, ASCOM. To provide area coverage and support for each Area Support Group, a Military Intelligence Detachment, Security, is attached to each Area Support Group. Although each of these detachments is subordinate to the Mili-
Figure 10. Military intelligence group, security, ASCOM.

tary Intelligence Group, Security, and most of their operations are centrally controlled and coordinated, by the Military Intelligence Group, Security, the detachments are laterally responsive to the requirements of the Area Support Group commanders through their respective Directors, Security, Plans, and Operations. To provide the flexibility required by variance in intensity and location of hostile activities and by changing workloads and priorities, the Military Intelligence Group, Security, in coordination with the ASCOM ACofS, Security, Plans, and Operations, will shift personnel between subordinate detachments as the situation requires. Each Military Intelligence Detachment, Security, will have subordinate elements dispersed throughout the Area Support Group area of responsibility.

b. Hostile activities, such as espionage, sabotage, and subversion, transcend Area Support Group boundaries. For this reason the Military Intelligence Group, Security, must exercise a centralized control and coordination of espionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion operations. This centralized control does not preclude or interfere with the responsiveness of the detachments to the respective Area Support Groups. Operations of the group are coordinated through direct liaison with the Military Intelligence Group, Field Army; the Military Intelligence Group, Theater Army; and intelligence and security units supporting the Theater Air Force and Theater Navy. Liaison at all levels, as appropriate, is maintained with intelligence and security (including police) agencies of host governments, allied nations, and other U. S. agencies, particularly with military police and civil affairs units, to coordinate operations and exchange information of mutual interest. Status-of-forces and other agreements with allied nations may in some instances restrict the operations of the Military Intelligence Group, Security. The group will be dependent in varying degrees on allied services and agencies for security investigations of indigenous labor force personnel, as
well as for assuming a part of the effort in counterintelligence and security operations.

c. The Military Intelligence Detachment, Security, will designate a liaison officer and an alternate or assistant to serve as the point of contact with the rear area operations center. Frequency of contact will depend on the intensity of hostile activities and the volume of information to be exchanged. Liaison will be a "two-way street." The RAOC will pass information and requests for information to the respective detachments. Information of an urgent nature will be passed laterally by the Military Intelligence Detachment, Security, to the RAOC at the same time that it is forwarded to the group. Information not of an urgent nature will be forwarded to group for correlation and evaluation and then forwarded through the ASCOM ACoFS, Security, Plans, and Operations, and appropriate Area Support Group Director, Security, Plans, and Operations, to the RAOC in the area. An SOP on the channeling of RAP information/intelligence from the Military Intelligence Group, Security, to the RAOC and between Area Support Groups, their RAOC, and the Military Intelligence Detachments, Security, must be prepared by the ACoFS, Security, Plans, and Operations, ASCOM. This SOP must be sufficiently flexible to permit adaptation of procedures to varied situational requirements of the individual Area Support Groups.

73. Nature of Support from the Military Intelligence Group, Security

a. The group with its subordinate detachments will, in the performance of its normal functions as outlined in FM 54–6—(TEST), assist in rear area protection activities. The following functions are particularly significant:

(1) Collection of information on key personalities among the hostile elements operating in the TASCOM area.
(2) Development of networks of human sources of information dispersed throughout the TASCOM area.
(3) Conduct of operations designed to penetrate hostile elements.
(4) Application of surveillance techniques to acquire additional information on known, suspected, or potential hostile personalities or bases of operation.
(5) Interrogation of suspects, guerrillas, and prisoners of war of counterintelligence interest.
(6) Maintenance of a central records facility (Military Intelligence Detachment, CRF) on personnel of intelligence interest.
(7) Processing of requests for security checks of indigenous labor force personnel. Actual investigations will be performed by host country agencies.

b. Following are examples of information which the RAOC may receive from the Military Intelligence Group, Security, and its subordinate detachments:

(1) Identities of persons, groups, and organizations hostile to U. S. interests.
(2) Identities of unreliable local government officials.
(3) Political developments which present a threat to rear area security.
(4) Location of arms and equipment of hostile persons or groups.
(5) Identities of improperly documented persons.
(6) Identities of known or suspected enemy collaborators, sympathizers, potential saboteurs, and other persons who pose a threat.
(7) Location of buildings and installations known or suspected to be bases of operation, supply points, or meeting places of hostile elements.
(8) Indications of the imminence of sabotage attempts, guerrilla raids against U. S. installations or units, or ambushes of lines of communication.
(9) Reports on methods of operation and techniques employed by saboteurs.

c. The Military Intelligence Detachment, Security, has the capability of providing assistance in the security education and training programs of the Area Support Group. However, the austerity of strength of these detachments and the frequent load of tasks with higher priorities may severely limit this capability.
74. Counterintelligence Support in the FASCOM Area

a. Counterintelligence support of rear area protection activities within the FASCOM area will be provided by the Counterintelligence Detachment, Military Intelligence Group, Field Army. Within the field army area, from the division rear boundary back, this detachment will provide the same support as does the Military Intelligence Group, ASCOM, in the TASCOM area. Functions and capabilities are generally the same. In addition to the Counterintelligence Detachment Headquarters, Military Intelligence Group, Field Army, which is located in the vicinity of the field army headquarters, the detachment has six stations for control purposes. These stations are dispersed throughout the field army area, one of them at FASCOM headquarters. Assigned to each station are an appropriate number of four-man teams which can be shifted as the situation requires. RAOC and counterintelligence stations should be located in proximity to each other. Inasmuch as specific locations, channels of communication, and liaison will vary with area considerations, procedures must be established by SOP.

b. Counterintelligence operations will be coordinated between the Military Intelligence Group, Security, and the Counterintelligence Detachment with additional liaison with all intelligence and security agencies in the FASCOM and adjacent areas.

Section III. RAP CONSIDERATIONS IN USE OF TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT

75. General

In planning for tactical air support for rear area protection, it must be realized that rear area commanders requesting such support must compete with tactical units for allocation of available aircraft. Thus, it is imperative that, in the basic RAP command policy directive (ch 2), adequate procedures and policies be spelled out so that area commanders are granted authority to utilize available, support, to include —

a. Air reconnaissance support.

b. Close air support.

76. Air Reconnaissance Support

a. General. Within the geographical limits of a designated rear area will be subareas designated as scan areas (see para 95-99). Normally these areas are beyond the surveillance activities of the rear area commander. During situations where surveillance of these areas is considered necessary by the area commander, he may request surveillance support through Army command channels which will be considered in the daily apportionment of the available air support for air reconnaissance missions.

b. Procedure. Based on the situation, the RAOC may request either preplanned or immediate requests for air reconnaissance missions as authorized by the basic RAP policy document. Reconnaissance flights will be made as provided by the apportionment of available resources and subsequently allocated by the appropriate army commander.

(1) Field army service area. Preplanned requests for air reconnaissance support are passed over Army communications means from the RAOC to the Army Support Brigade then to the FASCOM for coordination with the Army TOC (TASE) which processes the request the same as requests received from other subordinate commands. Following completion of the mission, information derived from the debriefing report is forwarded by the Air Force intelligence officer or ARLO by the fastest suitable means to the RAOC. If the RAOC is provided suitable communications means (TACP), direct reporting from the aircraft may be provided when the requirement for speed is essential. Air reconnaissance reports may also be delivered directly to the RAOC by aerial means, when necessary.
(2) **TASCOM.** Since FM 100–26 (TEST) does not address the TASCOM area, no definite procedure can be developed to request air reconnaissance support for RAP functions. However, under certain situations, such requirements may exist in the TASCOM requiring local SOP to be developed. As a possible solution, the RAOC could make requests (when authorized) through Army command channels to the ASCOM or possibly the TASCOM which would consolidate all requests from the RAOC and approve those which have highest priority and can be filled by allocated aircraft for this purpose.

(3) **Immediate air requests.** May be requested by any Army unit or activity when required for RAP operations. Units would make request to appropriate RAOC which would transmit to a TACP if available. If a TACP were not available, it would be necessary to rely on other available communications means to relay request to appropriate DASC or to some Air Force element which has been designated to provide immediate air support.

(4) **Tactical air reconnaissance capabilities.** Both Army and Air Force reconnaissance capabilities are utilized to the maximum to support the following:

(a) Survey areas for future sites of units and activities to be located or relocated in the rear areas to assure consideration for their adequate protection.

(b) Assist in gathering intelligence information on location of enemy forces to facilitate offensive action to eliminate enemy forces.

(c) Provide reconnaissance security (see para 59–70).

(d) Specific mission. Reconnaissance for a specific mission; i.e., a critical convoy, is planned to meet the special requirements of that mission.

77. Close Air Support

Close air support of RAP forces must be considered and planned. These forces normally are made up of RAP platoons from combat support and combat service support units which will be relatively unskilled in the use of close air support. RAP forces normally are considered capable of reacting against enemy company sized or smaller type unit operations with presently assigned equipment. When larger enemy forces are operating in the rear areas, it will be necessary for the responsible commander to request tactical troops to accomplish rear area security missions. Depending on the situation and availability, appropriate TACP's may be attached to these tactical forces to provide necessary control and communications for close air support roles. Procedures for requesting this support originating in the field army service area would be direct to the Army TOC (TASE) and in the TASCOM area to a designated Army or Air Force headquarters capable of alerting Air Force elements.

78. **Tactical Air Control Party (TACP)**

- **a.** Normally, TACP's would not be required in support of RAP operations in the field army service area and/or the TASCOM area. As mentioned above, when the situation in the rear area become critical, the responsible area commander will request tactical troops to adequately perform rear area security missions. These tactical troops may have TACP's attached if the situation warrants such attachment.

  - **b.** In the event it was considered necessary to provide TACP's to RAP forces, they would be assigned on the basis of one TACP to each RAOC. The TACP would support any RAP force activated in the RAOC area of responsibility and, in addition, would train appropriate RAP force elements in their proper use. In the event tactical forces were assigned to the area, a TACP would be already familiar with the area of operations.

79. Planning Considerations for Support of RAP Operations

- **a. Surveillance.** To adequately perform the RAP functions in the rear area, it is necessary to provide responsible area commanders with means to properly perform surveillance over their areas. The amount of aerial surveillance support required would depend on such factors
as other (ground) means available, threat to the rear area, size, and type of terrain to be secured.

(1) The responsible area commander would request permanent attachment of Army aircraft (fixed wing or helicopter) to support RAP operations when deemed necessary. This request would be made through Army command channels and would be considered with other aircraft requirements.

(2) Benefits might also be derived by requesting surveillance reports from Army and Air Force elements that would normally be passing over areas requiring surveillance. This information could be passed to the appropriate RAOC following completion of the aircraft mission or by radio communications if available and speed was essential. The same procedures for requesting preplanned aerial surveillance would be followed.

b. Area Damage Control Support. Tactical air support provides assistance to responsible area commanders by the following means:

(1) Protection of vital resources. Provided by regular air defense capabilities and any deterrent effect provided by overhead flights. Location of enemy elements in the rear areas during surveillance operations also aid in the protection of resources in the rear when offensive actions are taken to eliminate enemy forces.

(2) Survey of damaged area. Provided upon request to survey damaged area to determine extent of damage and to assist in estimating requirements for damage control operations. Normally, this request would be submitted by the RAOC responsible for the damaged area; however, in large scale damaged areas, this request could originate from the ADCOC at a higher headquarters, such as FASCOM or ASCOM.

(3) Aerial resupply. RAP forces engaged in rear area security operations may require such support similar to other combat type forces. However, the greatest use would probably be required in area damage control operations where critical supplies and personnel would be needed in a damaged area and, because of the situation, aerial movement would be the most practical method for their delivery.

Section IV. COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT FOR RAP

10. General

A communications system in support of rear area protection operations must be mobile and flexible enough to provide a high grade of service over extended distances, over restrictive terrain, and under all types of atmospheric and climatic conditions. For certain coordination and control of RAP operations, systems must provide a number of secure communication channels among the rear area operations centers and their associated RAP units. In addition, there must be two or more routes between points of the system to provide flexibility of employment and to reduce vulnerability to enemy action and equipment failure. All these capabilities are available through the area communication systems of the theater which RAP basically relies on to pass routine and initial warning information.

81. Theater Army Communications System

a. Within the communications zone, portions of the required communications support for the RAP concept is obtained through the Theater Army Communications System (TACS). In the COMMZ, organizational and operational considerations of the theater army make centralized control of communications system the most desirable method of operations. Therefore, to support this theory within the COMMZ, the TACS is individually installed, operated, and maintained by the US Army Strategic Communications Command (USASTRAT-
COM) (THEATER) under the operational control of the theater army commander. Because of the organizational and operational concepts of the COMMZ, the TACS to support the headquarters, units, and installations located therein will require a communications system consisting of two subsystems: a command oriented communications subsystem and an area oriented communications subsystem.

b. The command oriented communications subsystem consists of direct multichannel communications links interconnecting the major headquarters of the theater and theater army. There are also other direct multichannel links which may be required between headquarters and installations and which cannot be satisfied by the area oriented communications subsystem of the TACS. These direct multichannel communications links are provided by tropospheric scatter (troposcatter), radio relay, and/or cable facilities. In addition, these facilities are engineered to handle all types of traffic on a 24-hour basis.

c. The area oriented communications subsystem of the TACS is essentially the single most important communications support system for RAP operations. It is through this system that the greater portion of administrative matters conducted by the RAOC will be transacted and, in all likelihood, will provide the initial means for a unit to alert the RAOC of any attack or disturbance. Further, this system will allow the RAOC to contact those organizations containing a RAP potential element. These organizations consist of the many subordinate commands along with their attached units which comprise the theater army and provide combat support and combat service support to the theater. Because of the way these subordinate commands are widely dispersed throughout the COMMZ, an extensive communications system is required for command and coordination of RAP operations. These communication requirements are satisfied by the area oriented communications subsystem of the TACS. This system extends along the lines of communications (LOC) from the rear of the theater, through the COMMZ, and interconnects with the field army communications system in the combat zone. It provides local and long distance communications service for headquarters, units, and installations located along the LOC. The type of services provided are telephone, teletypewriter, facsimile, data, and messenger. Each RAOC will be connected into the area oriented communications subsystem through the facilities of the area command to which they are assigned. This procedure will provide the RAOC with reliable communications service to all other headquarters, units, and installations as required. Circuits within this subsystem are generally provided on a common user basis with sole user circuits being provided when justified according to criteria established by the theater army commander.

82. Field Army Communications System

a. Because the field army does not have a fixed organization, its communications system will vary in size and composition as the size of the supported forces vary. The basic communications system for the field army consists of multichannel radio and cable links, signal centers, extension facilities, HF radio nets, and a messenger service organized into an area oriented communications subsystem and a command oriented communications subsystem.

b. The field army multichannel radio and cable links connect the signal centers of the field army communications system. These links interconnect the echelons of the field army headquarters and connect the echelons of the field army headquarters to the echelons of major subordinate command headquarters to form the command oriented communications subsystem. The multichannel links between the area signal center and from the area signal centers to the division communications system, to the echelons of the corps headquarters, and to other major headquarters, units, and installations in the area form the area oriented communications subsystem. The circuits of the system are designed primarily as common user circuits; however, sole user circuits may be provided when justified. The signal centers are connected to at least two other signal centers to provide alternate routing between centers and to reduce the vulnerability of the system. The field army communications system is connected to the TACS in at least two places called theatre access points (TAP) by signal
troops of USASTRATCOM. This provides for a completely integrated theater communications system.

c. A field army signal center consists of signal equipment that can be interconnected to provide terminal, patching, switching, radio/wire integration, communications center, and messenger facilities for headquarters, installations, and units. Signal centers are located at headquarters and in an area to provide service to dispersed units and installations. The RAOC will be connected into the field army area oriented communications subsystem through the nearest signal center. This will then provide the RAOC essentially with the same basic service throughout the field army area as that provided for in TACS. All signal centers located throughout the theater have a radio/wire integration capability. This service provides a means for mobile radio stations within range of the communications center to enter the area oriented communications subsystem.

