FIELD MANUAL

STAFF OFFICERS FIELD MANUAL

STAFF ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE

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HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

JULY 1972
# Staff Officers' Field Manual

## Staff Organization and Procedure

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*This manual supersedes FM 101-5, 14 June 1968, including all changes.*
CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

Section I. INTRODUCTION

1–1. Purpose

This manual prescribes doctrine for staff organization and procedure. Its purpose is to assist commanders and staff officers in the organization and operation of headquarters. *It is not a guide for employing forces or a description of specific command duties.*

1–2. Scope

a. The contents of this manual are applicable to—

(1) General war.

(2) Limited war.

(3) Cold war, to include stability operations.

b. The organizational and procedural information covers the primary fields of staff operation.

c. The manual applies primarily to the Army in the field. With appropriate modification, it also applies to other Army commands and to Army elements of joint and combined headquarters.

d. The specific staff organization and the staff officers' responsibilities and duties outlined in this manual are those most commonly used in the US Army. However, a commander may deviate from the guidance contained herein to conform with his mission and with the resources available to accomplish his mission.

e. This manual is in consonance with the following international standardization agreements, which are identified by type of agreement and number at the beginning of each appropriate chapter in the manual:

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1–3. Recommended Changes

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommendations to improve its clarity or accuracy. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons will be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct

to the Commanding General, US Army Combat Developments Command Combat Systems Group, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027. Originators of proposed changes that would constitute a significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels, to the Commanding General, US Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and followup.

1–1
Section II. STAFF PRINCIPLES

1-4. The Commander

a. Command is the authority that a commander in the Military Service exercises over his subordinates by virtue of his rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. Command also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, training, and discipline of assigned and attached personnel.

b. The commander alone is responsible for all that his unit does or fails to do. He can delegate authority, but not responsibility. He is assisted in performing command functions by deputy or assistant commanders and a staff.

c. The commander discharges his responsibilities through an established chain of command. All orders from a higher commander to a subordinate unit are issued by the commander of the highest unit to the commander of the next subordinate unit. Intermediate commanders are bypassed only in urgent situations. In such instances, both the commander issuing the order and the commander receiving the order should notify intermediate commanders of its context as soon as possible.

1-5. Deputy and Assistant Commanders

a. The commander establishes definite procedures for using deputy and assistant commanders. He prescribes their roles and duties and their relationships with the chief of staff, the staff, and commanders of subordinate units. Deputy and assistant commanders must keep themselves informed of operations so that they can assume command, if necessary, and continue operations without a break in the logical sequence of command guidance, planning, decision, and execution. The commander informs them of his plans, intentions, goals, and problems, and the chief of staff distributes information on the status of staff actions.

b. A deputy or assistant commander normally has no staff. When he has specific responsibilities, he receives assistance from the staff as prescribed by the commander. When the deputy or assistant commander needs a staff, the commander may detail officers from his headquarters or from subordinate units to assist the deputy commander, or the commander may make a subordinate unit's headquarters available to him.

c. Deputy and assistant commanders may give orders to the chief of staff or his assistants only when and within the limits that the commander authorizes. They may go to the staff at any time, however, for advice or assistance.

d. Deputy and assistant commanders normally are not part of the chain of command. Their relationship to subordinate units is established by their assigned tasks and the units made available to them to accomplish these tasks or as delineated by the commander.

1-6. Composition of the Staff

a. The staff consists of officers who are specifically ordered or detailed to assist the commander. These officers may be assigned for full-time duty or for dual duty. (A unit commander may perform staff duties in addition to his command duties.) To preserve integrity of the line and staff (para 3-9d), dual-duty assignments should be limited.

b. The commander commands the staff, but the chief of staff directs and supervises it. (The executive officer does this at brigade and lower levels of command.)

1-7. Staff Functions

Five functions are common to all staff officers: providing information, making estimates, making recommendations, preparing plans and orders, and supervising the execution of plans and orders.

a. Providing Information.

   (1) The staff collects, collates, evaluates, and transmits the fragments of information that flow continuously into the headquarters. The staff rapidly processes this variety of information and provides the commander with pertinent, evaluated information in a usable form. Staff officers perform this function by—

      (a) Collecting information from all available sources and maintaining continuing contact with these sources. When possible, the staff officers establish procedures to produce an automatic flow of information to the headquarters.

      (b) Collating and evaluating information in their respective areas of responsibility.

   (2) In collecting the latest information available, staff officers look for pertinent in-
formation and transmit it promptly to the commander or to other members of the command who need it. They—

(a) Determine the significance, reliability, and completeness of this information and transmit evaluated information without request whenever a new influence on military operations is indicated.

(b) Insure the exchange of information within the staff and with higher, adjacent, and lower units so that all staffs and other commands can exploit the information fully. To do this, each staff officer must have a basic understanding of the kind of information needed by all staff officers and commanders.

b. Making Estimates.

(1) The staff prepares estimates to assist the commander in his examination of all factors influencing contemplated courses of action. On the basis of these estimates, the staff provides the commander—

(a) Conclusions on how significant factors will affect the situation; or

(b) Recommendations on how available means can best support the selected course of action.

(2) Adequate plans hinge on early and continuing estimates by staff officers. Failure to make these estimates may lead to costly errors and omissions because of no consideration given to possible contingencies or obstacles to a planned course of action.

(3) Discussion of the estimate as a problem-solving technique is in chapter 5. Discussion of procedures and techniques for preparing estimates is in paragraph 2–10 and appendix C.

c. Making Recommendations. Staff officers make recommendations to assist the commander in reaching decisions and establishing policies. Staff officers also offer recommendations to one another and to subordinate commanders. In the latter case, recommendations are for the purpose of assistance only; they carry no implied command authority (para 1–10b(2)). Discussion of procedures is in paragraph 2–11.

d. Preparing Plans and Orders.

(1) The staff converts the commander's decisions and policies into plans and orders. The commander may delegate authority to staff officers to issue these plans and orders without his personal approval (para 1–9).

(2) The staff analyzes the commander's policies and decisions to insure full understanding before formulating plans and issuing orders for their implementation. The staff coordinates these plans and orders with other staff elements within and outside the headquarters.

(3) The staff also prepares plans based on anticipated events or conditions. These plans help the commander to make decisions and to reduce reaction time.

e. Supervising the Execution of Plans and Orders. The staff assists the commander by insuring that subordinate elements carry out the commander's plans and orders. This supervision relieves the commander of much detail, keeps the staff apprised of the situation, and provides the staff with information it may need for progress reports. Such information is necessary when other staff officers and subordinate commanders and their staffs request policy interpretations and assistance in resolving difficulties.

1–8. Staff Responsibility

a. Staff officers are assigned functional areas of interest and staff responsibility for accomplishing staff actions in these areas. Assignment of staff responsibility for a particular activity improves efficiency by—

(1) Giving the commander a single staff agency for advice and assistance in a particular functional area.

(2) Giving staff and subordinate elements of the command a commander's representative with whom they can coordinate or consult on a particular functional area.

(3) Insuring that all command interests receive staff attention.

(4) Enabling staff officers to give their complete attention to a manageable portion of command interests.

b. The assignment of staff responsibility carries no connotation of command authority over other staff officers or over any other elements of the command.

c. Chapter 4 contains a detailed discussion of the responsibilities and duties of staff officers.

1–9. Staff Authority

a. The commander specifically delegates authority to the staff, or to a particular staff officer.

(1) The commander normally delegates au-
FM 101-5

Authority to the staff to take final action on matters within command policy.

(2) The authority he delegates to individual staff officers varies with the level and the mission of the command, the immediacy of operations, and the relationship of the staff officer's area to the primary mission of the command.

b. When the commander authorizes staff officers to issue orders in his name, the commander retains responsibility for these orders.

1-10. Relationship Between the Staff and Commanders and Staffs of Subordinate Commands

a. General. Staff officers carrying out basic staff functions must avoid usurping the responsibilities or the prerogatives of subordinate commanders and staffs with whom they work.

b. Relationship of Staff Officer to Subordinate Commander. A staff officer contacts a subordinate commander to transmit orders or instructions, to provide advice and recommendations, or to exchange information.

(1) Normally, all orders issued from a higher headquarters requiring or prescribing action by a subordinate element of the command are by, or in the name of, the higher commander. Exceptions to this basic principle occur—

(a) When the higher commander specifically authorizes staff members to issue orders and instructions (para 1-9). The commander formally announces this delegation of authority to insure proper distribution and unquestioned validity.

(b) When the commander delegates operational control of a unit to a staff officer. This is announced formally by the commander to insure complete and universal understanding. Such delegation authorizes the staff officer to issue orders in his own name on matters involving composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the unit's mission. It does not include administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training unless a subordinate commander requests assistance in these matters.

(c) When the technical or professional nature of certain activities requires a special relationship. Technical control represents a degree of command authority that the commander delegates and announces formally.

(d) When the command organization includes a subordinate unit that is assigned or attached for administrative control only or for command less operational control. The adjutant general company in the division support command (DISCOM) is an example of assignment for command less operational control. Division staff officers, rather than the adjutant general company commander or the DISCOM commander, normally are delegated authority formally by the division commander to control operational mission activities of the company elements. Orders pertaining to administrative matters go to the DISCOM commander; orders pertaining to operational tasks go direct to the appropriate element of the adjutant general company.

(2) Recommendations and advice to subordinate commanders from staff officers of a higher headquarters are recommendations and advice only. A subordinate commander may accept or reject them just as he does those from his own staff.

c. Staff-to-Staff Contacts.

(1) In planning and conducting current operations and other activities, staff officers of a headquarters frequently need to contact their counterparts at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. The staff officers may need to get information, pass on guidance, or issue orders or instructions affecting command or staff element operations.

(2) These staff-to-staff contacts are for coordination and cooperation only. The higher headquarters staff officer exercises no independent authority over the subordinate headquarters staff.

(a) Staff officers normally honor requests for information. However, when a subordinate command staff officer considers a request unreasonable or a transgression of command prerogatives, he reports it to the chief of staff (executive officer), who may ask that the request be submitted through command channels.

(b) Staff-to-staff contacts may pass orders or instructions affecting a subordinate command's operations. These are commander-to-commander communications, however, issued in the higher commander's name. If the receiving staff officer considers an instruction unwarranted or a transgression of command prerogatives, he reports the matter to the chief of staff (executive officer), who may ask that the instructions be issued through command channels.

(c) Information affecting the operations of a staff section often goes staff to staff. Such
information usually is to improve interstaff relationships or to meet a particular higher staff requirement. (Changes in the submission time or contents of a report or requirements to establish temporary liaison are typical examples.)

1-11. Qualifications of Staff Officers
The effectiveness of a staff depends on the professional qualifications of its members. Staff officers must have the ability and inclination to lead. They must also have thorough knowledge of the structure, capabilities, limitations, and operating techniques of the units composing their organization and must know how these units function. Generally, command experience or responsible positions at lower staff levels are the criteria for assignment of officers to principal staff positions.
CHAPTER 2

STAFF PROCEDURES

Section I. GENERAL

2–1. Introduction

a. The staff provides information to the commander and supplies him with advice and estimates, as required. The staff prepares plans and converts the commander's decisions into plans and orders that go to all subordinate elements for planning or execution. As authorized by the commander, the staff supervises the execution of these plans and orders and takes the necessary action to insure that the commander's intentions are carried out. Staff officers must always remember that the command mission and the commander's responsibilities are the bases for all their actions. In handling the details in their assigned areas of interest, staff officers must never forget that they are the means to accomplish the mission—not ends in themselves.

b. Staff officers follow standard procedures and use standard techniques when possible.

2–2. Definition

a. Staff procedures are methods used to accomplish staff functions. They are the how of staff operations. A staff visit is a staff procedure. It is used, for example, in collecting information or in supervising the execution of tasks (para 1–7).

b. Use of effective staff procedures expedites the accomplishment of staff actions and improves the quality of assistance provided the commander.

c. Staff officers must have a working knowledge of the common tools and procedures used in all good staff work. They must also know the detailed procedures and techniques needed in their particular staff sections and jobs.

Section II. PROCEDURES

2–3. Completed Staff Action

Although this paragraph contains aspects of the staff officer-commander relationship, the principles outlined are applicable to other action officer-approval authority levels, such as a member of the staff section-staff section chief or chief of staff.

a. A completed staff action is a staff officer's analysis of a problem, to include consideration of all feasible courses of action, and his solution presented in a finished form that the commander can approve or disapprove as a completed action. Emphasis is on the words “completed action” because of the tendency to present difficult problems piecemeal to the commander. It is a staff officer's duty to work out even the most perplexing details, not to ask the commander to do it. The commander wants answers, not questions. However, as he develops his study, the staff officer may consult the commander for additional guidance or for assurance that he is proceeding in the proper direction.

b. A completed staff paper that recommends implementing actions includes an implementing memorandum, directive, or letter for the commander to sign or to approve. This places the staff officer's views before the commander in finished form and expedites implementation.

c. The theory of completed staff action usually makes more work for the staff officer, but it gives the commander more freedom. It also protects the commander from partially developed ideas, voluminous memorandums, and incomplete oral presentations.

d. The results of completed staff action should be clear and furnish concise statements of the essential facts. The recommended action should
reflect consideration of all feasible courses of action and the views of all agencies concerned and should present both advantages and disadvantages.

e. The concept of completed staff action has a corollary doctrine of equal importance—planning guidance to the staff. Adequate command guidance facilitates completed staff action and precludes wasted effort. After familiarizing himself with the problem, the commander limits the area to be studied and provides data, as appropriate, from experience or knowledge. He fixes responsibility for the solution and asks the responsible staff agency or individual for an estimated completion date. The commander also makes himself available to discuss points that need clarification.

f. Completed staff action applies to any staff procedure, written or otherwise, that is submitted to the chief of a staff section, the chief of staff, or the commander. It includes followup actions by the staff to insure compliance with instructions or orders.

2-4. Staff Coordination

a. Coordination within a staff is essential for two reasons: to insure harmonious staff action in carrying out the commander's plans and to avoid conflicts and duplications by making necessary adjustments in plans and policies before their implementation.

b. Most staff actions require coordination. The action officer and all other interested staff officers examine and correlate all subactions and resolve any conflicts. Each staff officer examines the action from the commander's point of view and determines the proper action within his area of interest.

c. The chief of staff (executive officer) establishes procedures to coordinate staff operations.

d. In specific staff actions, the action officer assigned the particular task is responsible for staff coordination.

e. Current organizational and operational concepts rely on the rapid, coordinated action and reaction of military forces; therefore, effective staff coordination procedures are essential. Staff officers must be familiar with the responsibilities of all staff sections of the command. Staff officers must also know the kinds of information that each section needs and what each section can provide. Knowing these facts, staff officers can determine when consultations with other staff sections are necessary and what features of the problem need to be discussed.

f. Specific coordination procedures include—

(1) Informal and formal conferences of various staff members.

(2) Briefings.

(3) Prompt distribution of essential information, decisions, and orders within and among headquarters staff sections.

(4) Properly functioning staff message control.

(5) Formal routing of staff papers to appropriate sections for comment and concurrence.

(6) Close contact and exchange of information by each staff section with the corresponding staff section at higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting headquarters.

g. Staff coordination is time consuming. Getting complete coordination when quick action is essential, or getting all interested parties to concur, is not always possible. In such cases, the action officer presents the plan or the recommendation to the proper authority, explaining that immediate action is required and what differences must be reconciled. The referral authority may call all interested parties together to get complete concurrence, or he may approve the recommendation without it. When complete coordination is not possible before taking a priority action, interested staff elements are informed of the action taken.

2-5. Staff Supervision

a. General.

(1) The staff must constantly supervise the execution of plans and orders so that they will be carried out as the commander intends.

(2) Staff officers must be thoroughly familiar with the commander's plan and how he wants it carried out. Further, they must keep informed of developments that affect the plan and must recommend necessary changes.

(3) Supervision, through analysis of reports, staff visits, and inspections, is the procedure the staff uses to carry out this responsibility.

b. Analysis of Reports. Properly analyzed and evaluated reports and summaries help staff officers determine the progress of the command's operations. Reports offer a quicker way than
ties might affect each course of action. A discussion of the use of the estimate as a problem-solving technique is in chapter 5. A formalized process for making estimates is in appendix C.

c. The preparation of estimates is a continuing process. The development of new information and considerations necessitates revision of estimates to improve the accuracy of recommendations or decisions based on the estimates.

2–11. Procedures for Presenting Recommendations

a. A staff officer will analyze and present practical alternatives concerning matters within his functional areas of interest or affecting his operations. He must, however, be fully prepared to make a recommendation to the commander. Observations concerning functional areas that are not his primary responsibility are normally given to the appropriate staff officer.

b. Staff officers follow both formal and informal procedures in the analysis of problems and the presentation of recommendations. The analysis, whether written or mental, must be systematic. Practical recommendations may be presented by written estimates or studies, or they may be presented verbally on a person-to-person basis.

c. Whether the procedures are formal or informal, the staff officer must carefully analyze and compare all feasible alternatives. He bases the analysis on the best information available. He presents the alternatives candidly and objectively, and he must clearly depict the disadvantages and the advantages of each.

d. The staff officer must be thoroughly prepared to express a positive recommendation when requested by the commander. This preparation includes coordination with other staff officers when the recommendation affects their areas of interest. The recommendation should clearly identify the best alternative from the staff officer’s view and should be stated in a form that requires only the commander’s approval or disapproval.

2–12. Study

A staff study technique is valuable for analyzing problems to them. Chapter of staff study format, and an example

2–13. Procedures for Preparing Plans and Orders

a. Responsibility for the overall preparation and publication of a plan or an order is assigned to a single staff officer. Other staff officers provide elements of the plan or the order that apply to their staff areas of interest.

b. Staff officers who supply elements of the plan or the order interpret the commander’s desires concerning their respective areas, prepare initial drafts, handle all necessary coordination, and submit complete final drafts to the staff officer responsible for overall preparation.

c. The staff officer having responsibility for overall preparation reviews the component elements to insure consonance with the commander’s decision and makes appropriate recommendations to the preparing officers, if needed. He then assigns identification numbers to the plan or the order and to annexes and appendixes, as needed; accomplishes final staff coordination; and submits the complete document to the chief of staff for command approval and signature. When the plan or the order has been signed, the responsible staff officer authenticates copies as necessary and reproduces and distributes the document.

d. Staff officers prepare and issue many fragmentary orders, either orally or in writing. Usually, these orders concern immediate operational requirements. The staff officer confers informally with other staff officers concerned and gets the chief of staff’s approval. When time is critical, staff officers with delegated authority write and issue fragmentary orders in the commander’s name. They promptly inform the chief of staff and any other interested staff officers about these orders.

e. A discussion of plans and planning procedures is in chapter 6; orders, in chapter 7; and techniques for preparing plans and orders, in appendix D.

2–14. Military Writing

a. At division level and above, the complexity of operations normally requires written directives, reports, orders, and studies. Staff officers at these levels must possess the ability to write accurately, concisely, and clearly.

b. Staff writing is a means of communicating ideas to the commander, subordinate unit commanders, and other staff officers through orders, recommendations, studies, reports, and other
types of formal or informal documents. Effective staff writing conveys the writer's exact meaning and is not subject to misinterpretation. Officers can express themselves clearly by following these basic principles in writing their staff papers (DA Pam 1-10):

1. **Unity.** Adhere to a single main idea.
2. **Accuracy.** Check facts; eliminate mechanical errors.
3. **Clarity.** Write simply and clearly.
4. **Brevity.** Use simple words and short sentences. Eliminate superfluous words and subject matter.
5. **Coherence.** Develop and arrange subject matter logically.
6. **Objectivity.** Keep an impersonal and unprejudiced viewpoint.
7. **Completeness.** Finish the job. Turn in a paper that needs only the commander's approval and signature to make it a completed action.

2-15. Staff Research

a. **General.** Staff research is the collection and evaluation of facts staff officers must have to solve problems or to write staff papers. Some data will be available in office records. Other data are available only by research through many sources.

b. **Extent of Research.** The problem itself determines the research needed. Only after analyzing the problem and listing the main issues to be considered can the staff officer determine how much and what kind of information he must collect.

c. **Collection and Evaluation of Data.**
   1. **Sources of information.** A list of all likely sources of information on the subject under consideration is the first requisite in collecting data. The researcher may find references by—
      (a) Consulting the indexes of Army publications in the Department of Army Pamphlet 310-series.
      (b) Checking correspondence, reports, and previous studies on the subject or on related subjects in the headquarters files.
      (c) Checking reports control records.
      (d) Using a library, if available.
      (e) Consulting those persons concerned with similar problems.
      (f) Requesting assistance from other headquarters.

2-16. Administrative Procedures

a. **Policy File.**
   1. A policy file summarizes the current policies of the commander and higher headquarters and the basic operating principles for the staff section maintaining the file. It covers a variety of activities of interest to a staff section and is based on existing orders, experience, and past command decisions. The policies may be in the form of brief notes, plans, studies, directives, or sample orders. The file is kept up to date and is tabbed or indexed. The file changes with commanders and conditions.

b. **Records.** Staff section records are essential to provide information for the commander and staff, for higher and lower headquarters, and for the unit or staff section historical record. The Army Functional Files System (TAFFS) is the only file system authorized by the Department of the Army for use throughout the Army. Under TAFFS, files are decentralized and the creating agency establishes responsibility for maintenance of files. TAFFS program policies and procedures (files planning, creation, equipment, and use) are in AR 340-1. TAFFS instructions for individual file standards and file arrangements, maintenance, and reference for all Army elements down through division level are in AR 340-18-1 through 340-18-15. AR 340-2 contains similar instructions for Army organizations below division level. Appendix H contains examples of typical staff records.
c. **Journals.**

(1) The journal is the official chronological record of events affecting the staff section. The amount of detail recorded varies with the number of personnel in the staff section and the kind of operation. Model entries limit details to those necessary to fix the time and to report essential facts about important events. Important incidents are recorded as they occur. Such information includes the time important messages are received or transmitted; visits of higher commanders and staff officers; purposes, subjects, and conclusions of conferences; and absences of the section chief from the command post. Summaries of written messages or orders, including necessary references to maps and similar data, are entered in the journal. The original messages are filed in the journal file. Oral messages or orders are recorded in full when practicable. Appendix H contains a sample page from a staff journal.

(2) The chief of staff (executive officer) and each staff section in headquarters down to and including division and major staff sections in brigades, regiments, groups, and similar-size units maintain journals. In the combat zone, battalions and separate companies also maintain journals (AR 220-15).

(3) The assembled journals of the staff sections give a complete picture of the unit's operations for a given period and are a permanent record. When the period ends, a summary of important events and plans for the future period is entered. This summary includes the reasons behind decisions and happenings.

d. **Workbooks.**

(1) Workbooks are ready references for use in conducting current operations and in preparing reports. A staff section workbook is an indexed collection of information obtained from written or oral orders, messages, journal entries, and conferences. The workbook may also include accounts of the staff officer's own conclusions, opinions, ideas, and inspections. It consists of a pad of looseleaf notebook pages indexed by subject. Workbooks are indexed to fit a staff section's particular needs. Most workbooks are indexed to facilitate preparation of periodic reports and show references to paragraphs and subparagraphs in these reports. The branches of the staff sections of higher headquarters may keep specialized workbooks. Appendix H contains a sample staff section workbook.

(2) A message containing information on different subjects is entered in various sections of the workbook. The entries seldom quote the entire message. An entry is lined out when action on the item has been completed. Pages from the workbook are removed and destroyed when no longer of use.

e. **Situation Maps.** A situation map is a graphic presentation of the current situation. Each staff section keeps its situation map up to date by posting dispositions and activities that concern the section. Tactical operations center (TOC) facilities and war rooms also have situation maps. As soon as changes are received, they are posted on the map and entered in the section journal. When staff section personnel strength is inadequate or when activity is light, two or more staff sections may maintain situation maps jointly. In brigade and smaller headquarters, a combined situation map, kept under the supervision of the operations officer (S3), may be sufficient.

f. **Information Displays.** Information displays, automated or manual, often are required to supplement detail contained on the situation map or to make available that information which is not suitable for posting on the situation map. Information associated with the situation map is located adjacent to the map. Other displays, usually providing data on the status of units or activities, are located for easy viewing and posting.

### 2-17. Staff Message Control

Staff message control is the function of processing messages and is the responsibility of the communications-electronics officer. Messages are delivered direct from the telecommunications center to the intended staff sections, and suspense control is maintained by the staff sections.
CHAPTER 3

STAFF ORGANIZATION

Section I. GENERAL

3–1. Objective of Staff Organization
A military staff is a single, cohesive unit organized to help the commander accomplish his mission. The staff is organized and operates—

a. To respond immediately to the needs of the commander and subordinate units.

b. To keep the commander informed of the situation.

c. To reduce the time needed to control, integrate, and coordinate operations.

d. To reduce changes for error.

e. To relieve the commander of supervisory details in routine matters.

3–2. Considerations in Organizing Military Staffs
The following interrelated considerations affect staff organization:

a. Mission. The command mission is the fundamental consideration in organizing a staff. The mission determines the activities necessary for its accomplishment. These activities, in turn, determine command and staff interests.

b. Broad Fields of Interest. Regardless of the command mission, command interests within the Army in the field usually can be divided into five broad fields: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and civil-military operations. However, the relative importance of these five fields and the functional areas included in them vary with the mission, the level of command, and the environment. A sixth field, comptroller, is added at the headquarters of theater army and major combat service support commands and may be added at field army when required.

c. Law and Regulation. Army regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice establish special relationships between certain staff officers and the commander.

d. Direct Control of Functional Areas. The commander may desire to exercise personal control over functional areas that he considers particularly significant. When this is the case, the responsible staff officer reports directly to the commander rather than to the chief of staff. However, this does not relieve the staff officer from responsibility for keeping the chief of staff informed of his activities.

3–3. Principles of Staff Organization
The commander follows the principles of good staff organization by—

a. Describing assigned responsibilities clearly.

b. Delegating decisionmaking authority to officers commensurate with their assigned responsibility.

c. Grouping related activities.

d. Establishing an effective span of control.

Section II. STAFF STRUCTURE

3–4. General
A commander may include any or all of three different groups—coordinating, special, and personal—in his staff organization, depending on his needs. He also may have a chief of staff to direct and supervise the staff.
also coordinate all activities of the organization to insure the most efficient employment of the force as a whole.

b. Special staff officers assist the commander in professional, technical, and other functional areas included in, but narrower than, the broad fields of interest of coordinating staff officers and largely relating to technical, administrative, and branch matters. They are organized into sections generally comparable to the professional, technical, and other special functional areas in the command.

c. Personal staff officers assist the commander in personal matters or in specific functional areas. Personal staff officers are those officers whom the commander selects to serve as his aids and those individual staff officers whose activities he desires to coordinate and administer directly rather than through the chief of staff. These staff officers report directly to the commander on those matters designated by him rather than through normal staff channels established within the headquarters. In most cases, these staff officers divide their time between the commander's personal staff and either the coordinating staff group or the special staff group. The inspector general and staff judge advocate are normally members of the commander's personal staff. Chapter 4 discusses those officers who are frequently selected to be personal staff officers and enumerates their responsibilities and duties.

3–5. Staff Structure

The general staff structure includes all three staff groups. The number of staff chiefs and assistants in each group varies at different levels of command. A chief of staff is a characteristic of this staff structure. The coordinating staff officers may be designated assistant chiefs of staff (ACofS). Figure 3–1 shows a general staff structure and is the model for all staff structures.

![Diagram of General Staff Structure]

*Figure 3-1. General staff structure.*
Figure 3–2. Typical staffs, headquarters, tactical commands.
Section III. STAFFS OF MAJOR US ARMY FIELD COMMANDS

3–6. Organization and Composition

a. The basic organizational structure of major headquarters staffs is the general staff (para 3–5).

b. Theater army or army group staffs are organized according to tables of distribution and allowances (TDA). At other levels, the staffs are organized according to tables of organization and equipment (TOE) or TDA's. The commander may organize his staff in any way that he desires so long as it is within authorized personnel limitations. Figures 3–2 and 3–3 show typical staffs.

3–7. Chief of Staff

a. The chief of staff is the commander's principal staff assistant and adviser.

b. He is the senior member and the head of the staff. He is responsible for execution of staff tasks and the efficient response of staff members. He also coordinates both the coordinating and special staff group efforts (para 4–3 and 4–4).

c. The commander may delegate him authority that amounts to command of the staff.

d. The chief of staff may have one or more assistant or deputy chiefs of staff.

3–8. Coordinating Staff Officers

a. Coordinating staff officers at division, higher headquarters, and comparable commands are members of the general staff. They and their assistants comprise the coordinating staff group (para 3–4a).

b. Coordinating staff officers are the commander’s staff assistants in designated broad fields of interest (para 3–2b). Collectively, they have staff responsibility for the commander’s entire field of responsibilities, except in those functional areas that the commander decides to control personally or in areas reserved by law for specific staff officers.

c. Coordinating staff officers in tactical command staffs are designated ACofS’s as follows:

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Figure 3–5. Typical staff, headquarters, TASCOM/FASCOM.
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1Direct access to the commander as a personal staff officer, as required.

2Normally a member of the commander’s personal staff.

3Pertains to FASCOM only.
(1) ACofS, G1, personnel.
(2) ACofS, G2, intelligence.
(3) ACofS, G3, operations.
(4) ACofS, G4, logistics.
(5) ACofS, G5, civil-military operations (CMO).
The abbreviated designations (G1, G2, G3, G4, and G5) are used more often than the formal designations.

d. Coordinating staff officers in major combat service support commands and their subordinate commands are designated ACofS as follows:
   (1) ACofS, personnel.
   (2) ACofS, security, plans, and operations.
   (3) ACofS, services.
   (4) ACofS, supply.
   (5) ACofS, maintenance.
   (6) ACofS, materiel (in the absence of an ACofS, supply, and ACofS, maintenance).
   (7) ACofS, movements.
   (8) ACofS, civil-military operations.
   (9) ACofS, comptroller.

e. Although the extent of staff activities varies with the headquarters level (para 3–19), functional area responsibilities of ACofS's are uniform within each designation (chap 4).

f. The ACofS are advisers, planners, coordinators, and supervisors. They concentrate on estimating the situation and on planning. They avoid becoming involved in the details of unit operations, services, and activities, which are special staff officer and subordinate commander responsibilities.

g. The ACofS are responsible for overall coordination of actions. They also insure that related special staff activities are coordinated and integrated with operations. Although each ACofS works in a specified field, there is much overlapping of interests. When this overlap is extensive, the chief of staff assigns definite responsibilities to each ACofS. These assignments include primary responsibility for coordination.

(1) The chief of staff may assign primary coordinating staff responsibility for a specific functional area to an ACofS. This staff officer then becomes the chief of staff's principal assistant in insuring that the commander's plans for that functional area are carried out.

(2) It is normal for other coordinating staff officers to have a direct interest in functional areas designated as primary staff responsibilities of other staff officers. For example, training is a primary staff responsibility of the operations officer; however, the intelligence officer and the logistics officer are directly concerned with intelligence training and maintenance training respectively. In such instances, a clear definition of staff responsibilities will insure coordination and eliminate conflict. When a coordinating staff officer is required to supervise a functional area that is not his primary responsibility, he does so in coordination with the staff officer having primary coordinating staff responsibility. Such supervision does not affect the fundamental responsibility of the officer assigned primary coordinating staff responsibility.

h. Coordinating staff officers are directly responsible to the chief of staff; however, the commander frequently consults them directly. In such cases, and in the absence of instructions from the commander to the contrary, they report to the chief of staff any information that they give the commander or receive from him.

3–9. Special Staff Officers

a. Although TOE or TDA prescribe the numbers and types of special staff officers in field command staffs, the commander may adjust these personnel allowances. He accomplishes this by modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) or modification tables of distribution and allowances (MTDA). He establishes only those special staff sections needed to accomplish the mission, or he combines or allocates duties to meet special circumstances.

b. The chief of staff, assisted by the coordinating staff officers, supervises, directs, and coordinates the activities of special staff officers (e below).

c. Special staff officers assist the commander and staff by performing the basic functions of all staff officers (para 1–7). They also—

(1) Provide the commander and staff with information, estimates, and recommendations in their specialized fields.

(2) Assist coordinating staff officers in preparing plans, orders, and reports.

(3) Supervise command activities in their special technical fields.

(4) Plan and supervise training in their
own staff sections and, within their functional fields, assist in supervising training throughout the command.

d. A special staff officer may be a commander and perform both staff and command functions. These two functions are associated with different responsibilities and duties and must be performed separately. Any special staff officer may be given authority to perform specified functions of command such as operational control over designated units.

e. Functional areas and responsibilities of staff officers often overlap; therefore, coordination is all important. Each ACoS has primary responsibility for supervising those special staff activities that fall within his broader functional area of responsibility. Special staff officers also consult and coordinate with all other interested staff officers.

f. The duties and responsibilities of selected special staff officers are listed in paragraphs 4-27 through 4-54. Some of the duties and responsibilities do not apply at all command levels. The headquarters level to which a special staff officer is assigned is a consideration when these listed duties and responsibilities are used. FM 100-15 provides information on operations at theater army, army group, field army, and corps. FM 61-100 provides information on operations at division.

3-10. Personal Staff Officers

Paragraph 3-4c contains a discussion of the personal staff; chapter 4 contains a discussion of the responsibilities and duties of personal staff officers.

3-11. Liaison Officers

a. Liaison officers work under the direction of the chief of staff or his representative.

b. Liaison officers represent their commanders at other headquarters. Through personal contact, they promote cooperation and coordination of effort and exchange essential information.

3-12. Staff Assistants and Deputies

The chief of staff and each coordinating and special staff officer normally have assistants or deputies.

a. An assistant is a planner, an adviser, and a coordinator. He has authority only when his chief has specifically delegated it to him. The full authority of a chief normally is not delegated to an assistant.

b. A deputy has authorization to act for his superior within designated limits. His authority may be limited to a particular field which may be specified in his title.

Section IV. SMALLER UNIT STAFFS

3-13. General

Units smaller than division that are authorized a headquarters staff are the corps artillery; the brigade; the regiment; the group; the division artillery; the division support command (DISCOM); the battalion; the squadron; and, in specific instances, large detachments and special commands.

3-14. Organization and Composition

a. The TOE for each type of unit specifies the unit's staff organization and composition. However, within authorized personnel limitations, the unit commander may organize his staff in accordance with his particular needs. Figure 3-4 shows a typical smaller unit staff organization. Applicable TOE's and organizational field manuals provide detailed information on the organization and composition of the staffs of small units.

b. A civil-military operations staff section will be established at brigade, comparable units when required, and in battalions when authorized by the Department of the Army or the theater commander.

c. Smaller combat service support unit staffs may have coordinating staff officers with functional areas of interest that differ from those shown in figure 3-4 and that are more suited to the unit mission. In some smaller combat service support unit headquarters, such as the field depot and the area support group headquarters, the coordinating staff officers may be designated as directors, although such designation does not necessarily indicate more staff authority or the lack of a special staff.
3-15. Functions, Duties, and Responsibilities

a. Staff functions of the smaller unit staff are generally the same as those for higher staffs discussed in preceding paragraphs. However, the operational nature of smaller unit missions requires some modification. The advisory, planning, coordinating, and supervisory staff activities of the smaller unit are highly accelerated, abbreviated, and mostly informal, but the basic objectives and staff relationships remain similar to those at higher levels (para 3-1 through 3-12).

b. Paragraphs 4-61 and 4-62 contain a discussion of the duties and responsibilities of selected unit staff officers.

Section V. STAFFS OF JOINT AND COMBINED COMMANDS

3-16. Joint Commands

a. Provisions in JCS Pub 2 direct that a unified command commander have a joint staff, while the commander of a specified command, a joint task force, or other type of joint command may be directed by his establishing authority—

(1) To form a joint staff; or

(2) To augment his own staff by assigning or attaching thereto officers from Services other than his own in such numbers and in such appropriate positions as to give balanced representation to all Services involved.
b. A joint staff reasonably balances members, experience, influence of position, and rank among the Services concerned. The joint staff also has balance with regard to the composition and combat contribution of the forces and the character of the operations to ensure that the commander has adequate assistance on the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of each component part of the force. There should be a joint staff below theater level to conduct the land battle only when significant forces of two or more Services are involved.

c. An augmented staff normally follows the structure of the staff of the commander concerned. While the augmented staff is not a joint staff, the principles for the operation of a joint staff are applicable.

d. JCS Pub 2 includes the basic principles, joint staff organization, and joint staff functions.

3-17. Combined Commands

a. Organizational principles for combined command staffs are the same as those for other types of staffs. However, there are several considerations in organizing a combined command staff. Most important is the extent of the commander’s authority over national components accorded by the international agreements that establish his command. Directives must define the commander’s authority and responsibilities in exercising administrative (including logistic and disciplinary) and operational control over the combined forces. Other matters for consideration include differences in language and national interests, weapon systems, intelligence collection resources, combat service support procedures, organizations, and national staff systems.

b. The type of command structure influences staff organization.

(1) One type of combined command structure groups forces by nationalities. It calls for each contributing nation to have balanced forces that can be assigned to a geographic area (fig 3-5). When this structure is used, a combined staff is required only for the supreme allied commander’s headquarters.

![Combined command structure diagram](image-url)
(2) Another type of combined command structure groups forces by type regardless of nationality (fig 3-6). It requires a combined staff of all participating nations down to the lowest command in which two or more nations participate in approximately equal proportion. When grouping of forces is by type, orientation of the staff organization is on the force mission. For example, orientation of the staff organization of a combined command composed of naval forces is on the naval task to be performed.

(3) A third type of combined command structure is a combination of the two structures in (1) and (2) above. Such a structure results from dividing a portion or all of the area of responsibility of the supreme allied commander into subarea combined commands. Within these subarea commands, grouping of forces may be by nationality or by type.

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**LEGEND**

- - - - - Operational command, combined.

- - The supreme allied commander may establish a subarea combined command or a combined task force, consisting of significant elements from two or more nations, as required.

*Figure 3-6. Combined command structure organized by type of functional components.*
Section VI. STAFF SECTION ORGANIZATION

3–18. General

a. Section chiefs in each headquarters determine the internal organization of their staff sections, subject to command approval. The section chiefs make decisions within the authorized levels for personnel and equipment prescribed by appropriate TOE's or TDA's.

b. Basic factors that determine the organization of a staff section include—

1. The command mission.
2. Scope and importance of section activities.
3. Availability of personnel.
4. Preferences of the commander and the staff chief.
5. Requirement for echelonment of command posts.

c. Required characteristics of a staff section include—

1. Functional capacity.
2. Capability for round-the-clock operations.
3. Flexibility to meet peakloads.
4. Ability to displace to a new headquarters location while maintaining effective operations.

d. A staff section is authorized only sufficient personnel to carry out staff duties. The staff chief must not dissipate this strength by assigning his personnel duties that are a responsibility of another staff officer or of an operating unit.

e. The staff chief often delegates supervision of a section's specific functional activities to officers in the section. These officers have titles that indicate their responsibilities.

3–19. Emphasis in Functional Areas

Comparable staff officers of different headquarters are responsible for the same functional areas of interest. However, emphasis is on different aspects at different levels of command, and the scope of required activities varies. Representative variations are shown in a through f below.

a. Personnel. There are provisions for manpower management positions in the personnel section at theater army headquarters and other commands using bulk TDA’s. There are no such provisions in the personnel section of a headquarters organized under a TOE. At division, theater army support command (TASCOM), field army support command (FASCOM), and theater army headquarters, staff activities concerned with prisoner-of-war, civilian internee/detainee, civilian labor (except at division level), graves registration, and replacement functional areas are so important as to warrant special consideration in the organization of personnel sections. This is not true at corps, field army, and army group headquarters.

b. Intelligence.

1. Intelligence sections of tactical headquarters generally include operations, G2 air, counterintelligence, and administrative subdivisions. At field army and higher levels, where planning is more extensive than at lower levels, there is a separate plans subdivision. The broad scope of counterintelligence operations, production of strategic intelligence, and order of battle intelligence also are considerations in organizing higher level sections.

2. The primary concern of the intelligence functional area in combat service support commands is collection of information for counterespionage, countersubversion, and countersabotage (technical intelligence is produced by theater army). The staff for intelligence is combined with that for operations into the ACoS, security, plans, and operations.

c. Operations.

1. In tactical command headquarters, the primary concern of the operations section is organization, training, plans, and operations. Staff activity and the emphasis on each of these functions depend largely on the command mission and the operational environment of the headquarters. For example, as the activities of the command progress from organization to training, then to operations, the operations officer correspondingly modifies the workload in the section and changes the organization of the section accordingly. However, the operations officer continually monitors all activities within his broad area of functional responsibilities. The operations section's basic organization and capabilities must be flexible so that the section can respond to various situations and missions of the command.

2. The organization of operations sections is similar at comparable levels throughout tacti-
cal commands. Corps and higher levels normally have a separate plans subdivision. At field army and higher, there usually is a separate subdivision to handle troop basis and organizational requirements. Combat service support units other than division support command (DISCOM) normally have separate ACofS's for services, supply, maintenance, materiel (when appropriate), and movements. Combat service support units include relatively few aspects of tactical operations in the operations functional area. In TASCOM and FASCOM headquarters staffs, operations and intelligence functional areas are combined in the same staff section.

d. Logistics. The logistic section of a headquarters provide information, advice, and recommendations for establishing logistic support priorities and allocations. The section assists subordinate levels in obtaining support and insures that the command receives logistic support in accordance with the commander's policy.

e. Civil-Military Operations. The primary concern of the civil-military operations section is planning, coordination, and staff supervision of political, economic, social, and psychological aspects of military operations. In stability operations, the section has primary staff responsibility for the internal development assistance activities of the command. Staff activity and the emphasis on each of these functions depend on the command mission and the operational environment of the headquarters. In smaller units, a civil-military operations staff officer (S5) may not be authorized; in the absence of an S5 section, the S3 normally plans and executes the necessary S5 functions. FM 41-10 and FM 33-1 contain detailed discussions of the civil affairs and psychological operation functions.

f. Comptroller. Basic functions assigned to comptrollers include management analysis, programming, automatic data processing, internal review, statistical reporting and analysis, finance services, and reports control. The scope and complexity of these functions vary from formulation of plans and policies at theater army headquarters to, when authorized, the operational control of automatic data processing facilities furnishing services to two or more organizational elements at lower levels of the combat service support command. The comptroller has responsibility for staff finance functions. He also has operational control of the finance and accounting office when such an office is included in the TDA or the TOE unit to which he is assigned. Comptroller sections—

(1) Provide administrative control and accounting for the funds needed to secure resources and facilities of the command.

(2) Assist in the overall management of men, money, and materiel resources and facilities of the command.

(3) Participate with other staff members in establishing objectives, policies, and organization of the command.

(4) Review and assess the effectiveness of the activities of the command in relation to its mission.
CHAPTER 4
RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF STAFF OFFICERS
(STANAG 2103)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

4–1. Purpose
The material in this chapter is a guide to commanders in organizing their staffs. The commander's desires, his needs, and available personnel cause variations in assignment of responsibilities and duties; however, the commander should not overlook the advantages of parallel structure and organization in commands working closely together.

4–2. Scope
a. This chapter describes the principal responsibilities and duties of staff officers assigned to division or higher level field command staffs.

b. This chapter also includes correlation of the responsibilities and duties of selected staff officers of units smaller than division with those of higher level staffs.

Section II. CHIEF OF STAFF

4–3. General
The relationship between the commander and his chief of staff normally is such that the chief of staff is able to reflect accurately the commander's desires when the commander is absent or when he is involved with more important tasks.

4–4. Responsibilities
The chief of staff is the coordinator and supervisor of the staff. His role calls for directing staff activities to coordinate action and to free the commander from routine detail so that the commander may devote his energy to problems that merit his attention. The chief of staff—

a. Directs, supervises, and coordinates the work of the staff. His responsibilities encompass—

(1) The activities of all staff members except in those specific areas reserved by the commander.

(2) The relationship between the various members of the staff.

(3) The relationship between the staff and subordinate units and agencies.

b. Formulates and announces the staff operating policies.

c. Keeps the commander and staff informed on matters affecting the situation.

d. Represents the commander, when authorized.

e. Receives the commander's decisions and insures that they are implemented by—

(1) Instructing the staff to prepare and issue implementing plans or orders.

(2) Assigning specific staff officers the task of preparing detailed plans, orders, reports, and other staff actions.

(3) Reviewing staff actions to insure that they are adequate, integrated, and designed to produce the intended results.

(4) Approving actions or obtaining the commander's approval.

(5) Alerting subordinate unit commanders to the actions that will be required of them.

(6) Receiving additional decisions from the commander when unexpected problems arise.

f. Maintains the master policy file, insures that all instructions issued to the command agree with the commander's policies and plans, and monitors the command standing operating procedure (SOP).
g. Insures that the commander’s orders and instructions to the staff are carried out.

h. Requires that all coordinating and special staff officers, unless instructed otherwise by the commander, inform him of any recommendations or information that they give directly to the commander or of any instructions that they receive directly from the commander. (Personal staff members may be exempt unless the commander directs otherwise.)

i. Insures establishment of the required liaison.

j. Supervises operations of the war room, when established.

k. Exercises overall direction of the staff representatives in the tactical operations center (TOC).

Section III. COORDINATING STAFF OFFICERS, TACTICAL FIELD COMMANDS

4-5. Assistant Chief of Staff, G1, Personnel

The assistant chief of staff (ACofS), G1, personnel, is the principal staff assistant to the commander in the administration and management of individuals under direct US military control. He advises other staff officers and assists them in handling personnel problems in their particular functional areas. This assistance may include actual preparation of plans and some direct supervision. The ACofS, G1, has primary coordinating staff responsibility for—

a. Maintenance of Unit Strength.

(1) Strengths. Collecting, preparing, and presenting command strength status data and loss estimates.

(2) Personnel records, estimates, and reports. Preparing records, estimates, and reports showing the status of personnel matters in the command.

(3) Replacements.

(a) Individual replacements. Determining present and anticipated requirements; handling requisitions and allocations (according to priorities established by the commander); providing for administrative processing and movement of individual replacements; and locating operating replacement units.

(b) Unit replacements. Determining the availability of unit replacements, requisitioning units (in coordination with the ACofS, G3), and handling administrative processing.

b. Personnel Management.

(1) Military personnel. Procuring, classifying, reclassifying, assigning, transferring, rotating, promoting, demoting, eliminating, retiring, and separating personnel.

(2) Enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees/detainees. Collecting, protecting, processing, evacuating, treating, using, disciplining, educating, and repatriating of enemy prisoners of war (PW) and civilian internees/detainees.

(3) Captured or detained US military personnel. Providing for administration, processing, evacuation, health, and morale of recovered captured or detained US and allied military personnel.

(4) Civilian personnel. Providing for procurement, administration, and utilization of civilian employees (in coordination with the ACofS, G5, for indigenous personnel).

(5) Safety. Planning, developing, and supervising all aspects of safety.

c. Manpower Management. These functions include—

(1) Allocating manpower resources to subordinate commands and activities.

(2) Evaluating the uses of available manpower and developing policies and standards.

(3) Procuring and distributing personnel.

(4) Preparing the personnel estimate.

d. Development and Maintenance of Morale.

(1) Personnel services. Providing for leaves; rest and recreational facilities; character guidance; religious activities; special services; savings program; voting; and postal, financial (where there is no comptroller assigned), welfare, and exchange services.

(2) Graves registration. Supervising cemeteries, evacuation, personal effects, and ceremonies.

(3) Casualty reporting. Developing plans and policies for reporting casualties.
Decorations and awards. Developing plans and policies pertaining to decorations and awards.

e. Health Services. Including medical supply and maintenance.

f. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order. Including troop conduct and appearance and control and disposition of stragglers.

g. Headquarters Management. Providing for movement, internal arrangement, organization, security, and operation of the headquarters; allocating shelter for headquarters troops and staffs.

h. Miscellaneous. Advising on the location of the rear command post; general educational development; dependent affairs; marriage to foreign nationals; reception of visitors; personnel plans, orders, and reports; and administrative matters not specifically assigned to another coordinating staff officer.

4-6. ACoFS, G2, Intelligence

The ACoFS, G2, intelligence, is the principal staff assistant to the commander on all military intelligence matters. He advises and assists other staff officers on all intelligence phases of the functional areas for which they are responsible. This assistance may include preparation of plans or orders. In addition to his staff functions, the ACoFS, G2, has certain operational functions pertaining to counterintelligence activities and the production of intelligence. (A discussion of these functional areas is in paragraphs B-18 through B-32.) The ACoFS, G2, has coordinating staff responsibility for—

a. Production of Intelligence. Collection of information, conversion of information into intelligence, and dissemination of intelligence. This includes—

(1) Recommending essential elements of information (EEI).

(2) Preparing plans, orders, and requests for target acquisition, combat surveillance and reconnaissance, and other intelligence collection activities.

(3) Supervising and coordinating the command's intelligence collection activities, including air reconnaissance and surveillance; interrogation of enemy PW's, civilian internees/detainees, and refugees; debriefing of returned captured US personnel, escapees, and evaders; exploitation of captured documents and captured materiel; ground surveillance programs; signal intelligence (SIGINT) programs; employment of long-range reconnaissance patrols; and development of countermeasures for the command's operational security (OPSEC).

(4) Processing information into intelligence. This includes recording, integrating, correlating, evaluating, and interpreting information.

(5) Integrating the information collection efforts of other US military elements, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and allied and indigenous elements.

(6) Exercising staff supervision over the staff weather officer (SWO) and coordinating with the staff weather officer (SWO) to insure correct interpretation of weather information in terms of intelligence.

(7) Supervising and coordinating predictions of fallout from enemy-employed nuclear weapons and coordinating chemical agent detection, biological agent sampling, and radiological surveys.

(8) Supervising the preparation of reports pertaining to enemy nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks.

(9) Disseminating information and intelligence. Commonly used means include intelligence estimates, summaries, and annexes; periodic intelligence reports; analyses of the area of operations; studies; and situation maps and displays.

(10) Directing the collection of technical information and the processing of this information into technical intelligence material. Details on the technical intelligence effort are in FM 30-16.

(11) Exercising staff supervision over the SIGINT resources that are attached or under the operational control of the commander. This function includes—

(a) Maintaining a continuous estimate of the SIGINT situation.

(b) Coordinating friendly SIGINT operations.

(c) Translating EEI into missions for Army SIGINT units.

(d) Recommending the employment of SIGINT resources.

(12) Determining and acting on needs for intelligence of other staff agencies.
b. Use of Intelligence and Information.

(1) Estimating how the characteristics of the area of operations and the weather will affect the friendly and enemy courses of action.

(2) Estimating enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities and the course of action that the enemy is likely to pursue.

(3) Preparing intelligence estimates, annexes, reports, summaries, briefings, and studies.

(4) Estimating enemy nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities.

(5) Developing air and artillery targets.

(6) Developing future air and ground reconnaissance targets or areas of interest for surveillance.

(7) Providing recommendations regarding proposed areas of operations to the ACofS, G3.

(8) Preparing and disseminating special reports of a statistical character and reports covering defined periods and operations relative to the enemy ground and air situations.

(9) Preparing and disseminating illustrations and descriptions of captured enemy equipment.

c. Counterintelligence. Planning, coordination, and supervision of efforts to neutralize enemy (or potential enemy) surveillance, reconnaissance, and other intelligence activities and protection of information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations or materiel against sabotage. Specific responsibilities include—

(1) Participating in planning and carrying out countersurveillance to prevent hostile surveillance of friendly forces, installations, or areas.

(2) Planning and implementing (through intelligence and other military and civilian agencies) all offensive and defensive measures to counter or to neutralize hostile espionage, sabotage, and subversion.

(3) Requesting security investigations on US or alien military and civilian personnel and other investigations as required in (2) above.

(4) Recommending a censorship policy and planning and supervising the intelligence aspects of censorship, except field press censorship.

(5) Recommending signal security (SIGSEC) policy and exercising staff supervision over SIGSEC surveillance activities.

(6) Developing appropriate intelligence countermeasures for support of OPSEC to prevent the enemy from learning of friendly plans or gaining significant prior warning of friendly operations.

(7) With respect to compromising emanations control—

(a) Develop policy and standards relating to the degree which compromising emanations must be controlled and insuring that adequate TEMP-EST surveillance is maintained and incorporating the results into a continuing evaluation of the effectiveness of the command's compromising emanations control effort.

(b) Evaluating the vulnerability of command facilities to exploitation through compromising emanations and obtaining assistance from the supporting United States Army Security Agency (USASA) element in determining the control measures that must be applied.

(c) Notifying the commanding officer of the supporting USASA element when facilities that electrically process classified information are installed.

(8) Developing policy and standards for safeguarding COMSEC material and exercising staff supervision over the implementation of those policies and standards.

d. Intelligence Training. Supervision, in coordination with the ACofS, G3, of the intelligence training of the command. Specific responsibilities include—

(1) Preparing the command intelligence training plan.

(2) Directing the training of assigned and attached intelligence units and intelligence staffs.

(3) Preparing the aggressor portion of exercise scenarios.

(4) Making staff visits to and staff inspections of intelligence training activities.

(5) Conducting specified security training, such as that concerning Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army and Deliberate Security Violations (SAEDA).

(6) Supervising intelligence schools.

e. Other.

(1) Assisting the ACofS, G3, in planning tactical cover and deception operations by furnishing an assessment of—

(a) Enemy means of collecting information and the capabilities of those means.
4-5. **ACofS, G3, Operations**

The ACofS, G3, operations, is the principal staff assistant to the commander in matters pertaining to organization, training, and primary mission operations. He also advises and assists other staff officers in the operational aspects of their particular activities. The ACofS, G3, has primary coordinating staff responsibility for—

a. **Organization**, which involves—

(1) Developing and maintaining the troop basis, including review and revision to insure assignment of the numbers and types of units needed to support and accomplish the mission.

(2) Organizing and equipping units; estimating the numbers and types of units to be organized and the priority for phasing in or replacing personnel and equipment in the units.

(3) Assigning, attaching, and detaching units, detachments, or teams.

(4) Receiving units, detachments, or teams and orienting, training, and reorganizing them as necessary.

(5) Mobilizing, demobilizing, activating, and inactivating units.

(6) Allocating and controlling military and civilian manpower authorizations; processing all Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) reports; and submitting modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) and modification tables of distribution and allowance (MTDA) changes for both personnel and equipment.

b. **Training**, which involves—

(1) Preparing and carrying out training programs, directives, and orders and planning and conducting field exercises.

(2) Determining requirements for and allocation of training aids and facilities, including training ammunition and ammunition for training.

(3) Organizing and conducting schools.

(4) Planning and conducting training inspections and tests.

(5) Compiling training records and reports.

(6) Maintaining, coordinating, and advising on the status of the unit readiness of each unit in the command.

(7) Integrating SIGSEC and compromising emanations control into unit training, command school programs and training exercises.

c. **Operations**, which involve—

(1) Preparing the operation estimate.

(2) Making recommendations on primary mission operations, during both planning and execution, concerning—
(a) Task organization.
(b) Integration of fire and maneuver.
(e) Use of combat support means (less intelligence, counterintelligence, and CMO).
(d) Allocation and assignment of special ammunition.
(e) Ammunition basic loads.
(f) Special ammunition load.
(g) Required supply rate of ammunition.
(h) Priorities for allocating critical resources of the command, including personnel, supplies, and equipment.
(i) Determination of need for unit replacements.
(3) Preparing, authenticating, and publishing the command SOP.
(4) Coordinating the use of airspace.
(5) Integrating combat support from other Army elements and other Services with the command’s combat and combat support operations.
(6) Exercising staff supervision over all OPSEC activities.
(7) Organizing and employing control and assessment teams.
(8) Conducting nuclear vulnerability assessment analysis in an active nuclear environment.
(9) Supervising tactical troop movements and publishing the movement order.
(10) Designating areas for bivouacking, quartering, and staging units.
(11) Recommending the general locations of command posts.
(12) Establishing boundaries.
(13) Preparing, authenticating, and publishing operation orders, including review and integration into the orders of annexes and appendixes prepared by other staff officers.
(14) Preparing operational records and reports.
(15) Supervising and coordinating TOC operations.
(16) Planning and supervising electronic warfare (EW) activities in support of tactical operations. This function includes—
   (a) Preparing and coordinating the EW annex to plans and orders.
   (b) Determining EW support requirements, to include recommendations for allocation of USASA support.
   (c) Exercising staff supervision over the electronic warfare element (EWE).
   (d) Exercising staff responsibility for maintaining a list of GUARDED frequencies.
   (e) Exercising staff responsibility for evaluating or preparing meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion reports.
(17) Recommending the appropriate mission-oriented protective posture for the command (FM 21-40).
(18) Preparing the tactical cover and deception estimate, recommending the cover and deception story, and preparing the tactical cover and deception plan.
(19) Supervising implementation of command SIGSEC and compromising emanations control activities necessary to achieve command objectives.

d. Planning, which involves—
   (1) Maintaining a current estimate of the situation in coordination with other staff officers.
   (2) Preparing and coordinating operation plans, including review and integration into the plans of annexes and appendixes prepared by other staff sections.
   (3) Reviewing plans of subordinate units.
   (4) Submitting one published copy of plans, directives, and training material having SIGSEC or compromising emanations control implications to the commanding officer of the supporting USASA element for review.

4–8. ACoFS, G4, Logistics
The ACoFS, G4, logistics, is the principal staff assistant to the commander in planning matters pertaining to supply, maintenance, movements, services, and miscellaneous logistic support of the command. The ACoFS, G4, as the logistic planner, must maintain close and continuous coordination with the support command commanders, who are responsible for logistic support operations. The ACoFS, G4, advises other staff officers and assists them in logistic matters in their respective areas of responsibility. This assistance may include the preparation of plans or orders. The ACoFS, G4, insures that adequate technical channels exist for combat service support functions within his broad functional area. The ACoFS, G4, has primary coordinating staff responsibility for—
a. Supply, which involves—

(1) Determining supply requirements, less medical supplies.

(2) Monitoring the requisition, procurement, storage, and distribution of supplies and equipment and maintenance of materiel records.

(3) Insuring that security for supplies and equipment in depots or other storage areas is adequate.

(4) Supervising the distribution of critical combat weapons, munitions, and equipment according to priorities established by the commander.

(5) Recommending prescribed loads.

(6) Supervising the management, procurement, and storage of special weapons and associated supplies.

(7) Supervising the collection and disposition of excess, surplus, salvage, and, in coordination with the ACoFS, G2, captured enemy supplies.

b. Maintenance, which involves—

(1) Monitoring and analyzing equipment maintenance status.

(2) Determining maintenance requirements, less medical maintenance.

(3) Recommending maintenance priorities to the commander.

(4) Supervising and coordinating the timely completion of maintenance.

(5) Requisitioning, storing, and distributing repair parts and associated maintenance supplies.

(6) Employing operational readiness floats.

(7) Supervising evacuation and/or retrograde of unserviceable equipment to appropriate maintenance facilities for repair and return to stock.

(8) Determining the adequacy of maintenance organization, personnel, skills, training, tools, test equipment, and facilities and making appropriate recommendations in these areas.

(9) Receiving, storing, and shipping captured enemy equipment of nonintelligence value.

c. Movements, which involve—

(1) Planning and coordinating transportation used in combat service support activities and administrative troop movements.

(2) Recommending procedures for controlling transportation movements, use of highways, and surface traffic.

(3) Coordinating airlift used to support combat service support operations.

(4) Preparing instructions pertaining to highway regulation, to include circulation and traffic control.

d. Services, which involve logistic services not covered by a through e above, to include—

(1) Planning and coordinating the construction of facilities and installations, except fortifications and signal communications.

(2) Acquiring, allocating, administering, and disposing of real estate, to include billets and shelters.

(3) Property control.

(4) Food service.

(5) Fire protection.

(6) Personal services, bath and laundry services, clothing impregnation/reimpregnation, and clothing exchange.

e. Miscellaneous, which includes—

(1) Determining the adequacy and recommending employment of logistic support units.

(2) Determining requirements for additional logistic support units.

(3) Establishing priorities for employment of logistic support units.

(4) Determining requirements for use of local civilians, enemy PW's, and civilian internees/detainees in logistic support operations.

(5) Recommending the general location of service areas and the movement of logistic support units.

(6) Preparing logistic estimates, reports, and plans.

(7) Preparing, authenticating, and distributing the administrative/logistics order and the administrative/logistics overlay and preparing paragraph 4, "SERVICE SUPPORT," and/or the service support annex of the operation plan or order.

(8) Supervising preparation of plans for area damage control.

(9) Supervising the nuclear accident and incident program.

(10) Supervising decontamination operations.
and the chemical and biological accident and incident program.

4—9. ACofS, G5, Civil-Military Operations

The ACofS, G5, CMO, is the principal staff assistant to the commander in all matters pertaining to political, economic, social, and psychological aspects of military operations. He has staff responsibility for those actions embracing the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in the area of operations and for those actions in which psychological operations (PSYOP) techniques are used to support the achievement of command objectives by creating in target groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior desired. In the performance of these functions, he is responsible for—

a. Advising, assisting, and making recommendations that relate to CMO, to include the civil affairs (CA) and psychological aspects of current or proposed operations.

b. Preparing plans and recommending policies and procedures for CMO activities, including military government, when appropriate.

c. Preparing estimates and conducting studies and analyses for CMO activities.

d. Preparing the portions of operation and administrative/logistics plans and orders concerning CMO activities.

e. Determining the requirements for resources to accomplish CMO activities of the command, to include CA and PSYOP units and personnel.

f. Exercising staff supervision over CA and PSYOP units that are attached or under operational control of the command and of CMO activities of other units of the command.

g. Procuring indigenous resources.

h. Supervising CA functions of the command in the fields of government, economics, and sociology.

i. Recommending command policy concerning obligations between civil and military authorities and policy concerning the population of the area of operations and its works and activities arising from treaties, agreements, international law, and US policy.

j. Advising on matters pertaining to the civil population, local government, institutions, economy, and economic resources available for military use.

k. Providing civil support for tactical and combat service support operations and for preventing civilian interference with these operations.

l. Supervising community relations for the command in theaters of operations.

m. Coordinating military support of populace and resources control programs.

n. Advising on the impact of friendly nuclear and chemical weapon employment and the impact of enemy biological, chemical, and nuclear weapon employment on the civilian population.

o. Evaluating enemy PSYOP efforts.

p. Providing technical advice and assistance in the reorientation of enemy defectors, enemy PW’s, and civilian internees/detainees.

q. Establishing and maintaining close and continuing relations with other US Government agencies having CMO responsibilities.

r. Coordinating military support of civil defense in the area of operations.

s. Coordinating military intelligence aspects of CMO activities with the ACofS, G2.

4—10. ACofS, Comptroller

The ACofS, comptroller, is not normally required on the staff of a tactical commander below field army. If the corps commander’s responsibilities include management of limited resources or management analysis functions, his special staff may include selected elements to provide advice on these matters. When assigned, the ACofS, comptroller, has coordinating staff responsibility for those functions listed in paragraph 4—18.

Section IV. COORDINATING STAFF OFFICERS, THEATER ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND

4—11. ACofS, Personnel

See paragraph 4—5.

4—12. ACofS, Security, Plans, and Operations

The ACofS, security, plans, and operations, is responsible for—

a. Preparing broad planning guidance, policies, and programs for command organizations, operations, and functions.

b. Developing and maintaining the troop basis, including review and revision to insure assignment of the numbers and types of units needed to support and accomplish the mission.
c. Preparing, authenticating, and publishing the command operation orders, to include review and integration into the orders of annexes and appendices prepared by other staff officers.

d. Developing policies and guidance for the training of the command and evaluating this training.

e. Coordinating displacements of subordinate commands and assignment of facilities.

f. Exercising staff supervision over all OPSEC activities.

g. Developing broad plans and policies for collecting information for counterintelligence (counterespionage, countersubversion, and counterasabotage) and intelligence purposes, levying information collection requirements within the command and disseminating intelligence.

h. Developing policies and reviewing plans for rear area protection (RAP) and physical security.

i. Developing plans and requirements for terrain studies, mapping, charting, and allied topographic fields.

j. Coordinating the collection and distribution of weather data.

k. Coordinating communications-electronics (C-E) functions of the command.

l. Recommending essential elements of information (EEI).

m. Exercising operational control of the general chemical laboratory.

n. Developing policies and guidance to conduct and control EW and tactical cover and deception functions of the command.

4—13. ACofS, Services

The ACofS, services, is responsible for—

a. Recommending policy and providing guidance for the provision of services; preparing and reviewing plans; determining requirements; and supervising activities for decontamination, clothing impregnation/reimpregnation, post exchange, graves registration, food service, repair and utilities, fire protection, real estate, topography, laundry, bath, clothing exchange, renovation, and construction.

b. Providing guidance and recommending priorities for accomplishing the Services' base development plans and establishing troop basis for future operations.

c. Determining requirements and recommending priorities for the provision of necessary services.

d. Preparing plans for services and engineering support, to include requirements for combat service support troops, in his primary areas of interest. Planning for the development, use, and incorporation of civilian and military resources in the theater army support system.

4—14. The ACofS, Materiel

The ACofS, materiel, is responsible for—

a. Serving as the principal adviser to the commander on materiel matters.

b. Developing policies, plans, procedures, and programs for—

(1) Materiel management and operations.

(2) The establishment and maintenance of supply levels and stockage lists in accordance with policies established by higher headquarters.

(3) Materiel management information systems, to include the Army Maintenance Management System.

(4) The collection and evacuation of materiel.

(5) Procurement and property disposal in accordance with policies of higher headquarters.

(6) Scheduled supply and automatic supply.

c. Preparing the supply and maintenance portions of command orders and plans, including base development plans.

d. Determining supply and maintenance requirements.

e. Recommending policies and procedures for controlled items.

f. Supervising materiel operations within the command.

g. Exercising technical supervision over materiel matters within the command and applicable to the force supported, when and as directed by higher headquarters, and coordinating with the logistic readiness officer in exercising this technical supervision.

h. Coordinating with—

(1) The logistic readiness officer on matters
related to materiel readiness within the command
and the force supported.

(2) The ACofS, movements, concerning
movements requirements and policies.

(3) The ACofS, security, plans, and opera-
tions, on recommendations concerning the troop
basis, employment and location of supply and
maintenance units, changes/modifications to ta-
bles of organization and equipment (TOE) per-
taining to supply and maintenance units, and spe-
cial equipment required for tactical cover and de-
ception operations.

i. Insuring that adequate technical channels of
supervision and communication are established
within the command to serve the needs of the
supported force in accordance with policies estab-
ished by higher headquarters.

j. Cross-leveling supplies and maintenance re-
ources within the command.

k. Insuring that applicable maintenance pro-
grams support supply requirements.

l. Evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of
materiel management and operations, using, as
one method, the review of reports provided by the
materiel management center and automatic data
processing equipment (ADPE).

m. Establishing standards for supply and
maintenance inspections.

4–15. ACofS, Supply, and ACofS,
Maintenance

In commands where the position of ACofS, ma-
terial, has not yet been established, two coordi-
nating staff officers perform these duties.

a. The ACofS, supply, is responsible for—

(1) Preparing guidance for the supply por-
tion of support plans, base development plans,
and troop basis for future operations.

(2) Recommending supply policies on proc-
curement and disposal for subordinate com-
mands.

(3) Establishing and maintaining supply
levels and stockage lists in accordance with pol-
icies established by higher headquarters.

(4) Recommending policies, priorities, allo-
cations, and criteria for controlled items.

(5) Supervising supply activities, to include
reviewing summary management reports (com-
puter printouts) to determine the efficiency of
supply activities.

b. The ACofS, maintenance, is responsible for—

(1) Providing guidance and recommending
policies for maintenance operations.

(2) Reviewing, analyzing, and evaluating
materiel status reports.

(3) Establishing uniform procedures for the
collection and presentation of maintenance man-
agement information.

(4) Establishing standards for maintenance
inspections to insure efficient theater army main-
tenance support.

(5) Recommending priority schedules for
the reconditioning or the overhauling of materiel
to meet theater army requirements for the pre-
sent and the predictable future.

(6) Maintaining close liaison with the
ACofS, supply, and the ACofS, security, plans,
and operations, to keep informed on the status of
items in short supply and to insure that the main-
tenance effort is directed in a manner that con-
tributes toward accomplishment of the mission.

(7) Developing policies, plans, and proce-
dures for the collection and evacuation of mater-
iel.

Details on the functions of the ACofS, main-
tenance, composition of the staff maintenance sec-
tion, and operational procedures are in FM 29–20.

4–16. ACofS, Movements

The ACofS, movements, is responsible for—

a. Developing guidance, policies, and plans for
the command's transportation services, to include
movement control; highway regulation; motor,
rail, air, and water transportation; and ocean and
inland transportation terminal services (except
pipeline).

b. Preparing the transportation portion of the
command's support plans and orders, base devel-
opment plans, RAP plans, and troop basis for fu-
ture operations.

c. Planning, in coordination with the Air
Force and the Navy, for use of these Services' transpor-
tation for Army movements and for use
of Army transportation for their movements.

d. Planning, in coordination with host or allied
nations, for use of their transportation for use of
US forces and for support of such nations by
Army transportation. This includes support of
CMO and use of allocated national and local com-
mercial transportation capabilities and facilities.
e. Coordinating the command's transportation plans with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters, as required.

f. Developing policies and establishing criteria for the command's movement control plan and programs required to implement throughput transportation of cargo and personnel.

g. Developing policies and criteria for operation of the command's highway traffic headquarters, to include traffic circulation plans, traffic control plans, route classification, and assignment of controlled routes.

h. Making plans and recommendations, in coordination with the command's aviation officer, for employment of Army air transport capability in combat support and combat service support operations, to include use of airspace and air traffic control procedures.

i. Recommending location and adequacy of main supply routes and location of combat service support installations.

j. Recommending policies and establishing procedures for examining and processing captured transportation equipment of nonintelligence value and providing technical staff assistance to the command's military intelligence unit, as required.

k. Supervising the OPSEC of transportation service activities.

4-17. ACofS, CMO
See paragraph 4-9.

4-18. ACofS, Comptroller
The ACofS, comptroller, is the principal staff assistant to the commander in management and financial matters. These matters include allocation and use of resources, progress and statistical reporting and analyses, cost analysis, financial services, and overall management of the command. The comptroller usually assists the chief of staff in programing and program coordination. He advises other staff officers on management and financial matters for which they are responsible and may provide staff assistance to them in preparing plans and orders. The functional areas and specific activities for which he has coordinating staff responsibility are—

a. Finance Advisory Services.
(1) Advising the commander and supervising the implementation of command policies concerning the military pay system, currency control, savings programs, establishment and termination of banking facilities, control and impact of black-market operations, and utilization of military payment certificates and foreign currencies.

(2) Recommending to the ACofS, G3, and monitoring the deployment of operating finance units and activities to insure the provision of required finance services.

(3) Recommending to the ACofS, G1, and monitoring the proper assignment and utilization of finance operating personnel.

(4) Providing technical advice and guidance to finance operating units and activities concerning military pay and allowances and responsibility for funding of finance officers.

(5) Maintaining liaison between finance units in the field and the command element to which assigned.

c. Progress and Statistical Reporting and Analyses.

(1) Providing integrated and independent progress and statistical reports and analyses of command programs, to include quantitative and qualitative evaluations of programed objectives, progress made in meeting these objectives, and effectiveness of the use of resources.

(2) Preparing statistical data and controlling reports for command use or for submission to higher headquarters.

d. Management Analysis.
(1) Analyzing organization and management systems and procedures and recommending improvements.

(2) Developing analytical techniques such as work simplification, work measurements, and operations research.

e. Programing/Budgeting.
(1) Supervising the development, execution, evaluation, and revision of the command operating program/budget.

(2) Integrating the various functional area inputs to produce a balanced overall program.

g. Cost Analysis. Preparing or supervising the preparation of cost analyses and estimates for use in planning, programing, and budgeting, which are all part of the decisionmaking process.

f. Automatic Data Processing. Managing automatic data processing (ADP) resources. Monitoring the allocation and use of ADPE. The comp-
troller may be assigned operational control of ADP facilities servicing two or more organizational elements.

g. Financial Accounting. When accounting functions are assigned to the command, supervising and providing technical guidance to the units or activities operationally responsible for these functions (DA Pam 35–10). In commands where there is an accounting mission, the comptroller may combine his finance advisory service and accounting policy staff elements, forming a finance and accounting division.

h. Internal Control.

(1) Establishing and maintaining a system of internal control to promote operational efficiency and to encourage adherence to command policies.

(2) Establishing internal accounting systems.

(3) Making internal reviews and auditing nonappropriated funds.

(4) Recommending pecuniary liability or relief from pecuniary liability by review of reports of survey and reports of loss of funds.

Section V. COORDINATING STAFF OFFICERS, FIELD ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND

4–19. ACofS, Personnel

See paragraph 4–5.


See paragraph 4–12.

4–21. ACofS, Services

The ACofS, services, is responsible for—

a. Preparing policies, plans, and programs and coordinating and supervising activities pertaining to engineering services as they apply to combat service support. He also is responsible for supervising activities pertaining to decontamination, post exchange, graves registration, food service, repair and utilities, fire protection, laundry, bath, clothing exchange and impregnation/reimpregnation, and renovation.

b. Developing the service portion of plans and orders.

c. Developing and making recommendations for the troop basis and changes/modifications to TOE's pertaining to service units.

d. Developing and recommending priorities for services provided.

e. Developing and coordinating requirements for real estate and field installations for the command and preparing plans for their acquisition, allocation, and use.

f. Reviewing policies governing hasty burials, recommending the numbers and locations of field army cemeteries, and providing policies and procedures on evacuation of remains and personal effects of both US and enemy personnel.

g. Developing policies and plans for the provision and location of laundry and bath facilities, frequency of usage, and criteria for the establishment of clothing exchange operations.

h. Developing policies and plans for post exchange operations, including locations, area coverage, and scope of operations. He also is responsible for making recommendations pertaining to criteria and procedures for gratuitous issues, as appropriate.

4–22. ACofS, Materiel

See paragraph 4–14.

4–23. ACofS, Supply, and ACofS, Maintenance

In commands where the position of the ACofS, materiel, has not yet been established, two coordinating staff officers perform these duties.

a. The ACofS, supply, is responsible for—

(1) Developing policies, plans, and programs for and coordinating and supervising supply activities, to include salvage and property disposal.

(2) Developing the supply portion of plans and orders.

(3) Supervising the inventory control center and establishing policies and criteria for management and operation of the stock control centers of subordinate commands.

(4) Establishing supply levels based on directives of higher headquarters.

(5) Issuing controlled items in accordance with priorities, allocations, and established criteria.
(6) Balancing supply levels among support brigades in consonance with requirements of the tactical situation.

(7) Coordinating and supervising command procurement to insure compliance with policies of higher headquarters.

(8) Developing policies, plans, and criteria for and supervising the operation of scheduled supply or automatic supply, as appropriate.

(9) Coordinating throughput policies and criteria.

(10) Coordinating supply plans and requirements that pertain to use of reparable assets to meet supply plans and requirements.

(11) Reviewing summary management reports (computer printouts) to evaluate the efficiency of supply functions and to insure that supply policies, plans, and programs are being carried out effectively.

(12) Reviewing and approving supply procedures (requisition, issue, storage, and accounting) and modifications thereto.

(13) Developing criteria and processing procedures for emergency requisitions.

(14) Developing criteria for the determination of requirements and consumption factors, analysis of demand data, and development of stockage lists.

(15) Reviewing and approving proposed stockage lists and policies for subordinate commands at general support level.

(16) Developing and making recommendations for the troop basis and changes/modifications to TOE's pertaining to supply units.

(17) The ACofS, maintenance, is responsible for—

(1) Developing plans, policies, and programs for maintenance activities and coordinating and supervising these activities.

(2) Developing the maintenance portion of command orders.

(3) Supervising the maintenance management center and establishing policies and criteria for maintenance management centers of subordinate commands.

(4) Developing policies and guidance for establishing uniform procedures for the collection, analysis, reporting, and presentation of maintenance management information and for the purposes of the Army Maintenance Management System.

(5) Developing policies and plans for the collection and evacuation of materiel, to include evacuation instructions and condition standards.

(6) Recommending maintenance standards for inspections.

(7) Developing policies and plans for evaluating the materiel readiness of the command and making recommendations for its improvement.

(8) Establishing and reviewing priority schedules for repair of materiel to insure that the maintenance effort is in consonance with supply requirements and items in short supply.

(9) Developing and making recommendations for the troop basis and changes/modifications to TOE's pertaining to maintenance units.

(10) Recommending policies, plans, and procedures for balancing maintenance resources, as required, and providing technical assistance and data to maintenance units.

(11) Reviewing summaries of equipment improvement recommendations and developing recommendations, policies, and plans to insure corrective action.

(12) Coordinating maintenance plans to insure availability of parts and assemblies for scheduled programs.

4–24. ACofS, Movements

The ACofS, movements, is responsible for functions listed in paragraph 4–16, with the following exceptions:

a. Railway Staff Functions. He coordinates with the theater army support command (TASCOM) ACofS, movements, for railway transport requirements within the field army area. (Railways operating in the field army area are an extension of the communications zone (COMMZ) railway service.)

b. Ocean Water Terminal Staff Functions. Transportation service in the field army area normally does not include ocean water terminal operations.

4–25. ACofS, CMO

See paragraph 4–9.

4–26. ACofS, Comptroller

See paragraph 4–18.
Section VI. OTHER STAFF OFFICERS

4–27. General

a. This section includes listings of the responsibilities and duties that may be assigned to other staff officers who may serve on field command staffs. Not every command will have all the staff officers indicated in this section; thus, in applying any specific list in a given staff, the level of the headquarters and the scope of its command and control functions are considerations. These considerations are discussed in paragraphs 4–55 through 4–60.

b. The staff officers listed herein may be special staff officers or members of a coordinating staff section, or the commander may designate them personal staff officers. Specialists integrated into the coordinating staff provide advice and assistance in their technical areas of interest.

c. Although staff officers may perform specified functions of command over designated units, the responsibilities and duties contained in succeeding paragraphs pertain only to their performances as staff officers.

d. Other officers advise and assist the commander. These officers include liaison officers, commanders of elements supporting the command, and representatives of other Services who serve in staff capacities. The naval gunfire liaison officer, the air liaison officer, and the staff weather officer (SWO) are examples of other Service representatives specifically provided to perform staff duties.

4–28. Adjutant General

The adjutant general is assigned operational and technical supervision responsibilities for the following administrative and personnel services:

a. Forms management services, including design and control of local and command forms.

b. Records management services, to include—
   (1) Mail management, including internal communications control, headquarters mailrooms, distribution centers, and messenger service for nontactical unclassified and classified material.
   (2) Correspondence management, including quantity and quality control.
   (3) Files management, including initiation, storage, and disposition.

   c. Publications management services, including—
      (1) Authentication, publication, and distribution of all orders and instructions except combat orders, certain technical instructions, and instructions issued by special staff officers in their capacity as commanders.
      (2) Procurement, storage, and distribution of publications and blank forms.
      (3) Monitoring of pinpoint distribution.

d. Printing and reproduction services, including supervision of field printing plants, control of contract field printing, and operation of reproduction services for the headquarters.

   e. Reports control and standardization services in commands not having a comptroller.

f. Military personnel management services, including—
   (1) Procurement, to include recruiting, enlistment, and reenlistment.
   (2) Personnel testing.
   (3) Classification and reclassification.
   (4) Assignment and reassignment.
   (5) Evaluation.
   (6) Promotion and reduction.
   (7) Maintenance of personnel records (except leave and pay).
   (8) Separation, to include retirement, discharge, transfer, and elimination.
   (9) Replacement operations.

   g. Welfare and morale services, including—
      (1) Casualty reporting and related actions, such as line-of-duty determinations, letters of sympathy and condolence, and survivor assistance.
      (2) Decorations and awards.
      (3) Absences.
      (4) Personal affairs counseling, to include dependent affairs.
      (5) Postal services.
      (6) Special services, to include entertainment; crafts; library; service club; sports; and rest, leave, and recreational activities.
      (7) Bands.

   h. Personnel and administrative training.
4–29. Aide-De-Camp

The aide-de-camp is a personal staff officer. He—

a. Assists the commander in apportioning his time and coordinating his personal activities and command responsibilities.

b. Provides for the personal comfort and security of the commander.

c. Supervises the activities of other personnel provided for the commander's personal use, e.g., assistant aides, cook, driver, clerk.

4–30. Air Defense Artillery Officer

The air defense artillery (ADA) officer—

a. Determines requirements for ADA units and recommends their allocation to subordinate units and the command relationship between the subordinate units and supporting ADA units.

b. Recommends to the ACoS, G3, the allocation of nuclear weapons for ADA missions and the special ammunition load for ADA units.

c. Recommends ADA unit tactical missions and priorities for air defense (AD).

d. Prepares the ADA portion of plans and orders, to include the ADA appendix to the fire support annex and/or the ADA annex.

e. Prepares the ADA portion of the command SOP.

f. Coordinates with the ACoS, G2, the establishment and functioning of an ADA intelligence system.

g. Prepares the AD portion of the training program and supervises AD training of the command.

h. Insures coordination of Army ADA operations within the force and with area and regional AD commands, ADA elements of other Services, and allies in the area of operations.

i. Plans and coordinates the use of airspace with aviation and other staff members, as appropriate.

j. Assists other staff elements in analyzing enemy AD capabilities and determining measures to counter or evade.

k. Monitors the readiness status of ADA units.

l. Monitors the condition of ADA equipment and advises the commander and appropriate staff elements on associated maintenance problems.

m. Advises on ADA EW operations in coordination with other staff elements.

n. Plans and supervises EW operations within AD, to include assisting in the preparation of the EW annex to operation plans and orders.

o. Participates in the development or review of joint AD rules and procedures pertinent to the force.

4–31. Aviation Officer

The aviation officer—

a. Exercises staff supervision over technical and flight aspects of administration, training, safety, and operations of Army aviation units.

b. Monitors the maintenance of aircraft and advises the commander, responsible staff personnel, and major subordinate commanders on the condition of equipment.

c. Prepares the aviation portion of the training program and exercises special staff supervision over aviation training in the command.

d. Assists in the planning and supervision of the following Army aviation operations:

   (1) Employment of aviation in combat and combat support operations.

   (2) Establishment and operation of the air traffic regulation system.

e. Assists the staff in preparing aviation portions of estimates, plans, orders, and reports.

f. Prepares the aviation portion of the air movement plan and, in conjunction with the AD officer and other appropriate agencies, assists in developing the airspace utilization plan.

g. Coordinates with transportation and movement staff personnel in matters requiring Army aircraft for combat service support operations.

4–32. Chaplain

The chaplain—

a. Advises the commander and his staff on all matters of religion and morals and morale as affected by religion.

b. Coordinates with the ACoS, G1, the assignment, promotion, transfer, and replacement of subordinate unit chaplains and their enlisted assistants within the command.

c. Supervises the maintenance of the chaplain policy files and records within his own section
and in the chaplain sections of appropriate subordinate command elements.

d. Prepares the chaplain portion of contingency plans for area and denominational coverage and for RAP situations and, with command approval, the contingency plans of subordinate element chaplain sections throughout the command.

e. Supervises personnel and training matters pertaining to chaplains, to include training of lay leaders, character guidance instructions, religious education, training conferences, and comparative religious instructional training conferences.

f. Monitors, through the appropriate staff agency, the procurement, storage, issue, and distribution of chaplain supplies.

g. Supervises the chaplain program and budget activity for appropriated funds, the use of nonappropriated chaplain funds, chaplain use of nonappropriated welfare funds, and the procurement and employment of auxiliary chaplains.

h. Plans and supervises the religious activities of the command, including area and denominational coverage and ministry to mass casualties; religious ministrations to hospitalized members of the command, prisoners in confinement or under arrest, enemy PW's, civilian internees/detainees, and refugees; and the religious education program.

i. Establishes liaison with chaplains of higher and adjacent headquarters, with chaplains of other Services, and with forces of allied nations, as appropriate. He also establishes liaison with various churches, civilian and religious organizations, and other groups that assist in activities related to religion and morality and coordinates their religious activities to the command; in an area of operations, he maintains this liaison through the ACoFS, CMO, and the CA religious-related personnel, when present.

j. Implements the character guidance program, to include integration of the principles of good citizenship, moral behavior, and code of conduct into the program.

k. Advises the commander and appropriate staff officers on the impact of religions of host country populations on the command mission and on US interests and objectives and participates in stability operations, as directed.

l. Provides pastoral services, as needed, for the headquarters and collocated attached elements having no assigned chaplains. In this sense, the staff chaplain is a pastor within his own headquarters.

4-33. Chemical Officer

The chemical officer—

a. Assists in planning the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, to include integration of chemical weapons in denial operations and barriers.

b. Plans and recommends requirements for chemical troops and the employment thereof.

c. Prepares the chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) annex to plans and orders, CBR estimates of the situation, and SOP's for defense against nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks.

d. Prepares the CBR portion of the training program and exercises staff supervision over CBR training throughout the command.

e. Exercises technical supervision over CBR activities throughout the command.

f. Plans and supervises—

(1) Chemical operations and radiological aspects of nuclear weapon employment with other combat support and combat service support operations.

(2) Chemical and nuclear target analysis and munition requirement computation, as required.

(3) Receipt, collation, evaluation, preparation, and distribution of nuclear, biological, and chemical reports.

(4) Effective wind-message preparation and distribution.

(5) Nuclear, biological, and chemical strike reports and assessment of effects for all enemy strikes and friendly nuclear and chemical strikes, as required.

(6) Collection of CBR contamination information in conjunction with higher, lower, and adjacent units.

(7) Collation, evaluation, and distribution of CBR contamination data.

(8) Maintenance of the CBR situation map.

(9) Maintenance of the radiation-dose status of subordinate and attached units.

(10) Measures to avoid or reduce the effects of enemy nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks.
g. Provides data on the casualty-producing effectiveness and the degree of downwind hazard from friendly chemical attacks.

h. Advises on—
   (1) The impact of CBR contamination on tactical, logistic, and civil-military operations.
   (2) CBR intelligence matters.
   (3) The use of defoliants and herbicides in support of tactical operations.
   (4) Smoke operations, including coordination with the ACoFS, G3, or the ACoFS, security, plans, and operations, if the use of smoke is part of tactical cover and deception operations.
   (5) Flame operations.
   (6) The implementation of mission-oriented protective posture.
   (7) The employment of airborne personnel detectors.
   (8) CBR and nuclear defense.

i. Provides fallout predictions, as required.

j. Supervises the chemical, biological, and radiological element (CBRE) activities.

Further information on the responsibilities and functions of staff chemical officers is contained in FM 3-1. Additional information on CBR defense is contained in FM 3-12, FM 21-40, FM 21-41, and FM 21-48.

4—34. Civilian Personnel Officer

The civilian personnel officer—

a. Advises the commander, staff, and units on management and administration of civilian employees. He is assigned special staff and operational responsibilities for the administration of laws and regulations. In coordination with other staff elements in foreign areas, he develops employment conditions and policies on use of non-US citizen employees and, where appropriate, participates in negotiations with host countries on labor agreements.

b. Supervises administration of civilian personnel management activities in the command, to include—
   (1) Recruitment and placement.
      (a) Administering recruitment, promotion, and career assignment systems.
      (b) Carrying out Army policies governing qualifications, placement, and other employment matters.

(2) Position and pay management.
   (a) Advising on assignment of duties to provide an economical and efficient position structure.
   (b) Classifying civilian positions in accordance with applicable legislation and regulations.
   (c) Carrying out Army policies and applicable laws governing pay and other compensation.

(3) Training and development.
   (a) Conducting training and development programs in coordination with employee supervisors.
   (b) Orienting new employees on employment conditions and installation facilities.

(4) Employee-management relations.
   (a) Advising on supervisor-employee relations, disciplinary actions, and grievances.
   (b) Maintaining contact with organized employee groups and undertaking the resolution of labor problems.
   (c) Evaluating employee services, facilities, and working conditions in coordination with other staff officers concerned.

(5) Official personnel records. Maintaining official personnel folders and records required by civilian personnel regulations.

c. Develops, in coordination with other staff officers concerned, plans and standby directives prescribing procedures for procurement, use, and administration of the civilian labor force in the continental United States and for use of local labor in foreign areas in an emergency.

4—35. Communications-Electronics Staff Officer

The C-E staff officer—

a. Advises on C-E matters, including signal communications, location of headquarters, location of signal facilities, and use of signal activities for deception.

b. Determines and recommends requirements for signal communications support and the employment of signal troops. (Does not include plans and recommendations pertaining to signal supply and maintenance troops.)

c. Prepares the signal and electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM) portion of the training program and supervises signal and ECCM training of the command.
d. Exercises technical supervision over signal activities throughout the command.

e. Coordinates frequency allocation, frequency assignment and use, and the reporting and processing of meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion problems.

f. Assists in the preparation of EW plans and annexes.

g. Plans and supervises operations pertaining to—

(1) Installation, operation, and maintenance of signal communications systems by assigned or attached signal units.

(2) Still- and motion-picture photographic services, except air-photography, and the operation of film libraries and film equipment exchanges.

h. Advises on matters pertaining to electromagnetic radiation environments in the command.

i. Observes radiofrequency-producing equipment in the command and advises on the effective use of this equipment to reduce radiofrequency interference with other communications equipment and with nuclear and conventional weapon systems.

j. Advises on the expected effects on the command of all source-produced radiofrequencies.

k. Coordinates measures to reduce electromagnetic radiation interference.

l. Advises on the technical C-E aspects of electronic systems and devices, as required.

m. Supervises the implementation of SIGSEC policy and procedures. Takes action to insure that—

(1) Only approved COMSEC material is used and that COMSEC interface is provided for in planning cryptonets.

(2) Approved ELSEC procedures and practices are applied.

(3) The ACofS, G3, or the ACofS, security, plans, and operations, is advised on C-E matters pertaining to OPSEC.

n. Prepares, coordinates, and publishes the communications-electronics operation instructions (CEOI) and the communications-electronics standing instructions (CESI) for use throughout the command.

o. Prepares the C-E annex to operation orders and plans.

4-36. Dental Surgeon

The dental surgeon—

a. Coordinates dental activities with the command surgeon.

b. Exercises staff supervision and technical control over command dental activities.

c. Determines requirements for dental units and utilization of dental personnel and recommends employment thereof.

d. Plans and supervises the following dental functions:

(1) Preventive dentistry program for the command.

(2) Maintenance of the oral health of the command.

(3) Maintenance of professional standards and levels of dental care and treatment.

(4) Establishment of priorities for dental care and treatment.

(5) Professional training of dental personnel.

e. Plans dental care programs provided to the indigenous population.

f. Determines requirements for dental equipment and supply and supervises their use.

g. Provides advice and technical assistance in the construction, rehabilitation, and use of dental facilities.

h. Prepares or consolidates reports on command dental activities.

4-37. Engineer

The engineer—

a. Provides technical advice on the requisitioning, procurement, storage, distribution, and documentation of engineer material.

b. Determines requirements for engineer troops (coordinates with the ACofS, G2, on the assignment of engineer topographic troops) and recommends employment thereof.

c. Prepares the engineer portion of the training program and exercises staff supervision over engineer training throughout the command.

d. Exercises technical supervision over engineer activities throughout the command.

e. Plans and supervises engineer operations pertaining to—
(1) Construction, maintenance, and repair of roads, trails, highways, bridges, airfields, and inland waterways and construction, major repair, and major maintenance of railways, cableways, tramways, and pipelines.

(2) Construction, maintenance, rehabilitation, and repair of camps, cantonments, warehouses, hospitals, and other types of structures (except signal communications); airfields; harbors; permanent fortifications; and all river-crossing means, to include tactical, fixed, and floating bridges, boats, rafts, and assault bridging.

(3) Denial operations and barriers, to include advising the operations officer on implementation; supervising the technical aspects of employment; preparing the engineer portion of plans and orders; and, as appropriate, assisting in the location and construction of obstacles requiring special skill and equipment.

(4) Amphibious operations, to include command and control of shore parties, landing and provision of inland mobility to assault elements, and general engineer support on the beach.

(5) Construction, maintenance, repair, and operation of utilities, to include water supply systems, fixed bathing installations, portable and fixed electric powerplants, and nuclear powerplants.

(6) Fire protection at installations.

(7) Acquisition, administration, and disposition of real estate.

(8) Procurement, storage, reproduction, and distribution of maps, map substitutes, and related mapping material, in accordance with ACofS, G2, guidance.

(9) Construction and placement of deceptive devices and advice and assistance on camouflage activities in support of tactical cover and deception operations.

(10) Engineer reconnaissance, survey control, mapping projects, terrain studies, in accordance with ACofS, G2, guidance.

(11) Demolitions, to include atomic demolition munitions.

(12) Assistance in the development of traffic circulation plans in conjunction with the transportation officer and the provost marshal (PM).

(13) Classification of roads, bridges, and airfields and appropriate distribution of such information; preparation and posting of traffic signs and issuance of materials to military police (MP) units for preparation and posting of temporary traffic signs.

(14) Insect and rodent control and fumigation of buildings.

(15) Operation of engineer real property maintenance activities.

(16) Technical advice and assistance on matters pertaining to engineer materiel and its readiness status, including disposition of captured engineer materiel of nonintelligence interest.

(17) Recommendation of priorities and allocation of critical and controlled items of engineer equipment.

(18) Construction of CBR and nuclear permanent and improvised protective shelters, recovery of fixed military installations from nuclear attack, and use of earthmoving equipment in CBR decontamination.

f. Advises the commander and staff on considerations for pollution abatement and recommends corrective techniques to use when pollution is unavoidable.

4–38. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Staff Officer

The explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) staff officer is responsible for—

a. Supervising EOD unit technical and training activities.

b. Planning locations and numbers of EOD units required for effective explosive disposal support.

c. Establishing and operating an EOD incident reporting system.

d. Establishing, operating, and supervising technical intelligence reporting procedures as prescribed by AR 75–15.

e. Coordinating requirements for EOD service with other Services, Federal agencies, allied countries, and other Army commands. This may include arranging for support to the disposal units, as required.

f. Monitoring the supply status or requesting expedited development of special EOD tools and equipment.

Additional details may be found in FM 9–14, FM 9–15, and AR 75–15.
4–39. Field Artillery Officer

The field artillery officer—

a. At division and corps is the field artillery commander, and normally he is designated the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). At field army, the field artillery officer is organic to the staff and is normally assigned as the FSCOORD. He is a special staff officer functioning under the staff supervision of the ACofS, G3. In smaller units, brigades, or separate task forces, the FSCOORD usually is the commanding officer or his designee from the attached or supporting field artillery unit. In the absence of an attached or supporting field artillery unit, the situation may require the commander to designate an FSCOORD for coordination of available fire support. FM 6–20–1 and FM 6–20–2 contain doctrine concerning the FSCOORD and fire support coordination procedures.

b. Advises on fire support matters, field artillery target acquisition, radar emplacement, counterbattery operations, and deception operations by field artillery.

c. Provides information on the status of field artillery fire support means.

d. Recommends the field artillery task organization.

e. Provides information on the status of field artillery ammunition on hand, recommends to the ACofS, G3, the field artillery ammunition required supply rate, provides an estimate of the adequacy of the field artillery ammunition available supply rate, and recommends the available supply rate for subordinate commands.

f. Recommends the allocation or assignment of nuclear and chemical weapons for field artillery missions; also recommends the field artillery special ammunition load for field artillery units, subordinate units, supply points, and depots, as appropriate.

g. Assists in the preparation of operation plans and orders by providing information pertinent to fire support organizations and operations. Supervises the preparation of the fire support annex and supporting appendixes (e.g., plans for the use of individual fire support systems).

h. Provides for target analysis and damage assessment of nuclear and chemical weapons employed on surface targets by field artillery units of friendly forces.

i. Coordinates field artillery survey within the command and with higher and adjacent commands.

j. Provides technical assistance to the ACofS, G2, in the study and evaluation of enemy fire support capabilities.

k. Prepares the field artillery portion of the training program and exercises staff supervision over field artillery training throughout the command.

l. Monitors the maintenance condition of field artillery equipment and advises the commander and responsible staff personnel on related problems.

m. Coordinates field artillery target acquisition within the command and with higher and adjacent commands.

n. Submits to the ACofS, G2, information and intelligence derived from field artillery operations.

o. Organizes and supervises the fire support element (FSE) of the TOC at division and higher levels or the fire support coordination center (FSCC) at lower levels down to and including maneuver battalion headquarters (FM 6–20–2).

4–40. Finance and Accounting Officer

a. The finance officer serves as staff finance officer in commands where there is no comptroller. As the staff finance officer, he provides technical advice (or finance advisory services) to the finance offices assigned to the command and advises the commander on—

(1) The savings programs for assigned personnel.

(2) The command currency control program.

(3) Black-market activities.

(4) The banking facilities within the command's area of responsibility.

(5) The transmittal of personal funds.

(6) Matters relating to reports of survey and reports of loss of funds.

(7) Funding of finance officers.

(8) Economic impact of expenditures on local economy.

b. In some commands, the finance officer or the finance and accounting officer is assigned responsibility for both the staff functions and the opera-
tional functions of the commands (e.g., the division finance officer).

(1) Staff responsibilities include those matters listed in $a(1)$ through (8) above.

(2) Operational responsibilities include—

(a) Maintenance of accountability for and safeguarding of public monies, except intelligence collection fund monies.

(b) Disbursement of public funds, except intelligence collection funds.

(c) Maintenance of personal financial and leave records for all assigned personnel.

(d) Computation of travel pay.

(e) Establishment and funding of class B agents and forward service teams.

(f) Funding and reimbursement of impress fund cashiers and class A agents.

(g) Provision of currency exchange facilities, when required.

(h) Collection of funds.

(i) Issuance of saving bonds and treasury checks.

(j) Payment, when authorized, of commercial accounts.

(k) Staff supervision over distribution of intelligence collection fund monies.

(l) Computation and payment of miscellaneous payments.

(m) Preparation of changes to members’ master pay account.

(n) Payment, when authorized, of local national personnel employed by the command.

c. Commands having an accounting mission, but not authorized a comptroller, are authorized a staff finance and accounting officer. The staff finance and accounting officer provides technical advice and staff supervision to the finance and accounting element(s) assigned to the command and advises the commander on—

(1) Matters included in $a(1)$ through (8) above.

(2) Accounting matters.

(3) Program and budget matters, to include status of appropriated funds.

4-41. Headquarters Commandant

The headquarters commandant—

a. Exercises operational control over headquarters troops not assigned or attached to subordinate commands.

b. Is responsible for—

(1) Local security of the headquarters.