83. Organic Communications

a. General. Although the area communications systems of the theater provide support service for the day-to-day routine business and the initial warning actions of the RAOC's, it is important that the RAOC's have their own organic communications systems. As a mission develops, RAS or ADC operations will revert to mobile organic AM and FM radio net systems for command and control.

b. Rear Area Operations Center Net (AM). Due to the extensive distances involved, the rear area operations center nets will consist of single sideband (SSB) AM radios. These nets will provide command and control communications between the RAOC plans and operations section and any activated RAOC task force command section or RAS company command and control team. When the RAOC detachment commander activates a task force command section or when a RAS company command and control team is alerted, the SSB AM radio net will be brought into service. This net will remain in service until the completion of the mission, at which time the net control station, which is the RAOC, will then close the net and return to the services of the area communications system of the theater.

c. RAS Task Force Command and Control Nets (AM). A RAS task force command section normally moves to the scene of a disturbance when two or more RAS company command and control teams are activated. Communications support between these units is accomplished by expanding the RAOC SSB AM radio net to accommodate this additional requirement. Types of SSB AM radio nets are illustrated in figure 11.

d. RAS Auxiliary Command and Control Net (FM). Appropriate FM radios are provided for establishment of FM radio command and control nets as auxiliaries to the SSB AM radio nets. However, the limitations on the range of FM radios discourage any dependency on these auxiliary nets when extended distances are involved. Refer to figure 11.

e. RAS Company Command and Control Net (FM). With the activation of the RAS company command and control teams, it will be required that the teams alert their appropriate RAS platoons. As the platoons form, they will report in on the RAS company command and control net, of which the command and control team is net control station (fig. 12). With the completion of the mission, all FM nets will be closed by their respective net control station and communications support will again depend on the area communication system of the theater.

f. ADC Task Force Command and Control Net (AM). An ADC task force command section normally moves to the scene of the ADC event as soon as possible. Communications from the scene to the RAOC are then provided by the organic SSB AM radio in the ADC task force command section.

g. ADC Auxiliary Command and Control Net (FM). Appropriate FM radios are provided for establishment of an auxiliary FM net between the RAOC and the ADC task force command section. However, the limitations on the range of FM radios discourage any dependency on these auxiliary nets when extended distances are involved.

h. ADC Operations Net. Separate operational nets from the ADC task force command section to ADC teams working at the ADC incident site may be established. These nets
will depend on the organic radio of the participating ADC teams. However, it is visualized that most internal communications at the ADC incident site will be performed by messenger or landline methods.

Section V. CBR FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN SUPPORT OF RAP

84. General

a. CBR responsibilities in support of rear area protection pertain largely to measures for avoiding or minimizing the effects of enemy chemical, biological, and nuclear attack. These responsibilities are centered in either the RAOC or the area damage control center (ADCOC) of headquarters having major rear area protection responsibilities.
b. CBR operations performed in the RAOC/ADCO include—

1. Assisting in the preparation of plans to prevent enemy interference by surface or airborne forces with support operations and to destroy the hostile forces involved.

2. Assisting in the preparation of plans to minimize the damage effects of enemy mass destruction weapon attacks, major accidents, and natural disasters.

3. Preparing vulnerability analyses of units and installations within their area of responsibility in accordance with available intelligence.

4. Receiving, collating, evaluating, and disseminating NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) reports as specified in STANAG 2103 and discussed in detail in FM 21–40, and FM 8–12.

5. Preparing and disseminating predictions of fallout from enemy delivered nuclear weapons.

6. Providing data on the casualty-producing effectiveness of and degree of hazard from enemy chemical and biological attacks.

7. Planning, controlling, and coordinating chemical and biological detection and radiological monitoring and survey operations, and decontamination operations of decontamination elements.

8. Plotting and displaying forecasts and/or information on areas of chemical and biological contamination and the areas of effects of nuclear detonations to include radiological fallout.

9. Assisting in planning, controlling, and coordinating area damage control teams.
(10) Providing advice on CRB matters to the commander and staff.

c. Unit commanders are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping their units to insure the accomplishment of their mission in a CBR environment. To assist unit commanders in executing these responsibilities, AR 220–58 provides for the appointment, within all company size units, of a qualified CBR officer, noncommissioned officer, and enlisted alternate on an additional duty basis. Detailed duties of CBR officers and NCO's are outlined in FM 21–40.

d. In view of the anticipated operational employment of rear area protection forces, each officer and NCO in a RAP task force must be proficient in CBR tactics, techniques, protective measures, detection, decontamination, and CBR defense procedures. Their knowledge of and ability to use riot control agents, chemical agent detection equipment, and radiac equipment are of particular importance in RAP operations.

e. FM 21–40 provides for company size units to organize and train CBR teams composed of unit personnel. These teams include chemical agent detection and radiological monitoring teams, decontamination teams, and control parties. To preclude degrading unit capabilities, appropriate special equipment for these teams is authorized by TA 50–914. These trained CBR teams located in an area commander's area of responsibility are a source of CBR support for use in RAP operations. However, unit commanders must insure that their unit has sufficient CBR trained personnel to permit the unit to continue its primary mission in a CBR environment during the absence of the unit's CBR teams.

f. The assignment to Area Support Command of responsibility for RAP operations in the communications zone requires the inclusion of appropriate personnel to staff a security and damage control branch in the ASCOM headquarters. The staffing of the security and damage control branch, Area Support Command, is in TOE 54–402G.

g. RAP forces must be trained and responsive to counter any threat to include use of CB munitions when authorized. Commanders of RAP forces must be knowledgeable in the use of chemical agents which may assist in reducing the resistance of guerrilla forces that have organized themselves in isolated fortified pockets within the area.

h. The use of chemical smoke generator units may be advantageously employed in rear area operations to protect critical installations, ports, and command headquarters. Operations and planning for smoke operation details are contained in FM 3–50.

i. Rear area security tactical forces may also employ chemical smoke generator units, when assigned by the theater commander to facilitate operations against large enemy forces such as airborne troops, armor penetration, or large guerrilla forces. The integration of chemical smoke and other chemical and biological agents must be completely coordinated with other forces operating in close proximity to or whose weapons are within range of the objective area. For employment of chemical and biological agents, see the FM 3–10-series.

Section VI. EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL OPERATIONS

85. General

a. Introduction. Past experience in wars indicates that approximately 5 to 10 percent of the total amount of ammunition employed will fail to function as originally intended. The presence of these items in a rear area poses a threat to personnel, materiel, facilities, operations, and troop morale. For a full discussion of EOD operations, refer to FM 31–45.

b. Types of Incidents. During hostilities, a number of unexploded ordnance incidents of interest to the RAOC may be encountered in rear areas, including—

(1) Unexploded bombs, shells, rockets, mines, and torpedoes; either duds or equipped with delayed-action or influence type fuzes.

(2) Malfunctioned and unexploded missiles, both friendly and enemy.
(3) Downed friendly and enemy aircraft containing unexploded ordnance and hazardous ejection devices.

(4) Sabotage devices and "home-fabricated" bombs introduced by clandestine means by enemy agents.

(5) Stocks of damaged ammunition in fires and explosions resulting from military attacks or accidents.

(6) Numerous false reports of all the above types.

86. EOD Mission

To detect, report, render safe, recover, evaluate, and dispose of unexploded United States and foreign explosives, including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, dropped or placed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to installations, personnel, material, or operations. This function is primarily one of concern to RAP area damage control operations.

87. Organization and Planning

a. General. The organization for performing explosive ordnance disposal services consists of EOD staffs, EOD control units, disposal units, and explosive ordnance reconnaissance agents. Support of EOD services is provided by ADC teams activated by the RAOC or by regular military police, engineer units, decontamination teams, CBR teams, technical intelligence teams, and medical units as required.

b. EOD Staffs. In the communications zone, an EOD staff section is normally assigned within the ACofS, Security, Plans, and Operations Section of the ASCOM and, in the field army, the FASCOM headquarters. Normal controls exercised include—

(1) Establishment of policies governing EOD service in the COMMZ or in the field army.

(2) Distribution of EOD units to balance workloads.

(3) Distribution of special EOD equipment.

(4) Monitorship and coordination of EOD services.

(5) Establishment and maintenance of the EOD incident reporting system.

c. EOD Control Units. EOD control units provide operational control, planning, and administrative services related to mission operations of disposal units for assigned geographical areas of responsibility. The EOD control unit operates a control center for the receipt of explosive ordnance incident reports and the dispatch of disposal units to unexploded ordnance locations within the assigned control area. EOD control units are normally assigned on the basis of 1 per 5 to 8 EOD disposal units. The functions performed by the EOD control units include—

(1) Operating an EOD control center and assigning specific disposal missions.

(2) In the absence of a RAOC, providing operational and technical direction and coordinating support of disposal activity (air transportation, military police, technical intelligence, engineer equipment, and decontamination equipment).

(3) Evaluating activities of the disposal units and recommending distribution of personnel and equipment to balance workloads.

(4) Authorizing the movement of disposal personnel and equipment to meet high priority operations.

(5) Conducting liaison with rear area operations centers.

(6) Conducting liaison with indigenous local law enforcement agencies through the civil affairs organization.

(7) Alerting EOD units for standby during the movement of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons through their area of responsibility.

d. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units. Explosive ordnance disposal units perform final reconnaissance, identification, render safe, recovery, field evaluation, and disposal operations. They are normally authorized on the basis of 5 per corps slice of a field army or independent corps, 2 per independent division, 8 per communications zone, or 1 per 30,000 troops, whichever is greater. Additional EOD units are assigned as required. Other functions performed by the EOD units include—

(1) Supporting ammunition service activi-
ties on a standby basis (e.g., shipment of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons).

(2) Instructing and assisting ammunition storage units in the disposal of unserviceable ammunition.

(3) Training explosive ordnance reconnaissance agents, as required.

(4) Developing emergency render safe procedures and special tools for dealing with first-seen foreign explosive ordnance.

(5) Assisting technical intelligence units in developing data on foreign explosive ordnance and performing final disposition as required.

e. Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance Agents. EOD service is a highly specialized military function. It would be impractical and uneconomical to train and assign EOD personnel to perform all operations at an explosive ordnance incident site. However, to operate efficiently, the EOD organization must be informed rapidly of the presence of unexploded ordnance or toxic agents. This requires that military personnel, police, and civil defense personnel be selected and thoroughly trained to recognize and report the presence of unexploded ordnance. Such trained personnel or organizations most likely to encounter explosive ordnance in the field are designated as explosive ordnance reconnaissance agents (EORA). Explosive ordnance reconnaissance and EORA responsibilities are covered in TM 9–1385–9. ADC potential may be activated by the RAOC to support EOD operations when the seriousness warrants such action.

(1) Military police units. In many areas, the first information relative to explosive ordnance incidents is acquired by operating military police units through liaison and coordination with indigenous law enforcement agencies and with supported military units. Maximum utilization should be made of the communications network of operating military police units. Therefore, military police in particular are thoroughly familiar with explosive ordnance reconnaissance and incident reporting procedures. Activities performed by military police in support of EOD operations include—

(a) Reporting the presence of explosive ordnance encountered to appropriate RAOC (or in accordance with local SOP).

(b) Sealing off and marking the affected area.

(c) Controlling traffic and the evacuation of individuals.

(d) Securing critical installations, activities, facilities, and property.

(e) Performing CBR monitoring of personnel, vehicles, and areas and submitting contamination reports as required.

(2) CBR teams. After a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack, CBR teams conduct an explosive ordnance reconnaissance for unexploded nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons encountered during the conduct of their CBR reconnaissance. Accordingly, CBR teams are trained in explosive ordnance reconnaissance.

(3) Engineer units. Engineer construction units are responsible for providing heavy equipment support for area damage control and public emergencies. Activities performed by engineer units in support of EOD operations include—

(a) Constructing protective barriers to reduce the effects of a detonation.

(b) Preparing excavation and disposal sites (for example, bulldozing and removing soil).

(c) Excavating for deeply buried explosive ordnance when beyond the capabilities of the EOD units. Location of the explosive ordnance, enforcement of safety measures, render safe procedures, and removal of the explosive ordnance are the responsibilities of the EOD unit commander.

(4) Decontamination teams. Decontamination teams are capable of performing explosive ordnance reconnaissance
in conjunction with their decontamination mission. After a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack, decontamination teams may be the first units to encounter the explosive item or toxic agent. They may also be called upon to support EOD operations when the possibility of gross contamination of equipment or facilities may require the use of power-driven decontamination apparatus.

(5) Medical units. Medical units will be alerted and provide necessary support to EOD operations, such as treating and evacuating casualties.

(6) Technical intelligence teams. Technical intelligence teams will normally be supported by EOD units in the gathering of information and materiel of technical intelligence value on first-seen enemy explosive ordnance. However, technical intelligence must flow both ways because the EOD unit must have all available information on such items in order to effectively dispose of them.

88. Reporting Explosive Ordnance Incidents

Anyone may report unexploded items in the field. The incident will normally be reported by telephone or radio to the appropriate RAOC. Information to be reported should include a description of the item, its location, facilities or operations threatened, and any other information which will assist in determining the urgency of the mission. The rear area operations center will relay the information to the EOD control center for the geographical area in which the incident occurred.

89. Assigning Priorities and Categories of Incidents

The probability of multiple unexploded incidents has necessitated the development of a system to classify each incident according to its potential threat to the war effort and, thus, establish priorities for action. This classification system is based upon an estimate of the damage to be expected in the event the unexploded item functions and produces a high-order detonation. The EOD control unit, in coordination with the RAOC concerned, will award the final category classification within the guidance provided by the COMMZ or field army headquarters staff element responsible for rear area protection. See FM 31-45 for categories and priorities within categories required to establish the numerical sequence for disposition of unexploded ordnance incidents.

90. Scheduling EOD Operations

Upon receipt of an item incident report and assignment of appropriate categories, the EOD control center notifies and dispatches the necessary EOD teams. Disposal operations must be scheduled with regard to the category of each incident report, the locations, and personnel availability. Receipt of reports of incidents falling into high categories will necessitate changes in the work program already established and will require rescheduling and reassignment of incident tasks to the disposal team. It is seldom possible to gauge the time required to complete incident tasks assigned. When an EOD team requires more or less time than estimated by the control section to complete its assignment, it will be necessary to readjust the overall workload. Air transportation service for the EOD teams and site support from other units are normally arranged for by the EOD control center through the rear area operations center.

91. Planning by EOD Units

Upon receipt of disposal mission instructions from the EOD control center, the EOD unit commander determines the composition of the EOD team necessary to perform the disposal task. This includes assuring that appropriate render safe procedures, rations, demolitions, special EOD tools and equipment, and EOD qualified personnel are dispatched without delay to the incident site.

92. Preliminary Precautions

After arriving at the scene and appraising the situation, the team chief advises local troop commanders as to the adequacy of protective measures already taken. If they are insufficient, specific recommendations should be made for their improvement. If excessive
caution has been observed, advice as to relaxation thereof should be given. After determining the disposal method and the procedure to be followed, local commanders should be requested to take or assist in safety precautions. These might include the halting of highway and rail traffic and further withdrawal of nearby personnel. If commanders are unable or unwilling to comply with such requests, the incident should be abandoned and a prompt report made to the control unit of the circumstances.

93. EOD Team Operations

The EOD unit commander or his designated senior NCO is solely responsible for determining the proper procedure to be used to accomplish disposal. Actual disposal operations are carried out by the EOD teams. Specialists in other fields will provide technical advice to the EOD team chief as required.

94. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Reports

Upon completion of the mission, the EOD unit will notify the EOD control center and submit a report of disposal actions taken. The EOD control center will notify the responsible RAOC of the completion of the mission. Information of technical intelligence value will be routed through the EOD staff officer to technical intelligence organizations. Information on new EOD techniques required and employed will be routed by the EOD control unit to the EOD staff officer of the command and to subordinate EOD units in the area.
CHAPTER 5
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Section 1. AREA ORGANIZATION

95. General

The establishment of an area with definitive boundaries requires thorough consideration of rear area protection requirements. RAP measures are normally emergency actions that test an area command structure to its maximum. It is generally safe to assume that if this structure can provide command control over the land area and its military resources for RAP operations, it is capable of controlling the area during normal service and support operations. The opposite is generally not true. An area scaled to the maximum capabilities of its command and control element during normal operations is apt to have inadequate control during emergencies.

96. Basic Considerations

In delineating the general area boundaries, the commander takes into consideration the following points:

a. Low Intensity Conflict. The nature of the conflict; e.g., low intensity conflict, permits and favors the tight grouping of service and support facilities while high intensity conflict has the opposite effect.

b. Span of control. The effectiveness of command and control is inversely proportionate to the distances between subordinate echelons. Area, per se, attenuates command. Regardless of troop strength, a command's area must have logical limits.

c. The enemy situation. An area subject to frequent, severe, or prolonged enemy activity will require a higher degree of control. Any given command structure will find its control problems compounded in an active area and this is normally offset by reducing the size of the area to that which can be managed.

d. Responsiveness. The smaller an area, the most responsive its resources will be to emergencies. While dispersion is always a critical consideration, it is seldom necessary to disperse to a point where adequate response to RAP requirements is seriously impaired.

e. Continuity. An area designed to fit the natural limits of the units therein will provide better continuity in the transition from normal to emergency operations. Thus, functional commanders and area commanders attempt to create unified “blocks” insofar as company or battalion elements are concerned. The major portion of each tenanted unit's functions are performed within that area.

f. Military police. Military police represent the major force deliberately organized for rear area security purposes that is consistently available to a rear area commander. Their capabilities and limitations are also considered when establishing area boundaries.

97. Method

Organization of an area for security purposes differs from organization of the same area for damage control purposes. While the resources used in these two functions are often drawn from the same sources, the purpose and, therefore, the plan and operation will vary. It is these variations in plans and operations that dictate the method of organizing the area (see fig. 13).