(2) Arrangement and movement of the headquarters.

(3) Supervision of training and morale activities of headquarters personnel and casualties.

(4) Messing, quartering, and supplying of headquarters personnel and casualties.

(5) Reception and accommodation of visitors to the headquarters.

(6) Supervision of motor transportation organic to, or allocated for use by, the headquarters.

(7) Provision of protective areas for headquarters personnel and casualties.

(8) Supervision of maintenance of equipment organic to, or allocated for use by, the headquarters.

4-42. Historian

The historian—

a. Supervises the historical activities of the command and assists in planning historical coverage.

b. Prepares the unit history. In larger commands, this may consist of providing guidance on preparation of staff section histories and compiling these into a complete unit history.

c. Prepares special studies or reports based on assembled historical material.

d. Supervises the collection, preservation, and disposition of historical records and properties, to include operation of historical museums.

4-43. Information Officer

The information officer—

a. Advises the commander and staff on all aspects of command information functions, to include information planning, publication of command information newspapers and other information media, operation of command information broadcast stations and networks in overseas commands, and distribution of command information through these media.

b. Insures that material for public release has been reviewed for security clearance under established policies; distributes information pertaining to the command to appropriate information media in accordance with established command
and security policies; maintains liaison with, receives, and escorts civilian and military information media representatives, assists them in obtaining and clearing information relating to the command, and supervises their activities.

c. In conjunction with the ACofS, G3, or the ACofS, security, plans, and operations, insures that information activities conform with the requirements of OPSEC.

d. In conjunction with the ACofS, CMO, observes and analyzes trends in public opinion and plans positive and continuing community relations programs to gain and maintain public understanding, good will, and support. In stability operations, he gives attention to the requirements for exploitation of military assistance to civilians in the military civic action program.

e. Implements and supervises, as directed, field press censorship in combat areas on the outbreak of hostilities.

f. Prepares the public information and command information portions of SOP's and operation plans and orders.

4-44. Inspector General
The inspector general is a personal staff officer. He—

a. Reports directly to, and is under the direct supervision of, the commander on whose staff he serves.

b. As a confidential adviser to the commander, inquires into and reports on matters pertaining to the performance of the mission, state of discipline, efficiency, and economy by conducting inspections, investigations, surveys, and studies as directed by the commander and as prescribed by law and regulations.

c. Consults all staff sections before making inspections to obtain items for the special attention of inspection personnel and to obtain technical assistance.

d. Advises staff sections concerning matters noted during inspections and furnishes them copies of extracts of inspection reports of direct interest to the particular staff section.

e. Receives, investigates, and reports on allegations, complaints, and grievances of individuals and agencies.

f. Recommends remedial action to correct deficiencies and delinquencies noted in inspections or investigations.

g. Advises the commander on the releasability of information from inspector general reports of inspections or investigations.

4-45. Liaison Officer
The liaison officer's primary duty is to maintain continuity in the exchange of information and to promote cooperation and coordination of effort by personal contact between two or more headquarters or agencies. The liaison officer—

a. Keeps himself informed on his own unit's situation and makes this information available to the commander and staff of the visited unit.

b. Makes continuing reports on matters within the scope of his mission, keeps appropriate records, and advises the commander of the headquarters he is visiting on the contents of reports that he sends back to his own headquarters.

4-46. Logistic Readiness Officer
The logistic readiness officer in tactical commands is normally a senior staff officer. The commander may designate his assistant or deputy commander as the logistic readiness officer. In combat service support commands, the logistic readiness officer will be a separate staff officer reporting to the commander, his deputy, or possibly to the chief of staff. The logistic readiness officer (AR 11-14)—

a. Determines and reports on the qualitative and quantitative status of equipment in relation to standards established for specific end items and organizational materiel.

b. Recommends action to be taken on factors that decrease the materiel readiness of the command, such as manpower, money, training, conservation of equipment life, repair parts, tools, facilities, and maintenance management.

4-47. Provost Marshal
The PM—

a. Advises on the promulgation and enforcement of laws, orders, and regulations for the maintenance of order and discipline; populace and resources control; police intelligence operations; special investigative efforts; refugee control and displacement; and other associated police duties.

b. Determines and makes recommendations
concerning requirements for and employment of MP units and coordination with civilian police, paramilitary forces, and other civilian regulatory agencies.

c. Prepares and supervises the MP portion of the training program and exercises staff supervision over MP training in the command.

d. Is responsible for receiving, evaluating, preparing, consolidating, and disseminating reports covering PM and MP activities.

e. Studies and analyzes MP operations as a basis for planning and formulating new policies.

f. Furnishes information and advice on all phases of MP activities related to morale, conduct, and appearance of military personnel; vice control; military prisoners; enforcement of pass and curfew regulations; and apprehension of absentees.

g. Enforces compliance with pertinent provisions of international law.

h. Gives technical advice and assistance on the use of troops in providing military aid to civil authorities.

i. Plans policies and procedures for insuring the physical security of logistic and administrative installations.

j. Plans and supervises the following MP operations:

(1) Combat support in the form of offensive and defensive operations against minor enemy elements; tactical operations in urban areas; convoy escorts; route security; route reconnaissance; economy-of-force operations in RAP missions; perimeter defense as part of a larger unit; security between checkpoints, installations, or roadblocks, to include reaction forces for isolated posts or installations.

(2) Circulation/movement control, to include vehicular traffic, convoys, refugees, individual movement, curfews, identification and registration systems, and lines of communications.

(3) Police intelligence activities, to include data developed in conjunction with indigenous police forces and collection, evaluation, and dissemination of law enforcement and security data.

(4) RAP activities, to include data developed in conjunction with indigenous police forces.

(5) Enforcement and maintenance of military law, order, and regulations.

(6) Apprehension of military offenders and civilians who commit offenses in areas under military control.

(7) Collection, evacuation, processing, internment, care, treatment, discipline, safeguarding, use, education, and repatriation of enemy PW's and civilian internees/detainees.

(8) Internal security of command posts and other critical facilities.

(9) Crime prevention and coordination of criminal investigations.

(10) Confinement, care and rehabilitation of military prisoners in stockades, rehabilitation training centers, and hospital prison wards.

(11) Stability operations and activities, to include police internal defense operations, combined and joint patrol operations, police aspects of populace and resources control, and police training and advisory activities.

(12) Protection of Government property, including the prevention of pilferage of equipment and supplies in transit and in storage.

(13) Physical security, to include physical security surveys and inspections.

(14) Measures for aid to military or civil authorities in civil disturbances and disasters and coordination of these measures.

(15) Operation of branch PW/civilian internee/detainee information center in the theater of operations.

(16) Provision of MP support and MP RAP potential. FM 19–4 contains the specific responsibilities and duties of the PM.

4–48. Secretary of the General Staff

Staffs of higher headquarters include a secretary of the general staff (SGS). He is not a coordinating, special, or personal staff officer. In staffs other than the general staff, a staff secretary may perform the activities of an SGS. The SGS—

a. Acts as executive officer for the chief of staff.

b. Maintains an office of temporary record for the chief of staff.

c. Receives officials visiting the headquarters to confer with the commander, the chief of staff, deputy chiefs of staff, or ACoF's.

d. Performs other duties that the chief of staff may assign him.
4-49. Staff Judge Advocate

The staff judge advocate—

a. Provides legal advice to the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders on all matters involving military law (Department of Defense directives, Army regulations, and command regulations), domestic law (including US statutes, Federal regulations, and State and local law), foreign law, status-of-forces agreements, and international law.

b. Supervises and is responsible for the administration of military justice and other legal matters in the command. He—

(1) Communicates directly with the commander on military justice matters.

(2) Examines and recommends to the convening authority appropriate action on charges before they are referred for trial by general courts-martial, reviews records of trials by general courts-martial and military commissions, and recommends to the convening authority the action that should be taken.

(3) Provides trial and defense counsel (qualified lawyers within the sense of Article 27(b): Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)), for general courts-martial; when requested or otherwise required, provides defense counsel and military judges for special courts-martial and defense counsel at investigations conducted pursuant to Article 32: UCMJ, and to accused or suspects held in custody; and, when requested, provides advice to individuals concerning nonjudicial punishment matters, requests for relief under Article 69: UCMJ, and other disciplinary matters.

(4) Reviews records of trials by special and summary courts-martial for legal sufficiency, initiates appropriate corrective action when necessary, and acts as custodian of special and summary courts-martial trial records.

(5) Prepares and processes correspondence concerned with the imposition of nonjudicial punishment under Article 15: UCMJ, when required; in appropriate cases, reviews appeals from punishment imposed under Article 15: UCMJ, and makes recommendations to the commander.

(6) Recommends policies relating to conditions under which pretrial and posttrial confinement of military personnel will be imposed and advises and assists other staff agencies and subordinate commands in the enforcement of announced policies relative to confinement.

(7) Recommends, in conjunction with the PM, policies relating to liaison with civil law enforcement and civil judicial agencies.

c. Reviews reports of investigating officers and boards of officers to determine legal sufficiency and makes appropriate recommendations to the commander. He furnishes counsel when requested and available and when authorized by the appropriate Army regulation.

d. Supervises military justice and other legal training in the command.

e. Furnishes advice to individuals, as requested, against whom pecuniary liability is asserted in connection with reports of survey and reports of loss of funds.

f. Furnishes legal assistance and advice to military personnel, their dependents, and other authorized persons concerning personal, civil, and legal problems and supervises the command’s legal assistance and preventive law programs.

g. Supervises and administers all matters pertaining to claims and recommends action to be taken, including certification for payment, if appropriate.

h. Prepares legal opinions and furnishes legal advice on public international law matters, both customary and conventional (the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, status-of-forces agreements), and in the applicability of US laws in foreign countries. He also provides advice on foreign law and private international law problems.

i. Examines procurement contracts; furnishes legal advice in connection with disputes and other problems in the procurement field, when required; provides counsel in Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals cases tried under the optional accelerated procedure; and furnishes legal advice with respect to the use and disposal of Government property.

j. Supervises the administration of war crimes trials and trial records in the command, to include legal advice on violations of international law.

k. Advises on legal aspects of CMO, military aid to US civil authorities, disaster relief, and civil defense.

l. Furnishes legal advice to the command and to individuals, as required and/or requested, on military personnel matters (including military
status, pay, allowances, promotion, reduction, separation, authorized activities, appeals to administrative boards, and complaints under Article 138: UCMJ).

m. Provides legal advice concerning nonappropriated funds, donations, use and disposal of Government property, military installations, military support to civil authorities, disaster relief, and civil defense.

4-50. Surgeon

The surgeon—

a. Advises on the health services of the command and the occupied or friendly territory within the commander's area of responsibility.

b. Advises on the medical effects of the environment and of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons on personnel, rations, and water.

c. Prescribes treatment procedures and insures that facilities for treatment of CBR and nuclear casualties are available, insures that first-aid supplies are available for troop use, examines foodstuffs and water to determine suitability for consumption after exposure to chemical and biological agents or radiological contamination and other types of pollution, is responsible for identification of biological agents used against friendly troops, advises on preventive medicine measures to protect friendly troops from the effects of potential enemy biological agents, and furnishes detailed technical evaluation of the impact of these agents on friendly troops.

d. Determines requirements for medical equipment and supplies and supervises the requisitioning, procurement, storage, maintenance, distribution, and documentation thereof.

e. Plans and recommends requirements for classification and employment of Army Medical Department personnel.

f. Prepares the medical portion of the training program, exercises staff supervision over medical training in the command, and plans and supervises the training of non-US military and civilian medical and paramedical personnel when so directed.

g. Exercises staff supervision (and technical control when such authority is delegated as outlined in paragraph 1–10b(1)(c)) over medical activities throughout the command, including personal hygiene, environmental sanitation, first aid, sanitary aspects of food service and food procurement, and other preventive medicine activities affecting the health of the command.

h. Plans and supervises the following health service operations:

   1. The system of treatment and evacuation, to include aeromedical evacuation by medical air ambulance units and by nonmedical Army aviation units.

   2. Preventive medicine in the command and, as required, in public health activities.

   3. Professional health service in subordinate units.

   4. Preparation of reports on the records of injured, sick, and wounded and custody thereof.

   5. Medical supply, maintenance, and optical fabrication.

   6. Examination and processing of captured medical equipment and supplies of nonintelligence interest and necessary inspection service for captured animals and food supplies.

   7. Technical inspection of medical equipment and supplies, to include organizational maintenance.

   8. The equipment status reporting system within his area of responsibility.

   9. Medical laboratory service.

   10. Whole-blood control.

   11. Professional health services for enemy PW's and civilian internees/detainees.

i. Coordinates medical requirements for construction and transportation.

4-51. Transportation Officer

The transportation officer may be assigned as a special staff officer (in divisions), as an assistant to the ACoFS, G4, for transportation (in corps and army headquarters), or as an assistant for transportation in the director of services staff section (in the area support command and group). His basic functions are the same as those listed in paragraph 4–16, with the exception that planning and supervision include more day-to-day direction of transport service operations, including—

a. Making plans and providing recommendations on requirements, availability, and employment of transportation.

b. Supervising transportation aspects of training.
c. Exercising staff supervision over transportation matters and advising the commander and staff on all matters pertaining to transportation.

4-52. Veterinary Officer

The veterinary officer—

a. Coordinates veterinary activities with the surgeon.

b. Exercises staff supervision over the command veterinary service.

c. Determines the requirements for veterinary supplies and equipment.

d. Prepares reports on command veterinary activities.

e. Advises on—

(1) Procurement and management, including housing of military animals.

(2) Participation of veterinary personnel and units in CA activities.

(3) Use of medical laboratory services by veterinary personnel.

f. Plans and supervises the following veterinary functions:

(1) Inspection of subsistence of both animal and nonanimal origin to determine compliance with requirements for wholesomeness and quality.

(2) Inspection of facilities, establishments, and/or vehicles in which subsistence is transported, procured, processed, stored, or issued to insure that proper sanitary practices and methods are employed.

(3) Inspection of subsistence, including food-producing animals, exposed to CBR contamination to determine suitability for consumption.

(4) Care and treatment of military animals and prevention and control of disease and injury in military animals.

(5) Measures for the prevention and control of food-borne diseases and animal diseases transmissible to man or animals.

4-53. Women's Army Corps Staff Officer

The Women's Army Corps (WAC) staff officer—

a. Makes recommendations to appropriate commanders and staff officers on plans and policies pertaining to procurement, classification, training, utilization, assignment, career development, promotion, investigation, discipline, separation, participation in reserve activities of the Army command, and any other matter that affects the morale and well-being of WAC commissioned officers, warrant officers, and enlisted women.

b. Inspects WAC units and individuals in the command.

4-54. Staff Weather Officer

The US Air Force Air Weather Service provides operational weather service to tactical commanders. This includes providing the SWO on request. The SWO—

a. Advises on matters related to weather service for the supported Army command.

b. Has a complete understanding of the mission, organization, and equipment of the supported command.

c. Advises the Air Weather Service through Air Force channels on the weather service requirements of the supported Army command.

d. Assists in the preparation of weather annexes to plans of the supported command and reviews weather annexes of subordinate commands.

e. Informs the Army commander and his staff of Air Force weather unit capabilities and limitations that may affect weather service.

f. Monitors weather service provided to lower levels of the supported Army command.

g. Provides assistance, on request, to Army aircraft accident investigating boards.

h. Assists in determining weather service requirements, develops weather service procedures, trains Army personnel in the understanding and use of weather observations and other operational weather matters, prepares and presents weather aspects in flying-safety lectures, develops weather portions of training circulars or manuals, and obtains and presents weather training films.

i. Performs other duties in the field of weather service as directed by the appropriate Army or Air Force commander.

AR 115-10/AFR 105-3 contains additional information on weather service requirements.
Section VII. CONSIDERATIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES AT FIELD LEVELS

4-55. General

a. Staff responsibilities and duties enumerated in previous sections of this chapter vary with the level of command. Certain of the responsibilities and duties listed apply at one level but not at another.

b. This section contains a discussion of the scope and importance of staff operations at the various field command headquarters and indicates the staff responsibilities and duties normally not applicable at these headquarters.

4-56. Theater Army

a. FM 100-15 contains a discussion of the concept of organization, the operational mission, and the administrative mission of theater army.

b. Theater army staffs develop policy and coordinate operations rather than conduct operations. Therefore, the operational responsibilities and duties indicated in paragraphs 4-27 through 4-54 for various staff officers, whether combat, combat support, or combat service support, normally do not apply at theater army.

4-57. Army Group

a. FM 100-15 contains doctrine for army group operations, to include organization, strategic and tactical missions, and administrative functions.

b. The primary concern of army group staffs is developing plans and providing long-range operational direction (letters of instructions) to subordinate field armies. Staff activities devoted to the conduct of current operations are generally limited to intelligence collection in support of planning and long-range interdiction, control and allocation of means available for current army group operations, and supervision of the execution of army group orders.

4-58. Field Army

a. FM 100-15, FM 54-3, and FM 54-4 contain doctrine for field army operations, to include organization, missions, and functions.

b. The field army staff is both a planning and an operational staff. Staff activities include combat, combat support, and combat service support operation planning, coordination, and supervision.

c. Special staff officers act as monitors in the determination of requirements for equipment and supplies and in the requisition, procurement, storage, distribution, and documentation thereof and in the recovery, evacuation, and disposition of real estate. In combat service support activities, the monitor role does not include detailed planning of operational organization, procedures, and techniques or control and coordination of current operating activities.

d. Special staff officers advise and make recommendations concerning combat service support matters when field army operations are being planned, but only when these matters are within their respective functional areas of responsibility.

4-59. Corps

a. FM 100-15 contains doctrine for corps operations, to include organization, missions, and functions.

b. The corps staff is both a planning and an operational staff. Staff activities primarily deal with combat and combat support operation planning, coordination, and supervision. Staff activities concerned with combat service support operations are limited to those necessary to assist the operations of the corps. These activities consist primarily of making recommendations for field army support of corps units and controlling and allocating ammunition and other supply items, if required.

c. The responsibilities and duties of staff officers at corps are essentially the same as those at field army (para 4-58).

4-60. Division

a. FM 61-100 and FM 54-2 contain doctrine for division operations, to include organization, missions, and functions.

b. The division staff is both a planning and an operational staff. The discussion of the field army staff (para 4-58) applies generally to division level. The division support command (DISCOM) staff is responsible for staff planning and supervision in the DISCOM and its organic units.
Section VIII. UNIT STAFF OFFICERS

4-61. General

a. The staffs of units smaller than division are organized to meet unit requirements. Staff officers may be assigned both coordinating and special duties.

b. The responsibilities and duties of specific staff officers for a specific staff organization are in appropriate field manuals or other training publications pertaining to a particular unit.

4-62. Typical Unit Staff Officers

a. Staff officers found in headquarters of organizations smaller than division may include—

(1) The executive officer, who performs functions generally similar to those of a chief of staff (para 4-4). In addition, he may be the second in command.

(2) The personnel officer (S1), who performs many of the same functions as the SGS and the ACofS, G1, at higher levels.

(3) The intelligence officer (S2), who performs generally the same functions as the ACofS, G2, at higher levels. In addition, the S2 is responsible for collecting local weather observations on request and relaying these observations to the division SWO. For specific field artillery S2 responsibilities, see FM 6-121 and FM 6-140.

(4) The operations and training officer (S3), who performs generally the same functions as the ACofS, G3, plus operational functions of special staff officers who may not be members of the small unit staff, e.g., the chemical staff officer and the engineer staff officer.

(5) The logistics officer (S4), who performs generally the same functions as the ACofS, G4, at higher levels.

(6) In a combat battalion or brigade deployed in stability operations, a CMO (S5) section, which may be authorized by an MTOE. When a unit is not authorized an S5 section, the commander should designate an officer, usually the S8, to be responsible for the CMO functions.

b. Staff specialists on smaller unit staffs include officers trained to work with assigned or attached specialist groups. The specialists generally function as technical advisers and may include—

(1) The combat support company commander, who advises the commander and staff on the capabilities and utilization of the combat support company.

(2) An ammunition officer, who advises on the status of ammunition and the means for its delivery; requisitions, receives, and distributes ammunition; maintains records; and submits ammunition reports.

(3) A C-E officer (para 4-35). At battalion, the C-E officer may also command the communications platoon/section.

(4) A maintenance officer, who—

(a) Advises on maintenance matters.

(b) Supervises maintenance activities (less medical and cryptoequipment), to include the adequacy of maintenance organization, personnel, tools, equipment, repair parts, and facilities.

(c) Maintains liaison with higher, adjacent, and lower headquarters concerning maintenance matters.

(d) Prepares equipment status reports, as required; maintains records of equipment condition; and advises on trends and incipient maintenance problem areas.

(e) Analyzes maintenance data and recommends courses of action based on such analysis.

(5) A logistic readiness officer (para 4-46).

(6) A motor officer, who advises on motor transportation and supervises the operation and maintenance of motor transportation of the unit and the training of motor transportation personnel.

(7) A chemical officer, who performs generally the same functions as the chemical staff officer at higher levels (para 4-33) and acts as an assistant operations officer, as required. A battalion chemical noncommissioned officer and a CBR-trained officer and enlisted personnel below battalion assist in the CBR functions of their units as specified by AR 220-58 and FM 21-40.

(8) An information officer, who performs generally the same functions as the information staff officer on higher level staffs.

(9) A surgeon, when authorized (para 4-50).

(10) A chaplain (para 4-32).

(11) An aviation officer (para 4-31).

(12) A PM (para 4-47).
c. Commanders of attached or supporting units provide staff assistance in their areas of interest, as required. For example—

(1) The commander (or his designee) of an attached or supporting field artillery unit normally serves as the FSCoord.

(2) The commander of the flight detachment assigned, attached, or supporting the unit performs the same functions as the aviation officer when an aviation officer is not provided by the TOE or the table of distribution and allowance (TDA).

(3) The engineer unit commander functions as the supported unit engineer staff officer when an engineer unit is in support or attachment.

(4) The commander of an attached or supporting ADA unit normally serves as ADA officer if no organic ADA is present.
CHAPTER 5
MILITARY PROBLEM-SOLVING TECHNIQUES (STANAG 2118)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

5-1. General

a. The commander and his staff continually face problems that must be solved; these problems involve uncertainties, questionable or incomplete data, and several courses of action. They must make decisions and recommendations based on judgment of such uncertainties as enemy intentions and capabilities, the influence of morale, the state of training, new systems, new organizations, the variations inherent in higher commands, the weather, and changes to the mission.

b. Decisions result from a problem-solving process that consists of—

(1) Recognizing and defining the problem.
(2) Gathering the data needed to determine the scope of and to solve the problem.
(3) Developing, listing, and analyzing possible solutions to the problem.
(4) Selecting the best solution to the problem.

c. To insure that the many factors which influence military operations receive logical and orderly consideration, the Army uses several systematic methods of problem solving. Two methods are the estimate of the situation and the staff study. These methods assist decisionmakers in developing and analyzing logical courses of action. However, selection of the best of several feasible courses of action will be influenced by the decisionmakers' knowledge, experience, and judgment. Operations research/systems analysis offers decisionmakers many techniques that provide additional information for the detailed analysis of these courses of action (alternatives) and may be used in conjunction with other problem-solving methods.

5-2. Assumptions

a. In the absence of facts, assumptions are used to fill gaps in information that is known or what conditions are or probably will be. In planning, assumptions are an indispensable tool.

b. The validity of the assumptions used in critical to any good estimate or study. Each assumption used must be tested against the question. "Is this assumption absolutely necessary to the solution of this problem?" If the answer is no, the assumption is not valid. In many cases, it is difficult to determine the validity or the necessity of an assumption. Analyses can be performed to assist in this determination. If such analyses are performed, they should appear in the study.

c. An assumption also must be logical; it must be realistic; and it must be stated positively.

Section II. THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

5-3. Purpose

a. The purpose of the estimate of the situation is to find the best way to accomplish a given mission. The estimator considers all the circumstances affecting the situation and analyzes and evaluates possible courses of action. The conclusion indicates the course of action that offers the best probability of success. This gives the commander a basis for making his decision and for determining how he will employ his unit.

b. The basic approach used in the estimate is applicable to any situation, level, or type of command. An individual may use this process to arrive at any decision. The commander uses it to decide his best course of action. The staff officer uses the commander's estimate to determine a recommended course of action for accomplishing a specific task. He uses the staff estimate to determine how factors in his particular field of interest will influence courses of action under consid-
eration and to arrive at his recommendations to the commander.

5-4. Scope and Nature of the Estimate

a. The estimate is as thorough as time and circumstances permit. The detail varies with the level and the type of command.

(1) Normally, estimates at division are not formal, written documents. However, the commander or the staff officer should use the appropriate format (app C) as a guide and checklist.

(2) At levels above division, the estimate frequently is written and follows the prescribed format in detail.

b. The estimator (whether a commander or a staff officer) uses information, conclusions, and recommendations from other pertinent estimates in analyzing his problem. He may incorporate some of this material into his estimate, but he alone is responsible for the content of his estimate.

c. Estimates are updated continuously as factors that affect operations are changed, as new facts are determined, as assumptions are replaced by facts or rendered invalid, or as changes to the mission are received or indicated.

5-5. The Format for an Estimate of the Situation

a. How the estimator arrives at a decision is a matter of his personal determination. However, sound decisions result only from a thorough, clear, unemotional analysis of all data pertinent to the situation. Because modern military problems are complex, the organization and consideration of data in a certain sequence make logical analysis easier and the production of sound conclusions more likely.

b. The format for the estimate of the situation assists the estimator in applying thoroughness, clarity, judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to the situation and in reaching a sound decision. Figure 5–1 provides a general description of the format and the contents of each of its elements.

c. This format is a logical and useful one but is not rigid. The estimator does not have to complete one paragraph before he goes to the next. He may make many small analyses or estimates within the overall estimate and refer frequently to material previously considered, revising or adding to this material as necessary. The format is valuable as a checklist. It insures the consideration of significant aspects and serves as a base or a reference point for updating the estimate.

d. Subsequent paragraphs contain a discussion of the application of this format to the needs of tactical commanders, combat service support commanders, and staff officers.
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

References: Maps, charts, or documents (as necessary for understanding of the estimate).

1. MISSION
The restated mission determined by the commander in step 3 (fig 5–4) of the sequence of command and staff actions.

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
   a. Determine all facts or, in the absence of facts, logical assumptions that have a bearing on the situation and that contribute to or influence the ultimate choice of a course of action. Analyze available facts and assumptions, or both, and arrive at deductions as to their favorable or adverse influence or effect on accomplishment of the mission.
   b. Determine and list significant difficulties or difficulty patterns that are anticipated and that could adversely affect accomplishment of the mission.
   c. Determine and list all logical courses of action that will accomplish the mission.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION
Determine through analysis the probable outcome of each course of action listed in paragraph 2c when opposed by each significant difficulty enumerated in paragraph 2b. This may be done in two steps, as follows:
   a. Determine and state those anticipated difficulties or difficulty patterns that will have an unequal effect on all courses of action.
   b. Analyze each course of action against each significant difficulty or difficulty pattern to determine strengths and weaknesses inherent in each course of action.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION
Compare courses of action in terms of significant advantages and disadvantages or in terms of the major considerations that emerged during analysis (3b above). Decide which course of action promises to be most successful in accomplishing the mission.

5. DECISION (OR RECOMMENDATIONS)
Translate the selected courses of action into a complete decision statement (or recommendation), showing, who, what, where, when, how, and why, as appropriate.

/s/ __________________________

Annexes (as required)
Distribution

Figure 5–1. Format for the estimate of the situation.
5-6. The Tactical Commander's Estimate

a. The purpose of this estimate is to determine the best course of action for accomplishing a tactical mission.

b. The commander prepares his estimate based on his knowledge of the situation and on oral or written reports by his staff. Each staff member comments on the effect that considerations within his area of responsibility will have on possible courses of action. Whether the commander personally prepares a written estimate, makes a mental estimate, or studies and approves the recommendations in staff estimates (para 5-8), he is responsible for and must announce his decision.

c. Appendix C contains the basic principles for preparing a tactical commander's estimate. It also contains two specific examples showing how a tactical commander can use estimates of the situation.

5-7. The Combat Service Support Commander's Estimate

a. The purpose of this estimate is to determine the best course of action to accomplish a combat service support mission. In preparing the estimate, the commander follows the basic principles and sequence indicated for the tactical commander in paragraph 5-6. Some modification is necessary, however, so that all factors applicable to the combat service support mission may be examined. Because the combat service support commander's estimate is necessarily detailed, it is generally a written report. A large portion is based on data and conclusions contained in the personnel, logistic, and civil-military operations (CMO) estimates prepared by appropriate staff officers of the headquarters concerned.

b. Appendix C contains a sequence for preparing a combat service support commander's estimate.

5-8. Staff Estimates

a. General.

(1) In studying a problem, the staff assists the commander by furnishing information, conclusions, and recommendations. A principal method that staff officers use in providing this assistance is the estimate. The estimate serves two general purposes:

(a) It summarizes the significant aspects of the situation, thereby assisting the commander in selecting a course of action. (The commander uses this summary in paragraphs 2 and 3 of his estimate.)

(b) It evaluates and determines how the means available can best be used to accomplish the mission. (The commander may incorporate this portion, in part, into his estimate; or the staff officer may use it, after the commander announces his decision, to determine his recommendations to accomplish the subsidiary mission over which he has supervision or control.)

(2) In making an estimate, the staff officer consults with other staff officers and with other appropriate agencies to insure that he considers all factors affecting the situation.

(3) A properly prepared staff estimate culminates in definite conclusions and recommendations.

b. Preparation. Staff estimates follow the same logical and orderly process indicated previously in this chapter. The staff officers may present their estimates orally or in writing.

(1) Except for the operation estimate, the subject areas of staff estimates are smaller in scope than the commander's estimate. The operation estimate uses the same format as the commander's estimate and generally has the same content. However, the operation estimate culminates in a recommendation, while the commander's estimate reaches a decision.

(2) Staff officers may prepare estimates on a variety of subject areas. Coordinating staff officers may prepare an estimate covering the entire area of their staff responsibilities, or some subarea or activity included therein. Likewise, special staff officers may prepare an estimate covering all, or a portion of, their responsibilities.

(3) Staff officers prepare the estimates discussed in paragraphs 5-9 through 5-13. Estimates prepared by staff officers in nontactical commands follow the same format within the subject area covered by the estimate.

5-9. Personnel Estimate

a. The personnel estimate is an analysis of the influence of personnel factors on the contemplated courses of action: it may include the impact of the operation, or each course of action, on personnel matters. Appendix C contains a format for use in preparing a personnel estimate and a specific example of a personnel estimate for a tactical command.

b. The personnel officer or special staff officers
with personnel responsibilities also may make estimates to determine the best course of action for accomplishing a specific personnel task. The format for the tactical commander's estimate (app C) provides a sequence that may be used for this type of estimate.

**5-10. Intelligence Estimate**

* a. The intelligence estimate is an analysis of the influence of enemy, or potential enemy, capabilities, exploitable vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action and of the effect of the area of operations on friendly operations. Appendix C contains a format for use in preparing an intelligence estimate and a specific example of an intelligence estimate for a tactical command.

* b. The intelligence officer also may make estimates to determine the best course of action for accomplishing a specific intelligence task. The format for the tactical commander's estimate (app C) provides a sequence that may be used for this type of estimate.

**5-11. Operation Estimate**

* a. The operation estimate is an analysis of all factors affecting reasonable and practical courses of action that will accomplish the mission. It is made to determine a recommended course of action for accomplishing the mission and may include the impact of operations on friendly forces. The format for the tactical commander's estimate in appendix C is used for the operation estimate and retitled "Operation Estimate." Paragraph 5 is retitled "RECOMMENDATIONS" and is used to recommend a specific course of action. The format for the combat service support commander's estimate (app C), with appropriate changes, is used in preparing the combat service support command operation estimate.

* b. The operations officer also may make estimates to determine the best course of action for accomplishing a specific operational task. The format for the tactical commander's estimate (app C) provides a sequence that may be used for this type of estimate.

**5-12. Logistic Estimate**

* a. The logistic estimate is an analysis of the influence of combat service support factors on contemplated courses of action; it may include an analysis of the impact of operations on combat service support. Appendix C contains a format for use in preparing a logistic estimate and a specific example of a logistic estimate for a tactical command.

* b. The logistics officer or special staff officers with logistic responsibilities also may make estimates to determine the best course of action for accomplishing a specific combat service support task. The format for the tactical commander's estimate (app C) provides a sequence that may be used for this type of estimate.


* a. The CMO officer prepares estimates to analyze the influence of CMO factors on contemplated courses of action; they may include an analysis of the impact of operations on CMO. If the estimate covers all facets of CMO, the estimate is titled "CMO Estimate." However, if civil affairs (CA) or psychological operations (PSYOP) are analyzed separately, the estimates are titled "CA Estimate" or "PSYOP Estimate" respectively. Appendix C contains formats for use in preparing these estimates and an example of each type of estimate.

* b. The CMO officer or special staff officers with CMO responsibilities also may make estimates to determine the best course of action for accomplishing a specific CMO task. The format for the tactical commander's estimate (app C) provides a sequence that may be used for this type of estimate.

**Section III. THE STAFF STUDY**

**5-14. General**

* a. A staff study is a formal staff paper containing a concise analysis and recommending a solution to a specific problem or a specific problem area. It is the result of thorough research and provides the commander, or other superiors, a report of the analysis, together with conclusions and recommendations.

* b. The staff study plays the same role in staff operations pertaining to administration that the estimate of the situation does in combat operations. The staff study assists the commander in making a decision when he is dealing with complex or controversial questions. While the staff study is an important vehicle in decisionmaking, it should not be overused.
5–15. Format

a. Staff studies consist of two parts: the summary sheet and supporting annexes. The summary sheet has the following format:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>PROBLEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>ASSUMPTIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>DISCUSSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>CONCLUSION(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>ACTION RECOMMENDED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Annexes include the supporting documents attached to the staff study so that the commander can rapidly obtain more information on some point in the summary sheet. He should find only information pertinent to the study in the annexes. The annexes are an integral part of the complete study and should be clearly labeled and arranged for easy identification. Individual annexes may be withdrawn for other use, so they should be labeled in pencil in the lower left corner “Annex A,” “Annex B,” etc.

d. The general description and contents of the staff study summary sheet are given in figure 5–2. An example of a completed staff study is in figure 5–3.
SUBJECT: The heading is similar to that used for a military letter. The file reference and subject are included as in a military letter. Classification appears at the top and bottom of each page.

1. PROBLEM. Concise statement of the problem in the form of a mission. If the problem is complex, indicate the scope. Subparagraphing may be used.

2. ASSUMPTIONS. Any assumptions necessary for a logical discussion of the problem. Assumptions are used in the absence of factual data to constitute a basis for the study and to broaden or to limit the problem. The assumption, while not a fact, must have a basis or foundation of fact.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM. Paragraph 3 contains statements of undeniable fact having influence on the problem or its solution. Care is exercised to exclude unnecessary facts because they confuse the issue being discussed. Some facts may be uncovered during research, while others are inherent in the directive assigning the problem.

4. DISCUSSION. Paragraph 4 includes the detailed analysis of all the relevant factors, including the advantages and disadvantages of possible solutions to the problem. In this paragraph, the author sets down in a clear and concise manner his analysis of the data secured during his research. In a lengthy or a complicated staff study, this paragraph may be only a summary, with the details included in a discussion annex. The author must exercise the same care in setting down his discussion as he used in analyzing his data to insure that each item is placed in proper perspective.

5. CONCLUSIONS. Paragraph 5 presents the conclusions drawn from the analysis of all relevant factors, all possible solutions to the problem, and all factors that affect these solutions. Conclusions must logically follow from the previous paragraphs. No new material should be introduced in the conclusions.

6. ACTION RECOMMENDED. Paragraph 6 must be in consonance with the conclusions. The staff action must be complete. If it is recommended, for example, that a letter be signed by the commander, the actual letter should be attached to the study as an annex.

ANNEXES (as required)

CONCURRENCES/NONCONCURRENCES: Each officer concerned shows his concurrence/nonconcurrence by his initials, followed by his rank, name, position title, and telephone number. The reasons for any nonconcurrence should be briefly stated here or on a separate page that will become an additional annex to the staff study.

*Signature should include position title and telephone number.

Figure 5-2. Staff study summary sheet format.
CONSIDERATION OF NONCONCURRENCES: The author of the staff study states the results of his consideration of any nonconcurrences. This may be briefly stated here or attached as an additional annex. If his consideration shows that the nonconcurrence cannot be supported, the author states the reasons therefor. The author will sign or initial this consideration of nonconcurrence.

ANNEXES ADDED: (List the annexes, if any, containing nonconcurrences and considerations of nonconcurrences.)

ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY: (Heading not necessary.)
Approved (disapproved), including (excluding) exceptions.

____________________________
Signature
SUBJECT: Recovered US Military Personnel

1. PROBLEM. To determine whether captured US military personnel recovered by 1st Army should be held in the army service area for processing or moved immediately to the communications zone.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.
   a. Approximately 20,000 prisoners per month for the next 4 months will be recovered by 1st Army.
   b. Many recovered prisoners will be in poor physical condition.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.
   a. Adequate transportation is available.
   b. Truck transportation, although available, is not required.
   c. There is no Department of the Army policy governing processing and evacuation of recovered prisoners of war.
   d. During World War II, recovered US military personnel were evacuated as soon as possible to the continental United States for complete processing and rehabilitation.

4. DISCUSSION.
   a. Advantages in immediately moving recovered personnel to the communications zone.
      (1) 1st Army would not have to expend manpower needed for other requirements to process these individuals.
      (2) Housing facilities may be entirely lacking at point of recovery. In any event, better facilities exist in the communications zone.
      (3) Recovered US military personnel in poor physical condition should be hospitalized. 1st army does not have the necessary medical facilities.
      (4) Rapid evacuation will have a beneficial morale effect on the troops and the public.
   b. The above advantages become disadvantages if recovered prisoners are retained in the army area. The only advantage in holding personnel in the army area is to obtain information on the enemy by detailed debriefing. (Concurrently, a disadvantage of immediate evacuation.)
   c. For details, see Annex B (Discussion).

5. CONCLUSION. US military personnel recovered from the enemy should be evacuated to the communications zone with minimum delay.

6. ACTION RECOMMENDED.
   a. That the conclusion in paragraph 5 be approved.
   b. That the attached letter (Annex A) be signed and forwarded to the Commanding General, 1st Army Group.

Figure 5-3. Example of a completed staff study.
ANNEXES:  
A—Letter to CG, 1st Army Group  
B—Discussion (omitted)  

CONCURRENCES:  
GBF  BG Frank, G3, Ext 213  
HLB  BG Bolde, G4, Ext 214  
TMB  BG Black, Surg, Ext 216  
ANW  COL White, AG, Ext 217  

NONCONCURRENCE:  
LJM  BG Meany, G2, Ext 212. Immediate evacuation of recovered US military personnel will prevent early debriefing and could result in loss of timely information concerning the enemy.  

CONSIDERATION OF NONCONCURRENCE: The desirability of obtaining information from recovered US military personnel as quickly as possible is recognized. However, since most of these men will have been confined and removed from the area of actual combat, the information that they may furnish would not affect the immediate tactical situation. Information could be obtained from the men by the use of a debriefing form either while they are being returned to the communications zone or on their arrival there. This information could be sent to G2 for his review.  

WES  

ANNEXES ADDED: None  

ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY: (Entry made after action of approval authority.)
(Classification)

ANNEX A
TO
STAFF STUDY (RECOVERED US MILITARY PERSONNEL)
Letter to CG, 1st Army Gp

(The letter should have no annex identification. This example cover sheet may be used to identify the annexes without the use of defacing marks on the actual letter.)

(Classification)

Figure 5-3—Continued.
SUBJECT: Recovered US Military Personnel

Commanding General
1st Army Group
APO 79315

1. I recommend that US military personnel held prisoner by the enemy and recovered in the course of advance by US forces be moved immediately on recovery to the communications zone, preferably by air.

2. 1st Army information sources indicate that approximately 20,000 prisoners per month will be recovered. Holding such individuals under army control for processing would call for an expenditure of manpower and supplies badly needed for tactical operations. In addition, the physical condition of these recovered prisoners is anticipated to be such that they should be hospitalized on recovery. Such hospitalization is not feasible with the medical personnel and facilities now available in the army area.

3. Immediate evacuation of recovered US military personnel will delay their debriefing. I will minimize this delay, however, by providing the prisoners with suitable debriefing forms for completion and by stationing liaison personnel at communications zone hospitals and convalescent centers.

J. R. DANE
GEN, USA
Commanding
Section IV. SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS IN MAKING AND EXECUTING DECISIONS

5-16. General

This section contains a discussion of the sequence of actions in making and executing decisions. Chapter 6 contains a discussion of plans and planning, and chapter 7 contains a discussion of preparation of orders.

5-17. The Sequence of Actions in Making and Executing Decisions

The sequence of actions in making and executing decisions involves a series of separate actions or steps. Although this discussion applies primarily to the tactical commander and the development of his plans and orders for combat operations, it applies equally to other military operations and to all staff officers in determining recommendations. Figure 5-4 shows the steps that a commander and his staff use in arriving at decisions and executing them. These steps are discussed in a through i below.

a. A higher headquarters normally assigns the mission (step 1), but the commander may develop or deduce the mission. The commander may initiate his mission analysis at this point. Mission analysis is discussed in c below.

b. His staff provides the commander the information available (step 2). Subordinate commanders receive information concerning the mission and the situation as early as practicable in the planning phase and at least by the time staff estimates are being prepared.

c. Based on this information, the commander completes his mission analysis and issues his planning guidance (step 3).

(1) The purpose of mission analysis is to insure that the commander fully understands his mission and to allow him to develop those tasks that are essential to the accomplishment of the mission. The commander performs his mission analysis by identifying the specified and implied tasks contained in his mission.

(a) Specified tasks are those tasks delineated in the mission received from higher headquarters or the missions developed or deduced by the commander.

(b) Implied tasks are those additional tasks that the commander identifies as essential to insure accomplishment of his mission. When identifying implied tasks, the commander should exercise caution not to include tasks that are routine or inherent in his mission.

(c) Besides identifying the specified and implied tasks, the commander may desire to reword one or more of the specified tasks given him by a higher headquarters.

(2) This mission analysis results in the commander's guidance to his staff members for use in preparing or revising their estimates. The amount of planning guidance varies with each mission, the volume and validity of information available, the situation, and the experience of the commander and the staff. Planning guidance is not limited to one specific step in the sequence of actions. However, initial guidance should precede the preparation of staff estimates.

(a) The commander normally includes in his initial guidance his restated mission as determined by his mission analysis; his general plan for using nuclear and chemical weapons, if appropriate; his considerations for the possible use of tactical cover and deception and any other factors that he considers important at this time; and any courses of action that he wishes developed.

(b) Unless higher headquarters has directed a specific course of action, he does not select the course of action at this time because to do so would prevent objective and unbiased staff estimates.

d. The commander's restated mission becomes paragraph 1 of all staff estimates. Based on the restated mission and planning guidance received, the coordinating staff officers prepare their staff estimates (step 4), assisted by special staff officers, who may also prepare their own estimates, if required. The coordinating staff officers present their estimates to the commander, which results in recommendations on the actions that the commander should take to accomplish his mission.

e. In step 5, the commander considers the recommendations of his staff, completes his own estimate, and announces his decision.

f. Following the decision statement (the last step of the commander's estimate), the commander may provide the staff with his overall concept of how the operation will be conducted (commander's concept), which is an amplification of his decision and explains any aspects he considers necessary.
g. A careful analysis, based on a complete understanding of the decision and the commander's concept of the operation, leads to a determination by all staff members of the actions required by the command to carry the operation to successful completion and to preparation of plans or orders (step 6).

h. The staff normally submits plans and orders to the commander for approval (step 7) before they are published as plans or orders (step 8). (Step 7 may be omitted if the urgency of the situation so warrants and if the commander has delegated such authority.)

i. Command and staff supervision of the execution of orders (step 9) is a continuing action, based on the commander's decision and his concept of the operation.

j. A summary chart of the actions described in a through i above is shown in figure 5–5 as sequence of commander and staff actions.
CHAPTER 6
PLANS AND PLANNING
(STANAG 2014 and 2031)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

6–1. General

a. Planning and preparation of plans are integral parts of the sequence of actions in making and executing a decision (chap 5). The time required to make a decision and complete the sequence of actions is less when plans based on anticipated commitments are readily available. This reduction in time depends on the accuracy of the forecast of probable commitment and the accuracy of the assumptions used in planning. If the prepared plans are accurate, the commander may merely order execution of one of them; thus, steps 3 through 7 of the sequence of actions in making and executing decisions (para 5–17) are accomplished with minimum time loss.

b. This chapter contains a discussion of the steps of the planning sequence as separate and distinct operations rather than as part of the sequence of actions in making and executing decisions included in chapter 5. However, these two sequences are closely related. Once a planning mission has been received (or assumed), the remaining steps of the planning sequence parallel those of the sequence of actions in making and executing decisions.

6–2. Necessity for Planning
Adequate and practical planning is essential to the success of any military undertaking. Proper planning permits the detailed and systematic examination of all factors involved in a projected operation. The larger the unit, the greater the need to anticipate and plan for longer range future operations.

6–3. The Staff in Planning

a. The staff continuously plans for future operations.

b. The extent of this planning varies with the level of command. At higher levels, staffs normally prepare plans for operations from one to several months ahead. At lower levels, the staffs are primarily concerned with alternate planning, counterattack planning, and short-range planning for continuation of a current mission.

c. In planning, each staff member considers those features of the projected operation that are peculiar to his functional areas of interest. He investigates the effects of these features on the plans of other staff sections and on unit operations. Normally, he prepares the plans pertaining to those areas that are his staff responsibility.

6–4. Planning Sequence

a. Planning is one of the continuous actions (functions) recognized in Army management doctrine (AR 1–24). The planning sequence is a series of steps representing a logical progression of command and staff actions required to develop plans. It parallels the first seven steps of the sequence of actions in making and executing decisions (para 5–17). However, some changes are necessary because the two sequences have different purposes. While the sequence of actions in making and executing decisions prepares for a single eventuality, the planning sequence attempts to prepare for all developments that can reasonably be anticipated. The planning sequence is shown in figure 6–1 and is discussed in the subparagraphs below.

(1) **Forecasting** is the first step in the planning sequence. The commander and his staff analyze and evaluate facts and trends to determine probable commitments and to predict future developments.
PREPARATION (Planning for) OPERATION

- Forecast to determine probable commitments
- Examine probable commitments and establish priority of further preparation
- Study implications of commitments to determine assumed mission
- Analyze mission to determine tasks
- Determine guidance
- Prepare planning studies
- Select course(s) of action
- Prepare complete plans
- Conduct rehearsals

Figure 6-1. Planning sequence.

(a) Higher headquarters may use command forecasts to begin the planning sequence. Subordinate commanders also may use these forecasts to begin their preparations concurrently, which permits them to complete their own studies and estimates. When planning and preparation begin early, the overall command reaction time is reduced. As actions are projected farther into the future, fewer facts are available, more assumptions must be made, and the probability of forecasted commitments occurring exactly as predicted diminishes rapidly.

(b) Assumptions are an essential part of forecasting and are used in all stages of the planning sequence. In the absence of facts, assumptions state conditions that must exist if a specific plan is to be put into effect. Different assumptions are used to develop alternate plans for various probable commitments. A subordinate planner treats a higher commander’s assumptions as facts bearing on the problem. When additional information becomes available, forecasts are changed to agree with the facts. These changes necessitate corresponding changes in plans being developed, or revisions to those already completed. All staff sections must be informed promptly of any changes so that planning and preparation will be coordinated throughout the command.

(2) Examining probable commitments and establishing priority of further preparation is the second step in the planning sequence. This involves an analysis of forecasted commitments and assumptions to determine the probability and the likely priority of their occurring so that priorities can be established for further planning and preparation. At this stage, a planning program begins to emerge (para 6-7).

(3) Studying the implications and the inter-relationship of the probable commitments to determine an assumed mission, or missions, is the third step in the planning sequence. As each mission becomes more apparent, the planning sequence and the sequence of actions in making and executing decisions become closely allied (i.e., the purpose of the latter is accomplishment of a single mission; whereas, the purpose of the former is preparation of the command for all reasonable eventualities).

(4) Analyzing the mission to determine the specific tasks to be performed, their complexity, and their relative importance is the fourth step in the planning sequence. At this point, the planning tasks and the phasing of planning tasks begin to emerge (para 6-7).

(5) Determining guidance for each specific mission’s tasks is the fifth step in the planning sequence. This planning guidance keeps all planners moving in the same direction at the same time. It facilitates concurrent planning by providing the foundation for studies and estimates needed to develop outline plans. The main sources of this guidance include—

(a) Oral planning guidance on specific tactics, key factors from the analysis of assigned or assumed missions, courses of action, forecasts, or procedures directed by the commander.

(b) Policy statements by the commander.

(c) Directives and orders from higher headquarters, including the mission, means avail-
able, limiting considerations, and special instructions.

(d) *Standing operating procedures (SOP).*

(6) *Preparing planning studies* is the sixth step in the planning sequence. Planning studies (or operational studies) determine the key factors in an undertaking and explore these factors in detail. Types of planning studies most frequently used in this step are estimates and staff studies (chap 5). These estimates and studies, started as a result of general planning and carried forward continuously, can be adapted quickly to specific situations. These planning studies are essential in determining the initial feasibility of various courses of action.

(7) *Selecting courses of action* is the seventh step in the planning sequence. This is done by preparing an outline plan (para 6–14) for each course of action that is retained. These outline plans are based on previously completed planning studies. Because preparation for all reasonable contingencies is the aim of the planning sequence, consideration of courses of action involves more than simply eliminating all but one course of action. Several courses of action may be retained to give reasonable assurance that the command is prepared for all likely contingencies. Additional courses of action also may be retained to use as alternate plans. These are normally attached as annexes to the basic plan.

(8) *Preparing complete plans* is the eighth step in the planning sequence. A complete plan is prepared for each course of action that is retained. The outline plan provides a framework within which all details necessary to build a complete plan may be added. These details come from original estimates, studies, and analyses of the problem or from new studies developed as the planning progresses.

(9) *Conducting rehearsals* is the ninth and last step in the planning sequence. This step may or may not be taken, depending on the command level and the time and facilities available.

b. A plan developed in the planning sequence described above is not necessarily implemented on completion. As new information becomes available or as events occur, the plan is reviewed and updated accordingly. This action continues until the plan is implemented or until no requirement exists for the plan.

6–5. *Organization for Planning*

There are four fundamental methods of organizing the staff for planning.

a. *Use the Existing Organization Without Change.* This method is applicable for normal operation of the unit and is generally preferable to the other methods discussed below. Each staff member contributes to the overall plan, but remains in his normal assignment and location. Planners coordinate with staff officers in other sections or levels of command by exchanging visits and correspondence.

b. *Create a Permanent Planning Section or Subsection.* In this method, a specially created agency does all the long-range planning for the organization. This leaves other agencies free to concentrate their efforts on short-range plans and current operations. This method is useful when current operations are intense and permit operations personnel little time for planning. It is also useful when current and future operations are not closely connected. Additional personnel are usually necessary to staff these planning sections and subsections. Extra facilities may also be necessary to permit complete separation of the planning and operational staffs.

c. *Use a Temporary Planning Committee.* This method, which is referred to as the ad hoc committee method, often is used to resolve a specific problem or to devise a specific plan of action. Since staffing of ad hoc committees diverts personnel from their normal duties, these committees should be used only to the extent necessary to relieve a staff from overextension of its capabilities or when a special planning action is required.

d. *Use a Combination of the Above Methods.* An example is the assembly of a planning section to work on planning tasks of common interest. When the tasks are completed, the planners return to their own sections to prepare their assigned portions of the overall plan, using the existing organization.

6–6. *Planning Method*

Many methods may be used to determine what actions, units, sequences, and procedures must be developed to accomplish an assigned mission. One way is to begin with the objective and the time it is to be attained and work backwards. This technique develops the units, organization, combat service support, and other essentials needed to
gain the objective. The relative time sequence and organizational placement will emerge from this technique. As the visualization continues, the need for specific tasks, conditions, or assumptions and their relative placement become apparent. Another method is to begin with the current position and plan through each intermediate step to the final objective.

6-7. Planning Program

a. General. A planning program is a schedule for performing a series of planning tasks in a particular order. It is a valuable aid in coordinating the detailed investigation of all matters essential to the planning process.

b. Planning Tasks. An analysis of the work to be performed during planning establishes the specific planning tasks that must be completed and the sequence for their completion. A checklist, based on this analysis, should be developed early in the planning sequence to facilitate the solution of problems in logical progression. This checklist simplifies periodic progress reviews and coordination; and when material is completed, it can be sent to lower levels of command for use in their planning.

c. Phasing of Planning Tasks. Phasing of planning tasks insures the completion of specific tasks in logical sequence. Phasing facilitates coordination of concurrent planning by different headquarters. The tasks should be analyzed before they are phased. When phases are established, they should allow sufficient time for each level of command to complete its assigned tasks and should provide for timely distribution of information to subordinate units. However, some overlapping of phasing is inevitable because planning proceeds concurrently. Frequently, a task in one phase of the planning sequence begins before some tasks in a preceding phase are completed. For instance, a more or less complete, detailed plan may be prepared in the preliminary phase before the formal directive has been received. Generally, phasing of planning is as indicated in the subparagraphs below.

(1) Preliminary phase. This phase is based on logical assumptions concerning future operations or on knowledge of the tentative plans of higher headquarters that is available before receipt of the formal directive.

(2) Initial phase. After the directive is received, plans are initiated, based on limited information and planning guidance. This phase includes preparation of staff and commander's tentative estimates and tentative plans.

(3) Preparation phase. Draft plans are prepared, based on more complete information, firm planning guidance, and detailed estimates resulting in the commander's decision and his concept of the operation.

(4) Approval phase. The commander reviews, refines, and approves the plan.

(5) Publication phase. The approved plan is published.

(6) Execution phase. The publishing headquarters provides assistance to the lower levels in completing their plans and in conducting rehearsals.

6-8. Time Element in Planning

The time required to plan and initiate an operation varies with the size of the unit. At battalion level, an operation may be planned and initiated within a few hours. In this case, the plan may result from a brief estimate of the situation and a decision that are applicable to the immediate future. At field army level, several months may be required to plan and initiate a major operation. The amount of detail considered in the preparation of the plan will vary, depending on the size and the type of command, the experience of the troops, the complexity of the operations, the factors of combined or joint participation, and the time available for planning. Measures to reduce planning time are as indicated in the subparagraphs below.

a. Standing Operating Procedures. SOP promote understanding and teamwork among commander, staff, and troops.

b. Preplanned Action. Any established plan in tactics or procedures for combat service support that can be rehearsed and refined beforehand saves planning time. Task organization; alternate tactical plans; and other supporting plans, such as rear area protection plans, also contribute to the saving of time.

c. Concurrent Planning. Concurrent planning by different levels of command and different staff sections conserves time and promotes the early detection and solution of problems. However, this does not relieve higher levels of the responsibility to provide information and instructions to subordinate units as early as possible. At successive levels, planning includes those details required for that particular level. Coordination between
higher and subordinate levels, through conferences and visits during the planning, helps pinpoint problems and their solutions. The extent to which planning can be concurrent depends on many factors, to include time and distance between the levels of command involved and security considerations. Because each subordinate unit involved in the operation performs its own planning, based on that of the next higher level, allocation of adequate time for subordinate unit planning is a consideration at each command level; failure to provide this time can create confusion at the lower levels and negate the planning efforts of the higher headquarters.

During planning for future operations, security is an important consideration. To retain initiative and surprise in the forthcoming operation, it is necessary to deny the enemy knowledge of the location, the time of the operation, and the means to be employed. Measures are instituted to control the area in which the planning is taking place, the personnel engaged in the planning, and the documents pertaining to the projected operation. Special measures are established for handling classified material concerning the operation. These measures include establishment of a restricted list of personnel who have access to elements of the plan; special passes and other identification means for those visiting between headquarters and between staff sections in a large headquarters; and separate offices of record for the recording, distribution, and transmittal of documents. An adjunct to security during planning is early inclusion of a cover plan for the planning and for the operation itself.

6—10. Coordination of Planning
Coordination insures that the elements of planned action fit together. In military application, coordination includes establishment of phases in planned operations as points at which actions and positions of forces must fit. Planning is coordinated through staff conferences, conferences of representatives of interested headquarters, and liaison visits between the units and agencies concerned.

6—11. Planning by Supporting Units
Supporting units have a special consideration that adds to the complexity of their planning. Whereas all elements must consider the physical environment, the enemy, and their higher headquarters, supporting elements must also base their planning on the plan of the supported command. This consideration is more than the simple addition of a single variable to the conditions facing a supporting unit. The various probable courses of action that the supported unit may take, both during planning and execution, have great impact on the planning of a supporting agency and demand flexibility in execution. Careful consideration of the special problems facing supporting units by all staff officers will assist supporting elements in planning to give rapid response to the supported units.

Section III. PLANS

6—12. General
A plan is a method or a scheme for a military action. It is a proposal to carry out a command decision or project. As part of the planning process, it represents the command's preparation in a specific area to meet a particular event. A plan may be written or oral. Although plans are based on specific conditions or assumptions, they are not static. By continuing estimates, analyses, and studies within the overall planning process, plans are changed, refined, and kept current.

6—13. Characteristics of a Plan
The essential element of a plan is that it offers a definite course of action and a method for execution. A good plan—
tion, personnel, materiel, and arrangements for the full period of the contemplated operation.

f. Provides for decentralization. It delegates authority to the maximum extent consistent with the necessary control.

g. Provides for direct contact, permitting coordination during execution between coequals and counterparts at all levels.

h. Is simple. It reduces all essential elements to their simplest form and eliminates those elements not essential to successful action. A good plan also eliminates all possibilities for misunderstanding.

i. Is flexible. It leaves room for adjustments because of operating conditions and, where necessary, stipulates alternate courses of action.

j. Provides for control. Adequate means exist, or have been provided, to carry out the plan in accordance with the commander's intent.

k. Is coordinated. All elements fit together, control measures are complete and understandable, and mutual support requirements are identified and provided for.

6-14. Outline Plan

The outline plan is a preliminary plan that outlines the salient features or principles of a course of action before the initiation of detailed planning. Commanders or staffs frequently use the outline plan to test the feasibility of an operation; to provide information to higher headquarters; to seek approval and allocation of means, when necessary; to obtain opinions and recommendations of subordinate commanders; to assist a commander in arriving at a decision; and to initiate and facilitate planning at lower levels. The word “outline” is used to indicate the degree of completeness rather than the level of command to which it applies. Although higher levels generally prepare outline plans, these plans may be useful to any commander.

6-15. Application of Plans

For different situations, a variety of modifiers are placed before the word “plan.” Some modifiers are “strategic,” “campaign,” “operation,” “administrative,” “supporting,” and “alternate.” These modifiers do not differentiate various types of plans, but merely signify the many purposes for which plans are generated. Regardless of the modifier applied, all plans are the expression of the planning process that is necessary in preparing for future action. A plan develops a course of action to accomplish a specific mission. Several of the different types of plans are included in a through e below.

a. Strategic Plan. This plan provides for the overall conduct of a war.

b. Campaign Plan. This plan provides for a series of related military operations to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space. With increasing ranges of weapons and wide dispersion of units in modern war, joint commands often make use of the campaign plan. JCS Pub 2 contains the form for a campaign plan prepared by a joint headquarters.

c. Operation Plan. This is a plan for a military operation (normally part of a military campaign). It covers a single operation or a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It implements operations derived from the campaign plan. An example of an operation plan is in appendix E. When the time and/or the conditions under which the plan is to be placed in effect occur, the plan becomes an operation order. The format is readily adaptable to produce various types of annexes to combat plans or orders.

d. Administrative/Logistics Plan. This plan applies to combat service support operations. It is based on the command's operational requirements, as determined by appropriate estimates. When put into effect, it is the administrative/logistics order. An example of an administrative/logistics plan is in appendix E.

e. Other Plans. A supporting plan complements another plan. An alternate plan provides for the accomplishment of a mission in a different manner. A contingency plan provides for major contingencies that can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of the command. Examples of other plans are in appendix E.

6-16. Format and Techniques in Preparing Plans

Appendixes D and E contain discussions of the format and techniques in preparing plans.

6-17. Annexes to Plans

The discussion of annexes contained in paragraphs 7-8 through 7-10 is applicable to annexes to plans. Examples of annexes to plans are in appendix E.
CHAPTER 7
ORDERS (STANAG 2014)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

7-1. General
The words "order," "directive," "instruction," and "command" are synonymous for all practical purposes. All are written or oral communications that convey information governing action. The word "command" implies less choice to the recipient in the manner of execution than do the other forms of orders. The word "directive" is used most often to describe a communication indicating broad aims, policies, or strategic plans promulgated by theater or higher commanders. The term "letter of instructions" is applied most frequently to documents prescribing guidance for operations of a large command and control thereof (e.g., a field army) over a long period. Appendix F contains historical examples of a directive and a letter of instructions.

7-2. Orders
Orders are of two general classes—combat and routine.

a. Combat orders pertain to strategic or tactical operations and their attendant combat service support. A combat order may be issued initially as a plan to become an order at some future time, either specified or as stated contingencies arise. Besides directives and letters of instructions, other combat orders are—

(1) Operation orders, which provide for coordinated action to carry out the decision of a commander in the conduct of an operation. The term "operation order" is general and includes both operation orders for the conduct of tactical operations and movement orders. Combat service support commanders also use operation orders to task their own units.

(2) Administrative/logistics orders, which provide for coordinated combat service support for the command.

(3) Standing operating procedures (SOP), which prescribe routine methods to be followed in operations.

(4) Warning orders, which give preliminary notice of actions or orders that are to follow. These are usually brief oral or written messages.

(5) Fragmentary orders, which give extracts from more detailed orders or which change previous orders. Like warning orders, these are usually brief oral or written messages.

b. Routine orders cover normal administrative operations in garrison or field service and include general, special, and letter orders; court-martial orders; bulletins; circulars; and memorandums. For details, see AR 310-1 and AR 310-10.


Section II. COMBAT ORDERS

7-3. General
A combat order is characterized by—

a. Clarity. Each command or agency that uses a combat order must understand it thoroughly. Use of highly technical language can cause misinterpretation. Use of accepted military terminology and phraseology conveys identical meanings to all using agencies.

b. Completeness. The order contains all the information and instructions necessary to coordinate and execute the operation. However, the order prescribes only those details or methods of execution necessary to insure that the actions of the subordinate units concerned conform to the plan of operations for the entire force.

c. Brevity. Superfluous words and unnecessary detail are avoided. However, clarity and com-
pleteness are not sacrificed in the interest of brevity.

d. Recognition of Subordinate Commanders' Prerogatives. The order should not infringe on the initiative of subordinate commanders by prescribing details of execution that lie within their provinces. Only under overriding circumstances, such as an operation requiring extremely close cooperation and timing, should a subordinate commander be told precisely how to perform an assigned task.

e. Use of the Affirmative Form. In the interest of simplicity and clarity, the affirmative form of expression is used throughout all combat orders. Such wording as "The trains will not accompany the brigade (battalion)" is defective for two reasons: first, the intent of the order depends on the word "not"; second, actual disposition of the trains is not indicated. The proper form is "Trains remain in the assembly area."

f. Avoidance of Qualified Directives. Such expressions as "attack vigorously" are not only meaningless and extraneous, but weaken the force of subsequent directives in which the qualifying adverb does not appear. Such expressions as "try to hold" and "as far as possible" lessen responsibility. Use of such terms as "main attack" and "coordinated attack" are adequate and clear and do not require further qualification. The term "supporting attack" is unnecessary when a main attack has been designated.

g. Authoritative Expression. The order reflects the commander's intention and will. Indecisive, vague, and ambiguous language indicates vacillation and indecision and leads to uncertainty and lack of confidence on the part of subordinates. The commander tells his subordinates in direct and unmistakable terms exactly what he wants them to do.

h. Timeliness. Timely distribution of orders allows subordinate commanders sufficient time for adequate planning and preparation. Concurrent planning saves time.

7–4. Operation Order

a. General. The purpose of an operation order is to give subordinate commanders the essential elements to carry out an operation. These elements are the situation, the mission, the assignment of tasks to formations/units, and the support and assistance to be provided. When an operation is to be conducted immediately, the complete order, or a series of fragmentary orders, is prepared based on the commander's announced decision and concept, if given. When an operation is to be conducted at some future time, the operation order may be an operation plan that will be executed on order by appropriate implementing instructions; for example, "Execute OPLAN 16 as OPORD 8; D-day H-hour is 151700 July 197-___."

b. Content. An operation order should include only that detail which is necessary for commanders of subordinate formations/units to issue their own orders and to insure coordination. The detail of how supporting and specialist units are to carry out their tasks should be issued in their own orders, which will use the same format as an operation order unless otherwise specified.

c. Preparation.

(1) Staff activity in the preparation of the operation order. The assistant chief of staff (ACofS), G3, operations (ACofS, security, plans, and operations, in the theater army support command (TASCOM) and the field army support command (FASCOM), has primary coordinating staff responsibility for preparation, publication, and distribution of the operation order of a command. Other staff officers assist by providing those portions of the order pertaining to their staff responsibilities. This contribution varies from a single sentence to a complete annex, depending on the requirement and the staff officer concerned. Appendix B contains a discussion of coordinating staff officer activities in the preparation and issuance of an operation order.

(2) Format. Operation orders have a prescribed format. They may be written, oral, or graphical (traces, overlays), or a combination of these formats. Formats and examples are in appendix F. A fragmentary operation order has no prescribed format. Those elements found in a complete order are omitted when they have not changed, are not essential, or are unavailable or incomplete at the time of issue.

(3) Techniques. Techniques used in the preparation of operation orders are in appendix D.

7–5. Administrative/Logistics Order

a. General.

(1) The purpose of an administrative/logistics (admin/log) order is to give the commander's plan for administrative and logistic support of operations. It is used to pro-
vide information to the supported elements, and it serves as a basis for the orders of supporting commanders to their units. At higher levels of command, it will generally replace the service support annex and be referred to in paragraph 4, "SERVICE SUPPORT," of the operation order. At lower levels of command, the need for an admin/log order may well disappear; or it may become inappropriate, as either paragraph 4, "SERVICE SUPPORT," or the service support annex will be adequate. Admin/log orders are usually written but may include traces, overlays, and other annexes.

(2) A new order is issued when a complete change in the combat service support situation or in the tactical situation occurs or when many changes make the current order ineffective. A complete admin/log order is also prepared as a matter of historical record. During a continuing situation, necessary changes to the current order are by the issuance of fragmentary orders or by the inclusion of changes in the operation order. An admin/log order is issued separately when the combat service support situation is expected to apply to more than one operation plan or order.

(3) Admin/log orders are most frequently issued by commanders having major combat service support responsibilities. However, these orders may be issued by other commanders, depending on the type of unit and its mission, the complexity of the combat service support situation, and the SOP.

b. Preparation.

(1) Staff activity in the preparation of the admin/log order. The ACofS, G4, logistics (ACofS, security, plans, and operations, in the TASCOM and the FASCOM), has primary coordinating staff responsibility for preparation, publication, and distribution of the admin/log order of a command. Other staff officers, both coordinating and special, assist by providing those portions of the order pertaining to their staff responsibilities. This contribution varies from a single sentence to a complex annex, depending on the requirement and the staff officer concerned. Appendix B contains a discussion of coordinating staff officer activities in the preparation and issuance of the admin/log order.

(2) Format. The format for an admin/log order is given in appendix F. A fragmentary admin/log order has no prescribed format. Those elements found in a complete order are omitted when they have not changed, are not essential, or are unavailable or incomplete at the time of issue.

(3) Techniques. Techniques used in the preparation of admin/log orders are in appendix D.

7–6. Standard Operating Procedures

a. General. The purpose of SOP's is to enumerate those procedures which are unique to the organization and which are habitually used for accomplishing routine or recurring actions or matters. They—

(1) Reduce the number, length, and frequency of other types of orders.

(2) Simplify the preparation and transmission of other orders.

(3) Simplify the training of troops.

(4) Promote understanding and teamwork between the commander, staff, and troops.

(5) Advise new arrivals or newly attached units of procedures followed in the organization.

(6) Facilitate and expedite operations.

(7) Reduce confusion and errors.

b. Scope.

(1) Each command develops an SOP based on applicable portions of published procedures of higher headquarters, the desires of the commander, and the habitual procedures that have been developed through experience.

(2) The SOP of a command includes a definite statement that subordinate unit SOP's will be based on, and conform to, that of the issuing command.

(3) The SOP is changed, as necessary, to meet various conditions or existing practices. The SOP is sufficiently complete to advise new arrivals or newly attached units of the procedures followed in the command. The amount of detail depends on the size of the unit and its state of training. Technical instructions pertaining to a limited number of specialists should not be included in the SOP, but should be issued as separate instructions or orders, including specific SOP's, as appropriate.

(4) The SOP is not to be used to consolidate actions and procedures prescribed in other publications and documents that are available to the subordinate unit.

c. Preparation, Publication, and Distribution.

(1) Preparation, publication, and distribu-
tion of the command SOP are the responsibilities of the operations officer. Other staff officers prepare appropriate portions of the SOP in the same manner as discussed for the operation order and the admin/log order (para 7-4c and 7-5b respectively).

(2) The SOP is published in the form most effective for the command.

7—7. Warning Orders and Fragmentary Orders

Warning orders and fragmentary orders are appropriate at all levels of command whenever their use can save time or effort.

a. Warning orders give subordinate units advance notice of a contemplated action so that they may have time to make the necessary preparations. Either a coordinating or a special staff officer may issue a warning order after completion of appropriate staff coordination.

b. Fragmentary orders provide pertinent extracts from more detailed orders. They provide instructions, as they are developed, when the complete order is not yet developed; provide specific instructions to commanders who do not require the complete order; or, more usually, provide timely changes to existing orders. Fragmentary orders are prepared and issued by either coordinating or special staff officers on command approval. Examples of a warning order and a fragmentary order are in appendix F.

Section III. ANNEXES TO ORDERS

7—8. General

a. The purpose of an annex is to provide detail not readily incorporated into the basic order. The annex is used to keep the basic text of an order short. It also allows selective distribution of certain information, e.g., movement tables.

b. An annex is an integral part of an order. The number or type of annexes used is governed by the needs of the particular order. Annexes, when used, increase the clarity and usefulness of the order.

c. Annexes provide information and direction to combat troops and to supporting, specialist, or service unit commanders. An annex to an order should not be an order from supporting, specialist, or service unit commanders to their troops, unless it is an annex to their own order. Some of the information and direction given in the body of the order may be repeated, as necessary, in the annex. The number of annexes to an order will be limited by the needs of the particular order.

d. Annexes include—

(1) Details that amplify the basic order, e.g., operation overlay, intelligence instructions.

(2) Combat support instructions, e.g., fire support, engineer.

(3) Administrative details, e.g., administrative overlay, traffic circulation and control instructions.

(4) Information or instructions on related operations, e.g., civil affairs, area damage control, psychological operations, rear area security.

(5) Any other information or directions required to amplify the order.

e. The use of annexes does not preclude including in the body of the order all information essential to the effective employment of all command elements. Staff officers and subordinate commanders should not have to read an entire annex to determine the basic organization and employment of a single arm or service.

7—9. Distribution

Annexes are issued to units or agencies whose actions are affected by information or instructions contained therein. Annexes may be issued simultaneously with the order or as a separate distribution. (Paragraph 7—10 below indicates the difference in format when annexes are issued separately.) Unless there is good reason to the contrary, each copy of an order is issued complete with all its annexes.

7—10. Format

a. As a general rule, manuscript annexes will follow the five-paragraph format prescribed for the operation order (fig F—1) to insure that no significant instructions are omitted. Standardization agreements prescribe that this format be used for the fire support, engineer, communications-electronics, and road movement annexes. Directed exceptions to this format rule are the service support annex, which follows the admin/log order format (fig F—2), and the intelligence annex (example F—15). Both of the latter are
subject to individual standardization agreement formats.

(1) The intelligence annex has a more rigid format than other annexes. It may be issued before distribution of the operation order. The purpose of the intelligence annex is—

(a) To disseminate intelligence essential to the conduct of the operation.

(b) To announce the commander's essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements.

(c) To assign information collection responsibilities to subordinate and attached commanders.

(d) To request information needed from higher and adjacent headquarters.

(2) General instructions for the preparation of the intelligence annex are the same as those for the operation order (para 7-2). The following factors are further guidance to preparation:

(a) The annex must be kept as brief as is consistent with clarity.

(b) Matters adequately covered in unit or command SOP's should not be repeated.

(c) Reference may be made to appropriate intelligence reports, provided addressees have the reports.

(d) Material of limited interest or that involves considerable detail may be included in appendixes to the annex. The most likely appendixes are enemy situation map or overlays; surveillance, reconnaissance, and observation missions; and map distribution table.

b. An annex may be written, or it may take the form of a trace, overlay, overprinted map, sketch, plan, or table. It may be used to give the detail of any part of the order, where appropriate. Annexes are lettered alphabetically in capitals (A, B, C, etc.) and may have one or more appendixes that are numbered in Arabic numerals.

c. If an annex is to have wider distribution than the basic order or is to be issued separately from the basic order, it must have suitable identification with respect to the basic order and bear, as does the order, a heading and all final entries (acknowledgment instructions; signature of the commander or authorized representative; appendixes; distribution; and authentication, if required). When an annex is issued as an integral part of the basic order and is on the same distribution as the basic order, it need only be suitably identified with respect to the order.

d. Examples of annexes are in appendix F. Techniques for preparation of annexes are in appendix D.
CHAPTER 8
HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS FACILITIES

Section I. ORGANIZATION

8-1. General

a. In the field, headquarters of divisions and larger units normally operate in two echelons. This permits greater dispersion of personnel and equipment and provides alternate control facilities. These echelons are not separate levels of command but components of the same headquarters.

b. The commander determines the location, composition, and organization of each echelon based on his needs to accomplish the mission.

8-2. Headquarters Echelonment

a. Major Tactical Headquarters of the Field Army. Field army, corps, and division headquarters frequently are organized in two echelons— the forward and the rear. In addition, the commander may choose to operate a tactical command post (CP) as an extension of the main CP.

(1) Forward echelon.

(a) The forward echelon, or main CP, consists of the commander and other headquarters personnel required to assist in the control of operations. The main CP is known as "main headquarters," "command post," "CP," or "division (corps or army) main." All coordinating staff officers and the special staff officers concerned with combat and combat support operations function from the main CP.

(b) The main CP must be capable of rapid and frequent movement. It may move as an entity or by echelonment to permit continuous operation.

(c) The assistant chief of staff (ACofS), G3, operations, recommends the general location of the main CP after coordinating security considerations with the ACofS, G2, intelligence, and communications with the communications-electronics (C-E) officer. The specific location is determined by the ACofS, G1, personnel, assisted by the headquarters commandant and the C-E officer. The chief of staff approves the location and the time and method of moving the main CP.

(d) The ACofS, G3, notifies all interested headquarters of the new location of the CP and the times that the main CP will close at the old location and open at the new location.

(2) Rear echelon.

(a) The rear echelon, or rear CP, generally consists of those staff agencies and other headquarters personnel engaged in combat service support activities not related directly to the control of combat or combat support operations. The rear CP is known as "rear headquarters," "rear command post," or "division (corps or army) rear." It is normally in the rear area of the command's area of operations.

(b) The ACofS, G1, recommends the general location of the rear CP. He coordinates with the ACofS, G2, on security, the ACofS, G3, on area allocation and rear area security, the C-E officer on communications, and the ACofS, G4, logistics, on area damage control. The headquarters commandant determines the specific location except at division level, where the officer in charge of the rear CP (normally the adjutant general) determines the location. The chief of staff approves the location and the time and the method of moving the rear CP.

(c) The ACofS, G3, notifies all interested headquarters of the new location of the CP and the times that the rear CP will close at the old location and open at the new location.

(3) Tactical CP. A commander may establish a third headquarters when he needs a command facility and selective staff assistance at a location closer to his major subordinate elements than that of his main CP. This groupment is drawn from the main CP and is not considered a separate echelon in the command and control system. This headquarters is commonly referred to as "tactical command post," "tac CP," or "division (corps or army) tac." It consists of a small
selected staff party, together with communications operating personnel and a security force, that operates away from the main CP. It is not capable of sustained operations. The composition, location, and time of movement of the tactical CP are normally personal decisions of the commander.

b. Army Group. The army group headquarters is normally echeloned, with a relatively small rear echelon dealing with matters primarily concerning the support of the army group headquarters proper. Whether the army group commander employs a tactical CP depends on the immediacy of tactical decision requirements and the adequacy of the communications system.

c. Other Commands. The headquarters of the theater army, the theater army support command (TASCOM), and the field army support command (FASCOM) are not echeloned unless special conditions, such as a nuclear environment, make echelonment advisable to reduce identification and vulnerability.

8–3. Headquarters Organization

a. The organization of the headquarters is functional to permit maximum efficiency. This functional grouping reduces congestion and facilitates the exchange of information and coordination between interrelated staff activities.

b. The ACofS, G1, has primary coordinating staff responsibility for the arrangement of the headquarters. He coordinates with other staff officers and submits recommendations to the chief of staff for approval.

8–4. Alternate Command Posts

a. An alternate CP enhances continuity of command by improving survivability. It may also provide for continuity during displacement of the main CP.

b. A separate facility may be established, when appropriately augmented, or a subordinate headquarters may be designated to serve as the alternate CP.

(1) When a separate facility is established, it may be in an isolated area, manned by personnel from the main CP, or at a subordinate headquarters. In either case, the alternate CP should have sufficient staff personnel and communications, housekeeping, and security personnel and equipment to permit essential monitoring of the situation. This continuing readiness enables the commander to exercise control through the alternate CP or to pass control to a designated individual at the alternate CP during displacement of, or in case of serious damage to, the main CP.

(2) When personnel or equipment limitations preclude establishing a separate facility, a subordinate headquarters may be designated the alternate CP. This headquarters may be supplemented with personnel and equipment, or it may be required to assume the responsibility using its own resources.

c. An alternate CP for a field army or lower tactical command is primarily an alternate for the main CP. Therefore, its organization and functions are oriented on the tactical situation.

d. The alternate CP for commands that normally do not divide the headquarters is the alternate for the entire headquarters. Therefore, its organization and functions will depend on the mission of the command.

Section II. OPERATIONS FACILITIES

8–5. General

a. The operations facility of the headquarters is the focal point of the commander’s means of exercising command and control. It is the principal location where the commander receives information, intelligence, and recommendations.

b. Rapid coordination between staff elements is necessary to expedite and carry out staff actions and command decisions. The commander organizes his staff to facilitate speed of action and coordination; at times, the staff members may organize informally when normal headquarters arrangements are not conducive to close coordination. In any case, this facility is not organized under tables of organization and equipment and does not constitute a separate echelon of the headquarters or level of command.

c. Combat and combat support operations require close and rapid coordination. Division, corps, and field army commanders frequently organize tactical operations centers (TOC) to achieve this coordination. Commanders of tactical levels below division also may use the TOC organization, but normally they use a less formal arrangement.
8-6. **Tactical Operations Center**

a. A TOC is an integrated staff facility comprised of selected representatives of coordinating and special staff officers and of certain combat support unit commanders. These representatives provide information concerning current operations in their respective areas of responsibility, make recommendations, take action within established policies, and issue implementing orders.

b. The organization and mission of the command, as well as the needs and desires of the commander, will determine the organization and operation of a TOC. Appendix J contains a discussion of an organization and a method of operation of a TOC that is suitable for use by field army, corps, and division.

8-7. **Rear Area Operations Center**

A rear area operations center (RAOC) is assigned to each area support group in the TASCOM; to each support group of the army support brigade in the FASCOM; and, when required, to each corps headquarters of the field army.

a. RAOC are organized into five sections as follows:

1. Center headquarters.
2. Administration and logistic section.
4. Rear area security task force command section.

b. The major functions of a RAOC are—

1. To identify rear area protection forces, plan for their employment, and command them, when activated.
2. To collect, collate, and distribute information pertaining to current operations of the area.
3. To serve as the operations center for the area commander in rear area security conditions short of prolonged severe situations. These conditions are discussed in detail in FM 31–85.

8-8. **Area Coordination Center**

An area coordination center (ACC) is a composite area headquarters at various political and military levels in which all internal defense and internal development activities are planned, coordinated, and directed. Members of the ACC include the local chiefs of military, paramilitary, and other governmental agencies and their US counterparts. The ACC has two major missions—to provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction of all internal defense and internal development efforts in a given tactical area of responsibility and to insure an immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements. The ACC also insures communication with the people and participation in programs designed to improve their security and well-being.
APPENDIX A

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Counterintelligence, Special Operations (U).
Intelligence Collection Operations, Intelligence Corps, US Army (U).
Aerial Surveillance-Reconnaissance, Field Army.
Stability Operations—Intelligence.
Stability Operations Intelligence Collection (U).
Weather Support for Field Army Tactical Operations.
Tactical Cover and Deception (U).
Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations.
Tactical Signal Intelligence (U) (to be published).
Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U).
Electronic Warfare (Ground Based) (U).
Civil Affairs Operations.
The Division Support Command and Separate Brigade Support Battalion.
The Field Army Support Command.
The Support Brigade.
The Division.
Combat Service Support.
Larger Units, Theater Army—Corps.
Staff Officers' Field Manual—Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data; Unclassified Data.

A-4. Technical Manuals (TM)

3-210 Fallout Prediction.

A-5. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications (JCS Pub)

(FOUO) 2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

A-6. Other Publications

This appendix presents additional information to assist staff officers in discharging their duties. Although oriented on coordinating staff officer responsibilities and activities, the information contained herein has value to all staff officers in understanding staff relationships in the daily performance of the staff.

Section I. PERSONNEL

B-1. General

a. Manpower management policies, procedures, and principles aim to achieve the most effective employment of the available human resources. Personnel management, on the other hand, seeks to improve managerial policies and procedures through which individuals, who make up human resources, can improve their potential. The principle of Army personnel management is the use of people efficiently and productively, on a personalized basis. Management must treat people as individuals at every level. The best personnel policy is ineffective unless management applies it intelligently and with understanding. Management develops policies and standards to insure equal treatment, but applies them in keeping with the individual circumstances and military requirements.

b. Commanders and staff officers have an inherent responsibility to accomplish tasks through efficient use of human resources consistent with the principle of Army personnel management.

c. The personnel staff officer (hereinafter called personnel officer) supervises the application of the above principles, makes appropriate recommendations for submission to the chief of staff or the commander, and issues instructions in the name of the commander as may be necessary.

d. The responsibilities of personnel officers at all levels of command are generally the same.

B-2. Personnel Functional Areas and Procedures

a. Personnel functional areas and procedures are generally the same for all field commands; however, a principal difference is the time element and the scope of personnel problems encountered. For example, the field army assistant chief of staff (ACofS), G1, personnel, frequently plans from 1 to 2 months ahead, while the ACofS, G1, of corps or division usually plans for a shorter period of time. Likewise, personnel officers at higher levels of command deal with personnel problems and matters relating to groups of individuals, while unit personnel officers are more involved in individual personnel matters.

b. Subsequent paragraphs provide guidance on staff procedures used by personnel officers at all levels of command.

B-3. Coordination and Supervision

a. The personnel officer coordinates appropriate matters with other coordinating staff sections. In addition, he actively coordinates those activities of special staff officers falling within his scope of staff responsibility.

b. The personnel officer always takes care to accomplish staff coordination with subordinate unit commanders when the matter under consideration affects subordinate unit commanders.

B-4. Standing Operating Procedure

The staff section standing operating procedure (SOP) and, as appropriate, the command SOP contain instructions concerning routine activities for which the personnel officer has staff responsibility. The SOP promotes teamwork and administrative efficiency and reduces the need for many administrative instructions. The personnel officer
prepares both the personnel staff section SOP and the personnel portion of the command SOP.

B-5. Maintenance of Unit Strength

a. General. The personnel officer is responsible to the commander for providing information concerning the strength of the command and for accomplishing necessary staff actions for maintaining its strength. In fulfilling these responsibilities, the personnel officer makes a continuous estimate of strength for present and future situations, and he exercises overall responsibility for the replacement function within the command.

b. Strength. The personnel officer obtains information on the status of the command strength through the receipt and analysis of reports from subordinate units. He estimates future strengths by making a loss estimate.

(1) Strength reports.
   (a) The personnel daily summary (PDS) (para B-16a) is the most effective means that the personnel officer employs to receive and convey promptly information of the current strength of the command.
   (b) The adjutant general (AG) receives other reports that partly duplicate the information contained in the PDS. Other special staff officers likewise receive reports that either complement or duplicate the information contained in the PDS. The personnel officer checks against records maintained by the AG, surgeon, chaplain, provost marshal (PM), and support command commander, as appropriate, to verify PDS data, particularly before consolidation for a periodic personnel report.
   (c) Units submit special strength reports with information on strengths after an event occurs that results in unusual changes in the strength of the unit. The SOP prescribes methods for submission of strength reports. The unit may initiate the report or submit it on request of the personnel officer.

(2) Loss estimates.
   (a) The personnel officer maintains a continuing loss estimate, balanced against programmed or estimated personnel receipts, to forecast future replacement requirements and to provide a basis for personnel requisitions. This estimate is complicated by the fact that losses cannot be accurately forecast.
   (b) Early in combat, the only battle and nonbattle loss experience data available may be those developed from past wars. Battle and non-battle loss statistics are available in FM 101-10-1. The personnel officer studies this information with extreme care and takes action to adjust the data only after comparison with past, present, and probable future conditions. He must coordinate closely with other staff officers, particularly with the intelligence officer for information on the enemy, weather, and terrain and with the operations officer for information concerning the nature of the operation to be conducted and its expected duration.
   (c) Commands required to submit loss estimates should submit loss rate tables for use in predicting replacement requirements as well as for use in advising the commander in the selection of a course of action.
   (d) Records of the radiation history of individuals provide significant data for loss estimation under nuclear warfare conditions. When appropriate, this information may be made a matter of record on the individual health records of the members of the command and may be included as an entry on the morning report.

c. Replacements. Replacement operations are conducted under centralized control to insure a maximum degree of responsiveness to operational needs. These operations are controlled by the AG under the supervision of the personnel officer.

(1) The personnel officer is responsible for—
   (a) Preparing and maintaining a continuing estimate of the replacement situation, including unit replacements, and advising the commander and staff thereof. As necessary, he submits his estimate to higher headquarters.
   (b) Formulating replacement policies concerning—
      1. Requisitions and reports.
      2. Allocation and distribution.
      3. Procurement.
      4. Assignment and reassignment.
   (c) Coordinating replacement matters with other staff sections, higher headquarters, and subordinate units.
   (d) Supervising the AG’s replacement operation activities.
      (e) Allocating replacements to units, based on priorities established by the commander.

(2) The AG, who is the principal operator, is responsible for directing replacement operations and has operational control of replacement operating units.

(3) The operations officer recommends priorities concerning the allocation of individual
replacements and, in coordination with the personnel officer, recommends the need for and assignment of unit replacements.

(4) The intelligence officer, in coordination with the operations officer, recommends priorities concerning the allocation of intelligence specialist replacements and the need for and assignment of intelligence and other information collection units.

(5) The logistics officer provides supply, facilities, and transportation in replacement operations. In coordination with the operations officer, the logistics officer recommends assignment of logistic support individual and unit replacements.

(6) Special staff officers provide appropriate services or facilities that replacement operations may require and recommend assignment of individual and unit replacements in accordance with their areas of interest.

**B-6. Personnel Management**

Although all staff sections assist the commander in managing personnel, the personnel officer has primary coordinating staff responsibility for supervising overall administration and management of matters and procedures affecting personnel as individuals. He directly supervises personnel management policies in the command and insures the implementation of pertinent procedures. He evaluates personnel management procedures and recommends new policies or changes to policies, when appropriate.

**a. Military Personnel.**

(1) The personnel officer is responsible for the classification, selection, and assignment of individuals. He assists in promoting the welfare of the command by supervising enforcement of policies governing such things as working hours, leaves, and passes. The personnel officer recommends and supervises execution of policies on the presentation of awards and decorations, promotions, pay, transfers, and reassignments. By constant reevaluation, the personnel officer measures the effectiveness of these activities and recommends such changes as the situation may warrant. He also coordinates with the operations officer in preparing and operating training and retraining programs for special classes of personnel.

(2) The personnel officer is responsible for processing promotions and battlefield appointments and, with the AG, sets up procedures to supervise the promotion and battlefield appointment program.

**b. Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees/Detainees.**

(1) General. The personnel officer supervises enemy prisoner-of-war (PW) and civilian internee/detainee activities of the command through the PM (for variation, see para B-17). The personnel officer, in conjunction with the staff judge advocate (SJA), insures compliance with pertinent laws and regulations to prevent disorders and international repercussions. He also insures consideration of the interests of other staff officers in the development and execution of plans for handling and processing enemy PW's and civilian internees/detainees.

(2) Processing and handling. The PM has special staff responsibility for the evacuation, guarding, processing, proper treatment, and administration of enemy PW's and civilian internees/detainees. He prepares plans and submits them to the personnel officer for coordination and integration with other activities of the command. The PM insures that the personnel officer is kept informed of the progress of enemy PW and civilian internee/detainee activities, and he submits unresolved problems to the personnel officer for resolution.

(3) Enemy PW and civilian internee/detainee labor. The personnel officer recommends policy, establishes procedures, and prepares plans for the use of enemy PW and civilian internee/detainee labor in accordance with international law and conventions and military regulations. The PM informs the personnel officer of the numbers and types of enemy PW's and civilian internees/detainees available for labor use.

**c. Civilian Personnel.**

(1) At the staff level, the function of civilian personnel administration includes the establishment of rules for recruitment; examination; certification and compensation; employee relations and conditions of employment; and personnel rating, promotion, and dismissal.

(2) The personnel officer insures compliance with general civilian personnel policy. Usually, he is authorized to take civilian personnel actions in the commander's name, including supervisory decisions and the initiation of personnel actions and personnel management activities, as necessary, to improve the civilian personnel activity and to insure compliance with existing policies.
(3) When major commands employ or would employ US or non-US civilian personnel in a foreign country during an emergency, the civilian personnel function includes—

(a) The development and implementation of plans for the emergency reassignment or evacuation of civilian personnel in areas of hostilities.

(b) The evaluation of available information on the numbers and categories of civilian labor needed in probable contingencies, local labor available, and potential labor conditions in objective areas.

(c) The preparation of directives and SOP's for implementation of policies of higher headquarters prescribing simplified procedures for the procurement, use, and administration of local national civilian personnel in each country where elements of the command have a mission.

(d) The development of provisions for organization, conditions of employment, and use of mobile civilian labor units in areas where labor would not otherwise be available in sufficient numbers and skills.

(e) The prescribing of procedures for development of an organization and trained cadre of military or civilian personnel in readiness to obtain, organize, administer, and supervise civilian labor in areas where a civilian personnel administration capability would not otherwise be available in an emergency.

d. Safety. The personnel officer supervises the accident prevention program; recommends its policies; maintains and analyzes information on the type, frequency, and cause of accidents; and recommends corrective measures.

B—7. Manpower Management

a. Manpower management involves planning military and civilian manpower programs by functional area of command in consonance with strength and budgetary limitations and, in foreign areas, with availability of local labor for military support functions; developing criteria for and appraisal of the use of manpower; and procuring and distributing manpower.

b. The definition of manpower authorization is more rigid in commands composed of table of organization and equipment (TOE) units than of table of distribution and allowance (TDA) units, which relatively limits TOE manpower management activities. Generally, these activities are confined to the operations officer's review of TOE authorizations and administrative processing of recommended changes/modifications to the TOE to higher headquarters.

c. The operations officer is responsible for the management and processing of personnel authorization documents, to include distribution of spaces that may be authorized for military and civilian personnel.

d. The personnel officer is responsible for the management and processing of personnel allocated to fill authorized spaces. Activities that may be required include—

(1) Determination of manpower replacement requirements. The determination of the total number of individuals required to replace losses with a breakdown by types.

(2) Procurement of personnel. The procurement of personnel in terms of numbers and military occupational specialties (MOS) or civilian occupational classifications.

(3) Development of performance standards and staffing criteria. The process of prescribing policies and procedures for the analysis of personnel performance in connection with personnel use within manpower authorizations.

(4) Evaluation of personnel employment. The evaluation of personnel practices and organizational development of agencies to insure the proper use of personnel.

(5) Distribution. The bulk distribution of replacements to using units.

(6) Operation of manpower reporting system. The gathering and the reporting of necessary facts about manpower and commands for information, operation, planning, and control.

B—8. Development and Maintenance of Morale

a. General.

(1) Everything done in the discharge of command responsibilities influences morale. Therefore, a commander considers morale in determining the method that he will use in discharging command responsibilities. Morale influences the manner of accomplishment of command activities; therefore, all staff officers must consider the status of morale.

(2) The personnel officer has staff responsibility for determining the status of and maintaining morale in the command. Through evaluation
of morale indicators obtained from staff visits, reports, and coordination with other staff officers, he advises the commander on the status of morale and makes appropriate recommendations. In addition, he exercises staff supervision over certain command activities that bear directly on morale. A discussion of these activities follows.

b. Personnel Services. The objective of personnel services is to care for the personal needs and welfare of men as individuals (FM 100-10).

(1) Rest and leave.

(a) The personnel officer has staff responsibility for recommending quota allocations to leave areas, religious retreat centers, and recreational centers and for the staff supervision of these areas. No strict policy can be established governing how quotas should be established. Policy depends on many factors, which the personnel officer must evaluate each time that he receives a quota. As a minimum, coordination is required with those staff officers who exercise staff supervision over activities of units being considered for quotas.

(b) The personnel officer is responsible for insuring that essential facilities are available at rest and leave areas, camps, or centers. He coordinates with other staff officers, as appropriate, to insure the provision of such necessary services as exchange detachments, special services units, postal and finance detachments, supply and service units, and the American Red Cross.

(2) Rotation. The personnel officer is responsible for recommending policy concerning rotation of individuals, supervising the implementation of the rotation program, and recommending changes to or deviations from established policy. He coordinates with other staff officers, as appropriate, to keep informed of the impact of the rotation program on the accomplishment of mission activities.

(3) Postal services. If the Army operates the postal service, the personnel officer has coordinating staff responsibility for preparing plans for postal service for the command. The AG is responsible for operating the postal system in accordance with pertinent Army and US Government regulations.

(4) Special services. Special services activities are a special staff responsibility of the AG under the staff supervision of the personnel officer.

(5) Nonappropriated fund activities. Services provided by nonappropriated fund activities have an important bearing on morale and welfare; therefore, the personnel officer provides guidance and supervision for the operation of these activities.

(6) The Army and Air Force Exchange Service. The personnel officer provides guidance and supervision of exchange activities. He evaluates the scope and efficiency of the exchange service and makes recommendations for change or improvement. He determines, in coordination with the logistics officer, whether exchange items are to be sold by the exchange service, to be issued as part of the field ration, or to be sold by mobile sales activities. When mobile sales facilities are used, the personnel officer provides guidance and supervision.

(7) Religious services. The personnel officer assists the staff chaplain in insuring that chaplains with troops have every facility possible for the effective discharge of their tasks. While the chaplain should not have staff responsibility for planning and supervising the unit morale program, he does provide advice and assistance.

(8) Character guidance. The personnel officer has staff responsibility for the effective implementation of the character guidance program. He supervises and coordinates those actions required for a continuous and integrated program. He normally is the chairman of the character guidance council.

c. Graves Registration Activities. The personnel officer coordinates with the operations officer to insure that training programs include training in the proper procedures for handling the deceased and their effects. He reviews plans for graves registration operations to insure provision of both adequate units and facilities to handle estimated killed-in-action losses. He coordinates with the logistics officer for the provision of logistic support, particularly transportation, for the expected operations.

d. Casualty Reporting System. The personnel officer supervises casualty reporting. He prepares plans to establish a casualty reporting system and gives precombat instruction in procedures at all levels throughout the command. The AG operates the casualty reporting system.

e. Decorations and Awards.

(1) The personnel officer insures that—

(a) Advance plans are made to establish a decorations and awards policy.
(b) All units issue precombat instruction in procedures in conformance with plans.

(c) Recommendations for awards are made promptly, correctly, and in accordance with established policies and regulations.

(d) Recommendations for awards are processed and acted on properly, efficiently, and rapidly.

(e) Recipients of awards receive publicity within their units and that the information officer obtains this information for public release.

(f) Corrective action is taken to amend the decorations and awards policy if it fails to establish comparable standards and equitable distribution for decorations and awards.

(2) The personnel officer should frequently measure the effectiveness of the decorations and awards policy established. Means commonly employed to accomplish this include—

(a) Staff visits,

(b) Compilation and analysis of statistics based on days in combat and accomplishments.

(c) Comparisons with adjacent units of similar organization and missions.

(d) Supervision over awards boards.

(e) Checks on processing within headquarters.

(f) Careful recording of recommendations for awards.

(g) Conferences with personnel officers of lower levels of command.

(h) Conferences with unit chaplains.

(i) Analysis of theater troop opinion polls.

B—9. Health Services

The surgeon is responsible for health services under the coordinating staff supervision of the personnel officer. These responsibilities include—

a. Preparing medical plans.

b. Providing adequate health services to the command.

c. Coordinating with the logistics officer and the support command commander to insure consideration of certain medical functions with the overall logistic plans, e.g., coordination of the medical evacuation plan with the transportation plan concerning use of roads and railways.

d. Conducting physical examinations.

e. Providing preventive medicine, including immunizations.

f. Providing veterinary, medical laboratory, and whole-blood control.

g. Providing medical materiel and maintenance.

h. Advising the command on personnel hygiene and sanitation.

i. Coordinating with the logistics officer and the support command commander on medical requirements for general supply, construction, and transportation.

j. Advising the personnel officer of the impact of past radiation exposure on the command.

k. Advising the personnel officer of the health status of enemy PW’s and civilian internees/detainees.

B—10. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order

a. General. All staff officers are concerned with discipline. The personnel officer and associated special staff officers have the most direct concern.

(1) The personnel officer is responsible for supervising the preparation of enforcement policies with emphasis on plans, policies, and procedures to insure fair, equitable, and uniform enforcement. The PM advises the commander and staff on matters pertaining to the maintenance of law and order is responsible for the enforcement of laws, regulations, and orders within the command.

(2) The personnel officer is concerned with the effects of military justice and courts-martial and with the general problem of discipline, law and order other than the administration of military justice. The SJA is directly responsible for the administration of military justice within the command. Although the SJA communicates directly with the commander on matters pertaining to military justice, he keeps the personnel officer informed on those matters pertaining to discipline, law and order within the command that are the responsibility of the SJA.

b. Measures for Maintaining Discipline, Law and Order. Discipline, law and order activities to which the personnel officer pays particular attention include—

(1) Preventive measures. These measures induce military personnel to develop habits and
attitudes of obedience and respect for authority and eliminate existing or potential causes of law violations or adverse behavior. Such measures include—

(a) Training.
(b) Employment of sound leadership principles at all levels.
(c) Careful and complete orientation of the soldier on his obligations, his privileges, the necessity for law and order, and provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
(d) Ceremonies and programs to develop military smartness, pride in organization, personal appearance, and personal accomplishment.
(e) The proper employment of military police (MP).
(f) Cooperation between military units and local civil authorities (in conjunction with the ACofS, G5, civil-military operations (CMO), and the PM).
(g) Adjustments of disciplinary measures to local conditions.
(h) Issuance of only such instructions and orders that can be enforced.
(i) Use of preventive measures that can accomplish their purpose without undue hardship.
(j) Use of suggestion, advice, and tactful criticism by commanders to keep men out of trouble.
(k) Compliance with the spirit and letter of the leave policy.
(l) Placing chronically troublesome civilian establishments and areas off limits.
(m) Private rebuke and considerate counsel in cases of initial minor offenses.
(n) Study and analysis of causes of violations and elimination of such causes.
(o) To the extent practicable, avoidance of disciplinary measures that remove the offender from training and from hazards and hardships of combat.
(p) Maintenance of factual data both relative to morale and discipline indicators and relative to the current status of men in arrest, delays in trial, and nature of offenses to detect early undesirable trends in discipline or in the administration of discipline.
(q) Insuring that personnel are afforded an opportunity to be heard regarding complaints and that, when warranted, proper corrective measures are taken.
(r) Encouraging regular attendance at religious services and faithful practice of individual religious obligations.
(s) Rehabilitation during and after confinement.
(t) Informing commanders of the problems and potential problems in their units and insuring that appropriate action is taken before serious incidents result. Effective leadership by officers and noncommissioned officers at the unit level is the key to reducing problems and incidents.
(u) The personnel officer's complete familiarity with administrative discharge regulations and procedures for personnel who cannot meet the Army standards of fitness and conduct. When troublemakers and substandard personnel are identified, administrative proceedings should be instituted immediately and processed expeditiously. A substandard soldier who should be eliminated administratively from the Service, but who is allowed to remain in the unit until he becomes involved in serious trouble serves only to lower the morale of the entire unit and to create additional disciplinary problems.

(2) Corrective measures. Corrective measures deal with actual offenders. These measures include the nonpunitive actions (admonition, reprimand, etc.) discussed in Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (revised); nonjudicial punishment pursuant to Article 15: UCMJ; and trial by court-martial. The measure to be employed in any particular case should be the minimum necessary to meet the ends of justice and discipline.

c. Straggler Control. Stragglers are military personnel who are away from their units in combat or on maneuvers without proper authority. The establishment and operation of straggler posts and straggler collecting points are responsibilities of the PM under the supervision of the personnel officer.

d. Military Justice.

(1) The personnel officer, in carrying out his responsibilities relating to law and order, insures that policies concerning the following measures are published and complied with:
(a) Preventive measures.
(b) Study of cases for the purpose of discovering and eliminating causes of derelictions.
(c) Provision of adequate numbers of members for appointment to courts-martial.
(d) Qualification of members of courts.
(e) Rotation of members of all courts.
(f) Frequent check of operation of correctional facilities.

(2) The statistical records of the SJA are important sources of information on the state of discipline in the command.

B–11. Headquarters Management

a. General. Headquarters management is the control of the organization and administration of the headquarters to ensure that operations are performed with optimum efficiency. This management deals with physical arrangement, control, and standardization of procedures within a headquarters or other activity. All staff officers are concerned with the administrative activities within their own staff sections. In addition, the personnel officer is responsible for assisting the commander in supervising the administrative activities within the headquarters. In performing this duty, the personnel officer does not encroach on the prerogatives of other staff officers in the operation of their own sections or functions. He makes himself available for advice to other staff officers on request. The comptroller performs management analysis functions for the commander as described in paragraph B–73. However, the presence in a headquarters of a comptroller does not relieve the personnel officer of the staff responsibility for headquarters management.

b. Headquarters Management Activities. The personnel officer is responsible for the following headquarters management activities:

(1) Organizing and managing the ACofS, G1, office.
(2) Coordinating and supervising the movement, allocation of office space, internal arrangement, security, and organization of the headquarters.
(3) Recommending changes in administration that would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the headquarters.
(4) Recommending staffing adjustments to reflect changes in workload based on assigned missions.
(5) Allocating shelter in the headquarters area for troops and the headquarters, in coordination with other staff sections.

c. Internal Layout of the Headquarters.
(1) The arrangement of personnel, groups of personnel, equipment, and facilities within individual sections of a headquarters is usually a matter for the individual section chief to prescribe. However, the personnel officer, in performing his responsibility for headquarters management, offers advice or makes recommendations, as required, in the interest of promoting efficiency or accomplishing economies in resources.

(2) The interior arrangement, location, and allocation of office space are based on desires, guidance, policies of the commander, and the facilities available.

d. Movement of the Headquarters.
(1) SOP normally cover the tactical movement of a headquarters and the occupation of a new area. The personnel officer is responsible for preparing and coordinating plans; alerting headquarters agencies to move and preparing them for the move; planning, organizing, and controlling the movement in accordance with SOP's; insuring an orderly movement into the new area; and establishing and occupying the new headquarters area with dispatch and without interruption to its continuity of operation.

(2) The personnel officer or his designated representative normally heads the quartering party consisting of representatives of the various headquarters elements to reconnoiter and select the exact location of the new headquarters area. He picks this specific location in coordination with other interested staff agencies, particularly the communications-electronics (C-E) officer and headquarters commandant. The quartering party accomplishes the organization, layout, and allocation of shelter in the new area before the main body of the headquarters arrives.

B–12. Personnel Estimate

The personnel officer prepares the personnel estimate to determine the impact of both the personnel situation on operations and operations on personnel matters. The estimate includes the personnel officer’s recommendations to meet estimated requirements. It may be written, particularly in the higher levels of command. In the division, the personnel estimate is frequently recorded only in the form of notes and is usually presented orally (app C).

B–13. Plans and Orders

a. The personnel officer usually begins to prepare his plan before the commander arrives at his decision; subsequently, he makes the neces-
sary adjustments to support the decision. The plan is reexamined, on completion, so that it adequately supports the current mission of the command and agrees with current policies. When the commander approves the plan, he may disseminate it by—

(1) An administrative/logistics order.
(2) An operation order (para 4 or, if used, the service support annex).
(3) Administrative publications media.
(4) Conferences.
(5) Messages.

b. When (1) or (2) above or both are used, the personnel officer provides the personnel portions to the appropriate coordinating staff officer responsible for preparation and publication of the order or annex.

B–14. Miscellaneous

The personnel officer has staff responsibility for a number of matters related to the individual that are outside the specific categories previously discussed. The more important of these are supervising activities concerned with education of military personnel, dependent schools, dependent affairs, marriage to foreign nationals, reception of visitors, and administrative matters not assigned other coordinating staff sections.

B–15. Records

Records that the personnel officer may maintain to assist him in carrying out his duties include—

a. The journal (para 2–16c).

b. The workbook (para 2–16d).

c. The policy file (para 2–16a).

d. Personnel situation map (para 2–16e). The personnel situation map shows current installations and unit dispositions that affect personnel activities. These maps may include actual and proposed future locations of headquarters of major units, replacement units, civilian personnel offices and civilian labor pools, automatic data processing (ADP) units, special services units, graves registration units and collecting points, cemeteries, medical units and facilities, bath and laundry units, enemy PW and civilian internee/detainee installations, straggler posts and collecting points, MP units, civilian collecting points, numbered finance disbursing units, Army postal units, and rest area locations. The personnel portion of the overlay that accompanies the administrative/logistics order is prepared from this map.

e. Personnel loss estimates (FM 101–10–1).

f. Personnel loss rate tables (FM 101–10–1).

g. Summaries of accident experience. These summaries identify sources from which casualties or other nonbattle losses originate. Subordinate elements analyze and report accident experience summaries to higher headquarters and similar organizations to determine trends and types of accidents common to planned operations and to establish realistic controls. Carefully maintained summaries of accident experience identify personnel and materiel failures that require remedial action.

B–16. Reports

Reports available to the personnel officer for use in carrying out his duties include the following:

a. Personnel Daily Summary. The PDS is the most effective means that the personnel officer employs to obtain the latest personnel information resulting from the unit’s actions for any given period. Appendix H contains an example of a PDS. The division prepares this report as of a designated time each day from information obtained from subordinate assigned units and attached combat units. Whenever possible, the division selects a prescribed time that will alleviate the administrative burden on operational units. The form contains information relative to authorized strengths and losses and gains. The division does not forward the form itself. Normally, the division transmits only the consolidated figures therefrom through command channels to higher headquarters. The personnel officer is responsible for the timely transmission of these consolidated figures to the next higher headquarters.


(1) The personnel section assembles this report and submits it to the organizational or higher commander either periodically or on call. The report presents pertinent data that indicate the personnel situation. The items covered in the periodic personnel report include the entire scope of personnel activities for a command for a given period.

(2) The value of this report is twofold:

(a) First, it permits a commander and interested staff officers periodically to obtain a recapitulation of facts pertaining to all personnel activities within the command. By comparing
these facts with those in previous reports, the commander and the staff can readily determine those activities and units requiring more attention.

(b) Second, the periodic personnel report forms the basis of the personnel portion of the operational report (AR 525-15).

(3) Much of the data listed in the periodic personnel report comes from records in the personnel section and in special staff sections of the headquarters, especially in the AG section and AG ADP units. Subordinate units must submit data only when these data are not available in the headquarters.

(4) Appendix H contains an example of a periodic personnel report.

c. **Battle and nonbattle loss reporting.**

(1) Units report battle and nonbattle losses to the personnel officer through the AG in accordance with instructions contained in AR 600-10.

(2) Battle and nonbattle loss reporting serves a twofold purpose:

(a) To furnish complete data on battle and nonbattle losses for use in notifying an emergency addressee and to provide data for settling pay, insurance, pension, and disability claims.

(b) To provide the various agencies of the Department of the Army, theater, and subordinate headquarters with information necessary to compile loss rate tables and estimated requirements and to facilitate accurate personnel strength accounting.

B-17. Organizational Considerations

a. The discussion in the preceding paragraphs of this section on the personnel functional area pertains to each major field level within the considerations contained in paragraphs 4-56 through 4-60 and further in this paragraph.

b. The headquarters staffs of the field army, corps, division, and field army support command (FASCOM) have few special staff officers. The personnel coordinating staff officers and the subordinate support command (brigade) perform those personnel responsibilities and duties for which a special staff officer is not authorized. Therefore, the personnel officer accomplishes staff coordination and supervision directly with the support command (brigade) rather than through a special staff officer. Activities influenced are—

(1) **Graves registration.** At each of the above levels of command, except FASCOM, the personnel officer is responsible for all force-level personnel staff activities related to graves registration. He coordinates directly with the support command on matters concerning support command graves registration operations. He exercises direct staff supervision rather than going through or being assisted by a special staff officer. Graves registration in the FASCOM is a staff responsibility of the ACofS, services, who exercises the staff supervision as discussed above.

(2) **Enemy PW's and civilian internees/detainees.**

(a) In the FASCOM, the personnel officer is responsible for all force-level personnel staff activities related to enemy PW's and civilian internees/detainees.

(b) At field army, corps, and division, the personnel officer is responsible for personnel staff activities related to enemy PW's and civilian internees/detainees; however, he limits his activities to coordinating staff supervision, while the PM accomplishes the more detailed coordination and supervision.

(3) **Miscellaneous.** At all levels, coordination of requirements for logistic support of personnel operations is either with the appropriate coordinating staff officer or directly with the support command (brigade) commander.

Section II. INTELLIGENCE

B-18. General

a. The functional area of intelligence includes both intelligence and counterintelligence activities. Intelligence and counterintelligence activities are an integral part of the operations of all units and individuals. AR 310-25 contains the definitions of intelligence and counterintelligence. FM 30-5, FM 30-9, FM 30-9A, FM 30-18, and FM 30-20 contain discussions of intelligence. FM 30-17 and FM 30-17A contain discussions of counterintelligence. FM 30-31 and FM 30-31A contain discussions of intelligence requirements in stability operations. AR 105-87 and FM 32-20 contain discussions of electronic warfare (EW), and FM 31-40 contains a discussion of tactical cover and deception as these fields relate to intel-
b. Generally, the responsibilities of the intelligence officer are common to all types of commands. However, the requirement for any given activity varies in scope and size at different levels and in different types of commands. These differences are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

B-19. Coordination and Supervision

a. The intelligence officer continuously coordinates with other staff officers to determine requirements and to insure the integration of intelligence operations with the overall operations. He ascertains the capabilities of available SIGINT resources for satisfying intelligence requirements. Other staff officers initiate coordinating action with the intelligence officer whenever new intelligence requirements appear. Typical relationships reflecting the high degree of coordination required include the following:

(1) All staff officers use the analysis of the area of operations, the intelligence estimate, and the current intelligence summary (INTSUM) in estimating the effects of weather, terrain, and enemy capabilities on activities in their fields of interest.

(2) The CMO officer and the intelligence officer work closely together in collecting and/or exchanging information in political, social, economic, and psychological fields for inclusion in the analysis of the area of operations. The CMO officer assists the intelligence officer in those intelligence activities that involve CMO, e.g., censorship; population; fingerprinting; census; identity cards; and detection of enemy sympathizers, enemy agents, or enemy infrastructure personnel within the civilian population.

(3) Staff members who need specific intelligence information state their needs to the intelligence officer. A typical request would include technical information required by the electronic warfare element (EWE) to plan and coordinate EW operations.

(4) All coordinating staff officers, special staff officers, and subordinate commanders should recommend to the intelligence officer essential elements of information (EEI) or other intelligence requirements appropriate to their areas of interest.

b. The intelligence officer should directly supervise and/or exercise operational control of—

(1) Military intelligence groups, battalions, companies, platoons, or detachments.

(2) Armored and air cavalry units (when employed in an intelligence role).

(3) Cryptologic activities of USASA units or detachments.

(4) Ground surveillance and reconnaissance elements.

(5) Air surveillance and reconnaissance elements of aviation units.

(6) Attack elements of aviation units (when employed in an intelligence role).

(7) Long-range patrol units.

(8) Agents, line crossers, and similar intelligence means and activities.

(9) Assigned or attached allied or US intelligence-producing elements.

c. In addition to the assets listed above, the intelligence officer may levy intelligence information-production tasks on USASA units or elements that may be attached to the command.

B-20. Collection of Information

a. General.

(1) The intelligence officer supervises and coordinates the information collection activities of the command. Proper supervision and coordination of these activities increase the quantity and improve the quality of the resultant available information and intelligence.

(2) The intelligence officer must have a thorough knowledge of available sources of information, collecting agencies, and the type of information that each of the latter can provide. He must understand the operations of the command to provide the particular intelligence required for success. He must have a thorough knowledge of the tactics, organization, and characteristics of the enemy. He especially must be competent in the fields of surveillance and countersurveillance, reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance, intelligence exploitation of captured enemy documents and materiel, human resources intelligence, and target acquisition operations.

(3) FM 30-5 contains a discussion of collection of information, including sources, agencies, intelligence requirements and their priority, indications, the collection plan, and orders and requests.

(4) The collection, the processing, and the
production of technical intelligence are explained in FM 30-16.

(5) FM 32-1 contains information pertaining to the direction, collection, processing, and use of SIGINT and to the part SIGINT activities play in the overall process of intelligence production.

b. Air and Ground Reconnaissance. In developing plans for air and ground reconnaissance and in coordinating these plans, the intelligence officer checks with the operations officer to insure that reconnaissance orders and requests to combat elements are compatible with the combat elements' primary mission. Additionally, the intelligence officer must be fully informed of planned combat operations so that reconnaissance will support these operations, to include integration of air and ground reconnaissance with the combat activity (FM 30-20).

c. Air and Ground Surveillance. The intelligence officer has staff responsibility for air and ground surveillance activities. In coordination with the operations officer, he assigns mission priorities similar to the procedure for processing requests for reconnaissance. FM 30-5 contains additional information.

(1) The intelligence officer—
   a. Plans the systematic watch of the battlefield.
   b. Assigns mission priorities in coordination with the operations officer.
   c. Coordinates and integrates all surveillance resources.
   d. Insures that electronic security (ELSEC) is considered in the placement and operation of combat surveillance devices.

(2) The operations officer—
   a. Designates combat units for use in combat surveillance.
   b. Furnishes information on friendly forces, to include their locations, activities, and plans.
   c. Specifies characteristics of targets that are of special interest to the current mission.

(3) Other staff officers who have an interest in combat surveillance either as operating agents or as users of the results of combat surveillance include—
   a. The C-E officer, who plans the necessary communication links and advises on the overall C-E aspects.
   b. The aviation officer, who furnishes air surveillance means.
   c. The field artillery officer, who furnishes means for and uses the product of combat surveillance in target acquisition.
   d. The chemical officer, who provides airborne personnel detectors and portable personnel detectors, with the attendant operating personnel.
   e. The air liaison officer (ALO), who provides means for and uses the products of combat surveillance for targetting purposes.
   f. The PM, who uses the information for convoy planning.

d. Target Acquisition.

(1) The intelligence officer has staff responsibility for target acquisition.

(2) The operations officer and the fire support coordinator (FCOORD) are particularly concerned with target acquisition activities.

(a) Field artillery and other fire support elements have organic means for target acquisition and, within the policy of the commander and in accordance with the planning of the intelligence officer, conduct target acquisition with these means.

(b) In the planning stage of an operation, the operations officer, in coordination with the FCOORD, provides the intelligence officer guidance on types of targets and target information requirements for nuclear and chemical attack. The intelligence officer develops a list of potential targets based on existing enemy information, characteristics of the area of operations, and enemy habits. He orders a collection effort using all available means to detect indications of the existence of potential targets. The intelligence officer then develops indications by a more intensive collection effort to provide the necessary detailed target information or to disprove the presence of the suspected target.

(3) The proper authority normally directs other target acquisition means of the command in accordance with instructions and guidance provided by orders and requests emanating from the intelligence section.

(4) Generally, the same procedure applies to both nuclear and nonnuclear situations; however, more decentralization of effort is generally the rule in a nonnuclear situation.

e. Prediction of Fallout and Radiological Monitoring and Survey (FM 3-12 and TM 3-210).

(1) The intelligence officer’s responsibility includes—
(a) Reviewing the chemical officer’s plans for accomplishing the prediction of fallout from enemy-delivered weapons and all monitoring and survey operations, insuring that such plans support the operation, and submitting the plans to the chief of staff for command approval.

(b) Insuring that procedures are established for collecting and evaluating information and that communication means are available for disseminating information on fallout from enemy-delivered weapons and all monitoring and survey operations.

(c) Considering the effect of predicted fallout on the area of operations, enemy capabilities, and friendly operations and providing estimates to appropriate staff members and to the commander.

(2) Close coordination with the operations officer is essential to insure a minimum conflict of interest between the responsibilities of the operations officer for prediction and dissemination of information on fallout from friendly-delivered weapons and the responsibilities of the intelligence officer for enemy-employed weapons.

B-21. Processing Information

The sequence that an intelligence officer follows in processing an item of information depends on its nature and content. FM 30–5 provides a detailed discussion of the recording, evaluation, and interpretation steps of processing information.

B-22. Counterintelligence

a. In planning counterintelligence measures, the intelligence officer is concerned with the security of the command. He recommends appropriate countermeasures to prevent the enemy from learning of those friendly activities that disclose the intentions of the command or, if disrupted, will imperil the accomplishment of the mission. To develop appropriate counterintelligence measures, the intelligence officer prepares a counterintelligence estimate of enemy intelligence, sabotage, espionage, and subversive capabilities and their effect on the mission of the command. He coordinates with other officers to determine the activities that require counterintelligence support. In devising counterintelligence measures, the intelligence officer coordinates with the rest of the staff to insure that the proposed counterintelligence measures do not unnecessarily hamper other operational activities.

b. The intelligence officer at combat service support headquarters places major emphasis on military security, denial of information to the enemy, and protection of critical installations. Air terminal and port, travel, and frontier security are of great importance. In addition, intelligence officers of combat service support commands also are concerned with civil security and censorship (except press censorship).

c. At division and corps, the chief of the counterintelligence section of the attached military intelligence company assists the intelligence officer in planning and supervising counterintelligence measures. The military intelligence battalion performs this function at field army and army group.

B-23. The Analysis of the Area of Operations

a. General. The analysis of the area of operations is an important product of the intelligence officer's activities.

(1) The analysis of the area of operations is a study to determine the effects of the area of operations on enemy and friendly operations. In making his analysis of the area of operations, the intelligence officer does not analyze effects of weather, terrain, other characteristics, and the enemy on specific courses of action employed by the operations officer or commander in their estimates; rather, he bases the analysis on the type of maneuver directed in the mission statement, i.e., attack, defend, delay, etc. Therefore, his analysis is a basis for developing specific friendly courses of action and enemy capabilities in the commander's estimates and in staff estimates.

(2) The intelligence officer has staff responsibility for initiating, coordinating, and insuring completion and dissemination of the analysis of the area of operations. Other staff sections contribute within their respective fields so that the final analysis represents a consolidated effort. Typical contributions include—

(a) The engineer's terrain studies.

(b) The staff weather officer's (SWO) operational weather forecasts and other weather and climatic data, to include light data.

(c) The CMO officer's information on sociology, politics, economics, psychology, technology, and related fields.

(d) The CMO officer's and the civilian personnel officer's information on local labor conditions.

(e) The unconventional warfare (UW)
officer's information from areas not under control of friendly forces.

(f) The PM's analysis of route reconnaissance and other information on rear area activities.

(3) The intelligence officer uses other sources of information, including national intelligence surveys and locally produced studies and periodicals. Analyses of other headquarters are valuable sources of information, although they may not directly apply to the particular unit.

(4) Regardless of the assistance received, the intelligence officer is responsible for the interpretation of the characteristics of the area of operations; for anticipating requirements; and for producing, maintaining, and disseminating intelligence pertaining to the characteristics of the area.

b. Preparation and Presentation.

(1) When possible, the intelligence officer prepares an analysis of the area of operations based on a deduced mission before the actual mission has been received. On receipt of the mission, the intelligence officer reevaluates the analysis. After the commander has reached a decision, the analysis of the area of operations may require refinement because of his adopted course of action. As the operation progresses, the uncovering of new areas, changes in mission, or receipt of additional or more accurate information may require revision of the analysis. Corps and higher headquarters normally prepare a written analysis in planning projected operations. In division headquarters, the intelligence officer may prepare a written analysis for projected operations to be carried out at great distances, such as airborne, amphibious, and airmobile operations; however, in most division operations, he will use the corps analysis, supplemented by information of particular pertinence to the division.

(2) Appendix G contains the format for and examples of an analysis of the area of operations. FM 30–5 contains additional information concerning the content of an analysis.

B–24. The Intelligence Estimate

a. General.

(1) The intelligence estimate is one of the major end products of the intelligence officer's activities. The collection and processing of information are oriented toward the intelligence estimate. The estimate brings together significant aspects of the area of operations and the enemy situation; presents, analyzes, and discusses the enemy capabilities, weaknesses, and strengths; and draws conclusions on the effects of the area of operations on friendly operations, the relative probability of the enemy's adoption of courses of action open to him, and enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited. With the intelligence estimate, the commander can balance these factors against his possible courses of action and choose his own favorable course of action.

(2) All levels of command prepare and keep an intelligence estimate. Because the intelligence estimate is concerned with many variables, a change in any major factor requires a review of the entire estimate to determine the implications. A current intelligence estimate can be presented at any time because the estimating process is continuous.

(3) In preparing an intelligence estimate, the intelligence officer makes realistic assumptions and deductions, based on a thorough knowledge of the enemy and careful study of the available information. Once the intelligence officer makes assumptions and deductions, he takes action to determine their accuracy.

b. Preparation and Presentation.

(1) The intelligence officer is responsible for the preparation and presentation of the intelligence estimate; however, other staff officers may provide him information and advice. This may include, as applicable—

(a) The operations officer—courses of action.

(b) The CMO officer—civilian and psychological aspects.

(c) The engineer—terrain information.

(d) The SWO—weather and related weather effects data.

(e) The FCOORD—enemy fire support capabilities.

(f) The UW officer—information from areas not under control of friendly forces.

(g) Other special staff officers—other characteristics as needed.

(2) The intelligence officer may present his estimate orally or in writing. At corps and higher levels, most estimates are written. The division uses both oral and written presentations, depending on the immediacy of the need. Levels below division normally use oral presentations. Regardless of the manner of preparation and presentation, the intelligence officer bases the estimate, as
far as practicable, on a prescribed format. Appendix C contains the format for and examples of the intelligence estimate.

B–25. Intelligence Annex to Operation Plans and Orders

a. The intelligence annex is a means of disseminating intelligence and information and of issuing intelligence instructions to a command for an impending operation. It confirms the orders and requests for information that have been made in fragmentary form and that are still current at the time the annex is issued.

b. An intelligence annex is normally prepared for each operation.

c. The intelligence officer prepares the intelligence annex and authenticates it when required. Appendix F contains an example of an intelligence annex.

B–26. Weather and Climate Studies and Summaries

a. The intelligence officer has staff responsibility for establishing and consolidating weather forecast and study requirements and the necessary coordinating actions with the Air Weather Service and other agencies providing weather information. He insures the distribution of weather forecasts and summaries, climate summaries, and climate studies, as required. He is assisted in these areas by the SWO, when assigned, or by the ALO.

b. The intelligence officer analyzes weather data and provides an evaluation of their effects on military operations. The analysis of the area of operations contains much of this evaluation; however, the intelligence officer disseminates special evaluations, when needed. The intelligence officer obtains assistance from other staff officers, including the engineer, transportation, C-E, chemical, staff weather, aviation, and UW officers.

c. FM 30–5 and FM 31–3 contain discussions of weather forecasts and weather and climate studies and summaries. Some of the FM 31-series contain information of weather effects in particular areas of the world.

B–27. Standing Operating Procedure

The intelligence officer prepares the intelligence section SOP and the intelligence portion of the command SOP.

B–28. Records

a. Journal. The journal contains briefs of important written and oral messages received and sent, as well as notations of INTSUM's, orders, records of important conferences, and similar matters pertaining directly to the intelligence section. The journal is the primary record of operations of the intelligence section of the headquarters. The journal is closed daily or at the end of a phase or period, as directed. At division, the chief of staff receives one copy for consolidation with other journals of the headquarters. See paragraph 2–16c and FM 30–5.

b. Workbook. For convenience, the intelligence workbook may consist of pages of looseleaf notebook that are indexed with headings corresponding to the type of intelligence report (INTREP) that the headquarters normally prepares. See paragraph 2–16d and FM 30–5.

c. Working Documents.

(1) The intelligence collection plan, which lists the current EEI and other intelligence requirements, is a valuable aid in planning and supervising collection activities. FM 30–5 and FM 31–3 provide both discussions and examples of the collection plan.

(2) The counterintelligence measures worksheet, an essential aid in counterintelligence planning, is the basis for preparing counterintelligence orders and requests. FM 30–5 contains both a discussion and an example of the counterintelligence measures worksheet.

d. Situation Map.

(1) The intelligence situation map is concerned primarily with the enemy situation; however, it also displays pertinent information on the friendly situation. The location of the command posts of higher, lower, and adjacent units; the boundaries between major subordinate units; the locations of friendly reconnaissance units, special forces elements, and air surveillance elements; and (when there is an appreciable distance between friendly positions and those of the enemy) the trace of friendly forward dispositions (FFD) or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) constitute the minimum information of the friendly situation shown on the situation map.

(2) The information posted varies with the size of the friendly unit. The smaller the unit, the more detailed is the information recorded. Division situation maps, for example, show the location of enemy units down to battalions; however,
some smaller elements, particularly fire delivery
means, are shown.

(3) The intelligence officer keeps the situation
map or overlay as simple as possible. He uses
authorized conventional signs, military symbols,
and abbreviations. See appendix D and FM
21-30.

e. Files.

(1) The journal file contains the original or
a copy of all messages and documents that are en-
tered in the intelligence journal.

(2) The information file is a suitably in-
dexed and cross-referenced file of information
that may be of future value.

(3) The order of battle files contain order of
battle cards for recording enemy unit identifica-
tion, history, and other details. FM 30-5 contains
a discussion of other order of battle files.

B-29. Reports

The collection and dissemination of information
and intelligence are accomplished by the receipt
and transmission of numerous reports varying in
content, scope, and format. Typical reports fol-
low. Examples or explanations are contained in
FM 3-12, FM 21-40, and FM 30-5 and in appen-
dix H, as noted.

a. Spot reports (app H).

b. INTREP's (FM 30-5).

c. Supplementary intelligence reports (SUP-
INTREP) (FM 30-5).

d. INTSUM's (FM 30-5 and app H).

e. Periodic intelligence reports (PERIN-
TREP) (app H).

f. Weekly INTSUM's.

g. Imagery interpretation reports.

h. Enemy PW and civilian internee/detainee
interrogation reports.

i. Debriefing reports of recovered captured or
missing US personnel.

j. Bombing, shelling, and mortaring reports.

k. Nuclear burst and biological and chemical
attack (NBC) (STANAG 2103) reports:

(1) NBC1—observer's initial report of nu-
clear burst or chemical or biological attack.

(2) NBC2—evaluated data report.

(3) NBC3—report of expected chemical, bi-
ological, and radiological (CBR) contamination.

(4) NBC4—radiation dose rate.

(5) NBC5—area of CBR contamination.

l. Weather reports.

B-30. Intelligence/Counterintelligence
Training

Because all military personnel have intelligence
responsibilities, they receive instructions in intel-
ligence and counterintelligence. Personnel as-
signed intelligence duties receive additional in-
struction appropriate to their assignments. The
intelligence officer is responsible for planning and
supervising the training of his own section; and,
in coordination with the operations officer, he su-
pervises intelligence training within the com-
mand. He prepares the intelligence training pro-
gram, conducts intelligence schools, makes staff
visits, supervises intelligence training, conducts
tests, and assists lower units in obtaining train-
ing aids and qualified instructors.

B-31. Map Supply Coordination

The intelligence officer and the support command
commander establish a direct channel of coordi-
nation and supervision in matters concerned with
map and map substitute supply operations. This
procedure is compared with other command head-
quarters such as the corps and field army, where
the intelligence officer exercises coordination and
supervision through a special staff officer (the en-
engineer).

B-32. Tactical Cover and Deception
Responsibilities

The ACofS, G2, intelligence, is responsible for
providing the ACofS, G3, operations, intelligence
input for tactical cover and deception estimates,
plans, and operations. This input includes inform-
ation on enemy intelligence collection agencies
and on the enemy's vulnerabilities and his proba-
ble reaction to friendly tactical cover and decep-
tion operations. The ACofS, G2, is also respon-
sible for preparing counterintelligence plans to
deny information on friendly tactical cover and
deception operations, providing information on
enemy tactical cover and deception activities, and
evaluating the effectiveness of ongoing friendly
tactical cover and deception operations.
Section III. OPERATIONS

B-33. General

The scope and magnitude of the operations functional areas vary with the type of command, the level of command, and the situation at a given time. The operations officer assists the commander in the discharge of his responsibility for the control of operations, which is one of overall direction, beginning with planning and carrying through to the completion of specific operations. In this capacity, the operations officer plans, coordinates, and integrates operations. The operations officer is designated ACofS, G3, or ACofS, security, plans, and operations, depending on the headquarters staff organization.

B-34. Operations Functional Areas and Procedures

a. In tactical commands, operations functional areas and procedures are concerned primarily with organization, training, and combat operations.

b. In combat service support commands, operations functional areas and procedures are concerned primarily with organization, training, and planning pertaining to the overall operations and functions of the command.

c. Subsequent discussions of operations activities include guidance on staff procedures.

B-35. Coordination and Supervision

a. Coordination. The nature of the operations officer's responsibilities requires a high degree of coordination between the operations officer and other members of the staff. Organization, training, and operational planning obviously affect the accomplishment of tasks that are the staff responsibilities of other staff officers. The operations officer continually initiates coordinating actions with other interested staff members; and, conversely, other staff members must keep the operations officer advised of implications in their areas of interest.

b. Supervision. The operations officer exercises staff supervision over activities having a direct relationship with his areas of staff interest. Chapter 4 contains a list of activities that normally fall under the staff supervision of the operations officer of a tactical command, a theater army support command (TASCOM), and a FASCOM. Some activities are under his staff supervision in all situations; others are under his staff supervision only under given conditions or circumstances. The operations officer exercises staff supervision over traffic control in a river-crossing operation, for example, until the bulk of the combat forces have crossed the river; then the logistics officer assumes staff supervisory responsibility.

B-36. Standing Operating Procedure

The operations officer prepares the operations staff section SOP and the operations portion of the command SOP. He also is responsible for the overall preparation and publication of the command SOP and changes thereto. In accomplishing this task, the other coordinating staff officers provide him with appropriation portions for inclusion in the command SOP.

B-37. Organization

a. Activation and Inactivation.

(1) To prepare the overall plan for the activation of a unit, the operations officer analyzes the unit's mission, determines tasks to be accomplished, and recommends to the commander a plan to establish task responsibilities and a schedule for their completion.

(2) The plan gives the details of unit organization and establishes priorities for the assignment of personnel (particular attention is given to the assignment of cadre) and the allocation of weapons and equipment in short supply and similar pertinent instructions.

(3) Throughout the analysis, the determination of tasks, and the preparation of the detailed phases of activation, close coordination with other members of the staff is essential. These staff members have a direct interest and a far more detailed knowledge of the several fields of interest that make up this operations function. Other staff members actually do much of the detailed planning based on guidance furnished by the operations officer, the chief of staff, or the commander.

(4) During the execution phase of the activation, the operations officer is responsible for receiving and processing units or teams, to include such orientation, training, and reorganization as may be required.

(5) For a unit's inactivation, he prepares
b. Training is accomplished through a continuous series of programs based on the training requirements of the unit. Training must be thoroughly coordinated to ensure that it is responsive to the fluctuations in the status of training in the command caused by the flow of replacements, introduction of new equipment, or the use of new tactics or techniques in the conduct of operations.

b. Training, a direct concern to all staff officers, influences the accomplishment of tasks for which these staff officers have responsibility. This relationship requires that the training program be thoroughly coordinated with all staff officers and that each staff officer, without derogation of the primary staff responsibility of the operations officer, accomplish a degree of supervision over training.

(1) The staff coordination required may include the preparation of specific training schedules and the establishment and operation of schools. As a minimum, it includes a review of the training program for adequacy both of scope and of time allocated.

(2) Staff supervision of training by other staff officers is concerned primarily with insuring that the nature of the training is adequate to the need and that the content is properly presented. The scope of supervision is generally related to the staff position; i.e., coordinating staff officers supervise broad fields, such as intelligence training (ACofS, G2), maintenance training (ACofS, G4, logistics); while special staff officers supervise a more restricted field, such as medical aspects (surgeon), C-E aspects (C-E officer), and CBR aspects (chemical officer).

c. Training directives from higher headquarters and the requirements of the command are the bases for the training program. This program is designed to reflect the status of training and to meet the needs of subordinate units; it is flexible and is further designed to attain the optimum tactical proficiency. The following factors are considerations in preparing a training program:

(1) Current strengths of units and plans for phasing in personnel.

(2) Current status of training of units and individuals, to include deficiencies revealed by inspections, reports, and training tests.

(3) Training policies, programs, and directives of higher headquarters.

(4) Commander's policies and instructions.

(5) Available training time.

(6) Training facilities and dates available. Availability dates often dictate the order of training accomplishment.

(7) Training aid requirements.

(8) Availability of equipment, supplies, and ammunition.

(9) Local and other school requirements.

(10) Instructor availability and capabilities.
(11) Time required by subordinate units. The early publication of training directives permits command and staff action at subordinate levels before beginning training.

d. Based on the above factors, the operations officer makes an estimate of the training situation. He determines the best training course of action to support the overall mission of the command. For example, if a division receives only 60 percent of its fillers, he determines whether fillers should be assigned to all units and begin training or whether selected units should be filled to full strength and start their training while other units remain at cadre strength. He coordinates recommendations resulting from the estimate with other coordinating staff officers and presents them to the commander for his approval. The commander's decision is the basis of the proposed training program.

e. On approval of the proposed training program, the operations officer has the necessary directives and orders prepared, coordinated with interested staff agencies, and issued. Concurrently, training facilities, equipment, ammunition, and training aids are procured and allocated.

f. Command and staff visits, training inspections, and tests determine the effectiveness of the training program. Results produced by the program are evaluated. This evaluation, which the operations officer supervises, forms the basis for revising the program and for future training programs of the command, particularly to include the lessons learned. Other staff officers assist the operations officer in these command and staff visits, training inspections, and tests, as appropriate.

B-39. Operations (Tactical Command)

a. Operation Estimate. The operations officer performs a continuous analysis of the tactical situation confronting the command to develop the facts and makes his recommendations to the commander. He is prepared to present his operation estimate to the commander at all times. The operations officer follows the same procedure and format in making the operation estimate that the commander uses in making his estimate except that in paragraph 5 of his estimate he makes “recommendations” rather than a decision. See appendix C for an example of the commander's estimate.

b. Plans and Orders. In the preparation of plans and orders, the operations officer considers all aspects of the operations that may affect the accomplishment of the mission, plans tasks for subordinate combat and combat support units (less intelligence and combat service support tasks), and publishes operation plans and orders. He insures the coordination and integration of all command activities having an influence on the planned operation. He receives information and recommendations for incorporation into the plan or order in the form of paragraph or subparagraph entries for the basic plan or order or in the form of annexes and appendices. Some of the more common assistance includes—

(1) The intelligence annex, prepared and authenticated by the intelligence officer.

(2) The fire support annex, prepared by the FSCOORD with assistance from appropriate designated representatives of the fire support means available. The operations officer receives the fire support annex from the FSCOORD; reviews the plan to insure its consonance with command guidance and compatibility with the planned scheme of maneuver or scheme of defense; integrates it into the operation plan (order); and, after command approval, authenticates the fire support annex and all appendixes thereto.

(3) Organization for combat of combat support elements provided by the appropriate special staff officer.

(4) ACoFS, G2, advice and recommendations concerning the intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of tactical cover and deception, to include recommending a deception target, barrier and denial, operation security, and reconnaissance-in-force operations.

(5) Assistance from ACoFS, G1, G2, G4, and G5 concerning matters within their respective purviews, including entries or annexes for the operation order.

(6) Advice from special staff officers concerning the availability and capability of combat support means and recommendations concerning employment of such means.

(7) Assistance from the EWE in the preparation of the EW annex.

c. Conduct of Operations. During combat, the operations officer is the focal point for the integration and coordination of activities primarily concerned with combat and combat support operations. He exercises staff supervision over activities of special staff officers that constitute operational assistance furnished combat elements. Special staff officers concerned include—
(1) The field artillery officer (FSCOORD).
(2) The air defense artillery (ADA) officer.
(3) The Army aviation officer.
(4) The chemical officer (excluding prediction of fallout from enemy-employed weapons and radiological monitoring and survey, which are the responsibility of the intelligence officer).
(5) The engineer.
(6) The C-E officer.
(7) The transportation officer (tactical troop movements).
(8) The UW officer.
(9) The PM (traffic control in river-crossing operations and other operations when traffic control is critical to the success of the combat operations in progress).

d. Rear Area Security. At division level and for a corps operating as part of a field army, rear area security planning and execution are responsibilities of the operations officer. For levels of command above corps or for an independent corps, rear area security planning and execution are responsibilities of subordinate combat service support or support commands. Staff activities of an operations officer of a tactical headquarters, such as an independent corps, a field army, or a theater army, are concerned with force-level planning and supervision. The operations officer—

(1) Prepares the rear area security annex to the command SOP and, if necessary, the annex to the operation plan or operation order.
(2) Reviews plans of the operating unit (TASCOM/FASCOM) to insure their compatibility with the primary mission of the command and their tactical adequacy.
(3) Coordinates with the personnel, logistics, and CMO officers to insure that force-level support requirements are considered and with the intelligence officer for the intelligence aspects of rear area security operations.
(4) Monitors rear area security operations as an element of overall command security, providing force-level direction, as appropriate, and recommends changes in composition and size of rear area security tactical forces, as appropriate.
(5) Assumes active supervision when such operations become vital to the success of the mission or the survival of the command.

e. Tactical Cover and Deception Planning. The ACofS, G3, develops the deception story to conform with the deception objective as stated by the commander. Development of the deception story and preparation of the deception plan follow the same general procedures used to prepare an operation order or an operation plan.

B-40. Operations (Combat Service Support Commands)

a. The operations officer (or ACofS, security, plans, and operations) is concerned with planning future operations and adjusting the operation and administrative/logistics orders to meet the requirements of current operations. His primary concern is insuring that the commander's intent, as reflected in the operation order, is being carried out. He recommends allocations and priorities and changes in organization and equipment. He is concerned with the operations activities previously discussed for a tactical command; in addition, he has staff supervision of rear area protection (RAP) operations. RAP includes responsibility for area damage control activities plus rear area security. However, the scope and size of tactical operations activities are greatly reduced because of the nature of command operations.

b. The ACofS, security, plans, and operations, prepares an operation estimate, which is based on the commander's planning guidance and staff estimates that other coordinating staff officers and special staff officers prepare. His concern is with broad courses of action leading to the accomplishment of the command mission.

c. The ACofS, security, plans, and operations, is responsible for the preparation, publication, and dissemination of the operation order and the administrative/logistics order. He is assisted by other members of the staff, who provide necessary entries, annexes, and appendixes to the operation order or administrative/logistics order, as required.

B-41. Records


b. Workbook (para 2–16d). Indexing of the operation workbook reflects the major activity of the command during the period, e.g., organization, training, or operations.

c. Situation Map (para 2–16e). The situation map is concerned primarily with the friendly situation.

(1) In tactical commands, the situation map
includes such postings as the location of command posts of friendly units of the command and adjacent and higher commands; patrols and ground reconnaissance elements; boundaries and other control measures; the FEBA or FFD; location of reserves; particularly significant aspects of the situation having an effect or possible effect on the operation, such as minefields, CBR contamination and other barriers, and defiles and other obstacles to movement; and planned nuclear concentrations. Information on the enemy may include the designation and zone of action of the comparable enemy force opposing the command and significant concentrations of enemy forces or other potential nuclear targets.

(2) In combat service support commands, the operation situation map may serve as the commander's situation map. It shows major headquarters and installations of the command; adjacent, higher, and supported headquarters; future locations; lines of communications; boundaries, present and future; the FEBA and FFD; and other aspects of the situation having an impact on operations warranting the operations officer's continuing attention.

d. Files. The journal file contains the original or a copy of all messages and documents that are entered in the operation journal. Other files are established as required.

e. Troop List. The troop list shows the composition and organization of the command and includes for each element listed the strength and major items of equipment of the element. The list normally includes a separate listing for each TOE unit down to and including battalions and separate companies, TOE detachments, and TDA units and detachments. It includes for each element entered the authorized strength, major items of equipment, and assignment of the element. At corps, field army, FASCOM, and TASCOM, maintenance of the troop list may be a full-time task requiring full-time assignment of personnel.

B-42. Reports

a. The operations officer obtains most of his information from reports that subordinate units and other staff members submit. Few of these reports are formally prepared and submitted; and, except for the operational report, none have a universally prescribed format.

b. During operations in the field, most reports submitted are current situation reports covering a specific event or activity. Reports are submitted by telephone, radio, or other electrical means in telegraphic language. A well-kept journal, journal file, and situation map are important because of the nature of these reports and the methods for reporting. A discussion of typical reports (tactical command) usually submitted in a format, and at a time prescribed by the receiving headquarters, follows.

(1) Initial enemy contact report is submitted on first commencing operations when initial contact with the enemy is made, or after loss of contact with the enemy.

(2) Unit progress report is used after contact with the enemy to report hourly location of elements or on reaching the assigned objective or crossing the designated phase line or checkpoint.

(3) Loss of contact with friendly units is submitted immediately on loss of contact.

(4) Situation report (SITREP) is submitted periodically as of a prescribed time as described in appendix H.

c. Formal reports prepared by the operations officer for submission to higher headquarters include—

(1) Periodic operation report. This report summarizes the friendly situation during and at the end of a prescribed reporting period. The next higher headquarters prescribes the reporting period. Normally, the division and separate brigades (regiment) are the lowest levels to submit a periodic operation report. Appendix H contains a format for and an example of a periodic operation report.

(2) Operational report AR 525-15 indicates units required to submit an operational report and the preparation and submission of the operational report.

B-43. Organizational Considerations

a. Field Army, Corps, and Division. The elimination of most of the technical service staff representation from the special staff of field army, corps, and division headquarters staffs and the organization of the TASCOM, FASCOM, and division support command (DISCOM) are organizational considerations in the following operation areas:

(1) Surface movements. If the movement can be completed without the use of support command vehicles, the operations section normally coordinates all staff actions necessary to the move-
ment. If the movement requires transport means from the support command, the support command commander provides the necessary information concerning transportation capabilities available in the command, recommendations concerning priorities and allocations from sources available, and assistance in the preparation of orders, as required. Normally, the support command commander keeps a vehicle availability table up to date and makes it available to the operations section.

(2) Traffic control. When the FASCOM is responsible for providing MP traffic control support, the operations officer coordinates directly with the FASCOM on traffic control requirements in river-crossing operations and other operations where traffic control is critical to the success of the combat operations.

b. Combat Service Support Commands. In combat service support commands, RAP (rear area security and area damage control) is a staff responsibility of the ACofS, security, plans, and operations. The staff activities of operations officers, discussed above, generally pertain.

**Section IV. LOGISTICS**

**B-44. General**

a. Activities that have logistic implications include transportation, supply, maintenance, fire support, barrier and denial, tactical cover and deception, CMO, troop movement, maintenance training, and replacement.

b. Commanders and staff officers insure that the logistic aspects of current and planned operations are given full and continuing attention.

**B-45. Materiel Readiness**

a. The requirement to maintain a condition of operational readiness, particularly the readiness of materiel, necessitates that commanders assign responsibilities for supervision of readiness functions to senior individuals or staff elements of commands. AR 11-14 defines materiel readiness functions as follows:

1. Determining the qualitative and quantitative status of equipment in relation to standards established for specific end items and organizational materiel.

2. Correcting or reporting to responsible authorities pertinent factors contributing to qualitative or quantitative deficiencies of equipment, manpower, money, training, conservation of equipment life, repair parts, tools, facilities, and maintenance management.

b. The materiel readiness functions are so broad in scope that only senior individuals or staff elements of a headquarters can adequately supervise them. Each headquarters organization should specifically charge individuals or staff elements with supervision of materiel readiness functions.

**B-46. Logistic Staff Functions and Procedures**

a. Logistic staff functions and procedures in tactical field command headquarters have a “supported force” orientation, i.e., the determination of support requirements and the establishment of priorities and allocations. They generally include the same functional areas at all levels of command. However, some tactical levels, e.g., field army and division, are more involved in logistic operations than others, e.g., theater army, army group, and corps. Planning, coordinating, and supervising staff activities at these levels generally increase in scope and size.

b. Logistic staff functions and procedures in the TASCOM and the FASCOM have a “supporting force” orientation, i.e., the execution of a support mission. Integrated with this orientation is the requirement for planning, coordinating, and supervising logistic support of the command itself.

c. In subsequent discussions of logistic functional areas, when practicable, procedures are identified with tactical commands or combat service support commands. When a clear distinction is not practicable, application of the “supported” or “supporting” concept, depending on the command considered, will determine the degree of validity of the procedure.

d. The term “logistics officer” is used generically to indicate the ACofS, G4; the ACofS, supply; the ACofS, maintenance; the ACofS, materiel; the ACofS, movements; and/or the ACofS, services, as appropriate to their responsibilities in the functional area under discussion.

**B-47. Coordination and Supervision**

a. Logistic support is integral to all operations and is considered on the checklist of every commander and staff officer. Other staff officers coordinate frequently with the logistics officer to in-
sure up-to-date information on the status of supply, maintenance, and services.

b. Logistic operations may require the use of command capabilities also needed for other operations. Logistics officers coordinate with other staff members to insure that proper priority and allocation of effort are given to logistic support operation requirements.

c. The establishment of priorities and allocations is a daily requirement in logistic support operations. Although the logistics officer normally determines the need for the establishment of priorities and allocations, he coordinates with other staff officers, as appropriate (as a minimum, the operations officer), to obtain the priorities and allocations to be used.

B-48. Standing Operating Procedure
Logistics officers prepare appropriate staff section SOP's and logistic support portions of the command SOP. Also, in tactical commands, the logistics officer prepares the area damage control annex to the command SOP, or the area damage control SOP, if issued separately.

B-49. Logistic Support Planning and Preparation of Administrative/Logistics Orders

a. Tactical Field Commands.

(1) To conduct sound logistic support planning, the commander makes an estimate that examines systematically and logically the factors that affect the logistic support of the operation (para 5-12). This estimate is the basis for much of the information incorporated into the combat service support plan.

(2) At division, the estimate is normally a continuous mental analysis of logistic support information and a consideration of its effect on the accomplishment of the tactical mission. Complicated operations may require a detailed, written estimate. In an independent corps and at field army, the scope of logistic support operations is such that a detailed, written estimate is normally necessary to arrive at sound conclusions on the logistic feasibility of an operation.

(3) The ACoFS, G4, is responsible for preparation of logistic support plans and the logistic portion of administrative/logistics orders and operation orders. He provides guidance to appropriate special staff officers, coordinates plans, and authenticates annexes pertaining to his coordinating staff officer responsibilities. Close coordination with the support command commander is important. As the primary logistic operator within the division, the support command's capabilities, limitations, and ongoing operations will impact heavily on the development of logistics plans and orders.

(4) The ACoFS, G4, is responsible for compilation, authentication, and distribution of administrative/logistics orders. However, the ACoFS, G1, provides the entries for paragraphs 5 and 6; the ACoFS, G5, provides the entries for paragraph 7. In addition, they may provide entries for paragraphs 3, 4, and 8.

b. TASCOM/FASCOM. The ACoFS, supply; the ACoFS, maintenance (or, when appropriate, the ACoFS, materiel); the ACoFS, services; and the ACoFS, movements, prepare separate estimates, plans, and orders pertaining to their respective areas of interest. Their actions parallel those of the ACoFS, G4, of a tactical command, modified by the scope of their field of interest and responsibility. They provide the results of their estimate and planning to the commander and to the operations officer for integration into the operation estimate and the commander's estimate. They prepare appropriate portions of the operation order and administrative/logistics order and provide such portions to the operations officer, who is responsible for overall preparation and publication (para B-40). They authenticate annexes and appendixes concerning operations for which they have primary coordinating staff responsibility.

c. DISCOM. Within the DISCOM, the operations and training officer (S3) is the planner for division-wide functions.

B-50. Supply

a. General. Whether the logistics officer in this paragraph is the ACoFS, G4; the ACoFS, supply; the ACoFS, services; the ACoFS, movements; the ACoFS, maintenance; or the ACoFS, materiel, depends on the command being considered.

(1) The consideration of demand experience, incoming requisitions, status reports of supplies on hand, and current and planned operations determines requirements for present and future operations. Other staff officers and commanders are the sources of information and requirements. The logistics officer establishes procedures, keeping himself informed of significant changes in status. In coordination with other staff officers, he determines requirements for future operations, except medical. The logistics officer insures the early
consideration of supply requirements in operational planning and the provision of information on future operations to other staff officers or the support command or both as early as practicable.

(2) The operations officer determines the required supply rate for ammunition.

b. Procurement. In determining the method of procurement, the logistics officer considers recommendations of other staff officers and supporting logistic unit commanders. When he considers local procurement, he obtains the recommendations of the CMO officer.

c. Storage and Distribution. Proper storage and distribution of supplies require consideration of the area of operations from a terrain standpoint, up-to-date information on the friendly and enemy situations, knowledge of future plans, and accurate records of supplies on hand. Logistics officers insure that logistic support plans reflect these considerations. As appropriate, the logistics officer recommends use of unit distribution or supply point distribution, schedules for issue to units, transportation means to accomplish the distribution, and routes to be used to insure that using units receive available supplies.

d. Allocations, Priorities, Prescribed Loads, and Available Supply Rates.

(1) Although determination of allocations, priorities, prescribed loads, and available supply rates (ASR) may be a matter of primary concern to other staff members, logistics officers submit recommendations as determined by consideration of the logistic aspects. The maintenance capability of a unit must be a consideration in making allocations and assigning priorities for issue of equipment; considerations affecting the prescribed load are the capability of the unit to transport the load and the capability of logistic support units to supply and resupply.

(2) Both the quantitative availability of supplies and the capabilities to transport and deliver the supplies directly influence the ASR. The logistics officer provides the operations officer pertinent information to insure proper consideration of these factors in determination of the ASR.

(3) Once the operations officer establishes priorities, prescribed loads, and ASR's, the logistics officer is responsible for supervising the necessary supply action.

e. Logistic Management of Nuclear Weapons.

(1) The purpose of field logistic management of nuclear weapons is to insure an adequate, responsive, and flexible supply of nuclear weapons to support tactical plans and operations.

(2) The logistic management of nuclear weapons includes—

(a) Supervision of nuclear weapon supply and maintenance.

(b) Preparation of nuclear weapon logistic support procedures.

(c) Coordination with the personnel, intelligence, operations, chemical, ADA, field artillery, C-E, and transportation officers and the engineer and the PM on plans, routes, locations, security, and issue procedures for the movement of nuclear weapons to and from special ammunition supply points (SASP) and depots.

(d) Determination and publication of procedures and instructions for the issue of nuclear weapons.

(e) Coordination with the operations officer and with the FSCoord regarding plans for positioning nuclear weapons to meet operational requirements within established and anticipated allocations.

(f) Determination of special ammunition stockages of nuclear weapons for special ammunition units, in coordination with the operations officer.

(g) Maintenance of current information on the logistic status of nuclear weapons within or available to the command.

(3) Special ammunition logistic elements (SALE) are communications zone (COMMZ) and combat zone organizations formed at the direction of the corps, field army, or theater commander to expedite supply and resupply of special ammunition. The SALE work closely with the fire support elements (FSE) of tactical operations centers (TOC).

(a) SALE consist of personnel who are specialists in the field of special ammunition. These personnel monitor special ammunition service support, including such factors as the receipt, storage, shipment, issue, and other capabilities of special ammunition supply installations in the SALE's area of responsibility. SALE maintain current asset data on special ammunition by location, time-distance factors, and transportation requirements.

(b) Personnel and equipment for manning their respective SALE's are included in the TOE's of the corps support brigade stock control center, the FASCOM inventory control center (ICC), and the materiel command ICC. The
SALE are physically located at the TOC's in the combat zone and at the theater army or ADA brigade headquarters in the COMMZ, but perform their mission under the direction of the COMMZ and combat zone logistic headquarters.

**B–51. Maintenance**

a. Whether the logistics officer in this paragraph is the ACofS, G4, or the ACofS, maintenance, depends on the command being considered.

b. The logistics officer has coordinating staff responsibility for organizational, direct support, and general support maintenance, including the maintenance assistance program, and for adequate backup support for field maintenance beyond the capability of organic units. In fulfilling this responsibility, he—

1. Determines the types and numbers of maintenance units required (assisted by the support command commander, when appropriate) and reviews the location of units to insure that distribution of maintenance support capabilities is consistent with operational requirements and RAP plans.

2. Recommends evacuation and repair policies.

3. Establishes schedules for inspection.

4. Conducts inspections and staff visits, requires maintenance status reports, and maintains records reflecting the command's status of maintenance.

5. Provides the commander and other staff members with an evaluation of the condition of maintenance as an aspect of the materiel readiness of the command and, when appropriate, an estimate of its impact on projected operations and recommendations for correction or improvement of existing conditions.

c. The logistics officer monitors maintenance training within the command to insure that it supports the overall command requirement. He provides the operations officer recommended training plans, performance standards, policies, programs, time allocations, and school quotas. As a result of staff visits and inspections, the logistics officer advises the operations officer of any need for changes in emphasis or policies in the maintenance training area.

d. Other members of the staff and the support command commander advise and assist in the maintenance program by observing maintenance operations during staff visits, by advising the logistics officer of future operations that may require special maintenance support, by giving consideration to the impact of their operations on the maintenance program, and by preparing plans and orders to be included as part of the maintenance program.

e. Specifics on maintenance support planning and the functions and operations of maintenance staffs at various levels in a theater of operations are contained in FM 29–20.

**B–52. Health Services**

(Although the personnel officer has coordinating staff responsibility for the health services functional area, the logistics officer also has interests in activities either integral to health services or in support of health services.)

a. The logistics officer reviews the health services plan for logistic considerations. As necessary, he provides staff guidance or coordinates with the surgeon, the personnel officer, and the support command commander concerning adjustments required because of logistic considerations. His particular concern is—

1. The provision of logistic support to the health services plan.

2. The coordination of the proposed locations of medical units and installations with locations of logistic support units.

3. The coordination of the medical evacuation plan with the transportation plan, particularly with respect to the use of roads and rail ways and the use of transportation carriers, including backhaul movements in medical evacuation.

4. That provision for augmentation transportation for medical evacuation is feasible and consistent with other requirements for transportation.

b. The logistics officer advises and makes recommendations concerning the logistic aspects of the command evacuation policy. His principal areas of concern are the impact on transportation requirements for evacuation and requirements for logistic support of medical installations and patients if the patients are not evacuated.

**B–53. Movements**

a. Whether the logistics officer in this paragraph is the ACofS, G4, or the ACofS, movements, depends on the command under consideration.
b. The logistics officer is responsible for determining overall present and future transportation requirements of the command for movement of units and supplies. Either the staff members or the units themselves present requirements for movement of units. The combat service support commands generate transportation requirements for movement of supplies.

c. The logistics officer is responsible for coordinating the use of all types of transportation to insure maximum use of cargo capacity consistent with the tactical situation. When requirements exceed availability, he obtains allocations and priorities and provides them to operating elements affected.

d. The logistics officer supervises highway regulation operations, to include selection of routes (in coordination with the operations officer) and traffic control (see para B-39c for exception). To insure efficient planning and implementation, the logistics officer, with assistance from the transportation officer, PM, engineer, and support command commander, coordinates and supervises development and execution of area highway regulation (FM 100-10).

B-54. Service

a. Whether the logistics officer in this paragraph is the ACofS, G4, or the ACofS, services, depends on the command being considered.

b. The logistics officer recommends policies pertaining to construction priorities and allocation of materials and personnel, including civilian personnel, available for logistic support functions. Within the policy of the command, he determines the priority and allocations of materials and personnel for construction of facilities and installations.

c. The logistics officer recommends command policy and exercises coordinating staff supervision over activities pertaining to maintenance and repair of, and provision of utilities for, facilities and installations and the acquisition, allocation, administration, and disposition of real estate. He exercises centralized control and coordination over billets and shelter and determines priorities and allocations, except those pertaining to headquarters company personnel, after coordination with appropriate staff elements.

d. The logistics officer recommends policy concerning property responsibility and accountability. He recommends approval or disapproval of quarterly reports of loss and reports of survey.

He recommends supply measures, conducts inspections, and advises on status of supply and property accounting and procedures.

e. The logistics officer recommends policy concerning the food service program, reviews the results of food service inspections, and recommends appropriate measures to correct deficiencies.

B-55. Miscellaneous Activities

a. Rear Boundaries.

(1) After coordination with the support command commander, logistics officers provide the operations officer a recommendation for location of the rear boundary to insure consideration of suitable areas for the location of logistic support installations.

(2) In tactical commands, the ACofS, G4, reviews the recommended location for the rear boundary of a subordinate unit to insure adequate space for combat service support operations. He makes recommendations concerning the boundary to the operations officer.

b. Service Areas and Locations of Units. The logistics officer recommends designation of service areas, reviews the general location of combat service support units providing logistic support to insure proper disposition of units and to detect and resolve conflicts, and coordinates times for the movement of units. Coordination is with the support command commander, the operations officer, and any other staff officer responsible for activities influenced.

c. Supply Routes. The logistics officer (operations officer in combat service support commands) has responsibility for selecting the main supply route or routes. Normally, the transportation officer, PM, engineer, and support command commander, as appropriate, in coordination with the operations officer, recommend routes.

d. Rear Area Security. The logistics officer submits recommendations to the operations officer on the adequacy of protective measures and the employment of combat service support troops providing logistic support in the integrated rear area security plan.

e. Area Damage Control. In tactical commands, the logistics officer coordinates area damage control activities with logistic support activities. In combat service support commands, logistics officers submit recommendations to the ACofS, security, plans, and operations.
f. Enemy PW and Civilian Internee/Detainee Support. In conjunction with the ACofS, G2; the ACofS, G5; and the PM, the logistics officer considers requirements for enemy PW's and civilian internees/detainees held by the command, to include those who can be expected in future operations.

B-56. Records

a. Journal (para 2-16c).

b. Workbook (para 2-16d). The logistic workbook index should assist in the preparation of the periodic logistic report.

c. Situation Map. The logistic situation map depicts the distribution of combat service support units and facilities either organic to, or in direct support of, the command; supply routes; proposed locations; service areas of subordinate levels of command; boundaries; headquarters of higher, lower, and adjacent commands; and headquarters of adjacent, higher, and lower support commands, if organized.

d. Files. The level of command determines the number of files required. Normally, all levels maintain the journal file and the information file.

(1) The journal file contains either the original or a copy of all messages and documents in the logistic journal.

(2) The information file is a suitably indexed and cross-referenced file of information that may be of future value.

B-57. Reports

a. General.

(1) Most logistic reports are concerned with materiel readiness and are technical in nature. They contain such information as quantities of supplies on hand, dispensed, and needed; quantitative measurements of service performed and needed; and other statistical measures for evaluation.

(2) Reports are held to the minimum necessary for staff supervision of the logistic effort and for the preparation of other required reports.

b. Periodic Logistic Report. Division and higher levels having a logistic support responsibility submit a periodic logistic report, which is a summary of logistic support operations for a prescribed period. The report is used for detecting trouble spots, weaknesses, and trends in logistic operations. Also, it is a principal historical document and a tool in developing logistic support planning data. Appendix H contains a format for and an example of a periodic logistic report.

B-58. Organizational Considerations

The ACofS, G4, is responsible for providing the necessary staff planning and coordinating staff supervision of logistic support. The support command commander is the logistic operator.

Section V. CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

B-59. General

a. CMO responsibilities, which include the functional areas of civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) apply at all levels of command; however, there is wide variance in the scope and size of CMO activities at different levels and under different operational environments. This applies whether or not a CMO officer is authorized in the headquarters.

b. CMO contain elements of all coordinating staff areas of interest, i.e., personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistic aspects.

c. The CMO officer prepares plans and orders for CMO activities of the command and has staff supervision thereof.

B-60. Coordination and Supervision

a. All commanders must comply with the applicable provisions of international law and status-of-forces agreements (if any) with respect to the inhabitants, government, and economics of occupied, liberated, or host countries. The military-civil relationships that this policy creates involve nearly every military activity; therefore, other staff officers coordinate with the CMO officer both in preparing plans and in issuing instructions.

b. Command activities normally requiring coordination with, or by, the CMO officer include—

(1) MP support for cordon and search operations, populace and resources control measures, circulation control of displaced persons and refugees, enemy PW and civilian internee/detainee labor, enforcement of curfews and law and order, and local security of bridges and other critical locations on main routes.

(2) Military health services support to the
civil populace and use of civilian hospitals for military hospitalization.

(3) Engineer support of civil population; acquisition of real estate; and procurement of civil construction materials, equipment, and labor for engineer tasks.

(4) Use of civilian communication facilities and local security of isolated civilian and military communication facilities.

(5) Provision of military transportation for civil populace and use of civilian transportation.

(6) Provision of military supplies of food for emergency support of civilian populace and procurement from local resources.

(7) Provision of insecticides, repellants, and rodenticides for protection of the health of the civil populace.

(8) Demobilization procedures influencing friendly irregular forces (on conclusion of hostilities, enemy military and paramilitary forces).

(9) Religious support to the civil populace and use of civilian religious edifices and consecrated areas for military religious services.

(10) Availability of local civilian labor for military support functions.

(11) Development of plans and programs for military civic actions and participation of military forces in other civic action programs.

(12) Military-civil community relations activities, both in the continental United States (CONUS) and in overseas areas.

(13) Domestic emergencies and military support of civil defense.

(14) Analysis of trends in public opinion.

(15) Planning of a community relations program to gain and maintain public understanding, good will, and support.

(16) Identification of enemy, friendly, and neutral target groups and psychological vulnerabilities.

(17) Development of plans to exploit psychological opportunities or vulnerabilities.

(18) Assessment of the effectiveness of friendly PSYOP.

(19) Support of other US Government agencies having propensity for CMO-related activities.

The CMO officer assists in the establishment of liaison and coordination between civil authorities/agencies and operating elements of the command.

B-61. Standing Operating Procedure
The CMO officer prepares the CMO staff section SOP and the CMO portions of the command SOP, which may be separated as CA and PSYOP.

B-62. Planning

a. Planning activities of the CMO officer vary, depending on the mission of the command. The CMO officer develops CMO aspects of plans for current and future operations.

b. Principal planning areas requiring coordination are the use of local resources, including labor; military support of the local population; security and defense measures; combat service support of CMO activities and of CA and PSYOP units; health and sanitation; public safety, including movement control; official contracts with local civilians; intelligence; and information activities.

B-63. Military Civic Action
The CMO officer advises and assists military and civilian authorities of a host country in the development of civic action plans and programs. He coordinates with other US agencies and makes recommendations concerning employment of US and host country resources for military civic action projects.

B-64. Estimates
Appendix C contains a format for and examples of the CMO officer's estimates. When the purpose of the estimate is to isolate CA and PSYOP factors independently, as they influence operations, a separate estimate may be prepared and titled "CA Estimate" or "PSYOP Estimate."

B-65. Records

a. Journal (para 2-16c). The maintenance of a complete detailed journal is of importance because of the international law aspects of CMO operations. The journal is the principal record for recounting situations and establishing the details of action taken.

b. Workbook (para 2-16d). Use of the CMO workbook index assists in preparing the periodic CMO reports.

c. Situation Map. The CMO situation map depicts current and future dispositions of assigned, attached, and supporting CA and PSYOP units; boundaries; headquarters of higher, lower, and adjacent commands; and such information on the
civil populace as seats of government, capitals of districts, townships, or similar subdivisions of the government; locations of large groups of refugees and displaced persons; areas requiring special measures for law and order, religious, or historical reasons; and off-limits areas.

d. Files. CMO staff section files may contain more detail than other staff section files because of the many and varied functional areas involved. In addition to the journal file and information file (para 2-16), the section may also maintain individual files of miscellaneous records for specific areas. These files are valuable references for future analysis of the commander's record and justification of his action. They should be removed to safe storage as soon as practicable.

B-66. Reports

a. General. Within the basic policy of keeping requirements for reports to a minimum, the CMO officer establishes procedures for reports, a complete record for historical purposes, and the collection of information required for the periodic CMO reports.

b. Periodic Reports. Appendix H contains a format for and an example of a periodic CA report, which is one type of periodic CMO report.

Section VI.

COMPTROLLER

B-67. General

a. The comptroller, as a member of the coordinating staff, assists the commander and staff by exercising his responsibilities as the command's principal staff officer in matters pertaining to the acquisition and utilization of resources and the overall management of the command.

b. The comptroller's responsibilities include—

1. Obtaining, administratively controlling, and accounting for the funds from which the command's resources are acquired.

2. Assisting in the overall management of men, money, and material resources and facilities of the command.

3. Performing reviews and analyses of systems, procedures, and organizational performance for the purpose of management improvement.

4. Collecting and processing management information for use in the decisionmaking process within the command.

5. Serving as the management consultant of the command.

6. Exercising staff supervision over the finance support network and related accounting functions of the command; resolving technical finance matters; and developing plans, policies, and programs for coordinated finance activities.

B-68. Programing/Budgeting

The comptroller has major responsibility for assisting the commander in developing, executing, evaluating, and revising the command operating program/budget. He assists the staff in integrating the various functional inputs into a balanced program/budget. He coordinates and supervises the formation of the command operating program/budget, insuring that the decision of the commander and the resources policy and guidance from higher headquarters are accurately reflected. The comptroller's program/budget responsibilities include—

a. Developing necessary plans, policies, and procedures to implement and execute the command's budgeting activity.

b. Preparing or issuing directives for the coordinated development and preparation of the command's operating program/budget and the accomplishment of the program/budget execution review.

c. Providing authority for the use of financial resources in the execution of the budget, including authorized fund distribution; exercising related staff supervision over budget execution in subordinate levels; and making related budget analyses, such as interpretation of trends in resources application and rates of obligations and expenses, and their impact on the command program accomplishment in current and future fiscal periods.

d. Providing assistance in all other aspects of the budget system, including the development of methods, procedures, formats, and techniques for preparation, analysis, and presentation and the development of budgetary statistics for budget/program purposes.

e. Providing and supervising the development of cost estimates of changes in the command's mission or of alternate courses of action to acquire...
complish the command's mission within budgetary limitations.

f. Providing or supervising the development of methods, procedures, techniques, and factors used in the preparation of cost analyses and cost estimates within the command.

g. Reviewing cost estimates prepared by other staff sections for validity, consistency, uniformity, and accuracy.

h. Preparing special studies that provide the background for planning, programing, and budgetary decisions.

B–69. Finance Advisory Services

The comptroller has staff responsibility for finance services within the command. Finance services include payment of military personnel, disbursing of public funds, and services related thereto. Functions included in the comptroller's responsibility for finance advisory services are—

a. Developing plans for and insuring the most efficient and effective employment of finance units within the command.

b. Monitoring the assignment and training of finance personnel within the command.

c. Establishing policy for and monitoring the currency control program within the command.

d. Determining the need for the establishment, operation, and termination of troop banking facilities within the command's area of responsibility.

e. Establishing funding policies and procedures for the command finance activities, to include disposition of captured and mutilated currency.

f. Establishing policy and procedures for the use of military payment certificates within the command, when required.

g. Evaluating the economic impact of command expenditures.

h. Monitoring the savings programs for assigned personnel.

i. Establishing policy for and monitoring the transmittal of personnel funds of assigned personnel.

j. Processing reports of survey and reports of loss of funds occurring within the command.

k. Performing technical inspections of finance units to insure compliance with laws and regulatory requirements governing the administration and expenditure of appropriated funds.

l. Providing administrative services in support of payment of legal obligations of the Army and collection of monies due the United States.

m. Evaluating requests of finance and accounting officers and their agents to hold specific amounts of cash at their personal risk.

n. Developing and recommending policies, directives, and regulations for control of exchange notes and purchase of local currency.

o. Preparing currency control procedures that address problems created by black-market operations and counterfeiting.

p. Developing and reviewing contingency, evacuation, and destruction plans.

q. Administering the reporting of command bonded positions.

B–70. Financial Accounting

a. The comptroller has staff responsibility for accounting activities when the commander is responsible for a financial accounting mission. He insures that the finance and accounting officers carry out finance and accounting activities as assigned and that they keep him advised thereof.

b. Functions included in the comptroller's responsibilities for financial accounting are—

(1) Developing plans and program objectives to implement the financial and property accounting activities of the command's management program.

(2) Analyzing the accounting data generated by the command; designing financial data statements that staff and operating officials require; and supervising the preparation, interpretation, and presentation of analyses and statements for commanders.

(3) Developing policies, procedures, and techniques governing establishment and maintenance of the command accounting system, including accounting and related reporting for appropriations, funds, property, and other assets available to, or in custody of, the command; liabilities of the command; and operating revenues, expenses, and costs of goods produced or services rendered.

(4) Administering the integrated account-
ing system and the provision of staff and technical supervision in the headquarters and in subordinate organizations and activities over all accounting, financial reporting, and the related accounting aspects of obligating procedures and administrative control of funds.

(5) Exercising supervision, where required, over the financial aspects of contract financing functions (such as guaranteed loans, progress payments, and advance payments), including the prompt ascertainment of contractor liabilities to the Government and timely collection of indebtedness due from contractors.

(6) As assigned or requested, taking actions or making recommendations on claims, reports of survey, and matters pertaining to loss of appropriated and nonappropriated funds.

c. The comptroller provides liaison and coordination with representatives of the US General Accounting Office, the US Army Audit Agency, and the Inspector General regarding examinations, audits, or inspections that those organizations conduct within the command.

B—71. Internal Control

The comptroller is responsible for establishing and maintaining a system of internal control within the command. Internal control encompasses the plan of organization and all the coordinate methods and measures adopted within an entity to safeguard its assets, check the accuracy and reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed managerial policies. This is accomplished through internal accounting systems, review, and audit. Functions include—

a. Continuously appraising and making required improvements in accounting systems and procedures.

b. Providing the major command with staff and technical supervision and assistance to insure adequacy and proper functioning of the internal review function of subordinate commands.

c. Supervising or performing the audit of nonappropriated funds, as delegated.

B—72. Progress and Statistical Reporting and Analysis

The comptroller has staff responsibility for activities primarily concerned with the conduct and integration of reviews and analyses to determine the status, progress, and results of all programs and activities, particularly in relation both to total resources of the command and the time schedule that the command is operating. Functions included in the comptroller's responsibility for progress and statistical reporting and analysis are—

a. Developing plans and program objectives to implement the progress and statistical reporting and analysis activity of the command's management program.

b. Reviewing and analyzing the execution phase of the operating program with respect to internal balance among the several elements of the program and providing for evaluation of the availability of resources in relation to requirements of the several elements of the program.

c. Reviewing and appraising performance, progress, program status, and trends against approved missions, tasks, programs, and schedules and identifying opportunities for improvement; reviewing and appraising the use of physical resources in relation both to work performed and the accomplishment of program and mission objectives; and presenting timely and meaningful analyses to the commander and staff as a result of such reviews and appraisals.

d. Exercising, for the command headquarters and its subordinate installations and activities, staff and technical supervision over all progress statistical reporting and analysis activities, including the reports control system; and developing guides and criteria for the collection, processing, analysis, summarization, and interpretation of statistical data.

e. Administering the reports control system, including the design of progress and statistical reports and the continuous review and appraisal of reports and reporting requirements.

B—73. Management Analysis

a. The comptroller normally has coordinating staff responsibility for management systems of the command. These systems consist of integrated groups of procedures, methods, policies, practices, and personnel that a commander and his staff use in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling. The comptroller normally is responsible for reviewing and analyzing existing management systems, developing new command-wide management systems outside the functional area of responsibility of any single staff agency, coordinating the integration of the staff functional area systems into the overall
management system, providing assistance to other staff agencies both in improving systems within their purview and in developing new systems, and studying system problems crossing organizational or functional lines.

b. Management analysis is the chief functional activity for studying and developing management systems. Normally, management analysis is a responsibility of the comptroller and provides a continuing and independent analysis of organization, functions, procedures, and management policies for the purpose of assisting in managing the command effectively and efficiently.

c. The comptroller normally has staff responsibility for—

1. Evaluating nontactical organization and methods, developing proposals for improvement, and assisting in the installation of new and improved organization and methods.

2. Exercising staff supervision over management improvement programs through management analysis techniques and, when assigned, manpower control.

3. Providing staff supervision over the development, extension, and use of performance analysis, including the development of standards of performance; and integrating performance analysis data with other management data.

4. Performing industrial engineering functions assigned to him or to the head of another appropriate agency of the command.

B-74. Automatic Data Processing

a. The comptroller has staff responsibility for insuring the effective and efficient management of combat service support ADP facilities, to include the following:

1. Analyzing ADP systems and specifications and recommending revision of existing programs, or adopting new programs.

2. Analyzing automatic data processing equipment (ADPE) inventory and operating status reports, recommending distribution of ADPE, and coordinating the development of data automation requests.

3. Developing policy for the establishment of alternative systems under emergency conditions.

b. The comptroller may be assigned operational control of ADP facilities furnishing services to two or more organizational or functional elements.

B-75. Other Responsibilities and Functions

a. Within command policies, the comptroller provides indoctrination and training of personnel in the principles and techniques of his functional activities.

b. In overseas areas, the comptroller exercises, in coordination with the ACoS, G5, such additional responsibility for foreign financial matters and other fiscal transactions as local conditions require.
This appendix provides a discussion of the applicability of the estimate of the situation to the needs of commanders and staff officers at major headquarters of the Army in the field (chap 5). It includes a detailed discussion of the sequence of, and basic principles for, the preparation of a tactical and a combat service support commander's estimate of the situation, including formats with explanations and examples. It also contains formats establishing a sequence for preparation of staff estimates and examples of the application of these formats at selected major headquarters.

Section I. TACTICAL COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

(The following discussion, including the format and content of the tactical commander's estimate of the situation, applies to the operation estimate of the situation except that the title of paragraph 5 of the operation estimate is "RECOMMENDATIONS" rather than "DECISION.")

C-1. Paragraph 1, MISSION

The restated mission, as determined by the commander in step 3 of the sequence of commander and staff actions (chap 5).

C-2. Paragraph 2, THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION

In this paragraph, the commander considers all elements and aspects of the situation that influence operations to formulate tactical courses of action and to facilitate analysis of such courses of action to accomplish the mission.

a. Subparagraph a, "Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action." The purpose of subparagraph a is to determine those facts of the
situation that will influence friendly and enemy actions and, therefore, may influence the choice of a course of action. The commander analyzes each fact and deduces the probable effect of that fact on other facts and on enemy and friendly actions. In the absence of facts, he uses logical assumptions.

(1) Characteristics of the area of operations (including analysis of the effects of pertinent characteristics of the operations). The commander considers the following:

(a) Weather.

1. Military aspects of predicted weather and light data for the period, together with the effects of these data on the employment, by friendly and enemy forces, of means or devices influenced by weather conditions.

2. Effect of weather on enemy operations, our operations, and terrain.

(b) Terrain.

1. Effect of terrain on observation and fire; concealment and cover; movement (surface and air); employment of friendly and enemy nuclear weapons and chemical weapons and enemy biological weapons; radiating devices, such as communications, electronic warfare, and combat surveillance; unconventional warfare; psychological operations; and other devices or aspects of military operations, as appropriate.

2. Effect of military aspects of terrain on enemy operations and our operations.

(c) Other pertinent factors. Succeeding subparagraphs include, when appropriate, analyses of the political, economic, sociological, and psychological factors or science, technology, materiel, transportation, and manpower, together with deductions pertaining to their effects on the operations.

(2) Enemy situation. The commander considers—

(a) Dispositions. Locations of enemy forces, including fire support elements, when appropriate. Dispositions may be shown by map or overlay.

(b) Composition. Indication of identity, armament, and type of organization of enemy forces.

(c) Strength. Stated in the following terms:

1. Committed forces. Number and size of enemy units committed against our force.

2. Reinforcements. Number and size of enemy reinforcements.

3. Air and nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities. Enemy air strength available to support ground operations; and, if known, the yield and number of nuclear warheads and quantities of chemical and biological agents and delivery means.

4. Other considerations. Enemy forces not listed above known to have special capabilities, such as electronic warfare, unconventional warfare, or combat surveillance by electronic, sonic, or other means, together with deductions concerning their effect on our combat power.

(d) Recent and present significant activities. This subparagraph summarizes recent and present activities of the enemy. If it is reasonable to believe that the enemy has knowledge of our situation or intentions, the commander emphasizes this fact. He pays particular attention to the pattern of employment of enemy nuclear weapons. He lists such items as enemy employment of new or unconventional weapons, techniques, and tactics or innovations in existing tactics, techniques, or materiel. He may include an evaluation of enemy intelligence collection means or techniques.

(e) Peculiarities and weaknesses. The commander indicates enemy peculiarities and weaknesses that will influence his combat effectiveness either favorably or unfavorably.

(3) Own situation. This subparagraph lists for own forces essentially the same considerations as those included in (2) above. However, biological agents and delivery means are not included in the listing of considerations. The subparagraph states recent and present significant activities, peculiarities, and weaknesses and includes such items as morale, training, civil affairs, and logistics. The operations officer compiles this information for the estimate, based on his knowledge of the situation and on information obtained from the personnel, logistics, and civil-military operations (CMO) officers. Otherwise, the commander obtains this information directly from the personnel, operations, logistics, and CMO officers' oral staff estimates. The information is usually in abbreviated form because it may be a repetition of what is generally known. However, own dispositions are significant and must be described in sufficient detail to determine considerations that will influence the commander's choice of a course of action favorably or unfavorably, to include vulnerability to enemy nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. The information in this subpara-
graph of the estimate includes an indication of own vulnerability to such attack.

(4) Relative combat power. Based on an analysis of data concerning the enemy and his situation, the commander determines and states his conclusions concerning relative combat power. These conclusions consist of an estimate of the general overall relationship of the combat power of his forces to that of the enemy forces, to include significant strengths and vulnerabilities. The basic factors of combat power are maneuver units and supporting fires. Additional factors that might be considered are tactical cover and deception, mobility, control and coordination, terrain, dispositions, weather, logistic support, psychological warfare, security, and electronic warfare. These factors do not always apply to any particular situation. For every operation, a determination of the appropriate factors must be made. The commander's analysis of relative combat power provides a general background for formulating courses of action and may indicate the basic nature and the characteristics of feasible courses of action. These conclusions assist in speeding up the estimating process by providing an indication of courses of action that would be infeasible and, therefore, should not be considered. The commander avoids becoming involved in an attempt to make a detailed study of personnel or weapons on both sides. He bases conclusions on a general impression of the relative capability of the two forces.

b. Subparagraph b, "Enemy Capabilities."

(1) Enemy capabilities are those courses of action that the enemy can physically perform and that will influence the accomplishment of our mission, if adopted.

(2) The intelligence officer normally determines enemy capabilities and presents them in the intelligence estimate. If justified, the intelligence officer also provides his evaluation of the relative probability of adoption. The commander considers all the enemy capabilities presented by the intelligence officer. He may accept, revise, and discard them or develop additional capabilities, if appropriate.

(3) The commander includes enemy vulnerabilities that are exploitable at his own, higher, or lower levels of command.

c. Subparagraph c, "Own Courses of Action."

(1) AR 310–25 defines a course of action as "any sequence of activities which an individual or a unit may follow; a possible plan open to an individual or a commander which would accomplish or is related to the accomplishment of his mission; the scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission; a line of conduct in an engagement." The estimator develops his own courses of action; however, the commander may formulate one or more courses of action and provide them as guidance to the staff.

(2) In subparagraph c, the commander considers the courses of action that the operations officer presented in his operation estimate. He may reject, modify, or formulate additional ones, if appropriate. This procedure assists the commander in considering all significantly different feasible courses of action.

(3) The ability to formulate feasible courses of action quickly and accurately is essential to sound decisionmaking. The development and recognition of feasible courses of action depend, in part, on the influence of the aspects of the situation considered in paragraph 2 of the estimate and, in part, on the judgment of the estimator. The individual formulating courses of action should use the following criteria as a guide:

(a) Is the course of action feasible; i.e., does the command have the capability to perform the contemplated action?
(b) Will the course of action accomplish the mission without undue damage to the command?
(c) Are the courses of action in sufficient detail to be distinguishable, one from the other, for purposes of analysis?

(4) There are several techniques for formulating courses of action. These courses may be stated in either broad or detailed terms. During his analysis of opposing courses of action, the estimator may add details, make revisions, and fully develop the courses of action.

(a) The estimator will include the following elements in each course of action. The amount of detail included is subject to the judgment of the estimator.

1. The type of action (e.g., attack, defend) (what).
2. The time that the action will begin or be completed (when).
3. The location of the action (in the defense, the assigned sector; in the attack, the general direction of the attack) (where).
4. The use of available means (how) (a broad indication of the maneuver elements, the form of maneuver or the formation to be employed, and, if appropriate, nuclear and chemical
fired to be employed; when necessary to distinguish between courses of action, he may include other supporting fires).

5. The purpose of the action (why) may be included in courses of action for clarity of purpose.

(b) As indicated above, courses of action can be stated in broad or detailed terms. The amount of detail included is subject to the judgment of the commander; however, courses of action should include sufficient detail to distinguish one from the other for purposes of subsequent analysis and comparison. In most instances, the distinguishing differences are in the elements of where and how. In expressing courses of action, either the where is used, stating only a portion of the how (normally used when courses of action are expressed in general terms); or the how is used, stating the where in general terms (normally used when courses of action are expressed in more detailed terms).

(c) A course of action for an offensive mission will include the what (attack), the when (time of attack), the where (direction of attack), the how (use of available means), and the why (purpose of the action). As indicated above, the amount of detail included in these elements is a matter of judgment.

(d) A course of action for a defensive mission will include the what (defend), the when (time the defense is to be effective), the where (may use location of forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) or areas units will defend), the how (some indication of forward committed units), and the why (purpose of action). Again, the amount of detail included in these elements is a matter of judgment.

C-3. Paragraph 3, ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION

The commander must analyze each of the courses of action formulated in paragraph 2c of the estimate (para C-2c) to determine its advantages and disadvantages to incorporate improvements, to determine requirements for supporting fires, and to define requirements for any other actions in conjunction with the course of action. The commander accomplishes this by war gaming the course of action from the current dispositions of the unit to the objective, to include any actions that may be required subsequent to securing the objective.

a. The first part of the commander's analysis is a preliminary analysis to discriminate between those considerations or enemy capabilities listed in paragraph 2b of the estimate that will materially assist in choosing the best course of action and those that will not.

1. Those enemy capabilities that are not selected for use in analysis are still valid capabilities that, if adopted by the enemy, will influence the accomplishment of the mission. However, they are of no assistance in determining the relative probability of success of own courses of action. Although these enemy capabilities are not selected, they continue to be used for reference purposes.

2. The determination of those enemy capabilities that should be selected for use in analysis requires judgment because there are no absolute rules governing this process. In general, when in doubt concerning the selection of a particular capability, the commander selects it. In exercising judgment, the commander—

(a) Analyzes the enemy capabilities presented by the intelligence officer, paying particular attention to those capabilities having a high probability of adoption. He will probably not select a capability with a low probability of adoption.

(b) Examines enemy maneuver capabilities to determine those capabilities that, if adopted, would produce a different effect on friendly courses of action. He selects these capabilities for purposes of analysis because they will assist in choosing a course of action.

(c) Reexamines the selected enemy maneuver capabilities to determine the characteristics that are inherent in other capabilities. For example, the characteristics of the delay capability may be inherent in the defense capability.

(d) For speed and simplicity, may combine more than one maneuver capability for purposes of analysis; e.g., he may combine defense and reinforcement of the defense, or he may combine attack and reinforcement of the attack.

3. The enemy artillery, air, and nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities are support capabilities. The enemy ordinarily would adopt these capabilities only in connection with maneuver capabilities, particularly at division and below. Therefore, the commander would not ordinarily select these enemy capabilities separately for purposes of analysis, but he would combine them with maneuver capabilities. Thus, as a final step in selecting the enemy capabilities that will assist in choosing the best course of action, the commander combines the support capabilities
with the maneuver capabilities previously selected.

(4) Assuming that, in a particular situation, the commander has selected the defense capability; the attack capability; and the reinforcement capability plus support capabilities, to include fire support and nuclear and chemical capabilities, he could state them as follows:

(a) Attack (now, tomorrow), reinforced (with (by) type of units), supported by available fire support, to include nuclear and chemical weapons.

(b) Defend (now, tomorrow), reinforced (with (by) type of units), supported by available fire support, to include nuclear and chemical weapons.

b. The second part of the analysis step is the analysis of each of own possible courses of action (para C-2c). The estimator makes no attempt to compare own courses of action. Paragraph 3 is a series of independent analyses of own courses of action versus enemy capabilities. The estimator analyzes each friendly course of action separately against each of the selected enemy capabilities to determine its outcome. He visualizes the action from the preparation for action through the execution stage. One approach he uses is to visualize the action by both sides in logical sequence from the present positions to the final objective. He considers all facts in developing paragraphs 1 and 2 of the estimate and their effects on the action. He determines the enemy capability to oppose the course of action and considers the degree of success in the face of enemy opposition. He weighs the degree of risk and its acceptability for each course of action. He considers active and passive measures by which the effects of enemy nuclear, biological or chemical, guerrilla, and air attacks may be decreased. He ties these together by a common mission. It is neither possible nor practicable for the commander to reach an overall conclusion on the best course of action until all the information developed during the course of analysis is available and the comparison in paragraph 4 has been completed.

c. Paragraph 3 is that part of the estimate in which the commander attempts to visualize and to anticipate all possible eventualities to discover strengths and weaknesses of each course of action. The following is an outline of one method that the commander uses to analyze an offensive course of action:

(1) He begins by determining the combat power that the enemy has committed in the initial position that must be ruptured. He then determines the combat power required to rupture the position in the face of available enemy power. At division, the commander visualizes combat power in terms of numbers and types of maneuver battalions. He examines current dispositions to determine those units that can be most logically employed. In making this examination, he considers any other facts that bear on the employment of specific units and any redisposition of units that may be necessary to initiate the course of action. At this time, he may consider the requirement for control headquarters.

(2) The commander then visualizes the movement of units from initial positions or from positions to which units have been redisposed.

(3) He visualizes the movement of units across the line of departure and the effect on those enemy defenses considered and appraises the enemy reaction to reinforce or to counter the attack. At this time, he considers and visualizes the requirement for supporting attacks in terms of units needed. He also considers the requirement for supporting fires, use of smoke, and supporting air in rupturing the initial enemy position. He visualizes critical areas and incidents and notes advantages and disadvantages. On completion of war gaming through the rupture of the initial enemy position, the commander develops the composition of the main and any required supporting attack forces and makes his decision on the composition, location, and possible employment of the reserve should the initial attack fail.

(4) The commander follows a similar process in continuing to war game to the objective. He considers requirements for supporting fires; nuclear and chemical fires; use of smoke, flame, and riot control agents; and supporting air. He assesses the capability of the supporting attack to contribute to success by immobilizing enemy units or by preventing the use of reinforcements. He again visualizes critical areas and incidents and notes advantages and disadvantages. He considers employment of the reserve and makes a decision on its movement into more advantageous supporting positions. He repeats this process until the objective is secured.

(5) Once the objective is secured, the commander considers requirements to consolidate, reorganize, build up, and move the reserve to the most advantageous positions.

(6) He repeats this process of analysis for each course of action against each of the selected enemy courses of action.
d. On completion of war gaming each course of action against each selected enemy capability, the commander should find that the following have been developed:

1. Requirements for readjustment of initial dispositions.
2. Composition of the main and supporting attack forces.
3. Requirements for fire support and incorporation of tactical cover and deception and electronic warfare techniques.
4. Probable enemy reaction during each phase of the operation.
5. Probable critical areas and incidents and how success is to be achieved in each case.
6. Initial location and composition of the reserve and its possible employment during various phases of the action.
7. Actions required in consolidating, reorganizing, and building up in the objective area.
8. Advantages and disadvantages of each course of action.

c. In the last subparagraph, the commander states an overall conclusion on which course of action offers the best prospect of success.

C-5. Paragraph 5, DECISION (Commander's Estimate)

a. The commander uses the course of action he considered in the comparison step that offered the best probability of success as a basis for his decision. The decision provides for accomplishment of all elements of the commander's restated mission.

b. The commander's decision, the last step of the estimate, is a clear, concise statement of the scheme of maneuver that he approves for the operation. He and his staff will use it to develop the remainder of the tactical plan.

c. The elements of what, when, where, and how are present in the course of action. However, before the decision is understandable to other than the estimator, it normally must also include the elements of who (the command itself or, when the entire command is not involved, the appropriate elements of the command), and so much of the why (the purpose to be attained and the reasons therefor) as are necessary for understanding.

d. The commander makes many "decisions" in the course of planning an operation. However, this decision is the initial decision as a result of his estimate and reflects the scheme of maneuver to be adopted. He includes any elaboration of this decision in the commander's concept to his staff.

C-6. Format and Examples

Figure C-1 summarizes the general description and content of the tactical commander's estimate of the situation contained in the above discussion. Examples C-1, C-2, and C-3, section IV, provide example applications of this format for use by a division commander and a field army commander. Example C-4, section IV, provides example application of this format for use by an area adviser in a stability operation.
(The operations officer of a combat service support command uses the discussion, content, and format of this estimate of the situation, except that the title of the final paragraph is "RECOMMENDATIONS" rather than "DECISION.")

C–7. Paragraph 1, MISSION

The mission may be a general mission or a specific mission. The mission statement is the restated mission determined by the combat service support commander's mission analysis.

a. The mission normally is to support the operations of another commander, or other commanders. It is set forth in orders and instructions from higher authority, or it may be deduced from knowledge of the situation and of the intent of higher authority. When paragraph 1 is a statement of a general mission of support, the commander includes the course of action of the supported command, or commands, if known.

b. Specific missions are normally within the scope of the general mission of support. A specific mission may be set forth in orders and instructions from higher authority or deduced from knowledge of the situation and intent of the higher authority. Examples are “Support three additional armored divisions in the 3d Army sector” and “Assume civil affairs responsibilities in the area, of the 3d Corps extending to the MEUSE River.” A specific mission for an estimate might also be an included task of the general mission for which the commander must decide on a course of action. The combat service support commander's mission of providing class V support to a field army is an example of an included task that might be the subject of a separate estimate.

C–8. Paragraph 2, THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION

Paragraph 2 of the combat service support commander's estimate serves the same purpose as paragraph 2 of the tactical commander's estimate. However, the nature of a combat service support command's operations requires emphasis on different aspects of the situation than for a tactical command. This necessitates a modification in the content and sequence of paragraph 2 of the estimate as follows:

a. Subparagraph a, “Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action.”

(1) Operations to be supported. The commander considers the nature of the operations to be supported, composition of supported forces, strengths to be supported, peculiar or unusual combat service support requirements of supported forces, and any other factors pertaining to the supported force that affect the scope and size of the support mission.

(2) Characteristics of the area of operations. The combat service support commander considers the same factors as the tactical commander. He applies these factors to the conduct of combat service support operations to determine the effects of the characteristics of the area of operations on these operations and to the accomplishment of his mission.

(3) Enemy situation. The commander considers enemy capabilities that are a threat to the conduct of his operations.

(4) Own situation. The commander considers those aspects of the friendly situation that provide bases for recognition of anticipated difficulties or difficulty patterns in the command's capability to provide the required support.

(a) Tactical situation. The commander considers the dispositions of the major elements of the supported force. He considers dispositions at the beginning of the operation and at those phases of the tactical operation that may require reassessment of the combat service support operations. He establishes any special support requirements needed at the beginning of the operation and at each subsequent phase. He determines any special support techniques or procedures required because of the tactical situation.

(b) Personnel, logistic, and civil-military operations. In separate subparagraphs, the commander considers the personnel, logistic, and CMO situations. Each subparagraph contains a consideration of the situation within the command as well as mission support requirements in the respective area. He states the effects of either or both considerations on accomplishment of the mission.

b. Subparagraph b, “Anticipated Difficulties or Difficulty Patterns.” This subparagraph parallels the purpose of paragraph 2b of the tactical commander's estimate. The combat service support commander determines and lists difficulties or difficulty patterns in the existing or projected situation that may influence accomplishment of the mission. The commander derives these difficulties
or difficulty patterns from the considerations in paragraph 2a of the estimate, and he uses them in the analysis paragraph of the estimate.

c. Subparagraph c, “Own Courses of Action.”
The commander lists the feasible courses of action that will accomplish the support mission.

C–9. Paragraph 3, ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION
The commander determines the probable effect of each significant difficulty on the success of each course of action. He may accomplish this in two steps:

a. Selecting those significant difficulties that oppose the friendly courses of action formulated and stated in paragraph 2c of the estimate.

b. Analyzing each course of action stated in paragraph 2c of the estimate against each selected difficulty. He determines the probable outcome of each course of action, including critical incidents, areas, times, and significant difficulties (para 3 of the tactical commander’s estimate (para C–3)). He applies these factors to his analysis by considering the impact of enemy capabilities and significant difficulties on the possible success of each course of action.

C–10. Paragraph 4, COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION
The combat service support commander’s comparison in this paragraph has the same objective as that of the tactical commander’s comparison, i.e., to compare the courses of action after the analysis to determine which course of action promises to be most successful in accomplishing the mission. Paragraph 4 of the tactical commander’s estimate (para C–4) contains a discussion of the techniques and procedures that the combat service support commander can use in making his comparison.

C–11. Paragraph 5, DECISION
In this paragraph, the commander translates the course of action selected into a statement of what the command as a whole is to do and as much of each of the elements of who, what, when, where, how, and why as may be appropriate.

C–12. Format and Examples
The format shown in figure C–2 summarizes the general description and content of the combat service support commander’s estimate of the situation.

Section III. STAFF ESTIMATES

Figure C–3 summarizes the general description and content of the personnel logistic, and CMO estimates. Civil affairs and psychological operations estimates may be made as combined or as separate estimates, depending on the relative emphasis required by the situation. Examples C–6, C–7, C–8, C–10, and C–11 provide example applications of this format for use by a personnel officer, a logistics officer, and a CMO officer.

C–14. Intelligence Estimate
Figure C–4 summarizes the general description and content of the intelligence estimate. Example C–5 shows example application of this format for use by an intelligence officer in a stability operation. Example C–9 shows example application of this format for use by an intelligence officer at corps.

C–15. Tactical Cover and Deception Estimate
The format for a tactical cover and deception estimate is similar to that for the operation estimate (fig C–1). Example C–12 shows example application of this format for use by an operations officer at field army.
COMMANDER’S (OPERATION) ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

References: Maps or charts.

1. MISSION
The restated mission determined by the commander in step 3 of the sequence of commander and staff actions (chap 5).

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
   a. Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Determine those facts of the situation that will influence friendly and enemy actions and thus may influence the choice of a course of action. Analyze each fact and deduce the probable effect of that fact on other facts and on enemy and friendly actions. In the absence of facts, use logical assumptions.

   (1) Characteristics of the area of operations.
   (a) Weather. Include the military aspects of weather and light data for the period. Include the predictable or assumed effects on the employment, by friendly and enemy forces, of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, electronic warfare, combat surveillance devices, unconventional warfare, psychological operations, and other means or devices that weather influences. Include the predictable or assumed effects on the employment, by enemy forces, of biological agents. Summarize the effects of weather on enemy and friendly operations.