98. Area Organization for Damage Control

a. Target Areas. Based on most probable effects of enemy activities, the area commander subdivides his area into target areas. Target areas are either individual or grouped facilities within a perimeter the size of which is based on the nature of the conflict.

b. Primary and Secondary Assembly Areas.
Figure 13. Variation in area organization for security and damage control.
Subsequent to designating target areas, the commander establishes primary and secondary assembly areas outside the target areas which RAP forces will use as a coordinating point for damage control operations. It is important in this respect for all facilities within a target area to critically analyze and recommend changes in assembly areas. This analysis will normally include considerations as follows:

1. Safety of RAP forces from explosives.
2. Access of RAP forces to target area and vice versa.
4. Access of aircraft and supply vehicle to assembly area.
5. Suitability of assembly area as eventual site for restoration of damaged facility or interrupted services.

c. Area Relief Scheme. Once target and assembly areas are designated, the RAOC plans for relief actions. Normally, only one damage control task force per area or subarea is created and only one plan per target area is prepared. Generally, if more than one target area suffers severe damage, assistance from other areas is required. If an area commander has sufficient resources to create more than one damage control task force, he further divides groups of target areas and assigns each group to a damage control task force.

d. Priorities. Each target area must have a distinct priority. This is accomplished in numbering of target areas. For example, should areas three and five be hit simultaneously, priority of effort will be devoted to area number three.

e. Intra-area Organization. Within target areas, designated commanders provide a similar area organization for their own damage control measures.

f. Civilian Areas. Civilian areas may also be designated as target areas. Normally, the numbering of these areas start with the last military area.

g. Void Areas. Insofar as damage control is concerned, the bulk of a given land mass is outside the areas for which deliberate counteractions are planned.

99. Area Organization for Security

Since a mere threat to the security of the command will adversely affect its operations, the total area under consideration is organized for security.

a. Basic Areas. The basic areas for security are—

1. The TASCOM area which is divided into support group areas.
2. The support group area which is divided into—
   a. Defense areas.
   b. Patrol areas.
   c. Scan areas.
3. The field army service area which is divided into subareas under the support groups of the Army Support Brigade.
4. The support groups of the Army Support Brigade subareas which are divided into—
   a. Defense areas.
   b. Patrol areas.
   c. Scan areas.

b. Designation of Defense Areas. Each area commander, as well as the commander of each facility in the rear, designates the area within which deliberate defense measures will be undertaken. These areas are called defense areas. They represent the minimum land area over which complete control must exist in order to guarantee the viability of the base. The size of the defense area is not based on the resources available to defend it, but on the need for the area to be defended. Considerations affecting the designation of a defense area include—

1. Character of enemy activities.
2. Hardness or strength of the base area.
3. Terrain.
4. Requirements of the base.

c. Designation of Patrol Areas. Each area and facility commander designates the minimum land mass outside the defense perimeter which must be covered by frequent air and ground patrolling with the objective of providing the amount of warning time the base needs to protect the defense area.

d. Designation of Scan Areas. The remainder of an area outside the defense and patrol perimeters is referred to as the scan
area. Generally, this area is beyond the surveillance capabilities of the area commander. Surveillance is conducted in scan areas by TASCOM and FASCOM commanders using tactical ground and aviation units allocated by the theater or army commander. (See also para 59–70 and para 75–79).

Section II. ADMINISTRATION AND ADPS FOR RAP

100. General

The RAP concept in support of the TASTA configuration relies in part on the effectiveness of ADP support. The objective is to capitalize on reports and procedures necessary for routine operations. Generally, the creation of new reports, procedures, or requirements is not necessary and should be avoided.

101. Scheduled Installation of ADP Systems

The Combat Service Support System (CS) may be installed worldwide in three sequential phases. Phase I is further divided into two parts: IA and IB. The exact sequence and timing of these phases will be determined later based on DA staff guidance, concept studies, and the desires of the theater commanders. Rear area security and area damage control functions presently appear in phase III.

102. Interim Period

Prior to arriving at phase III, it is apparent that the performance of RAP functions in the field will necessarily rely on manual methods. Sufficient personnel are assigned to the RAOC to perform required functions normally; however, the addition of ADPS and equipment as it becomes available will facilitate these operations. Information of assistance to the commander in performing his RAP mission will be available as a byproduct of other systems developed during phases I and II. The value of this information will depend on the final systems structure and the communication capability that exists from the data bank to the RAOC.

103. RAP ADPS Requirements

a. Objectives. To enable an area commander not normally in command of functional resources to take command of these elements located within his area of responsibility and to direct RAP operations in a rear area from a position of knowledge.

b. Nature and Scope. How automatic data processing may assist an area oriented commander in the following respects:

   (1) Determine his total area situation, to include geographical, political, and enemy intelligence data.

   (2) Location and capability of friendly resources (i.e., RAS potential and ADC potential).

   (3) Highway, weather, and similar data insofar as its potential impact on rear area security and area damage control.

   (4) Determine damage assessment factors.

   (5) Determination of the source and content of the data base required to perform (1) through (4) above.

c. Need for the RAP ADP System. Under TASTA–70 doctrine within any geographical area may be located functional entities commanded by up to six different commands. In the event of an emergency, the resolution of command and control for such situations as rear area security or area damage control places on an area commander a complicated command situation. There must be an efficient command backup system (the RAOC) that will minimize ADC operations or enemy interference during tranquil conditions. The RAOC will also allow the achievement of complete unity of command when and if required. Currently, an Area Support Group commander or a subarea commander within the FASCOM structure has no formal means by which he can acquire the information necessary to exercise intelligent control over the diverse resources for which he is responsible. Local commanders have determined the degree of participation of any given combat support or combat service support unit in rear area security or damage control type missions. To permit a commander to implement efficiently the doctrine delineated within this manual, ADP support should be provided as systems and equipment become available.
d. Results Anticipated. An ADPS will enable a commander to receive on either a recurring or exception basis a complete rundown of his area situation, to include the rear area protection potential found in units tenanted within his area of responsibility. In addition, this system will enable units located within a given area to immediately respond to the orders and commands of an area commander when it is necessary for him to assume command and control over these resources. This will, at a minimum, accomplish the following:

1. Automatically remind senior commanders of the type policy decisions which must be made if proper planning and actions are to be expected at a lower level.

2. Assist senior commanders in the classification of land areas which will form the basic rationale as to the status and authority of an area commander in relation to his functional tenants.

3. Prepare for an area commander an area oriented summary that will enable that commander to exercise his responsibilities from a position of knowledge.

4. Prepare for an area commander a complete summary of the resources available to him for rear area security and area damage control purposes.

5. Assist an area commander in the exercise of command and control by automating the planning procedures involved in this complicated function.

6. Assist subordinate units by automatically printing out portions of their plans which must be made in furtherance of the overall area plan. This plan to include the task force structuring, as well as a communications means.

7. Assist an area commander in planning for ADC functions based on expected damage assessments.

8. Automatically select the right plan for a given emergency situation and advise an operations officer of the precise preplanned steps he is expected to take for a given situation.

9. Automatically generate the requirement for a supporting plan on the part of higher headquarters, as well as the issuance of action memoranda on the happening of certain situations or incidents in the rear area.

104. Development of a RAP Interim Manual System and ADPS

It is anticipated that the final data support system developed will be based on the following:

a. Available Data. Each tactical, functional, or area control ADP system generates information that will provide for the requirements of RAP operations. The optimum RAP system will distill this data not only for use by the RAOC but for transmission to using units.

b. Full Use. The RAP system is designed to portray current information that enables the RAOC to logically employ RAP elements on short notice. A bonus effect also results in that the RAOC may provide functional units area oriented information needed for their routine operations.

c. The Data Base. The data base constantly current and available to all elements in any given area is maintained by CS3 and Tactical Operations System (TOS) of the ADSAF systems. It includes the following:

1. Task force for RAP.
   (a) Identification.
   (b) Location.
   (c) Status.
   (d) Planned commitments.

2. Friendly situation.
   (a) Unit Locations.
   (b) Security posture.
   (c) Current operations.
   (d) Communications means and access.
   (e) Spot reports.

3. Intelligence.
   (a) Area-incident analysis.
   (b) Operational patterns and techniques.
   (c) Forecasts and summaries.
   (d) Spot reports.

4. Area and terrain.
   (a) Civil affairs summary.
   (b) Weather.
(c) Terrain analysis.
(d) Road and highway information.
(5) Damage control resources and requirements.
(6) Special information.
   (a) EOD data.
   (b) CBR data.
   (c) Emergency assistance data.
      1. Medical.
      2. Fire.
      3. Police.

\subsection*{d. Acquiring the Data Base.}

(1) General. The data referred to in paragraph 103 above is acquired by the RAOC normally as an automatic byproduct of other ADSAF systems. Where automatic data processing services are available, program designs provide for this. Manual administrative systems may require minor redesigning. Each major data group is discussed below.

\subsubsection*{(a) The status of a unit as pertains to its preprogramed RAP responsibilities is an exception report submitted by a unit directly to the RAOC when operational considerations preclude meeting RAP requirements.}

\subsubsection*{(b) Planned commitments are provided by the RAOC when a unit's RAP element becomes part of a RAOC-RAP plan.}

(2) Friendly situation.

\subsubsection*{(a) The basic disposition of friendly units is provided in a graphic display format by the ADPC. This data consists of a roster of elements referenced by numbers to their relative position on an overlay. The RAOC may fill in the overlay with unit symbols if desired (fig. 14).}

\subsubsection*{(b) The security status of a unit is maintained by the RAOC using any effective system desired. For example, units might be listed in order of criticality and coded in reference to their degree of security. The objective is to be constantly aware of what must be secured and what is or is not secured.}

(c) In order to be constantly abreast of the current situation, the RAOC needs a generalized knowledge of unit operations involving the use of the land area the RAOC controls. Locally established reporting systems fill this requirement. Generally, tenant units report their area oriented operations to the RAOC. The RAOC in turn equates these operations to its ability to assist the unit with information, security, traffic control, or similar support measures. The objective here is to have one center completely informed and at the same time to make as many operations mutually supporting as possible. Examples of current operational reports are as follows:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Dispatch of small detachments or teams to areas not normally secured.
\item Operations in areas considered dangerous.
\item Significant or critical movements.
\item Conduct of road or bridge repairs.
\item Survey activities.
\item Unusual patrol activities.
\end{enumerate}

(d) All units in an area know how to contact the RAOC. The RAOC in turn knows how to contact all units. This knowledge includes all means of communications. Under this system, a transient unit with a problem requiring information or action is assured of assistance or, at a minimum, relay of the requirement to the proper element.

\subsubsection*{(e) The RAOC processes spot reports in the normal manner. An SOP should be established as a guide. The RAOC capitalizes on its ability to equate spot reports to the total situation and to refer emergency matters to those most directly concerned.}

(3) Intelligence. Intelligence information provided the RAOC is aimed at isolating the threats to the security of the
Figure 14. RAP ADPS unit location reference sheet.
RAOC's area. More complete, long range information is available at the area and support command levels. However, the RAOC does not have the need or the means to digest voluminous intelligence reports. Normally, the current intelligence data base is limited to —

(a) A current and projected summary of where security efforts should be concentrated.
(b) Techniques used by the enemy to compromise security.
(c) Spot reports.

(4) Area and terrain. This information comes from intelligence, civil affairs, and unit operations reports. It is aimed at constructing a picture of the geographical area and its people.

e. Formats. Plans being developed provide for uniform and easy to follow formats.

f. Procedures. Complicated administrative procedures must be avoided. The system being developed will include concise reporting procedures that insure expeditious flow of information.

Section III. ORGANIZATIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF UNITS PROVIDING RAP POTENTIAL

105. Estimated Unit Potentials

a. Purpose. This section provides a basis of analysis for the determination of the rear area protection potential of service support units.

b. Concept. Selected TOE units will have RAP potentials and identified additional RAP equipment requirements which will be reflected in their TOE. This potential represents a preprogramed requirement that the selected unit must meet when directed by appropriate authority. The inability of a unit to meet the requirement within the time specified by an area commander places on that unit a responsibility to report this fact. As the fluid resources of the rear move from area to area, their RAP potential is reported to the RAOC responsible for general area security and damage control operations. The RAOC is, therefore, aware of the resources it has for RAP operations and from these resources it structures RAP task forces, plans for their employment, and provides a command element if a task force is activated.

c. Normal Employment. The employment of service support units in their normal configuration and role is the best course of action. However, where a tactical or technical (damage control) requirement does not permit this or where only a portion of a unit is available, the RAP potential is the basis of demand.

d. Special Units. Many units will not have preprogramed potentials. Generally, the specialized nature of these units requires evaluation of their capabilities in light of the exact area and service support situation. Thus, a unit with no preprogramed potential may still be given a RAP mission if it has been awarded a suitable RAP priority designation.

e. The Building Block Theory. The RAP potentials reflected below do not represent a finite capability. They represent that which is reasonable in emergency circumstances and that on which expansion or contraction may be based.

f. Degradation of Support. All units suffer some degree of degradation of service support capabilities if required to perform RAP missions. However, a greater degree of degradation must be anticipated if the administrative area is not secure and positive actions are not taken for adequate protection. Normally, RAP actions are infrequent, short (i.e., less than 24 hours), and generally limited in scope. They are the immediate response to an enemy action or disaster pending the arrival of more deliberate forces.

g. Basis. The RAP potentials discussed below are provided as guide only. They are based on a normal concept of employment of type units. The potential is derived from an analysis of the unit TOE at the time of the printing of this manual. Changes in the TOE or in the normal mode of employment may change the potential of any given unit. It is anticipated that the RAP potential and additional equip-
ment for RAP purposes will be established as an integral part of the unit's TOE. As an interim measure they may be established:

1. By competent authority in the field.
2. As agreed on between area commanders and tenant units.
3. As a result of reasonable interpretation of command policies and SOP's.

h. Area Damage Control. Damage control operations are varied and the requirements for personnel and equipment depend largely on the extent and type of destruction. Normally, a unit can best support these operations in its existing configuration utilizing a squad size up to a battalion size force. The capability of service support units to provide damage control RAP forces and additional ADC equipment requirements should also be identified in selected TOE for consideration by the RAOC in preparing adequate area damage control plans.

106. Transportation Elements

a. Many transportation units are habitually deployed over vast linear distances and do not present a lucrative source for preprogramed emergency resources. However, selected terminal operation elements and short-haul units normally will have a sufficient number of personnel reasonably "close by" to permit the assumption that the potentials reflected herein will exist.

b. Generally, transportation is a critical requirement in a rear area protection operation and use of transportation elements in their normal configuration should be considered prior to their employment in a tactical role.

c. Perhaps the most significant contribution transportation elements may make to security is to emphasize that each vehicle or aircraft represents a reconnaissance potential.

d. A large number of specialized transportation units have significant special damage control potentials that will have to be determined by an area commander based on the total situation. The preprograming of these potentials is not considered feasible.

e. Following are estimated RAP potentials for selected transportation units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type unit</th>
<th>RAS potential</th>
<th>ADC potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trans Ry Equip Maint Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Hv Trk Co</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Lt Trk Co</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans L/Med Trk Co</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Med Trk Co</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Amph (GS) Co</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Term Trf Co</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Term Svc Co</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Amph-Land Cft Maint Co</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Lt Amph Co</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Trans Term Bn</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Med Amph Co</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD, Trans Trk Bn</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Maint Co (DS)</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Aviation Bn</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Maint Co (GS)</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Hv Helicopter Co</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Trans Comd</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD, Trans Motor Trf Gp</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Car Co, Army, Log Comb, A/B Corps</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Trans Bde</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Aircraft Maint Bn</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Trans Term Gp</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Ry Engr Co</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Base Maint Co</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
107. Supply Elements

a. Petroleum supply elements present a significant rear area protection liability. However, these units will normally be associated with engineer and military police elements from which they derive incidental security.

b. Most other supply elements operate from relatively stable bases and have considerably more personnel than the average service support element. While this is necessary to perform assigned missions, during emergencies a 25 percent degradation in service support will yield a relatively higher rear area protection potential. For this reason, many of these elements are considered to have a capability to provide RAS attack platoons rather than RAS rifle platoons.

c. Following are estimated RAP potentials for selected supply units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type unit</th>
<th>RAS potential</th>
<th>ADC potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Petroleum Op Bn</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD, Sup &amp; Svc Bn</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QM Air Delivery Co</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airdrop Equip Repair &amp; Sup Co</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QM Svc Co</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Sup Co (GS), Forward/Amy/COMMZ</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fld Svc Co (GS), Army/COMMZ</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Sup Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair Parts Sup Co (GS), Army/COMMZ</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Disposal Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Svc Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hv Material Sup Co (GS), Forward/Amy/COMMZ</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sup &amp; Svc Co (DS)</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

108. Signal Elements

a. Most signal elements operate in small groups, teams, and detachments and can, therefore, do little more than provide for their own local, close-in security.

b. The specialized nature of signal units coupled with their random disposition precipitated by terrain considerations makes their employment in damage control and support roles extremely difficult to standardize. However, it is expected that an area commander would often assign these units missions such as restoring communications.

c. Area commanders realize that, in emergencies, signal communications are most critical and that the employment of these elements must fully consider the potential impact on the communications system.

d. Following are estimated RAP potentials for selected signal units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type unit</th>
<th>RAS potential</th>
<th>ADC potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Sig Const Bn</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Const Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Cable Const Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Army Comd Sig Radio &amp; Cable Bn</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comd Radio Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comd Cable &amp; Wire Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Army Area Sig Bn</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Area Sig Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Army Comd Sig Op Bn</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Op Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm Cen Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD, Sig Bn</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD, Sig Gp</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Med HQ Op Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Comm Cen Op Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Small HQ Op Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Op Co, Large HQ</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Long Lines Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
109. Engineer Elements

a. The esprit of engineer units coupled with the necessity of keeping most men combat trained makes these units one of the best groupings to preprogram for rear area protection purposes.

b. Where feasible, entire units should be used in their normal configuration for rear area protection missions. This is particularly true of combat engineer units.

c. Many engineer elements habitually operate away from their parent unit or in small teams. Units of this nature have no measurable rear area protection potential and, hence, are not listed here.

d. Following are estimated RAP potentials for selected engineer units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type unit</th>
<th>RAS potential</th>
<th>ADC potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sig Trunk Switching Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Messenger Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Radio Relay Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig Pictorial Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

110. Aviation Elements

a. Army aviation elements are ideally suited for RAP operations in their existing configuration. However, the doctrinal thesis that aircraft are not earmarked for specific standby missions detracts somewhat from their ability to react rapidly to a RAP requirement.

b. A feasible compromise to retain some degree of responsiveness and at the same time not require aviation units to “stand by” is to require these units to be ready to provide life and reconnaissance for RAP operations or to report their inability to the RAOC.

c. Generally, area commanders should make their minimum standby requirements known to aviation units in their areas and aviation units inform area commander whenever they cannot meet these minimum requirements.