   (b) Terrain. Include the military aspects of terrain. Determine and include the effects of terrain on observation and fire; concealment and cover; movement; and the employment of friendly and enemy nuclear weapons and chemical agents and enemy biological agents, combat surveillance devices, unconventional warfare, psychological operations, and other means, devices, or aspects of military operations, as appropriate. Determine and include the effects of weather on terrain. Summarize the effects of terrain on enemy operations and friendly operations.

   (c) Other pertinent factors. Include relevant facts pertaining to hydrography, radiofrequency environment, communications, civil-military operations (politics, economics, sociology, and psychology), technology, materiel, transportation, manpower, refugees, or other factors influencing operations. Include facts and deductions from these facts concerning effects on operations and summarize the effects on enemy and friendly operations.

   (2) Enemy situation. Indicate the disposition of enemy forces, to include fire support units (when appropriate). Determine and state the composition of enemy forces, to include identity, armament, and type of organization. Include order of battle information on infantry, mechanized, armored, airborne, or airmobile units, cavalry, artillery, supporting air and naval units, and guerrilla forces. Determine enemy strength and state in terms of committed forces; reinforcements; and air, nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities. Summarize those recent and present activities of the enemy that may indicate his future action. Summarize enemy peculiarities and weaknesses that will influence his combat effectiveness either favorably or unfavorably. Determine and list enemy vulnerabilities.

   (3) Own situation. Include factors that bear on our own combat power, including dispositions, composition, strength (including air, chemical, and nuclear), morale, training, civil affairs, combat service support, own vulnerability to enemy nuclear attack, and other considerations that will influence our combat effectiveness favorably or unfavorably.

Figure C-1. Format for the tactical commander’s (operations officer’s) estimate of the situation.
(4) Relative combat power. Indicate the general overall relationship of the combat power of friendly forces to that of the enemy forces, together with an evaluation of significant strengths and vulnerabilities of the enemy and our own forces. This estimate within an estimate provides a general background for the formulation of courses of action and may indicate the basic nature and characteristics of courses of action.

b. Enemy Capabilities. List all courses of action that the enemy can perform and that will influence the accomplishment of the mission, if adopted. Include the relative probability of adoption, if justified. Include enemy vulnerabilities exploitable at own, higher, or lower levels of command.

c. Own Courses of Action. Formulate logical tactical courses of action to accomplish the mission in terms of what; when; where; how; and, when needed for clarity, why.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION
Determine the probable effect of each enemy capability on the success of each course of action (para 2c). This may be done in two steps, as follows:

a. Select the enemy capabilities that will materially assist in choosing the best course of action.

b. Analyze each course of action, in turn, against each selected enemy capability or combination of capabilities, considering the effects of the enemy capabilities stated in a above and the effects of those significant facts and assumptions provided in paragraph 2. Determine probable critical incidents, areas, and times and how to cope with them if they arise. During this process, the strengths and weaknesses (advantages and disadvantages) of each course of action with respect to these significant facts and assumptions are determined.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION
Compare courses of action in terms of significant advantages and disadvantages that emerged during analysis (para 3). Decide which course of action promises to be most successful in accomplishing the mission. Another method of comparison may be used in which certain major considerations (such as terrain, obstacles, and own dispositions) are isolated and all courses of action are discussed under each major consideration with a subconclusion reached for each major consideration.

5. DECISION (RECOMMENDATIONS)
Translate the course of action selected (para 4) into a statement of what the force as a whole is to do and as much of each of the elements of who, what, when, where, how, and why as may be appropriate.

/s/ ________________________________

Authentication
Annexes (as required)
Distribution

(Classification)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

References: Maps or charts.

1. MISSION
   a. When the purpose of the estimate of the situation is to determine the best course of action to execute a general mission of support, include the support mission set forth in orders and instructions from higher authority and the course of action of the supported command in general terms, when appropriate.

   b. When the purpose of the estimate of the situation is to determine the best course of action to execute a specific mission (within the general mission of providing combat service support), subject the specific mission to analysis. This restated mission is the mission statement used in the estimate. Determine what tasks must be performed to insure that the mission will be fully accomplished. State these tasks in the sequence in which they are to be accomplished, together with so much of the purpose of each task as appropriate.

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
   a. Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action. Determine and analyze those facts that will influence the choice of a course of action. Analyze each fact and deduce the probable effect on other facts and on friendly and enemy actions. In the absence of facts, use logical assumptions.

      (1) Operations to be supported. Describe the nature of the operations to be supported, emphasizing the impact of current and future problems and plans on the supported operations.

      (2) Characteristics of the area of operations.

         (a) Weather. Include the military aspects of weather. Summarize the effects of weather on the conduct of the support mission.

         (b) Terrain. Include those military aspects of terrain influencing the conduct of support operations. Include transportation facilities, such as roads, railroads, ports, and beaches, as appropriate.

         (c) Other pertinent factors. Include relevant facts pertaining to economic, political, social, and psychological conditions within the area of support operations. Include facts or deductions concerning the effects on support operations.

      (3) Enemy situation. Determine the effect of current enemy operations, including unconventional warfare and covert operations, on the support operation. List enemy capabilities that, if adopted, will influence the conduct of operations. Determine the effect of such capabilities.

      (4) Own situation. Include significant aspects of own situation and their effect on the mission. Include determination of requirements and availability of resources and the impact of future plans on the mission.

         (a) Tactical situation. Include present dispositions of major tactical elements and projected operations. State the effects of the tactical situation on the combat service support mission.

         (b) Personnel situation. Provided from the personnel estimate of the situation. State the effects of the personnel situation on the combat service support mission.

         (c) Logistic situation. Provided from the logistic estimate of the situation. State the effects of the logistic situation on the combat service support mission.

         (d) Civil-military operations (CMO) situation. Provided from the CMO estimate of the situation. State the effects of the CMO situation on the combat service support mission.

   ...
b. Anticipated Difficulties or Difficulty Patterns. List anticipated difficulties or difficulty patterns that may influence the accomplishment of the mission. This list may include enemy capabilities, including nuclear, biological, chemical, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations capabilities, or other major anticipated difficulties or difficulty patterns that must be overcome.

c. Own Courses of Action. Determine and list the logical courses of action that will accomplish the mission, if successful.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION

Determine the probable effect of each significant difficulty on the success of each course of action (para 2c). This may be done in two steps, as follows:

a. Select those significant difficulties that oppose the friendly courses of action formulated and stated in paragraph 2c.

b. Analyze each course of action stated in paragraph 2c against each selected difficulty from a above. Determine the probable outcome of each course of action, including critical incidents, areas, times, and significant deficiencies.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION

Compare courses of action in terms of significant advantages and disadvantages that emerged during analysis (para 3). Decide which course of action promises to be most successful in accomplishing the mission (or which tactical course of action can best be supported). Another method of comparison may be used in which certain major considerations (such as time, distance, and vulnerability) are isolated, and all courses of action are discussed under each major consideration with a subconclusion reached for each major consideration.

5. DECISION (RECOMMENDATIONS)

Translate the course of action selected into a statement of what the command is to do, including who, what, when, where, how, and why, as appropriate.

/s/ ____________________________

Commander

Annexes (as required)

Distribution

Figure C-2—Continued.
(Note. This format is for use by the personnel, logistics, and civil-military operations staff officers of a tactical command in combat. Because the battlefield dictates the need for an immediate, accurate, and continuing estimate, the estimate may be in the form of notes or it may be presented orally. When written, it should be brief. Paragraphs and subparagraphs that are not pertinent, or their contents are already known to the commander and staff, are omitted.)

 Issuing section and headquarters
 Place
 Date, time, and zone

(PERSONNEL) (LOGISTIC) (CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS) ESTIMATE

References: Maps or overlays (as necessary for understanding of the estimate).

1. MISSION
The restated mission determined by the commander in step 3 of the sequence of commander and staff actions (chap 5).

2. THE SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS
   a. Intelligence Situation. Information obtained from the intelligence officer. When the details make it appropriate and the estimate is written, a brief summary and reference to the appropriate intelligence document, or an annex of the applicable estimate, may be used.
      (1) Characteristics of the area of operations.
      (2) Enemy strength and dispositions.
      (3) Enemy capabilities.
         (a) Affecting tactical mission.
         (b) Affecting (personnel) (logistic) (civil-military operations) activities.
   b. Tactical Situation. Information obtained from the commander's planning guidance and from the operations officer.
      (1) Present dispositions of major tactical elements.
      (2) Possible courses of action to accomplish the tactical mission. (These courses of action are carried forward through the remainder of the estimate.)
      (3) Projected operations, if known, and other planning factors as required for coordination and integration of staff estimates.
   c. Personnel Situation. (Use with logistic estimate and civil-military operations estimate.) Information obtained from the personnel officer.
      (1) Present dispositions of logistic units and installations that have an effect on the logistic situation or on the civil-military operations situation, depending on the estimate being made (logistic estimate or civil-military operations estimate).
      (2) Projected developments within the personnel field likely to influence the operations (logistic or civil-military operations).
   d. Logistic Situation. (Use with personnel estimate and civil-military operations estimate.) Information obtained from the logistics officer.
      (1) Present dispositions of logistic units and installations that have an effect on the personnel situation or on the civil-military operations situation, depending on the estimate being made (personnel estimate or civil-military operations estimate).
(Classification)

(Short title identification)

(2) Projected developments within the logistic field likely to influence the operations (personnel or civil-military operations).

e. Civil-Military Operations Situation. (Use with personnel estimate and logistic estimate.) Information obtained from the civil-military operations officer.

(1) Present dispositions of civil-military operations units and installations that have an effect on the personnel situation or on the logistic situation, depending on the estimate being made (personnel estimate or logistic estimate).

(2) Projected developments within the civil-military operations field likely to influence the operations (personnel or logistic).

f. (Personnel) (Logistic) (Civil-Military Operations) Situation. (Situation presented depends on title of estimate; e.g., for the personnel estimate, this subparagraph is titled “Personnel Situation.”) In this subparagraph, the status is shown under appropriate subheadings. In the case of detailed information at higher levels of command, a summary may appear under the subheading with reference to an annex to the estimate.

g. Assumptions. Any assumptions required as a basis for initiating planning or preparing the estimate. Assumptions are modified as factual data when specific planning guidance becomes available.

3. ANALYSIS
Under each subheading and for each tactical course of action, when appropriate, analyze all (personnel) (logistic) (civil-military operations) factors, indicating problems and deficiencies.

4. COMPARISON
a. Evaluate deficiencies, if any, with respect to the accomplishment of the mission, using those tactical courses of action listed in the commander's estimate.

b. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each tactical course of action under consideration from the (personnel) (logistic) (civil-military operations) standpoint. Include methods of overcoming deficiencies or modifications required in each course of action.

5. CONCLUSIONS
a. Indicate whether the mission set forth in paragraph above can be supported from the (personnel) (logistic) (civil-military operations) standpoint.

b. Indicate which proposed course or courses of action can best be supported from the (personnel) (logistic) (civil-military operations) standpoint.

c. Indicate the (personnel) (logistic) (civil-military operations) disadvantages of each proposed course of action not listed in b above.

d. List the major (personnel) (logistic) (civil-military operations) deficiencies that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include specific recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effect of these deficiencies.

/s/
(Designation of staff officer)

Annexes (as required)
Distribution

(Classification)

Figure C-8—Continued.
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO ______

References: Maps, charts, or other documents.

1. MISSION
The restated mission determined by the commander in step 3 of the sequence of commander and
staff actions (chap 5).

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
This paragraph discusses the influence of the area of operations used in arriving at conclusions. It
is based on the facts and conclusions of the analysis of the area of operations, if one has been pre-
pared. It may be a reference to an analysis of the area of operations, if adequate coverage and dis-
cussion are contained therein.

   a. Weather.
      (1) Existing situation. Include light data and either a weather forecast or climatic informa-
tion, as appropriate. Use appendixes for detailed information.
      (2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Discuss the effects of weather on each enemy broad
course of action (e.g., attack, defend). Each discussion concludes with a statement of whether the
weather favors the course of action. Among the courses of action, include use of biological and chem-
ical agents; nuclear weapons; and special methods, techniques, equipment, procedures, or forces.
      (3) Effect on own courses of action. Discuss in the same manner as for (2) above, except that
the estimate excludes the use of biological agents and concentrates on the type of maneuver (e.g.,
attack, defend) to accomplish the mission.

   b. Terrain.
      (1) Existing situation. Use graphic representations, where possible. Use annexes for detailed
material. Include as much information as necessary for an understanding of concealment and cover,
observation and fire, obstacles, key terrain features, and avenues of approach. (Paragraph 3a, fig-
ure G-1, contains a discussion of these five factors in detail.) Include effects on each of these factors,
as appropriate, of nuclear fires, enemy biological and chemical agents, and any other pertinent con-
siderations.
      (2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Discuss in the same manner as for the effects of
weather in a(2) above. For defensive courses of action, state the best defense area and the best ter-
rain avenues of approach leading to it. For attack courses of action, state the best avenues of ap-
proach.
      (3) Effect on own courses of action. Discuss in the same manner as for effects of weather in
a(3) above.
c. Other Characteristics. The following additional characteristics considered pertinent are included in separate subparagraphs: sociology, politics, economics, psychology, and other factors. Other factors may include such items as science and technology, materiel, transportation, manpower, and hydrography. These factors are analyzed under the same headings as weather and terrain.

3. ENEMY SITUATION
This paragraph gives that information on the enemy which will permit later development of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities and refinement of these capabilities into a specific course of action and its relative probability of adoption.

a. Disposition. Reference may be made to overlays, enemy situation maps, or previously published documents.

b. Composition. Summary of order of battle of opposing forces and other enemy forces that can influence accomplishment of the mission. Reference may be made to previously published documents. Special mention is made of units capable of electronic warfare, stability operations, and other special operations, as appropriate.

c. Strength. Enemy strength is listed as committed forces, reinforcements, air, nuclear weapons, and chemical and biological agents. The purpose of this listing is to assist in developing enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities for use by the commander and staff in selecting our courses of action.

(1) Committed forces. List those enemy ground units, their immediate reserves, and their supporting ground fire units that are reasonably certain of being employed within a definite area regardless of the specific friendly course of action implemented. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces depends primarily on their disposition, location, and the level of command at which the estimate is being prepared. The intelligence officer usually accounts for committed forces by the size unit used to oppose the friendly-size unit used in his headquarters as a basis for planning operations (e.g., a brigade S2 normally considers committed forces in terms of companies; a division G2, in terms of battalions; and field army and higher headquarters, in terms of divisions). If there is doubt whether a unit is a committed force or a reinforcement, it is considered a reinforcement. This attributes to the enemy the maximum capability to reinforce his forces to oppose a given friendly course of action.

(2) Reinforcements. Include designation and location. Reinforcements are those enemy forces that may or may not be employed against us, depending on our choice of a specific course of action and enemy plans. To be considered reinforcements, the enemy forces must also be capable of employment against us at various times and places, subject to time and distance considerations, in time to influence the accomplishment of the mission. Disposition, location, level of control, or other factors considered at the time of the estimate are considered in determining which enemy forces are considered reinforcements.

(3) Air. List the number of enemy aircraft by type within operational radius. Include the number of possible sorties per day by type of aircraft, if known.

(4) Nuclear weapons and chemical and biological agents. Estimate, as appropriate, the number, type, yield, and delivery means of enemy nuclear weapons and chemical and biological munitions or agents available to the enemy. (Estimates of enemy air, nuclear, biological, and chemical operations capabilities are usually prepared at field army and higher headquarters. Units subordinate to field army use the estimates of higher headquarters.)
d. Recent and Present Significant Activities. In this subparagraph, selected items of information are listed to provide bases for analyses to determine relative probability of adoption of specific courses of action and enemy vulnerabilities. Enemy failures to take expected actions are listed as well as positive information.

e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses. Based on knowledge of enemy tactical doctrine, practices, the principles of war, the area of operations, and the enemy situation previously described and discussed, list peculiarities and weaknesses, and briefly discuss each, indicating the extent to which they may be vulnerabilities and how they influence possible friendly courses of action. The items listed are grouped under the headings indicated below. Only pertinent headings are used.

   (1) Personnel. An estimate of strength usually is included if less than 80 percent of authorized strength. Status of morale is included, if known.

   (2) Intelligence. An estimate of enemy intelligence success, ineffectiveness, and susceptibility to deception and detection usually is included.

   (3) Operations. An estimate of combat effectiveness usually is included if less than excellent.

   (4) Logistics. An estimate of the enemy's capability to support his forces logistically is included if there are apparent weaknesses.

   (5) Civil-military operations. An estimate of the attitudes of the enemy and the civilian populace and the status of food, supply, medical facilities, and communications usually is included.

   (6) Personalities. An estimate of the capabilities and/or weaknesses of the enemy commander and principal staff officers usually is included.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

   Based on all the previous information and analyses, develop and list the enemy capabilities (FM 30-5). The listing provides a basis for analyzing the available information to arrive at those capabilities that the enemy can adopt as specific courses of action and their relative probability of adoption.

   a. Enumeration. State what, when, where, and in what strength for each capability.

   b. Analysis and Discussion. To provide a basis for conclusions on the adoption of enemy capabilities and their relative probability of adoption, each capability, or appropriate combination thereof, is discussed in a separate subparagraph. Consideration of enemy deception measures is included. All the pertinent previous information and conclusions are tabulated as either supporting or rejecting the adoption of the capability. After listing all the evidence, each capability is judged from the enemy point of view of whether the adoption of the capability is advantageous to the enemy. Such judgments need not be made if the conclusion is obvious or if there is no evidence that the enemy will adopt the capability, except when the capability is one that will make the accomplishment of the friendly mission highly doubtful or impossible. This exception is to focus attention on dangerous threats.

5. CONCLUSIONS

   Based on all the previous information and analyses, conclusions are stated concerning the total effects of the area of operations on friendly broad courses of action; the courses of action most probable of adoption by the enemy, to include their relative probability of adoption; and the effects of the enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited. These conditions assist in the selection of a friendly course of action.

   (Classification)

   Figure C-4—Continued.
a. Effects of the Area of Operations on Own Courses of Action. For attack courses of action, indicate the best avenues of approach. For defense courses of action, indicate the best defense areas and the best avenues of approach leading to and into the defense areas. (This subparagraph is omitted if the discussion of the effects of the area on own courses of action in paragraph 2 has been omitted because of the availability of a current analysis of the area of operations.)

b. Probable Enemy Courses of Action. Courses of action are listed in order of relative probability of adoption. A listed course of action may include several subordinate courses of action that can be executed concurrently. Usually, no more than two or three courses of action, in order of probability of adoption, can be justified by the available evidence.

c. Enemy Vulnerabilities. List the effects of peculiarities and weaknesses that result in vulnerabilities that are exploitable at own, higher, or lower levels of command. The order of listing these vulnerabilities has no significance.

/s/ G2

(Commander, if distributed outside headquarters)

Authentication (G2 authenticates if commander signs estimate.).

Annexes

Distribution (if appropriate)
Section IV. EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS

Example C-1. Infantry Division Commander's Estimate of a Tactical Situation

(Classification)

20th Inf Div
EKBERG (1843), DSEA
131600L July 19_

COMMANDERS' ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION


1. MISSION
20th Inf Div attacks 140430 July, secures high ground (1055–1457), denies area south of TAKASAN Canal to the enemy, and protects corps east flank.

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
   a. Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action.
      (1) Characteristics of the area of operations.
         (a) Weather.
            1. Effect on enemy operations. Weather gives Aggressor good observation over avenues of approach into his position and good cross-country mobility. Wind directions do not favor Aggressor use of smoke or toxic chemical agents. Weather favors Aggressor use of air, nuclear, and biological weapons. Effective winds do not favor Aggressor use of fallout.
            2. Effect on own operations. Weather gives us good visibility and soil trafficability. Wind favors our use of smoke. Weather favors our use of nuclear weapons. Effective winds favor our use of fallout.
         (b) Terrain.
            1. Effects on enemy operations.
               (a) Aggressor-held terrain favors defense in depth to the division objective. Aggressor has excellent observation over all avenues of approach, and his flanks are protected by rivers on the east and artificial obstacles and river on the west.
               (b) Best avenue of approach for an Aggressor attack is the axis LEON (1370)—GONA (1640)—OSTRO (1955).
               (c) Terrain favors Aggressor delivery of nuclear weapons by low-level air attack as long as Aggressor controls PETROV Woods ridge.
            2. Effects on own operations. Terrain does not favor our attack. Aggressor has excellent observation over his entire front and the approaches to all key terrain features. Excellent obstacles protect his flanks.
            (c) Other considerations. The friendly attitude of the population will assist us, particularly as sources of information. The population may be exploited to hinder Aggressor troop movements. Control of civilians to prevent interference with operations will be a problem.
      (2) Enemy situation. Intelligence Estimate No 15.
      (3) Own situation.
         (a) Strength. Infantry battalions average approximately 90-percent authorized strength, except for the 1–66 Inf, which has one ineffective company and another at 80-percent authorized strength.
(COMDR’S EST OF SIT—20th Inf Div)

(b) Composition. 20th Inf Div.

(c) Dispositions. See Annex A (Situation Overlay).

(d) Combat service support. 1-66 Inf is short approximately 35 percent of its class II and VII equipment. Allocation of nuclear weapons for 14 July is one each SRC/1 KT, MRC/2 KT, FFR/5 KT, and FFR/10 KT. Available supply rate for 105-mm ammunition is 125; 4.2-inch mortar, 50; other types, no restriction.

(e) Morale. Excellent, except in 1-66 Inf, as a result of nuclear strike; somewhat low in 1-68 Inf, but believed to be a temporary condition.

(f) Status of training. Excellent.

(g) Combat efficiency. Excellent, except in 1-66 Inf, where it is poor, and 1-68 Inf, where it is fair.

(h) Reinforcements. 312th Mech Bde (two infantry battalions (mechanized) and one tank battalion) is in corps reserve.

(4) Relative combat power. It is estimated that our force is somewhat superior to the enemy in maneuver strength, mobility, conventional fire support means, and the ability to react quickly. While our force is believed to be superior in nuclear weapons, the enemy has had ample opportunity to analyze targets and compute data to employ those weapons he does have. The enemy is disposed on terrain that is decidedly advantageous to him.

(5) Electronic warfare. Electronic warfare resources can be used to minimize the use of the enemy’s electromagnetic devices, while helping to insure the effectiveness of our own emitters, especially during critical phases of our operations.

(6) Tactical cover and deception. Employment of cover and deception techniques will mislead the enemy and conceal from him our actual movements and dispositions.

b. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) Enumeration. Aggressor can—

(a) Attack now along our front, with six mechanized battalions supported by all available artillery, air, and nuclear weapons.

(b) Defend now in present positions with six mechanized battalions supported by all available artillery, air, and nuclear weapons.

(c) Reinforce his attack or defense with all or part of the following units at the places and times indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Motor</th>
<th>Foot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Estimated mechanized regiment (—) in vicinity of 1256</td>
<td>160489</td>
<td>40 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASM 1</td>
<td>min ASM 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 hr</td>
<td>7 hr 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>min ASM 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Estimated mechanized battalion in vicinity of JANINA</td>
<td>160489</td>
<td>50 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASM 1</td>
<td>min ASM 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 hr 5</td>
<td>7 hr 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>min ASM 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Estimated mechanized battalion in vicinity of CELINA</td>
<td>160489</td>
<td>50 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASM 1</td>
<td>min ASM 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 hr</td>
<td>6 hr 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>min ASM 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Estimated medium tank regiment (—) in vicinity of 1256</td>
<td>160489</td>
<td>55 min</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASM 1</td>
<td>——</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 hr 20</td>
<td>——</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>min ASM 1</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

ASM—After starting movement.
(Classification)

(COMDR'S EST OF SIT—20th Inf Div)

(d) Delay on present and successive positions to the CELINA (1557)—JANINA (1054) ridge.

(e) Withdraw any time north of the TAKASAN Canal.

(f) Employ within the 30th Army area an unknown number of nuclear weapons from 0.5-KT to 100-KT yield with delivery by air, rockets, cannon artillery, missiles, and prepositioning.

(g) Employ chemical agents at any time either independently or in conjunction with his other capabilities.

(h) 30th Army estimates that Aggressor can be expected to attack within the army area with as many as 100 fighter, 40 attack, and 30 bomber sorties daily. By massing aircraft within operational radius of 1st Corps, Aggressor can mount a maximum of 200 fighter, 80 attack, and 60 bomber sorties daily.

(2) Probable course of action. Defend in his present position, reinforced by his division reserve and using all available artillery, air, and nuclear weapons.

(3) Vulnerabilities. Aggressor is vulnerable to—

(a) Exploitation of penetration because of a lack of reserves at division level.

(b) Rapidly conducted offensive action for next 15 days because the shortages of 122-mm howitzer ammunition, replacement personnel, POL, and truck transportation have reduced his combat power.

(c) The effects of our psychological operations activities because of the hostility of the local population.

c. Own Courses of Action.

(1) Attack 140430 July in the direction Hill 412 (2049)—Hill 351 (1951)—Plateau BELLERIVE—Hill 306 (1754)—Hill 321 (1457); secure Hill 321 and the ridge west thereof; employ nuclear weapons on the enemy positions on the south slope of Hill 351, on the south slope of Plateau BELLERIVE, and on the south slope of Hill 306.

(2) Attack 140430 July in the direction Hill 418 (1848)—Hill 406 (1849)—Hill 408 (1651)—Hill 306 (1754)—Hill 321 (1457); secure Hill 321 and the ridge west thereof; employ nuclear weapons on the enemy positions on the south slope of Hill 406, on the south slope of Hill 408, and on the south slope of Hill 306.

(3) Attack 140430 July in direction Hill 418 (1848)—Hill 406 (1849)—Hill 408 (1651)—Hill 282 (1251)—Hill 326 (1158)—Hill 320 (1455); secure Hill 320 and the ridge east thereof; employ nuclear weapons on the enemy positions on the south slope of Hill 406, on the south slope of Hill 408, and on the southeast slope of Hill 282.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION

a. (1) Aggressor's delay, withdrawal, nuclear, air, chemical, and biological capabilities do not materially influence our choice of a course of action.

(2) Our dispositions are such that the threat of an enemy attack will not significantly influence or prevent necessary redisposition of our forces to implement any of our courses of action. If the enemy were to implement his attack capability before our attack, a decisive action would be fought near or on our present positions. It is doubtful that we have sufficient strength to defeat the enemy and concurrently launch a successful attack. Such an action also would involve major changes in the enemy's dispositions and some changes in our dispositions, thereby causing us to face a new situation necessitating a revised estimate with new courses of action. In this situation, the enemy's attack capability does not influence our choice of a course of action to accomplish our mission.

(Classification)
(Classification)

(COMDR'S EST OF SIT—20th Inf Div)

b. Course of action 1 (attack Hill 412—Hill 351—Plateau BELLE RIVE—Hill 306—Hill 321) versus—

(1) Aggressor defense in present positions with six mechanized battalions. Our forces are disposed in such a manner that no major redispersions would be necessary to implement this course of action. Our main attack would cross three areas (Hill 351, Plateau BELLE RIVE, and Hill 306), each of which is defended by an estimated Aggressor battalion. To rupture the initial positions and to hold the shoulders would require the efforts of two of our battalions and at least one tank company. Our initial attack would necessitate crossing a cross compartment to gain Hill 351 and an uphill attack against the Aggressor battalion on the south slope of that hill. Employment of a nuclear weapon should materially facilitate securing this ground. Target analysis reveals that either an SRC/1-KT or an MRC/2-KT weapon could be used on this target. Either would achieve the minimum effects necessary to assist in securing the position. Neither an FFR/5-KT nor an FFR/10-KT weapon could be used here for troop safety reasons. Some tree blowdown would occur, creating an obstacle to tanks and armored carriers. The success of the main attack against this position would depend on the ability of a supporting attack against Hill 406 to neutralize observation and fires from that area. Continuation of the main attack to the Plateau BELLE RIVE would again necessitate crossing a major cross compartment and an uphill attack. Either an FFR/5-KT or an FFR/10-K weapon would achieve minimum effects necessary to facilitate securing this position. This phase of the main attack should be supported by continuation of the supporting attack to Hill 408 to insure securing dominating terrain in the center of the zone. The success of 2d Corps attack would influence our success to some degree. The next phase of the main attack would cross a cross compartment in approaching Hill 306. To assist in securing this position, an FFR/10-KT weapon would achieve good effects. An MRC/2-KT or an FFR/5-KT weapon would achieve barely minimum effects. In conjunction with this attack, a supporting attack should be employed toward Hill 326 to gain possession of the dominating terrain in the left portion of the zone. Considerable time would be required for this attack to occur. The main attack would next cross a major cross compartment and extensive minefields under excellent enemy observation, while control of the high ground on the left would be the responsibility of a supporting attack force. To gain Hill 321 and move up the objective ridge from the east, it would probably be necessary to employ a force larger than two battalions in the final phase of the main attack, together with employment of our reserve weapon. In addition, it would probably become necessary to request from corps one additional nuclear weapon from the corps reserve for employment in this area. The best combination of nuclear weapons for this course of action is an SRC/1-KT weapon on Hill 351, an FFR/5-KT weapon on Plateau BELLE RIVE, and an FFR/10-KT weapon on Hill 306, leaving an MRC/2-KT weapon in reserve. This course of action uses a direct route to the objective. It provides somewhat restricted maneuver room for the main attack initially and adequate maneuver room for the supporting attack. It gives Aggressor the advantage of excellent observation of the approach of our main attack to Hill 321. It would depend for success on nuclear strikes and at least to a degree on the ability of a supporting attack to secure rapidly Hill 408 and Hill 326 without nuclear support. The east flank of the main attack is protected by an unfordable obstacle.

(2) Aggressor reinforcement of his defense. If Aggressor employed his reserve to reinforce his defense in the Plateau BELLE RIVE area, he could slow down the main attack, which, because of the restricted maneuver area, could cause sufficient concentration to make the main attack extremely vulnerable to nuclear strikes. In any event, it would be necessary either to commit additional combat power against him in that area or to reinforce the supporting attack to move to Hill 306 and Hill 321. If aggressor reinforced in the Hill 306 area, either the employment of additional force against him to gain that ground would be required, or it would be necessary to reinforce a supporting attack and commit it in the direction Hill 282—Hill 326—Hill 320 to secure Hill 320. If Aggressor reinforced in the Hill 408 area, he could canalize the main attack by holding terrain

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on the left flank. While he would not stop the main attack, additional combat power might be required to contain enemy forces in that area. This would ultimately favor the destruction of enemy forces in the Hill 408 area. If Aggressor reinforced in the Hill 282 or Hill 326 area, the securing of the objective by the main attack would be facilitated. If he reinforced the objective area, either a strong frontal attack would be necessary against his forces on terrain favoring the defender or the reinforcement and commitment of a supporting attack in the direction Hill 326—Hill 320 would be necessary.

c. Course of action 2 (attack Hill 418—Hill 406—Hill 408—Hill 306—Hill 321) versus—

(1) Aggressor defense in present positions with six mechanized battalions. No major redispositions would be necessary to implement this course of action. Our main attack would cross three areas (Hill 406, Hill 408, and Hill 306), each of which is defended by an estimated Aggressor battalion. Our attack from Hill 418 across the saddle to Hill 406 would allow us to take maximum advantage of high ground initially. An effective nuclear strike on Hill 406 would facilitate our advance. According to target analysis, an SRC/1-KT weapon will achieve good effects on this target. (Neither an MRC/2-KT, an FFR/5-KT, nor an FFR/10-KT weapon can be used on this target for troop safety reasons.) After Hill 406 has been secured, the main attack should be able to gain Hill 408 rapidly, although the attack would have to cross a relatively shallow mine belt en route to Hill 408. Any of our allocated weapons could be employed on the enemy positions on the south slope of Hill 408, although an MRC/2-KT weapon appears, from target analysis, to be most suitable. It would achieve good effects. By gaining Hill 408, our main attack would have gained control of the southern portion of the zone and have observation of our flanks. The action described thus far should be supported by an attack to secure Hill 331 and Plateau BELLERIVE. The next phase of the attack—the advance from Hill 408 to Hill 306—crosses a cross compartment under Aggressor observation and makes a major change in direction. It would depend for success on an effective nuclear strike on Hill 306. Containment or neutralization of the forces on Plateau BELLERIVE would be necessary. To obtain optimum effects on the enemy positions on Hill 306, an FFR/10-KT weapon should be employed. An additional supporting attack should be launched to secure Hill 326 to contain and neutralize enemy forces in that area and to secure the east flank of the main attack. The advance of the main attack force from Hill 306 to Hill 321 is across a wide cross compartment under excellent observation, encompasses another change in direction, and is across a mine belt. While initially employing three battalions in the main attack, it would probably become necessary to employ a larger force in the main attack in the last phase of the operation; the reserve nuclear weapon undoubtedly would have to be employed to facilitate securing Hill 321 and to provide support for rolling up the objective from the east. In addition, it might become necessary to request an additional weapon from corps to support the final phase of the attack. The optimum combination of nuclear weapons and targets in this course of action is an SRC/1-KT weapon on Hill 406, an MRC/2-KT weapon on Hill 408, and an FFR/10-KT weapon on Hill 306, leaving one FFR/5-KT weapon in reserve. This course of action takes advantage of high ground initially; however, it is not the most direct route to the division objective. In the latter phases of this attack, success may depend on the employment of one or two additional nuclear weapons and on an additional supporting attack in the eastern portion of the division zone.

(2) Aggressor reinforcement of his defense. If Aggressor reinforced on Plateau BELLERIVE, the advance of the main attack and the securing of Hill 321 would be facilitated; this would favor the destruction of enemy forces in the Plateau BELLERIVE area. If he reinforced on Hill 306, he could force us to commit additional combat power against him to gain that ground or to reinforce and commit a supporting attack in the direction Hill 282—Hill 320 to secure Hill 320. If he reinforced in the Hill 408 area, he could slow the main attack and cause us either to use additional force in
that area or to reinforce and commit the supporting attack to secure Plateau BELLERIVE, Hill 306, and Hill 321. If he reinforced the objective area, either a strong frontal attack would be necessary against his forces on terrain favoring the defender or the reinforcement and commitment of a supporting attack in the direction Hill 326—Hill 320 would be indicated. If he reinforced in the Hill 282 or Hill 326 area, the securing of Hill 321 would be facilitated.

d. Course of action 3 (attack Hill 418—Hill 406—Hill 408—Hill 282—Hill 326—Hill 320) versus—

(1) Aggressor defense in present positions with six mechanized battalions. No major redistributions would be necessary to implement this course of action. Our main attack would cross three areas (Hill 406, Hill 408, and Hill 282), each of which is defended by an estimated Aggressor battalion. From Hill 418 to Hill 408, the same considerations apply to this course of action as to course of action 2. From Hill 408 to Hill 282, the main attack would be required to cross a saddle that contains open, parklike woods against the Aggressor positions on Hill 282. Either an FFR/5-KT or an FFR/10-KT weapon would achieve necessary results against this target; an FFR/5-KT weapon is the optimum. Some tree blowdown would occur; however, this could easily be bypassed. The supporting attack, after securing Plateau BELLERIVE, should proceed to secure Hill 306. The main attack after securing Hill 282 would proceed along high ground to Hill 320 and would be in a position to roll up the objective area. It might become necessary, however, to request an additional weapon from corps to facilitate rapid securing of the objective area. In this course of action, changes of direction in the main attack are necessary. This course of action, if executed with speed, would provide an excellent opportunity to destroy the enemy along the approaches to and on the division objective. This course of action provides adequate maneuver room for the main attack and the supporting attack. It makes maximum use of terrain by employing the best avenue of approach to the objective. The optimum combination of nuclear weapons in this course of action is one SRC/1-KT weapon on Hill 406, one MRC/2-KT weapon on Hill 408, and one FFR/5-KT weapon on Hill 282, leaving the largest weapon, the FFR/10-KT, in reserve.

(2) Aggressor reinforcement of his defense. If Aggressor reinforced on Plateau BELLERIVE, the advance of the main attack, the securing of Hill 320, and the destruction of the enemy in zone would be facilitated. The same would be true if he reinforced on Hill 306. If he reinforced on Hill 408, however, either the commitment of additional combat power in this area would be required, or the supporting attack would have to be reinforced to advance in the direction Plateau BELLERIVE—Hill 306—Hill 321 to secure Hill 321. If he reinforced in the Hill 282 area, the Hill 326 area, or the objective area, he would slow the main attack; however, terrain does not favor his defense in this area to the extent that it does in the Plateau BELLERIVE or the Hill 306 area.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION

a. Course of Action 1.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Has east flank of the main attack protected by an obstacle throughout the attack.

(b) Avoids mined areas until it approaches the division objective.

(c) Is a reasonably direct route to the objective.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Main attack crosses four cross compartments; Aggressor has good observation of our main attack throughout its progress.

(b) Maneuver room for the main attack is somewhat restricted.
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(c) Main attack must cross an area in which some tree blowdown would occur (vicinity of Hill 351).

(d) Success of the main attack, during its most critical phases, may depend on success of the supporting attack, which is unsupported by nuclear fires. Success is also dependent, to a degree, on the advance of 2d Corps.

(e) Aggressor reinforcement in the Plateau BELLERIVE area could seriously delay or stop the main attack and force us to employ additional combat power. Aggressor reinforcement in the Hill 306 area or the Hill 321 area could delay the main attack and force us to employ additional combat power.

(f) There is little opportunity to destroy enemy in zone.

(g) Main attack forces can be canalized along the TAKASAN Canal and made vulnerable to nuclear attack.

(h) Nuclear weapons provide only minimum necessary effects.

b. Course of Action 2.

(1) Advantages.
   (a) Secures Hill 408 early in the attack.
   (b) Affords opportunity to destroy enemy in the Plateau BELLERIVE area.
   (c) Allows nuclear weapons to be used with good effects.

(2) Disadvantages.
   (a) Crosses four cross compartments, two of which are minor.
   (b) Requires two changes in direction for the main attack force.
   (c) Crosses two mine belts—one en route to Hill 408 and one approaching the division objective.

   (d) Could seriously delay the main attack and force employment of additional combat power because of Aggressor reinforcement in the Hill 408 area. Aggressor reinforcement in the Hill 306 area could delay the main attack and force employment of additional combat power.

c. Course of Action 3.

(1) Advantages.
   (a) Follows high ground to the objective, although initially crossing two minor cross compartments. Insures securing Hill 408 early in the attack.
   (b) Avoids obstacles, except for the shallow mine belt in the Hill 408 area.
   (c) Affords an excellent opportunity to destroy enemy in zone.
   (d) Allows good results to be obtained from nuclear weapons; leaves an FFR/10-KT weapon in reserve.

(2) Disadvantages.
   (a) Requires two changes in direction for the main attack force.
   (b) Is longest route to the division objective.

   (c) Could seriously delay progress of the main attack and force us to employ additional combat power because of Aggressor reinforcement in Hill 408 area. Aggressor reinforcement in the Hill 282, Hill 326, or objective areas could delay the progress of the main attack somewhat and might necessitate employment of additional combat power.

d. Discussion. Course of action 1 takes advantage of the unfordable obstacle to secure the right flank of the main attack. However, maneuver room for the main attack in this course of action is restricted, and the main attack is subject to canalizing and vulnerability to enemy nuclear weapons.
There is adequate maneuver room for the main attack in both course of action 2 and course of action 3. Although course of action 3 is longest and most circuitous, it follows high ground to the objective and avoids obstacles to the maximum. If conducted with speed, course of action 3 offers the best opportunity to destroy the enemy in zone. Course of action 2 is next best. Supporting attacks contribute to the success of the main attack in each course of action; however, course of action 1 depends to a significant degree of the success of a supporting attack. When the enemy's capability to reinforce his defense is considered, course of action 3 emerges as superior to course of action 2 because the enemy's reinforcement capability would have least serious effects on this course of action. Course of action 2 is superior to course of action 1 in this regard. From the point of view of the employment of nuclear weapons, course of action 3 is superior because it uses nuclear weapons effectively on Hills 406 and 408 (as does course of action 2) and requires only an FFR/5-KT weapon on call for use on the enemy positions on Hill 282. Course of action 1 is decidedly inferior in this regard.

e. Conclusion. Course of action 3 is superior to course of action 2; course of action 2 is superior to course of action 1.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION
The major considerations involved in this comparison are terrain, Aggressor's capability to reinforce his defense, and nuclear weapon employment.

a. Terrain.

(1) Course of action 1.
   (a) Advantages.
   1. Has east flank of the main attack protected by an obstacle throughout the attack.
   2. Avoids mined areas until it approaches the division objective.
   3. Is a reasonably direct route to the objective.
   (b) Disadvantages.
   1. Main attack crosses four cross compartments; Aggressor has good observation of our main attack throughout its progress.
   2. Maneuver room for the main attack is somewhat restricted.
   3. Main attack must cross an area in which some tree blowdown would occur (vicinity of Hill 351).
   4. Success of main attack depends on securing terrain by supporting attack.
   5. Avenue of approach provides little opportunity to destroy enemy; would push him back on his axis.

(2) Course of action 2.
   (a) Advantages.
   1. Secures Hill 408 early in the attack.
   2. Could trap and destroy enemy on Plateau BELLERIVE because of avenue of approach.
   (b) Disadvantages.
   1. Crosses four cross compartments, two of which are minor.
   2. Crosses two mine belts—one en route to Hill 408 and one approaching the objective.
   3. Requires two changes in direction for the main attack force.

(3) Course of action 3.
   (a) Advantages.
   1. Follows high ground to the objective, although initially crossing two minor cross compartments; insures securing Hill 408 early in the attack.

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2. Avoids artificial obstacles, except for the shallow mine belt in the Hill 408 area.
3. Interferes with natural enemy avenue of withdrawal.
4. Affords an excellent opportunity to destroy enemy in zone.

(b) Disadvantages.
1. Requires two changes in direction for the main attack force.
2. Is longest route to the division objective.

(4) From an overall terrain point of view, movement is decidedly difficult in course of action 1 and is only slightly less so in course of action 2. The advantage of the TAKASAN Canal as right flank protection in course of action 1 is negated by lack of maneuver room and dependence on a supporting attack force to secure key terrain for the main attack to advance. These latter disadvantages do not pertain to course of action 2. In course of action 2, the changes in direction of the route to the objective are a disadvantage when it is considered that the configuration of the avenue of approach is such that the enemy would be pushed almost straight back toward the objective and (except for the forces on Plateau BELLERIVE in course of action 2) would be allowed to escape. The avenue of approach in course of action 3 is longer but provides for more ease and rapidity of movement, follows the highest ground, and provides ample maneuver room. Its configuration is such that destruction of the enemy should be achieved. The changes in direction of this avenue of approach are considered a minor disadvantage. From the point of view of terrain, course of action 3 is superior.

b. Aggressor's Capability To Reinforce His Defense.

(1) Course of action 1.
(a) Advantages. None.
(b) Disadvantages.
   1. Aggressor reinforcement to the plateau BELLERIVE area could seriously delay or stop the main attack and force us to employ additional combat power. Aggressor reinforcement in the Hill 306 area or the Hill 321 area could delay the main attack and force us to employ additional combat power.
   2. Main attack forces can be canalized and made vulnerable to nuclear attack.

(2) Course of action 2.
(a) Advantages. None.
(b) Disadvantages. Aggressor reinforcement in the Hill 408 area could seriously delay the main attack and force employment of additional combat power. Aggressor reinforcement in the Hill 306 area could delay the main attack and force employment of additional combat power.

(3) Course of action 3.
(a) Advantages. None.
(b) Disadvantages. Aggressor reinforcement in the Hill 408 area could seriously delay progress of the main attack and force us to employ additional combat power. Aggressor reinforcement in the Hill 282, Hill 326, or objective areas could delay the progress of the main attack somewhat and might necessitate employment of additional combat power.

(4) While the enemy can reinforce in approximately equal strength in each course of action, his reinforcement would have the most serious effects on course of action 1 because he could canalize the main attack force against the TAKASAN Canal and might destroy that force. He could slow the accomplishment of the mission in course of action 2, but probably could not seriously threaten the integrity of the main attack or prevent the accomplishment of our mission. Adequate maneuver room exists in this course of action, and additional combat power would overcome this reinforcement capability although some time might be consumed in doing so. Course of action 3 provides the best terrain for the main attack and is the least favorable for the enemy to exercise his reinforcing capability. For this reason, this capability would have the least effect on course of action 3.

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c. Employment of Nuclear Weapons.
   (1) Course of action 1.
      (a) Advantages. None.
      (b) Disadvantages. Nuclear weapons provide only minimum necessary effects.
   (2) Course of action 2.
      (a) Advantages. Allows nuclear weapons to be used with good effects; leaves an FFR/5-KT weapon in reserve.
      (b) Disadvantages. None.
   (3) Course of action 3.
      (a) Advantages. Allows good results to be obtained from nuclear weapons; leaves an FFR/10-KT weapon in reserve.
      (b) Disadvantages. None.
   (4) While good effects are achieved in both courses of action 2 and 3, course of action 3 is superior because it leaves an FFR/10-KT weapon in reserve rather than an FFR/5-KT weapon. Course of action 1 achieves only minimum weapon effects.

d. Conclusion. Course of action 3 is superior to course of action 2; course of action 2 is superior to course of action 1.

5. DECISION
Division attacks 140430 July with the 1st Bde on west (left) making the main attack in the direction Hill 418—Hill 406—Hill 282—Hill 326—Hill 320 to secure Hill 320 and with 3d Bde making a supporting attack in the direction Hill 400—Hill 392—Hill 325—Hill 310 to secure Hill 310; denies the area south of TAKASAN Canal to the enemy; and protects the corps east flank. A nuclear preparation consisting of one SRC/1-KT weapon on enemy positions on Hill 406 and one MRC/2-KT weapon on Hill 408 will be fired from H-20 min to H-15 min. 2d Bde and one FFR/5-KT weapon and one FFR/10-KT weapon in reserve. 2d Bde to be committed in either the east or the west. The FFR/5-KT weapon to be on call for firing on Hill 282.

/s/Haye
HAYE
MG

Annex: A—Situation Overlay (omitted)
Example C-2. Infantry Division Commander's Estimate of a Training Situation

1. The date is 10 November 19__. The 20th Inf Div, located at an oversea station, has just initiated its annual training cycle. The general plan is as follows:

- Individual training (2 months) 1 Nov—31 Dec
- Small-unit training (2 months) 1 Jan—28 Feb
- Large-unit training (2 months) 1 Mar—30 Apr
- Maneuvers (2 months) May—Jun

2. Individual range firing is scheduled during the period 15 Nov—15 Dec.

3. At 0800 this morning, the G3, 2d Corps, called and informed the G3, 20th Inf Div, that another unit wanted the firing ranges during the period 20 Nov—15 Dec. He further informed the G3, 20th Inf Div, that the next availability for the ranges would be the period 20 Feb—18 Mar. The corps position was that the 20th Inf Div could keep the ranges as scheduled: however, if the division wanted to fire on the later date, corps could make the change. Also, corps needed a definite answer by the end of the day.

4. The initial reaction of the G3, 20th Inf Div, was that he wanted to keep the present schedule because considerable preparations had been made. However, he also knew that the division commander had raised some objection to firing at this time. For this reason, he decided to give the matter some thought before replying to corps.

5. The G3, 20th Inf Div, informed the commander and staff of the problem at the morning staff conference. After considering the problem for a few minutes, the commanding general gave the following planning guidance:

   "Gentlemen, I know that it will be difficult to change our plans at this late date; however, I want all of you to look into this problem carefully. Get all the facts for and against this change and brief me at 1600 today. I will make a decision at that time."

6. The staff studied the situation and briefed the commanding general at 1600.

7. As a result of the briefing, the Commanding General, 20th Inf Div, made the following mental estimate of the situation:

   "(Classification)

   * * * * * * * * * * *

1. MISSION

   20th Inf Div will conduct annual marksmanship training and range firing. (Not a new mission or an assumed mission, but a continuing mission and part of the normal training period.)

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION

   a. Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action.

      (1) Characteristics of the area of operations.

         (a) Weather.

            1. Period 15 Nov—15 Dec. Average temperature is 66°; average precipitation is 1.9 centimeters; average wind is from 10 to 15 knots. Generally good conditions for range firing.

            2. Period 20 Feb—18 Mar. Average temperature is 35°; average precipitation is from 25 to 38 inches of snow; average wind is from 12 to 20 knots. Generally adverse conditions for range firing.

         (b) Terrain. No significant difference except possibly restricted observation, particularly at the longer ranges, during the Feb—Mar period.

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(2) Own situation.

(From G1) (a) A significantly larger than normal turnover of personnel will take place in Dec because of a recently received DA policy statement that all personnel to be rotated in Dec and Jan will arrive in CONUS by 20 Dec. Additionally, anticipated replacements for Dec will not depart CONUS until after 1 Jan. This policy will influence about 15 percent of the command.

(From G2) (b) The military intelligence battalion is conducting a school for all unit intelligence sergeants at each division on a scheduled basis. This school is scheduled for the 20th Inf Div during the period 20—28 Feb.

(From G3) (c) The training program is established in proper progression as outlined in the ATP. The Feb firing date will alter the proper progression and require the division to alter its training as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training Area</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual training</td>
<td>1 Nov—30 Nov</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small-unit training</td>
<td>1 Dec—31 Jan</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-unit training</td>
<td>1 Feb—19 Feb</td>
<td>3 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range firing</td>
<td>20 Feb—18 Mar</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-unit training</td>
<td>19 Mar—30 Apr</td>
<td>5 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maneuvers</td>
<td>1 May—30 Jun</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The range firing will break into the large-unit training schedule and will require a rescheduling of the training areas for both small-unit and large-unit training as currently established. The only small-unit training area we can get in Dec is not nearly so good as the one we now have scheduled. In addition, some of the corps and army supporting units will not be available to join the division for combined training during the Feb period of large-unit training.

(From G4) (d) All class V for the range firing is on hand. Corps G4 notified the division that in case the firing is postponed, the ammunition must be returned and would be reissued in mid-Feb.

(3) ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION

a. NA. (Because there are no “Enemy capabilities” or “Difficulties,” this subparagraph does not apply. The following analysis is simply the analysis of the pertinent aspects of each course of action. In this analysis, the commander considers the facts presented in paragraphs 2a and mentally considers their relative significance in view of his judgment.)

b. Course of Action 1. Course of action 1 has the significant advantage of following an established and approved plan. The times, ranges, and training areas are established and confirmed. Considerable additional staff work would be required to readjust the existing plan. Another significant advantage of this course of action is the favorable weather conditions.

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Course of action 1 has the major disadvantage of firing just prior to a significant turnover of personnel and prior to receipt of replacements, thereby nullifying the purpose of the training to some degree. Course of action 1 also has the advantage of a logical progression of training.

c. Course of Action 2. Course of action 2 has a significant disadvantage of requiring considerable additional staff work to adjust the firing plans; training areas; class V; and projected schools, particularly the intelligence school, which is considered of great importance. Course of action 2 has another disadvantage of disrupting the logical progression of training. Course of action 2 has a possible disadvantage of unfavorable weather conditions. However, considering the alert status of the unit, the possibility of combat action is as great during unfavorable weather as during favorable weather. Therefore, range firing during unfavorable weather may actually be an advantage because it would test the division under the worst possible conditions. This could be an extremely important factor.

Course of action 2 has a significant advantage of firing after the abnormal turnover of personnel and the replacements are received.

4. COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTION

a. Advantages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course of action 1</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Implements established plans.</td>
<td>(1) Abnormal personnel loss just after firing completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Maintains logical training progression.</td>
<td>(2) Does not test units under adverse weather conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Tests units under best weather conditions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Discussion. (Omitted.)

c. Conclusion. (Omitted.)

5. DECISION (Omitted.)

(The discussion and conclusion in paragraphs 4b and c and the decision in paragraph 5 are omitted because, obviously, the decision is pure judgment on the part of the estimator. This judgment relates directly to the significance that each estimator places on the advantages and disadvantages of each course of action. One estimator may determine that, in his judgment, the most significant aspects are the advantages of an approved plan, the best possible training areas, favorable weather, and the fact that it is now too late to change. In this case, he may choose course of action 1. Another estimator may consider the most significant fact to be that the change would allow for firing by more personnel who would be with the division during subsequent training periods. He may also consider the fact that he could test the division under adverse weather conditions, reasoning that if a unit can fire under adverse conditions, it can do even better under favorable weather conditions. In this case, he may choose course of action 2.)

8. The above example represents a thought process that the commander would undoubtedly accomplish as the staff briefs him. He probably would announce his decision following the final briefing.
The above estimate also may be accomplished through use of the staff study format. The estimate format and the staff study format are essentially the same and have the same purpose—problem solving. The primary purpose of this example is to point out the inherent flexibility of the estimate format, because it can be used as a problem-solving tool for both tactical and nontactical problems.
Example C-3. Field Army Commander's Estimate of the Situation

(Classification)

30th Army
KILO (NF3275), WESTLAND
230830Z June 19__

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Reference: Map, series M319, WESTLAND, sheets BRAVO and INDIA, edition 2, 1:500,000.

1. MISSION

30th Army attacks 20 July, secures an area sufficient to support future operations to the north, and prepares to conduct subsequent offensive operations in the direction of OSCAR.

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION

a. Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action.

(1) Characteristics of the area of operations. Analysis of the Area of Operations Number 2.

(2) Enemy situation. Intelligence Estimate Number 3.

(3) Own situation.

(a) Dispositions. Annex A (Situation Overlay).

(b) Composition. Troop list.

(c) Strength. There are no critical shortages of personnel.

(d) Training, morale, and combat efficiency. US divisions are well trained. Morale is excellent. All units are estimated to be 85-percent combat effective.

(e) Combat service support. Logistic Estimate Number 3.

(4) Relative combat power. At present, the estimate is that there is sufficient combat power in terms of troops, nuclear weapons, and airpower for 30th Army to assume the offensive. We have a 9:7 superiority in opposing divisions, assuming that the enemy does not reinforce; a 3 to 4:1 superiority in nuclear weapons, assuming that the enemy does not increase his current operational capability; and air superiority.

b. Enemy Capabilities. (Intelligence Estimate Number 3.)

(1) To attack with forces presently committed.

(2) To defend in present position.

(3) To delay in successive positions to the RUFF Mountains.

(4) To avoid engagement by withdrawal to the RED River.

(5) To reinforce his attack, initial defense, or delaying action with forces from the RUFF Mountains or from north of the RED River.

(6) To conduct an amphibious envelopment of our present positions.

(7) To employ nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; tactical air support; electronic warfare; and guerrillas in support of any of the above.

c. Own Courses of Action. (Subsequent offensive operations in the direction of OSCAR will be the subject of a separate estimate.)

(1) Attack to secure the BLUE River line and Hill 2403 (MG4050).

(2) Attack to secure the RUFF Mountains.

(3) Attack to secure the RED River line.
COMDR'S EST OF SIT—30th Army

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION

a. Aggressor's amphibious, infiltration, nuclear, chemical, and air capabilities do not materially influence our choice of a course of action.

(1) An amphibious envelopment by an enemy mechanized regiment will not materially influence the accomplishment of any of the courses of action because of the limited forces and assault craft available to Aggressor and our preponderance of nuclear weapons and air superiority.

(2) The enemy capability to infiltrate combat troops and to employ guerrilla and bypassed forces will influence all courses of action to a degree commensurate with the length of our lines of communications and the size of our area of responsibility. As operations approach the RED River, infiltration, guerrilla operations, and operations of bypassed forces will hinder our operations more effectively, possibly to the extent of causing the diversion of friendly combat troops to rear area security missions.

(3) Current effective enemy air operations, combined with nuclear capability, can be expected to deter concentration of friendly troops and supplies and to prohibit the daylight movement of large numbers of vehicles.

(4) Enemy employment of nuclear weapons in excess of experience and estimated present availability materially will assist his current operational capabilities. Judicious enemy use of from 45 to 60 nuclear weapons will impede, but not prevent, accomplishment of any of our courses of action.

(5) If the enemy employs chemical munitions, which is unlikely at present, their most effective assistant to his tactical operations would be in the defense of, or delay to, the RUFF Mountains or RED River.

b. Attack to secure the BLUE River line and Hill 2403.

(1) The enemy lacks sufficient forces to launch a major offensive against our positions unless substantially reinforced by forces from the RUFF Mountains or north of the RED River. If the enemy attacks our positions with forces and nuclear weapons presently committed, he may achieve limited success; however, our preponderance of nuclear weapons and air superiority would cause rapid attrition of his exposed forces. Such action materially would assist in the accomplishment of this course of action and in facilitating future offensive operations. If the enemy exercises any one of his attack capabilities, which is not likely because of personnel and equipment casualties and the poor quality of replacements, the most critical to our overall mission is an attack in the direction ZULU (MG6010)—ALFA (MF0020) and the securing of our best port (ALFA) and adjacent beaches.

(2) Present enemy defensive positions are elaborate and well constructed; accordingly, defense of his present battle area can be expected to be relatively strong. Committed enemy forces for this defense, although organized in depth, are spread thinly. For this reason, our coordinated and effective use of available troops and nuclear weapons will permit rupture of his defensive position at selected and critical points; thus, defense of his present position without reinforcement will not materially influence our mission. Significant in implementation of this capability is the availability of one and possibly two tank divisions for counterattack.

(3) Delay in successive positions will assist our operations by requiring less initial expenditure of combat power, including both combat forces and nuclear weapons. There are few good delaying positions short of the RUFF Mountains. Also, once the enemy leaves his present defensive position, he becomes more exposed to our air and nuclear weapon attack.

(4) If the enemy avoids engagement of his major forces by withdrawal, it would provide for the maximum success of this course of action.

(5) If the enemy reinforces his attack capability with forces from the RUFF Mountains, which is not likely because of training and rehabilitation activities of these forces, he will increase his initial success. Such an attack will afford him ground force superiority; however, our superiority in airpower and nuclear weapons should negate this advantage appreciably, thus enhancing the accomplishment of this course of action. On the other hand, if the enemy reinforces with the 16th Tk Army (north of the RED River) or elements of the unidentified combined arms army (west of OSCAR), supported by appropriate nuclear weapons, it is doubtful that this course of action can be ac-
accomplished. Adoption of this course of action, therefore, must be contingent on the use of all available means (firepower and tactical cover and deception) to insure that these forces are not committed.

c. Attack to secure the RUFF Mountains.
   (1) For analysis of the enemy attack capability, see b(1) above.
   (2) For analysis of the enemy initial defense capability, see b(2) above.
   (3) Delay in successive positions to the RUFF Mountains will have the same general effect as in b(3) above; however, subsequent and determined defense of the RUFF Mountains may cause some delay in the accomplishment of this course of action because of the excellent defensive characteristics of the area. Enemy troops, well placed to defend the passes in the central area, will be difficult to dislodge. Operations in the eastward extension of the RUFF Mountains offer good opportunities for success. In any case, a tenacious defense of the RUFF Mountains can be expected because this range is the last major defensive position south of the RED River.
   (4) If the enemy avoids engagement of his major forces by a withdrawal to the RUFF Mountains, the same general effect on our mission as in (3) above applies, assuming that a defense of the RUFF Mountains will follow the withdrawal. A withdrawal to the RED River would insure the success of this course of action.
   (5) Reinforcement of an enemy attack or initial defense capability will have the same general effect as that in b(5) above. It is logical to assume that the RUFF Mountain defenses will be reinforced because the Aggressor 48th Comb Arms Army is engaged in strengthening these defenses. Reinforcement by troops north of the RED River, in conjunction with the delay or withdrawal capability before securing the RUFF Mountains, can prevent accomplishment of this course of action. Therefore, any significant enemy reinforcement sufficient to prevent accomplishment of this course of action must be accompanied by a decided increase in the employment of nuclear weapons over those actually expended recently.

d. Attack to secure the RED River line.
   (1) For analysis of the enemy attack capability, see b(1) above.
   (2) For analysis of the enemy defense of present positions, see b(2) above.
   (3) Delay in successive positions to the RED River position will assist our offensive by requiring less expenditure of combat power. The one major delaying position south of the RED River is the RUFF Mountains. The most effective delay can be expected from this position. This course of action does not require an assault of the RED River.
   (4) A withdrawal to positions north of the RED River will insure accomplishment of this course of action.
   (5) Enemy reinforcement of an attack or an initial defense capability will have the same general results as in b(5) above. Reinforcement of the delay or withdrawal capability, with particular emphasis to delay on the RUFF Mountains, will have the same general results as those in c(5) above.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION
   a. Attack to secure the BLUE River line and Hill 2403.
      (1) Advantages. Our present defensive positions are well prepared and dispersed and furnish excellent protection from the effects of enemy nuclear weapons. Our lines of communications will remain relatively short and will require no undue commitment of combat forces to rear area security. Sufficient depth is gained in the western portion of the sector to reduce the current threat to our lines of communications, to provide for better dispersion of troops and installations in the vicinity of ALFA, and to provide the minimum area required for future tactical and combat service support buildup. Secur-
(COMDR'S EST OF SIT—30th Army)

(1) Advantages. This course of action secures the initiative and takes advantage of surprise. If successful, it will evict the enemy from his present defensive positions and impose casualties by nuclear weapon attack. Securing the RUFF Mountains will give us excellent defensive positions and facilitate accomplishment of our mission. Positions in the RUFF Mountains will provide added depth to our defense, which is highly desirable.

(2) Disadvantages. This course of action requires the attack of markedly higher terrain, which favors the defender. Even though the RUFF Mountains are secured, the enemy will retain a bridgehead south of the RED River, which will facilitate any future attacks by him. Conditions for a future offensive into AGGLAND will not be the most desirable because we must secure and clear the area south of the RED River before conducting any major operations toward the north. Occupation of the RUFF Mountain position exposes our west flank to possible enemy attack down the BLUE River valley should the 1st (Allied) Army be unable to maintain contact with us.

c. Attack to secure the RED River line.

(1) Advantages. This course of action has all the advantages of course of action 2 plus securing the area south of the RED River as a prelude to future operations to the north. We and the enemy will gain equal control of the RED River crossing sites. Securing the RED River line provides the greatest depth for countering any future enemy offensive operation.

(2) Disadvantages. The west flank becomes more exposed to enemy action through the south RED River valley. Our lines of communications are the most extended and vulnerable in this course of action.

d. Conclusion. Course of action 3 (attack to secure the RED River line) is the best course of action, followed closely by course of action 2. Course of action 1 is the least desirable. Adoption of either of these courses of action will require use of long-range field artillery, air support, and tactical cover and deception to insure that reinforcing forces north of the RED River are not committed.

5. DECISION

30th Army attacks 20 July, secures the RED River line, and prepares to conduct subsequent offensive operations in the direction of OSCAR.

/s/Sams
SAMS
GEN

Annex: A—Situation Overlay (omitted)

Distribution: B
Example C–4. Area Adviser's Estimate of a Stability Operation

The following estimate provides a typical example of how the estimate format might be used by an area adviser (state, province, or district) in a stability operation. The facts are not all inclusive but only sufficient to provide a basis for an example of the estimate used in a stability operation. While this estimate is portrayed in written form, it represents a systematic thought process.

1. MISSION
   To clear and secure this area of insurgents by relocating all civilians into secured hamlets or hamlet complexes, assisting in preparation of hamlet defense plans, providing hamlet security, organizing and training hamlet militia, protecting the population from attacks, and initiating offensive operations to reestablish government control.

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
   a. Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action.
      (1) Characteristics of the area of operations. (See map (sketch), fig C–5.)
         (a) Weather—generally two seasons: dry season from October to May and rainy season from May to October.
         (b) Two-thirds of area is dense jungle and is sparsely inhabited by farmers. Numerous foot and elephant trails are interspersed throughout the jungle area. Foot traffic is extremely difficult off trails. The western one-third is composed of some jungle, rubber plantations, and cultivated areas. Trafficability throughout the western area is generally good for foot and vehicular traffic, except during the wet season when all vehicular traffic is generally restricted to roads. Ninety percent of the population and most of the hamlets, to include the seat of government, are located in the western zone.
      (2) Enemy situation.
         (a) Guerrilla forces are composed of three types:
            1. Auxiliary (village and hamlet).
            2. Regional (provincial).
            3. Regular (hard core).
         (b) Auxiliary guerrilla units (10- to 30-man units) are organized and operating in the following areas:
            1. One unit in the general vicinity of hamlets 1, 2, and 3 (3254).
            2. One unit composed of residents of hamlets in Hamlet Complex A (3253). This unit's primary activity is informing on government activity.
            3. One unit in the general vicinity of hamlets 5 through 8 (3253).
            4. One unit in the general vicinity of Hamlet Complex D (3352).
            5. One unit composed almost entirely of inhabitants of hamlet 9 (3252).
            6. Two units in the general vicinity of Hamlet Complex B (3251)—one in the western section and one to the south.
         (c) A regional provincial company operates throughout the area. Its present base supposedly is just east of the junction of River Y and Stream Z (3453).
         (d) The 300th Bn, a regular insurgent unit, frequently operates in this and adjacent areas. It is frequently reported to be in the area north of hamlet 1 (3254) and in the area south of Hamlet Complex D (3352). After a successful operation, the battalion frequently disperses and then reconstitutes deep in the jungle area along Stream Z.
         (e) The insurgents have rest and training camps and temporary supply bases in the jungle area east of gridline 35.
         (f) In the past 2 months, the insurgents have ambushed two convoys: one on the road to Hamlet Complex D (3352) and the other on Highway 1 in the vicinity of 3355. Insurgents have made...
Figure C-5. Map (sketch), adviser's estimate of stability operation.
eight attacks on hamlets, ranging in force size from approximately one company to a reinforced battalion attack on one hamlet in Hamlet Complex B. In the latter attack, this hamlet was completely overrun.

(g) Except for Highway 1 from area headquarters at 3253 to hamlet 7 (3153), military escort is essential for all military traffic. Civilian traffic is continually stopped and subjected to insurgent toll tax for use of this road.

(h) Rubber plantations are subjected to uniform monthly tax rates, but are otherwise allowed to operate.

(i) Insurgents have informers in all hamlets except in Hamlet Complex C.

(j) Insurgent peculiarities and vulnerabilities.

1. The insurgents depend largely on Hamlet Complexes A and B for recruits, food, and medical supplies.

2. The insurgents are vulnerable to friendly air and artillery.

3. The insurgents generally have fixed supply caches and base areas, which, if located and destroyed, will decrease insurgent operational effectiveness.

(3) Own situation.

(a) Our own forces are composed of three types:

1. Regulars (professional).

2. National Guard (provincial).

3. Hamlet militia.

(b) About one-half of the hamlets have trained and armed militia. Arms consist of carbines or shotguns. Day-to-day training of this militia is poor to nonexistent. Hamlet Complex C has an extremely well-trained militia. The militia also has machineguns and mortars and, within the past year, has defeated four vigorous attacks by insurgents without outside assistance, except air support.

(c) The province has a provincial force of one trained National Guard battalion. The battalion has seven understrength 100-man companies, reasonably well trained and well equipped. Their locations are shown on the map. They provide hamlet security and are available for very limited offensive operations.

(d) The 8th (Natl) Army Sep Regt and one ranger battalion are located in the area. (See map.) Capabilities are as follows:

1. 1st Bn, 8th Inf: provides security for Hamlet Complex D. Not available for offensive operations.

2. 2d Bn, 8th Inf: provides security for hamlets 4 through 8; secures Highway 1 from hamlets 7 through 10 for all military traffic. The battalion (minus one company) can be used for offensive operations for periods up to 1 week. During this period, no military traffic can use Highway 1.

3. 3d Bn, 8th Inf: one company provides security for 105-mm howitzer section in Hamlet Complex B. Available only for local operations. The battalion (minus) provides security for Hamlet Complex A, including the provincial capital. Not available for offensive operations.

4. Ranger Bn: assists in security of Hamlet Complex A. Is available for long-range patrols, extended operations, reaction operations, or other offensive operations.

5. One 155-mm artillery section at the provincial capital, one 105-mm artillery section at hamlet 7, and one section in Hamlet Complex B.

6. All National Army units are at approximately 70-percent strength, except the ranger battalion, which is at approximately 80-percent strength.

7. One naval unit (three armed gunboats) patrols River X from Hamlet Complex C.
(Advisor's Est of Stability Op)

(4) Relative combat power.
(a) Government forces have about a 6:1 advantage in personnel strength.
(b) Government forces have a significant advantage in fire support, which ranges from mortars to air support. Insurgents have a limited 60-mm and 81-mm mortar capability.
(c) Government forces have a significant advantage in vehicular mobility and airmobility. Insurgents have an advantage in foot mobility, mainly because they travel lighter than the government forces.
(d) The insurgents have a significant advantage in their capability to concentrate at any given point, while a large part of the government force is tied to local security mission.
(e) Any course of action to improve the present situation must consider releasing additional forces for extended offensive operations. Countering the insurgents’ capability is necessary to concentrate and to use the significant advantages that the government force has in personnel strength, fire support, and mobility.

b. Insurgent Capabilities.
(1) Ambush military convoys at any point in the province.
(2) Ambush military units up to battalion strength at any point.
(3) Attack any hamlet with units up to reinforced battalion size.
(4) Harass any hamlet or military unit with sniper fire, mines, or mortar fire.
(5) Conduct propaganda lectures, collect taxes, and abduct civilians in any area or hamlet.

c. Courses of Action.
(1) Concentrate military power in Hamlet Complex A, clear the area of insurgents, establish area security, and gradually enlarge the secure area until the entire area is under government control. Provide the largest possible tactical force to operate against the insurgent regular and regional forces outside the secure area.
(2) Concentrate military power in Hamlet Complexes A and B, clear each area of insurgents, establish area security in each area, and gradually enlarge each area until they join and the entire area eventually is secure. Provide tactical forces for a reaction force.

3. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action

a. Selection of Enemy Capabilities. Each of the insurgent capabilities will have a different and unequal effect on each of our courses of action. All should be retained for analysis. Each enemy capability also represents part of a total capability and, thus, can be combined into one overall capability that will represent a maximum capability for use in the analysis. This combined capability can be stated as follows: "The insurgent capability is to deliver antigovernment propaganda; harass; collect taxes; recruit; ambush; and attack civilians, hamlets, and government forces, with units up to a reinforced battalion, at any point along Highway 1 selected by the insurgents." This maximum combined capability will be used in analyzing our selected courses of action.

b. Insurgent Capability Versus Course of Action 1.
(1) This course of action requires a major realignment of forces. All government forces, except the hamlet militia and the ranger battalion, would be closed in on Hamlet Complex A. This would provide sufficient forces to isolate this area from insurgent activity. Complete military control would be gained over all hamlets within the complex. Traffic in and out of the area would be controlled, and security to all would be provided. Insurgents could be detected and eliminated. Militia could be trained and defenses could be prepared with minimum insurgent interference. As the area becomes organized and as sufficient local forces are trained for stability operations, military forces would be

(Classification)
available to extend the area of control gradually. Troops could expand and control the outer limits of the secure area while a well-trained and well-armed militia controls the interior. The zone of expansion would be generally south, along Highway 1, until the southern boundary of the area is secure. It is visualized that expansion east and west of this route could, at the same time, reach a general area at the west boundary and on the east to the River Y and Stream Z area. From this expanded area, operations could be launched against the insurgent bases in the jungles to the east.

(2) The major advantages of this course of action follow:
   (a) Sufficient military force would be available to secure initially the largest and most important hamlet complex.
   (b) Expansion would be accomplished only when the hamlets would be able to defend themselves.
   (c) Insurgents could be filtered out of the secure area.
   (d) Continuing security would tend to gain the complete support of the people within the secure area.
   (e) Sufficient forces would be available to support continuing offensive operations against the insurgents.

(3) The major disadvantages of this course of action follow:
   (a) All hamlets outside Hamlet Complex A, now under the protection of government forces, would be temporarily abandoned to the insurgents until the security expansion reached their area. Many of these people would probably move to the secure area, causing overcrowded conditions in this area.
   (b) Hamlet Complex C would be farther removed from possible government assistance and its possibility of being overrun would be materially increased; in particular, the gunboat patrol currently operating from Complex C would be inoperable.
   (c) Military movement on Highway 1 south would require 2 days' or more advance notice to secure the road for supply traffic. Air supply would be required to the maximum.
   (d) The psychological impact on the civilians from the abandoned hamlets would be extremely difficult to overcome in the future.
   (e) The tax, the collection of food, and the propaganda effort of the insurgents would be greatly enhanced; and government forces would have little or no capability to resist this pressure outside the secure area.

c. Insurgent Capability Versus Course of Action 2.

(1) Course of action 2 visualizes a change in troop dispositions similar to that in course of action 1, but eliminates some of the disadvantages of course of action 1 by maintaining two security areas that include the two largest hamlet complexes, A and B. This course of action will not support as many offensive operations as course of action 1. In this course of action, Hamlet Complexes C and D and hamlets 1 through 10 will be abandoned. In this course of action, the 8th Inf Regt, with its 1st and 2d Bn, would be relocated to Hamlet Complex B, with the task of defending this area. This regiment possibly could maintain security with one battalion and have one battalion available for offensive operations. The 105-mm section would remain in its present location, enabling the two provincial companies and Co A, 3d Bn, 8th Inf, to relocate to Hamlet Complex A.

(2) The provincial company at Hamlet Complex D and the three companies at hamlets 1, 3, and 9 would be relocated to Hamlet Complex A. Hamlet Complex A could be extended to include hamlet 4, and one provincial company would be located there. This action is essential to secure the important bridge over River Y. The 105-mm section at hamlet 7 would be relocated into Hamlet Complex A, and this action would provide either a 105-mm section or a 155-mm section as available artillery to support
reaction operations. This relocation would allow the provincial battalion to operate as an integral battalion unit to provide security to Hamlet Complex A, leaving the entire 3d Bn, 8th Inf, and the ranger battalion available for offensive operations.

(3) This course of action could possibly encompass sufficient area, both Hamlet Complexes A and B, so that the civilians in the abandoned areas would be encouraged to move into these two complexes. The government could construct and establish sufficient additional hamlets to house all civilians desiring to move into the secure areas.

(4) An appropriate consideration would be that the initial extension of the hamlet complexes would be south along Highway 1 from Hamlet Complex A and north along the same highway from Hamlet Complex B. Therefore, the abandoned hamlets 5 through 10 would be recovered at the earliest time, possibly within 1 year. The recovery of hamlets 1 through 3 and Hamlet Complex D would be at some future time.

(5) The major advantages of this course of action follow:
   (a) Fewer hamlets and civilians would be abandoned or relocated. Sufficient secure area would exist to relocate all civilians who wish to move.
   (b) Government forces would be closer and better able to assist Hamlet Complex C in its own security. The three gunboats presently at Hamlet Complex C would be maintained to patrol Rixer X to Hamlet Complex C.
   (c) Military security of Highway 1 would be easier to maintain and could probably be accomplished, when required.
   (d) The economic situation of the province would be improved because of the large rice-growing area in Hamlet Complex B.
   (e) Tax collection and insurgent propaganda would be eliminated in the two secure areas.

(6) The major disadvantages of this course of action follow:
   (a) Thirteen hamlets would have to be abandoned temporarily.
   (b) The adverse psychological impact on relocated civilians would be difficult to overcome.
   (c) The relocation would provide the insurgents with excellent propaganda material.
   (d) Fewer battalions would be available for reaction operations.

4. COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTION
   a. General. In this comparison of courses of action 1 and 2, the major considerations method will be used, and the following major considerations have been selected:
      (1) Number of battalions available for offensive operations.
      (2) Number of battalions available for defensive operations.
      (3) Effect of loss of secure areas on insurgents.
      (4) Hamlets abandoned.
      (5) Hamlets secured initially.
      (6) MSR, Highway 1, security.
      (7) Capability to assist Hamlet Complex C.
      (8) Civilian morale.
      (9) Insurgent propaganda capabilities.
      (10) Insurgent offensive capabilities.
(ADVISOR'S EST OF STABILITY OP)

(11) Areas to be defended, i.e., perimeter distances.

(12) Food production.

b. Comparison (Fig C-6).

c. Discussion.

(1) The primary purpose of any change is to increase the capability of the government to secure the population and to neutralize the insurgents. Therefore, the most significant advantage is the increased friendly capability in terms of battalions available for reaction operations. A second significant advantage is the provision of increased security for those hamlets designated as secure. In these two aspects, course of action 1 is superior to course of action 2, and both are an improvement over the present situation.

(2) Because a major portion of the mission is rallying the people to support the government, each course of action has several significant disadvantages. Each requires abandonment of several existing hamlets, but course of action 2, with only 13 losses, is significantly better than course of action 1. In respect to defended hamlets, course of action 2 is also superior because it defends 37 hamlets. In addition, each course of action provides better security for the selected hamlets than is presently the case.

(ADVISOR'S EST OF STABILITY OP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major considerations</th>
<th>Bns available for reaction operations</th>
<th>Hamlets abandoned</th>
<th>Hamlets secured (initially)</th>
<th>MSR security (Highway 1)</th>
<th>Capability to assist Hamlet Complex C</th>
<th>Civilian morale</th>
<th>Bns available for defensive operations</th>
<th>Area to be defended</th>
<th>Food production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Course of action 1</td>
<td>3 additional bn available</td>
<td>Approximately 25</td>
<td>Approximately 25</td>
<td>Less secure—more time required to secure road for military traffic. Greater reliance on air supply.</td>
<td>Less capability than at present.</td>
<td>Increase in the secure areas of about 1/4 of present hamlets. Decrease in the abandoned area of about 1/9 of the present. Limited capability to relocate people in abandoned hamlets.</td>
<td>4 bn available at Hamlet Complex A, Plus Ranger Bn if not on reaction operations.</td>
<td>Fewer hamlets to be defended; hence, less area to be defended. More combat power can be applied to the hamlets being defended.</td>
<td>Less area secure with a loss in secure rice-growing area and a loss in food production for the national government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course of action 2</td>
<td>2 additional bn available</td>
<td>Approximately 15</td>
<td>Approximately 37</td>
<td>Less than at present, but considerably better than in course of action 1. Less reliance on air supply.</td>
<td>Same capability as at present.</td>
<td>Increase in 2/3 of hamlets and decrease in about 1/3 of hamlets. A majority of people in abandoned hamlets could be relocated to secure areas.</td>
<td>2 bn available at Hamlet Complex B and 1 bn at Hamlet Complex A, Plus Ranger Bn and other bn not on reaction operations.</td>
<td>More hamlets to be defended; hence, a greater area to be defended with a reduction in the massing of combat power.</td>
<td>More rice-growing area secure. More food should be produced and delivered to friendly natives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subconclusion: Course of action 2 over 1.

Figure C-6. Major considerations, method of comparison, adviser's estimate.
(ADVISOR'S EST OF STABILITY OP)

(3) Course of action 2 denies more food production to the insurgents since Hamlet Complex B is maintained as a large food-producing area.

(4) Each course of action provides less continuing MSR security than at present, but course of action 2 maintains security over approximately one-half more of the MSR than does course of action 1 and is, therefore, significantly better.

(5) Course of action 2 maintains the same capability to assist Hamlet Complex C as the present situation; whereas, in course of action 1, the significant disadvantage is the loss of gunboat contact with Hamlet Complex C. In this respect, course of action 2 is better than course of action 1.

(6) Both courses of action 1 and 2, through the abandonment of existing hamlets, provide significant propaganda material for the insurgents; and it is an obvious and significant disadvantage. However, in course of action 2, this disadvantage could be offset to some extent by relocating, on a voluntary basis, many of the people in the secure areas. In course of action 1, the number of people involved would make complete relocation impracticable; therefore, course of action 2 is favored.

(7) Both courses of action 1 and 2 would obviously be detrimental to the morale of the people in the abandoned hamlets. However, each would also tend to improve morale in the secure areas because of the greater security provided. In this respect, course of action 2 would tend to decrease the morale of fewer numbers and increase the morale of more people than would course of action 1; therefore, course of action 2 is favored.

d. Selection. Considering both the significant advantages of increasing offensive operations and maintaining maximum security and the significant disadvantages of lowering civilian morale and improving insurgent propaganda means, course of action 2 is considered superior to course of action 1.

5. DECISION

Representative to the local government official (counterpart) will advise him to abandon hamlets 1 through 3 and 5 through 10 and Hamlet Complex D. To consolidate all military strength in Hamlet Complexes A and B. To intensify the security in these two areas. And to increase the scope and intensity of offensive operations to permit expansion of the area of security.

* * * * * * *
Example C-5. Intelligence Estimate of a Stability Operation

The following estimate provides a typical example of how the intelligence estimate format might be used by an area adviser (state, province, or district) in a stability operation. The facts are not all inclusive but only sufficient to provide a basis for an example of the intelligence estimate used in a stability operation. While this intelligence estimate is portrayed in written form, it represents a systematic thought process.

Reference: Map (sketch) (fig C-5).

1. MISSION
To clear this area of insurgents and reestablish government control.

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
   a. Geography.
      (1) Existing situation.
         (a) Climate. From October through mid-May, this area is under the influence of the dry northeast monsoon. As the northeast monsoon wanes in the latter part of May, low-level winds become more southeasterly. The general flow of air is then variable and poorly defined. Good weather can be expected during most of the period from October to May, with good ceilings and visibilities except for early morning fog, which usually dissipates by 0800 hours. From May to October, this area has increased cloudiness, with winds variable in direction and with the predominant flow from northeasterly to southeasterly. During this period, there is frequent thunderstorm activity, with wind gusts to 25 or 30 knots. Also, the precipitation is produced by two or three afternoon rain showers, which reduce visibility and make the jungle trails extremely slippery and hazardous to foot traffic. During the dry season from October through mid-May, the monthly mean maximum temperatures are in the mid-90's and the mean minimum temperatures are in the mid-70's. Record monthly minimum temperatures are in the mid-50's. During the wet season from May to October, the monthly mean maximum temperatures are in the high 80's and the mean minimum temperatures are in the low 70's. Record monthly minimum temperatures are in the mid-50's. Visibility is generally from 10 to 20 kilometers over the area except during periods of fog, when it drops to from 1 to 5 kilometers. Showers and thunderstorms restrict visibility at any one location for short periods; however, visibility of less than 2 kilometers is rare.
         (b) Topography. This area can best be characterized as a transition zone, with relief ranging from flat delta land to gently rolling plains with moderate slopes. Elevations range from sea level to 600 meters above sea level, with some peaks reaching more than 800 meters. Rivers in the area are generally wide and slow moving and they drain in a southerly direction. The flat delta terrain is subject to inundation during the wet season from May to October. The delta land is intensely cultivated with wetland rice and similar water-tolerant crops. These crops are grown in depths of 0.3 meter or less of water, maintained by dikes during the dry season. In the area also are extensive rubber plantations. The mature stands develop a continuous canopy. In active plantations, the ground is kept clear; where the plantations have been abandoned, undergrowth has developed. Generally, the trees are planted at 6-meter intervals in a square pattern. In the secure portion of the area, considerable dryland cultivation is practiced. About 60 percent of the area has extensive broad-leaved evergreen forests, which form a continuous single- and double-canopy jungle. Some grassland areas exist in these same areas, with growths up to 1.82 meters in height. Along the course of River Y are mangrove swamps. The swamps have broad-leaved evergreens, and the course of the river is repeatedly inundated during the wet season.

      (2) Effect on insurgent courses of action.

(Classification)
(INTEL EST OF STABILITY OP)

(a) In the areas of heavy vegetation, the lack of elevated areas restricts ground observation over the top of the vegetation. Fields of fire are good in the cultivated areas. In the forest and jungle areas, movement of vehicles will be largely restricted to the road net. In the cultivated areas, movement is fair at best, but possible for lighter vehicles (e.g., 3/4-ton trucks). The wet season restricts movement in cultivated areas, making it poor to unsuitable. The soils and drainage in this area are generally unsuited for underground installations.

(b) The dense forests and jungle provide excellent concealment for the insurgents and permit establishment and maintenance of base areas. Where drainage is good, the soil is suitable for underground installations. The rubber plantations provide excellent concealment, but restrict the fields of fire. However, these plantations provide good assembly areas for the enemy. Cross-country movement is fair to good for smaller vehicles and foot troops outside the jungle and forested areas.

(c) The mangrove swamps along River Y provide excellent concealment and impede movement of friendly troops into the area by any means, lending themselves to the establishment of small insurgent base areas. Inundation makes the soil unsuitable for underground installations.

(3) Effect on government courses of action.

(a) Friendly movement will be canalized along roads and trails through most of the area because of dense vegetation or inundated fields in the wet season. About 75 percent of the area is unsuitable for airborne operations, while most of the remaining 25 percent is suited only for small-scale airborne operations.

(b) In the wet season, the rapid deployment of armor generally will be restricted to roads. Prior reconnaissance can develop some avenues of armor movement even in the wet season. Most of the bridge capacities throughout the area will not support medium tanks.

(c) Poor observation in the delta, plains areas, and mangrove swamps will restrict artillery and air support missions. The peaks and rolling slopes will afford excellent observation.

b. Politics.

(1) Existing situation. The concentration of political power is at the national level. Important decisions and major programs originate and are directed in the national capital. The prime minister is the head of government and is assisted in the development of policies by the heads of the different ministries. The constituent assembly is the democratic voice of the people. The next lower level of government is the province. Below the province is the district. Districts are divided into villages and hamlet complexes, which are made up of several hamlets. The insurgents have attempted through the years to gain control of the government at the lowest level by reducing the effectiveness of the village and hamlet administration through terrorism, propaganda, and subversion. The insurgents plan to eliminate the recognized government and replace it with their own political chain of command. The insurgents will attempt to capitalize on any ineptness or corruption that may be found in government politicians and military commanders to win control over the populace. The continued stability of the national government and its democratic processes has reduced inroads by the insurgents to control the population in this area.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action. Political considerations are paramount to the insurgents' military operations. The insurgents will attempt to strike the areas where government administration and security are weak or nonexistent. Because of their political immaturity, the people are vulnerable to subversion and infiltration. For the insurgents to operate in areas under government control, they must either operate covertly or under the protection of a military force.

(3) Effect on government courses of action. The insurgents' political chain of command controls and gives direction to the insurgency. For the government to win completely, not only must the military activity be destroyed but also the insurgents' political chain of command must be eliminated.

(Classification)
c. Economy.

(1) Existing situation. The economy of this area is based largely on agriculture, with some small-scale industry. The principal agricultural products are rice, rubber, fruits, vegetables, and timber. The increased road security throughout the area has made goods available from isolated villages at lower costs. This area produces 70 percent of the country's rubber exports. Some plantations have actually been abandoned and some have ceased new planting and expansion, which are necessary for continued production. An estimated 30 percent of the population in this area depends either directly or indirectly on the rubber plantations for livelihood. Closure of plantations will force many of these people into the refugee stream. Normally, the plantation managership bears the expense of shipping food, particularly rice, into the food-short rubber-growing areas. Insurgent interdiction of roads and waterways and continued taxation have made the movement of food and goods within the area difficult.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action. The insurgents are vulnerable to an effective resources control program. They must depend on outside sources for rice, salt, vegetables, and medicine. Their combat effectiveness can be reduced by friendly action to secure present stocks and to prevent transportation of additional supplies into the area.

(3) Effect on government courses of action. Every effort must be directed toward depriving the insurgents of goods and money presently available to them. Insurgent interdiction of roads and waterways must be countered. The insurgents' tax collection program must be eliminated. If this taxation increases and additional productive plantations and farms are abandoned, the number of refugees seeking security, employment, and shelter will increase.

d. Sociology.

(1) Existing situation. Except for the support shown in recent provincial elections, the majority of the people have little or no interest beyond their immediate family or their local hamlet. The people will not actively participate in the current struggle unless forced by one side or the other. The majority of the population is Moslem, but a substantial number are Christians and Buddhists. In general, the population is not a cohesive group. It continues to be oriented along religious and regional lines. The contrast between this rural area and the rather affluent national capital is evident. The population will follow the side that can provide security in its local area.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action. The insurgents conduct political and psychological operations programs against the separate groups in the area without meeting united opposition. The general disinterest of the population in national affairs permits the insurgents to move troops and supplies through the area with little fear of reprisal or of being reported to friendly units.

(3) Effect on government courses of action. In areas that the insurgents control currently, the population can be expected to oppose friendly operations. Where the government is in control, the population will support operations to establish the area as secure. Throughout the area, the population will actively support the government when the military situation becomes stable and when the government responds to their needs. A continuing national effort is required to mold the various religious groups into a cohesive force against a common enemy.

e. Psychology.

(1) Existing situation. The primarily agrarian area has some small industry, mainly rice mills and woodcraft, brass, and ceramic plants. The population is rooted to the hamlet, where life revolves from generation to generation. This underdeveloped area has experienced colonial exploitation for much of its history. Its attitude is that of fatalism and indifference to events that occur around it.

(2) Effect on insurgent courses of action. The primitive state of development limits the quantity and quality of resources available to the insurgents from the local populace. The insurgents have exploited the population's desire for security, and its general indifference has permitted them to oper-
(Classification)

(INTEL EST OF STABILITY OP)

ate freely. The insurgents' propaganda efforts, reinforced with acts of terrorism, have caused the population to submit to the desires of the insurgents when the insurgents control a given area.

(3) Effect on government courses of action. The government must continue its dynamic program to secure the area, thus eliminating the insurgent threat and achieving the populace's desire for security. Only a positive and continuing program of rural development can cause an improvement in the standard of living. The government must establish control of this area to win the hearts and minds of the people.

3. THE INSURGENT SITUATION
   a. Organization and Leadership.
      (1) The military insurgent forces are composed of three types:
         (a) Auxiliary (village and hamlet).
         (b) Regional (provincial).
         (c) Regular (hand core).
      (2) The political action committee of the insurgent organization determines the leadership of each type of insurgent force. HAIL GRIM MUHY is the political and military leader in this area.
   b. Strength and Disposition.
      (1) Auxiliary guerrilla units (10- to 30-man units) are organized and operating in the following areas:
         (a) One unit in the general vicinity of hamlets 1 through 3 (3254).
         (b) One unit composed of residents of hamlets in Hamlet Complex A (3253). This unit's primary activity is informing on government activity.
         (c) One unit in the general vicinity of hamlets 5 through 8 (3253).
         (d) One unit in the general vicinity of Hamlet Complex D (3352).
         (e) One unit composed almost entirely of inhabitants of hamlet 9 (3252).
         (f) Two units in the general vicinity of Hamlet Complex B (3251)—one in the western section and one to the south.
      (2) A regional provincial company operates throughout the area. Its present base supposedly is just east of the junction of River Y and Stream Z (3453).
      (3) The 300th Bn, a regular insurgent unit, frequently operates in this and adjacent areas. Frequent reports indicate its presence in the area north of hamlet 1 (3254) and in the area south of Hamlet Complex D (3352). After a successful operation, the battalion frequently disperses and then reconstitutes in the jungle along Stream Z.
      (4) The insurgents have rest and training camps and temporary supply bases in the jungle east of gridline 35.
   c. Recent and Present Significant Activities.
      (1) In the past 2 months, the insurgents have ambushed two convoys: one on the road to Hamlet Complex D (3352) and the other on Highway 1 near 3355. Insurgents have made eight attacks on hamlets, ranging in force size from approximately one company to a reinforced battalion attack that completely overran one hamlet in Hamlet Complex B.
      (2) Except for Highway 1 from area headquarters at 3253 to hamlet 7 (3153), military escort is essential for all military traffic. Civilian traffic is continually stopped and subjected to insurgent toll tax.
      (3) Rubber plantations are subjected to uniform monthly tax rates, but are otherwise allowed to operate.

(Classification)
(INTEL EST OF STABILITY OP)

(4) Insurgents have informers in all hamlets except in Hamlet Complex C.

(5) Insurgents continue to seek and get rice and medical supplies from unprotected hamlets.

(6) The insurgents have increased their propaganda campaign to discredit the national government by conducting meetings in unprotected hamlets and by intimidating the hamlet chiefs.

(7) The insurgents' recruiting of young men in the area continues unabated. These insurgents threaten family heads, kidnap men, and give hamlets quotas.

(8) During the past 60 days, the insurgents have employed countersweep operations and have made a determined effort to deny access to base areas. They have avoided major contact with, but have increased harassment of, the hamlets. They have increasingly used mines with stronger charges than those employed in the past.

d. Strengths and Weaknesses.

(1) Recruitment and retention. The insurgents' ability to control the population and the hamlets in the area assists their recruiting program. However, the population's general apathy and poor conditions have forced the insurgents to adopt more rigorous recruiting methods. Retention of an insurgent is accomplished by fear and threats of death. The political chain of command attempts to instill a crusading fervor in its soldiers, but the hard life causes the average insurgent to become indifferent and, in some cases, to defect. There are indications that the training given new recruits is less proficient.

(2) Intelligence and security.

(a) The insurgents have a well-developed intelligence system, employing sympathizers and penetration agents and giving them stringent and effective security.

(b) The insurgents have complete knowledge of the terrain and conduct extensive reconnaissance and detailed rehearsals and exercises before any engagement of their own choosing.

(c) The insurgents' ability to use their base camps for recuperation and resupply is a major strength because their effective security has denied these base camps to destruction by government forces.

(3) Organization and training.

(a) The insurgents' cadre is the backbone of their military structure. These men are competent, well-trained leaders who demonstrate a high degree of dedication, discipline, and self-sacrifice.

(b) The insurgents have an excellent capability to conduct any type of operation during darkness; to move undetected through jungle areas, using the trails and roads under their control; and to conduct raids, harassment, and other guerrilla tactics at a relatively small cost to their forces.

(c) The insurgents can mingle with the civilians and take advantage of this relative freedom of movement to use public or private transportation without being easily detected.

(d) The insurgents have had to divert combat personnel to supply and transportation duties because of the lack of “volunteer” laborers from the populace.

(e) The insurgents have limited artillery and they lack airpower of any kind.

(f) The lack of decisive military and political victories has caused tensions and difficulties in the political chain of command of the insurgents.

(4) Finance and logistics.

(a) The insurgents can control the rural population and the villages in their areas and make the war pay for itself by taxation and extortion.

(b) The insurgents can either produce, manufacture, purchase, or extort the majority of their supplies. They lack only armament, explosives, and medical supplies.

(Classification)
(INTEL EST OF STABILITY OP)

(5) Communications.
   (a) The insurgents use captured communication equipment and other equipment that they purchase in third countries.
   (b) The insurgents rely extensively on rudimentary systems of hand signals, flares, messengers, and whistles to control combat operations.

4. INSURGENT CAPABILITIES
   a. Enumeration. The insurgents can—
      (1) Ambush military convoys at any point in the province.
      (2) Ambush military units up to battalion size at any point.
      (3) Attack any hamlet with units up to reinforced battalion size.
      (4) Harass any hamlet or military unit with sniper fire, mines, or mortar fire.
      (5) Conduct propaganda lectures, collect taxes, and abduct civilians in any area or hamlet.
      (6) Attack any lightly or ineptly defended outposts and watchtower or bridge defense in the area with units up to reinforced battalion size.
      (7) Defend against surprise attacks and deny use of major lines of communications through interdiction with units up to reinforced battalion size.

   b. Analysis and Discussion. Captured insurgent documents indicate that the insurgents will intensify guerrilla activity, extend and strengthen base areas, strengthen defenses, stress propaganda efforts, and continue the recruiting program. The insurgents will require time to accomplish resupply, replacement, retraining, and reindoctrination. To gain this time, the insurgents will adopt a plan to divert attention from the areas that they have selected for reoccupation. In the near future, harvesting the rice crop in this area will certainly be a prime consideration in the insurgents' military, political, and economic actions for the foreseeable future. Any insurgent large-scale action will depend on the rice stores available to the force to be employed. The insurgents still hope for victory. While continuing their policy of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, the insurgents will attack worthwhile targets of opportunity at the right time and place. Any target that offers hope for a psychological victory to the insurgents can be expected to be attacked. The insurgents can adopt all the capabilities that have been enumerated.

5. CONCLUSIONS
   a. Effects of the Operational Environment. The area of operations gives the advantage to the insurgents. The large land area; the lack of first-class lines of communications; and, more important, the lack of timely intelligence cause the government forces to react to the insurgents' initiative. Combat operations will consist of reaction to insurgent attacks until sufficient forces are available to secure the area. The terrain affords a marked advantage to the insurgents.

   b. Probable Insurgent Courses of Action. The insurgents will—
      (1) Intensify guerrilla warfare, acts of terrorism, harassment, propaganda, and interdiction of lines of communications, with an objective of increasing insurgent control over the populace.
      (2) Conduct up to battalion-size attacks against isolated forces and installations.
      (3) Withdraw from combat operations if they consider the situation unsuitable for a decisive victory.
      (4) Attack selected targets with forces of battalion strength at a time and place of their own choosing.
(INTEL EST OF STABILITY OP)

(5) Continue to secure their base areas and lines of communications.

c. Insurgent Vulnerabilities. The insurgents—

(1) Depend largely on Hamlet Complexes A and B for recruits, food, and medical supplies.

(2) Are lightly armed and are, therefore, highly susceptible to friendly air and artillery support.

(3) Generally have fixed supply caches and base areas, which, if located and destroyed, will decrease insurgent operational effectiveness.
PERSONNEL ESTIMATE NO 5

Reference: Map, series M501, Western EUROPE, sheets NM32–4 through NM32–9, edition 3, 1:250,000.

1. MISSION

1st Corps attacks 25 August, secures high ground near IPPESHEIM (MV8995) and POTHENBURG (MV8570), and prepares to continue attack to east.

2. THE SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS

a. Intelligence Situation.

(1) Characteristics of the area of operations.

(a) Intelligence Estimate No 7, 21 August 19.
(b) Effect on personnel activities. None.

(2) Enemy strength and dispositions.

(a) Intelligence Estimate No 7, 21 August 19.
(b) Effect on personnel activities. Aggressor's defense on near maximum frontages indicates that our losses should be smaller than if he were ideally disposed. The difference, however, will be negligible.

(3) Enemy capabilities. The enemy can—

(a) Attack at any time along our forward positions with an estimated 11 mechanized regiments supported by nuclear weapons, 20 artillery battalions, three antitank battalions, four heavy rocket battalions, and guided missiles.

(b) Defend in his present position and on successive positions to UFFENHEIM (NV8988) with an estimated 11 mechanized regiments supported by nuclear weapons, 20 artillery battalions, three antitank battalions, four heavy rocket battalions, and guided missiles.

(c) Delay in present position and in successive positions to the vicinity of UFFENHEIM.