111. Medical Service Units

Medical support for RAP operations is substantially the same as for normal operations. There is no necessity to preprogram medical support in medical TOE's for RAP operations. In structuring the RAP task force, the RAOC specifically provides for medical support. The area surgeon and/or senior medical unit commander present will prepare the medical portion of the RAP plan for the RAOC, based on evaluation of the capabilities of the available medical units and in light of the exact area and service support situation. Medical support will include unit level medical service and appropriate backup support for rear area security forces and medical aid teams for area damage control operations.

112. Civil Affairs Units

a. Civil affairs units generally operate as small teams. The relative power of these units to exert command influence over vast areas with minimal expenditure of resources makes them a potentially significant contributor to RAP operations.

b. The employment of either service support or tactical resources in RAP operations should.
always consider the advantages of including participation of civil affairs personnel most familiar with the affected area.

### 113. Maintenance Elements

a. The most significant deterrent to the use of maintenance elements for RAP operations is the unusually high percentage of critical specialists found in these units. The use of even a small number of maintenance personnel for security or damage control purposes might well cause a degradation of service support far outweighing the requirements of the situation.

b. As with supply units, many maintenance units operate from relatively cohesive bases and as such can be organized to at least defend themselves and, with consideration of their critical specialists, to assist in the defense of other areas. This is a subjective measurement best resolved on the spot.

c. Units reflected below are considered to have at least the minimum capabilities indicated.

d. Following are estimated RAP potentials for selected maintenance units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type unit</th>
<th>RAS potential</th>
<th>ADC potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lt Equip (GS) Maint Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon (alternate)</td>
<td>Lt rescue platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD, Maint Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hv Equip (GS) Maint Co</td>
<td>Attack platoon</td>
<td>Lt rescue platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection &amp; Classification Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt rescue platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammo (DS/GS) Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt rescue platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maint Co, COMMZ</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Maint (DS) Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Lt rescue platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guided Missile Maint Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Ammo (DS) Bn</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Ammo Gp</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maint Support Co (DS)</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>Lt rescue platoon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Ammo Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tire Repair Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 114. Military Police Elements

a. The logical and normal deployment of military police elements makes them ideal for RAP operations. Their areas of interest generally coincide with the enemy’s area of interest. In addition, military police normally will be the first element to investigate an incident or to be on the scene. Their inherent mobility coupled with excellent communications provides a capability to construct rapidly an integrated RAP element on the spot.

b. Often military police elements are deployed over relatively vast linear distances, and units so employed suffer some degradation of tactical responsiveness. However, where the total police effort is a product of area wide control, proper planning can overcome this problem.

c. Whenever possible, military police RAS responsibilities are preprogramed to provide reconnaissance and escort platoons. This approach provides an area commander an essential tool for RAS operations and simultaneously provides military police with the minimum equipment to perform their reconnaissance and escort responsibilities.

d. Following are estimated RAP potentials for selected military police units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type unit</th>
<th>RAS potential</th>
<th>ADC potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HHD, MP Bde</td>
<td></td>
<td>ADC party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHD, MP Bn</td>
<td>Comd &amp; con team</td>
<td>ADC party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Gd Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP ESCRG Co</td>
<td>Rifle platoon</td>
<td>Lt rescue squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Phys Scty Co</td>
<td>Recon &amp; escort platoon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Co</td>
<td>Recon &amp; escort platoon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
115. Administrative Units

The administrative complications inherent in an operational system dependent on the melding of diverse resources must be recognized. While rear area protection is a field system, it must apply good management techniques or it will collapse in a maze of plans, regulations, directives, charts, and memoranda. Adjutant general units called on in the early stages of system development can materially assist in providing both the data and the system most responsive to local requirements. In addition, these units can manage and improve administrative procedures with professional competence not normally found elsewhere.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type unit</th>
<th>RAS potential</th>
<th>ADC potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Svc Co</td>
<td>Not considered</td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Svc Det</td>
<td></td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Spt Postal Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Agency (GS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Labor squad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC, Personnel Command</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lt rescue squad &amp; labor squad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

1. Army Regulations
   1–70 Administration: Standardization Among Armies of the United States—United Kingdom—Canada.
   1–71 Administration: Standardization Among the Countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
   320–5 Military Terms, Abbreviations and Symbols; Dictionary of United States Army Terms.
   320–50 Military Terms, Abbreviations, and Symbols: Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.
   500–50 Emergency Employment of Army Resources: Civil Disturbances.
   500–60 Emergency Employment of Army Resources: Disaster Relief.

2. Field Manuals
   1–60 Army Aviation Air Traffic Operations—Tactical.
   1–100 Army Aviation.
   3–10 Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents.
   3–12 Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense.
   3–50 Chemical Smoke Generator Units and Smoke Operations.
   5–34 Engineer Field Data.
   5–36 Route Reconnaissance and Classification.
   9–1 Ordnance Service in the Field.
   17–1 Armor Operations.
   19–2 Military Police Support in the Field Army.
   19–3 Military Police Support in the Communications Zone.
   19–5 The Military Policeman.
   19–15 Civil Disturbances and Disasters.
   21–30 Military Symbols.
   21–40 Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Defense.
   24–1 Tactical Communications Doctrine.
   24–19 Communications-Electronics Reference Data.
   29–22 Maintenance Operations in the Field Army.
31-15 Operations Against Irregular Forces.
31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations.
31-21 Special Forces Operations.
31-45 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service.
33-5 Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures.
41-10 Civil Affairs Operations.
54-1 The Logistical Command.
54-3 The Field Army Support Command.
54-4 The Support Brigade.
54-6 Area Support Command.
54-8 (Test) The Administrative Support, Theater Army (Tasta–70).
55-4 Transportation Movements in Theater of Operations.
55-6 Transportation Services in Theaters of Operations.
55-15 Transportation Reference Data.
61-100 The Division.
(S) 100-1 Doctrinal Guidance (U).
100-5 Field Service Regulations-Operations.
100-10 Field Service Regulations, Administration.
(C) 100-20 Field Service Regulations-Counterinsurgency (U).
100-26 Army Air Ground Systems.
101-5 Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure.
101-10-1 Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organization, Technical, and Logistical Data, Unclassified Data.
101-10-2 Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data, Extracts of Organization and Equipment.

3. Technical Manuals

5–311 Military Protective Construction (Nuclear Warfare and Chemical and Biological Operations).
5–315 Firefighting (Structures and Aircraft) and Rescue Operations in Theater of Operations.
5–461 Engineer Handtools.
5–700 Field Water Supply.
5–725 Rigging.
8–285 Treatment of Chemical Warfare Casualties.
9–1385–9 Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance.
APPENDIX B

STRUCTURES FOR RAP ADC TEAMS

Section I. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL PARTY

1. Capabilities
   a. Moves rapidly to the scene of the ADC event.
   b. Assesses and reports damage.
   c. Controls and provides direction to area damage control operations.
   d. Performs limited chemical and radiological monitoring.
   e. Determines requirements for requests, coordinates and supervises area damage control teams furnished by other service units.
   f. Provides communication capability from scene of ADC event to the RAOC.

2. Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op Off</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recon/Assessment Off</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBR Off (CBR Trained)</td>
<td>CPT/LT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Op Sgt</td>
<td>E7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recon Sgt</td>
<td>E5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBR Sgt</td>
<td>E7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Teletype Team Chief</td>
<td>E5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Teletype Op</td>
<td>E4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio Set AN/VRC-46 (or equivalent)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Remarks
   a. Provided by headquarters elements of battalion or larger size units on the basis of one or more (as required) per support group in the Army Support Brigade and Area Support Group in TASCOM.
   b. This team is used when the TOE Area Damage Control Task Force Command Section is unavailable for any reason.

Section II. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL LIGHT RESCUE TEAM (SQUAD OR PLATOON)

5. Capabilities
   a. Moves rapidly to scene of ADC event.
   b. Provides limited first aid to casualties.
   c. Extracts trapped and injured personnel from wreckage and debris.
   d. Assists in firefighting operations when required.
   e. Assist CBR decontamination teams.

6. Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squad Leader</td>
<td>E5/E6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescue Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescue Worker (First Aid)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Driver</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrecker Op/Driver</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truck Dump or Cgo 2½-Ton W/Wn or 5-Ton W/Wn</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer 1½-Ton 2-Wheel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrecker 5-Ton</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shovel</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mattock Pick</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hammer Sledge 8 lb</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutter Bolt</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axe Single Edge</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar Pry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rope ½”</td>
<td>150 feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rope 1”</td>
<td>150 feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter Kit Common</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucket 2½-Gal</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Supplies</td>
<td>As required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goggles M1944</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacksaw W/Blades</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Hydraulic 5-Ton Cap (Min)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

8. Remarks

a. Normal squad or section used as a basis for this organization.

b. May be expanded to a type B (platoon size) unit by using basic platoon structure of unit or by combining three or four type A teams.

---

Section III. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL
LABOR TEAM (SQUAD OR PLATOON)

9. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to the scene of ADC event.

b. Assists in the rescue of trapped and injured personnel.

c. Provides limited first aid to casualties.

d. Provides hand labor for augmenting firefighting teams, light and heavy rescue teams, EOD detachments, and CBR teams.

e. Provides other hand labor as required by an ADC event.

10. Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squad Leader</td>
<td>E5/E6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst Squad Leader</td>
<td>E5/E4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Vehicle Driver</td>
<td>E3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>E3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truck Dump or Cgo 2½-Ton or 5-Ton</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer 1½-Ton 2-Wheel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Organic squad vehicles where available)

---

Section IV. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL
HEAVY RESCUE TEAM (SQUAD OR PLATOON)

13. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to scene of ADC event.

b. Moves wreckage, debris, and heavy loads; clears communication routes of rubble and debris; fights fires; and assists in the rescue of trapped and injured personnel.

c. Provides limited first aid to casualties.

14. Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type A Squad</th>
<th>Duty position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squad Leader</td>
<td>E5/E6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractor-Dozer Op</td>
<td>E4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrecker Op (or Crane Shovel Op)</td>
<td>E4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scooploader Op</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst Drivers</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welder</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tractor-Dozer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrecker or Crane Shovel (20-Ton Crawler</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crane from TOE 55–117</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scoop Loader</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torch Cutting</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Dump or Cgo 2½-Ton W/Win or</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Ton W/Win</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailer 1½-Ton 2-Wheel (Organic squad</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vehicles where available)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw Chain Driven</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shovel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mattock Pick</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar Pry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axe Chopping Single Bit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutter Bolt</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator 1.5 KW</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rope 1&quot;</td>
<td>300 feet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. Remarks

a. Best employed when using organic squad or section as a base.

b. May be expanded to a type B (platoon size) unit by using basic platoon structure of unit or by forming three or four similar type A squads.

c. Equipment based on TOE of unit and requirements at scene of destruction.

Section V. STRUCTURE FOR TRANSPORTATION AVIATION AREA DAMAGE CONTROL TEAMS

17. Capabilities

a. Proceeds to scene of destruction rapidly by air.

b. Provides limited aerial reconnaissance capability.

c. Provides limited rescue worker operation when required to use air transport.

d. Provides radio relay to scene of destruction when required.

18. Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty position</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Team A Reconnaissance Team</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 Obs Helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Team B Airmobile Light</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescue Team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>CH-47 Aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst Pilot</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Handtools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Team C Airmobile Team</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 UH-1B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst Pilot</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Handtools</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section VI. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL MEDICAL AID TEAMS

19. Capabilities

a. Performs triage and emergency medical treatment at scene of destruction.

b. Processes approximately 50 patients per hour.

c. Provides limited ground and air evacuation of patients from sorting stations to treatment facilities.

20. Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty position</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Team A Sorting Team</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC Officer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. Equipment

As designated by senior medical officer.
Section VII. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL TRAFFIC CONTROL TEAM

22. Capabilities
   a. Moves rapidly to the scene of ADC event.
   b. Provides traffic control posts in and around the area to restrict movement of personnel and vehicles in accordance with plans.
   c. Provides any one of the following or combination thereof:
      - 10—one-man posts
      - 5—two-man posts
      - 3—vehicle patrols
   d. Provides additional communication capability at the scene of destruction to the RAOC.
   e. Provides limited first aid to injured.
   f. Assists in radiological monitoring and survey missions as directed by ADC task force commander.

23. Personnel

24. Equipment

Section VIII. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL CBR DECONTAMINATION TEAM

25. Capabilities
   a. Provides third echelon CBR decontamination of terrain and materiel.
   b. Provides emergency third echelon CBR decontamination for approximately 60 individuals per hour.
   c. Adaptable for firefighting and mobile shower service.

26. Personnel

27. Equipment
   Decontaminating Apparatus Power Driven Trailer Mounted.

28. Remarks
   a. Organized by all units authorized above equipment.
   b. As required in a theater of operations.

Section IX. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL AUGMENTATION PROVISIONAL FIREFIGHTING TEAM (CLASS “A” FIRES)

29. Capabilities
   a. Moves rapidly to scene of fire (Class “A” Fires).
   b. Augments capabilities of the FB fire truck team to isolate, gain control of, and extinguish Class “A” fires.
   c. Supports rescue and relief operations as required, using 1000-gallon water distributor, truck mounted, with 55 GPM pumping capacity.

30. Personnel

31. Equipment

AGO 7471A
Section X. STRUCTURE FOR AERA DAMAGE CONTROL MUNITIONS
SAFETY CONTROL (MSC) TEAM

32. Capabilities
   a. Moves rapidly to the scene of ADC event.
   b. Assesses damage to munitions and their potential hazard of fires, explosions, or contamination. (Support is required for those munitions which are determined to be beyond the capability of the MSC team to neutralize.)
   c. Enforces safety measures.
   d. Escorts damaged hazardous munitions to disposal areas.
   e. Disposes of ammunition as required.

33. Personnel
   Duty position  Rank  Number
   Team Chief  Off or WO  1
   Sr Ammo Surv Sp  E6  2
   Ammo Surv Sp  E6  2

34. Equipment
   Item  Quantity
   Breath Appar Oxy Gen  5
   Calibrator Radian AN/UDM-6 ( )  1

Section XI. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL RECOVERY
TEAM CONVENTIONAL/SPECIAL AMMUNITION

35. Capabilities
   a. Moves rapidly to the scene of ADC event.
   b. Inspects and reports damage of conventional ammunition.
   c. Performs limited evacuation. (That required to meet emergency requirements and not requiring special EOD skills and equipment.)
   d. Recovers, as directed, items of conventional ammunition.
   e. Same as b, c, and d for special ammunition when supervised by MSC team.

36. Personnel
   Duty position  Rank  Number
   Team Leader  E6  1
   A Team Leader  E5  2
   Members  E4/E3  10

37. Equipment
   Item  Quantity
   Wrecker  1
   Radio  1
   Truck  2
   Decon Appar PD Team  1 as required

Section XII. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL
RECOVERY TEAM HEAVY EQUIPMENT GENERAL

38. Capabilities
   a. Moves rapidly to the scene of ADC event.
   b. Inspects and reports damage of heavy equipment, general.
   c. Performs limited evacuation. That required to meet emergency requirements.
   d. Recovers, as directed, major items of equipment and/or components.

39. Personnel
   Duty position  Rank  Number
   Team Leader  E6  1
   A Team Leader  E5  2
   Members  E4  8
40. Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wrecker</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recovery Vehicle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Weight Gen Mech Tool Set</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section XIII. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL
RECOVERY TEAM LIGHT EQUIPMENT GENERAL

41. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to the scene of ADC event.

b. Inspects and reports damage of light equipment, general.

c. Performs limited evacuation. (That required to meet emergency requirements.)

d. Recovers, as directed, major items of equipment and/or components.

42. Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team Leader</td>
<td>E6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Team Leader</td>
<td>E5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>E4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43. Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wrecker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt Weight Gen Mech Tool Set</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section XIV. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL LOUDSPEAKER
AND LEAFLET TEAM (LIGHT MOBILE)

44. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly by vehicle to scene of ADC event.

b. Conducts live or taped broadcasts to selected groups with loudspeaker.

c. Produces and distributes printed matter to selected groups with organic printing capability.

d. Provides internal command and control of PSYOP teams, responsive to RAOC direction.

45. Elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type team</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team HA, Light Mobile</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Para 10, TOE 33-500F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Op)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section XV. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL MOBILE RADIO TEAM

46. Capabilities

a. Supports ADC operation from present location when scene of destruction is within radio broadcast range.

b. Moves rapidly by vehicle to scene of ADC event.

c. Provides internal command and control, responsive to RAOC direction.

d. Prepares, produces, and conducts limited original radio broadcasts in support of ADC operations.

e. Provides news from scene of destruction as directed.

f. Receives news from teletype sources and broadcast as directed.

47. Remarks

*3 Teams—TASCOM; 2 Teams—FASCOM.
**Delete Team HE in TASCOM.

48. Elements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type team</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Team IA, Mobile Radio</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Para 15, TOE 33-500F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Op)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team IB, Mobile Radio</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Para 16, TOE 33-500F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Radio News)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section XVI. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL PSYOP CONTROL TEAM

52. Capabilities
   a. Moves rapidly to scene of ADC event.
   b. Provides administrative control and operational supervision of PSYOP operational teams.
   c. Assesses requirement for employment of PSYOP teams in ADC operation.
   d. Advises commander, RAOC on utilization of PSYOP teams.

53. Elements
   Type team Number Composition
   Team AA, Command & Control 1 Para 01, TOE 33-500F

54. Equipment
   Current TOE series.

55. Remarks
   Available in TASCOM; none in FASCOM.

Section XVII. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL AUGMENTATION AREA FLOODLIGHTING TEAM

56. Capabilities
   a. Moves rapidly to scene of ADC event.
   b. Provides emergency lighting to assist rescue and area damage control operations at night and under conditions of darkness or low visibility.

57. Personnel
   Duty position Rank Number
   Generator Operator E4 1
   Light Truck Driver E3 1

58. Equipment
   Item Quantity
   Truck Cargo 2½-Ton
   Trailer Cargo 1½-Ton
   Floodlight Set Mast Mounted 5KW
   Generator Set 5KW AC

Section XVIII. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL CBR RECONNAISSANCE TEAM

59. Capabilities
   Can perform CBR reconnaissance of the site of a nuclear, chemical or biological attack and furnish essential data to the commander. The team has little capability for evaluating the collected information and will function most effectively when receiving instructions from and reporting to a CBRE or comparable organization.

60. Personnel
   Duty position Rank Branch MOS Remarks
   CBR Recon Officer CPT CM 57318
   CBR Recon SGT E7 54E40 NC
   Decon SGT E6 12D40 NC

61. Equipment
   Item Quantity
   Radiac Set AN/PDR-27
   Radiacmeter IM-99/UD
   Radiacmeter IM-174/PD
   Detector Kit Chemical Agent M18A2
   Sampling and Analyzing Kit CBR Agent M19
   LIN S29577
   Truck ¾-Ton with AN/VRC-46 Mtd

62. Remarks
   a. This is Team LA, TOE 3-500G (draft).
   b. As required in theater of operations.
Section XIX. STRUCTURE FOR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

63. Capabilities

a. Moves rapidly to scene of ADC event.

b. Conducts ground radiological survey of an area of 15 to 40 square kilometers per hour.

c. Conducts aerial radiological survey of an area of 130 to 450 square kilometers per hour.

64. Personnel

a. Team A—Ground Radiological Survey Team.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rad Survey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trained for ground rad survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment OP</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Recorder/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Op</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Team B—Aerial Radiological Survey.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty position</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rad Survey</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Trained for aerial rad survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment Op</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65. Equipment

a. Team A—Ground Radiological Survey Team.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truck ¾-Ton APC or equivalent vehicle</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiometer IM-174/PD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiometer IM-93/PD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Set AN/VRC-46 or equivalent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA Form 1971-1-R</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Team B—Aerial Radiological Survey Team.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rotary Wing Aircraft</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiometer IM-174/PD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiometer IM-93/PD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA Form 1971-1-R</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66. Remarks

a. These teams can be organized by any unit authorized the appropriate equipment. TA 50-914 authorizes one IM-174/PD for each survey party.

b. There is no requirement that both members of team B come from the same unit. One unit may provide the aircraft (with pilot) and another unit may provide the radiological survey equipment operator.

c. As required in a theater of operations.
APPENDIX C
RAP SCENARIO

1. Purpose

This appendix provides a brief scenario to which the RAP concept may be addressed and contains a sample troop list, operations plans for both area security and damage control task forces, and the rationale behind their preparation.

2. General Situation

a. Map A (see fig. 15).

b. Background.

(1) The recently activated 15th Area Support Group is one of eight such groups in the Western Area Support Command (fig. 16). Prior to the activation of the 15th Area Support Group, the geographical area was a part of the 11th Area Support Group.

(2) The conflict is mid intensity but is limited to the geographic area of a UN member invaded by aggressor satellite (AGSAT).

(3) The area assigned the 15th Area Support Group is classified as "critical." (See para 29-43.) The host government has delegated authority to the theater commander to "take such measures as might be necessary to preserve the viability of a critical area and its environs providing any deviations from host-tenant arrangements are immediately reported to the host government." This authority has been further delegated to the Area Support Group commander.

(4) The mission of the 15th Area Support Group is to service and support functional army elements within its area of responsibility, to include the coordination and, when necessary, control of rear area protection measures.

(5) Training teams (TOE 19–500) from the WASCOM military police brigade are attached to the 503d Military Police Battalion and are currently training, organizing, and equipping indigenous paramilitary police elements for security guard duties.

(6) The population in the area is passively cooperative. Civil affairs elements are carrying out several programs aimed at bettering civil-military relations and improving food and clothing distribution systems. The northwest portion of the 15th Area Support Group area contains some disorderly elements, but local police have the situation under control.

(7) The 15th Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) has just been assigned to the 15th Area Support Group but has not started its organizational and planning tasks.

(8) The 12th Armored Cavalry Squadron is training in a "void" area about 41 kilometers east of the 15th Area Support Group. It has the mission to respond to emergency requests for security assistance issued by WASCOM.

(9) Prior to the activation of the 15th Area Support Group, the commanding officer of the 2d Engineer Construction Group has been acting as "sub-area coordinator" for the 11th Area Support Group. The 2d Engineer Construction Group has been instructed to continue to function in this capacity until such time as the RAP responsibilities can be taken over the 15th RAOC. Tenant units have also been instructed to follow plans and SOP
of the 11th Area Support Group until new plans and SOP are issued by the 15th Area Support Group.

3. Special Situation
Colonel Roland Von Tempke is reassigned from WASCOM to the 15th Area Support Group area with instructions to “organize a proper Area Support Group structure and to provide for the common protection of the area in consonance with the WASCOM SOP.”

4. First Action
Colonel Von Tempke’s first action was to direct the Director of Security, Plans, and Operations to accomplish the following:

a. Review existing RAP plans and SOP from the 11th Area Support Group and take immediate interim steps to improve our area protection.

b. Determine the RAP potential of the 15th Area Support Group.

c. Coordinate with WASCOM and determine the relative criticality for protection of the tenants and then relate these to actual existing risks.

d. Make new or modify old plans for use of the RAP potential concentrating on the higher risks. Check out how to get additional help if and when needed.

e. Make a long range plan to reposition units so that their operations are not inhibited and their security is enhanced.

5. Second Action
The Director of Security, Plans, and Opera-
tions was charged with translating the commander's guidance into action. His steps, in order, follow:

a. He directed the RAOC to coordinate with the 2d Engineer Construction Group to gather information concerning all existing RAP plans, SOP, and other pertinent data; to determine the immediate security problem and simultaneously assess the RAP potential of the area.

b. He ordered his assistant to fly to WASCOM and ask their help in determining—
   1. The relative criticality (order of importance requiring protective measures) of tenants in the 15th Area Support Group area.
   2. How the Area Support Group commander can get additional help if and when needed.
   3. The reaction of parallel functional commands to intra-area relocation of units or facilities which might be necessary to increase their overall protection.

6. Third Action

a. The RAOC commander knew that any interim security measures he took should meld easily with existing plans and also with his final concept. He asked for and got interim guidance on criticality for protection of the tenants as follows:
   1. Highest criticality for protection consists of—
      (a) The depot at Southton.
      (b) The MSR.
      (c) The special weapons unit near Northton.
   2. The next highest group consists of—
      (a) The signal installations at area D.
      (b) The rail line.
      (c) The pipeline.
   3. The last group consists of all other units and areas.

b. The RAOC operations section submitted a list of units located in the 15th Area Support Group area to the data processing center and asked for a printout of the RAP potential. The information was back in 5 minutes and was used as a basis to develop the RAP troop list for both RAS and ADC operations plans (annex A to appendix C). A requirement was placed on all units to report changes in their RAP potential or status to the RAOC.

c. Based on the available data (including existing RAP plans from the 2d Engineer Construction Group), the RAOC operations section formed an RAS task force and prepared an interim operational plan (OPLAN 15–1) for employment of the RAS task force (annex B to appendix C).

d. The RAOC also developed an interim operational plan (OPLAN 15–2) for employment of the ADC task force (annex C to appendix C).

7. Fourth Action

Subsequent to development of the interim defense plan, the Director of Security, Plans, and Operations confirmed or established the following:

a. The RAP priorities of tenant units established by the RAOC as confirmed by higher headquarters.

b. Backup combat support for the 15th Area Support Group will be provided by the 12th Armored Cavalry Squadron during the next 10 days. After that, a new unit is expected to move in that training area and the 12th will move out. TASCOM has issued necessary orders to the 12th to assure its response in event of an emergency. Requests for outside help will be made to WASCOM.

c. Plans have been completed to better the protection posture of the area by relocating some elements. Details of the plan are discussed at annex D to appendix C. This plan, however, is not placed into effect prior to the remaining actions in this scenario.

8. Fifth Action

a. Action. An enemy air strike moderately damaged the eastern portion of subarea A (see fig. 15).

b. Reaction.
   1. Subarea A took local SOP damage control actions and simultaneously notified the RAOC.
   2. The RAOC immediately dispatched its ADC Task Force Command Section and simultaneously alerted appropriate firefighting, medical, and rescue teams of the situation.
(3) The ADC Task Force Command Section reported that about 150 military and nearly 600 civilian personnel were in the area that was hit. Some 80 had been killed or injured and local firefighters reported the need for more equipment. The ADC Task Force Command Section assumed command of damage control operations at the scene and requested the RAOC to dispatch necessary ADC teams.

(4) The RAOC contacted the 15th Station Hospital and directed that suitable medical teams be dispatched to the area. Priority on use of facilities will be given to the medical aid teams. Additional firefighting resources were also dispatched on direction of the RAOC.

(5) The RAOC directed the area MP unit to reroute traffic off the MSR for the next 6 hours so that the road could be used for emergency vehicles.

(6) Civil affairs advised the RAOC that the school at Southton was available as a hospital for civilian casualties but that supplies and medical personnel would be needed. The RAOC requested 15th Area Support Group to handle all aspects of this problem since it involved outside areas and detailed coordination. 15th Area Support Group headquarters concurred.

(7) A later reconnaissance of the scene by the ADC Task Force Command Section revealed that military units in the area were still effective and capable of containing the damage. The only aid required consisted of medical teams and additional firefighting capability, both of which had been previously dispatched. These facts were reported to RAOC.

(8) Eight hours after the attack, all fires had been extinguished and firefighting teams released by the RAOC ADC Task Force Command Section.

(9) Treatment and evacuation of injured personnel continued. Civilian casualties were evacuated to host nation civil facilities in Southton and military casualties to the 15th Station Hospital. Evacuation of casualties was completed 12 hours after the attack. The medical teams were released to the 15th Station Hospital on approval of the ADC Task Force Command Section after concurring with the senior medical officer present.

(10) The ADC Task Force Command Section returned to the RAOC.

(11) Units located in the affected area continued cleanup activities directed toward restoration of normal functions.

9. Sixth Action

a. Action. The radio relay at 1121 has come under night attack by an enemy element firing mortars and grenades.

b. Reaction. In consonance with operations plan 15–1 (annex B to appendix C), the following actions took place:

   (1) 1st Platoon, RAS Company B (55th MP Co), was directed by the RAOC to proceed to the scene immediately.

   (2) WASCOM was requested to—
      (a) Provide Red Light airlift to RAS Company G per established plan.
      (b) Provide aerial reconnaissance over the site immediately.

   (3) "Phase II Red Light" was issued to all units.

   (4) "Phase III Red Light" was issued to RAS Company G and assembly area number 1 was designated as the point of assembly.

   (5) 1st Platoon, RAS Company B, advised the RAOC that it was hit by sniper fire en route to the relay site and had to direct about half of its strength to this problem in order to proceed to the relay site.

   (6) 1st Platoon, RAS Company B (–), arrived at the site and brought the clandestine forces under fire. The forces withdrew into the hills.

   (7) The RAOC RAS Task Force Command Section moved to the assembly area.
(8) RAS Company G advised the RAOC it was heliborne and proceeding to assembly area AA2.

(9) The RAOC redesignated three different assembly areas (AA3, 4, and 5) and directed the company to land a RAS platoon at each area and then search toward the relay site.

(10) Search operations continued for 12 hours but were fruitless. The lack of immediately responsive aerial reconnaissance was the main cause of losing the attacking force.

10. Seventh Action

(As a result of the sixth action, five reconnaissance aircraft (LOH type) were placed in direct support of the 15th Area Support Group RAOC. The RAOC attached these aircraft to the 503d Military Police Battalion for daily surveillance operations and for RAP actions as required.)

a. Action. As a result of the earlier bombing of Southton dissident elements in Weston have succeeded in getting the people in Weston worked up to the point where severe disorder appears imminent.

b. Reaction.

(1) Through civil affairs channels, the host nation is requested to bolster the Weston police force.

(2) Psychological operations personnel are assigned to the 15th Area Support Group to assist with this problem.

(3) Weston is placed "off limits" and only essential military traffic is routed in that direction.

(4) This problem decreased with time but served as the basis for the next action.

11. Eighth Action

a. Action. Intelligence reports give strong indications that clandestine elements are recruiting and training Westonites in the northwest corner of the 15th Area Support Group. It is anticipated that the mountainous road, numerous bridges, and the critical tunnel in that area will be subjected to harassing interdiction or sabotage activities.

b. Reaction.

(1) WASCOM is advised of the situation. This is a threat to the MSR and one that concerns TASCOM directly. It is recommended that the WASCOM military police strength be increased in the 15th Area Support Group area.

(2) WASCOM concurred and advised that the 39th Military Police Battalion with two military police companies would be moved into the area over the next 10-day period but that the 15th Area Support Group would have to secure the area in the meantime.

(3) The RAOC recommended to the 15th Area Support Group that—

(a) RAS Company A be activated to secure the depot at Southton. This action was coordinated with and approved by all commands concerned.

(b) The 299th Military Police Company be relocated from Southton to secure the MSR from RJ 709 (0816) to the 15th Area Support Group area boundary.

(c) One DS flight of two LOH's be provided the 299th Military Police Company.

(d) Armored cars from the 55th Military Police Company be attached to the 299th Military Police Company.

(e) One type B indigenous guard company be attached to the 299th Military Police Company.

(4) These actions were approved and the 299th Military Police Company set up two strongpoints in the area, placed joint military-paramilitary police guards at all critical points, and established patrols and escorts. One military police platoon was deployed in the mountain area with an equal number of paramilitary police from the type B unit to constantly patrol the high ground above the MSR.

(5) Large convoys were rerouted completely out of the 15th Area Support Group area from Northton and only
units of six to eight vehicles were permitted over the mountain pass. Each unit was escorted by armored cars.