(d) Withdraw beyond UFFENHEIM at any time before our attack.

(e) Reinforce his attack or defense with one or more of the following units at the time and place indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>312th Mech Regt.</td>
<td>KONIGSHOFEN</td>
<td>2 hours after starting move-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(NV5288)</td>
<td>ment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASSAMSTADT</td>
<td>1 hour 50 minutes after start-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(MV4975)</td>
<td>ing movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47th Mech Div</td>
<td>ASSAMSTADT</td>
<td>3 hours 20 minutes after start-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(MV4975)</td>
<td>ing movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KONIGSHOFEN</td>
<td>4 hours 10 minutes after start-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(NV5288)</td>
<td>ing movement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Tactical Situation.

(PERS EST 5—1st Corps)

(2) Possible courses of action.

(a) 1st Corps attacks 250700 August with the 20th Inf Div in the north, the 23d Armd Div in the center, and the 19th Inf Div in the south to breach Aggressor's first and second defensive belts. The 23d Armd Div makes the corps main attack. The 25th Armd Div, as corps reserve, follows in the zone of the 23d Armd Div. Corps continues the attack with three divisions abreast, with the 25th Armd Div passing through the 23d Armd Div to secure UFFENHEIM. The 23d Armd Div, as corps reserve, follows in the zone of the 25th Armd Div.

(b) 1st Corps attacks 250700 August with the 20th Inf Div in the north, the 23d Armd Div in the center, and the 19th Inf Div in the south to breach Aggressor's first and second defensive belts. The 23d Armd Div makes the corps main attack. The 25th Armd Div, as corps reserve, follows in the zone of the 23d Armd Div. Corps continues the attack with three divisions abreast, with the 25th Armd Div passing through the 23d Armd Div to secure UFFENHEIM. The 23d Armd Div follows and supports the 25th Armd Div.

(c) 1st Corps attacks 250700 August with the 20th Inf Div in the north, the 23d Armd Div in the center, and the 19th Inf Div in the south to secure UFFENHEIM. The 23d Armd Div makes the corps main attack. The 25th Armd Div as corps reserve, follows in the zone of the 23d Armd Div.

(3) Projected operations. This operation should be completed to 4 September, when 1st Corps will be ordered to continue the attack to the east with all possible speed to surround enemy forces in the area.

c. Logistic Situation.

(1) See Annex H (Administration) to OPORD 25.

(2) Augmentation transportation for medical evacuation will be limited until 15 September.


(1) See Civil Affairs Estimate No 1, 21 August 19... 

(2) Unrest among civilian population is indicated in this area.

(3) SAARLAUF (* * *) is stricken with a typhus epidemic. The G5 and the surgeon recommend placing SAARLAUF off limits.

e. Personnel Situation.

(1) Maintenance of unit strength.

(a) Strengths.

1. Summary.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{Unit} & \text{Authorized} & \text{Assigned} \\
19th Inf Div & 16,633 & 16,126 \\
20th Inf Div & 16,633 & 14,355 \\
23d Armd Div & 16,771 & 15,838 \\
25th Armd Div & 16,771 & 14,735 \\
\end{array}
\]

All other major units are at effective fighting strength.

2. For additional details, see Personnel Daily Summary No 110.

(b) Replacements.

1. All units have submitted requisitions for personnel shortages.

2. Allocations. The 223d Repl Bn has 400 infantry and 50 armor replacements on hand. Allocations are currently averaging 600 infantry and 100 armor replacements per week to the corps. Current rate of replacement support will continue for the duration of the operation. Quality of replacements is good; they are arriving with a shortage of equipment that sometimes necessitates their being held an extra day in division rear areas.
3. There is a shortage of armor replacements in the theater, and information from army indicates this shortage will continue for about 1 month. There is no possibility of securing an increase in the allocation of armor replacements.

2. Personnel management.
   (a) Enemy PW's. G2 estimates that 20,000 PW will be captured before 15 September. Morale of PW's is expected to be low. There are 400 PW in division collecting points. The MP escort guard company in direct support of the corps can evacuate 3,000 PW per day, provided transportation is available. G4 believes sufficient transportation can be made available to evacuate a minimum of 1,500 PW per day. Additional transportation assistance becomes available 15 September. Therefore, PW installations to hold large numbers of PW's will be required. CO, 205th MP Bn, states that he can guard up to 5,000 PW. The holding capability, combined with an evacuation rate of 1,500 PW per day, will be a short-term solution to the PW problem. Additional assistance in evacuation after 15 September should allow for the elimination of any large-scale holding requirements.
   (b) Civilian internees/detainees. Although some civilian internees/detainees will be uncovered, the number is expected to be small. The MP operation above can process and handle them.

3. Development and maintenance of morale.
   (a) Morale and personnel services. Morale is excellent; quotas to leave centers remain constant.
   (b) Graves registration. One graves registration company is in support of 1st Corps; Army cemetery is at GRIESWALT (* * *).

4. Health service.
   (a) Treatment and hospitalization capabilities are adequate; medical evacuation capabilities can handle normal requirements.
   (b) Current evacuation policy is 10 days.
   (c) Intelligence reports an epidemic of typhus in SAARLAUF.

5. Maintenance of discipline, law and order. Troop conduct and appearance are excellent; straggler rate is low.

f. Assumptions. There will be no change in the caliber of replacements.

3. ANALYSIS
a. Maintenance of Unit Strength.

   (1) Strengths. Courses of action 1 and 2 use the 23d and the 25th Armd Div alternately as the main attack force, while course of action 3 uses only the 23d Armd Div as the main attack force. The G3 estimates the total duration of this action to be 10 days. Anticipated losses under the proposed courses of action will reduce division strengths on the final day of the action to approximately as follows, provided no replacements are allocated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course of action</th>
<th>23d Armd Div</th>
<th>25th Armd Div</th>
<th>19th Inf Div</th>
<th>20th Inf Div</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12,325</td>
<td>11,668</td>
<td>12,010</td>
<td>10,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>11,748</td>
<td>11,668</td>
<td>12,010</td>
<td>10,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10,293</td>
<td>13,808</td>
<td>12,010</td>
<td>10,560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   The impact of these losses is such that the 23d Armd Div will be most seriously influenced by courses of action 1 and 2 and as lead division in course of action 3. In course of action 3, the 23d Armd
(PERS EST 5—1st Corps)

Div will receive significantly more casualties than in courses of action 1 and 2. The G3 estimates that the 25th Armd Div, which is in reserve for the entire operation, will have considerably fewer losses than in courses of action 1 and 2. In courses of action 1 and 3, there will be fewer total casualties, by computation; however, because of the shortage of armor replacements, bringing the 23d Armd Div to effective strength will be difficult if it is reduced to 10,293 in course of action 3. The total infantry casualties for all courses of action will be approximately equal. The 20th Inf Div is at 86-percent strength. Giving priority on infantry replacements to this division will alleviate the shortage of personnel forecast above.

(2) Replacements. Course of action 2 will create a greater requirement for armor replacements than courses of action 1 and 3. At present, armor replacements are in shorter supply than infantry replacements. All courses of action influence infantry replacement requirements about equally.

b. Personnel Management. Because of our rapid advance, the number of enemy PW’s captured will be about equal in all courses of action. The establishment of PW installations presents the same problem in all courses of action.

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale.

(1) Morale and personnel services. All courses of action involve a continuation of the attack and this, coupled with Aggressor’s low morale and willingness to surrender, will act to sustain high morale. All courses of action place troops units in the immediate presence of a typhus epidemic. Although this movement is not likely to cause an overall lowering of morale, it may cause isolated cases of group or individual morale problems.

(2) Graves registration. Although the distribution of casualties will be different, the number will be approximately equal in courses of action 1 and 3. Under all courses of action, the 19th and the 20th Inf Div may be required to transport casualties approximately 40 kilometers off the main supply routes to reach the cemetery after the divisions have progressed a short distance in the attack. This is not considered of major importance.

d. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order. Disciplinary problems will be created by securing SAARLAUF, then placing it off limits. CO, 205th MP Bn, states that he can assist securing of the town by controlling military personnel therein. The surgeon thinks that it would be better if no military personnel were required or permitted to enter the town. The G5 states that his information indicates that the civilian population is being adequately cared for, but entrance of our troops might cause unrest among the population.

e. Health Service. The typhus epidemic in SAARLAUF should not influence military units because all personnel were previously required to be immunized against the disease. However, to avoid needless exposure, military personnel should stay out of town unless their presence is absolutely essential.

4. COMPARISON

a. The dominant personnel factors are strengths; replacements; enemy PW’s and civilian internees/detainees; and discipline, law and order. All courses of action will influence graves registration, morale, personnel services, and headquarters management equally or nearly so.

b. Comparison of courses of action.

(1) Maintenance of unit strength.

(a) Concerning strengths. Course of action 3 will cause a reduction in the strength in the 23d Armd Div to a point beyond which it cannot sustain combat without additional replacement sup-
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port. Courses of action 1 and 2 will not deplete the strength of the division, and it should be capable of further combat after this action. Strengths favor adoption of course of action 1. If course of action 3 is used, the 23d Armd Div should be relieved as early as possible to reduce its losses and should be given sufficient time for rehabilitation and assimilation of replacements before being committed to action again. In all courses of action, the 20th Inf Div will also require time for rehabilitation.

(b) Concerning replacements. Course of action 2 will create a greater requirement for armor replacements, which are in short supply. Replacements favor courses of action 1 and 3.

(2) Personnel management. Concerning enemy PW’s and civilian internees/detainees. All courses of action influence enemy PW’s and civilian internees/detainees equally. The number of prisoners expected to be captured and the army’s inability to evacuate them present a problem.

(3) Maintenance of discipline, law and order. In any course of action adopted, CO, 205th MP Bn, should assist to the maximum the uncovering of SAARLAUF. G5 has indicated his capability to assist materially if this course of action is adopted. Discipline, law and order slightly favor courses of action 1 and 2.

(4) Health service. The typhus epidemic in SAARLAUF may present some problems in any course of action adopted; however, previous immunization should prevent this disease in US military units.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. The mission can be supported from a personnel standpoint. However, at the conclusion of the action, the corps strength will be low and a period of 2 weeks' rehabilitation should be planned for the 20th Inf Div and, if course of action 3 is adopted, for the 23d Armd Div.

b. Course of action 1 or 2 can best be supported from a personnel standpoint.

c. If course of action 3 is adopted, the estimated losses would result in the 23d Armd Div’s being at approximately 61-percent strength and unable to conduct sustained combat operations.

d. The corps commander should be informed of the projected strength at the conclusion of the operation and of the critical need for both infantry and armor replacements. He should also be informed of the need for replacements and rehabilitation for the 20th Inf Div in all courses of action and for the 23d Armd Div, if course of action 3 is adopted. It is recommended that priority of replacements be given to the 20th Inf Div and, if course of action 3 is adopted, to the 23d Armd Div.

/s/Simms
SIMMS
G1
LOGISTIC ESTIMATE NO 3

Reference: Map, series M319, WESTLAND, sheets BRAVO and INDIA, edition 2, 1:500,000.

1. MISSION

30th (US) Army attacks 20 July, secures an area sufficient to support future operations to the north, and prepares to conduct subsequent offensive operations in the direction of OSCAR.

2. THE SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS

a. Intelligence Situation.

   (2) Enemy strengths and dispositions. Intelligence Estimate No 3.
   (3) Enemy capabilities. Intelligence Estimate No 3.

b. Tactical Situation.

   (1) Operation Estimate No 3.
   (2) Possible tactical courses of action.
      (a) Attack to secure the BLUE River line and Hill 2403.
      (b) Attack to secure the RUFF Mountains.
      (c) Attack to secure the RED River line.
   (3) Projected operations. Initial operations will provide a sufficient base for offensive operations to the north toward OSCAR. Such offensive operations will be conducted on order and as soon as sufficient combat support and combat service support have been built up.

c. Personnel Situation.

   (1) Personnel Estimate No 3.
   (2) Approximate strengths to be supported.
      (a) From 20 through 31 July (12 days)—413,000.
      (b) From 1 through 19 August (19 days)—413,450. This strength includes the 23d Armd Div and excludes the 11th Inf Div.
   (3) The present dispositions of administrative units and installations other than logistic are * * *
   (4) There are no critical shortages of personnel that will affect logistic support of our operation.


   (1) The present dispositions of the 20th CA Bde * * *
   (2) The population of WESTLAND will, in general, be uncooperative initially. As our operations appear to be successful, large segments of the population may join or support us.
   (3) Enemy civilian personnel can be expected to influence our logistic operations as follows:
(LOG EST 3—30th (US) Army)

(a) Conduct guerrilla operations in our rear areas.
(b) Engage in sabotage, espionage, and subversion.
(c) Block major communication routes with refugees and displaced persons.

e. Logistic Situation. Supply and service installations (overlay 1) (omitted).

f. Assumptions.
   (1) Offensive operations to secure the BLUE River line and Hill 2403 will take 5 days.
   (2) Offensive operations to secure the RUFF Mountains will take 12 days.
   (3) Offensive operations to secure the RED River line will take 19 days.
   (4) The 23d Armd Div will be present and attached on 1 August (D+12).
   (5) The 11th Inf Div will be detached on 1 August (D+12).
   (6) Railroads will require extensive repair and rehabilitation.
   (7) Naval units cannot clear the SMOOTH Sea of enemy craft in the immediate future.
   (8) Supplies on hand on D-day will be as indicated in paragraph 3b(1)(b)1.

g. Special Factors. Communications centers and logistic installations will constitute remunerative targets for enemy nuclear weapons unless adequate measures are taken to reduce our vulnerability.

3. ANALYSIS

a. Sufficiency of Area. Capture and defense of the area envisioned by courses of action 2 and 3 will provide sufficient area for the combat service support installations necessary for future offensive operations to the north. Course of action 1, although providing somewhat more room in the western portion of the army sector than is now available, does not provide additional space in the eastern portion of the army sector. Moreover, much of the territory gained by course of action 1 is mountainous and of limited utility for combat service support installations. Any significant buildup accomplished in the space available will force concentration of materiel, units, and installations into complexes with a high degree of nuclear vulnerability.

b. Materiel and Services.
   (1) Supply.
      (a) Requirements.
         1. Daily replacement and consumption (R&C) tonnages for the 30th (US) Army.
         2. Authorized level of supply for all classes—10 days.
      (b) Availability.
         1. Estimated to be on hand by D-day (20 July)—80,000 short tons (STON) (44,200 STON of class III and 35,800 STON of dry cargo).
         2. Required supplies are available in TASCOM installations.
         3. By D-day, TASCOM units supporting us will be capable of delivering tonnages as follows:
            (a) For course of action 1: 10,440 STON of class III and 11,840 STON of dry cargo.
            (b) For courses of action 2 and 3:
               (1) From D-day until our advance requires opening rear support areas in the vicinity of MIKE—ECHO—TANGO on D+6: 10,440 STON of class III and 8,430 STON of dry cargo.
               (2) From D+6 until D+43 into MIKE—ECHO—TANGO areas: 10,440 STON of class III and 10,990 STON of dry cargo.
         4. TASCOM units cannot move supplies forward of rear support areas noted above.
      (c) Limiting features.
(LOG EST 3—30th (US) Army)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Limited offensive</th>
<th>Offensive</th>
<th>Defensive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 inf/3 mech div</td>
<td>6 inf/3 mech div</td>
<td>5 inf/3 mech/1 armd div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class I</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class II</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IV</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class V</td>
<td>5,460</td>
<td>4,730</td>
<td>4,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VI</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VII</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class VIII</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class IX</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force supplies</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dry cargo</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>7,780</td>
<td>7,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>4,420</td>
<td>7,880</td>
<td>8,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,820</td>
<td>15,660</td>
<td>16,040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Stock levels on D-day (20 July) are estimated to be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>STON auth</th>
<th>STON on hand</th>
<th>STON over/short</th>
<th>Percentage on hand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited offensive:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>44,200</td>
<td>44,200</td>
<td>-48,200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry cargo</td>
<td>84,000</td>
<td>35,800</td>
<td>-48,200</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>128,200</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>-48,200</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>78,800</td>
<td>44,200</td>
<td>-34,600</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry cargo</td>
<td>77,800</td>
<td>35,800</td>
<td>-42,000</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>156,600</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>-76,600</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Stock levels authorized D+5 (25 July):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>STON</th>
<th>STON</th>
<th>STON</th>
<th>STON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defensive:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>47,100</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry cargo</td>
<td>90,300</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>137,400</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Stock levels authorized D+12 (1 August):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>STON</th>
<th>STON</th>
<th>STON</th>
<th>STON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offensive:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>81,600</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry cargo</td>
<td>78,800</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>160,400</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class III</td>
<td>49,500</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry cargo</td>
<td>91,300</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>140,800</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td>STON</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LOG EST 3—30th (US) Army

4. Authorized stock levels can be met as follows:
   (a) Course of action 1. Attack to secure the BLUE River line and Hill 2403. (Attack for 5 days, then defend.)
      (1) Class III:
          a. Receipt of class III tonnages in excess of requirements through D + 4: 10,440 STON less 4,420 STON = 6,020 STON per day.
              b. Authorized stockage can be maintained throughout the offensive and defensive phases.
      (2) Dry cargo:
          a. Receipt of tonnages in excess of requirements through D + 4: 11,840 STON less 8,400 STON = 3,440 STON per day for 5 days, for a total buildup of 17,200 STON.
              b. Shortage remaining on 25 July: 90,300 STON less 35,800 STON less 17,200 STON = 37,300 STON.
              c. Time to reach authorized levels:
                 (1) D + 5 receipts of 11,840 STON less daily requirements of 9,030 STON = 2,810-STON-per-day buildup.
                 (2) 37,300-STON shortage , ,
                     2,810-STON-per-day buildup = 14 days or D + 18.
   (b) Course of action 2. Attack to secure the RUFF Mountains. (Attack for 12 days, then defend.)
      (1) Class III:
          a. Receipt of class III tonnages in excess of requirements through D + 11: 10,440 STON less 7,880 STON = 2,560 STON per day.
              b. On 1 August, the army would have its authorized stockage (49,500 STON) for the defense of the RUFF Mountains.
      (2) Dry cargo:
          a. Receipt of tonnages in excess of requirements through D + 5: 8,430 STON less 7,780 STON = 650 STON per day for 6 days, for a total buildup of 3,900 STON.
              b. Receipt of tonnages in excess of requirements for D + 6 through D + 11: 10,990 STON less 7,780 STON = 3,210 STON for 6 days, for a total buildup of 19,260 STON.
              c. On 1 August, the army will have its authorized stock of class III (49,500 STON) for the defense along the RED RIVER.
   (c) Course of action 3. Attack to secure the RED River line. (Attack for 19 days, then defend.)
      (1) Class III:
          a. Receipt of class III tonnages in excess of requirements through D + 18: 10,440 STON less*

* * *

(2) Dry cargo:
          a. Receipt of tonnages in excess of requirements through D + 5: 8,430 STON less 7,780 STON = 650 STON per day for 6 days, for a total buildup of 3,900 STON.
              b. Receipt of tonnages in excess of requirements from D + 6 through D + 11: 10,990 STON less 7,780 STON = 3,210 STON for 6 days, for a total buildup of 19,260 STON.
              c. Receipt of tonnages in excess of requirements from D + 12 to D + 18: 10,990 STON less 7,880 STON = 3,110 STON for 7 days, for a total buildup of 21,770 STON.
              d. Shortage on 8 August: 91,300 STON less 35,800 STON less 3,900 STON less 19,260 STON less 21,770 STON = 10,570 STON.

(C)lassification

C–60
(Classification)

(LOG EST 3—30th (US) Army)

e. Receipt of tonnages in excess of requirements after D+18: 10,990 STON less 9,130 STON = 1,860-STON-per-day buildup.
f. 10,570-STON shortage \( \frac{1,860-\text{STON-per-day buildup}}{6 \text{ days or D+24}} \)

5. Although authorized supply levels for dry cargo for any of the three courses of action cannot be met by D-day, tonnages available from TASCOM installations will be sufficient to avoid severe shortages and will permit gradual buildup after the offensive phase is completed. Class III receipts exceed the daily requirements in all courses of action, which will permit the army to have its authorized supply level on hand at the conclusion of offensive operations.

(2) Transportation.
(a) Requirements.
1. Logistic.
   (a) R&C tonnages to be moved: Eighty-five percent of daily R&C tonnages are consumed forward of the corps rear boundaries. All class III will be moved through TASCOM pipelines to the corps areas, where it will be distributed by the petroleum supply battalions of the corps support brigades. TASCOM highway transportation requirements for support of rehabilitation of communication facilities will preclude throughput of dry cargo to elements of the field army. After D+5, daily requirements for the forward elements must be moved from the supply installations at MIKE, ECHO, and TANGO by FASCOM transportation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course of Action</th>
<th>Dry Cargo (0.85 x 7,780)</th>
<th>Class III (0.85 x 7,880)</th>
<th>Total Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Offensive (6 inf/3 mech div)</td>
<td>6,620 STON</td>
<td>6,700 STON</td>
<td>13,320 STON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive (5 inf/3 mech/1 armd div)</td>
<td>6,700 STON</td>
<td>6,940 STON</td>
<td>13,640 STON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive (5 inf/3 mech/1 armd div)</td>
<td>7,760 STON</td>
<td>4,210 STON</td>
<td>11,970 STON</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Attached to the truck battalions of the corps support brigades: 10 light-medium truck companies, two heavy truck companies, and two light truck companies (5-ton truck).

(c) Forward displacement of stocks on hand.
(1) Stocks in the corps areas.
   a. It is estimated that the average rate of advance will be 11 kilometers per day to the RUFF Mountains and 13 kilometers per day beyond the RUFF Mountains.
   b. A minimum of 3 days' supply for the elements supported should be kept on hand in the corps areas. Eighty-five percent of supplies consumed within the army are issued in the corps areas. For the period D to D+11, dry cargo on hand in the forward areas should be 19,840 STON \( (0.85 \times 7,780 \times 3) \). For the period D+12 to D+18, dry stocks on hand in the forward areas should be 20,100 STON \( (0.85 \times 7,880 \times 3) \). The movement capability for the 3-day stock of class III in the corps areas is adequate.

(2) Stocks on hand in the army service area.
   a. TASCOM deliveries to the MIKE—ECHO—TANGO areas can begin on D+6. Forward movement from these areas to the corps areas can begin on D+7.
b. Buildup of stocks in the MIKE—ECHO—TANGO areas to levels presently held in the field army service area can be accomplished by D + 10 without limiting deliveries forward to the corps areas.

2. Administrative and miscellaneous. An average of 108,000 ton-km will be required daily for movement of replacements, mail, enemy prisoners of war, miscellaneous personnel tasks, displacement of hospitals, and for operations.

3. No requirement exists for additional transportation support from the transportation brigade for tactical movements. The corps support brigades will provide for the movement of corps tactical units and corps headquarters facilities on an as-required basis.

(b) Available for transportation of supplies from rear supply installations to corps support areas.

1. TASCOM pipeline and FASCOM petroleum supply battalions. The combined capability of the TASCOM pipeline facilities and the petroleum supply battalions of the support brigades will adequately provide for the movement of daily class III requirements and for the forward displacement of class III stocks.

   (a) Two light truck companies (2 1/2-ton).
   (b) One heavy truck company.
   (c) Four light-medium truck companies.
   (d) Two medium truck companies (cargo).

3. Rail. Rail transportation is not expected to be available until after D + 43.

4. Air. Four aviation companies (aslt spt), each equipped with 16 CH-47A aircraft (Chinook).

5. Sea. No shipping is available in the SMOOTH Sea.

(c) Limiting features.

1. Capability of the FASCOM transportation brigade to carry dry cargo is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No of units</th>
<th>Type of units</th>
<th>Forward ton-km per unit</th>
<th>Total forward ton-km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Light truck co (2 1/2-ton)</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Heavy truck co</td>
<td>144,000</td>
<td>144,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Light-medium truck co</td>
<td>55,200</td>
<td>220,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Medium truck co (cargo)</td>
<td>108,000</td>
<td>216,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aviation co (aslt spt)</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total forward ton-km per day, all types of cargo                      748,800

2. In addition to distributing supplies to the DISCOM's and DS units and displacing forward the stocks of the corps support brigades, the truck battalions of the corps support brigades, as organized, are capable of extending FASCOM support approximately 30 to 35 kilometers. They will also possess a limited capability for movement of tactical units within the supported corps.

3. The divisions are capable of supporting themselves approximately 40 to 48 kilometers forward of our forward supply installations (measured to the forward edge of the battle area).

4. Analysis of forwarding capability.
   (a) Course of action 1. This course of action presents no transportation limiting features for the movement of either class III or dry cargo.
   (b) Course of action 2. Sufficient transportation capability is available to support course of action 2. Peak requirement (578,400 ton-km) occurs on the last day of the offense, as follows:
(LOG EST 3—30th (US) Army)

(1) For administrative and miscellaneous support 108,000 ton-km (para 3b(2)(a)2).

(2) Forward movement of daily dry cargo tonnages from MIKE—ECHO—TANGO to corps support areas 462,910 ton-km (7,780 STON × 0.85 × 70 km = 462,910 ton-km).

(3) Total requirement for support of the offensive to the RUFF Mountains: 570,910 ton-km.

(4) The total requirement for support of a defense at the RUFF Mountains is 651,240 ton-km (9,130 STON × 0.85 × 70 km = 543,240 ton-km + 108,000 ton-km for administrative and miscellaneous support).

(c) Course of action 3. Insufficient transportation capacity for dry cargo is available to support course of action 3. Class III transportation capability is adequate to support this course of action. Dry cargo requirements for the offense can be supported 165 kilometers and the defense 152 kilometers forward of the MIKE—ECHO—TANGO areas as follows:

(1) Offense to the RED River.
   a. Forward movement capability of the transportation brigade:
      \[
      \frac{748,800 \text{ ton-km} - 108,000 \text{ ton-km}}{6,700 \text{ tons dry cargo per day}} = 95 \text{ km}
      \]
   b. DISCOM forward movement capability: 40 kilometers.
   c. Corps support brigade forward movement capability: 30 kilometers.
   d. Total support distance for offensive operations: 165 kilometers (95 km + 40 km + 30 km).

(2) Defense.
   a. Forward movement capability of the transportation brigade:
      \[
      \frac{748,800 \text{ ton-km} - 108,000 \text{ ton-km}}{7,760 \text{ tons dry cargo per day}} = 82 \text{ km} + 40 \text{ km} + 30 \text{ km} = 152 \text{ km}
      \]
   b. Class III transportation capacity is adequate for defensive operations at the RED River.

5. Transportation capability of the 120th TASCOM precludes delivering supplies forward of our support areas in the vicinity of MIKE—ECHO—TANGO until D+43; therefore, the extent of our operations north of these areas will depend on the capability of transportation available to us.

(3) Service.
   (a) Requirements and availability. Unexpected rains and extensive enemy demolitions may increase our requirements for engineer support.
   (b) Limiting features. While no limitations exist, the definite possibility of requiring additional engineer support must be minimized by careful planning and the earmarking of units for emergency work.

4. COMPARISON

Logistic deficiencies and tactical courses of action are evaluated as follows:

a. Logistic Deficiencies.
   (1) Supply. Authorized stock levels cannot be met before commencing the operation.
   (2) Transportation.
      (a) Transportation available to us will adequately support tactical operations only as far as the RUFF Mountains.
      (b) Additional transportation is not available.
      (c) Additional transportation support from TASCOM installations is not available to permit northward displacement of our support areas beyond the MIKE—ECHO—TANGO areas until D+43.

(Classification)
(LOG EST 3—30th (US) Army)

(d) Water transportation is not presently available and will not be available until naval forces gain control of the SMOOTH Sea.

(e) Railroads in our area require extensive repair and rehabilitation and are not expected to be available until after D+43.

(3) RAP. Course of action 1 does not provide an area sufficient to permit adequate dispersal of combat service support installations. Further, the area to be secured in course of action 3 presents extremely long and vulnerable lines of communications and a large area to administer.

b. Tactical Courses of Action.

(1) Sufficiency of area. Because of the inadequacy of the area provided, course of action 1 is not favored. Sufficiency of area favors adoption of courses of action 3 and 2 in that order.

(2) Supply. Although stocks will not be at authorized levels before commencing operations, tonnages delivered from TASCOM activities will permit gradual buildup. Supply favors courses of action 1, 2, and 3 in that order.

(3) Transportation. Requirements to support course of action 3 exceed capabilities; however, it can be supported for a limited period by requiring supply point distribution of all classes of supply, by withdrawing aircraft from the corps, and by requiring the corps support brigades to use all their transportation for movement of supplies. Combat support and combat service support requirements for an offensive beyond the RUFF Mountains and subsequent defensive operations along the RED River militate against these actions. Transportation favors courses of action 1, 2, and 3 in that order.

(4) RAP. Course of action 3 provides long and vulnerable lines of communications, increasing the difficulty of maintaining rear area security. Both courses of action 2 and 3 provide sufficient area for adequate dispersal of combat service support installations. Course of action 1 does not provide sufficient area for dispersal and forces concentration into highly vulnerable complexes. Area responsibilities favor adoption of courses of action 2, 3, and 1 in that order.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. The operation can be supported logistically.

b. Tactical course of action 1 (secure the BLUE River line and Hill 2403) can be supported most readily, but does not secure sufficient area for dispersion of units during the buildup. Course of action 2 (secure the RUFF Mountains) can be supported without undue difficulty. Course of action 3 (secure and defend the RED River line) can be supported with difficulty for a limited period and only by reducing the tactical mobility of the combat forces.

c. Deficiencies requiring the commander's attention.

(1) Inadequacy of area secured in course of action 1.

(2) Transportation.

(3) Supply levels.

d. Recommend the adoption of course of action 2.

/s/Green
GREEN
G4

Annexes (as required)
CIVIL AFFAIRS ESTIMATE NO 3

Reference: Map, series 34, CELEA, sheets 10 and 11 (ALFA, BRAVO), edition 1, 1:500,000.

1. MISSION

1st Army attacks 9 August, secures high ground north of ALFA and BRAVO, and prepares to continue attack north to the CELEAN Mountains.

2. THE SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS

a. Intelligence Situation.

1) Characteristics of the area of operations.

(a) The zone of advance is characterized by gently rolling terrain sloping down to the GREEN River, then gradually rising toward the foothills of the CELEAN Mountains to the north. The area is predominantly rural, with a pattern of small farms clustered around villages that serve as market centers and trading posts. There are two cities, ALFA (*) (population 20,000) in the west and BRAVO (*) (population 50,000) in the east, at the confluence of the GREEN and WHITE Rivers. ALFA is primarily a commercial center with some light industry, such as food-processing and fertilizer plants. BRAVO is a major communication and transportation center and the site of two major oil refineries.

(b) Outside BRAVO, the population's primary concern is its agricultural pursuits; and, though quite nationalistic, the population has little interest in politics and ideologies. The population resents Aggressor's attempts at collectivization and political indoctrination and his repressive measures to enforce crop delivery quotas. Our forces should be welcomed as liberators from such measures. However, the population will probably equally resent coercive CA measures. Some disaffection among the laboring class in BRAVO may be expected because of Aggressor ideological pressure.

(c) The area will not only be self-sufficient in food, but will have a surplus to support other current and future CA operations, provided Aggressor does not successfully pursue a scorched-earth policy. Sufficient personnel are in the area to carry on the normal civil functions. However, many able-bodied males either are in the military service or are harvesting crops, thus preventing the divergence of any significant numbers for labor in support of military operations, except in the immediate vicinity of BRAVO.

(d) No significant number of refugees is known to be in the area. Aggressor has brought in approximately 10,000 displaced persons: some 5,000 work in the oil refineries and railyards in BRAVO; the remainder are dispersed throughout the area as farm labor. Expectedly, most civilians, particularly the populations of ALFA and BRAVO, will flee temporarily during combat, but will return to their homes shortly thereafter. The number who remain refugees will depend on the extent of destruction.

(e) The oil refineries in BRAVO have been bombed, and the bridges across the GREEN River have been destroyed; otherwise, the area has suffered relatively little war damage. For the most part, public facilities required for essential functions are still operable.

(f) BRAVO is the provincial capital. Aggressor has appointed provincial, municipal, and local officials. The government is highly centralized and party cadres at all échelons control all political activity and insure the carrying out of government edicts.
(CA EST 3—1st Army)

(g) A sizable typhoid epidemic is reported in BRAVO. Civilian medical facilities and physicians are limited and are hampered by a severe shortage of medical supplies.

(2) Enemy strength and dispositions. Intelligence Estimate No 1.

(3) Enemy capabilities.
   (a) Lack of strong defensive positions in depth indicates that, when driven from present positions, Aggressor will probably conduct a series of delaying actions back to the CELEAN Mountains.

   (b) Aggressor can be expected to mount up to 100 fighter and bomber sorties daily to delay our advance. The use of nuclear weapons can be expected against troop concentrations and command and combat service support installations. The use of a nuclear weapon against BRAVO may be anticipated both to delay our advance and to destroy the oil refineries and the city's usefulness as a base for future operations. However, the bulk of the population probably will have fled before such destruction.

   (c) Aggressor can be expected to pursue a scorched-earth policy as he withdraws. The population will bitterly resist this effort, and friendly partisan activity will impede it. The degree of destruction will depend on the speed of our advance.

   (d) Aggressor can be expected to form and leave behind organized guerrilla groups to operate in our rear areas to disrupt combat service support activities and terrorize cooperating elements of the local population. He can also be expected to leave agents provocateur, particularly in ALFA and BRAVO, for purposes of espionage, sabotage, and subversion.

b. Tactical Situation.
   (1) Operation Estimate No 2.
   (2) Possible courses of action.
      (a) 1st Army attacks 9 August to secure the ALPHA—BRAVO—GREEN River line. The 1st Corps makes the main attack in the direction of ALFA—Hill 519 (* * *)
      (b) 1st Army attacks 9 August to secure the ALPHA—BRAVO—GREEN River line. The 2d Corps makes the main attack in the direction of BRAVO—Hill Complex 237 (* * *)
      (c) 1st Army attacks 9 August to secure the ALPHA—BRAVO—GREEN River line. The 1st Corps makes the main attack in the direction of Hill Complex 320 (* * *).

   (3) Next anticipated army operation is an attack to secure the CELEAN Mountains. Present area of operations, particularly the highway and rail network in the eastern sector of zone, is essential as a combat service support base for this operation.

c. Personnel Situation.
   (1) Admin/Log Order 2.
   (2) Proposed rotation plan, if approved, will entail loss of experienced CA personnel. A minimum of 1 month's area orientation is considered essential before replacements become fully effective.

d. Logistic Situation.
   (1) Admin/Log Order 2.
   (2) Priority of army transportation support to 2d Corps will limit civilian relief supplies that can be moved from depot stocks to 1st Corps zone. Supply point distribution, using civilian transportation, will be employed to the extent consistent with available transportation, POL, and obtainable road priorities.

   (3) Refineries in BRAVO and supporting pipeline facilities will be rehabilitated as soon as possible to ease the burden on sea transportation and port facilities.
(CA EST 3—1st Army)

e. CA Situation and Nature of Operations To Be Supported.

(1) US policy is to treat CELEA as a liberated country. US military forces will exercise CA authority until the government-in-exile can be effectively reestablished and national sovereignty can be restored.

(2) Because Aggressor resistance is expected to consist largely of successive delaying actions, our own advance should cause limited damage. However, if the enemy defends strongly at the GREEN River line, extensive local damage can be expected from our artillery preparations and bombardment, to include the possible use of nuclear weapons to force a crossing.

(3) Plans to use the area as a combat service support base for the assault on the CELEAN Mountain line will require immediate clearance and restoration of public transportation facilities, to include GREEN River crossings.

(4) The 21st CA Bde, with assigned battalions and functional teams, provides adequate CA command and control to support the operations. Functional specialists, particularly public health, public works, and engineering personnel, are limited.

(5) Theater policy prescribes a 1,500-calorie-per-day minimum ration for civilians. Relief supplies in depots are adequate to lessen undue hardship until the normal food distribution system is restored. However, transportation to move supplies to forward areas is limited. Extremely limited medical supplies are available to be diverted to the civilian population.

f. Assumptions.

(1) Aggressor-appointed officials will flee as Aggressor withdraws.

(2) Adequate numbers of capable leaders for initial appointments can be found among friendly partisans, returning refugees, and previously elected officials and business leaders who are currently imprisoned or working as common laborers.

(3) Aggressor will depict US forces as rapists, pillagers, and exploiters who intend to secure control to serve their own ends. Planted agents disguised as US soldiers will commit felonious acts to foment disaffection.

(4) Aggressor scorched-earth activities will be only moderately successful because of population resistance, partisan activity, and the speed of our advance.

(5) Food-processing plants will be destroyed, and the transportation network for farm-to-market distribution will be severely damaged.

(6) US military forces, assisted by local labor, will undertake the immediate decontamination and restoration of the refineries, key public works, and transportation facilities in BRAVO to improve combat service support capabilities for future operations.

g. Special Factor. Aggressor can use biological agents to contaminate the water supply and to destroy the usefulness of the area as a source of food supply; he has yet to do this. His use of these agents would increase civilian supply problems, and all CA units would require public health augmentation to prevent epidemics and the spread of disease.

3. ANALYSIS

a. Government Functions.

(1) Civil administration. Course of action 1 will result in initially bypassing sizable Aggressor elements. Establishment of effective CA control will be delayed until clearing operations are substantially complete. However, the speed of advance that course of action 1 promises should prevent Aggressor's rounding up and deporting those persons likely to be useful as appointed officials under CA. Either
(Classification)

(CA EST 3—1st Army)

course of action 2 or course of action 3 will result in Aggressor's clearance from the zone as the advance progresses, and CA units can establish control immediately in the wake of combat. However, the relatively slow speed of advance, particularly in the case of course of action 3, will permit Aggressor's deporting prominent persons at will.

(2) Public safety.

(a) Remarks concerning reestablishment of civil government ((1) above) are pertinent to the restoration of law and order.

(b) The principal public safety problem will be controlling civilian traffic and keeping refugees from hindering combat support and combat service support operations. This problem will become most acute if course of action 3 is pursued because this course is likely to involve extensive combat in built-up areas.

(3) Public health. Either course of action 1 or course of action 2 will avoid any immediate substantial exposure of our troops to the typhoid epidemic in BRAVO. Course of action 3 will expose our forces to the epidemic, and any heavy fighting in and around BRAVO will also result in stricken persons fleeing the area and thereby spreading the disease. Because of the limited number of public health teams available, CA units may experience considerable difficulty in controlling the epidemic and will probably require military medical unit support. In addition, course of action 3 is likely to result in a large number of civilian casualties requiring emergency treatment.

(4) Labor. Either course of action 1 or course of action 2, with the axis of advance through the sparsely populated, agrarian western sector of the zone, will uncover only a limited supply of labor to support operations. Course of action 3, with the main attack through the more populous eastern sector of the zone, should uncover an ample supply of labor. However, the damage to public facilities that may occur during course of action 3 will also increase the requirements for labor to restore minimum-essential civilian facilities.

(5) Tribunals. No special problems.

(6) Public welfare. No special problems.

(7) Public finance.

(a) Aggressor's capability to gain possession of US military payment certificates, to introduce counterfeit currencies, and to encourage black-market operations by purchase of short-supply items requires appropriate countermeasures.

(b) Unauthorized practices must be prevented to protect the value of currency.

(8) Public education. No special problems.

(9) Civil defense. No special problems.

b. Economic Functions.

(1) Economics and commerce.

(a) Because of extensive supply requirements for military operations, military assistance in the combat phase must be limited to preservation measures and that degree of economic rehabilitation which will assist military operations.

(b) In the postcombat phase, military effort may be directed toward restoration.

(c) Price control and rationing are the responsibilities of Celean authorities to the degree that they can function effectively.

(2) Food and agriculture. The speed of advance of course of action 1 should prevent Aggressor from carrying out wholesale destruction of crops and fields. Bypassed elements will probably be too concerned with their own defense to create extensive damage. Course of action 2 should apply sufficient pressure on Aggressor elements in the agrarian areas to prevent extensive, deliberate destruct-
Both courses of action 1 and 2 will entail some combat damage to crops and fields. However, this damage is considered negligible.

(3) Civilian supply. Civilian supply requirements will be related directly to our success in preventing extensive Aggressor scorched-earth activity; therefore, the discussion concerning food and agriculture (2) above applies here. The critical civilian supply problem will be transporting relief supplies from army depots to forward areas. Course of action 3 will uncover the major highway and rail network and will increase our civilian supply capability in this respect. However, course of action 3 is likely to uncover a large number of refugees and will permit the enemy to inflict considerable destruction in populated areas, thereby increasing the civilian supply requirements.

(4) Property control. Procedures for property control include—
   (a) Identification of ownership of Celean private property.
   (b) Military use of Celean private property to the degree that a requirement therefor exists.
   (c) Identification of private and public property belonging to other than Celean owners (i.e., Aggressor-owned, Allied-owned, neutrally owned) for administration by the CA organization.

c. Public Facilities Functions.

(1) Public works and utilities. Aggressor's destruction of key installations and facilities, including public utilities essential to the operation of the refineries in BRAVO, is anticipated, regardless of which course of action is pursued.

(2) Public communications. Early restoration of the communication facilities in the zone will greatly improve its value as a base for future operations. Course of action 3 will bring the majority of these facilities under our control in the early stages of the operation.

(3) Public transportation. The comments in (2) above are applicable to public transportation facilities.

d. Special Functions.

(1) Civil information. Particular attention should be given to countering the effects of ideological pressure on the Celean populace. Preparation of a detailed civil information plan and coordination with the G3 for utilization of psychological operations and public information agencies will facilitate effective fulfillment of the civil information mission.

(2) Displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees.
   (a) Aggressor's capability to interfere with our military operations by directing refugees and displaced persons into our lines and using nuclear or chemical weapons against densely populated areas may create special problems.
   (b) The military commander will direct handling and evacuation of displaced persons.
   (c) The standard of care will be that required to prevent disease and unrest, which prejudice the military mission.
   (d) Celean authorities will not be burdened with care of non-Celean displaced persons.
   (e) Course of action 3, with the zone of advance through a heavily populated sector, will create a large number of refugees. Control problems will be severe because MSR's to support the main attack will pass directly through the areas where the refugees are anticipated. The main attack in course of action 2 passes through a sparsely populated area, and few refugees should be anticipated. If course of action 1 is successful in forcing Aggressor to withdraw without extensive combat, there is an excellent chance that the bulk of the population, to include the displaced persons, will stand fast.

(3) Arts, monuments, and archives. No special problems.

(4) Religious relations. No special problems.

(Classification)
4. COMPARISON

a. Course of Action 1.

(1) Advantages.
   (a) The rapid exploitation may cause Aggressor to evacuate without extensive combat, which would, of course, facilitate CA and all other operations.
   (b) The axis of advance will avoid the built-up areas in the east, thereby easing public safety and refugee control problems.
   (c) The axis of advance will avoid the epidemic areas in BRAVO.
   (d) The speed of advance should prevent extensive Aggressor scorched-earth activities and the deportation of persons likely to aid our cause.

(2) Disadvantages.
   (a) Bypassing sizable Aggressor elements will delay establishment of effective CA control.
   (b) The refineries in BRAVO and key transportation facilities will remain under Aggressor control until the zone is cleared or Aggressor withdraws.
   (c) Labor available to support military operations will be limited.

b. Course of Action 2.

(1) Advantages.
   (a) Clearing the zone as the advance progresses will permit establishment of effective CA control immediately in the wake of combat.
   (b) The axis of the main attack is to the west, and the MSR's that support the main attack will not pass through expected lines of drift of refugees, thereby easing public safety and refugee control problems.
   (c) The axis of the main attack will avoid the epidemic area in BRAVO.
   (d) Pressure on Aggressor in the agrarian areas will hinder Aggressor scorched-earth activities.

(2) Disadvantages.
   (a) The relative slowness of advance expected, as compared with course of action 1, will give Aggressor more opportunity to employ scorched-earth tactics and carry out deportation programs despite combat pressure.
   (b) The direction of the main attack is away from the refineries in BRAVO and key transportation facilities and utilities, thus delaying the time that these facilities will come under our control.
   (c) The main attack will uncover only a limited supply of labor to support operations.
   (d) The supporting attack in the east will create refugee control problems on the MSR's in that area.

c. Course of Action 3.

(1) Advantages.
   (a) Clearing the zone will permit establishment of effective CA control immediately in the wake of combat.
   (b) The main attack in the east will bring the refineries and utilities in BRAVO and the key transportation network under our control at the earliest time.
   (c) The main attack will uncover an ample labor supply to support military operations.

(2) Disadvantages.
   (a) The slowness of the advance and the direction of the main attack will permit Aggressor to conduct scorched-earth and deportation activities relatively unhindered.
(Classification)

(CA EST 3—1st Army)

(b) The direction of the main attack will expose our troops to the typhoid epidemic at BRAVO, and heavy combat in this area will result in the probable spreading of the disease.

(c) The main attack will cause sizable numbers of refugees, with possible hindrance to combat support and combat service support operations.

(d) The main attack through the more populated area will increase civilian supply requirements.

d. Discussion.

(1) The overriding CA consideration is the extraordinary value of this area as a source of food supply. If this area comes to our control relatively intact, it will greatly ease civilian supply problems in this and future operations, with the consequent lessening of the burden on our combat service support system. The industrial facilities in BRAVO, while important, will require extensive rehabilitation before they can contribute to the support of military operations.

(2) The typhoid epidemic in BRAVO or the advent of enemy biological operations may require military medical units to assist in control. Military medical units should be alerted for this assistance.

(3) In view of the limited military supplies and transportation available to support CA activities, the course of action that permits use of civilian supplies available at centrally located sources is to be favored. Course of action 1 offers the best opportunity for a rapid advance and prevention of Aggressor's wholesale destruction of civilian food supplies. Courses of action 2 and 3 offer less opportunity for realization of the area's food supply potential.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. The proposed operation can be supported with the existing CA organization under any of the courses of action being considered.

b. Course of action 1 can best be supported, and its adoption is recommended.

c. Courses of action 2 and 3 do not allow for a rapid advance but permit Aggressor to employ scorched-earth tactics, thus increasing the required support from military sources.

d. Military medical units should be designated and alerted to assist in controlling the typhoid epidemic in BRAVO or in countering enemy biological operations.

/s/ Jones

JONES

G5
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO 23

Reference: Map, series M501, Western EUROPE, sheets NM32-4 through NM32-9, edition 3, 1:250,000.

1. MISSION

1st Corps attacks, H-hour, 16 August; secures corps bridgehead over the REGNITZ River-Canal System; secures NÜRNBERG; prepares to protect the army north flank; prepares to release one mechanized division to 3d Corps; and prepares to continue the attack into CZECHOSLOVKIA to secure crossings over the LABE River.

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Weather.

(1) From 10 to 25 August, weather will be generally cloudy with occasional showers. Visibility will average from 15 to 20 kilometers, except when reduced to from 2 to 5 kilometers during showers. Temperatures from 52° to 72° F. Surface winds from the west 7 to 9 knots. Winds aloft for yields of tactical interest about 15 knots from the south. Atmospheric pressure averages about 970 millibars. New moon, 14 August.

(2) Light data.

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(3) Effect on enemy courses of action. * * .

(4) Effect on own courses of action. * * * .

b. Terrain.

(1) Existing situation.

(a) Concealment and cover.

1. Wooded areas afford good concealment. Concealment and cover are available to a limited extent in the numerous ravines formed by the drainage system and in the villages scattered throughout the area.
(INTEL EST 23—1st Corps)

2. East of the REGNITZ River-Canal System, the forested FRANCONIAN JURA will limit mechanized operations and afford the defender cover, concealment, and superior observation of our approaching forces.

(b) Observation and fires. There are few good observation points, except along the heights overlooking the MAIN, TAUBER, and JAGST Rivers. Smoke from forest fires is likely to hinder observation for extensive periods after nuclear strikes. Fields of fire throughout the area generally are excellent to good.

(c) Obstacles.
1. TAUBER River (fordable; fordable with difficulty from TAUBER DISCHOF-SHEIM (NV4897) to the MAIN River).
2. Steep slopes and bluffs of the TAUBER and JAGST River valleys.
3. MAIN River (unfordable west of EBENSFELD (PA4047) to FRANKFURT; averages 70 meters in width west of and 30 meters in width north of BAMBERG).
4. Forests throughout the area. Numerous trails of firebreaks through the woods, not shown on the map, permit passage of tracked and wheeled vehicles through this obstacle. Forests are generally unsuited for conflagration except for heath and patches of forest during unusually long dry periods.
5. REGNITZ River-Canal System (unfordable from BAMBERG to NÜRNBERG; REGNITZ River-Canal System averages 66 meters (217 feet) in width).
6. City of NÜRNBERG. The city was partially destroyed at the outset of hostilities. The major highways that bypass the city are cleared; however, the main rail and road nets through the city are impassable.

7. City of ERLANGEN. ** *.
8. City of BAMBERG. ** *.

(d) Key terrain features. * * *

(e) Avenues of approach.
1. Avenues of approach into our position:
   (a) Axis GERCHSHEIM (NA5606)—TAUBERBISCHOF-SHEIM (NA4987)—HAR-DHEIM (NA8596)—WALLDURN (NV2922)—MICHELSTADT (NA0104).
   (b) Axis QUECKBRONN (NV6981)—ASSAMSTADT (NV5067)—LEIBENSTADT (NV3169)—AUERBACH (NV1672)—EBERBACH (MV9970).
   (c) Axis OBERWEILER (NV6889)—OHRINGEN (NV3750)—EBERSTA-DT (NV2448)—BAD RAPPENAU (NV0755).
2. Avenues of approach into Aggressor position:
   (a) Axis KONIGSHOFEN (NV5389)—GEISSLINGEN (NV8095)—WACHENROTH (PA-2312)—REIGNITZ River.
   (b) Axis HACHTEL (NV5774)—NEUSTETT (NV8279)—NEUSTADT (PV1793)—REIGNITZ River.
   (c) Axis SCHWABISCH HALL (NV5440)—ANSBACH (PV1462)—REIGNITZ River near NÜRNBERG.
3. The road net is excellent throughout the area.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Terrain does not favor the enemy attack. If the enemy does attack, his most favorable approach is astride the axis OBERWEILER—OHRINGEN—EBERSTA-DT—BAD RAPPENAU. Terrain favors Aggressor's defense in his present position.

(3) Effect on own courses of action. The terrain favors the defense. The steep slopes of the TAUBER and JAGST River valleys are formidable obstacles to mechanized attack. Fair weather favors exploitation of our armor, airpower, and use of nuclear weapons. Surface winds favor our use of...
smoke and chemical munitions. Near the corps southern boundary, the terrain is relatively open, with no major terrain obstacles between the JAGST River and the city of ANSBACH to the east.

c. Other Characteristics.
(1) Psychological. Aggressor nuclear attacks on large populated centers have resulted in bitter hostility of local civilians against Aggressor forces.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. The attitude of civilians should hamper operations of Aggressor guerrillas in our area.

3. ENEMY SITUATION.

b. Composition. Enemy forces opposing 1st Corps are the 9th F Mech Div and 18th Mech Div, which are assigned to Aggressor 2d Comb Arms Army. Enemy guerrilla forces (estimated strength, 800) in the SPESSART Mountain area across the MAIN River on our left flank are armed with small-arms and light crew-served weapons.

c. Strength.
(1) Committed forces. 1st Corps is opposed by approximately six mechanized regiments supported by 24 battalions of artillery (two 85-mm guns, four 122-mm guns, four 130-mm guns, four 152-mm guns, four 122-mm howitzers, two 160-mm mortars, two 140-mm rocket launchers, two 240-mm rocket launchers), four antitank artillery battalions, one rocket launcher battalion, and one Tondro missile battalion.

(2) Reinforcements. Enemy reinforcements available as of 100700 August for commitment in our zone are—
(a) 120th Tk Regt located near STALLDORF (NV6891).
(b) Estimated tank regiment located near NEUSIETTEN (PV1175).
(c) Estimated tank regiment near INGOLSTADT (PV0096), believed to be part of the 2d F Tk Div.
(d) 2d F Tk Div (-) believed to be located in the Aggressor second defensive belt somewhere south of NEUSTADT (PV1788).
(e) A reduced-strength mechanized division believed to be located generally near NURNBERG.
(f) 9th F Tk Div believed to be located near PV5558.
(g) Tank regiment near WALLHAUSEN (NV7752).
(h) Mechanized regiment near ERZBERG (NV8857).

(3) Air. *
(4) Nuclear. *

(5) Recent and Present Significant Activities.
(1) Photointerpretation reports indicate that Aggressor is preparing two defensive positions. Progress is considerably advanced on the defensive positions along the general FEBA trace. Major construction is about completed on the second defensive positions between OCHSENFURT (NA77-02)—ROTHENBERG (NV8670)—SCHUTTBERG (NV8439).

(2) Current intelligence indicates that elements of the Aggressor 2d F Tk Div were in the area east of DORNHEIM (NA9602) on 8 August and in the area of NEUSIETTEN (PV1175) on 9 August.

(3) Enemy aircraft penetrated the corps sector on the night of 7 August and dropped an estimated 50-KT nuclear weapon on the tactical bridge over the NECKAR River north of NECKARSULM (NV1548), destroying the bridge and the northern portion of the city.

(4) On 8 August, an estimated 50-KT nuclear weapon exploded near the 23d Armd Div area at NV0565, destroying one forward support company of the division maintenance battalion.
(Classification)

(INTEL EST 23—1st Corps)

e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses.

(1) Personnel. Aggressor units are operating at about 70 percent; enemy losses to date have been severe; Aggressor has been able to provide trained replacements by reassigning personnel from decimated units. Morale is rated as fair to poor.

(2) Intelligence. Enemy radio and camouflage discipline appears to be weakening.

(3) Operations. Aggressor divisions opposing 1st Corps are overextended. The enemy's stock of nuclear weapons is estimated to be reaching a critically low point.

(4) Logistics. Aggressor can support a defensive operation and, with difficulty, a limited-objective offensive operation. US air and nuclear attacks have destroyed an estimated 30 percent of the enemy transportation and have badly disrupted his lines of communications. Prisoners of war report tight control of artillery and mortar ammunition, rationing of gasoline, and nonreplacement of major items of equipment.

(5) Personalities.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Enumeration.

(1) Attack now along our front with five mechanized regiments supported by all available artillery, air, nuclear, and chemical weapons.

(2) Defend now in present positions with nuclear mechanized regiments supported by all available artillery, air, nuclear, and chemical weapons.

(3) Reinforce his attack or defense with all or part of the following units at the places and times indicated:

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<tr>
<th>Unit (b) Est tk regt</th>
<th>Place</th>
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<tr>
<td>vic INGOLSTADT</td>
<td>BAD MERGENTHEIM (NV5582)</td>
<td>2 hr 10 min after start of movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>or ETTENHAUSEN (NV6468)</td>
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<tr>
<td>vic WALLHAUSEN</td>
<td>LANGENBURG (NV6257)</td>
<td>1 hr 5 min after start of movement</td>
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<td>or ILSHOFEN</td>
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<td>ILSHOFEN</td>
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<tr>
<td>or LANGENBURG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>or HAGGEN (NV6777)</td>
<td>2 hr 35 min after start of movement</td>
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(INTEL EST 23—1st Corps)

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<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tr>
<td>(e) 2d F Tk Div (-)</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2 hr 10 min after start of movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Mech div vic of NURNBERG</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) 9th F Tk Div vic ROTH (PV5558)</td>
<td>ILSHOFEN</td>
<td>1 hr 40 min after start of movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Mech regt vic ERZBERG (NV8857)</td>
<td>LANGENBURG</td>
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(4) Delay in present position and subsequently in positions being prepared along the OCHSENFURT—ROTHENBERG—SCHUTTBERG line.

(5) Harass our left flank and rear by guerrilla attacks from the SPESSART Mountains at any time.

(6) Withdraw at any time.

(7) Employ in the 1st Corps area a limited number of nuclear weapons of 0.5-KT to 500-Kt yield with delivery by artillery, air, or prepositioning.

(8) Employ in the 1st Corps area a limited number of chemical attacks.

(9) By massing aircraft within operational radius of 1st Corps, mount a maximum of 50 fighter, 50 ground attack, and 30 bomber sorties daily.

b. Analysis and Discussion.

(1) Attack. There are no indications of enemy's adoption of this capability.

(2) Defend. The following indications point to enemy's adoption of the defense capability:
   (a) Occupation of a prepared defensive position on the TAUBER River—JAGST River line.
   (b) Construction of a second defensive position on the OCHSENFURT—ROTHENBERG—SCHUTTBERG line.
   (c) Shortage of fuel, ammunition, and heavy equipment.
   (d) Low morale.

(3) Reinforce. The presence of highly mobile units in the area is an indication that Aggressor will adopt his reinforcement capability.

(4) Delay. Aggressor's preparation of the OCHSENFURT—ROTHENBERG—SCHUTTBERG line is an indication of intent to delay on successive positions.

(5) Withdraw. A shortage of ammunition and the low morale of Aggressor troops point to the adoption of the withdrawal capability.

(6) Guerrilla attack. There are no indications of large-scale guerrilla attacks. The MAIN River on our north flank is unfordable and is a considerable obstacle. Harassing attack from the SPESSART Mountain area is an ever-present threat that could be carried out in conjunction with other action on our front.

(7) Aggressor nuclear attacks can be expected at the rate of from one to two weapons a day. Higher yield weapons are limited to air delivery and are believed to be in extremely short supply.

(8) Air attack is a continuing threat; however, it is unlikely that more than a small portion of Aggressor's air capability will be used in the ground support role.

(Classification)
(INTEL EST 23—1st Corps)

5. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Own Course of Action. Our best avenue of approach is * * *

b. Aggressor Probable Course of Action. Defend in present position, reinforced by available reserves and using all available artillery, air, nuclear, and chemical weapons.

c. Vulnerabilities.

(1) Aggressor forces are vulnerable to penetration in corps zone.

(2) Aggressor forces are vulnerable to rapidly conducted offensive operations because of a shortage of POL, high-yield nuclear weapons, and ammunition.

ALLAN
LTG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Goode
GOODE
G2
Annex: A—Situation Overlay (omitted)
Distribution: A
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS ESTIMATE NO 3

Reference: Map, series 34, CELEA, sheets 10 and 11 (ALFA and BRAVO), edition 1, 1:500,000.

1. MISSION

1st Army attacks 9 August, secures high ground north of ALFA and BRAVO, and prepares to continue attack north to the CELEAN Mountains.

2. THE SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS

a. Intelligence Situation.

(1) Characteristics of the area of operations.

(a) The zone of advance is characterized by gently rolling terrain sloping down to the GREEN River, then gradually rising toward the foothills of the CELEAN Mountains to the north. The area is predominantly rural, with a pattern of small farms clustered around villages that serve as market centers and trading posts. There are two cities, ALFA (population 20,000) in the west and BRAVO (population 50,000) in the east, at the confluence of the GREEN and WHITE Rivers. ALFA is primarily a commercial center with some light industry, such as food-processing and fertilizer plants. BRAVO is a major communication and transportation center and is the site of two major oil refineries.

(b) Outside BRAVO, the population's primary concern is its agricultural pursuits; and, though quite nationalistic, the population has little interest in politics and ideologies. The population resents Aggressor's attempts at collectivization and political indoctrination and his repressive measures to enforce crop delivery quotas. Our forces should be welcomed as liberators from such measures. However, the population will probably equally resent coercive governmental actions. Some disaffection among the laboring class in BRAVO may be expected because of Aggressor PSYOP and recent cooperation between this group and Aggressor authorities.

(c) The area not only will be self-sufficient in food, but will have a surplus to support other current and future CMO, provided Aggressor does not successfully pursue a scorched-earth policy. Sufficient personnel are in the area to carry on the normal civil functions. However, many able-bodied males either are in the military service or are harvesting crops, thus preventing the divergence of any significant numbers for labor in support of military operations, except in the immediate vicinity of BRAVO.

(d) No significant number of refugees is known to be in the area. Expectedly, most civilians, particularly the populations of ALFA and BRAVO, will flee temporarily during combat, but will return to their homes shortly thereafter. The number who remain refugees will depend on the extent of destruction. Aggressor has brought in approximately 10,000 displaced persons: some 5,000 work in the oil refineries and railyards in BRAVO; the remainder, dispersed throughout the area, work as farm labor.

(e) The oil refineries in BRAVO has been bombed, and the bridges across the GREEN River have been destroyed; otherwise, the area has suffered relatively little war damage. For the most part, public facilities required for essential functions are still operable.

(f) BRAVO is the provincial capital. Aggressor has appointed provincial, municipal, and local...
officials. The government is highly centralized, and party cadres at all echelons control all political activity and insure the carrying out of government edicts.

(g) A sizable typhoid epidemic is reported in BRAVO. Civilian medical facilities and physicians are limited and are hampered by a severe shortage of medical supplies.

(h) Key population groups in the area are the trade unionists in the population centers and those followers of the Orthodox religion in the rural area. Key communicators are members of the union leadership and the church hierarchy. Union leadership has cooperated with Aggressor authorities during occupation by Aggressor forces, and most union leaders were involved in Aggressor-supported disruptions before the war. Few union officials favoring the Allied cause have support among the unionists. The pro-Celean attitudes of church officials have been reinforced by Aggressor oppression, and the Orthodox Church can be counted on for vigorous and effective support of Allied efforts in the rural areas.

(i) A state-owned, 50,000-kilowatt radio station is situated in BRAVO, where broadcasting occurs on a limited schedule. Newspapers (trade union-owned) were published in BRAVO and ALFA before January of this year. Limited printing facilities still exist.

(j) Literacy rate of the indigenous population is estimated at 65 percent in the Celean language.

(2) Enemy strength and dispositions.

(a) Intelligence Estimate No 1.

(b) Annex A (Analysis of Enemy Psychological Vulnerabilities).

(3) Enemy capabilities.

(a) Intelligence Estimate No 1.

(b) The use of a nuclear weapon against BRAVO may be anticipated both to delay our advance and to destroy the oil refineries and the city's usefulness as a base for future operations. However, the bulk of the population probably will have fled before such destruction occurs.

(c) Aggressor can be expected to pursue a scorched-earth policy as he withdraws. The population will bitterly resist this effort, and friendly partisan activity will impede it. The degree of destruction will depend on the speed of our advance.

(d) Enemy PSYOP will find refugees a lucrative target if adequate control and support are not provided by military or civil authorities.

b. Tactical Situation.

(1) Operation Estimate No 2.

(2) Possible courses of action.

(a) 1st Army attacks 9 August to secure the ALPHA—BRAVO—GREEN River line. The 1st Corps makes the main attack in the direction of ALFA—Hill 519 (* * *).

(b) 1st Army attacks 9 August to secure the ALPHA—BRAVO—GREEN River line. The 2d Corps makes the main attack in the direction of BRAVO—Hill Complex 237 (* * *).

(c) 1st Army attacks 9 August to secure the ALPHA—BRAVO—GREEN River line. The 1st Corps makes the main attack in the direction of Hill Complex 320 (* * *).

(3) Next anticipated army operation is an attack to secure the CELEAN Mountains. Present area of operations, particularly the highway and rail network in the eastern sector of zone, is essential as a combat service support base for this operation.

c. Personnel Situation.

(1) Admin/Log Order 2.

(2) Proposed rotation plan, if approved, will entail loss of experienced PSYOP and CA personnel.
CMO EST 3—1st Army

A minimum of 1 month's area orientation is considered essential before replacements become fully effective.

d. Logistic Situation.

(1) Admin/Log Order 2.

(2) Priority of army transportation support to 2d Corps will limit civilian relief supplies that can be moved from depot stocks to 1st Corps zone. Supply point distribution, using civilian transportation, will be employed to the extent consistent with available transportation, POL, and obtainable road priorities.

(3) Refineries in BRAVO and supporting pipeline facilities will be rehabilitated as soon as possible to ease the burden on sea transportation and port facilities.

e. CMO Situation and Nature of Operations To Be Supported.

(1) US policy is to treat CELEA as a liberated country. US military forces will exercise governmental authority until the government-in-exile can be effectively reestablished and national sovereignty can be restored in accordance with existing CA agreements. 1st Army probably will relinquish control of this area to Celean authorities in approximately 4 months.

(2) Because Aggressor resistance is expected to consist largely of successive delaying actions, our own advance should cause limited damage. However, if the enemy defends strongly at the GREEN River line, extensive local damage can be expected from our artillery preparations and bombardment, to include the possible use of nuclear weapons to force a crossing.

(3) Plans to use the area as a combat service support base for the assault on the CELEAN Mountain line will require immediate clearance and restoration of public transportation facilities, to include GREEN River crossings.

(4) The 21st CA Bde, with assigned battalions and functional teams, provides CA command and control to support the operation. Functional specialists, particularly public health, public works, and engineering personnel, are limited.

(5) The 2d PSYOP Bn, with assigned companies, provides PSYOP support for the operation. One additional team will be required from theater army assets to direct operation of the radio station at BRAVO.

(6) Aggressor's scorched-earth policy and his willingness to use nuclear weapons on his own built-up areas to hinder our advance provide PSYOP themes that can be exploited tactically and against the indigenous population, providing US forces do not plan nuclear retaliation.

(7) Theater policy prescribes a 1,500-calorie-per-day minimum ration for civilians. Relief supplies in depots are adequate to alleviate undue hardship until the normal food distribution system is restored. However, transportation to move supplies to forward areas is limited. Extremely limited medical supplies are available to be diverted to the civilian population.

f. Assumptions.

(1) Aggressor-appointed officials will flee as Aggressor withdraws.

(2) Adequate numbers of capable leaders for initial appointments can be found among friendly partisans, returning refugees, and previously elected officials and business leaders who are currently imprisoned or are working as common laborers.

(3) Aggressor will depict US forces as rapists, pillagers, and exploiters who intend to secure control to serve their own ends. Planted agents disguised as US soldiers will commit felonious acts to foment disaffection.

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(CMO EST 3—1st Army)

(4) Aggressor scorched-earth activities will be only moderately successful because of population resistance, partisan activity, and the speed of our advance.

(5) Food-processing plants will be destroyed, and the transportation network for farm-to-market distribution will be severely damaged.

(6) US military forces, assisted by local labor, will undertake the immediate decontamination and restoration of the refineries, key public works, and transportation facilities in BRAVO to improve combat service support capabilities for future operations.

g. Special Factor. Aggressor can use biological agents to contaminate the water supply and to destroy the usefulness of the area as a source of food supply; he has not done this to date. His use of these agents would magnify civilian supply problems, and all CA units would require public health augmentation to prevent epidemics and the spread of disease. Public health teams from the 21st CA Bde, in coordination with CBRE and medical and engineer units of subordinate command, can assist Celean authorities in establishing defensive measures against enemy biological attack, sampling and detection techniques for early detection of biological agents, and facilities and procedures for treatment of personnel affected by these agents.

3. ANALYSIS

a. Government Functions.

(1) Public administration. Course of action 1 will result in initially bypassing sizable Aggressor elements. Establishment of effective CA control will be delayed until clearing operations are substantially complete. However, the speed of advance that course of action 1 promises should prevent Aggressor's rounding up and deporting those persons likely to be useful as appointed officials under CA. Either course of action 2 or course of action 3 will result in Aggressor's clearance from the zone as the advance progresses, and CA units can establish control immediately in the wake of combat. However, the relatively slow speed of advance, particularly in the case of course of action 3, will permit Aggressor's deporting prominent persons at will.

(2) Public safety.

(a) Remarks concerning reestablishment of civil government ((1) above) are pertinent to the restoration of law and order.

(b) The principal public safety problem will be controlling civilian traffic and keeping refugees from hindering combat support and combat service support operations. This problem will become most acute if course of action 3 is pursued because this course is likely to involve extensive combat in built-up areas.

(3) Public health. Either course of action 1 or course of action 2 will avoid any immediate substantial exposure of our troops to the typhoid epidemic in BRAVO. Course of action 3 will expose our forces to the epidemic, and any heavy fighting in and around BRAVO will also result in stricken persons fleeing the area and thereby spreading the disease. Because of the limited number of public health teams available, CA units may experience considerable difficulty in controlling the epidemic and will probably require military medical unit support. In addition, course of action 3 is likely to result in a large number of civilian casualties requiring emergency treatment.

(4) Labor. Either course of action 1 or course of action 2, with the axis of advance through the sparsely populated, agrarian western sector of the zone, will uncover only a limited supply of labor to support operations. Course of action 3, with the main attack through the more populous eastern sector of the zone, should uncover an ample supply of labor. However, the damage to public facilities that may occur during course of action 3 will also increase the requirements for labor to restore minimum-essential civilian facilities.

(Classification)
(CMO EST 3—1st Army)

(5) Tribunals. No special problems.
(6) Public welfare. No special problems.
(7) Public finance.
   (a) Aggressor’s capability to gain possession of US military payment certificates, to introduce counterfeit currencies, and to encourage black-market operations by purchase of short-supply items requires appropriate countermeasures.
   (b) Unauthorized practices must be prevented to protect the value of currency.
(8) Public education. No special problems.
(9) Civil defense. No special problems.

b. Economic Functions.
(1) Economics and commerce.
   (a) Because of extensive supply requirements for military operations, military assistance in the combat phase must be limited to preservation measures and that degree of economic rehabilitation which will assist military operations.
   (b) In the postcombat phase, military effort may be directed toward restoration.
   (c) Price control and rationing are the responsibilities of Celean authorities to the degree that they can function effectively.
   (d) Course of action 3, with the main attack in the east, should bring the refineries in BRAVO under our control in the early stages of the operation. However, either course of action 1 or course of action 2, if successful, may force Aggressor to evacuate BRAVO, thereby accomplishing the same result. Extensive destruction of refinery facilities by Aggressor is anticipated regardless of which course of action is pursued.
(2) Food and agriculture. The speed of advance of course of action 1 should prevent Aggressor from carrying out wholesale destruction of crops and fields. Bypassed elements will probably be too concerned with their own defense to create extensive damage. Course of action 2 should apply sufficient pressure on Aggressor elements in the agrarian areas to prevent extensive, deliberate destruction. Both courses of action 1 and 2 will entail some combat damage to crops and fields. However, this should be relatively insignificant compared with the damage Aggressor can inflict if he goes unhindered. In course of action 3, forces will progress slowly and will apply slight pressure on Aggressor in the agrarian areas, thereby permitting him to destroy these areas at will.
(3) Civilian supply. Civilian supply requirements will be related directly to our success in preventing extensive Aggressor scorched-earth activity; therefore, the discussion concerning food and agriculture (2) above applies here. The critical civilian supply problem will be transporting relief supplies from army depots to forward areas. Course of action 3 will uncover the major highway and rail network and will increase our civilian supply capability in this respect. However, course of action 3 is likely to uncover a large number of refugees and will permit the enemy to inflict considerable destruction in populated areas, thereby increasing the civilian supply requirements.
(4) Property control. Procedures for property control include—
   (a) Identification of ownership of Celean private property.
   (b) Military use of Celean private property to the degree that a requirement therefor exists.
   (c) Identification of private and public property belonging to other than Celean owners (i.e., Aggressor-owned, Allied-owned, neutrally owned) for administration by the CA organization.

c. Public Facilities Functions.
(1) Public works and utilities. Aggressor’s destruction of key installations and facilities, including public utilities essential to the operation of the refineries in BRAVO, is anticipated, regardless
(CMO EST 3—1st Army)

of which course of action is pursued. Damage to power generation and distribution facilities impacts on public health and the capability to use the 50-kilowatt radio station. Limited indigenous and CA unit capabilities require augmentation by US Army Engineer units.

(2) Public communications. Early restoration of the communication facilities in the zone will greatly improve its value as a base for future operations. Course of action 3 will bring the majority of these facilities under our control in the early stages of the operation.

(3) Public transportation. The comments in (2) above are applicable to public transportation facilities.

d. Special Functions.

(1) Displaced persons, refugees, and evacuees.

(a) Aggressor's capability to interfere with our military operations by directing refugees and displaced persons into our lines and using nuclear weapons or biological/chemical agents against densely populated areas may create special problems.

(b) The military commander will direct handling and evacuation of displaced persons. Secondary routes must be designated for the movement of refugees and displaced persons to minimize interference with operations. PSYOP will assist.

(c) The standard of care will be that required to prevent disease and unrest, which prejudice the military mission. Within the capability, refugees will be screened to determine their status and potential as intelligence sources.

(d) Celan authorities will not be burdened with care of non-Celan displaced persons.

(e) Course of action 3, with the zone of advance through a heavily populated sector, will create a large number of refugees. Control problems will be severe because MSR's to support the main attack will pass directly through the areas where the refugees are anticipated. The main attack in course of action 2 passes through a sparsely populated area, and few refugees should be anticipated. If course of action 1 is successful in forcing Aggressor to withdraw without extensive combat, there is an excellent chance that the bulk of the population, to include the displaced persons, will stand fast.

(2) Arts, monuments, and archives. No special problems.

(3) Religion. See paragraph 2a(1)(h).

e. PSYOP.

(1) Enemy. The rapid exploitation of course of action 1 is expected to leave pockets of enemy forces cut off from retreat to the CELAN Mountains. Considering the declining state of enemy morale identified in Intel Est No 1, PSYOP should be effective in decreasing resistance in this situation. This is particularly true of the 149th and 67th Div. The dynamic leadership in the higher levels in the Aggressor force makes them much less susceptible to PSYOP attack when their lines are intact.

(2) Exploitation. PSYOP teams will continue to work with intelligence, CA, and military police elements to identify enemy PW's, defectors, refugees, and others suitable for psychological exploitation.

(3) Civil information. Particular attention should be given to countering the effects of Aggressor PSYOP on the Celan populace and the cooperation of some groups with Aggressor authorities. Restoration of the mass communication facilities in BRAVO will greatly assist in the control of the populace. A PSYOP team KD, fixed radio, should be requested from theater army to direct the rehabilitation and operation of the 50-kilowatt radio station at BRAVO. 280th PSYOP Bn mobile radio equipment can be used initially to direct the civilian populace but lacks the credibility of an ostensibly indigenous station. Information sources will stress the speedy resumption of control by the Celan Government and the temporary nature of Allied control in this area. Effective measures to restore normal civilian activities and to rebuild combat-damaged facilities will be featured, with emphasis on

(Classification)
participation in these efforts by Celean Government officials. Aggressor atrocities against individuals who were popular in the area will be given attention.

(4) Refugee control. Psychological preparation of the populace in ALFA and BRAVO can reduce, but not eliminate, interference by refugees with our operations. PSYOP media can assist in control of refugees and displaced persons.

4. COMPARISON

a. Course of Action 1.

(1) Advantages.

(a) The rapid exploitation may cause Aggressor to evacuate without extensive combat, which would, of course, facilitate CA and all other operations.

(b) Combat power will be concentrated against the Aggressor 149th and 67th Div, which are most vulnerable to friendly PSYOP.

(c) The axis of advance will avoid the built-up areas in the east, thereby easing public safety and refugee control problems and enhancing cooperation of the populace.

(d) The axis of advance will avoid the epidemic areas in BRAVO.

(e) The speed of advance should prevent extensive Aggressor scorched-earth activities and the deportation of person likely to aid our cause.

(f) Rapid and disorganized withdrawal of enemy forces increases their susceptibility to friendly PSYOP.

(g) PSYOP should be able to assist in removing significant numbers of enemy troops from combat with decreased friendly loss.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Bypassing sizable Aggressor elements will delay establishment of effective CA control and use of mass communication facilities.

(b) The refineries in BRAVO and key transportation facilities will remain under Aggressor control until the zone is cleared or Aggressor withdraws.

(c) Labor available to support military operations will be limited.

(d) Planned use of nuclear weapons will provide increased opportunities for enemy PSYOP to jeopardize US relations with NEUTRALIA.

b. Course of Action 2.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Clearing the zone as the advance progresses will permit establishment of effective CA control immediately in the wake of combat.

(b) The axis of the main attack is to the west, and the MSR's that support the main attack will not pass through expected lines of drift of refugees, thereby easing public safety and refugee control problems.

(c) The axis of the main attack will avoid the epidemic area in BRAVO.

(d) Pressure on Aggressor in the agrarian areas will hinder Aggressor scorched-earth activities.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) The relative slowness of advance expected, as compared with course of action 1, will give Aggressor more opportunity to employ scorched-earth tactics and carry out deportation programs despite combat pressure.

(b) The direction of the main attack is away from the refineries in BRAVO and key transportation facilities and utilities, thus delaying the time that these facilities will come under our control.

(c) The main attack will uncover only a limited supply of labor to support operations.
(Classification)

(CMO EST 3—1st Army)

(d) The supporting attack in the east will create refugee control problems on the MSR's in that area.

(e) Orderly withdrawal of the enemy reduces his vulnerability to our PSYOP.

c. Course of Action 3.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Clearing the zone will permit establishment of effective CA control immediately in the wake of combat.

(b) The main attack in the east will bring the refineries and utilities in BRAVO and the key transportation network under our control at the earliest time.

(c) The main attack will uncover an ample labor supply to support military operations.

(d) The main attack in the east will bring the information media of BRAVO under our control at the earliest time.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) The slowness of the advance and the direction of the main attack will permit Aggressor to conduct scorched-earth and deportation activities relatively unhindered.

(b) Orderly withdrawal of the enemy reduces his vulnerability to our PSYOP.

(c) The direction of the main attack will expose our troops to the typhoid epidemic at BRAVO, and heavy combat in this area will result in the probable spreading of the disease.

(d) The main attack will cause sizable numbers of refugees, with possible hindrance to combat support and combat service support operations.

(e) The main attack through the more populated area will increase civilian supply requirements.

d. Discussion.

(1) The overriding CA consideration is the extraordinary value of this area as a source of food supply. If this area comes to our control relatively intact, it will greatly ease civilian supply problems in this and future operations, with the consequent lessening of burden on our combat service support system. The industrial facilities in BRAVO, while important, will require extensive rehabilitation before they can contribute to the support of military operations.

(2) The overriding PSYOP consideration is the facilitation of control of the populace to prevent interference with military operations. Of secondary importance, in this case, is the possibility of decreasing the enemy's combat efficiency.

(3) The typhoid epidemic in BRAVO or the advent of enemy biological operations may require military medical units to assist in control. Military medical units should be alerted for this assistance.

(4) In view of the limited military supplies and transportation available to support CA activities, the course of action that permits use of civilian supplies available at centrally located sources is to be favored. Course of action 1 offers the best opportunity for a rapid advance and prevention of Aggressor's wholesale destruction of civilian food supplies. Courses of action 2 and 3 offer less opportunity for realization of the area's food supply potential.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. The proposed operation can be supported with the existing CA and PSYOP organization under any of the courses of action being considered.

b. Course of action 1 can best be supported, and its adoption is recommended.

c. Courses of action 2 and 3 do not allow for a rapid advance but permit Aggressor to withdraw de-
liberately and to employ scorched-earth tactics. This reduces his vulnerability to PSYOP and increases the support required by the civil populace from military sources.

d. There is a typhoid epidemic in BRAVO, and a possibility of enemy biological operations exists within the area of operations. Military medical units should be designated and alerted to assist in controlling and countering these problems.

e. This command has no assets to direct the operation of the civilian radio station at BRAVO. A fixed-radio team should be requested from theater army.

f. The 21st CA Bde will require assistance from US Army Engineer resources to repair anticipated damage to the power system in BRAVO. An engineer construction battalion and two engineer utility detachments should be designated to provide direct support to the 21st CA Bde on order.

/s/Jones
JONES
G5

Annex: A—Analysis of Enemy Psychological Vulnerabilities
(omitted)

Distribution: C

Note. If the situation warrants, separate civil affairs and psychological operations estimates would be prepared. In the above case, civil affairs and psychological operations considerations are included in the same estimate.
Example C-11. Psychological Operations Estimate, Field Army

(Classification)

G5 Section, 30th (US) Army
KILO (NF3275), WESTLAND
190800Z June 19

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ESTIMATE NO 3

Reference: Map, series M319, WESTLAND, sheets BRAVO and INDIA, edition 2, $500,000.

1. MISSION
30th (US) Army attacks 20 July, secures an area sufficient to support future operations to the north, and prepares to conduct subsequent offensive operations in the direction of OSCAR.

2. THE SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS
a. Intelligence Situation.
   (2) Enemy strength and dispositions. Enemy forces opposing us consist of elements of Army Gp, ST LAURENCO.

b. Tactical Situation.
   (1) Present dispositions. Operation Estimate No 3.
   (2) Possible tactical courses of action.
      (a) Attack to secure the BLUE River line and Hill 2403.
      (b) Attack to secure the RUFF Mountains.
      (c) Attack to secure the RED River line.

   (3) Projected operations. Initial operations will provide a sufficient base for offensive operations to the north toward OSCAR. Such offensive operations will be conducted on order and as soon as sufficient combat support and combat service support have been built up.
c. Personnel Situation.
   (1) Personnel Estimate No 3.
   (2) There are no critical shortages of personnel that will affect PSYOP support of our operation.
   (3) Refugee and enemy PW resources must be screened to provide native speakers of dialects in future target areas for use in propaganda development and testing.

d. Logistic Situation.
   (1) Logistic Estimate No 3.
   (2) Resupply of repair parts for PSYOP equipment, especially mobile radios and TV transmitters, reduces effectiveness.
   (3) Twenty-pound bond paper is not available for the medium presses. Sixty-pound offset, which reduces effectiveness and increases transportation requirements, is being used.

e. Civil Affairs Situation.
   (1) Civil Affairs Estimate No 3.
   (2) Present dispositions of 20th CA Bde * * *.
   (3) The population of WESTLAND will, in general, be uncooperative initially. As our operations appear to be successful, large segments of the population may be persuaded to join or support us.
   (4) Enemy civilian personnel can be expected to influence our activities as follows:
      (a) Conduct guerrilla operations in our rear areas.
      (b) Engage in sabotage, espionage, and subversion.
      (c) Block major communication routes with refugees and displaced persons.
      (d) Engage in agitation propaganda in refugee and displaced person camps and population centers.

f. PSYOP Situation.
   (1) Disposition of PSYOP elements. Annex A.
   (2) Those territories south of the demarcation line between North and South WESTLAND will be treated as liberated territory. Theater has directed that US PSYOP will support the objective of enhancing the image of Government Republic of Westland and lay a foundation for rebuilding the economy and institutions.
   (3) The area north of the demarcation line will be placed under military government. PSYOP will support these activities with a view to insuring eventual turnover to a provisional democratic government.
   (4) 16th PSYOP Gp requires indigenous personnel from all proposed areas of operations to assist in the preparation and dissemination of propaganda. Refugees and enemy PW are most readily available from the RUFF Mountain area.

h. Assumptions.
   (1) Contemplated area of operations will remain under 30th (US) Army control for from 60 to 90 days before theater assumes control.
   (2) Psychological objectives for this area will remain as stated in the theater PSYOP policy and planning guide.

h. Special Factors. None.
(PSYOP EST 3—30th (US) Army)

3. ANALYSIS

a. Aggressor's 13th and 21st Armies are particularly susceptible to our PSYOP, especially when reinforced by strategic PSYOP under theater control. Annex B (Target Analysis, 13th, 48th, and 21st Comb Arms Armies).

b. Enemy propaganda can be expected to be directed principally at civilian targets, with their own guerrillas a secondary target. This must be countered. Annex C (Target Analysis, Civilian Groups in Area of Operations).

   (1) Groups in front of our lines may be prepared to resist our military government and refugee control efforts.

   (2) Targets behind our lines will be encouraged to support enemy guerrillas and to interfere with our civil affairs and logistic activities.

   (3) Enemy propaganda broadcasts will serve to improve the morale of guerrilla forces in our rear areas and these broadcasts can be expected to serve as an alternate means of communications.

c. Projected area of operations has adequate mass communication facilities to support military government and counterguerrilla activities. Some radio and TV stations and publication plants will require restoration; all will require supervision and control. The 16th PSYOP Gp and the 21st CA Bde resources are not adequate because of the extension of area under 30th (US) Army control.

* * * * *

4. COMPARISON

PSYOP deficiencies and tactical courses of action are evaluated as follows:

a. Deficiencies.

   (1) An adequate volunteer informant program to support counterguerrilla operations has not been devised.

   (2) Supply levels of printing supplies and repair parts for mobile radio and TV equipment will prevent optimum support for the operation.

   (3) Extension of the 30th (US) Army's area of responsibility requires resources to support counterguerrilla populace control and civilian information programs not presently available. Additional resources must be obtained from theater. Requirements are identified in Annex D (Proposed Employment of PSYOP Resources).

b. Tactical Courses of Action.

   (1) Enemy targets. Psychological vulnerabilities of forces defending RUFF Mountains are well developed. Adequate information is lacking on those forces expected to defend the BLUE River. Forcing the RUFF Mountain line will provide further psychological opportunities for an assault on the RED River. Vulnerability of enemy targets favors courses of action 2, 3, and 1 in that order.

   (2) Counterguerrilla activities. The principal inducement for the civilian population to support enemy guerrilla forces is the belief that the Aggressor regime will return. Friendly successes are the basis for the most credible PSYOP in this area. Counterguerrilla efforts favor courses of action 3, 2, and 1 in that order.

   (3) Control of civilian population. The civilian population can be expected to be most cooperative if they become convinced that we have been militarily and politically successful. However, adequate resources are not available to support extension of 30th (US) Army control over large areas. Civilian control factors favor courses of action 1, 2, and 3 in that order.

* * * * *

(Classification)
5. CONCLUSIONS
   a. PSYOP can support the mission.
   b. Tactical course of action 1 (secure the BLUE River line and Hill 2403) can be supported most readily from the standpoint of resources, but does not provide so impressive a success for psychological exploitation. Course of action 2 (secure the RUFF Mountains) can be supported best. Course of action 3 (secure and defend the RED River line) provides the most exploitable PSYOP situation, but will exceed our support capability.
   c. Deficiencies requiring the commander's attention.
      (1) Counterguerrilla program.
      (2) Resources for PSYOP support of counterguerrilla and civil information programs.
   d. Recommend the adoption of course of action 2.

/s/Peach
PEACH
G5

Annexes: A—Overlay, Disposition of PSYOP Elements (omitted)
    B—Target Analysis, 13th, 48th, and 21st Comb Arms Armies (omitted)
    C—Target Analysis, Civilian Groups in Area of Operations (omitted)
    D—Proposed Employment of PSYOP Resources (omitted)
Example C-12. Tactical Cover and Deception Estimate, Field Army

G3 Section, 30th (US) Army
BADEN BADEN (MA5142), GERMANY
081030A August 19

TACTICAL COVER AND DECEPTION ESTIMATE NO 1

Reference: Map, series M444, EUROPE, sheets 33 and 34, edition 3, 1:500,000.

Time Zone: ALFA.

1. MISSION
   a. Tactical. 30th (US) Army attacks 16 August, secures the LABE (ELBE) River—PRAHA (VR-6050)—VLTAVA River—CESKE BUDEJOVICE (VQ6025) line, and prepares to continue the attack to secure the MORAVSKA OSTRAVA—BRATISLAVA line.
   b. Deception. The deception objective is to cause Aggressor to fail to reinforce his forces in contact in the zone of the 1st and 3d Corps before our attack.

2. THE SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION
   a. Considerations.
      (1) The wooded terrain and extensive road net in 30th (US) Army sector provide friendly forces with excellent conditions for moving and concealing battalion-size units.
      (2) Aggressor patrol activities afford us opportunity to portray our cover and deception story.
      (3) Reported Aggressor communications intelligence units operating in the area opposite 30th (US) Army afford us opportunity to support the deception story with false and misleading communications traffic.
      (4) The civil population of the Federal Republic of Germany is loyal to the NATO cause.
      (5) The 2d Corps zone of attack contains most of the river obstacles and rugged mountains within the 30th (US) Army zone.
      (6) Our preparation for the attack will require an increase in combat support and combat service support activities in all corps sectors.
      (7) D-day is 16 August.
    b. Enemy Capabilities.
      (1) Intelligence capabilities. Aggressor can—
         (a) Detect our activities through ground and air reconnaissance and surveillance.
         (b) Detect, locate, and determine types of units through his communications intelligence capabilities.
         (c) Detect our presence through his ground and airborne radar and infrared surveillance system.
         (d) Detect our presence through the unaided ear or sonic detection devices.
      (2) Tactical capabilities. Aggressor can—
         (a) Continue current defense with forces in contact, supported by two tank divisions; one mechanized division; and artillery, air, and nuclear weapons.
         (b) Delay on successive positions to the ODER River.
(TAC COVER AND DECEPTION EST 1—30th (US) Army)

(c) Attack now along our FEBA with forces in contact, supported by two tank divisions; one mechanized division; and artillery, air, and nuclear weapons.

(d) Withdraw to the LABE—VLTAVA River line or the ODER River at any time.

(e) Reinforce his defense, when we attack, with all or part of the 8th Comb Arms Army from the vicinity of PLZEN in 12 hours.

c. Own Deception Courses of Action.

(1) Conduct a cover and deception operation in the 2d Corps sector before D-day to convince Aggressor that the 30th (US) Army main effort will be made in that sector on or about 23 August (D + 7).

(2) Conduct a cover and deception operation throughout the 30th (US) Army sector to convince Aggressor that we are improving our defenses in anticipation of an Aggressor attack. The aggressor main attack would be directed against our 1st Corps.

(3) Exercise cover and deception measures throughout the 30th (US) Army area before D-day to cause Aggressor to believe our attack is scheduled on or about 23 August (D + 7).

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION

a. Aggressor’s ability to detect, locate, and determine our types of units through his communications intelligence capabilities does not affect our choice of a course of action.

b. Course of action 1 (conduct cover and deception operations to convey that 2d Corps will make the main attack).

(1) Aggressor’s intelligence effort.

(a) Aggressor’s ground and air reconnaissance and surveillance. The DONAU and ILLER Rivers restrict extensive ground reconnaissance by Aggressor patrols. Aggressor’s observation is restricted by the forested areas.

(b) Aggressor’s ground and airborne radar and infrared surveillance system. The forested areas would block Aggressor’s ground radar and infrared from receiving the intended picture indicating a buildup for the main attack in the 2d Corps zone. Airborne radar and infrared could also be affected, but to a lesser degree.

(2) Aggressor’s tactical reaction. Once Aggressor detects the increased activity in the 2d Corps sector, he would increase his vigilance in the area. If Aggressor believes our deception story, i.e., that the 30th (US) Army main attack will be made in the 2d Corps zone, he would probably attempt to keep the ILLER River under continuing surveillance and meet any attempt to cross the river with long-range artillery, missiles, and airstrikes. If he took advantage of the river as an obstacle, he would require few Aggressor units to assist in slowing the attack. Aggressor’s probable reaction would be to continue surveillance of the area without any appreciable movement of troop units to meet the impending attack. If Aggressor does not believe our deception story, the cover and deception effort would not jeopardize the success of the tactical mission.

(3) Friendly implementation. To portray an impending main attack realistically in the 2d Corps sector would require the movement of units throughout the 30th (US) Army sector to indicate an increased flow of traffic into the sector and a buildup of forces. Real and decoy equipment is required to increase the numbers and types of units in the sector. The majority of the combat support and combat service support activities within the Army sector must be directed toward portraying that the 2d Corps has the highest priority for combat support and combat service support.

c. Course of action 2 (improve our defense against an attack with Aggressor main effort in 1st Corps sector).
(TAC COVER AND DECEPTION EST 1—30th (US) Army)

(1) Aggressor's intelligence effort.

(a) Aggressor's ground and air reconnaissance and surveillance. The terrain in 1st and 3d Corps sectors, except that portion of the FEBA located along the WAUBE River, is excellent for patrol activities. Air observers and cameras would detect cover and deception measures portraying improvement of the army defense sector.

(b) Aggressor's ground and airborne radar and infrared surveillance system. The forested areas would block Aggressor's ground radar and infrared devices from receiving the intended picture indicating an improvement in our defense. Airborne radar and infrared devices would also be affected, but to a lesser degree.

(2) Aggressor's tactical reaction. Once Aggressor detects the increased activity in the 30th (US) Army sector, and in particular within the 1st Corps sector, he would increase his vigilance in that area. He would augment his collection efforts and attempt to verify his findings through other collection means. Because our cover and deception efforts portray defensive operations, the Aggressor would not move his reserves. If Aggressor does not believe our deception story, he would probably improve his defenses all along the FEBA and move reserves into the 1st Corps sector because our buildup is concentrated there. Such action by Aggressor would interfere with our tactical plan.

(3) Friendly implementation. The portrayal of our preparation for the anticipated Aggressor attack would require that each corps' defensive positions be improved. This would require a portrayal of constructing barriers, preparing and improving blocking positions, and stockpiling fortification materials. Emphasis would be directed toward the 1st Corps sector.

d. Course of action 3 (deceive Aggressor as to time of attack).

(1) Aggressor's intelligence effort. Aggressor's ground and air reconnaissance and surveillance collection efforts would be directed toward obtaining information that would indicate our intentions. Our preparations would be observed and interpreted as a buildup for the offense. Aggressor would intensify his collection efforts to determine the time and place of the attack.

(2) Aggressor's tactical reaction. Aggressor would not be required to react quickly to our deception measures; therefore, he would not move his reserves. He would probably continue to improve his defensive posture.

(3) Friendly implementation. Routine cover measures by everyone plus imitative communication traffic by the signal brigade would be required to execute this course of action.

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION

a. Course of Action 1.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Aggressor's efforts would be directed to the 2d Corps sector.

(b) We could easily portray a buildup in the 2d Corps sector.

(2) Disadvantage. Because of the rugged terrain, to include the water obstacles, we would have difficulty convincing Aggressor that the main attack would be in the 2d Corps sector.

b. Course of Action 2.

(1) Advantage. The buildup required for portraying our improvement of the defense positions supports our required buildup for the attack.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Aggressor's poor personnel and combat service support situation makes difficult our convincing him that our buildup is designed to improve our defenses. (He will not believe our deception story.)

(Classification)
(TAC COVER AND DECEPTION EST 1—30th (US) Army)

(b) If Aggressor disbelieves our deception story, his tactical reaction could interfere with our tactical plan. (He would expect our main attack in the 1st Corps zone.)

c. Course of Action 3.

(1) Advantages.
(a) Measures to implement this course of action require little expenditure of troop or materiel assets.
(b) Little effort would be necessary to convince Aggressor of the validity of our deception story.

(2) Disadvantage. Aggressor is required to take action other than to continue to improve his present defensive positions.

d. Conclusion. Course of action 3 is best because Aggressor's tactical reaction, as a result of believing or not believing our deception story, does not interfere with our tactical plan. An additional reason for selecting this course of action is that we have only 1 week in which to establish our deception story.

5. RECOMMENDATION

Conduct a cover and deception operation throughout the 30th (US) Army area before D-day by developing the following deception story: 30th (US) Army will attack on 23 August.
APPENDIX D

PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES IN THE PREPARATION OF PLANS AND ORDERS
(STANAG 1001 AND 2029)

Section I. GENERAL

D-1. Introduction

a. Combat plans and orders may be completely written, or they may be portrayed graphically.

b. When graphic portrayal is used, the plan or order may be prepared with the graphic portrayal on an overlay or overprinted map as an annex (appendix, tab, inclosure) to the written portion, or with both the written portion and the graphic portrayal on the same overlay. See appendices E and F for examples.

c. When used, an overlay or overprinted map complements the written portion of the order and promotes clarity, accuracy, and brevity by conveying instructions graphically. Operational items appropriately shown graphically on overlays or overprinted maps include boundaries, assembly areas, command posts, lines of departure, directions of attack, axes of advance, coordinating points, phase lines, objectives, fire support coordination lines, fire coordination lines, and limits of advance. Combat service support items appropriately shown include main supply routes, combat service support installations and facilities, straggler control measures, and traffic control measures. Any pertinent instructions and information that can be shown graphically are included in preference to use of the written method. However, the mission and the complete concept are always written, even if shown graphically on an overlay.

D-2. Fragmentary Orders

The purpose of fragmentary orders is to provide brief, specific, and timely instructions without loss of clarity. Elements normally found in a complete order may be omitted when these elements have not changed, are not essential to the mission, might delay or complicate transmission, or are unavailable or incomplete at the time of issue. Fragmentary orders are prepared and issued by either coordinating or special staff officers on command approval. As a general rule, a fragmentary order—

a. Is addressed to each commander required to take action.

b. Is addressed to higher and adjacent headquarters for information, if applicable.

c. Refers to a previous operation order.

d. Indicates task organization changes, if applicable.

e. When necessary for clarity, includes a brief outline of the situation that generated the requirement for a fragmentary order, to include a statement of the mission, if changed.

f. Provides brief and specific instructions without loss of clarity.

g. Requests acknowledgment.

h. Contains proper classification.

An example fragmentary order is shown in appendix F.

D-3. Annexes, Appendixes, Tabs, Inclosures

a. Annexes. Annexes are lettered alphabetically in the sequence that they are mentioned in the basic order; for example, Annex C (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 6, 52d Mech Div; or Annex D (Transportation) to Administrative/Logistics Order 7, 30th Army. Annexes are termed plans only when they are in fact plans (e.g., Annex D (Barriers), not Annex D (Barrier Plans)). The coordinating staff officer responsible for the preparation of the combat order assigns letters to the annexes that are to accompany the order. Annexes normally follow the format prescribed for the operation order. (See paragraph 7-10 for exceptions.)

b. Appendixes. Additions that are necessary to
amplify an annex are contained in appendixes numbered serially with Arabic numerals; for example, Appendix 1 (Enemy Radio) to Annex C (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 6, 52d Mech Div. No format is prescribed; however, the five-paragraph operation order format is used, when appropriate.

c. Tabs. Additions that are necessary to amplify an appendix are contained in tabs designated alphabetically in sequence; for example, Tab A (Principal Fixed Stations) to Appendix 1 (Enemy Radio) to Annex C (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 6, 52d Mech Div. No format is prescribed; however, the five-paragraph operation order format is used, when appropriate.

d. Inclosures. Additions that are necessary to amplify a tab are contained in inclosures numbered serially with Arabic numerals; for example, Inclosure 1 (Hours of Operation) to Tab A (Principal Fixed Stations) to Appendix 1 (Enemy Radio) to Annex C (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 6, 52d Mech Div. No format is prescribed; however, the five-paragraph operation order format is used, when appropriate.

e. Additions. Additions necessary to amplify inclosures may be identified by repeating the procedures specified in c and d above with double letters (AA) and/or double numbers hyphenated to distinguish the additions; e.g., Inclosure 1-1 (• * *) to Tab AA (• * *) to Inclosure 1 (Hours of Operation) to Tab A (Principal Fixed Stations) to Appendix 1 (Enemy Radio) to Annex C (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 6, 52d Mech Div. No format is prescribed; however, the five-paragraph operation order format is used, when appropriate.

f. Technique. When annexes, appendixes, tabs, and inclosures are referenced by title in plans or orders, such titles are enclosed in parentheses. The technique for presenting these titles is as shown in a through e above.