12. Ninth Action

a. Action. In spite of these precautions, the mountain pass was subjected to relatively severe attacks by indirect and direct fire weapons. These actions took place at night. WASCOM ordered the 12th Armored Cavalry to the area but had to delay the actual move until arrangements were made to secure the area and roads it will vacate. This will take about 48 hours.

b. Reaction. The use of the 15th Area Support Group RAS potential in the role of clearing a vast mountainous area is considered unwise. The troops are neither equipped nor trained for this mission and the time involved would seriously hamper service support operations. It is decided to—

(1) Use the road only during daylight hours.

(2) Increase close-in security at night using the RAS potential as follows:

(a) First night—RAS Company B.

(b) Second night—RAS Company C.

(c) Third night—RAS Company D.

(d) Fourth night—RAS Company F.

(3) Initiate (under WASCOM direction but in coordination with the RAOC) combat aerial surveillance and patrolling pending arrival of the 12th Armored Cavalry Squadron.

13. Tenth Action

a. Action. The vigorous activities in the northwest corner and signs of more to come caused the enemy elements to “dissolve” into the populace of Weston. This was not discovered and on the fourth night a strong enemy attack was launched against the lightly guarded depot at Weston. (RAS Company F was on the mountain pass.)

b. Reaction.

(1) The RAOC implemented phase II of operations plan 15–1 for RAS Companies C and D. General support aircraft were available and, in accordance with the SOP, picked up RAS Company C at assembly area 6 and moved it to assembly area 10 in two shuttles.

(2) The 55th Military Police Company secured the route from Northton to Weston over which RAS Company D moved by organic vehicle.

(3) The RAOC RAS Task Force Command Section moved to the site and took control from Company C.

(4) Fragmentary orders were issued taking into consideration the difficulty of conducting night operations over unfamiliar terrain. Basically, the operation was limited to returning enemy fire and maintaining contact.

(5) Weston civil police sealed off the town to prevent reentry of enemy forces.

(6) The severe damage to area F illustrated the danger in using the RAS potential of that area for guard duty elsewhere.

(7) By daylight, the 12th Armored Cavalry Squadron was in the area and RAS units returned to their parent units.

14. Eleventh Action

The arrival of the 12th Armored Cavalry Squadron dictated the need for spelling out command and control arrangements. The unit was attached to the 15th Area Support Group and the 15th Area Support Group commander decided—

a. He would personally retain operational command over the unit.

b. The RAOC would support the 12th by providing it with intelligence, operational, and service support as might be required.

c. The 12th would place a liaison team in the RAOC to facilitate area, functional, and tactical unit coordination.

d. With the presence of significant combat forces, RAS SOP defines the role of RAS units as follows:

(1) RAS units will first be used to defend the base in which they are located.

(2) RAS units in contact with an enemy force will maintain contact until arrival of friendly combat forces; when
it is apparent that RAS units have fire superiority, limited offensive actions may be undertaken.

15. Twelfth Action

a. Action. During the presence of the 12th Armored Cavalry, overt actions subsided to almost zero. However, a series of disruptive acts terrorizing the civilian population called for adjustments to plans.

b. Reaction. The host government organized three companies of parapolice for employment in emergency situations. It was agreed by all concerned that, in order to attain unity of command in an emergency, these units would be placed under the operational control of the RAOC. A permanent liaison officer from the host government joined the RAOC. Military police stations in each town were colocated with the parapolice unit, which in turn was tied by radio and landline to each civil police station. Curfews were established, checkpoints set up, and rigid circulation control procedures were established. In order to preclude the premature commitment of the 12th Armored Cavalry, the following general plan was adopted:

(1) Parapolice forces secure vital installations in towns.
(2) Civil police forces handle circulation control measures.
(3) The RAS potentials seal off a town or specific areas therein in event of disturbances.
(4) Military police adopt riot control or city fighting techniques.
(5) The 12th Armored Cavalry prepares to move to scene of disturbance on order.
(6) Civil affairs concentrate on assisting local governments in preventive measures.

16. Thirteenth Action

a. Action. A large scale explosion severely damaged the rail terminal at Southton and was followed by the looting of intransit supplies on sidings in the area.

b. Reaction.

(1) The RAOC ordered reserve parapolice elements to the site to control looting.
(2) Damage control measures were instituted immediately. This action precluded activating the full RAS potential to seal off the town. However, the RAOC had planned for this contingency and had enough RAS potential on-call to seal off the immediate area.
(3) Military and parapolice sealed off the town.
(4) Civil police instituted selective search procedures.
(5) The RAOC advised military police that convoys on the MSR could not get through Southton. Emergency local reroute plans were implemented. The RAOC advised the MCC.
(6) The RAOC RAS Task Force Command Section moved to Southton to direct actions in that area.
(7) The RAOC recommended one troop of the 12th Armored Cavalry deploy to the area and release essential service and support specialists. The troop deployed and was placed under operational control of the RAOC.
(8) Large amounts of unexploded ammunition were strewn over the devastated area. The RAOC notified the EOD control detachment of a condition A. An EOD team was heliborne to the area.
(9) The 2d Transportation Battalion advised the RAOC that a mixed troop and freight train was 6 miles south of Southton, could not be rerouted, and was currently halted on the main line. The RAOC contacted military police railway security guards on the train and advised them of the situation. An officer flew out to the train to assist personnel unfamiliar with the terrain in organizing security measures. The RAOC organized and airlifted a RAS attack platoon which was attached to the train commander.
(10) Within 10 hours, the situation was under control. The RAOC ADC and RAS Task Force Command Sections released their attached units and re-
17. Fourteenth Action

a. Action. A forest and brush fire of unknown origin began in the early hours. The fire was located to the east southeast of Area A about three Km from the 3d Field Depot and POL storage area. Host nation civil authorities seemed capable of containing the fire.

b. Reaction.

(1) Shortly after the fire was observed, RAOC was notified of its existence and directed the ADC Task Force Command Section to investigate and assess the danger posed by the fire.

(2) After investigation, the Task Force Command Section reported to RAOC that there was no immediate danger to military facilities and that it appeared that civil authorities would be able to control the situation. However, the Task Force Command Section indicated that it would remain in the area until there was no doubt that the fire was completely under control.

(3) Two hours later, the Task Force Command Section reported that a suddenly developing high wind from the east southeast had fanned the fire to the point where it was now out of control and posed a definite and serious threat to facilities in Area A. The report further stated that the magnitude of the fire was so great that ADC teams within Area A did not have the capability to contain it; the report urgently recommended commitment of two engineer construction companies in an expeditious manner.

(4) Based on this request from the fire area, the RAOC immediately assessed its capabilities to respond to this request for assistance. The RAOC determined that two organic engineer construction companies were not available on their list of tabulated as-sets although many diverse and assorted types of engineer teams having ability to aid in the firefighting were listed. The RAOC looked at the possibility of responding to the request with several alternative solutions. However, this evaluation served only to verify that the most reasonable course of action was to use engineers as originally requested. Having previously coordinated with the commander of the 2d Engineer Construction Group on their mutual approach to RAP matters, the RAOC commander felt that the simplest and quickest way to obtain the desired assistance would be to call the engineer group headquarters direct, rather than going through the 15th Area Support Group headquarters.

(5) RAOC advised the 2d Engineer Construction Group of the problem and requested that engineer troops be dispatched to the scene. The 2d Engineer Group agreed to the request and directed the 35th Engineer Construction Battalion to take actions necessary to contain the threat and prevent damage to military facilities as a matter of immediate priority.

(6) Based on this order and the report of the ADC Task Force Command Section, 35th Battalion took the following actions in the sequence listed below:

(a) Ordered C and D companies to the scene.

(b) Alerted A and B companies for possible commitment.

(c) Called 2d Engineer Group and rendered an “Impact Report” as required by SOP. In this report, the impact of this ADC mission on current battalion projects was outlined. Also, measures taken to guard project sites and on-site construction materials were explained.

(d) Dispatched a portion of battalion headquarters to the scene to assess the situation and direct operations of battalion elements.
(7) After arrival of 35th Engineer Battalion Headquarters elements at the ADC event, a rapid assessment of the situation was made and reported to Headquarters, 35th Engineer Battalion. This initial assessment report was forwarded to Headquarters, 2d Engineer Construction Group. The 35th Engineer Battalion would continue to keep the 2d Engineer Construction Group fully informed of developments. Spot reports would indicate progress, estimates of completion, and notice of actual completion and other significant information.

(8) Assessment of the threat by the 35th Battalion resulted in a decision to construct a firebreak to isolate facilities in Area A from the fire. It was further decided to commit another construction company to the ADC mission and B company was ordered to the scene.

(9) After committing three engineer companies to the fire fight, the CO of the 35th Engineer Battalion personally arrived on the scene and met with Major ____________ of the Task Force Command Section. They agreed that since engineers now constituted the major portion of the firefighting force, that all firefighting elements would be placed under operational control of the 35th Engineer Battalion and that Major ____________'s small command section would serve as a coordinating link with the RAOC. The ADC Task Force Command Section remained at the scene and provided effective liaison between the 35th Battalion and RAOC.

(10) Eight hours after arrival of the first elements of the 35th Battalion on the scene, the firebreak was completed and D company was released to continue its normal missions. B and C companies remained on the scene for an additional four hours until the threat had passed.

(11) Feeling that his mission had been accomplished, the CO, 35th Engineer Battalion, accomplished the following:

(a) Coordinated with Major ____________ of the Task Force Command Section, who agreed that the fire was no longer a threat and immediately contacted RAOC, passed on this report and requested authority to release all troops. The RAOC approved this action and Major ____________ released the engineers.

(b) Contacted his parent engineer group headquarters, and informed them that he had completed the ADC mission and was releasing all engineer troops.

(12) 35th Battalion elements returned to their normal engineer missions.

18. Fifteenth Action

a. Action. Ammunition storage facilities in Area B sustained damage as a result of an enemy air attack made at dusk. Some ammunition was destroyed, but personnel casualties were light. Exploding ammunition caused several minor fires. Although there were few casualties, a threat to other stocks of ammunition remains due to the possibility of unexploded enemy ordnance.

b. Reaction.

(1) Affected units in Area B took immediate damage control action to contain damage and protect personnel and material.

(2) The 66th Ordnance Ammunition Battalion immediately notified RAOC of the incident, outlined the situation and requested activation of certain ADC teams.

(3) Based on this report, RAOC dispatched its ADC Task Force Command Section to the scene to serve as liaison with the control party of the 66th Battalion. Additionally, RAOC activated and dispatched to the scene the following ADC teams:

(a) 3 Labor Teams, 25th Labor Service Company.

(b) 1 Traffic Control Team, 299th Military Police Company.
(c) 2 Area Lighting Teams, A Co 35th Engineer Battalion.

(4) Within 2 hours, all teams had reported and were assigned tasks by the 66th Battalion Control Party; these tasks were directed toward limiting further damage.

(5) By noon of the following day, emergency measures to prevent further damage were completed and ADC teams were released to return to their respective units. Units within the affected area continued recovery activities directed to restoration of their primary function.

19. Summary

As is illustrated in this brief scenario of events, if resources exist and if a command arrangement exists, almost any situation within reason can be handled on a temporary and infrequent basis by combat support and service support resources backed up with, again, reasonable combat power. As it also illustrated, even if the combat power is sufficient to the situation, service and support resources must have a responsive, flexible, and measurable capability to participate in RAP activities.
# ANNEX A TO APPENDIX C

## Troop List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOE</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Rifle Plt</th>
<th>Atk Plt</th>
<th>R&amp;E Plt</th>
<th>Co</th>
<th>ADC party</th>
<th>Lt rescue Squad</th>
<th>Lt rescue Plt</th>
<th>Labor Squad</th>
<th>Labor Plt</th>
<th>ADC potential not used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55-16</td>
<td>HQ 29th Trans Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-28</td>
<td>57th Trans Trk Co (Hvy)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-67</td>
<td>58th Trans Trk Co (Lt/Med)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-565</td>
<td>15th Station Hospital (300 bed)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-427</td>
<td>81st Maint Spt Co</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-137</td>
<td>3d Hvy Equip Maint Co</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-146</td>
<td>85th Sup &amp; Svc Co</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-127</td>
<td>34th Hvy Materiel Sup Co (GS)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-97</td>
<td>299th MP Co (Phys Scty)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-117</td>
<td>A Co, 35th Engr Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-116</td>
<td>HQ 2d Trans Trk Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-228</td>
<td>53d Trans Railway Maint Co</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-512</td>
<td>3d Field Depot</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-206</td>
<td>HQ 12th Petrl Op Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-118</td>
<td>D Co, 35th Engr Bn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subtotal, Area A: 2 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 12 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |

| 19-77 | 55th MP Co (Area) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 9-48 | 512th Special Amm Co | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 55-67 | 28th Lt/Med Trk Co | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 19-97 | 287th MP Co (Phys Scty) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 19-500 | 35d MP Bn | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 10-449 | 25th Labor Service Co | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 9-117 | 102d Tire Repair Co | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 29-146 | 79th Sup & Svc Co | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 11-147 | 25d Sig Op Co (Small HQ) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 19-97 | 298th MP Co (Phys Scty) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 8-551 | 5th General Hospital | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Subtotal, Area C: 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 10 | 1 |

<p>| 11-347 | 143d Sig Long Lines Co | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 11-347 | 197th Sig Long Lines Co | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 9-36 | 66th Ord Amm Bn | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 9-33 | 29th Ord Amm Co | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 29-118 | 25d Gen Sup Co | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 29-118 | 24d Gen Sup Co | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 29-119 | 35th Repair Parts Supply Co (GS) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 10-449 | 25th Labor Service Co | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOE</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Rifle Plat</th>
<th>Art Plt</th>
<th>RAE Plat</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>ADC party</th>
<th>Lt rescue Squad</th>
<th>Lt rescue Plt</th>
<th>Labor Squad</th>
<th>Labor Plat</th>
<th>ADC potential not used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29-427</td>
<td>26th Maint Spt Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-124</td>
<td>80th Engr Dump Truck Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal, Area B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54-422</td>
<td>HQ 15th Area Spt Gp</td>
<td>Task Force Control</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-408</td>
<td>15th Rear Area Op Cen</td>
<td>RAP Operations Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-136</td>
<td>81st Maint Spt Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-134</td>
<td>663d Lt Equip Maint Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-119</td>
<td>35th Repair Parts Supply Co (GS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-17</td>
<td>64th Trans Light Truck Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-18</td>
<td>56th Med Truck Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal, Area D</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-500</td>
<td>15th Helicopter Ambulance Det</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal, Area E</td>
<td>NONE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-116</td>
<td>35th Engr Const Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-117</td>
<td>68th Trans Tml Service Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-118</td>
<td>B Co, 35th Engr Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-118</td>
<td>C Co, 35th Engr Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-26</td>
<td>42d Sig Const Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-27</td>
<td>442d Sig Const Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-17</td>
<td>56th Med Truck Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-112</td>
<td>2nd Engr Const Gp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal, Area F</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-377</td>
<td>15th Sig Radio Relay Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-18</td>
<td>53d Med Trk Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-18</td>
<td>54th Med Trk Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-47</td>
<td>119th Sig Cable Const Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-114</td>
<td>40th Engr Const Support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-116</td>
<td>36th Engr Const Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-118</td>
<td>B Co, 36th Engr Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-118</td>
<td>C Co, 36th Engr Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-510</td>
<td>10th Field Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal, Area G</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Normal ADC potential for a typical Area Support Group compares closely with 15th Area Support Group.
### Units or Activities Providing Special Teams for Area Damage Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Traffic Control</th>
<th>Medical Team A</th>
<th>Medical Team B</th>
<th>Medical Team C</th>
<th>Hvy rescue squad</th>
<th>Team FA</th>
<th>Team FB</th>
<th>Team FC</th>
<th>Team HD</th>
<th>EOD Det</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-97</td>
<td>299th MP Co (Phys Scty)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-565</td>
<td>15th Station Hosp (300 bed)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-117</td>
<td>A Co, 35th Eng Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-118</td>
<td>D Co, 35th Engr Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-500</td>
<td>Teams FA, FB, FC Firefighting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area B</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-500</td>
<td>Teams FA, FB, FC Firefighting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-500</td>
<td>EOD Detachment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-77</td>
<td>55th MP Co (Area)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-97</td>
<td>297th MP Co (Phys Scty)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-97</td>
<td>298th MP Co (Phys Scty)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-551</td>
<td>5th General Hospital</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-500</td>
<td>15th Helicopter Ambulance Det</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-500</td>
<td>Teams FA, FB, FC Firefighting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-500</td>
<td>Team HD, Utilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area D</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area E</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-118</td>
<td>C Co, 35th Engr Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-118</td>
<td>B Co, 35th Engr Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-117</td>
<td>8th Trans Tml Svc Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area G</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-114</td>
<td>40th Engr Const Spt Co</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-118</td>
<td>B Co, 36th Engr Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-118</td>
<td>C Co, 36th Engr Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-510</td>
<td>10th Field Hosp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Normal ADC potential for a typical Area Support Group compares closely with 15th Area Support Group.
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX C

TYPE OPLAN FOR REAR AREA SECURITY TASK FORCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Org</th>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ 15th RAOC</td>
<td>RAS Task Force Command Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Trans Bn</td>
<td>HQ Co A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299th MP Co</td>
<td>1st Plat, Co A (R&amp;E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Co, 35th Engr Bn</td>
<td>2d Plat, Co A (ATK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88th Sup &amp; Svc Co</td>
<td>3d Plat, Co A (ATK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58th Trans Co</td>
<td>4th Plat, Co A (ATK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57th Trans Co</td>
<td>5th Plat, Co A (RIFLE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th Ord Bn</td>
<td>HQ Co B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th MP Co</td>
<td>1st Plat, Co B (R&amp;E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Ord Co</td>
<td>2d Plat, Co B (RIFLE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d Gen Sup Co</td>
<td>3d Plat, Co B (ATK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Gen Sup Co</td>
<td>4th Plat, Co B (ATK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th Labor Svc Co</td>
<td>5th Plat, Co B (ATK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>503d MP Bn</td>
<td>HQ Co C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297th MP Co</td>
<td>1st Plat, Co C (R&amp;E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>663d Lt Equip Maint Co</td>
<td>2d Plat, Co C (RIFLE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Labor Svc Co</td>
<td>3d Plat, Co C (ATK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Trans Trk Co</td>
<td>4th Plat, Co C (ATK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th Sup &amp; Svc Co</td>
<td>5th Plat, Co C (ATK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42d Sign Bn</td>
<td>HQ Co D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>298th MP Co</td>
<td>1st Plat, Co D (R&amp;E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Co, 35th Engr Bn</td>
<td>2d Plat, Co D (ATK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143d Sig Long Lines Co</td>
<td>3d Plat, Co D (RIFLE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>197th Sig Long Lines Co</td>
<td>4th Plat, Co D (RIFLE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
35th Engr Const Bn
B Co, 35th Engr Bn
142d Sig Const Co
102d Tire Repair Co

53d Med Trk Bn
B Co, 36th Engr Bn
C Co, 36th Engr Bn
53d Med Truck Co

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces.
   b. Friendly Forces. 15th ASG organizes assigned and tenant resources for RAS purposes per above task organization.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. On order, RAS potentials of units listed under task organization are placed under operational control of indicated headquarters element.