D-4. Identification of Succeeding Pages of the Plan or Order

Second and succeeding pages of plans, orders, annexes, etc., carry a short title identification heading including the number (or letter) designation and headquarters, e.g., (ANX A (INTEL) to OPLAN 15—23d Armd Div).

D-5. Signature and Authentication

a. The name and the grade of the commander appear on all copies of the order. The original of a plan or order is signed by the commander or a specifically authorized representative. If the commander or authorized representative signs a master copy, the use of which permits automatic reproduction of the document with his signature thereon, no further authentication is required. If this signature is not reproduced, authentication by the appropriate coordinating staff officer is required on all subsequent copies of the plan or order.

b. When a command line and signature are required on annexes (para 7-10), procedures in a above apply. Copies other than the original, unless automatic reproduction is used (a above), are authenticated by the coordinating staff officer having primary interest in the field of the annex; thus, the assistant chief of staff (ACofS), G1, personnel, authenticates copies of a personnel annex to an administrative/logistics order, even though the ACofS, G4, logistics, authenticates copies of the order itself. Appendixes, tabs, and inclosures are signed and authenticated in the same manner.

Section II. GENERAL TECHNIQUES

D-6. Use of Abbreviations

a. Abbreviations are used to save time and space if there is no loss of clarity. The use of abbreviations should be consistent throughout any plan or order and its annexes.

b. Except for abbreviations in common international use, e.g., mm (for millimeters), or adopted by international agreement, abbreviations normally are not used in any communication that is circulated for inter-Allied use.

c. AR 310-50 contains detailed US Army policy covering the use of abbreviations, a list of prescribed authorized abbreviations and brevity codes, and procedures for the use of abbreviations and brevity codes within the Department of the Army.

D-7. Classification

a. Classification of plans and orders is prescribed in AR 380-5.

b. Unclassified instructional or training material representing plans and orders may be
marked ______ (Classification) ______ “For Training Otherwise Unclassified.” (AR 380–5.) Another technique provides for showing only the word “______ (Classification) ______” at the top and bottom of each page of the simulated material. Actual classified material used for instructional purposes is handled and safeguarded as required by its actual classification.

D–8. Designation of Units

a. The numerical designation of any army or air unit is given in Arabic numerals, such as “21st Army Gp,” “1st TAF,” “3d (FR) Army,” “2d Corps.” Acceptable methods of abbreviating the full designation of units are as follows: 1/A/1–61 Inf (1st Plt, Co A, 1st Bn, 61st Inf); or 1/B/23d Sig (1st Plt, Co B (Fwd Comm), 23d Sig Bn); A/1–7 FA (Btry A, 1st Bn (155-mm, SP), 7th FA); or 1–183 Ambl (1st Bn (Ambl), 183d Inf). Ordinal numbers are used to abbreviate parent unit designations, except for units organized under the combat arms regimental system (CARS), in which case cardinal numbers are used. Either a minus sign (—) or the word “minus,” denoting less than normal size, indicates the detachment of an organic unit only. Conversely, either a plus sign (+) or the word “plus” or “reinforced” indicates the attachment of a nonorganic unit.

b. Task forces may be designated by using the last name of the commander of the task force (TF Smith), or by using a code name (TF SAWDUST), or by using a number (TF 17) (TF 1–61).

c. Communications zones may be named for their geographical location, e.g., China Communications Zone (CHICOMMZ). The headquarters commanding the communications zone is the theater army support command (TASCOM). It may be designated geographically, e.g., China Theater Army Support Command (CHITASCOM), or numerically, e.g., 130th TASCOM. Units subordinate to TASCOM are usually designated numerically, e.g., 30th Personnel Command (PERSCOM), 4th Area Support Group (ASGP).

d. Combat service support installations are designated as follows:

(1) Depots are designated by type, number, class or classes of supply, army, or portion of the communications zone. No class of supply for a field depot is indicated; however, a class of supply for the subdepots is indicated when located away from the field depot headquarters. “Dep 610, C1 II and IV, 30th Army,” is an example of a designation of a subdepot located away from the field depot. Two depots are not designated by the same number.

(2) Supply points are designated by service, number, class or classes of supply, and organization or area supported, e.g., SUPPT 913, C1 V, 30th Army. Two supply points are not designated by the same number. A method of designating an ammunition supply point operating in two locations is “ASP 600 (Fwd) and ASP 600 (Rear).” When any ASP is designated “Fwd,” there should be a “Rear” shown.

(3) Distribution points are designated by class or classes of supply and organization. “C1 I DSP, 20th Inf Div,” and “C1 II and IV DSP, 23d Armd Div,” are examples of designations of distribution points.

e. When distinction between national forces of two or more nations is necessary, the distinguishing letters of the country are inserted between the numerical designation and the unit name, e.g., 3d (FR) Corps.

D–9. Designation of Places or Features

a. General.

(1) Geographical names of definite areas, cities, towns, rivers, mountains, and other places that are named specifically on a map are printed in capital letters exactly as spelled on the map in use.

(2) Coordinates for a place or feature are shown the first time that the name appears in the order; thereafter, coordinates are repeated only as necessary for clarity.

b. Areas. An area normally is described by naming the northernmost point first and giving the remaining points in clockwise order. Positions are described from left to right, facing the enemy.

c. Roads, Tracks, and Railroads. Roads, tracks, and railroads are identified either by name or by sequence of points on the road; by names in the direction of movement; and, when there is no movement, by stating from left to right or rear to front, assuming that the person designating the road, track, or railroad is facing the enemy. All other lines are designated in the same manner.

d. Riverbanks. Riverbanks are described as compass points, e.g., “north,” “east.” When referring to an attack of a river line, the friendly shore is referred to as the near bank and the enemy shore is referred to as the far bank.
e. Boundaries. Boundaries delimit areas of action (including maneuver and fires) and areas of responsibility. They are designated by easily distinguishable terrain features in the sequence in which the features occur on the ground. Boundaries are described from rear to front during an advance and from front to rear in defense and retrograde. If generally parallel to the front, e.g., rear boundaries, they are described from left to right, facing the enemy. The description of a boundary states specifically to which unit or formation an area or a point is inclusive or exclusive.

D-10. Date and Time

a. Dates include the day, month, and year (6 August 19__). In stating a night, both dates are included (night 4—5 August 19__).

b. Date-time groups are expressed as indicated in FM 21–30. Terms such as “PM,” “AM,” “daylight,” “dusk,” “EENT,” and “BMNT” are not used in lieu of date-time groups.

c. When orders apply to units in different time zones, either Greenwich mean time or the time in the zone specified by higher headquarters is used. Other than in operation and administrative/logistics orders, a letter expressing the time zone immediately follows the last digit of the group. In operation and administrative/logistics orders, time zone designations follow references in the heading of the order. For example, 062025Z Aug indicates 8:25 PM Greenwich mean time, 6 Aug ____. (See FM 101–10–1.)

d. When the date and the hour for beginning an operation are not specified in an order or plan, the following applies:

(1) The day on which the operation commences is known as D-day in English and J-day (Jour-J) in French. The system is, therefore—

| D–1 | D   | D+1 In English |
| J–1 | J   | J+1 In French |

(2) When several operations are being mounted in the same theater and confusion may arise through use of the same day-designation for two or more of them, any other letter of the alphabet may be used with exception of the following letters:

(a) M, which is used only for general mobilization.

(b) H, which is used only for numbering of hours.

(3) The system for numbering hours and minutes in an operation is the same as that for days, but the letter H normally is used. The numbering of hours is—

H–1 hour, H–30 minutes, H-hour, H+30 minutes, H+2 hours, etc.

(4) When several operations are being mounted in the same theater and confusion may arise through the use of the same hour-designation (for example, H-hour) for two or more of them, any other letter of the alphabet may be used with the exception of the following letters:

(a) M, which is used only for general mobilization.

(b) D and J, which are used only for numbering of days.

D-11. Direction

a. Directions are given as angles from true, magnetic, or grid north (the type of method used is always specified).

b. Compass points are used in place of the terms “left” and “right.” When the situation demands, the terms “left” and “right” are placed in parentheses immediately following the appropriate compass point.

Section III. OVERLAY TECHNIQUES

D-12. General

a. Overlay techniques involve the use of military symbols to portray in a condensed form the plans, orders, and information concerning a military situation.

b. FM 21–30 is the basic doctrinal publication covering authorized military symbols for use in US Army commands. This section applies the use of military symbols to the preparation of overlays and situation maps.

D-13. Relationship of Overlay to Written Portion

a. When the overlay and the written portion of the plan or order are separate documents—
(1) The overlay is an annex; it requires a heading and ending only when it is distributed separately (para 7-10).

(2) A reference to the overlay annex is contained within the written portion of the order.

b. When the overlay and any written portion of the order are on the same piece of paper—

(1) A single heading and ending serve both the overlay and the written portion.

(2) No reference to the overlay is required in the written portion.

D–14. Overlay Techniques

a. Use of Solid and Broken Lines. When the location of a unit or an installation or a coordinating detail (for example, assembly area or boundary) is in effect and will continue or is made effective by the order being prepared, the appropriate symbol is shown by solid lines. The symbol indicating a proposed or future location is shown by broken lines. The effective time of the proposal is shown, if known.

b. Objectives.

(1) An overlay normally shows objectives for only those units directly under the control of the headquarters issuing the plan or order. For example, objectives for battalions (companies) are shown on a division (brigade) operation overlay only if the battalion (company) is under division (brigade) control.

(2) Each objective shown is identified by a solid-line “goose egg” containing the abbreviation “OBJ” and a number, letter, code name, or unit designation. No set system is established. Sequence of numbering does not indicate priority or importance of the objectives to be secured.

(3) An objective assigned by higher headquarters may be given entirely to one subordinate unit or it may be divided. If divided, the objective may be shown graphically as separate objectives and numbered accordingly, or it may be divided into objectives by a boundary line. If divided by a boundary line, the boundary should be clearly definable on the ground.

c. Control Measures.

(1) Boundaries.

(a) In the offense, lateral boundaries extend beyond the objective far enough to coordinate the fires and actions required to secure and consolidate it. In the defense, lateral boundaries normally extend forward to the limit of the command’s area of influence, which is based on the effective range beyond the forward edge of the battle area of surface weapon systems providing supporting fires for the command.

(b) So far as practicable, boundaries are based on terrain features that are clearly defined on both the map and the ground. Lateral boundaries are so drawn that individual avenues of approach are clearly inclusive to the zone of a single unit (not split between adjacent units).

(c) A boundary is not required between a major unit and an armored cavalry or security unit performing a reconnaissance mission on the major unit’s flank (example F–1 shows the technique in this case). However, if an armored cavalry unit or a reconnaissance unit is used as an attack unit and is given an objective, then a boundary between the major unit and the cavalry (reconnaissance) unit is required. Also, a boundary is placed between a flank unit and an armored cavalry or security unit when the desire is to relieve the flank unit of responsibility for excessive area.

(d) Rear boundaries are habitually shown for divisions and higher levels. They are normally shown in administrative/logistics orders and in operation orders.

(e) Proposed boundaries (dotted lines) normally will be shown for subsequent phases of an operation for which “prepare to” and/or “on order” missions are assigned in paragraph 3 of the operation order or operation plan.

(2) Phase lines. Phase lines are shown by solid lines drawn approximately perpendicular to the direction of advance (withdrawal). They are labeled “PL” and given a letter, number, or code name designation.

(3) Lines of departure. A line of departure may be a clearly distinguishable terrain feature or the position of the attacking unit at the time of attack. When a clearly distinguishable terrain feature is used, a solid black line labeled “LD” designates the line of departure. When the attack is to be launched from current positions, the phrase “Line of Departure Is Line of Contact” is used (abbreviated LD/LC on the overlay and placed adjacent to the indicated friendly forward disposition (FFD) or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA)).

(4) Direction of attack. A direction-of-attack arrow is used to specify the direction of the main attack of a subordinate unit to coordinate closely a plan of maneuver (e.g., in a counterattack). A direction-of-attack arrow should extend
Figure D-1. Techniques in use of direction-of-attack arrow.

only as far as this form of control is essential to the overall plan. When a unit is directed to secure successive objectives with its main attack along a certain line, either one arrow extending through the objectives to the last objective or a series of arrows connecting the objectives may be used (fig D-1). The arrow restricts the maneuver of the subordinate unit and, therefore, should be used only when necessary.

(5) **Axis of advance.** An axis of advance may be identified by a code name or by the designation of the unit that is to use it. Unit designation is used when there is a possibility of misunderstanding (fig D-2). An axis of advance indicates the general direction of advance of a unit. A commander assigned an axis of advance may maneuver his troops and supporting fires freely to either side of the axis, provided he does not interfere with the maneuver of adjacent units.

(6) **Coordinating point.** A coordinating point is shown as a circle with an "X" in the center placed on a boundary. When on a specific line, it is appropriately labeled "FEBA," "GOP"; otherwise, labeling is permissible but not required.

(7) **Checkpoint.** A checkpoint is shown as a circle containing a reference name, letter, or number centered over the coordinate location of the terrain feature being used. Normally, checkpoints are placed on a separate overlay annex to an order.

(8) **Contact point.** A contact point is shown as a square with the contact point number placed inside centered over the coordinate location of the point.

(9) **Linkup point.** A linkup point is shown as a circle with the number of the point to the right and a dot in the center of the circle. The dot is centered over the coordinate location of the linkup point.

d. **Location of Units and Installations.**

(1) **In the attack,** assault units are indicated
by boundaries, line of contact (LC), unit symbols, and/or command post symbols (fig D-3).

(2) In the defense, units on the FEBA are indicated by boundaries, coordinating points, and command post symbols. A trace of the FEBA may be provided as a guide (fig D-4).

(3) Also, in the defense, a solid-line "goose egg" indicates an occupied defensive position. A broken-line "goose egg" indicates an unoccupied, but prepared defensive position. A symbol depicting the size of the unit involved is placed on the circumference of the "goose egg." The position may be identified by number or letter inside the "goose egg." Figure D-5 shows techniques in designating defensive positions.

(a) The "goose egg" is an enclosed area showing the outer limits of location of troops and not the entire area of responsibility.

(b) Normally, only defensive positions directly under the control of the issuing headquarters are shown on the overlay. Defensive positions of lower levels are shown when special requirements for coordinated defense exist.

Figure D-2. Axis of advance, labeled.

Figure D-3. Overlay portrayal, assault units, division in the attack.
(c) The solid end of the “goose egg” should face in the direction of primary concern.

(4) The location of the reserve is shown by an assembly area symbol delimiting its area and by the command post symbol if the actual location of the command post is known; otherwise, it is shown by the unit symbol (fig D-6). A unit in the reserve is not required to occupy all the area within the symbol nor is it responsible for all the area enclosed unless otherwise indicated.

(5) The general location of a cavalry unit with a security mission may be depicted as shown in figure D-7. The specific mission of the unit is included on the overlay or in the written portion of the order.

(6) Supply points or combat service support installations are shown by the appropriate symbol given in FM 21-30. Exact locations are indicated by placing a staff on the symbol. The base of the staff indicates the exact location.

e. Routes.

(1) Arrows are used to show routes of march. They are labeled with the word “Route” and a number, letter, or unit designation. Arrows are added to indicate one-way, alternating one-way, or two-way traffic.

(2) The main supply route is labeled “MSR.” Arrows are added, as appropriate, to indicate one-way, alternating one-way, or two-way traffic.
a. Occupied battalion defensive position.

b. Defensive position occupied by 1st Bn, 68th Inf.

c. Unoccupied but prepared battalion defensive position (or alternate reserve position). (If alternate reserve position, designate by number or letter or show symbol of unit to occupy.)

Figure D-5. Techniques in designating defensive positions.
FM 101-5

a. CP location known.

b. CP location unknown.

c. Two units composing reserve in same assembly area. (This does not indicate any particular command relationship between the units.)

d. Reserve units shown by a combination of a, b, and c above.

Figure D-6. Location of reserve.

Figure D-7. General location of a cavalry unit.
APPENDIX E

PLANS AND ANNEXES TO PLANS
(STANAG 2014 AND 2031)

Section I. General

E-1. Introduction

a. Chapter 6 contains general information pertaining to planning processes. This appendix contains an explanation of the techniques and principles involved in preparing operation and administrative/logistics plans. It also contains information pertaining to the format and content of both operation and administrative/logistics plans and the annexes to these plans. Typical examples of these plans and their annexes are also included.

b. As a rule, the format for a plan is similar to that for an order and facilitates easy transition to an order. When the times and conditions under which the plan is to be placed in effect occur, the plan becomes an order. The format also may be used for certain annexes.

c. Procedures and techniques applicable to the preparation of plans are discussed in appendix D.

d. To shorten some of the examples, asterisks have been used to show the omission of parts of paragraphs or entire paragraphs and subparagraphs. Where only a few words or a sentence has been omitted, three asterisks have been used. Where an entire paragraph or subparagraphs have been omitted, seven asterisks have been used.

E-2. Operation Plan

a. Format. The format for operation plans is identical with the format for operation orders (app F) with the following exceptions:

(1) Subparagraph d entitled “Assumptions” is added to paragraph 1. All assumptions used by the commander (by the staff officer if a staff plan) as a basis for the plan are listed.

(2) The time at which the plan is to be placed in effect or the conditions under which it is to be placed in effect are stated in the coordination subparagraph of paragraph 3.

b. Examples. Examples E-1 through E-4 are illustrations of operation plans.

E-3. Administrative/Logistics Plan

The various components of an administrative/logistics plan (logistics, personnel, civil-military operations) may be issued as separate plans or published as annexes to the plan. This procedure is normal in joint operations and may be employed in other situations in which publication and distribution of the components separately from the basic plan are desirable.

a. Format. Figure E-1 is a format with explanation for the administrative/logistics plan.
b. Example. Example E–5 illustrates an administrative/logistics plan at field army.

E–4. Annexes to Plans

Examples E–6 and E–7 are illustrations of annexes to plans. Subparagraphs not pertinent may be omitted.
ADMINISTRATIVE/LOGISTICS PLAN

References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents.¹

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan:

1. SITUATION
Information on the general overall situation essential to understand the current situation as it influences combat service support.
   a. Enemy Forces. Composition, disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, and identifications. (Reference to an operation plan or to the intelligence annex to an operation plan should be used, if published or to be published.) List enemy capabilities that can influence the combat service support mission.
   b. Friendly Forces. Pertinent information on own forces, other than those covered by a referenced operation plan or to be included in subsequent paragraphs of this administrative/logistics plan, that may directly influence the combat service support mission.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. May be listed here or in an annex.
   d. Assumptions. Assumptions used as a basis for this plan, e.g., strengths to be supported, rate and direction of movement of tactical operations, influx of refugees, and support available from other agencies.
      (1) Tactical situation. Obtained from the commander’s planning guidance and provided by the operations officer.
      (2) Personnel situation. Provided by the personnel officer.
      (3) Logistic situation. Provided by the logistics officer.
      (4) Civil-military situation. Provided by the civil-military operations officer.

2. MISSION
State the combat service support mission as a whole.

3. GENERAL²

4. MATERIEL AND SERVICES²

5. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION²

6. PERSONNEL²

7. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION²

8. MISCELLANEOUS
Include a statement on the time or the conditions under which the plan is to be placed in effect.²

9. COMMAND AND SIGNAL²

Acknowledgment instructions. /s/ ____________________________
Authentication
Annexes
Distribution

¹ When map references are used, the following minimum data must be included: map series number, edition number, sheet, and scale.
² Content and format for these paragraphs follow the format and instructions for like paragraphs in the administrative/logistics order (app F, fig F-2).

Figure E-1. Format for the administrative/logistics plan.
Section II. EXAMPLES

Example E-1. Counterattack Plan, Division

(Classification)

Copy no 4 of ___ copies
23d Armd Div
KUNZENDORF (XS0296), GERMANY
022300A June 19___
XT 53

OPLAN 15 (CATK PLAN GREEN)

References: Map, series M746, GERMANY, sheets 2520 II and III and 2620 II and III (BRESLAU—LIEGNITZ), edition 1—AMS, 1:50,000; OPORD 12.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: ALFA.

Task Organization:

1st Bde
1-95 Mech
1-10 Armor
1-12 Armor
1-11 FA (DS)
A/23d Engr (DS)

2d Bde
1-93 Mech
1-94 Mech
1-15 Armor
1-12 FA (DS)
B/23d Engr (DS)

3d Bde
1-91 Mech
1-92 Mech
1-11 Armor
1-13 Armor
1-14 Armor
1-13 FA (DS)
A/1-44 ADA (DS)
C/23d Engr (DS)

Div Arty
1-14 FA
1-15 FA
2d Bn (155, SP), 631st FA
(remains atch)

Div Trp
1-22 Cav
1-44 ADA (C/V)
23d Avn Co
23d Engr
236th MI Co (Div) (remains atch)
288th ASA Div Spt Co
(remains atch)
23d MP Co
23d Sig
241st CA Co (remains atch)

DISCOM
23d AG Co
23d Fin Co
23d Maint
23d Med
23d S&T

1. SITUATION
a. En Forces. Annex A (Intel) to OPORD 12.
b. Friendly Forces. OPORD 12.
c. Attachments and Detachments. Task organization.
d. Assumptions.

*Reference may be made to basic OPORD for task organization unless number of changes require new task organization.
(Classification)

(OPLAN 15 (CATK PLAN GREEN)—23 Armd Div)

(1) Penetration has been made in the sector of 1st Bde with the major portion of a mech div (est two reinf mech regt).
(2) 1st Bde has slowed or stopped penetration. 2d Bde has no penetration in sector.
(3) Three nuclear wpns will be available to spt the catk.
(4) The res as constituted will be available at its present strength and location when decision to catk is made.

2. MISSION
Div catk at D-day, H-hour, to destroy en forces in area of penetration.

3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of Operation. Annex 'A (Operation Overlay). This operation involves the employment of 3d Bde against the south flank of the en penetration, passing through elements of 1st Bde to exploit the effects of nuclear wpns. 1st Bde supports passage of 3d Bde. 2d Bde continues to defend in sector. A preparation will be fired employing nuclear wpns at H−30 minutes to neutralize en res in the area of the penetration and to assist 3d Bde in breaking through the en forward elements on the flank of the penetration. The nuclear preparation will be followed by a 20-minute conventional preparation beginning at H−15 minutes. Priority of fires to 3d Bde. Annex B (Fire Spt).

b. 1st Bde:
(1) Spt passage and atk of 3d Bde.
(2) Be prepared to assist in destroying en in penetration.
(3) Be prepared to relieve 3d Bde vic obj A and assist withdrawal of 3d Bde.

c. 2d Bde: cont def of sector.

d. 3d Bde:
(1) Atk; destroy en in penetration and secure obj A.
(2) Be prepared for relief by 1st Bde vic obj A; then reassemble as div res present area.

e. Arty:
(1) FA:
(2) ADA:
(3) Annex B (Fire Spt).

f. Res: 1–22 Cav on order. Be prepared to occupy blocking position 6 on 2 hours' notice.

g. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) This plan eff for planning on receipt and for execution on div order.
(2) Troop safety: emergency risk to unwarned, exposed pers.
(3) For execution LD is LC.
(4) Road priority to 3d Bde eff H−1 hour.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Annex F (Service Support) to OPORD 12.
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
Annex G (Communications-Electronics) to OPORD 12. Current CEOI Index.

Acknowledge.

HOOD
MG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Tuck
TUCK
G3

Annexes: A—Operation Overlay
B—Fire Spt (omitted)

Distribution: A
Example E-1—Continued

Annex A (OP Overlay) to OPLAN 15 (CATK PLAN GREEN)—23d Armd Div

References: Map, series M746, Germany, sheets 2520 II and III and 2620 II and III (Breslau—Liegnitz), edition 1—AMS, 1:50,000; OPORD 12.

Note: Heading and ending not required when annex is distributed with the operation plan.
Example E-2. Plan for Amphibious Attack, Corps as Army Landing Force

(Classification)

Copy no 2 of 220 copies
3d (US) Corps (Army Landing Force, TF 141)
NEWCASTLE (***), DEL
011100Z September 19
XR 2

OPERATION PLAN 11


Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: ZULU.


1. SITUATION
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) LANDFORMED conducts operations initiated by an amphibious attack to sever Aggressor lines of communications, destroys Aggressor forces in BOGNA, and restores political control to the legitimate government.
      (2) USWESTCOM provides forces for JATF 140 and supports 3d (US) Corps subsequent to amphibious operation.
      (3) 2d (Allied) Corps destroys Aggressor in zone, secures LANDFORMED's east flank, and conducts further operations as part of LANDFORMED.
      (4) 10th (Allied) Corps lands over beaches established by 3d (US) Corps, secures LANDFORMED's west flank, and conducts operations as part of LANDFORMED.
      (5) JATF 140 conducts advance force operations and executes amphibious attack to establish 3d (US) Corps (Army Landing Force, TF 141) ashore.
      (6) US Navy component assigned to JATF 140 lifts, lands, and supports Army Landing Force, TF 141.
   d. Assumptions.
      (1) Aggressor strength and dispositions in 3d (US) Corps beachhead will remain relatively unchanged until final preparations in landing areas are initiated.
      (2) Aggressor capability of reinforcing in 3d (US) Corps beachhead will not exceed three division equivalents by D+3.
      (3) Prior to D-day, NAVFORMED forces will gain and maintain control of the sea in the JATF 140 objective area and the lines of communications thereto.
      (4) Prior to D-day, NAVFORMED and AIRFORMED will gain and maintain air superiority in the JATF 140 objective area and over lines of communications thereto.
      (5) Missile and air attacks on Aggressor lines of communications in the objective area will reduce the enemy's reinforcing capability.

(Classification)
2. MISSION
3d (US) Corps (TF 141) lands in an amphibious attack beginning D-day, H-hour, between ACRA (4167) and BELUT (4093) in BOGNIA; secures and establishes a corps beachhead; establishes contact with 2d (Allied) Corps; and prepares to continue operations to destroy Aggressor forces in BOGNIA as part of LANDFORMED.

3. EXECUTION
      (1) Maneuver. This operation will be conducted in four phases:
         (a) Phase I (D-day). 3d (US) Corps (TF 141), operating as part of JATF 140, makes amphibious attack with three infantry divisions in the initial assault to secure division beachheads. Divisions conduct final preparation of landing areas and execution of assault landings.
            1. 20th Inf Div, on the west (left), lands in landing area PECOS, makes main attack to secure a division beachhead, and assists landing of initial elements of 26th Armd Div.
            2. 18th Inf Div, in the center, lands in landing area MISSOURI, secures a division beachhead, and assists landing of initial elements of 55th Mech Div.
            3. 15th Inf Div, on the east (right), lands in landing area JAMES and secures division beachhead.
         (b) Phase II (D + 1 to D + 6). On securing division beachheads, corps continues attack with no change in formation to secure lines DOLPHIN and SHARK. 20th Inf Div continues attack to secure line DOLPHIN and assists landing of remaining elements of 26th Armd Div and initial elements of 10th (Allied) Corps. 18th Inf Div continues attack to secure line SHARK in zone, assists landing of remaining elements of 55th Mech Div, and conducts reconnaissance to line DOLPHIN to establish contact with 20th Inf Div. 15th Inf Div continues attack to secure line SHARK in zone and port facilities at ATLANTIS (4175).
         (c) Phase III (D + 6 to D + 7). On securing lines DOLPHIN and SHARK, corps continues attack to secure corps beachhead. 26th Armd Div attacks through 20th Inf Div vicinity line DOLPHIN and makes main attack to secure objective 1 and corps beachhead line in zone. 20th Inf Div assists passage of 26th Armd Div, protects corps west (left) flank, and assists landing and positioning of 10th (Allied) Corps on 3d (US) Corps west flank. 55th Mech Div attacks through 18th Inf Div vicinity line SHARK to secure corps beachhead line in zone. 18th Inf Div assists passage of 55th Mech Div and then becomes corps reserve. 15th Inf Div continues attack to secure corps beachhead line in zone and to establish contact with 2d (Allied) Corps. 201st Armd Cav Regt protects corps east (right) flank. 3d (US) Corps shore party assumes responsibility for corps beach support area.
         (d) Phase IV (D + 8 to * * *). On securing corps beachhead line, corps defends in sector and prepares to continue attack under operational command (combined) of LANDFORMED. JATF 140 is dissolved. 3d (US) Corps assigns responsibility for beach support area to corps base commander.

   (2) Fires.
      (a) Air.
         1. Naval air of JATF 140 conducts air defense, tactical air support, and interdiction missions in objective area; priority close air support initially 20th Inf Div.
         2. Appendix 1 (Air Fire Support) to Annex D (Fire Support).
      (b) Naval gunfire.
(Classification)

(OPLAN 11—3d (US) Corps)

1. Naval fire support ships of JATF 140 provide gunfire and missile support; priority initially 20th Inf Div.
2. Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire) to Annex D (Fire Support).
   (c) Field artillery. Appendix 3 (Field Artillery) to Annex D (Fire Support). Priority of field artillery support initially to 20th Inf Div.

b. 15th Inf Div (Reinf):
   (1) Land beginning D-day, H-hour, by assault craft and assault aircraft through landing area JAMES and secure division beachhead.
   (2) Be prepared to receive one reserve BLT(S) and/or one BLT(A) from 55th Mech Div.
   (3) Be prepared to secure airfield and port facilities at ATLANTIS on D+1.
   (4) Be prepared to continue attack to secure line SHARK in zone.
   (5) Release 201st Armd Cav Regt on order after completion of phase II.
   (6) Be prepared to continue attack to secure corps beachhead in zone and to establish contact with 2d (Allied) Corps.

c. 18th Inf Div (Reinf):
   (1) Land beginning D-day, H-hour, by assault craft and assault aircraft through landing area MISSOURI and secure division beachhead.
   (2) Assist landing of 55th Mech Div. Exercise operational control for landing over elements of 55th Mech Div; release operational control on order.
   (3) Be prepared to receive one reserve BLT(S) and/or one BLT(A) from 55th Mech Div.
   (4) Be prepared to continue attack to secure line SHARK in zone.
   (5) Be prepared to conduct reconnaissance to line DOLPHIN to establish contact with 20th Inf Div.
   (6) Be prepared to assist passage of 55th Mech Div near line SHARK.
   (7) Be prepared to release 1st Sqdn, 202d Armd Cav Regt, to 55th Mech Div vicinity line SHARK.
   (8) On order, corps reserve beginning phase III.

d. 20th Inf Div (Reinf):
   (1) Land beginning D-day, H-hour, by assault craft and assault aircraft through landing area PECOS and secure division beachhead.
   (2) Be prepared to receive one reserve BLT(S) and/or one BLT(A) from 26th Armd Div.
   (3) Assist landing of 26th Armd Div. Exercise operational control for landing over elements of 26th Armd Div; release operational control on order.
   (4) Be prepared to continue to attack to secure line DOLPHIN.
   (5) Be prepared to assist passage of 26th Armd Div vicinity line DOLPHIN.
   (6) Be prepared to protect corps west flank beginning phase III.
   (7) Be prepared to assist landing and passage of 10th (Allied) Corps.

e. 201st Armd Cav Regt:
   (1) Initially attached to 15th Inf Div until passage of line SHARK; thereafter, revert to corps control.

(Classification)
(Classification)

(OPLAN 11—3d (US) Corps)

(2) Be prepared to protect corps east flank north of line SHARK.

f. 1st Sqdn, 202d Armd Cav Regt (Reinf):
   (1) Initially attached to 18th Inf Div.
   (2) On order, attached to 55th Mech Div after passage of line SHARK.

h. Arty:

   (Classification)

h. Corps Shore Party:
   (1) Land on order.
   (2) On order, release control of beach support area and attached units to base commander and prepare for redeployment.
   (3) Annex F (Shore Party).

i. Reserve:
   (1) 55th Mech Div:
      (a) Floating reserve D-day; be prepared to release one BLT(S) and/or one BLT(A) to either 18th or 15th Inf Div; priority 18th Inf Div.
      (b) On order, land over beaches in landing area MISSOURI under operational control of 18th Inf Div beginning D-day.
      (c) Be prepared to attack through 18th Inf Div vicinity line SHARK to secure 3d (US) Corps beachhead line in zone.
      (d) Be prepared to receive attachment of 1st Sqdn, 202d Armd Cav Regt, vicinity line SHARK.
   (2) 26th Armd Div:
      (a) Floating reserve D-day; be prepared to release one BLT(S) and/or one BLT(A) to 20th Inf Div.
      (b) On order, land over beaches in landing area PECOS under operational control 20th Inf beginning D-day.
      (c) Be prepared to attack through 20th Inf Div vicinity line DOLPHIN to secure objective 1 and 3d (US) Corps beachhead line in zone.

j. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and for execution on order. For planning, D-day 050830 December.
   (2) Base passive defense measures against Aggressor nuclear weapons on 50-KT low airburst.
   (3) Nuclear and chemical:
      (a) Divisions determine requirements for nuclear fires, including preassault fires, and submit to this headquarters.
      (b) Nuclear weapons will not be employed—
         1. Until approved by Commanding General, 3d (US) Corps.
         2. In excess of 50 KT.
         3. In the vicinity of populated areas of greater than 1,000 population when the effects will exceed a degree of risk equivalent to emergency risk for warned, exposed personnel.
         4. So as to interfere with planned beach support area operations, major routes of advance, or airfield development.
      (c) Employ planning factors that will give a high degree of assurance of no nuclear fallout.

   (Classification)
(Classification)

(OPLAN 11—3d (US) Corps)

(d) Plan for the employment of chemical weapons and maintain them in a state of readiness, but do not employ without approval this headquarters.

(4) Followup landings, movements within beachheads, and emergency employment of forces ashore in zone will be under control of commanders of assault divisions involved until Commanding General, 3d (US) Corps, assumes command ashore.

(5) All commands assist in the reorganization of Bognian Government military forces in zone.

(6) Commanders are authorized direct communications for planning.

(7) Subordinate commanders submit coordinated plans to this headquarters by 10 September.

* * * * * * * * *

Acknowledge.

BURNSIDE
LTG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Nelson
NELSON
G3

Annexes: A—Task Organization (omitted)
   B—Intelligence (omitted)
   C—Operation Overlay (omitted)
   D—Fire Support (omitted)
   E—Air Defense (omitted)
   F—Shore Party (omitted)
   G—Phased Task Organization (omitted)
   H—Tentative Allocation of Shipping (omitted)
   I—Landing Plan (omitted)
   J—Alternate Plans (omitted)
   K—Personnel (omitted)
   L—Logistics (omitted)
   M—Civil-Military Operations (omitted)
   N—Embarkation (omitted)
   O—Communications-Electronics (omitted)
   P—Cover and Deception (omitted)
   Q—Electronic Warfare (omitted)
   R—Airspace Coordination (omitted)
   S—Distribution (omitted)

Distribution: Annex S
OPLAN 2 (OPERATION OHIO)

Reference: Map, series 1501, THAILAND, sheets NE48-9, NE48-10, NE48-13, and NE48-14 (JOG (G)), edition 1-AMS, 1:250,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: GOLF.

Task Organization:

1st Bde
TF 1-81
1-66 Inf
1-67 Inf
791st Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
1-1 FA
  1st Plt, Btry B (Slt),
  191st FA
1st and 2d Plt,
A/1-43 ADA
A/20th Engr (DS)
  1st and 2d Plt, 5580th
  Engr Co (LE)
331st TNP* Plt (Spt)

2d Bde
TF 1-1
1-68 Inf
1-69 Inf
1-70 Inf
792d Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
1-21 Cav (-)
1-2 FA
  2d Plt, Btry B (Slt),
  191st FA
A/1-43 ADA (-)
B/20th Engr (DS)
332d TNP* Plt (Spt)

3d Bde
TF 1-82
1-71 Inf
1-72 Inf

793d Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
1-3 FA
  3d Plt, Btry B (Slt),
  191st FA
1/B/1-48 ADA
C/20th Engr (DS)
333d TNP* Plt (Spt)

Div Arty
1-4 FA (-)
  B/2-611 FA
  C/2-661 FA
Btry B (Slt), 191st FA (-)
2d Bn (8, SP), 611th FA (-)
  C/1-4 FA
  B/2-661 FA
2d Bn (175, SP), 661st FA (-)
  B/1-4 FA
  C/2-611 FA

Div Trp
Co A (LRP), 780th Inf
D/1-21 Cav
1-43 ADA (C/V) (-)
20th Avn Bn
110th Avn Bn (Cbt)
20th Engr
  5580th Engr Co (LE) (-)
235th MI Co (Div)
287th ASA Div Spt Co
20th MP Co
290th MP Co
20th Sig
1. SITUATION
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) Field Force Region II has responsibility for *
      (2) Royal Thai Forces *
      (3) Naval Forces *
      (4) Air Forces *
      (c) 2d (USAF) Air Div will support 20th Inf Div with 25 tactical air sorties daily. Other air support will be provided on an as-required basis.
      (5) Marine *
   c. Attachments and Detachments.
      (1) Following units remain attached:
         (a) Co A (LRP), 780th Inf.
         (b) 791st Inf Plt (Spt Dog).
         (c) 792d Inf Plt (Sct Dog).
         (d) 793d Inf Plt (Sct Dog).
         (e) 110th Avn Bn (Cbt).
         (f) 5580th Engr Co (LE).
         (g) 235th MI Co (Div).
         (h) 290th MP Co.
         (i) 240th CA Co.
      (2) Following units attached effective 080800 Dec:
         (a) Btry B (Slt), 191st FA.
         (b) 2d Bn (8, SP), 611th FA.
         (c) 2d Bn (175, SP), 661st FA.
         (d) 331st TNP Plt (Spt).
         (e) 332d TNP Plt (Spt).
         (f) 333d TNP Plt (Spt).
         (g) 334th TNP Plt (Spt).
         (h) 287th ASA Div Spt Co.
         (i) 292d PSYOP Det.
   d. Assumptions.
      (1) Units in para 1c will remain attached or will be attached.

2. MISSION
   Division, on order, will move to TAOR; construct brigade bases; conduct strike operations to clear TAOR of guerrilla units; prevent interference with traffic on Highway 22 in TAOR; block enemy infiltration routes; and be prepared to conduct elimination operations anywhere in Region II with priority to SAKHON NAKHON and NAKHON PHANOM Provinces.
(Classification)

(OPLAN 2 (OP OHIO)—20th Inf Div)

3. EXECUTION


   (1) Maneuver. Division moves to TAOR with 1st Bde, 2d Bde, and 3d Bde from west to east, assuming responsibility for brigade TAOR's and constructing bases. Initially, maneuver battalions may be used to construct base defenses, but priority of use for maneuver battalions will be in offensive operations. Brigades conduct operations to clear TAOR.

   (2) Fires. Field artillery will be positioned to provide fires throughout the division TAOR. Priority for field artillery and air support will be determined daily based on the existing situation. Annex C (Fire Support).

b. 1st Bde:

   (1) Establish brigade base in area GEORGE. Annex D (Land Lease Agreement).

   (2) Prevent interference with traffic on Highway 22 in brigade TAOR.

   (3) Conduct strike operations in TAOR.

c. 2d Bde:

   (1) Establish brigade base in area BILL. Annex D (Land Lease Agreement).

   (2) Maintain one infantry battalion as a 1-hour fast-reaction force. Do not commit this unit without approval of this headquarters.

   (3) Prevent interference with traffic on Highway 22 in brigade TAOR.

   (4) Conduct strike operations in TAOR.

d. 3d Bde:

   (1) Establish brigade base in area BOB. Annex D (Land Lease Agreement).

   (2) Prevent interference with traffic on Highway 22 in brigade TAOR.

   (3) Conduct strike operations in TAOR.

e. Arty:

   (1) FA:

      (a) 1-4 FA (-) : GSR 1-2 FA, area BILL.
         1. Attach Btry B to 2-661 FA; attach Btry C to 2-661 FA.
         2. B/2-661 FA and C/2-661 FA attached.

      (b) 2-611 FA (-) : GSR 1-1 FA, area GEORGE.
         1. Attach Btry B to 1-4 FA; attach Btry C to 2-661 FA.
         2. C/1-4 FA and B/2-661 FA attached.

      (c) 2-661 FA(-) : GSR 1-3 FA, area BOB.
         1. Attach Btry B to 2-611 FA; attach Btry C to 1-4 FA.
         2. B/1-4 FA and C/2-611 FA attached.

      (d) B/191st FA (-) : GS.

   (2) ADA:

      (a) 1-43 ADA (C/V) (-) : GS; priority of air defense to area BILL.

      (b) 1st and 2d Plt, A/1-43 ADA: attached 1st Bde.

      (c) A/1-43 ADA (-) : attached 2d Bde.

      (d) 1/B/1-43 ADA: attached 3d Bde.

   (3) Annex C (Fire Support).

g. 20th Engr:

   (1) Priority of work. Airfield construction and base defenses.
(Classification)

(OPLAN 2 (OP OHIO)—20th Inf Div)

(2) Annex E (Engineer).

g. Res: One infantry battalion from 2d Bde: be prepared to conduct an airmobile assault on 1-hour notice anywhere in TAOR.

h. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) All units located in brigade bases coordinate defenses with brigade.
   (2) Brigades must have prior approval from this headquarters to conduct operations outside their TAOR, except in cases of hot pursuit.
   (3) All brigade operations will be coordinated with Thai district officials concerned through the US Dist Advisory Det.
   (4) Brigades will establish liaison with the Thai ACC's in provinces in which they are based or operating. Additionally, they will establish liaison with each Thai district in which they operate. This liaison will be to the US Dist Advisory Det in provinces or districts. The advisory detachment will effect direct contact with the Thai officials.
   (5) Annex F (Army Aviation).
   (6) Annex G (Cover and Deception).
   (7) Annex H (PSYOP).
   (8) This plan effective for planning on receipt; for implementation on order.
   (9) Annex I (Distribution).

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
   Annex J (Service Support).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   b. Command. Division command post opens in vicinity of CHIENG KHRUA (NE0512); time to be announced. Acknowledge.

FOOT
MG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Walk
WALK
G3

Annexes: A—Intelligence (omitted)
   B—Operation Overlay
   C—Fire Support (omitted)
   D—Land Lease Agreement (omitted)
   E—Engineer (omitted)
   F—Army Aviation (omitted)
   G—Cover and Deception (omitted)
   H—PSYOP (omitted)
   I—Distribution (omitted)
   J—Service Support (omitted)
   K—Civil-Military Operations (omitted)
   L—Communications-Electronics (omitted)

Distribution: Annex I

(Classification)
Example E-3—Continued

ANNEX B (OP OVERLAY) to OPLAN 2 (OP OHIO)—20th Inf Div

Reference: Map, series 1501, THAILAND, sheets NE48-9, NE48-10, NE48-13, and NE48-14 (JOG(G)), edition 1-AMS, 1:250,000.

(Classification)
OPERATION PLAN 11

References: Map, series M562, FRANCE and GERMANY, sheets 30-5 and 30-6, edition 2, 1:250,000; OPLAN 20, 10th (US) Army; Admin/Log Order 10, 10th (US) Army.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: ZULU.


1. SITUATION
      b. Friendly Forces.
         (1) CENTAG attacks to secure DRESDEN, PRAGUE, LEIPZIG, and VIENNA and prepares to continue to attack to the east.
         (2) 10th (US) Army attacks 20 May to secure DRESDEN (NS1257) and PRAGUE (VR5847) and prepares to continue the attack to the east.
         (3) 120th TASCOM supports 10th (US) Army.
         (4) 16th (Allied) Army attacks to secure LEIPZIG (CA4728) and prepares to continue the attack to the east.
         (5) 1st (FR) Army attacks to secure VIENNA (CB5990) and prepares to continue the attack to the east.
         (6) 11th TAF supports 10th (US) Army.
   d. Assumptions.
      (1) The present line of contact will not change significantly.
      (2) National Territorial Defense Forces can contain guerrilla activity in rear areas.
      (3) Allied forces will maintain air superiority prior to H-hour.

2. MISSION

10th FASCOM provides combat service support, less construction support, to 10th (US) Army in its operation to secure DRESDEN and PRAGUE.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation. Annex C (Operation Overlay). Operation to be conducted in two phases:
      (1) Phase I. 10th FASCOM conducts combat service support operations with the 1st Spt Bde (Corps) and 2d Spt Bde (Corps) in support of 1st (US) Corps and 2d (US) Corps respectively and nondivisional units operating within corps areas of responsibility in operations to secure ER-FURT (PB4050) and NURNBERG (PV5080). Priority of support to 2d (US) Corps. 10th Spt Bde (Army) supports all units operating in or passing through the 10th (US) Army service area.
      (2) Phase II. 10th FASCOM continues combat service support operations with the 1st Spt Bde
(OPLAN 11—10th FASCOM)

(Corps) and 2d Spt Bde (Corps) in support of 1st (US) Corps and 2d (US) Corps respectively and nondivisional units operating within the corps areas of responsibility in operations to secure DRESDEN and PRAGUE. Priority of support to 1st (US) Corps. 10th Spt Bde (Army) continues to support all units operating in or passing through the 10th (US) Army service area.

b. 1st Spt Bde (Corps):

(1) Provide combat service support to the following units:
   (a) 1st (US) Corps units:
      1. 17th Inf Div.
      2. 52d Mech Div.
      3. 53d Mech Div.
      4. 23d Armd Div.
   (b) 10th FASCOM units and 11th TAF (cl I and field services) in 1st Spt Bde (Corps) area.
   (2) Prepare to act as 10th FASCOM MCC in an emergency.

d. 10th Spt Bde (Army):

(1) Provide combat service support to the following units:
   (a) HQ Co, 10th (US) Army.
   (b) 201st Armd Cav Regt.
   (c) 1st Bn (PSG), 305th FA.
   (d) 48d Arty Bde (AD).
   (e) 401st Arty Gp (AD).
   (f) 402d Arty Gp (AD).
   (g) 130th Avn Co (Army).
   (h) 150th Avn Co (ATC) (Army).
   (i) HHD, 301st Cml Bn (Smoke Genr).
   (j) HHC, 50th Engr Bde.
   (k) 61st Engr Gp (Cbt) (3 bn).
   (l) 62d Engr Gp (Cbt) (4 bn).
   (m) 200th MI Bn (Aerial Recon Spt) (Army).
   (n) 208d MI Bn (Army).
   (o) HHC, 28th ASA Gp.
   (p) 275th ASA Co (Op) (A).
   (q) 279th ASA Co (Proc).
   (r) 282d ASA Co (Scty).
   (s) 20th Sig Bde (Army).
   (t) 280th PSYOP Bn.
   (u) 10th FASCOM units in 10th Spt Bde (Army) area.
   (2) Prepare to act as 10th FASCOM alternate ICC (less ammunition control) and MMC in an emergency.

h. 80th Med Bde:

   (1) This plan effective for planning on receipt and execution on order.
   (2) RAP. 1st and 2d Spt Bde (Corps) conduct RAP operations as directed by corps commanders. Annex D (RAP).
   (3) * * *.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Admin/Log Order 10, 10th (US) Army.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   a. Signal.
      (1) Annex N (Communications-Electronics) to 10th (US) Army OPLAN 20.
      (2) CEOI Index 1-4.
   b. Command. 10th FASCOM CP located near HOMBURG (LV7963).

   Acknowledge.

   Jones
   LTG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Brown
BROWN
SP&O

Annexes: A—Task Organization (omitted)
         B—Intelligence (omitted)
         C—Operation Overlay (omitted)
         D—RAP (omitted)
ADMINISTRATIVE/LOGISTICS PLAN 10

RELATED OPERATION PLAN 20

Reference: Map, series M501, Western EUROPE, sheets NM32-2 through NM32-9, NM32-11, NM33-1, NM33-2, NM33-5, NM33-7, and NM33-8, edition 1, UTM, 1:250,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: ZULU.

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces.
      (1) Situation. Annex A (Intelligence) to OPLAN 20 and current PERINTREP.
      (2) Capabilities. Enemy guerrilla activity against 10th (US) Army combat service support activities is probable.
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) CENTAG attacks to restore the eastern boundary of the Federal Republic of Germany and continues the attack to the east.
      (2) 10th (US) Army—OPLAN 20.
   d. Assumptions.
      (1) Tactical situation.
         (a) The present line of contact will not change significantly prior to D-day.
         (b) The offensive operation will take 12 days.
         (c) Allied air forces will maintain air superiority prior to D-day.
         (d) National Territorial Defense Forces will contain guerrilla activity in rear areas.
      (2) Personnel situation. Personnel strengths to be supported:
         (a) 1st Corps 123,200
         (b) 2d Corps 89,400
         (c) 10th (US) Army troops 147,500
         (d) Other 20,100
         (e) Total 380,200
      (3) Logistic situation. Supporting units will be capable of delivering the following daily tonnages into the army area:
         (a) Highway 9,000 STON
         (b) Air 1,100 STON
         (c) Rail 4,000 STON
         (d) Pipeline 8,480 STON
      (4) Civil-military situation. Civil-military operation requirements for emergency civil supply will not exceed 65 STON per day.
2. MISSION
Provide combat service support for 10th (US) Army offensive operation to secure DRESDEN (NS-1257) and PRAGUE (VR5847) in accordance with concept of operations described in 10th (US) Army OPLAN 20.

3. GENERAL

a. 10th FASCOM provides combat service support to 10th (US) Army units with 1st Spt Bde (Corps) supporting 1st Corps, 2d Spt Bde (Corps) supporting 2d Corps, and 10th Spt Bde (Army) supporting 10th (US) Army and 10th (US) Army troops.

b. 10th FASCOM provides combat services as follows:

(1) 1st Spt Bde (Corps) spt:
   (a) 1st Corps units:
      1. 17th Inf Div.
      2. 52d Mech Div.
      3. 53d Mech Div.
      4. 23d Armd Div.
      5. 403d Arty Gp (AD).
   (b) 10th FASCOM units and 11th TAF (class I and field services) in 1st Spt Bde (Corps) areas.

(2) 2d Spt Bde (Corps) spt:
   (a) 2d Corps units:
      1. 15th Inf Div (on arrival).
      2. 18th Inf Div.
      3. 54th Mech Div.
      4. 25th Armd Div.
      5. 404th Arty Gp (AD).
   (b) 10th FASCOM units and 11th TAF (class I and field services) in 2d Spt Bde (Corps) area.

(3) 10th Spt Bde (Army) spt:
   (a) HQ Co, 10th (US) Army.
   (b) 201st Armd Cav Regt.
   (c) 1st Bn (PSG), 305th FA.
   (d) 43d Arty Bde (AD).
   (e) 401st Arty Gp (AD).
   (f) 402d Arty Gp (AD).
   (g) 130th Avn Co (Army).
   (h) 150th Avn Co (ATC) (Army).
   (i) HHD, 301st Cml Bn (Smoke Genr).
   (j) HHC, 50th Engr Bde.
   (k) 61st Engr Gp (Cbt) (3 bn).
   (l) 62d Engr Gp (Cbt) (4 bn).
   (m) 200th MI Bn (Aerial Recon Spt) (Army).
   (n) 203d MI Bn (Army).
   (o) HHC, 28th ASA Gp.
   (p) 275th ASA Co (Op) (A).
   (q) 279th ASA Co (Proc).
   (r) 282d ASA Co (Scty).
(Classification)

(ADMIN/LOG PLAN 10—10th (US) Army)

(a) 20th Sig Bde (Army).
(t) 280th PSYOP Bn.
(u) 10th FASCOM units in 10th Spt Bde (Army) area.

(c) 10th FASCOM provides supported units appropriate details on locations of combat service spt units, opening and closing times, and distribution schedules.

d. Supported units inform supporting 10th FASCOM units of pending displacement as soon as practicable; supporting units are responsible for informing supported unit of new arrangements, as necessary, for obtaining combat service spt.


4. MATERIEL AND SERVICES

a. Supply.

(1) Class I.
   (a) Unit distribution to divisions. All others SUPPT.
   (b) Three-day supply at DS level; 7-day supply at GS level.
   (c) Resupply based on unit strength reports. Supported units make special requirements known to appropriate SCC or DS supply element.

(2) Class II.
   (a) Unit distribution to DS level; SUPPT distribution to users.
   (b) Two-day supply at DS level; 3-day supply at GS level; additional 5-day level in 10th (US) Army service area.
   (c) SUPPT locations. Annex B (Admin/Log Overlay).

(3) Class III.
   (a) Unit distribution to DS level; SUPPT distribution to users.
   (b) Bulk class III. Two-day supply at DS level; 3-day supply at GS level; 2-day supply in 10th (US) Army service area.
   (c) Packaged class III. Two-day supply at DS level; 3-day supply at GS level; 5-day supply in 10th (US) Army service area.
   (d) Priority to 2d Corps.

(4) Class IV. Two-day supply at DS level; 3-day supply at GS level; priority to 2d Corps.

(5) Class V.
   (a) SUPPT distribution.
   (b) Three-day supply at DS level; 7-day supply at GS level.
   (c) 1st Spt Bde (Corps) establishes three ASP and two SÁSP in spt of 1st Corps. 2d Spt Bde (Corps) establishes three ASP and three SASP in spt of 2d Corps. Units in army service area draw class V from DS/GS ammunition supply installations on area basis. Annex B (Admin/Log Overlay).
   (d) Available supply rates 10—22 June:
      1. 155-mm how—120.
      2. 4.2-inch mortar, HE—45.
      3. Other types—no restriction.
   (e) Special ammunition. Appendix 1 (Special Ammunition) to Annex D (Fire Spt Plan) to OPLAN 20, 10th (US) Army.

(Classification)
(Classification)

ADMIN/LOG PLAN 10—10th (US) Army

(6) Class VI.
   (a) Essential comfort items will be issued gratuitously.
   (b) Spt bdes will operate mobile post exchanges in areas of responsibilities.
   (c) Special requirements will be approved through command channels.

(7) Class VII.
   (a) Two-day supply at DS level; 3-day supply at GS level; additional 5-day supply in 10th
       (US) Army service area.
   (b) Requisitions for controlled items will be submitted through command channels to this HQ,
       ATTN: ACoS, G4, with info copy to the supporting SCC/ICC.

(8) Class VIII.
   (a) 80th Med Bde establishes DS SUPPT in each corps area and DS/GS installation in army
       service area.
   (b) 80th Med Bde ICP near HOMBURG (LV7963).

(9) Class IX.
   (a) 15-day supply of specified items at DS and GS levels.
   (b) Major critical shortages exist in electronic repair parts for fire control and surveillance
       equipment and in repair parts and replacement components for general-purpose vehicles and armored
       personnel carriers. Commanders will give personal emphasis to proper operation and user mainten-
       ance on these types of equipment.

(10) Maps provided by 541st Topo Bn in accordance with 10th (US) Army SOP.

(11) Water. Water purification tablets will be supplied with rations.

(12) Captured foreign materiel will be reported to technical intelligence for evacuation instructions.

(13) 10th FASCOM ICC near BUDESHEIM (MA2134).
   (a) 10th Spt Bde (Army) SCC near ALZEY (MA8611).
   (b) 1st Spt Bde (Corps) SCC near USINGEN (MA6875).
   (c) 2d Spt Bde (Corps) SCC near KRUNBACH (MA8503).

b. Transportation and Movements.

(1) MSR and traffic circulation.
   (a) MSR 1, 3, 5, 14, 16, 18, and 20 are controlled routes.
   (b) All numbered MSR are two-way.
   (c) Highway regulating points are located at LB9703, LV7767, and MA0179.
   (d) Ten or more vehicles dispatched within an hour from same origin to the same destination
       constitute a convoy.
   (e) Convoys on controlled routes require clearance from MCC.

(2) Terminals.
   (a) Barge terminals at MA0471, MA2136, MA5139, MA6312, MV5888, MV5968, LA7959, and
       LA7043.
   (b) Rail terminals. Terminals are located as follows:
       1. MV1877 and LA9980.
       2. MV7774 opens on D+92.
       3. MV7504 opens on D+94.
       4. NB4803, NV1644, and PV1462 are planned terminals.

(3) Movements.
   (a) Requests for airdrop, air resupply.

(Classification)
(ADMIN/LOG PLAN 10—10th (US) Army)

1. Requests for airdrop are submitted direct to 10th FASCOM ICC through logistic channels.
2. Requests for air resupply are submitted direct to support brigade SCC through logistic channels.
3. Emergency requirements will be submitted through command channels, and the appropriate TOC HQ will notify the appropriate MCC and SCC or ICC.
   (b) 10th FASCOM MCC located near BUDESHEIM (MA2134).
      1. 1st Spt Bde (Corps) MCC near USINGEN (MA6875).
      2. 2d Spt Bde (Corps) MCC near GROSSGUMPEN (MA8503).

c. Services.
   (1) Construction.
       (a) No permanent type of construction will be undertaken. Local facilities will be used, as required, in accordance with civil-military operation policies.
       (b) Annex C (Engineer).
   (2) Field services. Annex B (Admin/Log Overlay).
   (3) Health services in accordance with preventive medicine policy, 10th (US) Army.
   (5) Other.
       (a) EOD service on request from corps support brigades.
       (b) Procurement request through channels to ACofS, Supply, 10th FASCOM.

d. Labor. Annex M (CMO) to OPLAN 20, 10th (US) Army.

e. Maintenance.
   (1) Priority to 2d Corps.
   (2) DS maintenance. Annex B (Admin/Log Overlay).
       (a) Repair time limit—3 days.
       (b) Expenditure limitations not applicable.
   (3) GS maintenance.
       (a) Repair time limit—5 days.
       (b) Annex B (Admin/Log Overlay).

5. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION


b. Hospitalization.
   (1) Combat support hospitals.
       (a) 8613th Cbt Spt Hosp near HOCHAST (MA6849): DS 52d Mech Div.

6. PERSONNEL

a. Maintenance of Unit Strength.
   (1) Submit emergency requisitions when battalion-size and larger units fall below 70 percent of authorized strength.
   (2) Critical shortages exist in helicopter mechanics and radio repairmen.
b. Personnel Management.
   (1) 10th (US) Army Policy Letter.
   (2) Enemy PW's and civilian internees/detainees.
      (a) 10th (US) Army Enemy PW and Civilian Internee/Detainee Policy Letter.
      (b) Army troops evacuate to nearest division collecting points.
      (c) 10th (US) Army PW Cage near HAHDENBACH (LA8619).
   (3) Military prisoners.
      (a) 10th (US) Army Confinement Policy Letter.
      (b) 10th (US Army Stockade near WEILER (LA9619).
   (4) Enlisted women will not be assigned forward of 10th (US) Army HQ.

b. Development and Maintenance of Morale.
   (1) Morale and personnel services. Annex E.
   (2) Graves registration.
      (a) Army cemeteries.
      1. Near WEISEL (MA1454).
      2. Near DANSENBERG (MV0885).
      (b) Isolated or mass burials not authorized unless approved by the theater commander. In emergencies when out of communications with higher HQ, division commanders may authorize burials.

c. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.
   (1) 10th (US) Army Policy Letter.
   (2) Curfew 2000—0600 hours.
   (3) Speed limit is 64 kmph (40 mph) on open highways.
   (4) Commanders will prohibit sales and bartering of military supplies and equipment.

7. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION
Annex M (CMO) to 10th (US) Army OPLAN 20.

8. MISCELLANEOUS
c. Reports. Annex F (Reports).

9. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. Signal.
   (1) Annex N (Communications-Electronics) to OPLAN 20.
   (2) CEOI Index 1-4.
b. Command.
   (1) 10th (US) Army CP KOENGERNHEIM (MA4622), rear MARTINSTEIN (LA9518), tac CP BENSHEIM (MA7203).
(ADMIN/LOG PLAN 10—10th (US) Army)

(2) Future locations to be announced.

Acknowledge.

TANGO
LTG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Papa
PAPA
G4

Annexes: A—Task Organization (omitted)
   B—Admin/Log Overlay (omitted)
   C—Engineer (omitted)
   D—Medical (omitted)
   E—Morale and Personnel Services (omitted)
   F—Reports (omitted)

Distribution: A
ANNEX D (AIR DEFENSE) to OPERATION PLAN 3

References: Map, series M501, Western EUROPE, sheet NM32-12 (MUNICH) * * *, edition 2-DMG, 1:250,000; Admin/Log Order 4.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: ZULU.

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization) to OPLAN 3.

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces.
      (1) Annex B (Intelligence) to OPLAN 3.
      (2) Enemy air capable of 55 fighter and 30 bomber sorties daily (by massing aircraft, Aggressor can make a maximum of 340 sorties daily).
   b. Friendly Forces. OPLAN 3.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Organization) to OPLAN 3.
   d. Assumptions.
      (1) Aggressor air forces can attack 30th (US) Army units and installations from any direction and at any time.
      (2) Aggressor can establish local air superiority in the OLMUTZ and TROPPAU areas.

2. MISSION
   ADA elements available to 30th (US) Army will establish a coordinated defense to destroy hostile airborne aircraft and missiles and to nullify and reduce their effectiveness over the 30th (US) Army zone.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation.
      (1) Maneuver. A coordinated SAM defense will be established for the army area, and ADA units will be continuously repositioned to maintain this coverage as 30th (US) Army advances. Responsibilities for AD:
         (a) CG, 46th Arty Bde (AD), provides coordination of overall low-, medium-, and high-altitude AD of 30th (US) Army; establishes AD against low- and medium-altitude air attack for field army service area; establishes AD against medium- and high-altitude air attack of corps assigned 30th (US) Army.
         (b) All commanders are responsible for passive AD, engagement of hostile aircraft with non-AD weapons, and en air action spot reports IAW 30th (US) Army field SOP.
      (2) Fires.
(ANX D (AD) to OPLAN 3—30th (US) Army)

(a) All AD engagements will be conducted IAW rules and procedures of regional AD commander (CG, 1st TAF).

(b) Priority of AD. Priority is to 1-305 FA (FSG), SASP's, army command post areas, and class III supply points. AD priorities of corps DS groups as specified by supported commander.

b. 44th Arty Bde (AD): coordinate with regional AD commander defense acquisition radar coverage, early warning, ident, and establishment of army air warning net.

   (1) 401st Arty Gp (AD): GS.
       (a) 1-488 ADA (HERC).
       (b) 2-489 ADA (HERC).
       (c) 3-490 ADA (HERC).
       (d) 4-491 ADA (HERC).
       (e) 5-492 ADA (HERC).
       (f) 6-493 ADA (HERC).

   Provide medium- and high-altitude AD of 30th (US) Army area, weighted toward army AD priorities. Be prepared to deliver surface fires within capabilities. (Annex C (Fire Support Plan) to OPLAN 3.) MNBA: XL—7,000 feet above terrain; XS—5,000 feet above terrain. Provide alternate bde AADCP.

   (2) 402d Arty Gp (AD): GS.
       (a) 1-430 ADA (C/V).
       (b) 2-431 ADA (C/V).
       (c) 3-432 ADA (C/V).
       (d) 1-451 ADA (Hawk, Towed).
       (e) 2-452 ADA (Hawk, Towed).
       (f) 3-453 ADA (Hawk, Towed).
       (g) 4-454 ADA (Hawk, Towed).

   Provide low- and medium-altitude AD of 30th (US) Army service area. Defend in priority 1-305 FA (PSG), SASP's, army command post areas, and class III supply points.

c. 403d Arty Gp (AD): DS, 1st Corps.

   (1) 4-433 ADA (C/V).
   (2) 5-455 ADA (Hawk, Towed).
   (3) 1-458 ADA (Hawk, SP).
   (4) 2-459 ADA (Hawk, SP).
   (5) 3-460 ADA (Hawk, SP).

   Defend priorities specified by CG, 1st Corps.

d. 404th Arty Gp (AD): DS, 2d Corps.

   (1) 5-434 ADA (C/V).
   (2) 6-456 ADA (Hawk, Towed).
   (3) 4-461 ADA (Hawk, SP).
   (4) 5-462 ADA (Hawk, SP).
   (5) 6-463 ADA (Hawk, SP).

   Defend priorities specified by CG, 2d Corps.

e. 405th Arty Gp (AD): DS, 3d Corps.

   (Classification)
(ANX D (AD) to OPLAN 3—30th (US) Army)

(1) 6-435 ADA (C/V).
(2) 7-457 ADA (Hawk, Towed).
(3) 7-464 ADA (Hawk, SP).
(4) 8-465 ADA (Hawk, SP).
(5) 9-466 ADA (Hawk, SP).

Defend priorities specified by CG, 3d Corps.

f. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) Appendix 1 (AD Operation Overlay).
   (2) 1st (US) TAF AD tactical SOP (not issued).
   (3) Requests for restricted areas to this headquarters, ATTN: AD Section. Requests to include radius of area, altitude restrictions, and effective dates and times.
   (4) IFF code as specified in joint operations instructions.
   (5) Each GS gp commander authorized to release up to 25 percent of subordinate ADA units for movement. DS gp report movement.
   (6) This plan is effective for planning on receipt, for execution on order.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
   Admin/Log Order 4, 30th (US) Army.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   a. Signal.
      (1) Appendix 2 (Communications-Electronics).
      (2) Current CESI, CEOI.
   b. Command. HQ, 44th (US) Arty Bde (AD), at XY5539.
      Acknowledge. (See note.)

OFFICIAL:
/s/Green
GREEN (See note.)
G3

HICKS
GEN

Appendixes: 1—AD Operation Overlay (omitted)
           2—Communications-Electronics (omitted)

Distribution: B

Note. The heading, acknowledgment, command line, and authentication are required when an annex is issued by separate distribution or on a wider distribution than the basic order.
# APPENDIX F
ORDERS AND ANNEXES TO ORDERS (STANAG 2014, 2031, 2041, AND 2099)

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Section I. GENERAL

F–1. General
a. Chapter 7 contains general information pertaining to orders. This appendix contains information pertaining to the format and content of orders and annexes and appendixes to orders. Typical examples are included.

b. To shorten some of the examples, asterisks have been used to show the omission of parts of paragraphs or entire paragraphs and subparagraphs. Where only a few words or a sentence has been omitted, three asterisks have been used. Where an entire paragraph or subparagraphs have been omitted, seven asterisks have been used.

F–2. Operation Order
The general description and contents of each element of the format for the operation order are summarized in figure F–1. Example operation orders are shown in section II of this appendix.

F–3. Administrative/Logistics Order
The general description and contents of each element of the administrative/logistics order are summarized in figure F–2.

F–4. Other Orders
An example fragmentary order, warning order, directive, and letter of instructions are shown in section III of this appendix.

F–5. Annexes and Appendixes
Example annexes and appendixes are shown in section IV of this appendix.

F–6. Standing Operating Procedure
A format for a standing operating procedure (SOP) is not prescribed. Figures F–3 and F–4 show example formats, with explanation, for a tactical unit SOP and a combat service support unit SOP respectively.
If there were no oral orders, this space is left blank. If there were oral orders, expressions such as “No change from oral orders” or “No change from oral orders except for paragraph 4” will be used.

Copy no _____ of _____ copies
Issuing unit
Place of issue (may be in code)
Date-time group of signature (time order is effective unless otherwise designated in para 3) must include time zone suffix (where the issuing unit is located)
Message reference number

The purpose of the message reference number is to allow an operation order to be acknowledged in the clear over radio without the possibility of the enemy’s learning that an operation order has been issued. It is normally the internal number of the message-releasing authority.

TYPE AND SERIAL NUMBER OF OPERATION ORDER (Note 1)
References: List any map or other document required to understand the order. Reference to a map will include the map series number (and country or geographic area, if required), sheet number (and name, if required), edition, and scale.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: The time zone applicable to the operation.

Task Organization: This information must be given either here; in paragraph 3, “EXECUTION”; or in an annex. Under this heading, as appropriate, give the subdivision of the force, including attached units, together with the names and ranks of the commanders, when necessary. Show complete designation of nonorganic units. Abbreviated designation may be used for organic units.

The major subordinate units of the force issuing the order are listed alphabetically or numerically, depending on the unit’s designation. For example, named task forces are listed first, alphabetically (TF JONES, TF MASON). Numbered brigades follow the task forces in numerical sequence. (Divisions in corps orders are listed numerically by type: infantry, infantry (mechanized), airmobile, airborne, and armored. Separate brigades listed in corps orders follow the same procedure as for divisions.)

Within brigades or divisional task forces, all units attached or providing support primarily to the brigade are listed numerically and/or alphabetically and are indented. The units indented are in the chain of command (subordinate) to the brigade commander. However, the units that are qualified by parenthetical terms, such as “Spt,” “GS,” “DS,” indicate a support role to the brigade for that unit. The parenthetical term indicates a command relationship, not a mission assignment. Mission assignments must be made in paragraph 3 of the order.

The sequence for listing units attached or supporting the brigade follows. Combat units are listed first and in this order: infantry, infantry (mechanized), airmobile infantry, airborne infantry, and armored. (Paragraph 3b(2)(e) gives the precedence of armored units.) When more than one unit of the same type are required, these units are written in numerical sequence. Combat units, combat support units, and combat service support units are listed in that order.

Division artillery, as a major subordinate unit, follows the task force/brigade listings. Field artillery units, in regimental numerical sequence, that have not been listed as attached or supporting a brigade or task force will be indented under division artillery.

See footnote on page F-1.
Division troops (corps and army troops in corps and army orders) follow division artillery as the next major listing. All units not previously listed (organic, attached, or supporting the division less those organic or attached to or supporting the division support command (DISCOM)) are indented under this heading. Combat units are listed first, followed by combat support units, then combat service support units. Combat support units are listed alphabetically by branch. When no branch can be determined, the type of mission performed by the unit will be the criterion in the alphabetical placing; e.g., air defense artillery, aviation, engineer, military intelligence, United States Army Security Agency (military intelligence), military police, and signal. Combat service support units under division troops might include civil affairs units and psychological operations units. They would be listed alphabetically.

The DISCOM is the last major subordinate listing of units in a division task organization. Units under the DISCOM normally are combat service support units. They are indented and are listed alphabetically by branch. When no branch can be determined, units are placed alphabetically according to the service performed. DISCOM units generally include adjutant general, finance, maintenance, medical, and supply and transport (service is supply).

The position of units that can perform more than one mission, i.e., combat, combat support, or combat service support, is determined by that unit's assigned mission.

Time or times that attachment, detachment, or support status is effective may also be listed here rather than in paragraph 1c.

1. SITUATION

Information of the overall situation essential to understand the current situation. This paragraph will always contain subparagraphs a, b, and c as shown below.

   a. Enemy Forces. Composition, disposition, location, movement, estimated strengths, identification, and capabilities. Reference to a published intelligence document, overlay, or annex may be sufficient. (Note 2).

   b. Friendly Forces. Information concerning friendly forces, other than that covered by the operation order, that may directly affect the action of subordinate commanders. This information is usually listed in order by higher, adjacent, supporting, and reinforcing units.

   c. Attachments and Detachments. When not given under “Task Organization,” list here or in an annex units attached to or detached from the issuing headquarters, together with the times that attachments or detachments are effective. If these units are indicated in “Task Organization,” an appropriate reference is entered. In the case of a unit that has been attached for some period of time, the term “Remains attached” may be used.

2. MISSION

A clear, concise statement of the task to be accomplished by the command. The mission statement normally contains the who, what, when, and, as appropriate, the why and where as taken from the higher headquarters order or as deduced by the commander. The how (unit or units making the main attack, formation, and other amplifications) more properly belongs in paragraph 3a, “Concept of Operation.” The mission is stated in full, even if shown on the operation overlay. Paragraph 2 never has subparagraphs.

See footnote on page F-7.

(Classification)

Figure F-1—Continued.
3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. This is a statement of the commander's tactical plan, to include the scheme of maneuver and the plan of fire support. It is intended to be primarily informative. It may also provide, where necessary, the commander's visualization of the conduct of the operation and a clarification of its purpose. Although brief, it is stated in sufficient detail to insure appropriate action by subordinates in the absence of additional specific instructions. The scheme of maneuver covers employment of major maneuver units (may include cavalry) and is derived primarily from the commander's decision. The plan of fire support complements the scheme of maneuver and stems from the commander's decision and from staff planning. It includes whether a preparation is to be fired and, if so, its starting time, duration, and the priority of fires; it may also include the employment of nuclear weapons. The concept of operation is complete in its entirety, even if portions are shown on the operation overlay.

(1) The concept of operation may be a single paragraph or may be divided into two subparagraphs: describing the scheme of maneuver and titled “Maneuver”, and covering the plan of fire support and titled “Fires.”

(2) When an operation involves two or more distinct phases, the concept of operation, or the maneuver portion thereof, may be prepared in subparagraphs describing each phase. Usually, each phase is given a designation (e.g., phase I, phase II).

(3) The concept of operation, if unusually lengthy, may appear as an annex to the order.

b. In subsequent separate lettered subparagraphs, the specific tasks to be accomplished by each element of the command charged with the execution of tactical missions are given. Missions or tasks of subordinate commands that are adequately contained on the operation overlay need not be repeated in these subparagraphs. When instructions are multiple, they are itemized. If there is a priority or a sequence for accomplishment, it is stated. If nuclear weapons are allocated or assigned to a subordinate unit, the allocation or assignment is shown in the subparagraph for the unit concerned unless a separate nuclear annex is used. Units not solely in reserve ((5) below) are listed in the following order:

(1) Combined arms commands. If applicable, the largest command headquarters subordinate to the unit issuing the order is listed first. This normally would occur when two or more major subordinate maneuver units are combined under a single commander, i.e. a task force. Combined arms commands are listed in alphabetical or numerical order, as appropriate.

(2) Combat elements not categorized in (1) above are then listed numerically (note 3) in order of—

(a) Infantry.
(b) Infantry (mechanized).
(c) Airmobile infantry.
(d) Airborne infantry.
(e) Armored elements. List tank units first, followed respectively by attack helicopter units, armored cavalry units (armored cavalry squadron at division, armored cavalry regiment at corps), and air cavalry units.
(f) Other combat elements. An engineer unit with a straight combat mission is an example. At battalion, the reconnaissance/scout platoon, heavy mortar platoon, antitank platoon, Redeye section, ground surveillance section, and armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) section, in that order, are examples.

See footnote on page F-7.
(g) Artillery. The artillery subparagraph is divided into three sub-subparagraphs: the first contains the field artillery organization for combat and assigned tactical missions; the second contains the air defense artillery organization for combat and assigned tactical missions; and the third refers to the fire support annex. The organic and attached field artillery and air defense artillery units are listed in numerical sequence (regimental numbers), beginning with the lowest numbered unit. As a minimum, the artillery subparagraph will include the field artillery organization for combat, assigned tactical missions, and a reference to the fire support annex. In orders to higher headquarters, there may be separate subparagraphs and annexes for field artillery, air defense artillery, and other fire support means (e.g., naval gunfire, air, chemical, nuclear). In division orders, all fire support means normally are addressed as part of the fire support annex, i.e., appendixes, tabs, etc.

(3) Other elements providing combat support, as applicable. These elements are listed in alphabetical sequence by branch. When the branch is undetermined, the service performed will be used as the criterion for sequential position, i.e., aviation, maintenance, supply etc. Normal service missions are not included. It is not necessary to list all the units in the command, nor is it required to give instructions for the total employment of a particular unit. For example, instructions to an engineer unit concern only the combat support portion of the unit's mission.

(4) Combat service support commands.  
(a) The largest command headquarters subordinate to the headquarters issuing the order are listed first in alphabetical or numerical sequence followed by commands (units) in descending order by size (command, brigade, group, battalion, company, detachment). Commands falling in the same alphabetical position will be listed in numerical sequence. Units with normal combat service support missions are not included in these subparagraphs.

(b) There usually will be no "Reserve" subparagraph within orders of combat service support units.

(5) Reserve elements. Composition of the reserve and instructions thereto appear in the next to the last subparagraph of paragraph 3, titled "Reserve."

(a) Nuclear weapons held in reserve (at division or lower or when the number of weapons is small) are shown in this subparagraph.

(b) In the case of a unit totally in reserve at the time the order becomes effective, this is the only subparagraph in which such a unit will appear. (This is true even when subordinate elements of the reserve unit are attached or support other units that have assigned missions in above paragraphs.) Units not in reserve at the time of the order, but designated as reserve at some future time, are listed initially in their appropriate subparagraph above and also in this subparagraph with a qualifying phrase on when or under what conditions the unit will be in reserve. The listing of two or more units in this subparagraph does not in itself indicate an attachment.

(6) The last subparagraph of paragraph 3 is titled "Coordinating Instructions" and contains details of coordination and control applicable to two or more elements of the command. Troop safety measures appropriate to the nuclear battlefield and the operation exposure guide may be shown here. Restrictions on use of nuclear weapons may be included. In a chemical environment, the level of mission-oriented protective posture, when different from that in the SOP, must be stated. Priorities and necessary coordination procedures for use of the airspace above the battlefield are shown here if not appropriate for entry in any other subparagraph.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
This paragraph contains a statement of the combat service support instructions and arrangements supporting the operation that are of primary interest to the units and formations being supported. It

(Classification)

Figure F-1—Continued.
may also give the commander's direction to combat service support commanders. If lengthy or not ready for inclusion in the operation order, this detail may be issued separately as an annex and referenced here, but matters of immediate concern should be given together with such reference. At higher levels of command, this paragraph will usually state "See Administrative/Logistics Order ." At lower levels of command, this paragraph or the service support annex may eliminate the need for an administrative/logistics order. Paragraph 4 contains such subparagraphs as are required, follows the sequence of paragraphs 3 through 8 of the administrative/logistics order, and includes headings corresponding thereto.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Instructions relative to command and the operation of communications-electronics (C-E). This paragraph may have as many subparagraphs as required. Three of the more common subheadings are "Signal," "Command," and "Axis of Command Post Displacement." C-E instructions may refer to an annex, but, as a minimum, should list the index and issue number of the C-E operation instructions (CE-O1) in effect and instructions for control, coordination, and establishment of priorities in the use of electromagnetic emissions, if not already issued. Command instructions include command post (CP) location of subordinate and higher units. Designation of alternate CP and succession of command will be entered in this subparagraph if not adequately covered in SOP or annex. The axis of command post displacement consists of one or more future locations.

Acknowledgment instructions.

Instructions for the acknowledgment of an order are given here, if required. The word "acknowledge" may suffice. An acknowledgment to an operation order means that it has been received and understood.

Authentication (Note 4)

Annexes (by letter and title)

Distribution

When orders are to be distributed either to a unit of a nationality other than that of the issuing headquarters or to a NATO command, the distribution list is normally given in full. Distribution includes copies of the order furnished either for action or for information.

Notes 1. The type of operation order (e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force, or joint) is indicated in combined or joint operations. Within a single Service, the type of operation order is normally omitted. When required, a code title may also be included. Operation orders of a command are numbered successively in each calendar year.

2. Reference to an annex may be made at any time it is desired to call the reader's attention to the annex. One such reference in the body of the order is all that is required.

3. When listing units that have both a parent unit numerical designation and an alphabetical identity, list by parent numerical sequence and alphabetically within parent unit if more than one unit from same parent unit.

4. The last name and the grade of the commander appear on all copies of the order. The original copy (no 1) must be signed by the commander or an authorized representative. This is the historical copy that remains in the files of the headquarters. If the commander or the chief of staff (executive officer) signs a master copy, the use of which permits automatic reproduction of the document with his signature thereon, no further authentication is required. If this signature is not reproduced, authentication by the preparing coordinating or unit staff officer is required on all subsequent copies.

Figure F-1—Continued.
(Each of the paragraph headings must be shown in a written order; however, an entry under each of the headings is not required. Terms such as "No change," "See overlay," "Annex ____," "None," or "Nil" are permissible. If any subparagraph is not applicable to a particular situation, it is omitted and the sequence of remaining subparagraphs is modified accordingly. Standing operating procedure (SOP) items are not stated in the order unless necessary to emphasize the item.)

(Classification)

The phrase "No change from oral orders" or "No change from oral orders except paragraph ____" will appear here if oral orders have been issued concerning this operation. In the absence of oral orders, this space is left blank.

Type no ______ of ______ copies
Issuing unit
Place of issue
Date-time group of signature (must include time zone suffix) (Note 1)
Message reference number

Type of Administrative/Logistics Order No ______ (Note 2)
Related Operation Order No ______ (when applicable)

References: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:
Composition and Location of Administrative and Logistic Service Units.
This information may be given here, in the appropriate paragraph of the order, or in a trace or on an overlay. If units are not listed here, this heading may be omitted.

1. SITUATION
A general statement of administrative and logistic factors affecting support of the operation. Include any information on the general overall situation essential to understand the current situation as it influences combat service support.

a. Enemy Forces. Composition, disposition, location, movements, estimated strengths, and identifications. (Reference to an operation order or to the intelligence annex to an operation order should be used, if published or to be published.) List enemy capabilities that can influence the combat service support mission.

b. Friendly Forces. Pertinent information on own forces, other than those covered by a referenced operation order or to be included in subsequent paragraphs of this order, that may directly influence the combat service support mission.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

2. MISSION
A clear and concise statement of the combat service support mission as a whole.

3. GENERAL
Outline the general plan for combat service support and any orders that are not suitably covered by succeeding paragraphs (e.g., location of the division support area in a division order, location of coordinating agencies, general instructions for movement of installations).

See footnotes on page F-12.

(Classification)

Figure F-2. Descriptive administrative/logistics order format.
4. MATERIEL AND SERVICES

Include information pertaining to supplies (normal daily requirements), transportation, maintenance, construction, other services, and allocation of labor for combat service support purposes.

a. Supply. This paragraph may contain a subparagraph for each class of supply, maps, water, special supplies, excess materiel, salvage materiel, and captured enemy materiel. When applicable, each subparagraph contains the location of the installations concerned with the handling of supplies and materiel for supported units, the time of opening or closing, operating units, supported units, levels of supply, methods and schedules of distribution, instructions for submission of routine reports concerning the particular supplies listed, and any other pertinent instructions or information needed by supported units. Instructions and/or information for two or more classes may be included under one subparagraph when entries are limited and when clarity is not sacrificed. For class V, include the designation and location of the approving agency for ammunition requisitions, the available supply rate (ASR), and the special ammunition load (SAL), as appropriate.

b. Transportation. Include location of terminals and installations (rail stations, airfields, ports, and beaches) and operating units; schedules (march tables, timetables, and entraining tables); traffic control and regulation measures, such as regulations, restrictions, allocation priorities, and regulating and control points; and designation of the main supply route (MSR). Items listed in this subparagraph are not necessarily limited to transportation operations and may include ocean, inland waterway, coastal, highway, air, rail, pipeline, and miscellaneous activities.

c. Services. Include information and/or instructions for supported units that prescribe the type of service available, designation and location of the unit or installation providing the service, assignments to support units, and schedules for service, if applicable. Service missions for service units not covered in other orders (e.g., priority of effort of engineers) may be included in this subparagraph. List under each subparagraph pertinent service installations, stating location, operating units, and assignments to supported units. In addition, special missions that are not covered in other orders may be assigned to service units in these subparagraphs.

(1) Construction.

(2) Field services. Laundry, bath, clothing renovation and exchange, bakery, decontamination, clothing impregnation or reimpregnation, graves registration.

(3) Health services. Medical, dental, and veterinary service, including laboratory service, spectacle service, whole blood control, preventive medicine, and health and sanitation.

(4) Installation service. Real estate, repair and utilities, fire protection, sewage and trash disposal, water supply.

(5) Other. Aviation, explosive ordnance disposal, photography, and procurement.

d. Labor. Include policies pertaining to the use of civilians and enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees/detainees, restrictions on the use of civilians and prisoners of war, allocation and priorities of available labor, and designation and location of labor units available.

e. Maintenance. Include priority of maintenance, location of facilities, and collecting points.

5. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

This paragraph contains information and instructions for supported units that prescribe the plan for evacuation and hospitalization of sick, wounded, or injured military personnel.
(Classification)

(Short title identification)

a. Evacuation. List dispensaries, aid stations, and clearing stations, stating opposite each its location, time of opening or closing, operating units, and units supported. This subparagraph should state routes, means and schedules of evacuation, and responsibilities thereof. Evacuation and treatment policies should be included, when applicable. Specific policy for evacuation by air and evacuation of CBR-contaminated patients is included.

b. Hospitalization. List hospitals (evacuation, station, general, field, and convalescent), giving for each the location, time of opening or closing, and units supported, if appropriate. If a definitive policy for hospitalization of casualties due to chemical agents, biological agents, or nuclear radiation has been established, this policy should be included in this subparagraph.

6. PERSONNEL

This paragraph contains all necessary information and instructions pertaining to personnel matters, including foreign civilian labor used in direct military support functions. Under each of the following subparagraphs are listed, when applicable, the installation, location, and time of opening or closing; operating units; the units or area served; rest, leave, and rotation criteria and quotas allocated to units; unit responsibility for movement or administration of personnel; reports required; requisitions or plans concerning personnel activities; and necessary references to previous orders, instructions, or SOP

a. Maintenance of Unit Strength.

(1) Strength reports. Include instructions for submission of data required to keep the commander informed on the status of strength. These instructions will include requirements for routine reports and special reports following a mass destruction attack or a natural disaster.

(2) Replacements. Include a statement establishing the validity of existing personnel requisitions, instructions for submission of requisitions, instructions for processing and moving replacements, the location of replacement units and the units each will support, and the type and location of unit replacements under control of the issuing headquarters.

b. Personnel Management.

(1) Military personnel. Include any information and/or instructions concerning classification, assignment, promotion, transfer, reclassification, demotion, elimination, retirement, separation, training, rotation, and personnel economies.

(2) Civilian personnel. List sources of civilian labor; locations of civilian personnel offices or other labor administration centers and labor pools; procurement policies and procedures; restrictions on use of civilian labor; administrative and control procedures; pay schedules, allowances, and combat service support to be provided; and responsibilities of subordinate commanders for administration. Refer to appropriate SOP or provide specific pay scales and other conditions of employment in an annex.

(3) Enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees/detainees. Instructions concerning the collection, safeguarding, processing, evacuation, use, treatment, and discipline of enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees/detainees and all other personnel arrested or captured but not immediately identifiable as prisoners of war. Location of enemy prisoner-of-war and civilian internee/detainee facilities.

c. Development and Maintenance of Morale.

(1) Morale and personnel services. Include information and/or instructions concerning leaves, rest and recreational facilities, decorations and awards, postal and finance services, religious activities,
(Classification)

personal hygiene, special services activities, post exchanges, welfare activities, and legal assistance.

(2) Graves registration. Include location of cemeteries, evacuation procedures, handling of personal effects, and ceremonies to be performed. Instructions outlining procedures to be followed in case of isolated burials, mass burials, and/or contaminated remains must be included in this subparagraph or in the unit SOP.

d. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order. Include information and instructions concerning troop conduct and appearance; the control and disposition of stragglers, including the location of straggler collecting points and special instructions for straggler control augmentation if mass destruction attacks occur; instructions for the administration of military justice; and any information or instructions concerning relations between military and civilian personnel, such as fraternization, black marketing, selling Government property, and respect for local laws.

e. Headquarters Management. Include instructions concerning movement, internal arrangement, organization, and operation of the headquarters; and allocation of shelter in headquarters area for troops and for the headquarters.

f. Miscellaneous. Include any personnel administrative matters not specifically assigned to another coordinating staff section or included in the preceding subparagraphs.

7. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

This paragraph covers such civil-military operation activities as the allocation of civil affairs units, control of refugees, feeding and treatment of the civilian population, and psychological operations in support of civil affairs.

8. MISCELLANEOUS

Special instructions not covered above.

a. Boundaries. Location of rear boundary and any other boundary needed for combat service support purposes.

b. Protection. Measures established for the protection of combat service support units and/or installations. Usually, this will consist of an announcement of the tactical unit providing the protection, combat service support units or installations receiving the protection, and any conditioning factors to the protection. This announcement is information for combat service support units, not an order to the tactical unit involved. Pertinent instructions from the rear area protection plan or reference to an annex or both will be included in this subparagraph.

c. Special Reports. Include those reports required but not included in previous paragraphs or those requiring special emphasis.

d. Other Combat Service Support Matters. Information and/or instructions not included in any previous paragraph.

9. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

This paragraph contains the headquarters location and movements, liaison arrangements, recognition and identification instructions, and general rules concerning the use of communications and other electronic equipment, if necessary. An annex may be used when considered appropriate.

(Classification)

Figure F-2—Continued.
Acknowledgment instructions.

/s/ Commander (Note 3)

Notes
1. This is the time the commander actually signs the order and is the effective time of the order unless stated otherwise in paragraph 8 above.

2. The type of administrative/logistics order indicates whether it is Naval, Army, Air, combined, or joint. Within a single Service, the type of administrative/logistics order is normally omitted. When required, a code title may also be included.

3. The name and the grade of the commander appear on all copies of the order. The original copy (no 1) must be signed by the commander or a specifically authorized representative. If the chief of staff signs the original, the term "FOR THE COMMANDER" is added. The signed copy is the historical copy that remains in the files of the headquarters.

4. If the commander or his authorized representative signs a master copy, the use of which permits automatic reproduction of the document with his signature thereon, no further authentication is required. If this signature is not reproduced, authentication by the preparing staff officer is required on all subsequent copies and only the last name of the commander appears in the signature block.
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

1. GENERAL
   a. Purpose. A statement of the general coverage and uses of the standing operating procedure (SOP), including applicability and any special contingencies.
   b. Conformity. Instructions concerning the requirement for conformity in the procedures of subordinate and supporting units.

2. COMMAND AND CONTROL
   This paragraph contains information of general applicability to all combat, combat support, and combat service support operations of the command.
   a. Organization. When applicable, designation of habitual task organizations and organizations of supporting and attached forces.
   b. Command Posts.
      (1) Composition, movement, and control; alternate command posts and succession of command applicable to the publishing headquarters; tactical operations center.
      (2) Requirements for, and procedures in, reporting information concerning command posts of subordinate units.
   c. Liaison and Coordination. Liaison responsibilities between headquarters and coordination responsibilities between headquarters.
   d. Communications-Electronics.
   e. Orders, Reports, and Distribution. General information common to all orders and reports that is applicable to all units of the publishing headquarters.

3. COORDINATION OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT OPERATIONS
   This paragraph in the body of the SOP contains information of general applicability, together with references to appropriate annexes, which provide detailed procedures.
   a. Intelligence.
      (1) Reconnaissance and surveillance. Instructions covering acquisition, processing, and dissemination of information acquired with ground and air reconnaissance or surveillance means, including request procedures for support.
      (2) Enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees/detainees. Level and detail of interrogation for proper fulfillment of intelligence mission.
      (3) Captured US personnel. Instructions for handling, processing, and debriefing of returned captured or missing US personnel.
      (4) Captured documents. Instructions for handling and processing captured documents.
      (5) Technical intelligence. Designation of items of enemy materiel required for examination and instructions for processing and disposition.

Figure F-1. Descriptive tactical unit SOP format.
(Classification)

(Short title identification)

(6) Maps, photographs, photomaps, and terrain models. Instructions covering availability, requisition, and distribution.

(7) Weather.

(8) Counterintelligence. Instructions concerning routine and special counterintelligence measures, including counterreconnaissance and counterinfiltration.

(9) Fallout prediction, radiological monitoring and survey, chemical agent detection, and biological agent sampling.

(10) Attached and supporting intelligence specialists and units.

b. Operations.

(1) Fire support coordination. This subparagraph discusses the planning and execution of fire support so that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. This should include procedures for a target numbering system, safety, observation, delivery of field artillery fires, close air support, naval gunfire support, air defense, use of smoke and battlefield illumination, and nuclear damage criteria.

(2) Security. Unit responsibilities, coordination requirements, reports, and requests for assistance.

(3) Development of the situation. Special instructions for establishing and maintaining contact and accomplishing special reconnaissance tasks by reconnaissance and security units.

(4) Tactical air support. Request procedures.

(5) Employment of nuclear weapons. Assignment and allocation of weapons, safety lines, risk criteria, and reporting results of nuclear fires.

(6) Air defense operations.

(7) Army aviation operations.

(8) Chemical operations.

(9) Engineer operations.

(10) Communications-electronics operations to include SIGSEC aids and equipment operations.

(11) Military police operations.

(12) Denial operations and barriers.

(13) Tactical cover and deception. Establish point of control over all activities.

(14) Electronic warfare. Establish controls and procedures for compiling and coordinating RESTRICTED frequencies list.

(15) Unconventional warfare.

(16) Civil-military operations.

c. Techniques. Operation and intelligence orders and reports pertaining to combat and combat support operations.

d. Special Considerations.

(1) Mobility. This subparagraph includes such information as march organization, control, priority, density and rate, halts, lights, passing, vehicle marking, and reporting accidents.

(2) Night operations.
4. COORDINATION OF COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

Only key operational procedures of general applicability are covered in the body of the SOP. Most of the subheadings below will refer to an annex for detailed coverage.

a. General. This subparagraph establishes the normal combat service support organization in support of the unit's operations. If a single coordinating agency (e.g., the support command commander) is used, include such information here.

b. Techniques. Orders and reports pertaining to combat service support operations.

c. Detailed Procedures.

(1) Combat service support.
   (a) Coordination of combat service support activities within each administrative agency.
   (b) Materiel and services.
      1. Supply. All classes.
      2. Transportation. All forms.

(2) Personnel.
   (a) Maintenance of unit strength.
      1. Strength records and reports. Procedures are included to report personnel status, casualties, and unit disasters.
      2. Replacements.
   (b) Personnel management.
      1. Military personnel. Personnel policies and activities used to implement the personnel management program.
      2. Civilian personnel. Policies and procedures for personnel management of US and local national civilians, including mobile civilian units, fillers for type B units, and responsibilities of subordinate command elements for administration, pay, and logistic support under various situations, to include—
         (a) Emergency modification of existing systems of employment.
         (b) Methods of administration in changing and in stabilized situations.
         (c) Organization and administration of mobile units.
      3. Enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees/detainees. All normal phases of processing, handling, accounting, and evacuation, other than interrogation, will be covered.
   (c) Development and maintenance of morale.
      1. Morale and personnel services. This includes authorized absences (pass, rest and recreation, leave), decorations and awards, mail, post exchange supplies, finance, chaplain, and special services.
      2. Graves registration service. Policy on recovery and disposition of dead—friendly or enemy.
   (d) Health services.
   (e) Maintenance of discipline, law and order. Troop conduct and appearance, handling of stragglers, and other disciplinary cases.

(Classification)
(Short title identification)

(f) Headquarters management. Applicable only to the command post of the publishing headquarters.

(g) Miscellaneous. Matters not covered in above subparagraphs.

(3) Miscellaneous combat service support matters.
   (a) Location of rear boundaries and designation of service areas.
   (b) Combat service support responsibilities for handling of nuclear weapons.

(4) Area damage control. Disasters of all types are considered. Coordination must be made with rear area protection plans.

(5) Public information and community relations. Policies made to improve military-civilian relations.

________________________
(Commanding)

OFFICIAL:
/z/

G3

Annexes: A—Internal Operations and Movement of the Headquarters
      B—Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees/Detainees and Captured Documents and Materiel
      C—Reconnaissance and Surveillance
      D—Counterintelligence
      E—Fire Support Coordination
      F—Actions To Minimize Effects of Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Attack
      G—Air Defense
      H—Army Aviation
      I—Chemical Operations
      J—Movements
      K—Unconventional Warfare
      L—Civil-Military Operations
      M—Rear Area Security
      N—Chemical
      O—Engineer
      P—Medical
      Q—Military Police
      R—Communications Electronics
      S—Supply
      T—Services
      U—Transportation
      V—Combat Service Support Responsibilities for Handling of Nuclear Weapons
      W—Area Damage Control

Distribution

________________________
(Commanding)

Figure F-3—Continued.
STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

PART ONE—ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS

Section I. APPLICATION

In this section, give the purpose and scope of the standing operating procedures (SOP) and applicability of procedures prescribed.

Section II. ORGANIZATION

By organization charts, show the organization of the combat service support command and its headquarters.

Section III. FUNCTIONS

1. In a general paragraph, explain the composition of the major elements of the headquarters (i.e., command and staff); the purpose of the headquarters; and the broad responsibilities and functions of the commander and staff officers.

2. By succeeding paragraphs, list the specific responsibilities and functions of each staff division, section, and subordinate elements of the command.

PART TWO—STAFF OPERATIONS

Section I. COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

By separate paragraphs, outline the primary relationships among various elements of the combat service support command and between the combat service support command and higher headquarters, adjacent, and supported units. The following must be clearly delineated:

1. Command and technical channels.

2. Dual responsibilities, such as one individual being both a commander and a staff officer.

3. Responsibility for liaison and coordination with higher, lower, and adjacent commands.

4. Cooperation and coordination between staff sections.

Section II. INTELLIGENCE

This section outlines the responsibilities for and describes the procedures for all matters pertaining to intelligence operations in the command.

Section III. ESTIMATES, PLANS, AND ORDERS

This section outlines the responsibilities for and describes the procedures for preparation of various estimates, plans, and orders.

Section IV. SECURITY

This section outlines the responsibilities for rear area protection for all elements of the command. This may be done by reference to the appropriate annex of the SOP or the operation plan.

Section V. LOGISTICS

In this section, detailed procedures should be given covering supply, construction, movement, main-

Figure F-4. Descriptive combat service support unit SOP format.
tenance, services, and labor. This section is closely related to the administrative/logistics order, and many aspects covered in the SOP need not be repeated in the administrative/logistics order. However, appropriate reference to the SOP should be made. The details of logistic operations will normally be given in the various annexes, and only the appropriate references need be made in the body of this section.

Section VI. PERSONNEL

In this section, detailed procedures should be given concerning all aspects of personnel management and operations. The following should be covered:

1. Strength records and reports.
2. Replacements.
3. Discipline, law and order.

Section VII. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

This section should give complete and detailed procedures pertaining to civil-military operations (CMO), to include coordination with theater psychological operations and civil affairs units and with other elements specifically committed to CMO activities, civil supply, evacuation, transportation, real estate, labor, national resources, control of civilian population, travel, curfew and other restrictions, public health, law and order, public information, government administration, displaced persons and refugees, finances, price control, rationing, and civil defense.

Section VIII. ADMINISTRATION

This section covers details pertaining to internal administrative matters not covered in other sections of the SOP. Such activities as postal service, records management, correspondence, printing and publication, miscellaneous reports, staff procedures, staff records, maintenance of daily journals, policy files, command reports, uniform regulations, office hours, reports control, forms control, office services, courier and messenger service, handling of classified correspondence, fiscal and financial activities, inspections and investigations, and other miscellaneous administrative functions.