2. MISSION
   15th Area Support Group organizes and controls resources within zone boundaries to execute rear area security operations.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation. RAS company headquarters element will organize RAS operations for assigned areas and will simultaneously plan to assist other areas as indicated. Units in defense yield control of RAOC Task Force Command Section on arrival of latter in afflicted area.
   b. RAS Task Force Command Section. Move to scene of disturbance or incident and take control of responding RAS potential allocated.
   c. RAS Company A.
      (1) Protect Area A.
      (2) Be prepared to move on order to assembly areas 1, 10, 13, 14, and 15.
   d. RAS Company B.
      (1) Protect Area B.
      (2) Be prepared to move on order to assembly areas 6, 13, 14, 10, 1, and 17.
   e. RAS Company C.
      (1) Protect Area C.
      (2) Be prepared to move on order to assembly areas 11, 12, 15, 10, and 1.
(Classification)

f. RAS Company D.
   (1) Protect Area D.
   (2) Be prepared to move on order to assembly areas 12, 14, 10, 15, and 1.

g. RAS Company F.
   (1) Protect Area F.
   (2) Be prepared to move on order to assembly areas 14, 1, 15, and 6.

h. RAS Company G.
   (1) Protect Area G.
   (2) Be prepared to move on order to assembly areas 10, 1, and 15.

i. Coordination Instructions.
   (1) This plan effective for planning on receipt and execution on order.
   (2) When executed, separate orders will be issued for each of the following phases:
      (a) Phase I. Assemble RAS potential in base assembly area and prepare to move to any one of designated assembly areas. RAS potential which must come from other base assembly areas will not move during phase I.
      (b) Phase II. Enter RAOC tactical net.
      (c) Phase III. Move to assembly area designated by order and revert to control of RAOC on arrival. RAS potential derived from units outside the base area will join at that point.

4. LOGISTICS
   a. Cite OPLAN 1 as authority to achieve required supply levels.
   b. Exception reports of shortages to RAOC daily.
   c. Transportation requirements by 051800 June to RAOC.
   d. Resupply during emergency operations per SOP.
   e. Medical annex to follow.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   a. Command. CP at designated assembly area after phase II.

________________________________________
Commander

(Classification)
ANNEX C TO APPENDIX C

TYPE OPLAN FOR DAMAGE CONTROL

OPLAN 15–2 (Blue Light) Copy No 5
Reference: RAP SOP 15th ASG
Figure G–1
Task Organization: See annex A

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces. See OPLAN 15–1 (Red Light).
   b. Friendly Forces. 15th ASG organizes assigned and tenant resources for ADC purposes per task organization, annex A.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. On order, selected units, having ADC potential and listed under task organization, annex A, are dispatched to scene of incident and placed under operational control of indicated control element.

2. MISSION
   15th Area Support Group organizes all potential resources within zone boundaries to execute area damage control operations; assumes operational control of required tenant units previously earmarked as having ADC potential when an ADC incident occurs.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation. 15th ASG organizes for ADC mission by establishing a RAOC following previously established concepts. RAOC assumes operational control when damage incident is reported and immediately dispatches ADC Task Force Command Section or other appropriate control party to scene. RAOC operations section issues warning orders to the most appropriate ADC teams to prepare to move on order. ADC teams are moved into area on order from RAOC, ADC Task Force Command Section, or appropriate ADC control party. Teams take all possible appropriate actions to protect friendly forces and facilities and eliminate the threat or source of danger. ADC control elements organize for area damage control operations in assigned areas and simultaneously plan to assist other areas as indicated.
   b. 15th RAOC (15th Area Support Group).
      (1) Monitor and coordinate ADC operations within area. Assist control elements in planning operations.
(Classification)

(2) Coordinate with the RAOC of adjacent Area Support Groups for necessary mutual support.

(3) In areas with tenant units having command and control capability, designate major unit to organize, plan, and control ADC operations. Relieve major unit of responsibility by substituting forces from RAOC ADC Task Force Command Section when situation requires such action.

(4) In areas having no major tenants, designate RAOC, ADC Task Force Command Section to supervise all ADC organization, planning, and control.

(5) Activate control elements and ADC potential as required.

(6) Assist control elements in conduct of ADC operations.

c. Area A.

(1) HQ 29th Transportation Battalion (major C&C unit).
   (a) Organize and plan for ADC operations in area.
   (b) Upon activation as control party, move to scene of incident and assume control of ADC elements allocated to operation until relieved by RAOC control element. Request additional support from RAOC as required.
   (c) Be prepared to assist, on order, Area B in performing ADC mission by augmentation or assumption of control.

(2) 3d Field Depot. Be prepared to assume ADC mission of HQ 29th Transportation Battalion, on order.

(3) Units providing ADC teams.
   (a) Organize and be prepared to commit on order from RAOC of major C&C unit in area, number and type teams indicated at annex A.
   (b) Establish channels of communication with either RAOC or major C&C unit in area as facilities permit.*
   (c) On order, dispatch teams to designated assembly point and on arrival report to control part for instructions.

d. Area B.

(1) HQ 66th Ordnance Ammunition Battalion (major C&C unit).
   (a) Organize and plan for ADC operations in area.
   (b) Upon activation as control party, move to scene of incident and assume control of ADC elements allocated to operation until relieved by RAOC control element. Request additional support from RAOC as required.
   (c) 29th Transportation Battalion will be prepared to assist Area B on order, in performing ADC mission by augmentation or assumption of control.

(2) ADC Task Force Command Section (from 15th RAOC). Be prepared to assume on order, ADC mission of 66th Ordnance Ammunition Battalion.

*See note last page of OPLAN.
(3) Units providing ADC teams.
   (a) Organize and be prepared to commit on order from RAOC or major C&C unit in area, number and type teams indicated at annex A.
   (b) Establish channels of communication with either RAOC or major C&C unit in area as facilities permit.*
   (c) On order, dispatch teams to designated assembly point and on arrival report to control party for instructions.

e. Area C.
   (1) HQ 503d MP Battalion (major C&C unit).
      (a) Organize and plan for ADC operations in area.
      (b) Upon activation as control party, move to scene of incident and assume control of ADC elements allocated to operation until relieved by RAOC control element. Request additional support from RAOC as required.
      (c) Be prepared to assist on order, Areas A & D in performing ADC mission by augmentation or assumption of control.
   (2) ADC Task Force Command Section (from 15th RAOC). Be prepared to assume ADC mission of HQ 503d MP Battalion, on order.
   (3) Units providing ADC teams.
      (a) Organize and be prepared to commit on order from RAOC or major C&C unit in area, number and type teams indicated at annex A.
      (b) Establish channels of communication with either RAOC or major C&C unit in area as facilities permit.*
      (c) On order, dispatch teams to designated assembly point and on arrival report to control party for instructions.

f. Area D.
   (1) ADC Task Force Command Section (from 15th RAOC).
      (a) Organize and plan for ADC operations in Area D. Designate a unit in Area D to assume interim control until relieved by control element from RAOC.
      (b) On order, move to scene of incident and assume control of ADC elements allocated to operation. Request additional support from RAOC as required.
   (2) HQ 503d MP Battalion. Be prepared to assume on order, ADC mission of ADC Task Force Command Section in Area D.
   (3) Units providing ADC teams.
      (a) Organize and be prepared to commit on order from RAOC, ADC Task Force, Command Section or major C&C unit area responsible for Area D number and type teams indicated at annex A.

* See note last page of OPLAN.
(Classification)

(b) Establish channels of communication with either RAOC, ADC Task Force Command Section or major C&C unit responsible for Area D as facilities permit.*
(c) On order, dispatch teams to designated assembly point and on arrival report to control party for instructions.

g. Area E.
(1) ADC Task Force Command Section (from 15th RAOC).
(a) Organize and plan for ADC operations in Area E. Designate a unit in Area E to assume interim control until relieved by control element from RAOC.
(b) On order, move to scene of incident and assume control of ADC elements allocated to operation. Request additional support as required.
(c) HQ 35th Engineer Battalion. Be prepared to assume on order, ADC mission of ADC Task Force Command Section in Area E.

(2) Units providing ADC teams.
(a) Organize and be prepared to commit on order from RAOC, ADC Task Force Command Section or major C&C unit responsible for Area E, number and type teams indicated at annex A.
(b) Establish channels of communication with either RAOC, ADC Task Force Command Section or major C&C unit responsible for Area E as facilities permit.*
(c) On order, dispatch teams to designated assembly point and on arrival report to control party for instructions.

h. Area F.
(1) HQ 35th Engineer Construction Battalion (major C&C unit).
(a) Organize and plan for ADC operations in area.
(b) Upon activation as control party, move to scene of incident and assume control of ADC elements allocated to operation until relieved by RAOC control element. Request additional support from RAOC as required.
(c) Be prepared to assist on order, Areas E&G in performing ADC mission by augmentation or assumption of control.

(2) HQ 2d Engineer Construction Group. Be prepared to assume ADC mission of HQ 35th Engineer Construction Battalion, on order.

(3) Units providing ADC teams.
(a) Organize and be prepared to commit on order from RAOC or major C&C unit in area, number and type teams indicated at annex A.
(b) Establish channels of communication with either RAOC or major C&C unit in area as facilities permit.*
(c) On order, dispatch teams to designated assembly point and on arrival report to control party for instructions.

* See note last page of OPLAN.
i. Area G.

(1) HQ 36th Engineer Construction Battalion (major C&C unit).
   (a) Organize and plan for ADC operations in area.
   (b) Upon activation as control party, move to scene of incident and assume control of ADC elements allocated to operation until relieved by RAOC control element. Request additional support from RAOC as required.
   (c) Be prepared to assist on order, Areas E&F in performing ADC mission by augmentation or assumption of control.

(2) HQ 2d Engineer Construction Group. Be prepared to assume ADC mission of HQ 36th Engineer Construction Battalion, on order.

(3) Units providing ADC teams.
   (a) Organize and be prepared to commit on order from RAOC or major C&C unit in area, number and type teams indicated at annex A.
   (b) Establish channels of communication with either RAOC or major C&C unit in area as facilities permit.*
   (c) On order, dispatch teams to designated assembly point and on arrival report to control party for instructions.

j. Coordination Instructions.

(1) This plan effective for planning on receipt and execution on order.

(2) Designated control parties will—
   (a) Prepare area damage control plan for respective areas and distribute per attached distribution list. *(Note. List is not actually attached in this sample.)
   (b) Designate assembly areas for conduct of ADC operations. Notify RAOC of such designations.
   (c) Request additional ADC support through RAOC.

(3) Units providing ADC teams will—
   (a) On receipt of code words "Blue Light," activate teams in place.
   (b) Dispatch teams to designated assembly points on order of RAOC, ADC Task Force Command Section or responsible major C&C unit.

4. LOGISTICS
   See OPLAN 15-1.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command.

   (1) RAOC CP at coordinates 087095.

   (2) Designated control parties assume command of ADC teams upon arrival of teams at assembly points.

* See note last page of OPLAN.
(3) RAOC exercises overall command of ADC operations.
b. Signal, Annex

*Note. Establishing communications from a lower unit to a higher is not a normal practice. However, in this case it seems advisable because of the provisional organization of elements, drawn from many units, to meet ADC requirements. Units within the Support Group area will be in a continuous transient state. For the higher unit to establish communications with the lower, places upon them, an additional burden which is probably beyond their capability.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA &quot;A&quot;</th>
<th>CONTROL PARTY</th>
<th>TRAFFIC CONTROL</th>
<th>LIGHT RESCUE</th>
<th>LABOR</th>
<th>HEAVY RESCUE</th>
<th>AREA LIGHTING</th>
<th>FIREFIGHTING</th>
<th>MEDICAL</th>
<th>MUNITIONS</th>
<th>CBR</th>
<th>DECONTAMINATION</th>
<th>RAD. SURVEY, AERIAL</th>
<th>RAD. SURVEY, AERIAL</th>
<th>RAD. SURVEY, AERIAL</th>
<th>RAD. SURVEY, AERIAL</th>
<th>RAD. SURVEY, AERIAL</th>
<th>AVIATION</th>
<th>LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE</th>
<th>LIGHT RESCUE</th>
<th>AIRMOBILE</th>
<th>EQUIP. RECOVERY</th>
<th>ESTIMATED</th>
<th>CONTROL</th>
<th>LOUDSPEAKER</th>
<th>RADIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ 29th Trans Bn</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Co 35th Engr Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>6/1</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>8/1</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st Maint Spt Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>5/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Hvy Equip Maint Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>4/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th Hvy Maint Spt Co</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Co, 35th Engineer Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td>6/1 1/2 2/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57th Trans Trk Co, Hvy</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58th Trans Trk Co Lt/Med</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299th NP Co Phys Scty</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Station Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Field Depot</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th Ord Amm Bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th HN Amb Det (6-500RA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th CBR Recon Det (3-500LA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th CBR Decon Det (3-500PB)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th BOD Det (9-500)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CLASSIFICATION)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA &quot;A&quot; (Cont)</th>
<th>FIREFIGHTING</th>
<th>MEDICAL</th>
<th>MUNITIONS</th>
<th>CBR</th>
<th>RAD. SURVEY/GROUND</th>
<th>RAD. SURVEY/AERIAL</th>
<th>RECONNAISSANCE</th>
<th>LIGHT RESCUE</th>
<th>AIRMOBILE</th>
<th>EQUIP RECOVERY/HEAVY</th>
<th>PSYOP CONTROL</th>
<th>LOUDSPEAKER/BLEAPET</th>
<th>MOBILE RADIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Firefighting Det (5-500)</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Firefighting Det (5-500)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Firefighting Det (5-500)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Firefighting Det (5-500)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th Firefighting Det (5-500)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Firefighting Det (5-500)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Firefighting Det (5-500)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available Resources, Area &quot;A&quot;</td>
<td>2 1 16 8 3 10 1 5 1 2 2 1 6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 2 1 1 1 7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CLASSIFICATION)
<p>| AREA WPN | CONTROL PARTY | TRAFFIC CONTROL | LIGHT RESCUE | HEAVY RESCUE | AREA LIGHTING | FIREFIGHTING | MEDICAL | MUNITIONS | CBR | RECONNAISSANCE | DECONTAMINATION | RAD. SURVEY, GROUND | RAD. SURVEY, AERIAL | RECONNAISSANCE | LIGHT RESCUE | AIRMObILE | EQUIP. RECOVERY/LIGHT | EQUIP. RECOVERY/HEAVY | PSYOP CONTROL | LOUDSPEAKER/BLEEDER | MOBILE RADIO |
|----------|----------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|---------|-----------|-----|----------------|----------------|---------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------------|-----------|
| 66th Ord Ammo Bn | 1/1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 29th Ord Amm Co | 2/1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 26th Maint Spt Co | 5/2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 35th Repair Parts Sup Co | 1/3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 25th Labor Svc Co | 3/1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 23d Gen Spt Co | 1/2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 24th Gen Spt Co | 1/3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 80th Engr Dtrk Co | 6/4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 299th MP Co Phys Sety | 1/1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A Co 35th Engr Bn | 1/1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 15th Station Hospital | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 13th Hel Amb Det (8-5008A) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 29th EOD Det (9-5000) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 66th CBR Recon Det (3-5001A) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 96th CBR Decon Det (3-5009F) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2d Firefighting Det (5-500) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA &quot;H&quot; (Cont)</th>
<th>16th Firefighting Det (5-500)</th>
<th>17th Firefighting Det (5-500)</th>
<th>18th Firefighting Det (5-500)</th>
<th>19th Firefighting Det (5-500)</th>
<th>20th Firefighting Det (5-500)</th>
<th>52d Firefighting Det (5-500)</th>
<th>Available Resources, Area &quot;H&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1 1 8 11 1 2 1 5 1 2 1 6 1 2 1 1 1 7 - - - - - - -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CCLASSIFICATION)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE AND NUMBER ADC TEAMS PROVIDED, WITH SEQUENCE OF ACTIVATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TASK ORGANIZATION BY AREA AND UNIT DESIGNATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA C^M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 503d MP Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>663d Lt Equip Maint Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Co 35th Engr Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102d Tire Repair Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Labor Svc Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Trans Trk Co Lt/Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23d Sig Op Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81st Maint Spt Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th Repair Parts Sup Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th MP Co (Area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>297th MP Co (Phys Scty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>298th MP Co (Phys Scty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Gen Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Hel Amb Det (8-500 BA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>512th Special Ammu Co</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th EOD Dat (9-500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASK ORGANIZATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CLASSIFICATION