Section IX. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

This section covers such activities as the location of command posts and special instructions and reports not covered in other parts of the SOP. Also included are special instructions concerning communications-electronics (C-E) that are not contained in the C-E annex, C-E standing instructions (CESI), and C-E operation instructions (CEOI). SIGSEC aid and equipment applications will be included in this section of the SOP.

Authentication

Annexes

Annexes to an SOP facilitate the use of the SOP and preserve brevity, completeness, clarity, and simplicity within the main body of the SOP. By using annexes, information that either is limited in scope or is technical in application can be excluded from the main body of the SOP; however, appropriate reference should be made to the annex. Use of annexes also facilitates use of the SOP by permitting a larger printing and distribution of the annexes than of the main body plus all annexes. The following is a list of annexes that may be included in a combat service support command SOP:
Organization charts.
Administrative overlay.
Intelligence.
Civil-military operations.
Supply.
Maintenance.
Construction.
Health services.
Field services.
Ammunition.
Support of nuclear weapons.
Transportation.
Personnel.
Judge advocate.
Military police.
Finance.
Procurement.
Rear area protection (when not published as a separate operation plan).
Other emergency plans (when not published as a separate operation plan).
Other annexes, as appropriate.

Distribution

Figure F-4—Continued.
Section II. EXAMPLE OPERATION ORDERS

Example F-1. Annotated Operation Order (Overlay Annex), Division
(Located in back of manual.)
Example F-1—Continued

ANNEX B (OP OVERLAY) to OPORD 7-52d Mech Div

Reference: Map, series V661, KANSAS-MISSOURI, sheet 7061 (METROPOLIS-JUNCTION CITY), edition 1, 1:50,000.

Note. This is an example of an annex issued with the operation order.
MOVEMENT ORDER 9

Reference: Map, series M501, Western EUROPE, sheets NL31-1 and NL31-4 (TOURS-POITIERS), edition 2-AMS, 1:250,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALFA.
(MO 9—23d Armd Div)

Task Organization:

1st Bde
- 1-91 Mech
- 1-10 Armor
- 1-11 Armor
- 1-14 Armor

2d Bde
- 1-92 Mech
- 1-94 Mech
- 1-13 Armor

3d Bde
- 1-93 Mech
- 1-95 Mech
- 1-12 Armor
- 1-15 Armor

Div Arty
- 1-11 FA
- 1-12 FA
- 1-13 FA
- 1-14 FA
- 1-15 FA

Div Trp
- 1-22 Cav
- 1-44 ADA (C/V)

236th MI Co (Div) (remains atch)

288th ASA Div Spt Co (remains atch)

23d MP Co

23d Sig

241st CA Co (remains atch)

DISCOM
- 23d AG Co
- 23d Fin Co
- 23d Maint
- 23d Med
- 23d S&T

1. SITUATION
   b. Friendly Forces. 1st Corps atk 3 Jul.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. Task organization.

2. MISSION
   23d Armd Div marches 012030 Jul to ST AUBIN (* * *) as 1st Corps res.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation. 23d Armd Div will move on two routes from army res to 1st Corps res in accordance with Annex B (Road Movement Table).
   b. 1st Bde: move on Route RED.
   c. 2d Bde: move on Route BLUE.
   d. 3d Bde: follow 2d Bde.
   e. 1-22 Cav: move 011900 Jul over Route RED and Route BLUE to secure div assembly area by 020200 Jul.
   g. 23d MP Co: move 011900 Jul over Route RED and Route BLUE, post guides and TCP's, and secure BLUE River bridges at PA683686 and RS850495 until passage of division.
   h. Div Trp: follow 1st Bde.
   i. DISCOM: follow Div Trp.

(Classification)
j. Coordinating Instructions. Advance parties move with 1-22 Cav.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
No change.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
      Acknowledge.

      ANDERSON
      MG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Yates
YATES
G3

Annexes: A—Intelligence (omitted)
         B—Road Movement Table (omitted) (See example F–20.)
         C—Communications-Electronics (omitted)

Distribution: A
Example F-3. Order for Attack (Overlay Type), Armored Division

(Classification)

No change from oral orders.

Copy no 3 of ___ copies
23d Armd Div
YUNGCHUN (9107), CHINA
011100H Jun 19
XP 102

OPORD 21

Reference: Map, series L783, CHINA, sheet 8632 II (FUEN), edition 3-AMS, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: HOTEL.
(OPORD 21—23d Armd Div)

Task Organization:

1st Bde
- 1-91 Mech
- 1-92 Mech
- 1-10 Armor
- 1-11 Armor
- 1-11 FA (DS)
- A/1-44 ADA (DS)
- A/23d Engr
- Sec/E/23d Engr
- 1/23d MP Co

2d Bde
- 1-93 Mech
- 1-94 Mech
- 1-12 Armor
- 1-13 Armor
- 1-12 FA (DS)
- B/1-44 ADA (DS)
- B/23d Engr
- Sec/E/23d Engr
- 2/23d MP Co

3d Bde
- 1-95 Mech
- 1-14 Armor
- 1-15 Armor
- C/23d Engr

Div Arty
- 1-13 FA
- 1-14 FA
- 1-15 FA

- 2d Bn (155, SP), 631st FA (atch eff 011400 Jun)

Div Trp
- 1-22 Cav
- 1-44 ADA (C/V)
- 23d Engr (−)

- 5050th Engr Co (Fltbrg) (atch eff 011600 Jun)

- 236th MI Co (Div) (remains atch)
- 288th ASA Div Spt Co (remains atch)
- 23d MP Co (−)
- 23d Sig
- 241st CA Co (remains atch)

DISCOM
- 23d AG Co
- 23d Fin Co
- 23d Maint
- 23d Med
- 23d S&T

1. SITUATION
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) 1st Corps atk 020330 Jun with two divisions in the assault, 23d Armd Div on the west
          (left) and 20th Inf Div on the east (right), secures CHANGCHOW (5080), and prep to cont atk to the north.
      (2) 55th Mech Div follows and supports 23d Armd Div.
      (3) 201st Armd Cav Regt protects corps west flank.
      (4) Elements 9th TAF support 23d Armd Div.
      (5) 2d Bn (8, SP), 606th FA, reinf 23d Armd Div Arty.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. Task organization.

2. MISSION
   23d Armd Div passes through the 55th Mech Div. Atk 020330 Jun, secures crossing over TSIN River, prep to cont atk to north.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation.
(OPORD 21—23d Armd Div)

(1) Maneuver. 23d Armd Div passes through 55th Mech Div and attacks with 1st Bde on west, 2d Bde on east, 3d Bde in reserve; 1–22 Cav protects division east flank, secures crossings over TSIN River between HUTOW (4483) and ANKI (4500) inclusive; prep to cont atk to the north.

(2) Fires. Nuclear fires will be employed to neutralize Aggressor reserve vic area of pass and against targets of opportunity. A 30-minute nonnuclear field artillery preparation will be fired beginning at H–20 minutes. Annex B (Fire Support).

b. 1st Bde:

c. 2d Bde:

d. 1–22 Cav: follow 2d Bde initially; protect division east flank.

e. Arty:

(1) FA:

(a) 1–11 FA: DS 1st Bde.
(b) 1–12 FA: DS 2d Bde.
(c) 1–13 FA: GS; prep DS 3d Bde on commitment.
(d) 1–14 FA: GS.
(e) 1–15 FA: GS.
(f) 2–631 FA: GS.

(2) ADA:

(a) 1–44 ADA (C/V): GS; protect in priority 1–15 FA, 1–14 FA, and div HQ.
(b) A/1–44 ADA: DS 1st Bde.
(c) B/1–44 ADA: DS 1st Bde.

(3) Annex B (Fire Support).

f. Div Trp: follow 1st Bde.

g. DISCOM: remain in present position until maneuver elements reach PL APPLE.

h. Reserve: 3d Bde: fol 1–22 Cav during passage; thereafter, follow 2d Bde; prep to assume mission of either 2d Bde or 1st Bde in that priority; prep to protect division east flank.

i. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Lead brigades coordinate passage of lines in zone.
(2) Operation exposure guide: moderate risk.
(3) Annex C (Engineer).
(4) Annex D (Road Movement Table).

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

Annex E (Service Support).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

(OPORD 21—23d Armd Div)

OFFICIAL:
/s/McDonald
MCDONALD
G3

Annexes: A—Intelligence (omitted)
B—Fire Support (omitted)
C—Engineer (omitted)
D—Road Movement Table (omitted)
E—Service Support (omitted)
F—Communications-Electronics (omitted)

Distribution: A
201st Armd Cav Regt
2d Bn, 606th FA
Example F-4. Order for Defense (Overlay Type), Infantry Division (Mechanized)

**OPORD 19**

Reference: Map, series H709, YUGOSLAVIA, sheets 2486 III and 2485 IV (SISAK-IVANIC GRAD), edition 1-AMS, 1:50,000.

*Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALFA.*

(No change from oral orders.)

Copy no 3 of ___ copies
52d Mech Div
CEPELIS (WL993285), YUGOSLAVIA
110700A May 19___
AB 17

*Classification*
(Classification)

(OPORD 19—52d Mech Div)

Task Organization:

1st Bde
- 1-77 Mech
- 1-78 Mech
- 1-2 Armor
- 1-6 FA (DS)
- A/1-52 ADA (DS)
- A/52d Engr (DS)

2d Bde
- 1-79 Mech
- 1-80 Mech
- 1-3 Armor
- 1-7 FA (DS)
- B/1-52 ADA (DS)
- B/52d Engr (DS)

3d Bde
- 1-81 Mech
- 1-82 Mech
- 1-4 Armor
- 1-5 Armor
- 1-23 Cav (-)
- C/52d Engr (DS)

Div Arty
- 1-8 FA
- 1-9 FA
- 1-10 FA
- 2d Bn (8, SP), 610th FA (remains atch)
- 2d Bn (155, SP), 635th FA (remains atch)

Div Trp
- D/1-23 Cav
- 1-52 ADA (C/V)
- 52d Avn Co
- 52d Engr
- 237th MI Co (Div) (remains atch)
- 289th ASA Div Spt Co (remains atch)
- 52d MP Co
- 52d Sig

DISCOM
- 52d AG Co
- 52d Fin Co
- 52d Maint
- 52d Med
- 52d S&T

1. SITUATION
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) 3d (US) Corps defends along SAVA River in sector from ZAGREB (WL780700) exclusive to BISTRAC (XL272270) inclusive and prepares to attack to the northeast.
      (2) 53d Mech Div will close on SAVA River near DESNA MARTINSKA VES (XL077496) not later than 111100 May.
      (3) 54th Mech Div is defending on SAVA River in sector.
      (4) Elements 9th (US) TAF support 52d Mech Div.
      (5) 72d Arty Gp (FA) GSR 52d Mech Div Arty.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. Task organization.

2. MISSION

52d Mech Div defends 111200 May along SAVA River from DESNA MARTINSKA VES (XL077496) exclusive to XL156310 to hold the enemy northeast of Highway 201.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation.
      (1) Maneuver. 52d Mech Div conducts a mobile defense in sector, employing the 1st Bde and 2d Bde from north to south in the forward defense area. 1st Bde will defend in sector to retain the high ground immediately adjacent to the SAVA River. 2d Bde will delay in sector. 3d Bde, as division res, counterattacks to destroy enemy in penetration; priority of employment to 2d Bde sector.

(Classification)

F-30
ANNEX M (REAR AREA SECURITY) to OPERATION PLAN 10—30th Army

References: Map, series 1501, Southwestern ASIA, sheets NJ38-13, NJ38-14, and NJ38-15, edition 1, 1:250,000; USAF series 1006, Aeronautical Approach Chart, index AC 3, sheets 427, BI, BIII, CI, and CII, edition 1, 1:250,000; Admin/Log Order 8.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: ZULU.

1. SITUATION
   b. Friendly Forces. OPLAN 10.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. No change from 10 October troop list.
   d. Assumptions. Enemy can—
      (1) Penetrate army service area with armored elements up to three battalions in strength.
      (2) Assault with airborne elements of less than regimental strength supported by air and light artillery.
      (3) Mount a guerrilla attack of battalion strength unsupported by artillery.
      (4) Infiltrate units up to battalion size unsupported by artillery.
      (5) Execute sabotage anywhere in the area.
      (6) Combine the above capabilities.

2. MISSION

30th Army secures and defends units, installations, activities, and lines of communications in army service area and prepares to execute offensive and rescue missions in adjoining areas.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation. Appendix 1 (Operation Overlay). Operations are conducted with locally available forces for a period of up to 24 hours without the assistance of army reserve forces.
   b. 30th FASCOM:
      (1) Responsible for planning and execution.
      (2) Organize and supervise security of the army service area and execute security measures.
      (3) Send requests for army reserve forces to G3, 30th Army.
   c. 30th Armd Div:
      (1) Prepare for commitment in the army service area; priority to areas 1 and 2 in that order.
(Classification)

(ANX M (RAS) to OPLAN 10—30th Army)

(2) Prepare antiairborne plan for areas 1, 2, and 3. Coordinate plan with CG, 30th FASCOM, and submit coordinated plan to 30th Army HQ.

d. 312th Inf Bde: prepare for commitment anywhere in army service area north of line O–X.

e. 202d Armd Cav Regt:
   (1) Prepare for commitment in army service area south of line O–X.
   (2) Provide up to one squadron on army order to CG, 30th FASCOM, for convoy escort to division transfer points.

f. 100th Avn Gp (Cbt): prepare to furnish one aviation company (assault helicopter) to move company-size elements of reserve forces on 2 hours' notice.

g. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) This plan is effective for planning on receipt and for implementation on order.
   (2) Units in army service area directly under 30th Army HQ control establish necessary coordination and liaison with CG, 30th FASCOM.
   (3) CG, 30th FASCOM, submits operation plans concerning 30th Army units other than support command units to 30th Army HQ for approval.
   (4) Nondivisional units will be released to CG, 30th FASCOM, for employment. Divisional units will be employed by CG, 30th Army, to include antiairborne operations.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Admin/Log Order 8.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. Signal.
   (1) Annex E (Communications-Electronics) to OPLAN 10.
   (2) Warning nets. Appendix 2 (Warning Nets).
   (3) Alerts. Appendix 2 (Warning Nets).

b. Command. * * *

Acknowledge. (See note.)

PERRY
GEN
(See note.)

OFFICIAL:
/s/Scott
SCOTT
G3
(See note.)

Appendixes: 1—Operation Overlay (omitted)
2—Warning Nets (omitted)

Distribution: A

Note. The heading, acknowledgment, command line, and authentication are required when an annex is issued by separate distribution or on a wider distribution than the basic order.
(OPORD 19—52d Mech Div)

(2) Fires. Priority of air and field artillery fires to 2d Bde initially; to 3d Bde when committed. Annex B (Fire Support).

b. 1st Bde:
   (1) Defend in sector.
   (2) Prepare in priority blocking positions 2, 1, 3.

c. 2d Bde:
   (1) Delay in sector.
   (2) Prepare in priority blocking positions 5, 6, 4, 7.

d. 1st Cav:
   (1) Maintain contact with 53d Mech Div until unit closes on SAVA River near DESNA MARTINSKA VES.
   (2) On order, conduct surveillance of division rear area.

e. Arty:
   (1) FA:
      (a) 1–6 FA: DS 1st Bde.
      (b) 1–7 FA: DS 2d Bde.
      (c) 1–8 FA: GSR 1–6 FA; DS 3d Bde when committed.
      (d) 1–9 FA: GS.
      (e) 1–10 FA: GS.
      (f) 2–610 FA: reinf 1–7 FA.
      (g) 2–635 FA: GSR 1–6 FA.

   (2) ADA:
      (a) 1–52 ADA (C/V): GS; protect in priority div res, DISCOM, and div CP.
      (b) A/1–52 ADA: DS 1st Bde.
      (c) B/1–52 ADA: DS 2d Bde.

   (3) Annex B (Fire Support).

f. 52d Engr:
   (1) Priority of effort to 3d Bde.
   (2) Annex C (Barrier).
   (3) Annex D (Engineer).

g. DISCOM: be operational in new area near XL110950 not later than 112400 May.

h. Res: 3d Bde:
   (1) Prepare to execute division counterattack plans, priority to 2d Bde sector. Annex E (Counterattack Plans).
   (2) Prepare in priority blocking positions 11, 10, 12, 9, and 8.
   (3) Prepare to release up to one battalion task force on 30-minute notice to division control for rear area security missions.

i. Coordinating Instructions. Brigades in forward defense area coordinate reconnaissance and security measures forward of the FEBA.
OPORD 19—52d Mech Div

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Annex F (Service Support).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
CEOI Index 1–6. Annex G (Communications-Electronics).

Acknowledge.

OFFICIAL:
/s/Carrier
CARRIER
G3

Annexes: A—Intelligence (omitted)
B—Fire Support (omitted)
C—Barrier (omitted)
D—Engineer (omitted)
E—Counterattack Plans (omitted)
F—Service Support (omitted)
G—Communications-Electronics (omitted)

Distribution: A
72d Arty Gp (FA)
Example F-5. Order for Assault, Airborne Division (Operation Overlay as Annex)

(Canonical)

Copy no 2 of ______ copies
102d Abn Div
SILVER CITY (VR763498), MONROVIA
210930Z January 19
AB 02

OPORD 2

References: Map, series JWS123, MONROVIA, sheet 1 (LODE—VEIN), edition 69—DMG, 1:50,000; Admin/Log Order 3.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

Task Organization:

Assault Echelon

1st Bde
1-311 Abn
1-312 Abn
1-313 Abn
1-319 FA
1st and 2d Plt,
A/1–47 ADA
A/102d Engr
1/102d MP Co
1/B/102d Sig
4 TACP
A/102d Med
Det, 102d AES Co

2d Bde
1-314 Abn
1-315 Abn
1-316 Abn
1-320 FA
1st and 2d Plt,
B/1–47 ADA
B/102d Engr
2/102d MP Co
2/B/102d Sig
4 TACP
B/102d Med
Det, 102d AES Co

3d Bde
1-317 Abn
1-318 Abn

Followup Echelon

DISCOM
HHC & Band (-)
102d Maint (-)

DISCOM
SUPCOM Op Plt/B/102d Sig
Det, 102d AES Co
102d Sup Co (-)
1. SITUATION
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) 1st (US) Corps attacks to north from present positions to destroy enemy forces in zone.
      (2) JTF FALCON attacks D-day near LODE (625773) by airborne assault with 102d Abn Div.
      (3) Friendly irregular forces assist on and after D-day by interdicting movement of enemy reinforcements in direction of LODE (* * *).
      (4) 9th (US) TAF maintains air superiority and provides close air support to JTF FALCON.
      (5) 30th (USAF) Air Div supports 102d Abn Div with airlift.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. Task organization.

2. MISSION
102d Abn Div conducts abn assault 271100 January, secures crossings over the BOLDER River near LODE, blocks enemy movement, and assists the passage of the 23d (US) Armd Div.

3. EXECUTION
      (1) Maneuver.
         (a) This operation involves securing a single airhead by daylight airborne assault, employing the 1st Bde on the coast, the 2d Bde in the northwest, the 3d Bde in the southwest, and the 1-319 Abn as the division reserve. 102d Abn Div will secure an airhead that will include crossings over the BOLDER River and will block enemy movement near LODE until linkup with the 23d (US) Armd Div.
         (b) The assault echelon will secure crossings over the BOLDER River near LODE and eliminate organized enemy resistance within the airhead.
         (c) Subsequent operations within the airhead will insure defense of the airhead line to protect the crossing sites until linkup occurs.
      (2) Fires. Preassault airstrikes will commence at H–30 minutes and terminate at H–1 minute. Airstrikes will destroy or neutralize enemy forces in the general objective area.
   b. 1st Bde: prepare for linkup with 23d (US) Armd Div on D+3.
c. 2d Bde:

d. 3d Bde:

e. 1–28 Cav: reconnoiter forward of COP to a range of 20 kilometers with priority along Highways 25, 62, 49, and 51.

f. Arty:
   (1) FA:
      (a) 1–319 FA: atch 1st Bde.
      (b) 1–320 FA: atch 2d Bde.
      (c) 1–321 FA: atch 3d Bde.
   (2) ADA: 1–47 ADA (Vulc, Towed) (-): GS; protect in priority division CP and division airfield.
      (a) 1st and 2d Pit, A/1–47 ADA: atch 1st Bde.
      (b) 1st and 2d Pit, B/1–47 ADA: atch 2d Bde.
      (c) 3d Pit, A/1–47 ADA: atch 3d Bde.
   (3) Annex C (Fire Support).


h. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) Orders to implement alternative plans, postponement, or cancellation only on authority CG, 102d Abn Div.
   (2) Annex D (Aviation).
   (3) Annex E (Engineer).
   (4) Annex F (Counterattack Plans).
   (5) Annex G (Air Movement).
   (6) Annex H (Distribution).

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Admin/Log Order 3.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. Signal.
   (1) Annex I (Communications-Electronics).
   (2) CEOI Index 1–5.


Acknowledge.

CASPERSION
MG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Ford
FORD
G3

Annexes: A—Intelligence (omitted)
B—Operation Overlay
OPORD 2—102d Abn Div

C—Fire Support (omitted)
D—Aviation (omitted)
E—Engineer (omitted)
F—Counterattack Plans (omitted)
G—Air Movement (omitted)
H—Distribution (omitted)
I—Communications-Electronics (omitted)

Distribution: Annex H
Example F-5—Continued

(ANNEX B (OP OVERLAY) to OPORD 2-102d Abn Div)

References: Map, series JWS123, MONROVIA, sheet 1 (LODE-VEIN), edition 69-DMG, 1:50,000;
Admin/Log Order 3.
Example F-6. Order for Defense, Corps

(Classification)

Copy no 2 of _____ copies
1st Corps
ZEBO (WL4625), ZARLAND
181200R August 19___
QT 2

OPORD 6

References: Map, series L201, ZARLAND, sheets VERTO and BAYER, edition 1, 1:250,000; Admin/Log Order 7, 30th Army.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ROMEO.


1. SITUATION
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) 30th Army defends in sector from KOBEG (* * *) to SASKO (* * *) inclusive, employing the 3d Corps on the north, 1st Corps in the center, and 2d Corps on the south.
      (2) 8th TAF supports 30th Army.
      (3) Zarland militia provides rear area security in corps rear area.
      (4) 401st Arty Gp (AD) provides DS to 1st Corps.

2. MISSION
   1st Corps defends in sector from * * * to * * * by 201200 August, establishes corps covering force along BLUE River by 201200 August, and delays Aggressor forward of FEBB until 222400 August.

3. EXECUTION
      (1) Maneuver. 1st Corps conducts mobile defense of sector in three phases:
         (a) Phase I. Corps establishes defense in sector with three divisions in the forward defense area—19th Inf Div in the north, 53d Mech Div in the center, and 54th Mech Div in the south. 25th Armd Div establishes corps covering force along the BLUE River and delays Aggressor forward of GOP until 222400 August.
         (b) Phase II. On withdrawal of the covering force, corps conducts mobile defense of sector with 19th Inf Div defending in the north, 53d Mech Div delaying in the center, and 54th Mech Div defending in the south; allows no penetration beyond line BROWN; 25th Armd Div prepares for corps counterattack operations, with priority to 53d Mech Div sector.
         (c) Phase III. Corps counterattacks to destroy enemy forces penetrating the forward defense area.
      (2) Fires.
         (a) Air. Priority of close air support to covering force in phase I, divisions in the forward
(OPORD 6—1st Corps)

defense area in phase II, and support of counterattacking forces in phase III. Appendix 1 (Air Fire Support) to Annex D (Fire Support).

(b) Field artillery. Priority to covering force in phase I, divisions in the forward defense area in phase II, and support of counterattacking forces in phase III. Appendix 2 (Field Artillery Fire Support) to Annex D (Fire Support).

(c) Air defense artillery. Priority to corps reserve; 1st Bn (SGT), 212th FA; and corps CP in that order. Annex E (Air Defense).

(d) Nuclear. Nuclear weapons will be assigned to the covering force for the conduct of delaying operations and to the divisions in the forward defense area for destroying Aggressor elements forward of line BROWN. The bulk of the nuclear weapons will be reserved to support corps counterattacks. Corps-controlled weapons will be used to destroy Aggressor nuclear delivery means, to seal penetrations, and to destroy enemy res. Appendix 3 (Nuclear Fire Support) to Annex D (Fire Support).

b. 19th Inf Div: defend in sector; retain Hills 450 and 390.

c. 53d Mech Div:
   (1) Establish initial delaying position along the FEBA in sector.
   (2) On withdrawal of corps covering force through FEBA, delay in sector; retain Hill 320.

d. 54th Mech Div: defend in sector; retain Hill 410—360 ridge.

e. 25th Armd Div:
   (1) Establish corps covering force along BLUE River; delay Aggressor forward of the GOP until 222400 August.
   (2) After completion of covering force mission, revert to corps res.
   (3) Release attachments on withdrawal of that unit through FEBA.
   (4) Release 25th Armd Div Arty, less forward observer parties and LO’s, to 1st Corps Arty.

f. 201st Armd Cav Regt:
   (1) Attached to 25th Armd Div.
   (2) Prepare for detachment on withdrawal through FEBA and assemble as corps res near VERTO (BM1550).

g. Arty:
   (1) FA:
      (a) 25th Armd Div Arty: GS on completion of covering force mission; revert to 25th Armd Div control when committed.
      (b) 65th Arty Gp (FA):
         1. Attached 25th Armd Div initially.
         2. On completion of covering force mission, revert to corps arty control and GSR 19th Inf Div Arty.
      (c) 66th Arty Gp (FA): reinforce 53d Mech Div Arty.
      (d) 67th Arty Gp (FA): GSR 54th Mech Div Arty.
      (e) 68th Arty Gp (FA): GS.
      (f) 1st Bn (Tgt Acq), 105th FA: GS.
      (g) 1st Bn (SGT), 212th FA: GS.
      (h) Btry C (Slt), 189th FA: GS.
(OPORD 6—1st Corps)

(2) ADA:
(a) Priority of protection to corps reserve; 1st Bn (SGT), 212th FA; corps CP.
(b) Annex E (Air Defense).
(c) Annex D (Fire Support).

h. 102d Avn Gp: priority of employment initially to corps covering force.

i. 53d Engr Bde:
(1) 60th Engr Gp:
(a) Place one bn DS 19th Inf Div.
(b) Attach 523d Engr Bn to 25th Armd Div for covering force mission.
(c) One bn prepare for DS 25th Armd Div when committed.

(2) 61st Engr Gp:
(a) 525th Engr Bn: DS 54th Mech Div.
(b) 527th Engr Bn: DS 53d Mech Div.

(3) Annex F (Engineer).
(4) Annex G (Barrier).

j. Res:
(1) 25th Armd Div: after completion of covering force mission, assemble vicinity ODEB (*** )
as corps res; priority for commitment in 53d Mech Div sector.

(2) 315th Mech Bde:
(a) Priority for commitment initially in 53d Mech Div sector; on withdrawal of 25th Armd
Div, priority for commitment to 19th Inf Div sector.
(b) Prepare blocking positions A, B, and C in that priority.
(c) Be prepared for employment as rear area security force; priority to MSR's.

(3) 201st Armd Cav Regt: priority for commitment to 54th Mech Div sector.

(4) Nuclear weapons: ***.

k. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Divisions in the forward defense area establish GOP by 201200 August.
(2) Priority for road movement to 25th Armd Div until withdrawal from covering force.
(3) Divisions in forward defense area maintain contact with 25th Armd Div during covering
force operations and be prepared to assist in its withdrawal through GOP and forward defense area.
(4) EEI (in priority):
(a) When, where, and in what strength will the enemy make his main attack?
(b) Will the enemy continue to employ nuclear weapons against us? If so, when, where,
how many, of what yields, and by what delivery means? Where are the enemy's nuclear delivery means
located?
(5) Operation exposure guide: corps, troops, negligible risk.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

a. Admin/Log Order 7, 30th Army.

b. Annex H (Service Support).
5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   b. Command. Corps main CP opens VERTO (BM1550) 200800 August.

Acknowledged.

FRINK
LTG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Murphy
MURPHY
G3

Annexes: A—Task Organization (omitted)
B—Intelligence (omitted)
C—Operation Overlay
D—Fire Support (omitted)
E—Air Defense (omitted)
F—Engineer (omitted)
G—Barrier (omitted)
H—Service Support (omitted)
I—Communications-Electronics (omitted)

Distribution: A
Example F-6—Continued

ANNEX C (OP OVERLAY) to OPORD 6—1st Corps

References: Map, series L201, ZARLAND, sheets
VERTO and BAYER, edition 1,
1:250,000;
Admin/Log Order 7, 30th Army.
Example F-7. Order for Attack, Field Army

(Classification)

Copy no 2 of _____ copies
30th (US) Army
Kaiserslautern (MV1178), Germany
101800Z May 19_
D5

OPORD 8

References: Map, series M501, Western EUROPE, sheets NM32-4 through NM32-9, edition 3, 1:250,000;
Admin/Log Order 7;
PERINTREP No 5, HQ, CENTAG.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.


1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.
   (1) Aggressor has been halted with heavy losses to his attacking forces and is presently in positions from MARBURG (MB8529) to AVENSTEIN (NV2134) in an apparent effort to hold an advanced position. Strength of his tactical units is approximately 70 percent.
   (2) Annex B (Intelligence).
   (3) PERINTREP No 5, HQ, CENTAG, 101200 May.

b. Friendly Forces.
   (1) CENTAG attacks to secure line ODER River—BUDAPEST (DB9451) and prepares to continue attack to the east to secure line BREST (FA1830)—L’VOV (GB8415).
   (2) 16th (Allied) Army attacks to secure LEIPZIG (CA4728) and prepares to continue the attack to secure crossings over ODER River in zone.
   (3) 1st (FR) Army attacks to secure VIENNA (CB5990) and prepares to continue attack to secure BUDAPEST.
   (4) 4th (Allied) TAF supports 30th (US) Army, destroys enemy aircraft and installations, and interdicts enemy lines of communications.


2. MISSION

30th (US) Army attacks 20 May to secure DRESDEN (NS1257) and PRAGUE (VR5847) and prepares to continue the attack to secure BRESLAU (XS4264), MOR-OSTRAVA (CA0525), and crossings over the ODER River.

3. EXECUTION

   (1) Maneuver. Operation to be conducted in two phases:
      (a) Phase I. Army attacks with 1st and 2d (US) Corps abreast to secure ERFURT (PB4050) and NURNBERG (PV5080). 2d (US) Corps on south (right) makes army main attack.
(OPORD 8—30th (US) Army)

(b) Phase II. On securing ERFURT and NÜRNBERG, army continues the attack with two corps abreast to secure DRESDEN and PRAGUE and prepares to continue the attack to secure BRESLAU, MOR-OSTRAVA, and crossings over the ODER River. 1st (US) Corps on the north (left) makes army main attack.

(2) Fires.
   (a) Air.
   1. 4th (Allied) TAF attacks known enemy positions during phase I, with priority to Aggressor nuclear weapon launching and storage areas, and then to enemy strongpoints in zone.
   2. Priority for air support to 2d (US) Corps during phase I; to 1st (US) Corps during phase II.
   3. Appendix 1 (Air Fire Support) to Annex D (Fire Support).
   (b) Field artillery.
   1. Priority for field artillery support to 2d (US) Corps during phase I; to 1st (US) Corps during phase II.
   2. Appendix 2 (Artillery Fire Support) to Annex D (Fire Support).
   (d) Nuclear.
   2. Appendix 3 (Assignment of Nuclear Weapons) to Annex D (Fire Support).

b. 1st (US) Corps:
   (1) Secure ERFURT.
   (2) Be prepared to continue the attack to secure DRESDEN.

c. 2d (US) Corps:
   (1) Secure NÜRNBERG and bridgehead over REGNITZ River—LUDWIGS Canal.
   (2) Be prepared to continue the attack to secure PRAGUE.

d. Arty:
   (1) Field artillery: 1-305 FA (PSG) : GS.
   (2) Air defense artillery: 48d Arty Bde (AD) : GS.
   (a) 401st Arty Gp (AD) : DS 1st (US) Corps.
   (b) 403d Arty Gp (AD) : DS 3d (US) Corps.
   (c) Priority of protection to nuclear weapon storage areas, major supply installations, army main command post in that order.
   (3) Annex D (Fire Support).

e. Reserve:
   (1) 23d (US) Armd Div: priority of employment initially in zone of 2d (US) Corps; be prepared for attachment to 1st (US) Corps in phase II.
   (2) 52d (US) Mech Div: on order, phase II army reserve near BAYREUTH (PA8536).

f. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) Phase I coordinating point at UNTEROBERNDORF (PA3638).
   (2) Attachments, detachments, and boundaries, unless otherwise directed, are effective 110800 May.
(OPORD 8—30th (US) Army)

(3) Annex F (Chemical).
(4) Annex G (Engineer).
(6) Annex I (Unconventional Warfare).
(7) Annex J (Rear Area Security).
(8) Annex K (Cover and Deception).
(9) Annex L (Electronic Warfare).

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
   a. Admin/Log Order 7.
   b. Materiel and Services.
      (1) 2d (US) Corps has priority on supplies and transportation during phase I.
      (2) 1st (US) Corps has priority on supplies and transportation during phase II.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   a. Signal.
      (1) Annex M (Communications-Electronics).
      (2) CEOI Index 1–4.
   b. Command. 30th (US) Army main CP KAIERSLAUTERN (MV1178); rear CP BAD KREUZNACH (MA1822); tac CP BENSHEIM (MA7305).

Acknowledge.

OBERHOLZER
GEN

OFFICIAL:
/s/Marachino
MARACHINO
G3

Annexes: A—Task Organization (omitted)
   B—Intelligence (omitted)
   C—Operation Overlay (published separately) (omitted)
   D—Fire Support (omitted)
   E—Air Defense (omitted)
   F—Chemical (omitted)
   G—Engineer (omitted)
   H—Civil-Military Operations (omitted)
   I—Unconventional Warfare (omitted)
   J—Rear Area Security (omitted)
   K—Cover and Deception (omitted)
   L—Electronic Warfare (omitted)
   M—Communications-Electronics (omitted)

Distribution: * * *

(Classification)
Example F-8. Operation Order, Stability Operation

(Classification)

(No change from oral orders.)

Copy no 2 of _____ copies.

20th Inf Div
CHIENG KHRUA (VE0512), THAILAND
060800G February 19___
BZ 65

OPORD 7 (OPERATION ALAMO)

References: Map, series L708, THAILAND, sheets 5762 I, 5763 II and IV, 5862 IV, and 5863 III and IV (BAN PHOK NOI, AMPHOE PHANNA NIKHOM, BAN KHOK SILA, CHANG-WAT SAKON NAKHON, BAN NA WUA, AMPHOE SI SONGKHRAM), edition 1–AMS, 1:50,000; OPORD 2.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: GOLF.

Task Organization:

TF BRIGADIER
TF 1–76 Mech
1–21 Cav (−)
E/20th Engr
Det A/202, 27th SF Gp (OPCON eff 070630 Feb)
4th Plt/240th CA Co
3d Armed Pgned Sqd (Thai) (OPCON)

1st Bde
1–66 Inf
1–67 Inf
1–71 Inf
1–72 Inf
791st Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
1–1 FA (DS)
1st Plt, Btry B (Slt), 191st FA

1st and 2d Plt, A/1–43 ADA
A/20th Engr (DS)
1st and 2d Plt, 5580th Engr Co (LE)
331st TNP* Plt (Spt)
Tm SA (Pub Health); Tm JA (DP)/240th CA Co
Tm HB (Lt Mbl Loudspeaker)/292d PSYOP Det

2d Bde
TF 1–1
1–68 Inf
1–69 Inf
1–70 Inf
792d Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
1–2 FA (DS)

2d Plt, Btry B (Slt), 191st FA
2d Plt, 5580th Engr Co (LE)
A/1–43 ADA (−)
B/20th Engr (DS)
332d TNP* Plt (Spt)
1st Plt/240th CA Co
Tm HB (Lt Mbl Loudspeaker)/292d PSYOP Det

3d Bde
TF 1–73 Mech
793d Inf Plt (Sct Dog)
1–3 FA (DS)

3d Plt, Btry B (Slt), 191st FA
1st and 2d Plt, B/1–43 ADA
C/20th Engr (DS)
333d TNP* Plt (Spt)

*Thailand National Police.

1st Bde, 21st Inf Div
7–66 Inf
7–67 Inf

2d Armed Pgned Sqd (Thai) (OPCON)
(OPORD) 7 (OP ALAMO)—20th Inf Div

7-68 Inf
7-1 FA
A/7-43 ADA
A/21st Engr
338th TNP* Plt (Spt)
1st Plt/241st CA Co
5th Armed Pgd Sqd (Thai)

Div Arty
1-4 FA (-)
B/2-611 FA
C/2-661 FA
Btry B (Slt), 191st FA (-)
2d Bn (8, SP), 611th FA (-)
C/1-4 FA
B/2-661 FA
2d Bn (175, SP), 661st FA (-)
B/1-4 FA
C/2-611 FA

DISCOM
20th, Fin Co
20th Maint
20th Med
20th S&T

20th AG Co

1. SITUATION


b. Friendly Forces.

(3) 2d (USAF) Air Div supports 20th Inf Div with 50 fighter-bomber sorties daily from 7 to 11 February.

c. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) Following units remain attached:
(a) Co A (LRP), 780th Inf.
(b) 791st Inf Plt (Sct Dog).
(c) 792d Inf Plt (Sct Dog).
(d) 793d Inf Plt (Sct Dog).
(e) Btry B (Slt), 191st FA.
(f) 2d Bn (8, SP), 611th FA.
(g) 2d Bn (175, SP), 661st FA.
(h) 110th Avn Bn (Cbt).
(i) 5580th Engr Co (LE).
(j) 235th MI Co (Div).
(k) 287th ASA Div Spt Co.
(l) 290th MP Co.
(m) 331st TNP Pit (Spt).
(n) 332d TNP Pit (Spt).
(o) 333d TNP Pit (Spt).
(p) 240th CA Co.
(OPORD 7 (OP ALAMO)—20th Inf Div)

(2) 101st Avn Gp attached effective 061000 February.
(3) 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div, attached effective 070730 February.

2. MISSION

20th Inf Div occupies line of encirclement HARRY at 070730 February; prevents escape of guerrillas in encirclement; and, on order, attacks to destroy the encircled guerrilla force.

3. EXECUTION


(1) Maneuver. The 20th Inf Div moves to occupy line of encirclement HARRY at 070730 February and, on order, attacks to destroy encircled guerrilla force. The 1st Bde and 2d Bde will move by air to LZ's near assigned zones. 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div, moves by air, on order, to occupy positions along line HARRY vacated by 1st Bde. TF BRIGADIER will move by surface to secure area BEN. 3d Bde will continue present missions in TAOR. This operation will be conducted in four phases:
   (a) Phase I. 1st Bde and 2d Bde move by air to occupy line of encirclement HARRY at 070730 February. TF BRIGADIER moves by surface and occupies area BEN by 070730 February.
   (b) Phase II. 1st Bde attacks to phase line SAM to compress the encircled force. 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div, moves by air to occupy positions along line HARRY vacated by 1st Bde attack. 2d Bde holds line of encirclement in zone.
   (c) Phase III. 1st Bde attacks to destroy guerrilla forces in encirclement. 2d Bde, 20th Inf Div, and 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div, hold line of encirclement in zone.
   (d) Phase IV. 1st Bde is extracted by air to original position along line HARRY. 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div, conducts strike operations in the encircled area. 2d Bde holds line of encirclement in zone.

(2) Fires.
   (a) Phases I, II, and III. Priority of field artillery and air to 1st Bde.
   (b) Phase IV. Priority of field artillery and air to 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div.
   (c) Annex C (Fire Support).

b. TF BRIGADIER:

(1) Move by Highway 22 to area BEN.
(2) Provide security for movement of 1-1 FA and 1-2 FA to area BEN.
(3) Release 1-76 Mech and 1-21 Cav (−) to 1st Bde and 2d Bde respectively at 070730 February.
(4) Retain one armored cavalry troop, 1-21 Cav (−), for security of area BEN.
(5) Coordinate defense of all units in area BEN.

c. 1st Bde:

(1) Continue to occupy and secure TAOR with one infantry battalion, OPORD 2.
(2) Move three infantry battalions by air to occupy line HARRY at 070730 February.
(3) Receive attachment of 1-76 Mech effective 070730 February.
(4) On order, attack to phase line SAM to compress encircled guerrilla force.
(5) On order, attack from phase line SAM to destroy guerrilla force in encirclement.
(6) After searching to Highway 22, be prepared for air movement to original positions along line HARRY and to support attack of 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div.
FM 101-5
(Classification)

(OPORD 7 (OP ALAMO)—20th Inf Div)

d. 2d Bde:
(1) Continue to occupy and secure TAOR with 1–70 Inf, OPORD 2.
(2) Prepare one infantry battalion for commitment as division reserve by airmobile assault on 30-minute notice. Continue internal defense development mission as practicable.
(3) Move two infantry battalions by air to occupy line HARRY at 070730 February.
(4) Receive attachment of 1–21 Cav (–) effective 070730 February.
(5) Prevent guerrilla escape from encirclement and support attacks to destroy guerrilla force.

e. 3d Bde: continue present mission in TAOR, OPORD 2.

f. 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div:
(1) On order, move by air to occupy positions along line HARRY vacated by 1st Bde.
(2) Prevent guerrilla escape from encirclement and support 1st Bde attacks to destroy guerrillas.
(3) Be prepared to conduct search from line HARRY to Highway 22 to locate evaders and to destroy base camp and tunnel complexes.

g. D/1–21 Cav: provide surveillance of division TAOR and AO WASHINGTON.

h. Arty:
(1) FA:
(a) 1–1 FA: OPCON TF BRIGADIER for move to area BEN. DS 1st Bde.
(b) 1–2 FA: OPCON TF BRIGADIER for move to area BEN. DS 2d Bde.
(c) 1–3 FA: DS 3d Bde.
(d) 1–4 FA: GS.
(e) 2–611 FA: GSR 1–1 FA; provide LO to TF BRIGADIER.
(f) 2–661 FA: GS.

(2) ADA:
(a) 1–43 ADA (C/V) (–): GS; continue present missions, OPORD 2.
(b) 1st and 2d Plt, A/1–43 ADA: attached 1st Bde.
(c) A/1–43 ADA (–): attached 2d Bde.
(d) 1st and 2d Plt, B/1–43 ADA: attached 3d Bde.

(3) Annex C (Fire Support).

i. 101st Avn Gp:
(1) Assist 1st Bde and 2d Bde, 20th Inf Div, and 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div, in planning and execution of the airmobile portion of this operation.
(2) Provide aircraft to move the committed units of the 1st Bde and assault elements of the 2d Bde in one lift. Immediately following the first lift, provide aircraft to lift the remaining elements of the 2d Bde.
(3) On order, provide aircraft to lift the 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div, from present location to positions along line HARRY.
(4) During phases II, III, and IV of this operation, maintain the capability to lift the assault elements of one infantry battalion from area BEN on 30-minute notice.
(5) Coordinate the employment of all assigned and attached Army aviation for this operation.
(6) Annex D (Army Aviation).
j. Res: on order, one infantry battalion, 2d Bde. Be prepared for commitment by airmobile assault on 30-minute notice.

k. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) No physical reconnaissance will be made of the operational area without approval of this headquarters before 070630 February.
   (2) Units coordinate movement along Highway 22 with TF BRIGADIER.
   (3) Units report movement plans to this headquarters before 062400 February.
   (4) Annex E (Engineer).
   (5) Annex F (Cover and Deception).

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Annex G (Service Support); Annex H (Civil-Military Operations).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   b. Command.
   (1) Division main CP remains at CHIENG KHRUA.
   (2) Division tactical CP opens in area BEN effective 070730 February.

Acknowledge.

OFFICIAL:
/s/Walk
WALK
G3

Annexes: A—Intelligence (omitted)
   B—Operation Overlay
   C—Fire Support (omitted)
   D—Army Aviation (omitted)
   E—Engineer (omitted)
   F—Cover and Deception (omitted)
   G—Service Support (omitted)
   H—Civil-Military Operations (omitted)
   I—Communications-Electronics (omitted)

Distribution: A
Example F-8—Continued

(Classification)

ANNEX B (OP OVERLAY) to OPORD 7 (OP ALAMO)—20th Inf Div

References: Map, series L708, THAILAND, sheets 5762 I, 5763 II and IV, 5862 IV, and 5863 III and IV (BAN PHOK NOI, AMPHOE PHANNA NIKHOM, BAN KHOK SILA, CHANGWAT SAKON NAKHON, BAN NA WUA, AMPHOE SI SONGKHRAM), edition 1-AMS, 1:50,000;

OPORD 2.
Example F-9. Operation Order, Corps Support Brigade

(Classification)

Copy no _____ of _____ copies
HQ, 1st (US) Spt Bde (Corps)
BAD HOMBURG (MA7265), GERMANY
260800Z April 19_
DG 32

OPORD 8

References: Map, series M501, Western EUROPE, sheets NM32-2 through NM32-9, NM32-11, NM33-1, NM33-5, NM33-7, and NM33-8, edition 1, UMT, 1:250,000;
Admin/Log Order 10, 10th (US) Army;
OPORD 4, 10th (US) FASCOM;
Current PERINTREP, 10th (US) Army.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.


1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces.
      (1) Current PERINTREP, 10th (US) Army.
      (2) Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 4, 10th (US) FASCOM.
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) 10th (US) Army attacks 280400Z April to restore the eastern boundary of the Federal Republic of Germany.
      (2) 10th (US) Army FASCOM. OPORD 4.
      (3) 1st (US) Corps attacks in zone 280400Z April to restore assigned portion of the eastern boundary of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. MISSION
1st (US) Spt Bde (Corps) provides combat service support to the 1st (US) Corps offensive operation to restore the eastern boundary of the Federal Republic of Germany.

3. EXECUTION
   b. 11th Spt Gp:
      (2) Be prepared to assume mission of 1st (US) Spt Bde (Corps) and/or 12th Spt Gp in that order of priority.

(Classification)
(OPORD 8—1st (US) Spt Bde (Corps))

c. 12th Spt Gp:
   (2) Be prepared to assume mission of 11th Spt Gp and/or 1st (US) Spt Bde (Corps) in that order of priority.
d. 95th Ammo Gp: support 1st (US) Corps, nondivisional units, and USAF elements in the 10th (US) Army service area north of boundary between 17th and 18th Spt Gp.
e. 201st P&A Bn: * * *.
f. 610th Petri Sup Bn: * * *.
g. 406th Trans Bn (MT): * * *.
h. 3010th Fin DS Co: * * *.
   * * *
   * * *
   * * *
k. 4104th Mov Con Co: * * *.
l. 738th Sig Co: * * *.
m. 2165th Stk Con Co: * * *.
n. 2001st Maint Mgt Det: * * *.
o. 2201st Pub Info Det: * * *.
p. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) Speed limit 56 kmph (35 mph) on all roads unless otherwise posted.
   (2) Messenger vehicles have priority on all roads.
   (3) Curfew 2000—0600 hours.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
   a. Admin/Log Order 10, 10th (US) Army.
   b. Maintenance.
      (1) Priority of support to 52d Mech Div.
      (2) DS repair time limit—3 days; GS repair time limit—5 days.
      (3) GS production line maintenance not authorized.
      (4) Annex C (Maintenance Overlay).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   a. Signal.
      (1) Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to OPORD 4, 10th (US) FASCOM.
      (2) CEOI Index 1–14.
   b. Command. 1st (US) Spt Bde (Corps) CP near BAD HOMBURG (MA7265).

Acknowledge.

Wiley
BG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Willis
WILLIS
SP&O

Annexes: A—Task Organization (omitted)
         B—Operation Overlay (omitted)
         C—Maintenance Overlay (omitted)

Distribution: * * *.
Section III. EXAMPLES OF OTHER ORDERS

Example F-10. Fragmentary Order, Armored Division

FROM: CG23D ARMD DIV //USAAD-HD//

TO: CO1ST BDE //USAAD-FB//
     CO2D BDE //USAAD-SB//
     CODIV ARTY //USAAD-DA//

INFO: CG1ST (US) CORPS //USAOC-HD//
     CG52D MECH DIV //USAMD-HD//

(Subj: Change to OPORD 11 (U)

A. AB12: OPORD 11 ( )
   1. ( ) Change in task org: TF 1-13 atch 3d Bde.
   2. ( ) En force est to be 1 tk regt delaying adv 2d Bde.
   3. ( ) 3d Bde: bypass 2d Bde on north, atk 171530 June to secure
      obj 1. One 155-mm how/B/1-KT wpn asgd.
   5. ( ) New 23d Armd Div-52d Mech Div bdry: pres 1st Bde-3d Bde,
      23d Armd Div, bdry west of PL CEDAR; and PL CEDAR (autobahn excl)
      northeast to RJ at MC705563; then railroad to MC792708.

B. (U) Acknowledge.

V. H. CANNON
MAJ ASST G3
USAAD-HT
HAWK 33

A. B. SABER
LTC G3
USAAD-HT
HAWK 34

DD FORM
DEC 70
173

REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 JUL 65, WHICH WILL BE USED.
Example F-11. Warning Order, Infantry Division

FROM: CG20TH INF DIV //USAID-HD//

TO: C01ST BDE //USAID-FB//
C02D BDE //USAID-SB//
C03D BDE //USAID-TB//
CODIV ARTY //USAID-DA//
CODISCOM //USAID-DS//
C01-21 CAV //USAID-AR//
C020TH AVN BN //USAID-AV//
C020TH SIG //USAID-CE//
C020TH ENGR //USAID-EN//
C020TH MP CO //USAID-MP//
C0404TH TRANS BN (MT) //USAID-HD//

(Classification)

USAID-HD

Subj: Warning Order (U)

( ) Div moves night 5-6 Aug to assy area east of the ODER River vic of OPFELN (YR1016) and prep to adv early 7 Aug in zone to secure crossings over the WARTA River to cover the deployment of 1st Corps.
Five trans trk co attch eff 051900. Rd mov plan and OPLAN to be issu at comdr's conf at 051300.
Example F-12. Historical Example of a Directive

Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force

12 February 1944

1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for liberation of Europe from Germany. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.

2. Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate Channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

3. Notwithstanding the target data above, you will be prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the enemy on your front, to effect a re-entry into the Continent with such forces as you have available at the time; a general plan for this operation when approved will be furnished for your assistance.

4. Command. You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command generally in accordance with the diagram in Appendix (attached). Direct communication with the United States and British Chiefs of Staff is authorized in the interest of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary logistic support.

5. Logistics. In the United Kingdom the responsibility for logistics organization, concentration, movement, and supply of forces to meet the requirements of your plan will rest with British Service Ministries so far as British Forces are concerned. So far as United States Forces are concerned, this responsibility will rest with the United States War and Navy Departments. You will be responsible for the coordination of logistical arrangements on the Continent. You will also be responsible for coordinating the requirements of British and United States forces under your command.

6. Coordination of operations of other Forces and Agencies. In preparation for your assault on enemy-occupied Europe, sea and air forces, agencies of sabotage, subversion, and propaganda, acting under a variety of authorities, are now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem to you desirable.

7. Relationship to United Nations Forces in other areas. Responsibility will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operations of the Forces of the USSR for your guidance in timing your operations. It is understood that the Soviet Forces will launch an offensive at about the same time as OVERLORD with object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western front. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater, will conduct operations designed to assist your operation, including the launching of an attack against the south of France at about the same time as OVERLORD. The scope and timing of his operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will establish contact with him and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views and recommendations regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your attack from the United Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will place under your command the forces operating in southern France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command. You will submit timely recommendations compatible with this regard.

8. Relationship with Allied Governments—the re-establishment of Civil Governments in Liberated Allied Territories and the administration of enemy territories. Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.

Appendix (omitted)
LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Twelve

TO: Commanding General, First Army APO #230, US Army
    Commanding General, Third Army APO #403, US Army

1. When junction is effected between elements of the First and Third Armies in the HOUFFALIZE area, the First Army will come under command of Twelfth Army Group. It is proposed that the boundary between the armies will extend east along L’OURTHE River—OURTHE P7478—RJ at P8228-25—ST. VITH P8588—SCHONBERG P9588—HALLSCHLAG L0896 (all inclusive to First Army). (See overlay.)

2. Twelfth Army Group will destroy enemy troops trapped west of HOUFFALIZE and continue the attack to the northeast on ST. VITH.

3. a. First Army, leaving sufficient forces to destroy the enemy trapped in its zone, will continue its attack towards ST. VITH assisted by an attack from the MALMEDY area.

b. Third Army, defending along the line of the SAAR, MOSELLE, and SAUER Rivers, and leaving sufficient forces to destroy the enemy trapped in its zone, will continue the attack toward the northeast and protect the right flank of the First Army.

4. Upon the capture of ST. VITH, it is proposed to continue the attack to the northeast to the RHINE River in the vicinity of BONN; First and Third Armies abreast on the front PRUM-MONSCHAU.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
  A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
    Brigadier General, GSC
    AC/S, G-3

1 Incl—Annex 1, Overlay (omitted)
Section IV. EXAMPLE ANNEXES AND APPENDIXES TO ORDERS

Example F–14. Intelligence Annex to Division Operation Order

(Annex issued as a separate document.)

(The format used in this annex is based on STANAG 2014.)

ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE) to OPERATION ORDER 24

References: Map, series * * *, BUTTANO, sheet 204 (ZELLE–PAGT), edition 2, 1:50,000; INTSUM No 55.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: QUEBEC.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION
INTSUM No 55 and Appendix 1 (Situation Overlay).

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Essential Elements of Information. Will Aggressor reinforce his forces along the FLOOD River before the time of attack? If so, when, where, and with what forces? Special attention to the mechanized regiment and the medium tank regiment near BURG (* * *).

b. Other Intelligence Requirements (not in priority).

(1) Will Aggressor continue to defend in his present positions? If so, how will he organize the ground, and with what troops? Special attention to locations and activities of reserves and to vulnerability to nuclear attack.

(2) Will Aggressor attack before 110500 September? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the axis Hill 536 (* * *)—Hill 524 (* * *)—CR 981 (* * •).

(3) Will Aggressor employ nuclear weapons against us? If so, when, where, how many, of what yields, and by what delivery means?

(4) Will Aggressor use chemical or biological agents? If so, what agents, when, how, and where?

(5) Will Aggressor employ electronic warfare jamming or deception? If so, when? Where is his equipment located?

(6) Where are the locations and what are the technical operating characteristics of Aggressor’s communication and noncommunication electromagnetic emitters?

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS (Note 3)

a. Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units.

(1) 2d Bde:

(a) Report as obtained.

1. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.
2. Location and size of ammunition dumps and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
3. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.
4. Number, size, composition, and time observed of enemy patrols.
5. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.
6. The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for chemical and biological activity.
7. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks or wearing protective clothing or both.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.
1. Activity in medium tank regiment (minus) and tank battalion assembly area near BURG.
2. Location and activity of mechanized regiment near BURG.

(2) 3d Bde:
(a) Report as obtained.
1. Activity of mechanized battalion north and east of CR 987 (* * *).
2. Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503 (* * *).
3. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the Flood River.
4. Location and size of ammunition dumps and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
5. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.
6. Number, size, composition, and time observed of enemy patrols.
7. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.
8. The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for chemical and biological activity.
9. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks or wearing protective clothing or both.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.
1. Activity in medium tank regiment (minus) and tank battalion assembly area near BURG.
2. Location and activity of mechanized regiment near BURG.

(3) 1–21 Cav: report as obtained.
(a) Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 508.
(b) Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the Flood River.
(c) Location and size of ammunition dumps and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
(d) Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.
(e) Number, size, composition, and time observed of enemy patrols.
(f) Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.
(g) The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for chemical and biological activity.
(h) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks or wearing protective clothing or both.

(4) Div Arty:
(a) Report as obtained.
1. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the Flood River.
2. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.
3. Number, size, composition, and time observed of enemy patrols.
4. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.

(Classification)
(ANX A (INTEL) to OPORD 24—20th Inf Div)

5. The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for chemical and biological activity.
   (b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

(5) 20th Avn Bn:
   (a) Report as obtained.
   1. Activity of mechanized battalion north and east of CR 987.
   2. Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.
   3. Location, size, and type of unit near Hill 536 (north of BURG).
   4. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.
   5. Location and size of ammunition dumps and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
   6. Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM.
   7. The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for chemical and biological activity.
   8. Enemy air defense activity.
   (b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.
   1. Movement on the following roads:
      (a) North on Highway 25 (* * *).
      (b) West on Highway 2 (* * *).
      (c) West on Highway 4 (* * *).
   2. Activity in medium tank regiment (minus) and tank battalion assembly area near BURG.
   3. Location and activity of mechanized regiment near BURG.
   4. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

(6) 20th Engr Bn: report as obtained.
   (a) Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.
   (b) The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for chemical and biological activity.

b. Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units.

(1) 1st Corps is requested to provide—
   (a) As obtained.
   1. Location, size, and type of unit near Hill 536 (north of BURG).
   2. Number, types, direction of movement, and time of movement of air or surface vehicular traffic within the division zone, with special attention to Highway 2.
   3. Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of Highway 25 within the division zone.
   4. Evidence of field fortifications and troop concentrations along the following lines:
      (a) Hill 503—CR 987.
      (b) Hill 518 (* * *)—Hill 536—Hill 499 (* * *).
   5. Location and size of ammunition dumps and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
   6. Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH (* * *) to BURG.
   7. Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.
   8. Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets in the corps zone capable of striking the division.
   9. Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM.
(ANX A (INTEL) to OPORD 24—20th Inf Div)

10. The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for chemical and biological activity.
11. All enemy chemical and biological supply movement and supply dumps in division zone.
12. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks or wearing protective clothing or both.

(b) As obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Movement on the following roads:
   (a) North on Highway 25.
   (b) West on Highway 2.
   (c) West on Highway 4.

2. Activity in medium tank regiment (minus) and tank battalion assembly area near BURG.
3. Location and activity of mechanized regiment near BURG.
4. Location and activity of mechanized regiment southwest of CR 994(* * *).
5. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons and the caliber and state of preparation of positions, in corps zone.
6. CP’s, supply points, and medical facilities east of Highway 25.

(2) 18th Inf Div is requested to provide—

(a) As obtained.

1. Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of Highway 25 within the division zone.

2. Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.

3. Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.
4. Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within 18th Inf Div zone.
5. Locations of heavy artillery positions, including number of weapons and the caliber and state of preparation of positions.
6. Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM.

7. The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for chemical and biological activity.
8. All enemy chemical and biological supply movement and supply dumps.
9. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks or wearing protective clothing or both.

(b) As obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Movement on the following roads:
   (a) North on Highway 25.
   (b) West on Highway 2.
   (c) West on Highway 4.

2. Location and activity of mechanized regiment southwest of CR 994.

(3) 52d Mech Div is requested to provide, as obtained—

(a) Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

(b) Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.

(c) Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.

(d) Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within 52d Mech Div area of interest.

(e) Locations of heavy artillery positions, including number of weapons and the caliber and state of preparation of positions.

(f) Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM.
(ANX A (INTEL) to OPORD 24—20th Inf Div)

(g) The interception of any enemy patrols equipped for chemical and biological activity.

(h) All enemy chemical and biological supply movement and supply dumps.

(i) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks or wearing protective clothing or both.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL
   a. Prisoners of War, Deserters, Repatriates, Inhabitants, and Other Persons. Prisoners of war from the 58th Arty Div will be reported to division G2 without delay.
   b. Captured Materiel. Enemy-manufactured VT fuzes and electronic warfare equipment will be safeguarded and reported to division G2 without delay.

5. DOCUMENTS AND/OR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED
   a. Maps. SOP distribution of map (BUTTANO, 1:50,000, ZELLE-PAGT).
   b. Photos. Following airphotos will be furnished:
      (1) Basic cover of division zone (1:10,000 approximately).
         (a) Six copies each brigade and division artillery.
         (b) One copy each tank battalion, mechanized infantry battalion, 1–21 Cav, 20th Avn, division engineer, and division signal officer.
      (2) Annotated airphotos distributed automatically as available.
      (3) Requests for preplanned airphoto missions due at division CP by 1400 daily, effective 11 September.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
   a. All units coordinate use of Army aircraft through division TOC to reduce number of aircraft in air over division zone before attack.
   b. Appendix 3 (Counterintelligence).

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION
   SOP except as modified in paragraph 3.

8. MISCELLANEOUS (Note 2)

   Acknowledge. (Note 1)

   ABLE (Note 1)

   MG

   OFFICIAL:

   /s/Guest

   GUEST (Note 1)

   G2

   Appendixes: 1—Situation Overlay (omitted)
   2—Air Reconnaissance (omitted)
   3—Counterintelligence (omitted)

   Distribution: Same as OPORD 24 (Note 1)

   Notes 1. Required only when the annex has a wider distribution than the order or is being distributed separately from the order.

   2. Paragraph 8, “MISCELLANEOUS,” is used, if required. All other main paragraph headings are required to be listed. Terms such as “No change” “See overlay,” “Annex ________,” “None,” and “Not applicable” are permissible and should be used to maintain brevity in the order.

   3. Paragraph 3 may be prepared as an appendix to the intelligence annex.
Example F-15. Fire Support Annex to Division Operation Order

(Annex issued with the operation order.)

(Classification)

ANNEX B (FIRE SUPPORT) to OPORD 2—20th Inf Div

Reference: Map, series M503, Baha, sheet 4224 IV (CAPE FORTH—ATHENAL), edition 1—DMG, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces.
   (1) Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 2.
   (2) Enemy is capable of attacking fire support delivery units with air-, missile-, and cannon-delivered nuclear weapons. Enemy air capable of 40 bomber and 150 fighter-bomber sorties per day in zone of 1st Corps.
   b. Friendly Forces.
   (1) 1st Corps attacks 140430 Sep with the 20th Inf Div on the east and 21st Inf Div on the west, secures north bank of the IDAWANA River, and destroys enemy in zone.
   (2) 9th TAF supports 30th Army with minimum allocation of 300 close air support sorties daily for the period 140400 to 152000 Sep. Priority to 1st Corps until north bank of IDAWANA River is secure.
   (3) Artillery support.
      (a) 1st Bn (PSG), 305th FA: GS 30th Army; priority of fires to 1st Corps.
      (b) 23d Armd Div Arty: GSR 20th Inf Div Arty; on order, revert to 23d Armd Div control.
      (c) 63d Arty GP (FA): reinf 20th Inf Div Arty.
   (4) Naval gunfire support. Naval Fire Support Group (TG 38.1) supports 1st Corps; Fire Support Unit Two (TU 38.12) provides support to 20th Inf Div.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. Attached effective 131900 Sep:
      (1) 1st Bn (105, Towed), 601st FA.
      (2) 2d Bn (155, SP), 631st FA.

2. MISSION
   Division artillery and supporting fire support agencies support 20th Inf Div operations to secure north bank of IDAWANA River, using nuclear, conventional, and special ammunition to include field artillery, close air support, naval gunfire, and air defense artillery fires.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation.
   (1) Maneuver. OPORD 2.
   (2) Fires. At H—30 minutes, division will employ one MRC/2-KT weapon on enemy forces on Hill 374 (191395) and one MRC/0.5-KT weapon on Hill 412 (224410). A 25-minute nonnuclear preparation will be fired beginning at H—20 minutes. Initial division reserve consists of two MRC/2-KT weapons.
b. Close Air Support.

(1) General. Sixteen fighter-bombers on air alert from H to H + 1 hour over corps zone to be assigned missions as approved by corps tactical operations center. Armament—mixed load.

(2) Allocations. Priority of close air support to 20th Inf Div for period 140400 to 140900 Sep.

(3) Appendix 1 (Air Fire Support).

c. Arty Support.

(1) FA:

(a) General. Field artillery will support the attack with a nuclear preparation at H−30 minutes. A nonnuclear preparation will be fired from H−20 minutes to H+5 minutes.

(b) Organization for combat.

1. Division artillery:
   1−1 FA: DS 1st Bde.
   1−2 FA: DS 2d Bde.
   1−3 FA: GSR 1−1 FA; on order, DS 3d Bde.
   1−4 FA: GSR 1−2 FA.
   1−5 FA: GS.
   1−601 FA: reinf 1−1 FA; on order, reinf 1−3 FA.
   2−631 FA: GS.

2. Reinf artillery:
   63d Arty Gp (FA):
   2d Bn (8, SP), 611th FA.
   2d Bn (8, SP), 612th FA.
   2d Bn (155, SP), 641st FA.
   1st Bn (155, Towed), 651st FA.

(c) Miscellaneous.

1. 1−1 FA plan the fires of 1−3 FA for the preparation only.
2. 1−2 FA plan the fires of 1−4 FA from H−10 minutes to H+5 minutes.
3. Appendix 2 (Field Artillery Fire Support).

(2) ADA: Appendix 3 (Air Defense Artillery Fire Support).

d. Chemical Support. * * *

e. Naval Gunfire Support.

(1) General. Fire Support Unit Two (TU 38.12) support the attack beginning at H−1 hour; H−20 minutes to H+5 minutes support the attack with preparation.

(2) Allocation of naval gunfire support.

(a) CA77 (one heavy cruiser): GS 1st Bde.
   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

(d) DD854 (one destroyer): DS 1−66 Inf.

(3) Miscellaneous. Appendix 4 (Naval Gunfire Support).

f. Nuclear Fire Support.

(1) Assignment.

1st Bde ..........1 FFR/10 KT
2d Bde ..........1 FFR/10 KT

(2) Appendix 5 (Nuclear Fire Support).
g. Coordinating Instructions.
   (1) Allocated nuclear weapons will be assigned by separate communication. Appendix 5 (Nuclear Fire Support).
   (2) Notification of nuclear fires will be through command fire direction channels.
   (3) Fire support appendixes to division FSE before 132200 Sep.
   (4) Report of poststrike analysis of targets to division FSE.
   (5) Counterbattery tactics: status—active; criteria—to be announced.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
      (1) 105-mm how (HE) 150.
      (2) 155-mm how (HE) 120.
      (3) 8-in how (HE) 60.
      (4) Other types no restriction.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   a. Signal.
      (1) CEOI Index 1–14.
      (2) Emergency signal for lifting fires—green star cluster.
      (3) Normal radio traffic before attack.
      (4) Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to OPORD 2.
   b. Command.
      (1) FSE—division main CP.
      (2) Division artillery CP (initial)—LE190360.

Appendixes: 1—Air Fire Support (omitted)
2—Field Artillery Fire Support (omitted)
3—Air Defense artillery Fire Support (omitted)
4—Naval Gunfire Support (omitted)
5—Nuclear Fire Support (omitted)
APPENDIX 1 (AIR FIRE SUPPORT) to ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT) to OPORD 19—20th Inf Div

Reference: Map, series M503, BAHA, sheet 4224 IV (CAPE FORTH—ATHENAL), edition 1—DMG, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 19.
   b. Friendly Forces. OPORD 19.

2. MISSION
   Elements of 9th TAF conduct tactical air operations in support of 20th Inf Div on 19 April.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation. Air support will neutralize enemy defensive positions, artillery, and reserves in that priority and conduct poststrike reconnaissance and reconnaissance of potential target areas. Priority of close air support to 1st Bde on 19 April.
   b. Allocations.
      (1) Estimated 40 tactical fighter-bomber sorties available for close air support daily, beginning 190430 April. Tab A (Preplanned Close Air Support Missions).
      (2) Estimated 15 reconnaissance sorties available daily, beginning 190430 April. Tab B (Preplanned Reconnaissance Missions).
      (3) Airborne close air support coordinator available through TASE.
   c. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) FSCL: Tab C (Fire Support Coordination).
      (2) Maximum ordinate artillery fires: 1st Bde area is 5,000 meters for period 190530 to 190615 April.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
   Annex E (Service Support) to OPORD 19.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   b. Command. * * *

Tabs:* A—Preplanned Close Air Support Missions (omitted)
   B—Preplanned Reconnaissance Missions (omitted)
   C—Fire Support Coordination (omitted)

*Tabs may be distributed separately. Tabs A and B are revised daily; Tab C is revised, as required.
ANNEX E (ENGINEER) to OPORD 2—1st Corps

References: Map, series M535, Central EUROPE, sheets 31–4 and 31–5, edition 2, 1:250,000; Admin/Log Order 2.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALFA.

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Org) to OPORD 2.

1. SITUATION
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) OPORD 2.
      (2) 11th Army Engr Gp will take over road maintenance at 012400 April in area shown. Appendix 1 (Engineer Operation Overlay).
      (3) 401st Arty Gp (AD) provides AD protection at all corps bridge sites during construction and after completion of construction.
      (4) 721st Sig Bn (Corps) will furnish one wire team each to 55th Engr Gp (Cbt) and 56th Engr Gp (Cbt) to assist in installing and maintaining wire communications.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Task Org) to OPORD 2.

2. MISSION
   Corps engineer units support 1st Corps river-crossing operations 220600 April by constructing and operating rafts, by constructing bridges, and by maintaining roads in corps zone.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation. * * *
   b. 50th Engr Bde:
      (1) 55th Engr Gp (Cbt): DS 20th Inf Div.
         (a) Support 20th Inf Div crossings.
            1. Construct and operate—
               (a) Two each light tactical rafts at sites DELTA and ECHO by H + 3 hours.
               (b) One each raft to support class–60 traffic at sites BRAVO, DELTA, ECHO, FOX-TROT, and GOLF by H + 3 hours.
               (c) One each float bridge to support class–60 traffic at sites ALFA and CHARLIE by H + 10 hours.
            2. Support attack on far bank.
               (b) Maintain roads in zone until 012400 July. Appendix 1 (Engineer Operation Overlay).
               (c) Establish two water supply points in crossing area.
               (d) Support 52d Mech Div on order.
         * * * * * * * * *
   c. Coordinating Instructions. Protective booms will be constructed and maintained at all bridge sites.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
   Admin/Log Order 2.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   b. Command. * * *

Appendix 1—Engineer Operation Overlay (omitted)
ANNEX F (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS) to OPORD 5—30th (US) Army

References: Map, series M535, Central EUROPE, sheets 30-1, 30-2, 30-5, and 30-6, edition 2, 1:250,000; Intel Est No 2; Admin/Log Order 2.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALFA.

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces. Intelligence Estimate No 2, 271200 February. Guerrilla attacks on lone messenger vehicles have increased. Enemy capable of jamming all radio circuits.
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) USASTRATCOM (theater) provides trunks from theater access points to army area signal centers.
      (2) OPORD 5.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. Annex A (Troop List) to OPORD 5.

2. MISSION
   To install, operate, and maintain the army area communication system and provide terminals at major elements of the command to support crossing of RHINE River. Initial system to be in operation by 021500 March.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation. The army area communication system will operate as prescribed in the 30th (US) Army SOP. Emphasis will be on the use of existing commercial wire facilities under army control when such facilities can be used without major rehabilitation. Increased use will be made of air messenger service.
      b. 20th Sig Bde: ● ● ●.
      c. 1st Corps: ● ● ●.
      d. 2d Corps: 731st Sig Co (COMMCEN Op) (Army) attached.
         (1) Coordinate operations and continue training and combat service support of assigned and attached signal units.
         (2) Install, operate, and maintain communication system and facilities for army main, rear, and alternate and for FATOC main and alternate. Provide internal communication support for such other units and installations, as directed. Provide army photographic and messenger service.
         (3) Continue operation of army area communication system.
         (4) Be prepared to establish area signal centers on east side of RHINE River.
         (5) Be prepared to construct cable crossings of RHINE River in area between BINGEN (MA2135) and WORMS (MV9854).
         (6) Provide communication support for rear area protection operations. Annex G (Rear Area Security) to OPORD 5.
         (7) Provide cryptographic support to army and corps troops and divisions.
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Admin/Log Order 2.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. Signal. CEOI Index 1-15, 30th (US) Army, in effect.

b. Command.
(1) Verdun Area Command, VERDUN (MG5378).
(2) 2d (US) Army, ST MIHIEL (MG8819).
(3) 30th (US) Army Main, SAARLAUTERN (LV8765).
(4) 30th (US) Army Rear, CONFLANS (LJ0850).
(5) 30th (US) Army Alternate, NEUNKIRCHEN (LV6868).
(6) 1st Corps, KIRCHBERG (LA8634).
(7) 2d Corps, KAIERSLAUTERN (MV1177).
c. Axis of Command Post Displacement. SAARLAUTERN (LV3765).

Appendixes: 1—Cable Routes (omitted)
2—Commercial Cable and Open-Wire Systems (omitted)
3—Radio Nets (omitted)
4—Frequency Priorities (omitted)
5—RESTRICTED Frequencies (omitted)
6—Army Multichannel Communication Systems (omitted)
7—Army Communication System Diagram (omitted)
8—Messenger Schedules (omitted)
ANNEX G (ARMY AVIATION) to OPORD 6—10th (US) Army

References: Map, series M406, EUROPE, sheets 2 through 7, edition 2, 1:500,000; Admin/Log Order 7.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALFA.

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces.
      (1) Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 6.
      (2) Enemy air capable of sporadic fighter-bomber sorties in zone.
   b. Friendly Forces. OPORD 6.

2. MISSION
   Army aviation units support 10th (US) Army offensive operations to drive enemy forces in zone from Western Germany; support rear area security operations in army rear area; support logistic supply operations.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation.* * *
   b. 112th Avn Gp:
      (1) Priority of support to 2d Corps and 1st Corps in that order.
      (2) Prepare to furnish four medium helicopters for rear area security operations on an on-call basis; prepare to furnish one company to move elements of reserve forces on 2-hour notice.
      (3) Have available one platoon of medium helicopters for movement of special ammunition on an on-call basis.
   c. 150th Avn Co (ATC):
      (1) Provide assistance to Army aviation elements in the combat zone to enable these elements to operate airfields and accomplish aviation missions at night and in adverse weather conditions.
      (2) Establish an FOC near LOHNSFELD (MV1790) and coordinate FOC with CG, 43d Arty Bde (AD).
   d. 1st Corps:* * *
   e. 2d Corps:* * *
   f. 3d Corps:* * *
   g. Coordinating Instructions.
      (1) Appendix 1 (FOC Operations).
      (2) Appendix 2 (VFR Air Traffic Control).
4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Admin/Log Order 7.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
b. Command.
   (1) 112th Avn Gp, WIESBADEN (MA5142).
   (2) 125th Avn Bn, SANDHOFEN (MV6190).
   (3) 134th Avn Bn, WIESBADEN (MA5142).
   (4) 150th Avn Co (ATC), LOHNSFELD (MV1790).

Appendices: 1—FOC Operations (omitted)
2—VFR Air Traffic Control (omitted)
Example F-20. Road Movement Table Annex to Infantry Division Operation Order
(Annex issued with operation order.)

ANNEX B (ROAD MOVEMENT TABLE) to OPORD 9–20th Inf Div

Reference: Map, series M504, AFGAN, sheet 4842 (BHAD-WURST), edition 1–DMG, 1:100,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

**General Data:**
- Average Speed: 20 kmph.
- Traffic Density: 20 veh per km.
- Hails: SOP.
- Routes:
  1. Route RED. Serials: 1, 3, 4, and 5.
  2. Route BLUE. Serials: 2 and 6.
- Critical Points:
  1. Start point: RJ 413 at MB201699.
  2. Release point: RJ 211 at QA590628.

**Note:**
- Only the minimum number of headings above should be used. Any information common to two or more movement numbers should be included under the “General Data” paragraphs.
- Since the table may be issued to personnel concerned with control of traffic, the security aspect must be remembered. It may not be desirable to include dates or locations.
- Critical point is defined as “a selected point along a route used for reference in giving instructions.” It includes start points, release points, and other points along a route where interference with movement may occur or where timings are critical.
- The movement number identifies a column (or element of column) during the whole of the movement.
- If an annex has the same distribution as an operation order, it is not necessary to include the headings shown in this example.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mov number</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>No of vehicles</th>
<th>Load class of heaviest vehicle</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Route to start point</th>
<th>Critical points</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>(j)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1st Bde</td>
<td>COL Long, Condr</td>
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<td>***</td>
<td></td>
<td>BHAD area</td>
<td>WURST area</td>
<td>RED</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2d Bde</td>
<td>COL Corley, Condr</td>
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<td>BHAD area</td>
<td>WURST area</td>
<td>BLUE</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3d Bde</td>
<td>COL Smith, Condr</td>
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<td>BHAD area</td>
<td>WURST area</td>
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<td>BHAD area</td>
<td>WURST area</td>
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<td>LTC Camp, Condr</td>
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<td>DISCOM</td>
<td>COL Norling, Condr</td>
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<td>***</td>
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<td>BHAD area</td>
<td>WURST area</td>
<td>BLUE</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
- Other critical points.
- Other main routes to start points.
- Other main routes from release points.
- Other critical points.
- Other routes from release points.
- Other routes to start points.

F-73
ANNEX E (BARRIER AND DENIAL) to OPORD 2

References: Map, series L202, sheets 54-2 and 54-3 (SUDOLAND and ZORANIA), edition 1, 1:500,000; Admin/Log Order 2.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ALFA.

1. SITUATION
   b. Friendly Forces. OPORD 2.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. None.

2. MISSION
   1st (Allied) Army conducts barrier and denial operations in zone to support the attack to and defense of the RUFF Mountains (* * *).

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation.
      (1) General.
         (a) Extensive use of barriers will be made as an economy-of-force measure. Maximum use will be made of local materials for barrier construction.
         (b) Unless indicated otherwise, priorities for construction of barriers are—
             1. Forward barrier.
             2. Army east (left) flank barrier and army rear barrier.
             3. Intermediate barriers.
             4. Army west (right) flank barrier.
         (c) Appendix 1 (Barrier Location Concept) shows the lines of coordinated obstacles required by army but does not indicate the density, depth, or numbers of individual obstacles. Responsible units will construct obstacles, as required, to cause maximum restriction to enemy movement. High-speed avenues of approach will be blocked in depth.
         (d) Destruction of population centers and communications, transportation, utilities, mining, factories, and port facilities and installations will be kept to a minimum. Destruction of installations or facilities that may adversely influence ALFIE's combat service support capability will be avoided.
         (e) When secured, the RUFF Mountains are designated a barrier vital to the command as a whole.
      (2) Offense. Both corps will accomplish the planning and execution of barriers in this phase of the operation (D to D+10). Obstacles planned or created should provide for ready integration in-
(ANX E (BARRIER AND DENIAL) to OPORD 2—1st (Allied) Army)

to the army or corps barrier plans. Full use must be made of barriers to canalize enemy counterattacks into killing areas, particularly on the west flank.

(3) Defense. It is anticipated that the army will defend the RUFF Mountains for 20 days (D + 10 to D + 30). Barriers will be located to canalize enemy attacks into killing areas. Intermediate barriers will be constructed with sufficient gaps to allow free movement of the army reserve in rear of or within the battle area.

b. 1st (US) Corps:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barrier/target</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass at KRANIA (DA801350)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Prepare for atomic demolition to be executed only on orders this headquarters. Responsibility for pass at KRANIA will be assumed by 1st (ZA) Army on order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pass at PILAR (DA800615)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Prepare for atomic demolition to be executed only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil refinery vic PILAR (DA710580)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Prepare for demolition; demolish if threatened with capture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier ABC at DA625710</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Prepare for atomic demolition to be executed only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfield KRUE (DA650190)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Prepare for atomic demolition to be executed only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier IJ at DA785890</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Prepare for atomic demolition to be executed only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier EJ at DA690845</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Prepare for atomic demolition to be executed only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier EF at DA735285</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Prepare for atomic demolition to be executed only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier BE at DA738095</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Prepare for atomic demolition to be executed only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier AI at DA845040</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Prepare for atomic demolition to be executed only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. 12th (US) Corps:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barrier/target</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barrier CD at DY653825</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Demolish with ADM if threatened with seizure; otherwise, execute only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier FGH at DY500820</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Demolish with ADM if threatened with seizure; otherwise, execute only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port facilities ZATOK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Demolish with ADM if threatened with seizure; otherwise, execute only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(DY450710)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optical factory at SLIKEN (DY500805)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Demolish and evacuate lens grinders to BRICNE (*** *) if threatened with seizure; execute only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier CF at DY480320</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier DH at DY515120</td>
<td>4</td>
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</table>

d. 50th (US) Engr Bde:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barrier/target</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass north of ABLE (DY560050)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Prepare for atomic demolition at location designated by 12th (US) Corps; execute only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Classification)
(ANX E (BARRIER AND DENIAL) to OPORD 2—1st (Allied) Army)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barrier/target</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass through STEMMER (DY610920)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Prepare for atomic demolition at location designated by 12th (US) Corps; execute only on orders this headquarters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear energy plant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Prepare for demolition; demolish if threatened with seizure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRAYTONIA (DY425640)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare for demolition; demolish if threatened with seizure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesium mine DELTON (DY405335)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier JK at DY630765</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier FKM at DY630690</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier GM at DY630880</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier LM at DY420570</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier IL at DY420330</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier MNO at DY390770</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrier HO at DY530650</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Corps coordinate location of barriers along boundaries, including extent of lanes and gaps. Coordinate with counterattack plans.

(2) Demolition of bridges and other transportation facilities in rear of the FEBA executed only after clearance this headquarters or release of control of route, or routes by this headquarters.

(3) Nuisance mines will not be authorized.

(4) Complete barrier plans will be forwarded this headquarters by 091500 June.

(5) Complete barrier plans will not be distributed below division; appropriate extracts authorized as far forward as brigade CP.

(6) Barrier construction may be initiated without further orders. Improvement of barrier system will continue during the operation. Atomic demolition plan and ADM target analyses will be forwarded this headquarters by 081500 June.

(7) Use of chemical agents or mines for contamination purposes requires specific army approval.

(8) Barrier and denial operations must not unduly restrict future army operations, particularly to the north.

(9) ALFIE personnel will exploit technical intelligence targets in 1st (Allied) Army zone. Such personnel will receive full cooperation and assistance.

(10) ADM are available. Annex C (Fire Support) to OPORD 2.

(11) Appendix 2 (Minefield Location).

(12) Appendix 3 (Chemical Agents and Mines for Contamination).

(13) Appendix 4 (Demolitions).

(14) Appendix 5 (Atomic Demolitions).

(15) Appendix 6 (Distribution).

(16) Reports and records.

(a) Minefields. Submit required reports of intent, initiation, completion, and change by fastest means available consistent with signal security. Written standard record will follow on all but protective minefields.
(Classification)

(ANX E (BARRIER AND DENIAL) to OPORD 2—1st (Allied) Army)

(b) Demolitions and other obstacles. Report location, type, extent, and estimated time of completion.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
   a. 1st (Allied) Army Admin/Log Order 2.
   b. Indigenous labor not authorized forward of division rear area.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
   b. Command. * * *
   Acknowledge.

HAMMUS
GEN

OFFICIAL:
/s/Williams
WILLIAMS
G3

Appendixes: 1—Barrier Location Concept (omitted)
           2—Minefield Location (omitted)
           3—Chemical Agents and Mines for Contamination (omitted)
           4—Demolitions (omitted)
           5—Atomic Demolitions (omitted)
           6—Distribution (omitted)

Distribution: Appendix 6

(Classification)
ANNEX L (AIRSPACE UTILIZATION) to OPORD 4

References: Map, series M501, Western EUROPE, sheet NM32-9 (HOMBURG) ***, edition 2–DMG, 1:250,000;
Admin/Log Order 4.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces. OPORD 4.
   b. Friendly Forces. OPORD 4.
   c. Attachments and Detachments. None.

2. MISSION
   10th (US) Army provides airspace regulation and control to insure proper and efficient coordination and timely access to the airspace over the combat area by all users, with minimum mutual interference.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation.
      (1) Airspace utilization.
         (a) Aircraft of all Services must be free to conduct combat operations without restraint, except those required for command and control, coordination of effort within and among the participating Services, and safety.
         (b) The coordination altitude is 7,000 feet. Army aircraft will be free to operate VFR below this altitude with restrictions as imposed by this annex. Appendix 1 (Air Route Overlay).
         (c) Surface-to-surface and air defense artillery weapons are free to fire in all airspace, subject only to normal fire support coordination measures, restraints imposed by readiness conditions, and rules for engagement.
         (d) The restrictions and risks imposed on aviation and air defense reflect the commander's priorities for operations.
      (2) Concept of air support.
         (a) Army aviation. Annex J (Army Aviation) to OPORD 4.
         (b) 9th TAF. Appendix 2 (Air Fire Support) to Annex D (Fire Support) to OPORD 4.
   b. Airspace Priorities.
      (1) On receipt of the appropriate ZULU code, army air defense has total priority in the designated areas, and all friendly air traffic will clear the airspace immediately.
         (a) ZULU ALFA—clear entire combat zone airspace.
FM 101-5

(ANX L (ASPA UTILIZATION) to OPORD 4—10th (US) Army)

(b) ZULU BRAVO—clear 1st (US) Corps airspace.
(c) ZULU CHARLIE—clear 2d (US) Corps airspace.
(d) ZULU DELTA—clear 3d (US) Corps airspace.
(e) Code BLUE SKY (all clear) will be broadcast every 30 seconds for a 10-minute period.
(f) Authority to declare local air defense artillery weapon free areas is delegated to corps and division commanders with capability to effectively clear their airspace of organic and supporting aircraft.

(2) 1st (US) Corps area priority to westbound traffic on air routes/corridors A32 and T2.
(3) 2d (US) Corps area priority to eastbound traffic on air routes/corridors T1, T4, D21, and D22.
(4) 3d (US) Corps area priority to westbound traffic on air routes/corridors B30 and T3.
(5) US Air Force tactical fighter-bombers have priority on objectives A, B, and C from 180500 to 180550 January.
(6) Army airmobile and aerial fire support aircraft have priority from 180551 January until completion of the airmobile operation on objectives A, B, and C.
(7) Aircraft will not enter restricted areas without complying with restrictive measures in effect. Appendix 1 (Air Route Overlay).
(8) Aircraft will not enter or overfly prohibited (exclusion) areas at any time. Appendix 1 (Air Route Overlay).

c. Air Traffic Control Organizations. FOC and FCC locations and areas of responsibility. Annex J (Army Aviation) to OPORD 4.

(1) Aircraft penetrating the ATCL from the enemy side will be engaged if not positively identified as friendly.
(2) Aircraft penetrating air defense restricted areas will be engaged if not positively identified as friendly.
(3) Aircraft employing ECM will be engaged if not positively identified as friendly.
(4) Aircraft operating below 150-knot ground speed within the combat zone and outside air defense restricted areas will not be engaged unless positively identified as hostile.
(5) Aircraft committing hostile acts will be engaged. Annex E (Air Defense) to OPORD 4.

e. Reentry Procedures.
(1) Reentry points are on air corridors A and B and air routes/corridors T2, T1, and T3.
(2) IFF transponder setting is mode 4, channel 31.
(3) Visual recognition procedures are as prescribed in ACP 150(B).
(4) Emergency reentry procedures for aircraft experiencing IFF malfunction:
   (a) Call SKY CAT control before reaching the ATCL, who will alert the AADCP.
   (b) Attempt to reach a reentry corridor.
   (c) Aircraft entering without an operational IFF must land at the first available airfield capable of receiving that type of aircraft.

f. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) All Army aircraft moving forward in the division area, with the exception of surveillance aircraft, remain below 600 feet until 180550 January.
(ANX L (ASPA UTILIZATION) to OPORD 4—10th (US) Army)

(2) ATCL 2 effective 180550 January.

(3) Air warnings disseminated by all air traffic regulation elements, the AADCP, and the warning broadcast net.

(4) High-performance aircraft will not penetrate a lower safety layer of 1,000-foot absolute altitude, except for takeoff and landings, unless under positive control of a forward air controller.

(5) All flights above the coordinating altitude or departing the combat zone subject to control by the CRC of the 9th TAF.

(6) Air corridor B restricted between altitudes of 1,500 and 7,000 feet from 180645 until 180900 January for the use of troop-lift aircraft.

(7) Flights operating in brigade areas of 19th and 21st Inf Div restricted to brigade aircraft and aircraft in direct support of the brigades.

(8) Aircraft flying along air routes/corridors under direct control of the appropriate air traffic regulation organization from time of departure until termination. The following coordination is required for controlled flights:

(a) Below the coordinating altitude. Flight plan data passed to air traffic control facilities.

(b) At or above the coordinating altitude.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

Admin/Log Order 4.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Signal.

(1) Annex H (Communications-Electronics) to OPORD 4.

(2) Call words and frequency: 10th (US) Army CEOI.

(3) 9th TAF call words and frequency: 10th (US) Army CEOI.

(4) Navigation facility frequency en route: air navigation charts dated 210001 December.

b. Command.

(1) Location of AADCP. Annex E (Air Defense) to OPORD 4.

(2) Location of FOC and FCC. Annex J (Army Aviation) to OPORD 4.

Acknowledge.

HANES
GEN

OFFICIAL:
/s/Leroy
LEROY
G3

Appendix: 1—Air Route Overlay
Example F-22—Continued

Legend

- Primary air route/corridor (with 10 nautical miles).
- Temporary air route/corridor (width 5 nautical miles).
- Distance between stations in nautical miles.
- LF/MF beacon.
- High-speed climb corridor (graduated altitude and nautical miles from terminal facility).

APPENDIX 1 (AIR ROUTE OVERLAY) to ANNEX L (AIRSPACE UTILIZATION) to OPM 4-10cl. (US) Army

References:
Map, series M501, Western Europe, sheet M531-9 (Hamburg) ** edition
2-mic, 1:250,000;
Adams/Log Order 4.
ANNEX F (SERVICE SUPPORT) to OPORD 12

Reference: Map, series M642, POLAND, sheets 5811, 5842, 5941, 5942, 6041, and 6042 (CZESTOCHOWA—ZAWIERCIE, MIECHOW—KIELCE, and SANDOMIERZ—KRASNIK), edition 1-AMS, 1:100,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: BRAVO.

1. GENERAL
This order provides for cbt svc spt to 23d Armd Div near PRADIA. Div is supported by the 1st Spt Bde (Corps) and the 82d Med Gp. Div instl open not later than 090800 August. 1–14 FA supported from 1st Bde Tn area. 23d Engr Bn supported from 2d Bde Tn area. Appendix 1 (Service Support Overlay).

2. MATERIEL AND SERVICES
a. Supply.
   (1) Cl I.
      (a) Supply point distribution for all units supported from div spt area on 9 August only.
      (b) All units maintain two rations in reserve during period 9 to 12 August inclusive.
   (2) Cl II. Priority to 1st Bde 9—10 August.
   (3) Cl III.
      (a) GS Sup Instl 622, 30th Army (AB101202).
      (b) Fuel allocations. Appendix 2 (Fuel Allocations).
   (4) Cl IV.
      (a) No barrier/fortification materials available at GS Sup Instl 622 until 100600 August.
      (b) Priority on barrier/fortification to 2d Bde on arrival objective area.
   (5) Cl V.
      (a) ASP 955, 30th Army (AB202316), opens 090600 August.
      (b) SASP 956, 30th Army (AB226281), opens 090600 August.
      (c) ASR 9—12 August.
         1. 81-mm mortar (WP) 5.
         2. 4.2-in mortar (HE) 150.
         3. 155-mm how (HE) 75.
         4. Other types—no restriction.
      (d) Special ammunition load.
         1. 1–14 FA MRC/2 KT 3.
         2. 1–15 FA FFR/10 KT 3.
   (6) Cl VI.
      (a) Tobacco and toilet items will be issued gratuitously with rations on odd-numbered days through 19 August.
(ANX F (SVC SPT) to OPORD 12—23d Armd Div)

(b) 1st Spt Bde (Corps) will operate mobile post exchanges in bde tn areas commencing 091900 August.

(7) Cl VII. Howitzer, 155-mm, and truck, 5-ton, LWB, controlled items; submit requisitions through command channels.

(8) Cl VIII. 808th Med Dep establishes supply point near 82d Med Gp HQ at AB2830; opens 090800 August.

(9) Cl IX. Major critical shortages exist in repair parts and replacement components for general-purpose vehicles and armored personnel carriers. Commanders will give personal emphasis to proper operation and user maintenance on these types of equipment.

(10) Appendix 3 (Air Resupply).


(1) Bridges on main roads are two-way, class-60; on secondary roads, they are one-way, class-50, or better.

(2) Route YOKE from DB0901 to DB1520 closed for movement of armor from 090100 to 090500 August.

c. Services.

(1) Effective 090800 August exchange of socks and underwear will be resumed at all bath points.

(2) Decon Plt, 2020th Fld Svc Co (GS) (Fwd), provides supervision of unit decontaminating activities beginning 090800 August.

d. Maintenance. Priority of support to—

(1) 1-14 FA.

(2) 1-10 Armor.

(3) 1-22 Cav.

(4) 1-12 Armor.

3. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. Current cholera and typhus inoculations will be completed before 102400 August.

b. Maximum use of aeromedical evacuation for high-priority casualties.

c. 8090th Cbt Spt Hosp DS to 23d Armd Div.

4. PERSONNEL

a. During period 10 to 12 August inclusive, submit personnel daily summary as to 1500 to reach this HQ by 1900.

b. Guards delivering enemy PW's to PW coll pt remain under control of PM until released.

c. Contaminated remains will be segregated and moved by separate transportation.

d. Local restaurants and food-catering establishments are off limits.

5. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

a. Curfew for civilians is 1800 to 0800.

6. MISCELLANEOUS
   a. Div rear boundary is army light line.
   b. Div chaplain located at div main effective 091200 August.

Acknowledge.

KEHE
MG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Wise
WISE
G4

Appendixes: 1—Service Support Overlay
           2—Fuel Allocations (omitted)
           3—Air Resupply (omitted)
           4—Traffic Circulation and Control (omitted)
           5—Civil-Military Operations (omitted)

Distribution: A
Example F-23—Continued

APPENDIX 1 (SERVICE SUPPORT OVERLAY) to ANNEX F (SERVICE SUPPORT) to OPORD 12-23d
Armd Div

Reference: Map, series M642, POLAND, sheets 5841, 5842, 5941, 5942, 6041, and 6042
(CZESTOCHOWA—ZAWIERCIE, MIECHOW—KIELCE, and SANDOMIERZ—KRASNIK), edition
1-AMS, 1:100,000.

1 Heading not required when appendix is distributed with the annex.
2 Composition of 2d and 3d Bde Tns is approximately the same as 1st Bde Tns.
ANEX G (CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO OPORD 7

References: Map, series L708, THAILAND, sheets 5762 I, 5763 II and IV, 5862 IV, and 5863 III and IV (BAN PHOK NOI, AMPHOE PHANNA NIKHOM, BAN KHOK SILA, CHANGWAT SAKON NAKHON, BAN NA WUA, AMPHOE SI SONGKHRAM), edition 1–AMS, 1:50,000;
Periodic CA Report 10.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: GOLF.

1. SITUATION
   a. Enemy Forces.
      (1) Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 7.
      (2) Psychological situation.
         (a) Guerrilla forces’ morale remains high mostly because they are operating in what they con-
             sider a “safe” area and they have their families with them.
         (b) The current food supply is adequate, but a shortage of medical personnel, equipment, and
             supplies exists. Smallpox and other diseases reportedly have broken out.
         (c) Native villagers have been sympathetic toward the guerrillas; however, friction has arisen
             between the native villagers and the guerrillas over the latter’s policy of conscripting labor for use
             in base camp construction.
   b. Friendly Forces.
      (1) OPORD 7.
      (2) Periodic CA Report 10.

2. MISSION

20th Inf Div conducts civil-military operations (CMO) to undermine the morale of the guerrilla force
in the target area, to provide an alternative to the guerrillas’ continued resistance, to weaken the link
between the guerrillas and the civilian population, to prevent civilian interference with the tactical
mission, and to assist the national government in gaining population support throughout the opera-
tional area.

3. EXECUTION
   a. Concept of Operation.
      (1) CA activity will be directed at facilitating refugee control, preventing epidemics, support-
ing tactical operations, and controlling the population. All tactical operations will include the use of
CMO and armed pgnd sqds to provide immediate medical care, civic action, and PSYOP activities. Rough handling of civilians, indiscriminate detention, and similar actions resulting in a lessening of cooperation by the people in the target area will be avoided. Priorities for civic action projects are contained in appendix 1.

(2) PSYOP mission and objectives will be fulfilled by accomplishing the supporting tasks contained in appendix 2 (Objectives and Tasks). The primary target groups for the psychological campaign are the guerrillas and the civilian population in the target area. PSYOP will support CA activities, including those concerned with refugee and population control. PSYOP techniques to be used are contained in appendix 3 (PSYOP Techniques and Themes).

(a) PSYOP will support the tactical operations conducted in the target area by leaflet dissemination, air and ground loudspeaker broadcasts, and face-to-face communication. PSYOP teams, materials, and support aircraft will be available on both an on-call basis and a preplanned basis.

(b) Preplanned leaflets will be available to direct refugees to designated collecting points.

b. TF BRIGADIER:

(1) Conduct PSYOP in support of objectives and tasks listed in appendix 2 and as specified in a above.

(2) Establish a CA operational base and conduct civic action visitations.

c. 1st Bde: conduct CA and PSYOP in support of objectives and tasks listed in appendix 2 and as specified in a above.

d. 2d Bde:

(1) Conduct PSYOP in support of objectives and tasks listed in appendix 2 and as specified in a above.

(2) Establish a CA operational base and conduct civic action visitations near line HARRY.

e. 3d Bde and DISCOM: conduct CA and PSYOP in support of objectives and tasks listed in appendix 2 and as specified in a above.

f. 1st Bde, 21st Inf Div: conduct CA and PSYOP in support of objectives and tasks listed in appendix 2 and as specified in a above.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Civilians classified as refugees will be provided emergency assistance until moved to a secure area, where they will be under the care of national authorities. Units generating refugees will provide security and care for their welfare until they come under the control of the government. All action regarding refugees will be closely coordinated with division G5.

(2) When feasible, captured enemy materiel and foodstuffs will be evacuated and turned over to national authorities. Host country resources and transportation will be used to the maximum practicable. Captured food caches will be destroyed only when their extraction is impracticable.

(3) Emergency medical treatment and evacuation will be provided for members of the local population injured as a result of the operation when they do not interfere with the accomplishment of the mission.

(4) Requests for PSYOP missions will be coordinated through proper channels.

(5) A PSYOP tm HB will be a standard part of every cordon and search operation. Maximum use will be made of armed pgnd sqds.