1/1

CLASSIFICATION
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE AND NUMBER ADC</th>
<th>CONTROL PARTY</th>
<th>TRAFFIC CONTROL</th>
<th>LIGHT RESCUE</th>
<th>LABOR</th>
<th>HEAVY RESCUE</th>
<th>AREA LIGHTING</th>
<th>FIREFIGHTING</th>
<th>MEDICAL</th>
<th>MUNITIONS</th>
<th>CBR</th>
<th>RAD, SURVEY/GROUND</th>
<th>CBD, AERIAL</th>
<th>RECONNAISSANCE</th>
<th>DECONTAMINATION</th>
<th>EQUIP RECOVERY</th>
<th>LIGHT RECOVERY</th>
<th>AIRMOBILE</th>
<th>PSYOP CONTROL</th>
<th>LOUDSPEAKER</th>
<th>BLEEGER</th>
<th>MOBILE RADIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TEAM BY AREA AND UNIT DESIGNATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA &quot;NEW&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ 35th Engr Const Bn</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th MP Co (Area)</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Co 35th Engr Bn</td>
<td>6/1 2/1 8/1</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Gen Hospital</td>
<td>4/1 5/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Hel Amb Det (8-500A)</td>
<td>6/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Firefighting Det (5-500)</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Firefighting Det (5-500)</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d Firefighting Det (5-500)</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53d Firefighting Det (5-500)</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>512th Special Ammco Co</td>
<td>1/1 1/1 1/1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th EOD Det (9-500)</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Labor Service Co</td>
<td>3/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102d Tire Repair Co</td>
<td>8/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66th CBR Recon Det (3-500LA)</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96th CBR Deca Det (3-500FB)</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CLASSIFICATION)
<p>| AREA &quot;W&quot; (Cont) | CONTROL PARTY | TRAFFIC CONTROL | LIGHT RESCUE | LABOR | HEAVY RESCUE | AREA LIGHTING | FIREFIGHTING | MEDICAL | MUNITIONS | CBR | RECONNAISSANCE | DECONTAMINATION | RAD. SURVEY/GROUND | RAD. SURVEY/AERIAL | RECONNAISSANCE | LIGHT RESCUE | AIRMOBILE | EQUIP RECOVERY/LIGHT | EQUIP RECOVERY/HEAVY | PSYOP CONTROL | LOUDSPEAKER/BROADCAST | MOBILE RADIO |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|-------|--------------|--------------|--------------|---------|------------|-----|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------|---------------------|-------------|
| 663d Lt Equip Maint Co | 1 | 15/1 |
| 81st Maint Spt Co | 2/1 |
| Available Resources, Area &quot;W&quot; | 2 | 1 | 6 | 11 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 6 | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | - | - | - | - | 15 | 2 | - | - | - |
| TYPE AND NUMBER ADC TEAMS PROVIDED WITH SEQUENCE OF ACTIVATION | CONTROL PARTY | TRAFFIC CONTROL | LIGHT RESCUE | HEAVY RESCUE | AREA LIGHTING | FIREFIGHTING | MEDICAL | MUNITIONS | CBR | DECON/CONTAMINATION | RAD/SURV/GROUND | RAD/RECON/AERIAL | RECOGNITION | LIGHT RESCUE | AIRMEN | EQUIP RECOVERY/LIGHT | EQUIP RECOVERY/HEAVY | RAD/COMM CONTROL | LOUDSPEAKER/BLAST VEST | MOBILE RADIO |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|----------|-----------|-----|------------------|------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|--------|---------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------|---------|
| <strong>AREA πm²</strong>                                                 |                |                |              |              |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| HQ 35th Engr Const Bn                                         | 1/1            |                |              |              |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| 55th MP Co (Area)                                             | 1/1            |                |              |              |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| B Co 35th Engr Bn                                             | 6/1            | 2/1            | 8/1          | 2/1          |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| C Co 35th Engr Bn                                             | 6/2            | 2/3            | 8/2          | 2/2          |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| 8th Trans TM Svc Co                                           | 1/1            | 1/2            |              |              |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| 56th Trans Trk Co, Med                                        | 1/2            |                |              |              |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| 142d Sig Const Co                                             | 1/3            |                |              |              |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| 5th Gen Hospital                                              |                |                |              |              |               | 4/1          | 3/1       |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| 15th Hel Amb Det (8-500RA)                                   | 6/1            |                |              |              |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| 29th BOD Det (9-500)                                          |                |                |              |              |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| 66th CBR Recon Det (3-500LA)                                  |                |                |              |              |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| 96th CBR Recon Det (3-500FB)                                  |                |                |              |              |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| HQ 2d Engr Const Gp                                           | 1/2            |                |              |              |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| 29th Labor Svc Co                                             |                |                |              |              |               |              |          |           |     |                  |                  |                |             |             |        |                     |                  |                 |                 |             |         |
| <strong>Available Resources, Area πm²</strong>                            | 2              | 1              | 12           | 6            | 5             | 16           | -         | -         | -   | 4               | 4               | 3              | 6           | -         | -     | 1                   | 1                | 1               | 1                | 6            | -       |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE AND NUMBER ADC TEAMS PROVIDED, WITH SEQUENCE OF ACTIVATION</th>
<th>TASK ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>AREA &quot;NOM&quot;</th>
<th>CONTROL PARTY</th>
<th>TRAFFIC CONTROL</th>
<th>LIGHT RESCUE</th>
<th>LABOR</th>
<th>HEAVY RESCUE</th>
<th>AREA LIGHTING</th>
<th>FIREFIGHTING</th>
<th>MEDICAL</th>
<th>MUNITIONS</th>
<th>CBR</th>
<th>RAD. SURVEY/GROUND</th>
<th>RAD. RECONNAISSANCE</th>
<th>RECOVERY</th>
<th>DECONTAMINATION</th>
<th>AVIATION</th>
<th>AIRMOBILE</th>
<th>EQUIP. RECOVERY</th>
<th>LIGHT RECOVERY</th>
<th>EOD</th>
<th>LOUDSPEAKER BLEAFLET</th>
<th>MOBILE RADIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HQ 36th Engr Const Bn</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HQ 2d Engr Const Co</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55th MP Co (Area)</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C Co 36th Engr Bn</td>
<td>6/1</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>8/1</td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Co 36th Engr Bn</td>
<td>6/2</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td>8/2</td>
<td>2/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40th Engr Const Spt Co</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>4/3</td>
<td>3/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53d Trans Trk Co, Med</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54th Trans Trk Co, Med</td>
<td>1/2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>119th Sig Cable Const Co</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15th Sig Radio Relay Co</td>
<td>1/4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10th Field Hospital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/1</td>
<td>3/1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15th Hs Amb Det (8-SOBOA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16th It Equip Maint Co</td>
<td>4/3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29th EOD Det (9-SO00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66th CBR Recon Det (3-SO0LA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66th CBR Recon Det (3-SO0LA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CLASSIFICATION)
1. General

Based on a complete appraisal of the enemy and friendly situations, the 15th Area Support Group developed a scheme of deployment that would facilitate RAP actions. Over a period of time (following time frame of scenario), units were relocated as shown on map B (fig. 17). Some of the actions and rationale are discussed in this annex to provide a better understanding of advantages that can be obtained by proper organization of an area.

2. Organization of the Land Area

The total area was reorganized as shown on map B. Considerations included the following:

a. Areas A and B were consolidated and redesignated as area 1.

b. Areas D and G were eliminated and consolidated with areas 1 and 3.

3. Damage Control

The organization for damage control operations was based on the threat analysis for each established subarea. Each subarea created an emergency structure as their resources permitted. In addition, OPLAN 15-2 was modified to account for changes in unit locations and priorities.

4. Civil Affairs

a. Military police liaison personnel were permanently assigned to police stations in each major town. The area communications system was expanded to tie in these stations.

b. Municipal vehicles were allocated POL from military resources in return for assumption of responsibility for pipeline security “in and within 10 miles of the police precincts.”

c. Emergency food and medical supplies were allocated in return for security and maintenance of railroads and highways within town and village boundaries.

d. Emergency ordinances were passed by local officials pertaining to circulation restrictions, contraband, identification requirements, and similar matters.

5. Security

a. Each subarea established its own local security plan.

b. The RAOC set up a readiness training and testing program.

c. Defense and patrol areas were provided resources required to execute their functions.

d. Coverage of the scan area by WASCOM was requested but, due to lack of aviation and other resources, no positive response was possible. Paramilitary police being trained by the 503d MP Battalion will help fill this gap.

6. Operations

a. All units in the area were advised to submit daily operations reports to the RAOC in the event—

   (1) Small groups are operating in isolated areas.

   (2) Convoys or critical movements of individual vehicles are contemplated.

   (3) Unusual incidents among the civil population take place.

   (4) Inexplicable damage of property, roads, rails, or pipelines or inexplicable loss of property takes place.

b. Intelligence type military police patrol reports are sent to the RAOC operations section.

c. WASCOM directed at least one checkpoint be established on the MSR by each area support group to facilitate coordination rear to front and left to right. Therefore, the group south of the 15th Area Support Group operates a checkpoint advising the 15th Area Support Group RAOC of all northbound movements and
the 503d MP Battalion operates a checkpoint advising the RAOC of all southbound movements.

d. Constant liaison is maintained between tenant units and the RAOC.

7. Supplies and Equipment

Special allocations to equip units for their RAP role have been approved for those units not already authorized additional equipment. Some equipment has been allocated for issue to local civil and para-police organizations.

8. Major Problems

a. The lack of responsive and dependable aviation support rules out planning for this valuable tool either for reconnaissance or security purposes.

b. The high probability that need for combat arms assistance will occur simultaneously in other areas makes counting on the 12th Armored Calvalry for all reaction extremely dangerous.

c. The reluctance of indigenous civilians to work inside or close to military installations is a potential source of discontent.

9. Miscellaneous

a. Unit status reports are providing the data base for automatic relay of RAP information to the RAOC. These data include—

   1. Unit location and strength.
   2. RAP potential.
   3. Communications information.

b. RAOC personnel visit each subarea on a frequent and recurring basis to coordinate, inspect, and test RAP measures.
Figure 17. Map B.
INDEX

ADPS, RAP Requirements ........................................ 103
Area Damage Control Elements .............................. 46b, c
Area Designation .............................................. 34
Area Organization:
  Basic Considerations ...................................... 96
  For Damage Control ........................................ 98
  For Security .............................................. 99
  Method ................................................... 97
Base Defense .................................................. 64
CBR Functional Support of RAP ............................... 84
Civic Action, Military ......................................... 27g, 28d
Civil Affairs Operations in
  Support of RAP ........................................... 25, 26
Civil Defense, Military Support of ...27g, 28e .......... 16, 18
  Command .................................................. 19, 31, 53
  Command, Exercise of for ADC ......................... 55
  Command, Exercise of for RAS ......................... 54
  Command Relationships ................................. 4
Communications:
  Field Army System ...................................... 82
  Organic ............................................... 83
  Theater Army System .................................. 81
Community Relations ......................................... 27e
Considerations, Preoperational ............................. 5
Data Base .................................................... 56, 58
Economy of Force ........................................... 14
Explosive Ordnance Disposal:
  Mission ................................................. 86
  Organization and Planning ............................... 87
  Scheduling Operations .................................. 90
  Preliminary Precautions ................................ 92
  Reports .................................................. 88, 94
  Team Operations ....................................... 93
Force of Arms, Entry by .................................... 27
  Forces, Allied ......................................... 39
Indigenous Personnel Policies ............................... 38
Internal Defense ............................................ 28b
Invitation, Entry by ....................................... 28
Military Intelligence Group, Role of .................... 72
Mission and Functions ..................................... 2
Offensive .................................................. 18
Organization ................................................ 3
Organizational and Operational
  Concepts .................................................. 24
  Operations:
    Area Damage Control .................................. 70
    Populace and Resource Control ...27f, 28d .......... 15, 18
    Psychological ......................................... 27h, 28f
    Rear Area Protection .................................. 65
Planning ..................................................... 5, 21
  Planning Considerations for
    TACAIR Support ....................................... 79
  Planning by EOD Units .................................. 91
  Police Authority ........................................ 41
  Populace and Resources Control ...27d, 28e .......... 14, 18
  Potentials, Estimated Unit .............................. 105
  Priority ................................................. 15
  Protection, Integrated .................................. 8
RAP Elements, Type ........................................ 46
Rear Area Security Company, Building the ............... 49
Rear Area Security Conditions ......................... 7
Rear Area Security Elements ............................... 46c
Rear Area Security Numerical
  Relationships for ....................................... 8
Resources, Determining .................................... 45
Responsiveness .............................................. 20
Security:
  Base .................................................. 62
  Combat ............................................... 69j
  Escort .................................................. 69h
  Linear Operations ..................................... 69
  Local .................................................. 63
  Passive ............................................... 69d
  Patrol .................................................. 69g
  Planning ................................................ 68
  RAP, Forms of ......................................... 66
  Reconnaissance ........................................ 69f
  Remote .................................................. 69e
  Site .................................................... 61
  Strong Point .......................................... 69i
Site Selection, Proper ..................................... 59
Structure of Area Damage
Control Teams:
  Augmentation Area Flood-lighting Team ............ Sec XVII, app B
  86

AGO 7471A

127
Structure of Area Damage Control
Teams (Continued)

Augmentation Provisional
Firefighting Team — Sec IX, app B 83
Aviation Area Damage
Control Units — Sec V, app B 82
CBR Decontamination
Team — Sec VIII, app B 83
CBR Reconnaissance
Team — Sec XVIII, app B 86
Damage Control Party — Sec I, app B 80
Heavy Rescue Team — Sec IV, app B 81
Labor Team — Sec III, app B 81
Light Rescue Team — Sec II, app B 80
Loudspeaker and Leaflet
Team — Sec XIV, app B 85
Medical Aid Team — Sec VI, app B 82
Mobile Radio Team — Sec XV, app B 85
Munitions Safety Control
Team — Sec X, app B 84
PSYOP Control
Team — Sec XVI, app B 86
Radiological Survey
Team — Sec XIX, app B 87
Recovery Team Conventional/
Special Ammo — Sec XI, app B 84
Recovery Team Heavy
Equipment General — Sec XII, app B 84
Recovery Team Light Equip-
ment General — Sec XIII, app B 85

Traffic Control Team — Sec VII, app B 83

Support:
Air Reconnaissance — 76 53
Close Air — 77 54
Counterintelligence in the
FASCOM Area — 74 53
Military Intelligence Group,
Security — 73 52
TASCOM — 71 50

Tactical Air Control Party — 78 54
Tactical Resources, Use of — 35 20
Task Force, Building the — 48, 51 31, 33
Tenant Units, Assistance to — 57 36

Unit Priorities — 33 19

Unit RAP Potential Estimates:
Administrative Units — 115 77
Aviation Elements — 110 75
Civil Affairs Units — 112 75
Engineer Elements — 109 75
Indigenous Elements — 50 32
Maintenance Elements — 113 76
Medical Service Units — 111 75
Military Police Elements — 114 76
Signal Elements — 108 74
Supply Elements — 107 74
Transportation Elements — 106 73

Vulnerability — 17 9
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

Distribution:

To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12–11 requirements for Enemy Pow and Civilian Internees.