(6) Current guidance on the limitations of CA authority will be followed to the letter.
(ANX G (CMO) to OPORD 7—20th Inf Div)

(7) Proposed civic action projects will be coordinated with and approved by the G5 in conjunction with provincial authorities.

(8) Reports will be made in accordance with the division SOP.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

Annex H (Administration) to OPORD 7.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

OPORD 7.

Acknowledge.

OFFICIAL:

/s/Jones

JONES

G5

Appendixes: 1—Priority for Civic Action Projects (omitted)

2—Objectives and Tasks (omitted)

3—PSYOP Techniques and Themes (omitted)

Distribution: A

21st Inf Div

1st Bde, 21st Inf Div

101st Avn Gp
Example F-25. Traffic Circulation and Control Appendix to Armored Division Service Support Annex

APPENDIX 1 (TRAFFIC CIRCULATION AND CONTROL) to ANNEX E (SERVICE SUPPORT) to OPORD 14-23d Arm Div

Reference: Map, series V762, UNITED STATES, sheet 4071 (UPTON), edition 3-AMS, 1:50,000.
Example F-26. Electronic Warfare Annex to Division Operation Order
(Annex issued as a separate document.)

ANNEX M (ELECTRONIC WARFARE) to OPORD 8
Reference: Map, series M520, EUROPE, sheets 33 and 35 (KASSEL and HALLE), edition 5, 1:250,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: ZULU.

1. SITUATION
a. Enemy Forces.
   (1) Annex A (Intelligence) to OPORD 8.
   (2) Enemy communications-electronics environment. Appendix 1 (Enemy Electronic Order of Battle Overlay).

b. Friendly Forces. OPORD 8.

c. Attachments and Detachments. 287th ASA Co (-), with tm A (Countermeasures) of 275th ASA Op Co (A), attached effective 022300 June.

2. MISSION
To conduct EW operations and provide electronic data base in support of the 52d Mech Div in attack to secure Hill 322 (MA1394) and Hill 305 (MA0490).

3. EXECUTION
a. Concept of Operation. Units with EW resources will conduct both communication and noncommunication EW activities in support of the division mission. Appendix 2 (Electronic Warfare Operations Overlay).

   (1) ECM.
      (a) ECM jamming teams will jam on order command communications between designated battalion and regiment of Aggressor’s reserve elements.
      (b) Deception.
         1. The 1st Bde, 2d Bde, and 201st Armd Cav Regt will implement manipulative deception activities as directed by the tactical cover and deception plan (Annex _____ to OPORD 8) from H – 10 hours to H – 5 minutes.
         2. Designated communication elements of the 2d Bde will conduct manipulative communication deception activities commencing at H – 20 minutes against targets outlined in the division tactical cover and deception plan (Annex _____ to OPORD 8) to simulate the brigade attack across the RHINE River between BINGEN (MA2135) and WORMS (MV9854). Main elements of the brigade will participate with the attacking force.
         3. ECM teams will direct imitative deception from H – 5 minutes to H + 30 minutes against
the enemy reserve elements (believed to be elements of the Aggressor 45th Mech Div) in an attempt to cause this unit to remain in place.

(c) Appendix 3 (Electronic Countermeasures).

(2) Electronic security measures (ESM).

(a) Paragraph ___(ESM), Annex ____ (Electronic Warfare), Division Field SOP.

(b) Special emphasis will be placed on furnishing ESM to the electronic warfare element (EWE) and ECM teams conducting imitative deception.

(c) Appendix 4 (Electronic Security Measures).

(3) ECCM.

(a) Rigid frequency control measures will be in effect from H-24 hours until H+50 minutes.

(b) Paragraph (ECCM), Annex (Electronic Warfare), Division Field SOP. Appendix 5 (Electronic Counter-Countermeasures).

b. 287th ASA Co:

(1) Deploy two signal collection and jamming platoons in 1st Bde area to conduct jamming operations from H-15 to H+45 minutes against command communications between regiment and battalion of the Aggressor 46th Mech Div.

(2) Deploy a signal collection and jamming platoon in 2d Bde area to conduct imitative deception activities on order from H-15 to H+45 minutes against the Aggressor 12th Regt.

(c) 1st Bde: * * *.

(d) 2d Bde: * * *.

e. 3d Bde: * * *.

f. 1-23 Cav: * * *.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) EWE provides 287th ASA Co listing of TABOO/PROTECTED/GUARDED frequencies. Appendix 6 (RESTRICTED Frequencies).

(2) 287th ASA Co coordinates on-off control of active ECM with EWE.

(3) 1st Bde and 2d Bde coordinate deception activities with EWE.

(4) 287th ASA Co’s positioning of EW weapons will be coordinated with the EWE to prevent disruption of special weapons in Div Arty operations.

(5) Wire and messenger communications will be used to the maximum from H-10 hours to H-5 minutes.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
Annex K (Service Support) to OPORD 8.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL


b. Command. 287th ASA Co CP division main.

Acknowledge.

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/s/Knowit
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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX 1—Enemy Electronic Order of Battle Overlay (omitted)
APPENDIX 2—Electronic Warfare Operations Overlay (omitted)
APPENDIX 3—Electronic Countermeasures (omitted)
APPENDIX 4—Electronic Security Measures (omitted)
APPENDIX 5—Electronic Counter-Countermeasures (omitted)
APPENDIX 6—RESTRICTED Frequencies (omitted)
APPENDIX G

ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

Appendix B, paragraph B-23, contains a general discussion of the analysis of the area of operations, including information pertaining to the preparation and presentation of the analysis. Figure G-1 below presents the format for an analysis of the area of operations, including a general description of the content of each element of the format. Example G-1, which follows figure G-1, is an example of an analysis of the area of operations at corps level.
ANALYSIS OF AREA OF OPERATIONS NO 5

References: Maps (series number, sheet(s), edition, scale), charts, or other appropriate documents.

1. PURPOSE AND LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS

a. Purpose. Include delineation of the area being studied.

b. Limiting Considerations. Include a statement of the mission of the command and other considerations that limit the application of the study, e.g., time, the commander’s plan of action, and enemy capabilities.

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA

This paragraph is a listing of facts pertinent to the purpose and limiting considerations of the study for use as a basis for the succeeding paragraphs.

a. Climatic or Weather Conditions. List or refer to other documents containing, for the period under study, meteorological conditions, to include precipitation, fog, cloud conditions, temperature, relative humidity, light data (including moon phases, moonrise and moonset, beginning and end of nautical and civil twilights), and other data, as appropriate. When appropriate, include magnetic phenomena.

b. Terrain. Use specially colored maps or overlays to the maximum to illustrate each of the characteristics below and the effect of predicted weather conditions on them. Under each characteristic include those facts that will assist in subsequent determination of the effects of the characteristic on the use of nuclear weapons, chemical and enemy biological agents, and important devices and equipment in implementing courses of action. (Do not include in this subparagraph the interpretation of these effects on possible friendly or enemy courses of action.)

   (1) Relief and drainage systems. Configuration of the ground, including slopes for personnel and vehicles and critical relief for equipment dependent on line of sight. Configuration and condition of streams, including depth, slope, condition of banks and bottom, and location of crossing sites.

   (2) Vegetation. Wooded areas, including location of trees, diameter of trunks, density, crown cover, and undergrowth. Types of natural and cultivated vegetation of nonwooded areas.

   (3) Surface materials. Type and distribution of soils and subsoils in the area and soil trafficability. Soil content as it affects induced radiation.

   (4) Manmade features. Manmade changes in the topography, including roads, railroads, bridges, tunnels, mines, towns, industrial areas, and fortifications. Include type of construction.

c. Additional Characteristics. The following additional characteristics are considered, as pertinent, in separate subparagraphs: sociology, politics, economics, religion, psychology, and such other characteristics as science and technology, materiel, transportation, manpower, and hydrography. Under each of the characteristics considered, list all facts that pertain to the area of study and that may influence friendly and enemy courses of action. The extent of coverage required for these characteristics varies with the mission and other aspects of the operational environment. These characteristics

See footnote on page G-4.

Figure G-1. Format for the analysis of the area of operations.
are particularly important to theater combat service support units and to all units in a cold war situation. They influence, to some extent, the decisions of all commanders and become increasing importance as the area of interest of a command increases.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA

In this paragraph, the facts covered in the previous paragraph are analyzed to determine their influence on factors affecting tactical and combat service support activities that are considered in the development of specific courses of action. The analysis is divided into two parts—tactical aspects and combat service support aspects. The extent of the analysis of each of the two parts depends on the mission, those means available to accomplish the mission, and the possible means that the enemy can employ to prevent accomplishment of the mission. In considering the factors under each aspect, include the effects, as appropriate, of and on nuclear fires, chemical and enemy biological agents, and important devices and equipment used in implementing courses of action.

a. Tactical Aspects.

(1) Concealment and cover. Indicate graphically or describe the influence of weather, relief, vegetation, and manmade features. Include, as appropriate, effects of and on nuclear fires, surveillance devices, and chemical and enemy biological agents. This discussion is oriented on protection of friendly and enemy forces and on the effects on other operations, to include use of guerrillas or irregular forces, infiltration and counterinfiltration, tactical cover and deception, counterintelligence, armor, and artillery. This discussion also is oriented on site requirements for combat service support tactical installations.

(2) Observation and fire. Indicate graphically or describe the influence of weather, relief, vegetation, surface materials, manmade features, and other pertinent characteristics. Include any marked effects on surveillance devices, equipment based on line of sight, and fire delivery means. Effects on fire include effects on delivery means, fields of fire, and effectiveness of fires. Observation and fire are of concern to combat service support units because they influence rear area protection considerations.

(3) Obstacles. Indicate graphically or describe all natural and artificial obstacles and the influence of relief, weather, vegetation, surface materials, and manmade features. Include effects, as appropriate, of and on nuclear fires, chemical and enemy biological agents, and trafficability and accessibility. If of significant influence, indicate the effect of each obstacle on possible friendly and enemy courses of action. Obstacles and trafficability influence site locations for combat service support units.

(4) Key terrain features. Based on the analysis of concealment and cover, observation and fire, obstacles, and the mission, select the key terrain features. Consider any locality or area the seizure, retention, or control of which affords a marked advantage to either force. Briefly discuss, in turn, the influence of each key terrain feature listed. Discussion is oriented toward subsequent development of friendly and enemy courses of action. Revise as required by the commander's decision and the current situation. This discussion may be omitted when the enemy has no capability to secure or to control terrain features that will materially affect the accomplishment of the mission.

(5) Avenues of approach. Based on all previous analyses of the tactical aspects, develop possible avenues of approach. Development of avenues of approach does not consider the dispositions of enemy forces. An avenue of approach must afford some facility of movement and room for adequate dispersion for a force large enough to have a significant effect on the outcome of the operation. When either opposing force has available an adequate number of aircraft that can be used to deploy troops and equipment forward of the battle area and can significantly affect accomplishment of the mission, air avenues of approach may be listed. If terrain and weather conditions do not significantly influence

(Classification)
choice of flightpaths, air avenues of approach are not listed. Enemy avenues of approach are listed first, followed by a list of friendly avenues of approach into the enemy battle area. When the opposing forces are not in close contact, or when only security forces are in contact, avenues of approach to the battle area for both forces are listed. Each listing of an avenue of approach is accompanied by a brief discussion to provide a basis for subsequent development of possible courses of action by either force. For combat service support units, the discussion of avenues of approach is based on rear area protection requirements.

b. Combat Service Support Aspects. Analyze the facts listed in paragraph 2 and the subconclusions developed under tactical aspects (a above). Considering the activities listed below, isolate those facts and subconclusions that significantly influence choices of possible courses of action by either the friendly or the enemy force or that require special activities to insure combat effectiveness and adequate support. Omit any activity that is not significantly influenced.

(1) Personnel. Of particular importance when weather and terrain conditions are severe; when the area of operations has a significant population, to include potential labor forces; or when political and economic conditions are unsettled.

(2) Logistics. Of particular importance when weather and terrain conditions are severe, when the area of operations imposes additional logistic requirements or has significant resources of military value, or when political and economic conditions are unsettled. Detailed coverage is required for those commands whose mission is logistic support of other units.

(3) Civil-military operations requirements. Of particular importance to tactical units when the numbers of civilians in the area create control problems and restrict use of firepower. Detailed coverage is required for commands with extensive civil-military operations responsibilities.

4. EFFECTS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA

This paragraph contains the conclusions reached on the basis of the facts and subconclusions developed in the previous paragraphs. The final conclusions are stated in terms of effects on the general courses of action available to both friendly and enemy forces as indicated below.

a. Effect on Enemy Courses of Action. List, in turn, each significant possible enemy course of action, such as attack; defense; withdrawal; and use of air, armor, nuclear fires, chemical and biological agents, and guerrillas. Accompany each listed course of action (using separate subparagraphs) with a discussion to indicate the characteristics of the area favoring or not favoring the course of action. For attack courses of action, indicate the best avenue of approach. For defense courses of action, indicate the best defense areas and the best avenues of approach leading to the defense areas.

b. Effect on Own Courses of Action. Discuss as in a above those broad courses of action that will accomplish or facilitate accomplishment of the mission, such as attack or defense and withdrawal (including use of air, armor, nuclear fires and chemical agents, and irregular forces).

(See note.) /s/ G2

Note. If distributed outside the headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command, a message reference number is added, and the ending is appropriately modified.
ANALYSIS OF AREA OF OPERATIONS NO 7
Reference: Map, series AC-1, NESHUMA, sheets X-1 and Y-1, edition 71, 1:100,000.

1. PURPOSE AND LIMITING CONSIDERATIONS

a. Purpose. To analyze the area in the corps zone from near WYLA (2157) northwest to and including the POTAPAWI Canal (* * *).

b. Mission. Attack 140430 June; secure high ground 2140—2857; deny area south of POTAPAWI Canal to the enemy; protect army east flank.

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA

a. Climatic or Weather Conditions.

(1) Climate. Annex A (Climatic Summary).


(a) Precipitation. None predicted.

(b) Fog. None predicted.

(c) Temperature. From 72\(^\circ\) to 85\(^\circ\) F.

(d) Wind. Surface winds from the south 5 to 7 knots. Winds aloft for yields of tactical interest about 15 knots from the south.

(e) Cloudiness. None predicted.

(f) Atmospheric pressure. Average about 980 millibars.

(g) Moon. New moon, 19 June.

(h) Light data.

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<th>Date</th>
<th>BMNT</th>
<th>BMCT</th>
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b. Terrain.

(1) Relief and drainage systems. Area is drained by the ISHO River (* * *) on the east and northeast and by the ZOSHA River (* * *) on the south and southwest. The ridge from Hill 406 (1449) to ROTZ (2234) generally bisects the area. The major spurs of this ridge run generally east and west. The terrain is generally rolling, with a series of sharply rising tablelands. The KILRA (* * *), ISHO, and ZOSHA Rivers and the POTAPAWI Canal are unfordable. The ISHO River north of BRI-GITA (* * *) averages 30 meters wide and 2 meters deep. The ZOSHA River averages 15 meters wide and 2 meters deep. The POTAPAWI Canal has steep banks about 3 meters high and is about 18 to 22 meters wide at the top of the banks. All other rivers and streams are fordable, varying from 1 to 6 meters wide and about 35 centimeters deep. Annex B (Relief Overlay).

(2) Vegetation. Vegetation consists of growing crops, pasturelands, and wooded areas. Underbrush has been cleared throughout the area. Roads and streambanks are generally bordered with
trees. Small, scattered patches of trees are found in the lowland plains. Annex C (Vegetation Overlay).

(3) Surface materials. Surface material consists primarily of thick, clayey soil, with low sodium content, on a hard limestone base. Above 200-meter elevation, with few exceptions, the soil is capable of supporting heavy wheeled and tracked vehicles. The rains do not seriously affect trafficability. Below 200-meter elevation, and in stream bottoms, the soil can support only light tracked or wheeled vehicles moving singly and becomes impassable where the turf has been destroyed or where vehicles travel in column.

(4) Manmade features. The principal roads, north-south through BLIPP (1557) and BARDOI and east-west through BRIGITA and TACO (1451), are hard surfaced and 7 meters wide. The area is covered with an extensive network of secondary roads. All bridges on regularly maintained roads are two-way class 50. Villages consist of closely grouped buildings of brick or stone. Aggressor has constructed extensive field fortifications and artificial obstacles throughout the area that he occupies south of the POTAPAWI Canal. The artificial obstacles, primarily minefields and wire entanglements, are most extensive in the ZOSHA River valley and in the general area 1058–1268. Small coal mines are scattered throughout the area.

c. Sociology.

(1) The area is mostly rural. The farm villages have present populations of fewer than 100 each. The farmers are mostly workers on large farm properties recently confiscated by the Circle Trigon Government. The large towns in the area, listed below with present population, are market and mining centers.

(a) BRIGITA ............... 15,000.

(2) The political and economic instability that preceded the seizure of power by the Circle Trigon Party resulted in lowering of moral standards and breakdown of family control. Petty thievery, pilfering, and bribery are accepted ways of life. Juvenile delinquency by both males and females is common.

d. Economics. The economic instability of NESHUMA and last year's crop failure have resulted in near starvation conditions. Present crops ripen in September. Black-marketing and barter are the major types of trade. Aggressor ration controls are ineffective because there is little food or goods to be obtained through regular trade channels.

e. Psychology.

(1) The local population consists mostly of semi-illiterate farmers and miners, who are highly responsive to verbal and pictorial mediums appealing to their love of earth and country. They are distrustful of strangers and quick to violent anger when property is apparently needlessly destroyed.

(2) Except for a fanatic core of Circle Trigon officials, the local population is hostile to the Circle Trigon regime. This hatred has been fed by the ruthless land confiscation of the regime and the civilian labor impressment policies of the Aggressor forces. The local population expects the UN forces to restore farm property immediately to their original owners.

3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE AREA

a. Tactical Aspects.

(1) Concealment and cover.

(a) Relief. The rolling terrain affords partial cover and concealment from ground observation.
(ANAL OF AO 7—1st Corps)

The rolling terrain and numerous folds in the ground will provide some protection from thermal effects of nuclear bursts.

(b) Vegetation. IVAR Forest (1863) offers excellent concealment for large units. Woods throughout the area afford some protection from thermal effects because thick deciduous cover is in full leaf.

(c) Manmade features. Buildings in the area offer some cover from small-arms fire and shell fragments but do not provide protection from blast to any significant extent.

(2) Observation and fire.

(a) Weather conditions. Weather permits good air and ground observation. Continued dry weather will increase dust clouds caused by nuclear weapons and reduce observation for a significant period in nuclear target areas. Weather favors our use of smoke but not Aggressor's.

(b) Relief. From the Aggressor-held high ground, observation over approaches into his position is excellent. The Aggressor-held hills west of the KILRA and ISHO Rivers dominate the western part of the area. High ground near Hill 408 (1342) gives Aggressor excellent observation to the southwest, west, and north. The corps objective, with the spur extending south, gives Aggressor excellent observation over all approaches leading directly to it. Fields of fire for flat-trajectory weapons are generally short and good and excellent in valley bottoms and from the military crests of open hilltops. The excellent fields of fire on the southern slopes of DANKO Woods Ridge (**) and Hill 406 and from the southern slopes of the corps objective favor Aggressor defense. Long-range fields of fire to the north from DANKO Woods Ridge favor our attack after we have gained this area. Fields of fire for high-angle weapons are good throughout the area.

(c) Vegetation. In wooded areas, fields of fire for flat-trajectory weapons are restricted to trails and roads. Vegetation restricts ground-level observation. Forest fire smoke clouds will reduce observation throughout the area.

(d) Manmade features. Village church steeples are high enough to serve as excellent observation points.

(3) Obstacles.

(a) Relief. Terrain favors Aggressor use of persistent chemical agents in the valley forward of his present position. Drainage system consists of KILRA, ISHO, and ZOSHA Rivers and POTAPAWI Canal.

(b) Vegetation. Woods, especially the IVAR Forest, will become obstacles if blowdown occurs or if set afire and will favor use of persistent chemical agents. Cultivated areas will limit wheeled vehicles.

(c) Surface materials. In stream bottoms and below 200-meter elevation, the wet soil will magnify the cratering effects of subsurface nuclear bursts and will not support off-road vehicular traffic except for movement of single light vehicles.

(d) Manmade features. Extensive artificial obstacles, consisting of minefields and wire, are located on the west flank and in the area 1355—1657. These obstacles hinder movement and limit use of avenues of approach in these areas. Except for BRIGITA, buildings and villages do not present significant obstacles even if destroyed by blast.

(4) Key terrain features.

(a) GRILLVAR Hill mass (2041). This terrain feature controls the avenues of approach in the western part of the corps zone and is key terrain. If our plan of attack calls for a main effort in this area, we must progress south of it to insure success of the main effort.

(b) Hill 390 (1310) and Hill 421 (1820). If the enemy attacks before we do and secures or controls either or both of these hill masses, this will prevent, or at least seriously hinder, the launching of the corps attack.
(Classification)

(ANAL OF AO 7—1st Corps)

(c) TNOMYEH-NAOJ Ridge (°°°°). This ridge controls the area immediately south of the POTAPAWI Canal and all major crossings over the canal. Our mission cannot be accomplished without securing this terrain.

(5) Avenues of approach.
   (a) Available to Aggressor into our position.
      1. Axis IRVE (2538)—OLIRI (1832)—Hill 390. This approach is wide enough for at least two regiments with adequate dispersion. It leads almost directly to a key terrain feature, crosses few obstacles, has good trafficability, and has a fair road net.

   (b) Available to use into Aggressor's position.
      1. Axis Hill 398 (1138)—ALEXO (2042)—TNOMYEH-NAOJ Ridge. This approach is wide enough for at least one infantry division with adequate dispersion. It is a valley approach until ALEXO. The valley floor near ALEXO is partially blocked with minefields. When ALEXO is reached, high ground is retained all the way to the corps objective. The road net is excellent and there are no trafficability problems.

b. Combat Service Support Aspects.
   (1) Personnel. Sociological characteristics adversely affect discipline, law and order, use of civilian labor, and security of installations.

   (2) Logistics. Sociological characteristics adversely affect security of supply installations. Economic characteristics may impose additional logistic burdens. Mining areas may be sources of construction equipment and materiel.

   (3) Civil-military operations. Political, sociological, economic, and psychological characteristics create problems in control of civilians to prevent interference with operations and to maintain security. Distribution of instructions to civilians will require special measures.

4. EFFECTS OF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA

a. Effect on Enemy Courses of Action.
   (1) Effect on enemy defense.
      (a) Aggressor-held terrain favors defense in depth to the corps objective, with main defenses in the GRILLVAR Hill and TNOMYEH-NAOJ Ridge areas. Aggressor has excellent observation over all avenues of approach, and his flanks are protected by the rivers on the east and by the river and artificial obstacles on the west. The best avenues of approach to these areas are ** **.

      (b) The excellent visibility permits Aggressor to use his supporting fires to the maximum.

   (2) Effect on enemy attack.
      (a) Aggressor's best avenue of approach is the axis IRVE—OLIRI—Hill 390.

      (b) Excellent visibility limits unobserved Aggressor movements toward our positions except during darkness. Lack of precipitation favors cross-country mobility.

   (3) Effect on enemy air. Weather favors the Aggressor use of air. Terrain favors Aggressor use of air-delivered nuclear weapons as long as he controls DANKO Woods Ridge.

   (4) Effect on enemy use of nuclear weapons. Weather favors use of nuclear weapons. Effective winds do not favor use of fallout from nuclear weapons.

   (5) Effect on enemy use of chemical operations. Weather conditions do not favor use of non-persistent chemical agents. Terrain favors use of persistent chemical agents in the valley forward of his present defensive position. Extensive wooded areas also favor use of persistent chemical agents.

(Classification)
(CLASSIFICATION)

(ANAL OF AO 7—1st Corps)

(6) Effect on enemy electronic warfare operations. Enemy positions on high terrain favor his use of jamming to negate the effect of our communication and surveillance systems, especially if he chooses to make a defense in presently occupied positions.

b. Effect on Own Courses of Action.

(1) Our best avenue of approach is axis Hill 398—ALEXO—TNOMYEH-NAOJ Ridge.

(2) Weather and terrain do not favor our attack. They restrict our ability to maneuver toward the Aggressor positions without being observed except during darkness. The lack of precipitation favors cross-country mobility except below 200-meter elevation.

(3) Weather favors our use of nuclear weapons. The rolling terrain and the numerous folds provide some protection from thermal effects of nuclear bursts. Wooded areas are dry and easily set on fire. Soil composition does not favor the production of high dose rates of induced radiological contamination. Winds aloft favor our use of fallout nuclear weapons.

(4) Weather conditions favor our use of persistent chemical agents.

Acknowledge.

BOLTON
MG

OFFICIAL:
/s/ Seabrook
SEABROOK
G2

Annexes: A—Climatic Summary (omitted)
B—Relief Overlay (omitted)
C—Vegetation Overlay (omitted)

Distribution: A
### APPENDIX H

**STAFF RECORDS AND REPORTS**

*(STANAG 2020, 2022, AND 2029)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Records</th>
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<td>H-3</td>
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<td>Example H-2. Staff Section Workbook</td>
<td>H-4</td>
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<td>II.</td>
<td>Periodic Reports (Tactical Commands)</td>
<td>H-5</td>
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<td>Figure H-1. Periodic Personnel Report Format</td>
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<td>Example H-3. Periodic Personnel Report, Infantry Division</td>
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<td>Figure H-2. Periodic Intelligence Report Format</td>
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<td>Example H-4. Periodic Intelligence Report, Corps</td>
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<td>Figure H-5. Periodic Operation Report Format</td>
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<td>Example H-5. Periodic Operation Report, Armored Division</td>
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<td>Figure H-4. Periodic Logistic Report Format</td>
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<td>Example H-6. Periodic Logistic Report, Field Army</td>
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<td>Figure H-5. Periodic Civil Affairs Report Format</td>
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<td>Example H-7. Periodic Civil Affairs Report, Infantry Division</td>
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<td>III.</td>
<td>Miscellaneous Reports and Summaries</td>
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<td>Example H-8. Spot Report, Infantry Division</td>
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<td>Figure H-6. Personnel Daily Summary Format</td>
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<td>Example H-9. Intelligence Summary, Infantry Division (Mechanized)</td>
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<td>Figure H-7. Operational Situation Report Format</td>
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### Section I. RECORDS

**Example H-1. Staff Section Journal**

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#### DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

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<td>0710</td>
<td>G1—To stf meeting. Returned 0730.</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>0730</td>
<td>JA—Submitted rept on courts-martial cases tried during the past week.</td>
<td>S--F</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>0739</td>
<td>G4—CofS approved req to employ 100 civ in obt svc spt units in div rear area.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>0750</td>
<td>G1, 30th Army--Div quota of 250 spaces at theater lv fac for Dec.</td>
<td>S--T</td>
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<td>AG--100 repl rec yesterday and 200 repl are expected today.</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>1016</td>
<td>PM--Submitted rept on stragglers redirected during past week.</td>
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<td>1047</td>
<td>CG--No civ will be employed fwd of the DISCOM area.</td>
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<td>1130</td>
<td>G1, 1st Corps--Stf visit concerning various G1 matters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>CofS--Div comdr announced that all off commissioned through battlefield appointment will be asg to their present bn and may be asg to their present co when vacancy exists.</td>
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<td>AG--A large number of the 100 repl rec yesterday arrived with equip shortages.</td>
<td>G3, G4, CofS</td>
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</table>

**LEGEND**

- M--Situation map.
- S--Staff distribution.
- T--Distribution to troops.
- F--File.
### Example H-2. Staff Section Workbook

#### INTELLIGENCE (G2) WORKBOOK

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</table>

**Note 1.** Numbers on tabs refer to paragraphs in periodic intelligence report.

**Note 2.** The classification is stamped at the top and bottom of each page.

| Classification | 2a Armor | 2a Artillery (FA, ADA) | 2b Air | 2c and d Airborne and Irregular | 2e NBC | 2f Electronic warfare | 2g Other (new tactics, new weapons, admin activities) | 3a Order of battle (new unit identifications) | 3a New personalitites | 3a Enemy movements | 3b Enemy strength (KIA, WIA) | 3b Enemy equipment destroyed, captured | 3b PW | 4 Counterintelligence | 5 Weather | 6 Terrain | 7a and b Enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities | 7c Conclusions |
Section II. PERIODIC REPORTS (TACTICAL COMMANDS)

(Classification)

(Omit paragraphs and subparagraphs not applicable.)

Copy no ___ of ___ copies
Issuing headquarters
Place of issue
(may be in code)
Date-time group
(to include month and year)

PERIODIC PERSONNEL REPORT NO ___

Period covered: (date and time to date and time).

References: Maps (series number, sheet(s), edition, scale); charts, or reports.

Disposal instructions: (if any; e.g., DESTROY WITHIN 48 HOURS OF RECEIPT).

1. MAINTENANCE OF UNIT STRENGTHS

   a. Strengths. Authorized and assigned strengths at close of period and location of units (assigned and attached units listed separately). Gains during period: replacements, hospital returnees, and others. Losses during period: battle and nonbattle losses; administrative losses; losses of key officer and enlisted personnel.

   b. Replacements. Requisitions outstanding; qualifications and status of replacements.

2. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

   a. Military Personnel. Discussion of any unusual situations or problems concerning classification, assignment, promotion, transfer, reclassification, demotion, elimination, retirement, separation, rotation, and management of personnel as individuals.

   b. Civilian Personnel. Numbers and uses of civilians employed by unit.

   c. Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees/Detainees. Numbers of enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees/detainees captured or detained during period (listed by capturing unit) and comments on any unusual events or conditions.

3. DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF MORALE

   a. Morale and Personnel Services. Concise statement of status of morale in units, including factors contributing toward good and poor morale conditions; tabulation of personnel visiting leave centers and personnel receiving awards and decorations; and summary of other personnel services provided.

   b. Graves Registration. Burials completed and dead awaiting burial (own and enemy); numbers of dead, including identified and unidentified; and location of cemeteries and burial sites.

4. HEALTH SERVICES

   a. Evacuation. Injured, sick, and wounded personnel: on hand at start of period; received from supported units; received from own units; evacuated by air, rail, water, and road; returned to duty; died; on hand at end of period awaiting evacuation by air, rail, water, and road. Include data on allied, civilian, and enemy prisoner-of-war patients, when appropriate.

   (Classification)

Figure H-1. Periodic personnel report format.
b. Hospitalization. Show beds authorized, assigned, and in operation; bed credits authorized and in use (based on the capability of medical treatment facilities operating in support of the command).

5. MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER
Military discipline, military justice, comments on straggling, and any usual problems concerning law and order.

6. HEADQUARTERS MANAGEMENT
Displacements, standards of shelter throughout the area, and use by the headquarters of private and nonmilitary public buildings.

7. MISCELLANEOUS
Important engagements participated in and names of individuals distinguishing themselves in such engagements. Add (as an annex) photographs of personnel and important scenes or events bearing on personnel activities.

Commander

Annexes

(Classification)

Figure H-1—Continued.
PERIODIC PERSONNEL REPORT NO 18
Period covered: 281800 Jun to 051800 Jul 19.
Reference: ***.

1. MAINTENANCE OF UNIT STRENGTHS
   a. Strengths.
      (1) Authorized and assigned strengths.
         (a) Assigned units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Authorized strength</th>
<th>Assigned strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Off</td>
<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/20th Inf Div</td>
<td>XM6545</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/1st Bde</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-66 Inf</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-71 Inf</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1 Armor</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-43 ADA</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-21 Cav</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHB/20th Inf Div</td>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1 FA</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Avn Bn</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/20th DISCOM</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Maint</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(PD PERS REPT 18—20th Inf Div)

(b) Attached units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Authorized strength</th>
<th>Assigned strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Off</td>
<td>WO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA plt</td>
<td>XM6636</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6 Armor</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Gains during period.

(a) Assigned units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Replacements</th>
<th>Hospital returnees</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-66 Inf</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-67 Inf</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-43 ADA</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1 Armor</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Engr</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1 FA</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Avn Bn</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC/20th DISCOM</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th S&amp;T</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Attached units. None.

(3) Losses during period.

(a) Assigned units.

1. Battle losses.
   (a) Killed in action

   Number of losses:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Off</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (b) Died of wounds or injuries received in action

   Number of losses:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Off</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (c) Wounded or injured in action

   (d) Missing in action

   (Classification)
(Classification)

(PD PERS REPT 18—20th Inf Div)

(e) Captured ........................................***  ***  ***

Total ........................................***  ***  ***

2. Nonbattle losses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Administrative losses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Key personnel losses during period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Position occupied</th>
<th>Nature of loss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James A. Brown</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>CO, 1st Bde/20th Inf Div</td>
<td>KIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Attached units.

1. Battle losses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Nonbattle losses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Administrative losses. None.
4. Key personnel losses during period. None.

b. Replacements.
   (1) Requisitions outstanding. Requisitions for 36 officers, 17 warrant officers, and 1,145 enlisted men were outstanding at the close of the period.
   (2) Qualifications and status of replacements. Officer and enlisted replacements received during this period possess the necessary physical and technical qualifications. Replacements necessary to keep units up to authorized strength have not been received.

2. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
      (1) Personnel who have been certified by medical officers as unfit for combat or combat support continue to be returned to the division. Tactical units have absorbed as many of these returnees as possible; others have been reassigned to service units within the division. The division has reached its saturation point in this regard. Physically unfit personnel should not be returned to their units within the division.
      (2) Officer promotion and appointment.
         (a) MAJ to LTC .......................... 1
         (b) CPT to MAJ .......................... 2
         (c) 1LT to CPT ......................... 11
         (d) 2LT to 1LT ......................... 19
         (e) Battlefield appointment .......... 1
         Total .................................. 34
      (3) Two officers have been relieved from duty for inefficiency.
   b. Civilian Personnel. The division has employed an average of 200 indigenous personnel for general labor on road construction and similar projects.
   c. Enemy Prisoners of War.
      (1) Enemy captured during period.
         |
         | Off WO EM
         |---|---|---|
         | 5 | 0 | 136 |
         |   |   | ***|
         |   |   | ***|
         |   |   | ***|
         |   |   | ***|
         |   |   | ***|
         | 42 | 2 | 945 |
      (2) Comments. During the period 2—4 July, no enemy prisoners of war were evacuated by army, which has placed a burden on the division.

3. DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF MORALE
      (1) Morale is excellent in all units except the 1–66 Inf. Assignment of recently arrived, experienced company commanders to this unit should improve its condition.
(PD PERS REPT 18—20th Inf Div)

(2) Personnel visiting 30th Army leave center.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Off</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Decorations awarded.

(a) Recapitulation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>DSC</th>
<th>Silver Star</th>
<th>Bronze Star</th>
<th>Purple Heart</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 1st Bde</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 2d Bde</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ, 3d Bde</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-66 Inf</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-67 Inf</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-68 Inf</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-69 Inf</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-70 Inf</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-71 Inf</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-72 Inf</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-73 Inf</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-76 Mech</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1 Armor</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-16 Armor</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-21 Cav</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-43 ADA</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Inf Div Arty</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Sig</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Engr</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Individual names. Annex A (Decorations).

(4) Postal services have improved since last reporting period and are now satisfying all requirements adequately.

(5) Bath, laundry, and clothing exchange services have been adequate. However, the tactical situation has prevented 2d Bde from using the services during the reporting period.

b. Graves Registration.

(1) Recapitulation by unit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Off</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-66 Inf</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-67 Inf</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-69 Inf</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-70 Inf</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-71 Inf</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1 Armor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1 FA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unit

Off | WO | EM

1-5 FA  | 1  | 0  | 3
1-43 ADA | 0  | 0  | 2
1-21 Cav | 2  | 0  | 9
20th S&T | 0  | 0  | 1
1-6 Armor | 1  | 0  | 7

Total  | 19 | 0  | 180

(2) Individual names of deceased. Annex B (Burials).

4. HEALTH SERVICES

a. General. Medical facilities have been adequate for the reporting period.

b. Evaluation.

On hand start of period ......................... 187
Received during period ....................... 314
Total ........................................ 501

Evacuated during period:

- Air ........................................ 127
- Rail ........................................ 0
- Highway ................................... 193
- Died ....................................... 12
- Total ........................................ 332

On hand end of period ......................... 169

c. Hospitalization.

Hospital beds ................................. 300
In operation ................................. 240
Occupied .................................. 169
Vacant ....................................... 71

5. MAINTENANCE OF DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER

a. Discipline.

(1) Absent without leave ......................... 0 0 10
(2) Desertion .................................. 0 0 2
(3) Looting ................................... 0 0 0
(4) Self-inflicted wounds ....................... 0 0 3
(5) Other ..................................... 1 0 8

Total ........................................ 1 0 23

b. Military Justice.

(1) Courts-martial.

(a) General .................................. 0 0 1
(b) Special ................................. 0 0 3
(Classification)

(PD PERS REPT 18—20th Inf Div)

(c) Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Off</th>
<th>WO</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (2) Charges preferred.
| (a) General | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| (b) Special | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| (c) Summary | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Total    | 0 | 0 | 7 |

c. Comments.

(1) There has been an increase in abuse of civilian property during the period. Strict disciplinary action is being taken.

(2) Prevention and control of straggling were improved during operations at the end of the period.

6. HEADQUARTERS MANAGEMENT

CP displaced three times, rear echelon once.

7. MISCELLANEOUS

During the period 28 June—1 July, the division was in corps reserve. During the period 2—5 July, the division has been attacking.

KAYHE
MG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Zecca
ZECCA
G1

Annexes: A—Decorations (omitted)
B—Burials (omitted)

Distribution: * * *
PERINTREP NO __

Period covered: (date and time to date and time).

References: Maps (series number, sheet(s), edition, scale).

Disposal instructions: (if any; e.g., DESTROY WITHIN 48 HOURS OF RECEIPT).

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

This paragraph contains a brief summary of enemy operations during the period. Amplifying details are furnished in the paragraphs that follow and in appropriate annexes, or both. This paragraph provides brief highlights of the enemy situation and the significance of the enemy's major activities, to include marked changes in morale, strengths, dispositions, tactics, combat effectiveness, and equipment. Data that are lengthy or can conveniently be shown graphically are presented in annexes.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES

This paragraph, in conjunction with those following, provides the details of the situation summarized in paragraph 1. Detailed intelligence provided in this paragraph covers all operational activities. Information may be presented graphically by overlays, printed maps, sketch maps, and annexes. Subparagraphs are omitted when appropriate intelligence is not available or is adequately covered by other portions of this report.

a. Ground. (Primarily includes activities of combat arms, reserves, and reinforcements; also includes enemy defenses, minefields, fortifications, barriers, obstacles, and other defensive works.)

b. Air. (Includes air force activities, such as bombing, close air support, tactical air reconnaissance and surveillance, and air-supported operations.)

c. Airborne.

d. Irregular.

e. Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Operations.

f. Electronic Warfare.

g. Other. (Normally includes other than combat arms; includes appropriate comments not covered in other subparagraphs on reserves, reinforcements, new tactics, weapons and equipment, administrative installations, and combat service support. Also includes appropriate technical intelligence.)

3. ORDER OF BATTLE

Frequently, this paragraph will consist only of references to the enemy situation map (or overlay) and to the order of battle annex, which is developed using the format shown below. When desired by the commander, particularly significant order of battle changes may be summarized in this paragraph in addition to being discussed in detail in the order of battle annex.

(Classification)

Figure H-2. Periodic intelligence report format.
(Classification)

(Short title identification)

a. Composition and Disposition.

b. Strength. (Personnel and major weapons and items of equipment.)
   (1) Losses.
   (2) Current strength.

c. Tactics.

d. Training.

e. Combat Service Support.

f. Combat Effectiveness.

g. Miscellaneous Data.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
This paragraph, or parts thereof, should be issued as an annex if a limited distribution is required.

a. General. (A short summary of the counterintelligence situation during the period.)

b. Espionage.

c. Sabotage.

d. Subversion.

e. Communication and Noncommunication Security.

f. Miscellaneous.

5. WEATHER
This paragraph gives a summary of the effect of weather on operations during the period.

6. TERRAIN
Use an annex, special maps, and overlays, when possible. Include impact on future operations, if appropriate.

7. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
This paragraph lists and discusses briefly enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. The conclusions present the commander's assessment of the most probable courses of action available to the enemy in order of probability of adoption and vulnerabilities that are exploitable by own, higher, or lower levels of command.

a. Enemy Capabilities.

b. Enemy Vulnerabilities.

c. Conclusions.

Signature block

Authentication:

Annexes: (Any intelligence document may be distributed as an annex to a PERINTREP. Although annexes are a means of distributing detailed intelligence and information, care is exercised to avoid unnecessary bulk and duplication.)

Distribution:

(Classification)

Figure H-2—Continued.
PERINTREP NO 50

Period covered: 240001—242400 February 19


Disposal instructions: UNITS BELOW DIVISION LEVEL DESTROY WITHIN 48 HOURS OF RECEIPT.

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

Enemy resistance intensified during our attack. Aggressor launched several counterattacks, to include the recapture of * * * at 0700 by a force estimated at two rifle battalions supported by 10 tanks and an estimated 1-KT high-airburst nuclear weapon delivered at 0645 hours at * * *. An attack in battalion strength was defeated in Aggressor's attempt to regain * * *. Defensive construction north of * * * River continues. Extensive minefields and antitank ditches are being constructed along the line * * * where wired-in entrenchments and emplaced antitank weapons already exist. The unidentified tank division near * * * has started to displace to dispersal areas near * * *. Annex A (Enemy Situation). Annex B (Potential Nuclear Targets).

2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES

a. Ground.

(1) Armor. Ten tanks supported the attack in two-battalion strength in recapturing * * *. No other tank action reported during the period.

(2) Artillery. Light harassing artillery fire was reported near Hill * * * before 1400. During the remainder of the period, the firing increased in this area in support of a counterattack. The greatest number of enemy artillery missions occurred near * * * in support of the attack on * * * and its subsequent defense.

(6) Engineer. Bridges along Highway * * * at * * * are reported ready for demolition. New minefields are located south of * * *. Enemy PW state that greatly increased mine-laying activity is in progress north of * * * near * * *. Appendix 1 (Overlay) to Annex A (Enemy Situation).

b. Air. Fifteen medium bombers attacked our rear area supply installations at 2315. A gas dump at * * * was ignited and 12 vehicles destroyed in a motor park near * * *. Enemy increased air-ground support during the afternoon by bombing and strafing in grid squares * * *.

c. Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Operations. The 1-KT high-airburst nuclear weapon fired at 0645 hours at * * * was delivered by undetermined means. This was the first nuclear weapon delivered in the corps area in the last 3 days. * * * Annex B (Potential Nuclear Targets). Location of nuclear delivery means is shown in Appendix 1 to Annex A.

3. ORDER OF BATTLE

a. Composition and Disposition. Recent intelligence indicates enemy 40th Tk Div to be attached to 2d Comb Arms Army effective 2 March.
(PERINTREP 50—1st Corps)


4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. General. There was no marked change in the counterintelligence situation during the period. Use of female agents was reported, and emphasis on location of nuclear warhead storage sites continued. Extensive use was made of artillery-delivered propaganda.

b. Espionage. A female Aggressor agent was captured at * * *. The agent confessed that her mission was to locate nuclear warhead storage sites and that there were many other agents in the area with this same mission.

c. Sabotage. Censorship of civilian mail revealed a strong subversive element among transportation workers in the city of * * * and contemplated sabotage of rail facilities there.

d. Miscellaneous. Aggressor fired about 200 shells containing propaganda leaflets all along the corps front. The leaflets stressed the futility of attacking * * * in view of Aggressor's capabilities and promised safe passage of lines for all who would surrender.

5. WEATHER
Annex D (Weather Summary).

6. TERRAIN
Annex E (Special Terrain Study).

7. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

a. Enemy Capabilities. Enemy can—

(1) Continue to defend in place with three mechanized divisions supported by estimated 24 artillery battalions and four antitank battalions.

(5) Employ within the corps area from five to 20 nuclear weapons per month with probable yields of 50 KT or less, employing all available delivery means.

b. Enemy Vulnerabilities.

(1) West flank from * * * to * * * is open to envelopment.

c. Conclusions. Aggressor will continue to defend in present position pending reinforcement by 40th Tk Div, at which time he will initiate a general offensive with main attack directed vicinity * * *.

UNGER
MG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Forsyth
FORSYTH
G2

Annexes: A—Enemy Situation, with Appendix 1 (Overlay) (omitted)
B—Potential Nuclear Targets (omitted)
C—Order of Battle (omitted)
D—Weather Summary (omitted)
E—Special Terrain Study (omitted)

Distribution: A
PERIODIC OPERATION REPORT NO ___

Period covered: (date and time to date and time).

References: Maps (series number, sheet(s), edition, scale).

Disposal instructions: (if any; e.g., DESTROY WITHIN 48 HOURS OF RECEIPT).

1. OWN SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD
A statement of the situation as it existed at the end of the period, to include any special conditions that should be brought to the attention of higher headquarters, the location of major troop units, and pertinent activities of each. As much detail as possible is indicated graphically on a situation overlay or map attached as an annex.

2. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS
Any information relative to activities of adjacent and supporting units during the period that are of importance to the operations of the command, to include operations of air, naval, and ground units.

3. OWN OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD
A resume of the operations that have been carried out by the major subordinate combat units of the command arranged in order of combined arms commands, infantry, armor, artillery, combat support, and others. Include any activities of operational importance and movements of units. Details, as appropriate, may be shown on a situation overlay or map attached as an annex.

4. COMBAT EFFICIENCY
A statement of the combat efficiency of the command, to include any pertinent changes during the period. Consideration, as appropriate, will be given to morale, strength, status of training, status of health, status of supplies and equipment, and time that units have been in contact.

5. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
A statement of the results of operations conducted by the command, as a whole, and by major subordinate combat units, as appropriate, to include any specific results that would have an effect on the assignment of future missions to the command, as a whole, or by the command to subordinate combat units. Any details of successes or failures of interest to the next higher command will be included.

6. MISCELLANEOUS
Details not appropriate to above paragraphs, such as weather, road conditions of importance, and any other factors that have had a bearing on operations of the command.

(Classification)

Figure H–8. Periodic operation report format.
Example H-5. Periodic Operation Report, Armored Division

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no 3 of _____ copies
23d Armd Div
WORMS (MV5599), GERMANY
190010Z Dec 19—
MX 57

PERIODIC OPERATION REPORT NO 17
Period covered: 180001 to 182400 Dec 19—

1. OWN SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD
Annex A (Situation Overlay).

2. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS
Air atk delivered on en pos north of HEIDELBERG (***), between 0600 and 0630.

3. OWN OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD
   a. Combined Arms Commands.
      (1) 1st Bde secured bridges intact over NECKAR River near WEINHEIM (***).
      (2) 2d Bde secured crossings over NECKAR River near NEU WALDORF (***).
      (3) 3d Bde, Div Res, moved from near KIRCHHEIM (***), to asy area near SANHOFEN (***).
   b. Reconnaissance. 1-22 Cav protected div south flank.
   c. Artillery.
      (1) FA: All bn spt atk. One 2-KT nuclear weapon fired by A/1-15 FA in spt of 2d Bde.
      (2) ADA: 1-44 ADA (C/V) protected bridges over the RHINE River.
   d. Engineers. 23d Engr improved crossings over the RHINE River and maintained MSR to KAI-
      SERSLAUTERN (MV1178).
     4. COMBAT EFFICIENCY
Div str 87 percent; casualties: 1st Bde, 2 percent; 2d Bde, 5 percent. Morale excellent. Combat efficiency excellent.

5. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
Div atk at 0630 hours, crossed NECKAR River, and is now dspo as shown in Annex A (Situation Overlay). Prep to cont atk on HEIDELBERG at 190650 Dec.

6. MISCELLANEOUS
   a. Weather. Snow and sleet from 0400 to 0600 had little effect on operation. Cold and cloudy.
   b. Canals and swamps in RHINE and NECKAR River valleys delayed div progress temporarily.

JOHNSON
MG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Gaustad
GAUSTAD
G3

Annex: A—Situation Overlay (ommitted)
Distribution: A

H-20
Note. Omit subparagraphs not applicable. This report may include important items of information relative to anticipated activities besides those concerning the period covered. The periodic logistic report is never prepared on a map or an overlay; however, annexes, consisting of maps, overlays, and other data, should be used to shorten the body of the report, when practicable. Use only those abbreviations that are in common usage and arrange data in tabular form, where possible. The use of coded headings to simplify the transmission of routine statistical data in abbreviated form of a short-period report is a common practice, especially in reports from lower units.

PERIODIC LOGISTIC REPORT NO.

Period covered: (date and time to date and time).

References: Map (series number, sheet(s), edition, scale).

Disposal instructions: (if any; e.g., DESTROY WITHIN 48 HOURS OF RECEIPT).

1. LOGISTIC SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

Locations of boundaries, installations, trains, and troops pertaining to supply, evacuation, transportation, service, and miscellaneous operations. (Indicate on map or overlay, where possible).

2. SUPPLY

a. Supported Strength. Average strength supported during period, including military personnel, civilian labor, enemy prisoners of war, and civilian internees/detainees.

b. Status of Supply. Show status of each item of supply that is critical or of particular importance at the time.

c. Local Procurement. For each service and procurement area, show quantity and value (indicate whether actual or estimated) of materiel procured locally.

d. Miscellaneous. Excess, salvage, captured enemy materiel; supplies and special supplies, such as forms and publications, exchange items, civil affairs supplies, and special services supplies. Include applicable information as in b above.

3. SERVICE

a. Transportation. For each pertinent item, outline briefly the progress of major movements and bottlenecks.

   (1) Highway.

      (a) Transportation vehicles and motive power classified by principal run or local area. For each type of vehicle or motive power, show total available, total operating, total deadlined, and breakdown of deadlined equipment into categories of maintenance.

      (b) Tonnage of supplies, number of vehicles, and number of persons transported, classified by principal run or local area.

      (c) Terminal operations. Show, for each, tonnage of supplies, number of vehicles, and number of persons loading and unloading; terminal equipment available and working.

Figure H-4. Periodic logistic report format.
(Classification)

(Short title identification)

(2) Air. Similar to (1) above.
(3) Rail. Similar to (1) above.
(4) Water. Similar to (1) above.
(5) Pipeline.
(6) Supply movement. Tonnage of supplies received in area and evacuated from area. Classify by means of transportation.
(7) Personnel movement. Number of personnel received in area and evacuated from area. Classify by means of transportation.

b. Construction. List principal projects, showing percentage of completion and projected operational and completion date for each.

c. Installations. For the principal installations of each service not covered above, show workload on hand at start of period, received, completed, and on hand at end of period, classified to conform to the class of work performed. List installations opened and closed during period (state location, date, and time).

d. Miscellaneous. Real estate, laundry, bath, clothing exchange, decontamination, and impregnation/reimpregnation, as required.

4. MAINTENANCE
Show quantity of principal items or classes of equipment awaiting maintenance on hand at start of period, received, completed, and on hand at end of period. Also show major items of equipment deadlined, by type and reason therefor, and items of equipment evacuated.

5. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Boundaries. Changes during the period and activities relative to anticipated changes.

b. Headquarters. Locations and activities relative to movements during the period and activities relative to anticipated changes.

c. Changes in Assignment During Period; Assigned; Relieved. (Show date and time.)

d. Protection. Losses or damage to logistic activities due to enemy, subversive, or natural causes. State corrective action taken.

e. Plans and Orders. Receipt and issue of basic combat service support plans or instructions. Attach a copy of each administrative/logistics order (or changes thereto) issued since the preceding report.

f. Other Logistic Matters. Logistic matters not otherwise covered, such as exploitation of civilian and enemy prisoner labor.

Authentication:

Commander

Annexes:

Distribution:

(Classification)

Figure H-4—Continued.
Example H-6. Periodic Logistic Report, Field Army

PERIODIC LOGISTIC REPORT NO 16 (Partial)
Period covered: 071800 to 120800 May 19__


1. LOGISTIC SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD
Annex A (Administrative Overlay).

2. SUPPLY
   a. Supported Strength. (Average for period reported.)
      (1) US Army.
      Assigned military:
      30th Army (incl indiv replacements) 269,300
      TASCOM 17,801
      Total military personnel 287,101
      Civilian labor:
      Mobile 155
      Static 625
      Total civilian labor 780
      Other:
      Hospital patients 3,947
      Enemy PW's and civilian internees/detainees 2,000
      Civilian (needy) 414,000
      Total other 419,947
      TOTAL US ARMY 707,828
      (2) US Air Force.
      Military personnel 2,795
      Civilian labor (static) 0
      TOTAL US AIR FORCE 2,795
      (3) US Navy.
      Military personnel 300
      Civilian labor (static) 0
      TOTAL US NAVY 300
   b. Status of Supply.
      (1) Levels. No change.
      (2) Short supply items. Annex B (Short Supply Items).
   c. Local Procurement. Annex C (Local Procurement).
d. Miscellaneous.
   (1) Captured enemy materiel. None.
   (2) Scrap. Annex D (Scrap).

3. SERVICE

   a. Transportation.
   (1) Highway.
      (b) Employment.

      | Vehicles dispatched | Cargo hauled (STON) | Personnel hauled (no) |
      |---------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
      | Cargo               | 9,365              | 37,472                | -         |
      | Personnel           | 497                | -                     | 9,937     |
      | Total               | 9,862              | 37,472                | 9,937     |

   (2) Air.
      (b) Employment.

      1. Forward movements.
         Cargo (STON) 2,428
         Personnel (no) 2,235

      2. Evacuation.
         Cargo (STON) 289
         Personnel (no) 2,455

   (3) Supply movement.
      (a) Tonnage (STON) received in 30th Army by—
         Highway 12,474
         Air 2,727
         Rail 17,172
         Total 32,373
      (b) Tonnage (STON) evacuated from 30th Army by—
         Highway 743
         Air
         Rail 3,110
         Total 3,853

   (4) Personnel movement.
      (a) Number received in 30th Army by—
         Highway 4,490
         Air 8,027
         Rail 17,294
         Total 29,811
      (b) Number evacuated from 30th Army by—
         Highway 2,105
         Air 2,455
         Rail 6,645
         Total 11,205

(PD LOG REPT 16—30th Army)

4. MAINTENANCE
Annex H (Maintenance).

5. MISCELLANEOUS
   a. Boundaries. No change.
   b. Headquarters. No change.
   c. Changes in Assignment. None.
   d. Protection. * * *
   e. Plans and Orders. Admin/Log Order 7, issued 110800 May.
   f. Other Logistic Matters. * * *

ARCHER
LTG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Andre.
ANDRE
G4

Annexes: A—Administrative Overlay (omitted)
B—Short Supply Items (omitted)
C—Local Procurement (omitted)
D—Scrap (omitted)
E—Vehicle Status Report (omitted)
F—Aircraft Status Report (omitted)
G—Construction (omitted)
H—Maintenance

Distribution: * * *
ANNEX H (MAINTENANCE) to PERIODIC LOGISTIC REPORT NO 16—30th Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>OH start of period</th>
<th>Rec during period</th>
<th>Completed during period</th>
<th>Evac during period</th>
<th>OH end of period</th>
<th>OH awaiting parts</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Amplifier converter, AM-914/TRC</td>
<td>ea</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,118</td>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>3,539</td>
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<td>ea</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amplifier converter, AM-914/TRC</td>
<td>ea</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tk, cbt, 105-mm gun, M60</td>
<td>ea</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
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<td>*</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Classification)
PERIODIC CIVIL AFFAIRS REPORT NO __

Period covered: (date and time to date and time).
References: Maps (series number, sheet(s), edition, scale) or charts.
Disposal instructions: (if any; e.g., DESTROY WITHIN 48 HOURS OF RECEIPT).

1. CIVIL AFFAIRS SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

Location of civil affairs units and pertinent activities of each; any important changes in civil affairs operational zones or areas; principal incidents and events since last report. (Indicate on map or overlay annex, where possible.)

2. GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

(Use annexes as necessary.)

a. Civil Administration.
   (1) Screening—removal, appointment of officials.
   (2) Political intelligence activities.

b. Tribunals.

c. Public Safety.

d. Public Health.

e. Public Welfare.

f. Public Education.

g. Labor.

h. Public Finance.

i. Civil Defense.

3. ECONOMICS

(Use annexes as necessary; arrange in tabular form, when practicable.)

a. Economics and Commerce.

b. Food and Agriculture.

c. Property Control.

d. Civilian Supply.

Figure H-5. Periodic civil affairs report format.
4. PUBLIC FACILITIES
   a. Public Works and Utilities.
   b. Public Transportation.
   c. Public Communications.

5. SPECIAL FUNCTIONS
   a. Civil Information.
   b. Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees.
   c. Fine Arts, Monuments, and Archives.
   d. Religious Relations.

6. MISCELLANEOUS
Indicate any special recommendations and requests, such as special civil affairs personnel problems existing, requisition for additional units, recommendations for lifting of controls and restrictions, recommendations for troop indoctrination, and other matters not properly covered in paragraphs above.

Commander

Authentication:

Annexes:

Distribution:
PERIODIC CIVIL AFFAIRS REPORT NO 7

Period covered: 071800 Jun to 141600 Jun 19__.

Reference: Map, series 891, sheet (* * *), edition 4, 1:25,000.

Disposal instructions: DESTROY WITHIN 72 HOURS OF RECEIPT.

1. CIVIL AFFAIRS SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD
   a. Annex A (Civil Affairs Overlay).
   b. 2d Plt, 204th CA Co, attached in addition to division civil affairs company, remains in LANCIANO after division moves forward.
   c. Annex C (Civil Affairs) to OPORD 7, issued 101400 Jun 19__.
   d. Operations during the period have resulted in establishment of law and order, provision for medical care of civilians, distribution of food, issuance of salvage clothing, and establishment of collecting point for civilians without identification papers.

2. GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
   a. Civil Administration.
      (1) Screening—removal, appointment of officials. The mayor of LANCIANO and most of the local governmental officials withdrew with enemy forces. The remaining officials are friendly to the United States and provide a source of information on enemy agents, persons sympathetic to the enemy, and enemy sabotage or subversive groups. Italian officials who have accompanied US forces are being placed in governmental offices. Existing governmental structure is being retained because of requirements of the military situation.
      (2) Political intelligence activities.
         (a) Sociological. Population is generally friendly, although dissident labor elements in rear areas have attempted to interfere with military operations by sabotage and passive resistance. Investigation indicates that dissident elements are enemy inspired. Population is generally apprehensive of employment of nuclear weapons.
         (b) Enemy component elements. Civilian officials report that the enemy is preparing to destroy animals and crops near PLUDUNO (* * *) by use of biological agents.
         (c) Espionage. Possibly at least eight enemy agents are operating in the LANCIANO areas.
         (d) Sabotage. Aggressor radio and transmitter and a small quantity of explosives have been discovered buried near LANCIANO.
         (e) Political subversion. Present attitude of remaining local officials will make further infiltration of collaborationists into local government difficult.
      (3) Counterintelligence documents. Documents of counterintelligence value have been found in the town hall and turned over to the G2.

(Classification)
b. Public Safety.

(1) Civilian police are assisting military police in maintaining law and order.

(2) As constituted, civilian police are capable of resolving local problems but cannot contribute materially to the prevention of sabotage.

c. Public Health.

(1) State of public health is generally good.

(2) Emergency medical supplies are being issued by division for civilian use. Additional medical supplies reportedly are in the area, and public health conditions are expected to improve.

d. Labor.

(1) Surveys are being conducted to determine amount of labor available by category and skill.

(2) Labor data.

| Available for military use in division area | 5,000 |
| Available for military employment as mobile labor | 3,000 |
| Employed in rehabilitation of public facilities and economy in division area | 4,000 |
| Total labor force in division area | 12,000 |

e. Civil Defense.

(1) Plans for civil defense are being integrated into rear area protection plans.

(2) Rear area civil defense and area damage control equipment has been surveyed. With exception of firefighting equipment, equipment is considered adequate for present requirement.

3. ECONOMICS

a. Food and Agriculture.

(1) Because this is primarily an agricultural area, local supplies of food are adequate for civilian use. However, a serious food shortage has been reported in PLUDUNO. Survey has been initiated to verify intelligence previously received.

(2) Local supplies of food in excess of civilian requirements are being warehoused for distribution in food-deficient areas.

b. Civilian Supply.

(1) Salvage clothing is being issued from military stocks for civilian use.

(2) No change is anticipated in estimated requirements for civilian supply.

(3) Copy of requisition submitted for engineer firefighting equipment is attached an annex B.

4. PUBLIC FACILITIES

a. Public Works and Utilities.

(1) Local water supply is polluted. Adequate military water purification equipment is now in operation.

(2) Civilian light and power systems are able to supply only minimum requirements for hospitals and other essential facilities.

b. Public Communications. Public communications are being restored. Estimate minimum civilian telephone communications will be available within 4 days.
5. SPECIAL FUNCTIONS

   a. Civil Information. News media are being reestablished. Estimate minimum press media will be available in 3 days.

   b. Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees.

      (1) Screening of displaced persons is progressing. Suspected subversives or plants average 12 percent.

      (2) Division collecting point contains approximately 1,000 civilians without identification papers. These civilians will be evacuated to camp in corps rear area, when established.

      (3) Disease and unrest supplies for displaced persons are not in excess of requirements stated in strategic-logistic study.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

   a. Inasmuch as the enemy can be expected to use all agencies and sources, including radio interception and agents, to gain information on military operations, recommend close communication discipline and careful monitoring of civil communications.

   b. In view of enemy political intelligence activities, recommend that additional means be provided this division to reinforce civil security in LANCIANO.

   c. Recommend that the engineer firefighting equipment requisitioned for LANCIANO be supplied at the earliest possible date.

   d. In view of impact of nuclear weapons in area, recommend intensive public information and indoctrination program to alleviate public uncertainty.

GREEN
MG

OFFICIAL:
/s/Blue
BLUE
G5

Annexes: A—Civil Affairs Overlay (omitted)
B—Requisition for Firefighting Equipment (omitted)

Distribution: A
Section III. MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS AND SUMMARIES

Example H-8. Spot Report, Infantry Division

Note. Spot reports are one-time reports used by all levels of command to transmit intelligence information of immediate value. No format is prescribed; however, the report should answer the questions who, what, where, and when. The two types of spot reports used most often are the hot report and the flash report. Speed of transmission is essential in both types, with the flash report having the higher priority.

(Classification)

FROM: CO 1st Bde

TO: CG 20th Inf Div

Message No 28, DTG 281416 July 19 . Recon patrol observed and identified 10 medium tanks of 2d Bn, 307th Mech Div, in open column moving west on Highway 10 at approx 20 kmph, near FULDA (MA3765) at 281410 hr.

(Classification)
Personnel Daily Summary No _____ as of _____, 19_____
(time) (date)

**HEADQUARTERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th><strong>Strength</strong></th>
<th><strong>Daily losses</strong></th>
<th>Gains</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auth (b) Asg (c) Pers/dy (d)</td>
<td>KIA (e) WIA (f) MIA (g) Nonbat admin (h) Total (i)</td>
<td>(j)</td>
<td>(k)-(w)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Figures that have not changed during the period need not be transmitted.

Explanation of columns:
a—Includes all assigned and attached units.  b—Shows TOE authorized strength, to include assigned and attached units.  c—Shows assigned strength, to include assigned and attached units.  d—Indicates number of personnel present for duty.  e—f—g—Self-explanatory.  h—Shows total personnel lost because of nonbattle deaths, injuries, disease or for administrative reasons.  i—Shows total of columns e through h.  j—Shows replacements and returned to duty.  k to w—To be used as desired.  x—Any pertinent remark, including key personnel losses (by name, rank, position) or items of information necessary to explain unusual entries in previous columns; numbers of personnel known to be captured may be included.
Example H-9. Intelligence Summary, Infantry Division (Mechanized)

Note. This example of an intelligence summary (INTSUM), which meets the requirements of STANAG 2022, is based on the suggested format in FM 30-5.

(Classification)

IMMEDIATE

FROM: CG 52d MECH DIV

TO: CG 2d CORPS

INTSUM 144 ending 040600, Para 3 ALFA Aggressor continued defense in zone except for local attack at 0415 near R376759 with estimated 90 men, 3 medium tanks, and light artillery support. Attack repulsed. Para 3 DELTA attack preceded at 0410 by very high airburst nuclear weapon, ground zero R374761, delivery means undetermined, yield estimated at 0.5 KT. Para 3 FOXTROT attack supported by 2 jet attack airplanes bombing and strafing near R396756 for 5 minutes, starting at 0425. Para 4 ALFA confirmed 20 KIA, estimated 5 KIA, estimated 30 WIA. Para 4 BRAVO 10, including 2 WIA. Para 4 CHARLIE 2 medium tanks destroyed, 1 damaged, 1 jet attack aircraft shot down. Para 6 prisoner states ammunition supply in forward units running low (CHARLIE—3). Para 7 ALFA patrol reports battery 152-mm howitzers at R303292. Prisoners confirm location 2d Bn, 17 F Mech Regt, near R375758 (BRAVO—1). Para 8 airborne radar reconnaissance detected 10 trucks moving south on road at R330280 at 0345. Para 9 probably routine supply vehicles. Para 10 snow started at 040545 and continuing. Ground frozen hard and supports all types of vehicles. Para 11 local attack reported probably was to secure Hill 405. Enemy is capable of continuing defense in present position, making local attacks to improve his defensive position, withdrawing to stronger position along LAURIEX River. Para 12 continued defense in present position most probable.

(Classification)
SITUATION REPORT NO______

Period covered: (date and time to date and time).

References: Maps (series number, sheet(s), edition, scale).

1. ENEMY
   a. Units in contact.
   b. Enemy reserves that can affect local situation.
   c. Brief description of enemy activity during period covered by report.
   d. Brief estimate of enemy strength, materiel means, morale, and his probable knowledge of our situation.
   e. Conclusions covering courses of action open to enemy.

2. OWN SITUATION
   a. Location of forward elements.
   b. Location of units, headquarters, and boundaries.
   c. Location of adjacent units and supporting troops.
   d. Brief description and results of operations during period of report.
   e. Noneffective units.

3. ADMINISTRATION
   General statement of the administrative situation, if other than normal, as it directly affects the tactical situation.

4. GENERAL
   Information not covered elsewhere.

5. COMMANDER'S EVALUATION
   To be completed when directed by higher authority.

Commander

Authentication:
Annexes:
Distribution:

Figure H-7. Operational situation report format (based on STANAG 2020).
SITREP 15. Period 120600Z to 12200Z. ENEMY. Locations and identification no change. Periodic hostile shelling of battalion area. No enemy patrol activity. OWN SITUATION. No change. ADMINISTRATION. Ten personnel casualties.
APPENDIX I
MILITARY BRIEFINGS AND CONFERENCES

Section I. MILITARY BRIEFINGS

1-1. General
   a. A military briefing is used to present selected information to commanders, staffs, or other designated audiences. The staff techniques employed are determined by the purpose of the briefing, the desired response, and the role of the briefer.

   b. There are four recognized different types of military briefings: information, decision, mission, and staff.

1-2. The Information Briefing

The information briefing is designed to inform the listener. The desired response is comprehension—understanding.

   a. Examples of instances in which an information briefing might be used are—

      (1) Information of high priority requiring immediate attention.

      (2) Information of a complex nature, such as complicated plans, systems, statistics, or charts, requiring detailed explanation.

      (3) Controversial information requiring elaboration and explanation.

   b. The information briefing deals primarily with facts. It includes a brief introduction to define the subject and orient the listener. It does not include conclusions or recommendations.

1-3. The Decision Briefing

The decision briefing is designed to obtain an answer or a decision. In higher headquarters, corps or above, the decision briefing is employed in most matters requiring command decisions, including tactical matters. In division headquarters and below, a more informal type of the decision briefing is used.

   a. The decision briefing may be compared to an oral staff study in that it contains each of the major elements of a staff study. The following sequence is usually the most logical order:

      (1) Isolate, define, and state the problem and state that the purpose of the briefing is to secure a decision. Include background information to show what led to the problem and why a decision is necessary.

      (2) State the assumptions, if necessary. Assumptions must be both reasonable and supportable.

      (3) Present the facts bearing on the problem. This portion of the briefing is essentially the same as that for the information briefing, and the same rules generally apply to both types of briefings. The briefer should be objective; he should state all the important facts accurately and fully. Facts having a direct bearing on the problem and already known to the person being briefed should be reviewed. Since this briefing should result in a decision, the listener is reminded of all the pertinent facts directly related to the problem. New facts unknown to the person being briefed are limited to those that have a direct bearing on and might influence the decision.

      (4) Discuss the courses of action. The courses of action are stated and briefly analyzed. The advantages and disadvantages of each course are pointed out and compared as in the discussion paragraph of the staff study. The briefer indicates possible results of each course of action and potential dangers involved.

      (5) State conclusions. The briefer states the degree of acceptance or the order of merit of each course of action.

      (6) Make recommendation or recommendations. The briefer words his recommendation so that it may be used as a decision on the commander's approval. On presenting his recommendations, the briefer should be prepared to discuss the coordination involved.

   b. At the outset of the briefing, the briefer
must state that he is seeking a decision. At the conclusion, if he does not receive a decision, he asks for it. The briefer should be certain that he understands the decision thoroughly. If he is uncertain, he asks for clarification.

c. Following the briefing, if the chief of staff is not present, the briefer informs the staff secretary, executive officer, or other appropriate administrative assistant of the commander’s decision.

1-4. The Mission Briefing
The mission briefing is a type of military briefing used under operational conditions to impart information, to give specific instructions, or to instill an appreciation of a mission.

a. In an operational situation or when the mission is of a critical nature, it may become necessary to provide individuals or smaller units with more data than the orders provide. This may be done by means of the mission briefing. The mission briefing reinforces orders, provides more detailed requirements and instructions for the individuals, and provides an explanation of the significance of their role. This type of briefing is presented with care to insure that it does not cause confusion or conflict with orders.

b. The mission briefing is usually conducted by a single briefing officer, who may be the commander, an assistant, a staff officer, or a special representative, depending on the nature of the mission or the level of the headquarters.

1-5. The Staff Briefing
The purpose of the staff briefing is to secure a coordinated or unified effort. This may involve the exchange of information, the announcement of decisions within a command, the issuance of directives, or the presentation of guidance. To accomplish these purposes, the staff briefing may include characteristics of the information briefing, the decision briefing, and the mission briefing, or any combination thereof.

a. Attendance at staff briefings varies with the size of the headquarters, the type of operation being conducted, and the personal desire of the commander. Generally, the commander, his deputy or executive officer, chief of staff, administrative assistant, and the senior representative of each coordinating and special staff section attend. Representatives from major subordinate commands may be present.

b. In garrison, staff briefings are normally scheduled periodically. Unscheduled staff briefings are called as the need arises. In headquarters of larger units, staff briefings are often held on a regularly scheduled basis. In combat, staff briefings are held when required by the situation; however, at corps and higher levels, normally staff briefings are regularly scheduled events. Staff briefings are valuable in operational situation in that full appreciation of the situation by commander and staff is difficult to achieve by other means.

c. Matters discussed at staff briefings will vary. At lower levels, topics of immediate concern to the unit and its operations will be discussed; while at higher levels, the briefing may deal more with matters of policy. If field or combat operations, tactical matters will predominate. When staff briefings are held on a regularly scheduled basis, the substance of each staff officer’s presentation may be an updating of material previously presented.

d. The chief of staff usually presides over the staff briefing. He calls on staff representatives to present matters that interest those present or that require coordinated staff action. Each staff officer is prepared to brief on his area of responsibility.

e. The presentation of staff estimates culminating in a commander’s decision to adopt a specific course of action is a form of staff briefing used in combat headquarters. In this type of briefing, staff officers involved follow the general pattern prescribed for the staff estimate being presented.

1-6. Briefing Techniques
There are four steps in executing a briefing assignment: analyzing the situation, constructing and rehearsing the briefing, delivering the briefing, and following up.

a. Analyzing the Situation. This step includes analyzing the audience and the occasion, determining the purpose, surveying facilities, and scheduling the preparatory effort.

(1) The audience.

(a) The nature of the occasion and the characteristics of the audience include such considerations as—

1. Who is to be briefed and why?
2. What is his official position?
3. How much knowledge of the subject does he have?
4. What is expected of the briefer?

(b) Before briefing an individual the first time, the briefer should inquire as to the desires of the particular official to be briefed.

(2) Purpose. The briefer must understand the purpose of the briefing that he is to deliver. Is he to present facts or to make a recommendation? The purpose determines the nature of the briefing.

(3) Time allocated. The time allocated for a briefing will frequently dictate the style, physical facilities, and the preparatory effort required. The briefer must know the approximate time allocated for the briefing before he constructs the briefing.

(4) Facilities. The briefer should consider the physical facilities available. For example, if the briefing is held in an office, the use of heavy equipment may be impossible. The availability of visual aids, draftsmen, and time are considerations. The briefer prepares a detailed presentation plan and insures that his assistants, if used, know what is expected of them.

(5) Preparatory effort. The preparatory effort is carefully scheduled. Each briefing officer should formulate a “briefing checklist” (fig I-1). The briefer makes an initial estimate of the deadlines that he must establish for accomplishment of each task. He schedules facilities for practice and requests critiques.

b. Constructing the Briefing. The construction of the briefing will vary with the type and purpose of the briefing. The analysis provides the basis for this determination. When the briefing is to be informational, it will, among other things, consist of assembling information, selecting key points, deciding how to present the key points, and selecting visual aids. When the briefing is to be a decision type, besides stating the facts the briefer must state the problem, isolate and analyze the courses of action, reach conclusions, make recommendations, and receive an understandable decision. The following are the major steps in preparing a briefing:
1. ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION

a. Audience.
   (1) How many are there?
   (2) Nature.
      (a) Who composes the audience?
      (b) Is only one Service involved?
      (c) Multiservice? Civilians? Foreign nationals?
      (d) Who are the ranking members?
      (e) What are their official positions?
      (f) Where are they assigned?
      (g) How much professional knowledge of the subject do they have?
      (h) Are they generalists or specialists?
      (i) What are their interests?
      (j) Personal preferences?
      (k) What is the anticipated reaction?

b. Purpose and Type.
   (1) Information briefing (to inform)?
   (2) Decision briefing (to obtain decision)?
   (3) Staff briefing (to exchange information)?
   (4) Mission briefing (to review important details)?

c. Subject.
   (1) What is the specific subject?
   (2) What is the desired coverage?
   (3) How much time will be allocated?

d. Physical Facilities.
   (1) Where will the briefing be presented?
   (2) What arrangements will be required?
   (3) What are the visual aid facilities?
   (4) What are the deficiencies?
   (5) What actions are needed to overcome deficiencies?

2. SCHEDULE OF PREPARATORY EFFORT

a. Complete analysis of the situation.
b. Prepare preliminary outline.
c. Determine requirements for training aids, assistants, and recorders.
d. Edit or redraft or both.
e. Schedule rehearsals (facilities, critiques).
f. Arrange for final review by responsible authority.

3. CONSTRUCTING THE BRIEFING

a. Collect Material.
   (1) Research.
   (2) Become familiar with subject.
   (3) Collect authoritative opinions and facts.
b. Prepare First Draft.
   (1) State problem (if necessary).
   (2) Isolate key points (facts).
   (3) Select courses of action.
   (4) State advantages and disadvantages. Analyze and compare.
   (5) Determine conclusions and recommendations.
   (6) Prepare draft outline.
   (7) Include visual aids.
   (8) Fill in appropriate material.
   (9) Review with appropriate authority.

c. Revise First Draft and Edit.
   (1) Make sure that facts are important and necessary.
   (2) Include all necessary facts.
   (3) Include answers to anticipated questions.
   (4) Polish material.

d. Plan Use of Visual Aids.
   (1) Check for simplicity—readability.
   (2) Develop method for use.

e. Practice.
   (1) Rehearse (with assistants and visual aids).
   (2) Polish.
   (3) Isolate key points.
   (4) Commit outline to memory.
   (5) Develop transitions.
   (6) Use definitive words.

4. DELIVERY
   a. Posture.
      (1) Military bearing.
      (2) Meaningful movement.
      (3) Eye contact.
      (4) Gestures.
      (5) Mannerisms.

   b. Voice.
      (1) Pitch.
      (2) Volume.
      (3) Rate.
      (4) Variety.
      (5) Enunciation.

   c. Attitude.
      (1) Businesslike (military bearing).
      (2) Helpful.
      (3) Natural humor.
      (4) Confident.
      (5) Answer questions.

5. FOLLOWUP
   a. Insure understanding.
   b. Record decision.
   c. Inform proper authorities.
(1) Collect material.
(2) Know the subject thoroughly.
(3) Isolate the key points.
(4) Arrange the key points in logical order.
(5) Provide supporting data to substantiate validity of key points.
(6) Select visual aids.
(7) Establish the wording.
(8) Rehearse in detail.

c. Delivering the Briefing. The success of the briefing depends greatly on its manner of presentation. A confident, relaxed, forceful delivery, clearly enunciated and obviously based on a full knowledge of the subject, helps convince the audience. The briefer maintains a relaxed, but military bearing. He uses natural gestures and movements, but he avoids distracting mannerisms. The briefer's delivery is characterized by conciseness, objectivity, and accuracy. He must be aware of the following specifics:
(1) The basic purpose is to present the subject as directed and to insure that the audience fully comprehends it.
(2) Brevity precludes a lengthy introduction or summary.
(3) Conciseness permits no "attention-getters." Illustrations should be used as backup information if questions arise.
(4) The briefer uses logic in arriving at conclusions and recommendations; there must be no personal or emotional involvement.

(5) The briefer expects and is prepared for interruptions and questions at any point. If and when these interruptions occur, the briefer answers each question before proceeding or indicates that the question will be answered later in the presentation. At the same time, he does not permit questions to distract him from getting back rapidly to his planned presentation. If the question will be answered later in the presentation, the briefer should so state and make specific reference to the earlier question when he introduces such material. The briefer must be prepared to support any part of his briefing. Before presenting his briefing, the briefer anticipates possible questions and prepares to answer them.

d. Following Up. When the briefing is over, the briefer prepares a memorandum for record. This memorandum should be brief; but it should record the subject, the date, the time, and the place of the briefing as well as the ranks, names, and positions of those present. The substance of the briefing may be recorded in a concise form. However, it may be omitted, depending on local custom. Recommendations and their approval, disapproval, or approval with modification are recorded as well as any instruction or directed action resulting from the briefing and who is to take action. When there is doubt as to the intent of the decisionmaker, a draft of the memorandum for record is submitted to him for correction before it is prepared in final form. The memorandum for record is distributed to staff sections or agencies that must take action on the decision or instructions contained in it or whose operations or plans may be influenced.

Section II. CONFERENCE DATA

I–7. General

a. Commanders and staff officers inevitably find that participation in conferences is a frequent requirement. Conferences often replace visits and correspondence as means of securing coordination because the conference—
(1) Is more likely to produce timely and sound results, when time is short, than will visits and correspondence between widely separated headquarters.
(2) Usually achieves more thorough coordination because all the facts and the experts to interpret these facts are brought together at one time. Normally, the majority of conflicts can be fully resolved, and complete understanding of the procedures developed can be imparted to all agencies represented at the conference.
(3) Offers the surest method of working out, within the time available, procedures that will produce complete cooperation among the divergent interests of commands.

b. Commanders and staff officers must have a thorough knowledge of the techniques of conducting and participating in conferences.

c. A commanders' conference is a meeting of commanders (or their representatives). A staff conference is a meeting of staff officers, normally principal staff officers (or their representatives), either of one headquarters or of several headquarters. Other elements of the staff may be pre-
sent at either a commanders' conference or a staff conference, as required.

I-8. Purposes of Conferences
Conferences are called for specific purposes, including determination and evaluation of facts; exchange of information and ideas; coordination of actions, including arrival at the best possible decision or reaching agreement in a particular area; problem solution; policy formulation; and instruction or advice.

I-9. Types of Conferences
The types of conferences in which a commander and his staff frequently participate are listed below. Participation varies with the conference purpose and includes representation from all interested agencies.

   a. Command.
   b. Staff.
   c. Planning.
   d. Training.
   e. Committee.
   f. Interview.
   g. Multipurpose conference involving more than one of the above.

I-10. Considerations Influencing the Calling of the Conference
Before a decision is made to call a conference, the following questions should be considered:
   a. What are the objectives of the conference?
   b. Can the objectives be attained as well or better by other means?
   c. Is attainment of the minimum objectives of the conference likely at this time?
   d. Are essential references available?
   e. Is time so vital that correspondence or visits would delay too long the agreements needed?
   f. How much time can be gained by the conference?
   g. Are suitable participants available?
   h. Can an appropriate place with suitable facilities be provided?
   i. Are the proposed scope, duration, and agenda appropriate?
   j. Are the issues clearly defined?
   k. Can adequate preparation for the conference be made in the time allowed?

I-11. Preparation for the Conference
Once the decision is made to call the conference, the staff prepares a conference planning checklist. This checklist assists the conference planner by insuring that he understands the exact purpose of the conference; considers all the participants, to include an analysis of the group characteristics that will result from the assemblage; prepares a proper agenda; provides proper facilities and materials; and makes plans for the preparation and use of a final report on the conference.

I-12. Conduct of the Conference
   a. Conferences are conducted differently, depending on the purpose, the authority of the conference leader, and the agenda. If the purpose of the conference is to solve a problem, the conference leader defines the problem and guides the group in obtaining the facts or assumptions and in making deductions therefrom that will influence the solution. The leader should then cause the group to propose alternatives by encouraging freethinking and avoiding critical analysis or comparison. Once alternatives have been proposed by the conferees, the leader should encourage critical analysis and evaluation in an effort to cause the group to move toward an acceptable solution. Action on individual agenda items may be required on the part of the conferees as a result of the solution to the problem. The leader should assign responsibility for such action within his authority and move on to the next item on the agenda.
   b. Whatever the purpose, the successful conduct of a conference depends on thorough preparation (including the conferees), adhering to the agenda, avoiding tangents, and compiling the results in usable form for the action that must be taken after the conference.

I-13. Authority of the Conference Leader
The authority vested in the conference leader influences the procedures to be followed by both the conference leader and the other participants. When the conference leader has no command authority over participants, all decisions, agreements, or recommendations must be determined by negotiation or reference to a command superior for action.
I-14. Agenda
The conference agenda, prepared and circulated before the conference, is the principal means by which the efforts of the conference are organized toward a common objective. The simplest form of agenda is a memorandum to the prospective participants covering the date, time, and place of the conference and a list of the items to be discussed.

A complete and a carefully prepared agenda includes—

a. An accurate statement of each point to be discussed, noting areas of possible conflict of views and points on which agreement is desired.

b. All available material or information that may assist the conferees in preparing themselves for the conference.

c. Designated individuals from whom special information will be requested at the conference.

d. A proposed solution to the problem for consideration by the conferees.
APPENDIX J  
TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER

Section I. INTRODUCTION

J–1. General
The tactical operations center (TOC) is a command installation in which communication facilities and personnel are centralized to control and coordinate current tactical operations. A TOC is usually established at field army, independent corps, corps, and division and may be established at lower levels of command.

J–2. Requirement
Improved weapon technology, tactical mobility, information-processing capabilities, and communication equipment have accelerated combat and increased the vulnerability of opposing forces. Consequently, success in battle and survival are becoming increasingly dependent on the ability of a staff to assist the commander in making accurate and timely decisions. To expedite staff reaction, a TOC will normally be established during active operations. The TOC expedites staff reaction by providing the appropriate personnel with the means to gather, process, retrieve, analyze, and display data rapidly and in a readily usable form; by placing coordinating elements in proximity; and/or by providing responsive communications between such elements and the higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands.

J–3. Purpose
The purpose of the TOC is to provide the commander evaluated information and recommendations concerning current combat operations and the use of resources. The TOC assists in—

a. Direction, control, and coordination of current combat and combat support operations of organic, assigned, and attached forces.

b. Integration of combat support provided by other Army elements or other Services into the commander's concept of operations.

c. Coordination of combat operations with operations of other Army elements or other Services to the extent required or permitted by higher authority.

J–4. Principles
a. The TOC is neither a formal military organization nor a separate agency or level of command. It is formed from resources of the command solely as an operating element to accomplish timely staff actions on matters concerning current operations at the level of employment.

b. The situation and the commander's desires govern the decision to establish a TOC, the selection of staff elements and supporting elements to be represented, and the functions to be performed in the TOC. Figure J–1 is a suggested organization for a TOC suited to employment at division, corps, and army.

Figure J–1. TOC organization.
c. The criteria used to determine essential functions and staff elements needed in the TOC for mission accomplishment are—

(1) The contribution that each function makes to current operations.

(2) The extent to which accomplishment of each function depends on information readily available only in the TOC.

(3) The extent to which accomplishment of each function depends on coordination with other functions of the TOC.

d. Considerations in developing an optimum TOC organization are improved communications and the enhanced ability of the TOC to obtain information rapidly from outside itself and to react promptly.

Section II. ORGANIZATION

J-5. Authority and Responsibilities

a. The authority and responsibilities of staff members in the TOC are encompassed by the assigned duties and responsibilities of coordinating and special staff officers and the staff doctrine contained in chapters 2 and 4.

b. The chief of staff is responsible for accomplishment of staff tasks, efficient and prompt response of the staff, and the coordination of staff efforts. He exercises overall direction of the staff, to include the staff representatives in the TOC.

c. The assistant chief of staff (ACofS), G3, operations, has coordinating staff responsibility to insure coordination and integration of available combat support with tactical operations. Normally, the ACofS, G3, without derogation of the normal responsibilities and functions of other coordinating and special staff officers, will be assigned primary coordinating staff responsibility for supervision of the TOC.

J-6. Composition

a. The commander or chief of staff determines the composition of the TOC. The number and type of functions performed in the TOC on a recurring basis determine the number of elements and personnel within these elements. On-call representatives from staff sections and liaison personnel from units are used for special or nonrecurring requirements.

b. This appendix is primarily concerned with recurring TOC functions and the TOC elements and personnel required therein on a continuing basis. Personnel needed in the TOC for special or nonrecurring situations that require individual or element representation from other staff sections within the command post are not discussed in this appendix. The requirements of the operation and the support situation determine the need for on-call liaison personnel and representatives of staff sections not normally represented in the TOC (ACofS, G4, logistics; ACofS, G5, civil-military operations; chemical; engineer; provost marshal; and communications-electronics (C-E)) or additional representatives of staff sections already represented in the TOC. The TOC elements listed below are considered necessary to TOC operations in most combat situations. Personnel requirements for these elements are covered in paragraphs J-23 through J-26.

(1) G2 element and G3 element.

(2) Fire support element (FSE).

(3) Tactical air support element (TASE).

(4) Airspace coordination element (ACE) (air defense artillery (ADA) and aviation representatives).

(5) Electronic warfare element (EWE).

(6) Administration section.

J-7. Staff Relationships

a. Staff officers in the TOC are responsible for—

(1) Being thoroughly familiar with the overall combat situation.

(2) Having detailed knowledge of all aspects of the current combat situation relating to their coordinating or special staff responsibility.

(3) Advising other staff officers in the TOC immediately on matters of mutual interest or concern.

b. Staff elements in the TOC maintain a continuous flow of information to corresponding elements in an alternate TOC, or to staff elements designated to man an alternate TOC, depending on the standing operating procedure (SOP) for emergency operations followed by the command.

c. Staff elements in the TOC maintain staff journals of the combat situation, decisions reached, and actions taken and regularly advise their respective counterparts outside the TOC.
Section III. OPERATION

J-8. Administrative Processing
TOC operations depend on the timely receipt, distribution, storage, and retrieval of information pertaining to current operations, e.g., data processing. Mechanized and automated equipment, when available, increases the speed of data processing and facilitates coordination of staff operations in the TOC. In the absence of such equipment, manual procedures are established to minimize the time required for administrative processing of information. The objective is to insure an accurate portrayal of the tactical situation and to prevent needless verification of data in the TOC. Procedures are established to make information processed through technical or staff channels immediately available to all appropriate staff elements in the TOC. Procedures also are established to make the results of the processing accomplished by one TOC element immediately available to other appropriate TOC elements and to staff sections outside the TOC.

J-9. Estimate of the Situation
A basic function of the TOC is to facilitate maintenance of a continuous estimate of the situation. The administrative processing and display actions performed in the TOC must support the estimating process.

a. Each TOC element maintains a continuous estimate of the situation within its particular area of competency.

b. Each TOC element acts on its own initiative to incorporate new or revised information into its estimate of the situation.

c. Each TOC element is responsible for prompt coordination with other elements when changes in its estimate of the situation appear to impact on the activities of other elements or on the overall combat situation.

J-10. Actions
Within the authority delegated by the commander, TOC elements are responsible for preparing and disseminating orders, requests, and reports necessary for current operations. External staff elements conduct routine planning and administrative functions.

a. Each element initiates action to insure that activities falling within its area of responsibility are in consonance with the commander's concept of operations.

b. Following the statement of the commander's decision and concept of operations, each TOC element is responsible for preparing its portion of instructions and requests necessary to implement and coordinate the action.

c. Each TOC element is responsible for coordinating its actions with other TOC elements and interested external agencies.

d. The G3 element is specifically responsible for overall coordination of all TOC activities.

Section IV. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

J-11. Location and Communications

a. The TOC is located in the main command post of the headquarters and shares the physical security and communication services established for the command post. Administrative traffic in the command post is routed to cause the least possible interference with TOC operations.

b. At division headquarters, the TOC shares the communication services and facilities established for the command post; at corps and army headquarters, the TOC's are provided additional communication facilities by the assigned signal unit.

J-12. Contingent Planning
Normally, provisions must be made for establishing an alternate TOC capable of immediately assuming the functions of the primary TOC. In certain instances, the establishment of alternate TOC facilities, e.g., control of stability operations from an established base, may not be necessary. In any case, procedures must be established to insure that the alternate TOC or the headquarters designated to function as such is constantly up to date on the current tactical situation.

J-13. Displacement
During displacement, the TOC must continue to operate in its old location until communications are established and functioning at the new location. The new location may be staffed by elements assigned to function as the alternate TOC or by the off-duty shift of the primary TOC.
Section V. ACTIVITIES

J-14. General

a. This section includes those activities considered minimum for normal accomplishment of the TOC mission. Each activity is stated in sufficiently broad terms to make it applicable at division, corps, or field army levels.

b. Determination of the staff elements and functions required in the TOC is a command prerogative and will depend on the situation. The activities and scope given herein are subject to modification, and additional elements and activities may be added at the option of the commander. In accomplishing these activities, TOC elements follow basic principles of staff operations, particularly in insuring staff coordination and the interchange of information.

J-15. G3 Element

The G3 element's primary functions are supervision and coordination of tactical operations. The element presents to the commander the current operation estimate of the situation and recommendations for the employment of organic, assigned, attached, and supporting combat and combat support units. The G3 element uses information provided by the ACofS, G3, staff section and other TOC elements and insures the dissemination of this information to the other elements of the TOC. The G3 element—

a. Maintains Information on the Status of Units Reporting Directly to the Headquarters. The element maintains only essential information required to insure control, e.g., knowledge of capabilities, commitment, availability, and effectiveness. The ACofS, G3, staff section outside the TOC and the major subordinate headquarters of the command maintain information not pertaining to current operations.

b. Maintains Information on the Current Status of Barriers and Obstacles. The location and extent of artificial and natural barriers, obstacles, and gaps are displayed in the TOC. This information is provided by the ACofS, G2, and the force engineer. The G3 element receives reports of changes as they occur and provides the information to other TOC elements and to other interested headquarters.

c. Maintains Information on the Current Friendly Situation. The G3 element is the focal point within the TOC for information on the current friendly situation. This information is shown graphically on the friendly portion of the situation map. Other TOC elements and combat support units not represented in the TOC submit periodic and spot reports to the G3 element. This information is maintained and displayed for use by all TOC elements. The G3 element also portrays the latest information on the operation, to include boundaries, control measures, objectives, and location of all units.

d. Maintains a Continuous Estimate of the Situation. The G3 element makes a continuous operation estimate of the situation, considers and integrates estimates provided by other TOC elements, and provides the operation estimate to the commander, when appropriate.

e. Recommends the Employment of Organic, Attached, or Supporting Combat and Combat Support Resources. Recommendations are based on advice and recommendations from other TOC elements, liaison representatives in the TOC, and major subordinate headquarters. Before it submits the recommendations, the G3 element coordinates them to insure feasibility, availability of required combat support and combat service support, and interchange of information.

f. Disseminates the Commander's Decisions, Guidance, Priorities, and Allocation of Resources. The G3 element disseminates to other TOC elements the commander's decisions and guidance concerning conduct of the current operation and the establishment of priorities and allocation of resources. The extent to which the G3 element may act on its own initiative is prescribed by the commander.

g. Prepares the Maneuver Portion of Fragmentary Operation Orders. The G3 element, in close coordination with the G2 element, prepares portions of orders pertaining to the combat elements of the command. Other TOC elements are provided this information to insure coordination of the combat support portion of orders. Orders prepared in the TOC are normally limited to fragmentary orders.

h. Determines, Recommends, Integrates, and Coordinates Requirements for Combat and Combat Support From Other Army Elements and Other Services. The G3 element receives recommendations for assignment of additional combat support resources from all other TOC elements and from elements of the command not repre-
sented in the TOC. The G3 element evaluates these recommendations and submits them to the commander. On receipt of additional resources, the other TOC elements recommend their employment to the G3 element, which coordinates and integrates the resources into the operation.

i. Disseminates Orders and Information and Monitors Execution to Insure Compliance With the Commander’s Concept and Decisions. The G3 element disseminates orders and instructions directly to combat and combat support units. The G3 element also disseminates information concerning the operation and the command that is considered valuable to commanders in understanding and executing assigned missions.

j. Supervises and Coordinates Activity in the TOC. While the chief of staff is responsible for coordinating the operation of the TOC with the staff operations of the remainder of the staff, the ACofS, G3, is charged with coordinating staff responsibility for supervision and coordination of TOC operations. This function includes responsibility for insuring that all TOC actions are within the policies of the commander, integrating all actions with the current operation, obtaining approval for all actions that exceed SOP or command policy, and resolving conflicts in the TOC. In the absence of the ACofS, G3, the chief of the G3 element is delegated responsibility to perform this function.

k. Recommends the Employment of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons. The G3 element evaluates the FSE’s recommendations for employment of nuclear and chemical weapons, including atomic demolition munitions (ADM). It coordinates with the G2 element to determine the suitability and importance of the target and to establish a priority for attack and with the ACofS, G4, to determine the need for and feasibility of distribution or redistribution of weapons to support recommendations. The G3 element then makes recommendations for weapon employment to the commander and advises the FSE of the commander’s decision.

l. Disseminates Nuclear Strike Warnings. While the FSE prepares strike warnings for all friendly nuclear strikes against surface targets, the G3 element is responsible for dissemination of these strike warnings within the command. The G3 element also prepares downwind chemical hazard prediction messages for approved chemical attacks.

m. Recommends Actions Required as a Result of Enemy Employment of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons in the Command Area. On receipt of report of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon employment in the command area and initial data concerning the strike, the G3 element estimates the effect on current operations. Each of the other TOC elements estimates effect in its area of interest and recommends to the G3 element action to take. The G3 element takes actions authorized and recommends other actions to the commander. On receipt of the commander’s decision, the G3 element issues implementing instructions to appropriate combat and combat support units. Necessary movement or re-location of combat service support units is coordinated with the ACofS, G4.

n. Coordinates Requirements for Movement of Combat and Combat Support Units. Movements of combat and combat support units in the command area are coordinated with the ACofS, G4. He supports movements in accordance with priorities recommended by the G3 element.

o. Determines, Recommends, Integrates, and Coordinates Requirements for Electronic Warfare. The G3 element receives electronic warfare (EW) estimates, annexes, and plans from the EWE and assigns EW tasks in support of current operations. The EWE keeps the G3 element informed on the status of attached and assigned EW resources. The EWE carries out approved EW resources employment and exercises on-off control over friendly electronic jammers. The G3 element coordinates EW matters with other staff elements and integrates the EW plan with operations of the command.

J–16. G2 Element

The primary function of the G2 element is the coordination of all intelligence activities pertaining to the current situation, preparation of portions of the current intelligence estimate, and dissemination of intelligence through use of spot reports. The G2 element uses information provided by the ACofS, G2, staff section and other TOC elements and insures the dissemination of this information to the other elements of the TOC. Examples of information received are the analysis of the area of operations and enemy order of battle information. The G2 element—

a. Maintains Information on Status and Capa-
abilities of Selected Information Collection Agencies. The G2 element maintains information on the location, status of capabilities, and commitment of intelligence agencies that report directly to the ACofS, G2. This information provides the basis for determining available capability at any time and for establishment of priorities.

b. Maintains Information on Surveillance and Target Acquisition. The G2 element insures that information on the allocation of air reconnaissance and surveillance means is readily available. The element consolidates and coordinates requests for tactical air reconnaissance.

c. Maintains Information on Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Probable Courses of Action. The G2 element requires information on enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities to determine intelligence requirements and priorities. The determination of the probable courses of action of the enemy is part of the G2 element's estimate of the situation and is based on analysis of the enemy’s capabilities, vulnerabilities, and other related information. The complete intelligence estimate is normally prepared by the ACofS, G2, staff section outside the TOC. The G2 element, however, develops and maintains a continuous estimate based on the current situation. The estimate is presented to the commander, as required, or when significant changes in the estimate occur.

d. Maintains the Enemy Portion of the Situation Map. The G2 element maintains the enemy portion of the situation map, which is a graphic record of the current dispositions and major activities of the enemy. The element may use separate overlays to display different categories of information. This activity complements maintenance of the friendly portion of the situation map by the G3 element.

e. Provides Information on Location and Activities of Reconnaissance Elements. The G2 element coordinates with the G3 element on the use of reconnaissance forces to insure that the collection effort is complete. Adjacent and supporting units are informed of reconnaissance operations to insure proper coordination. The G2 element consults with the entire TOC and other staff sections, as required, to insure coordination of reconnaissance operations with other activities.

f. Maintains the Commander’s Essential Elements of Information. As coordinator of command information collection activities, the G2 element must maintain the current essential elements of information (EEI) and record progress of efforts to satisfy these requirements. The G2 element evaluates intelligence requirements of other TOC elements and recommends additions or deletions to the EEI or other intelligence requirements, as appropriate.

g. Maintains Status of Combat Surveillance Operations. The G2 element, in close coordination with the G3 element, controls combat surveillance coverage to guard against gaps or other deficiencies of the integrated surveillance effort. The objective is to insure that the entire battlefield is surveyed periodically, with particular emphasis on areas that might indicate enemy choice of a course of action. The G2 element is responsible for coordination of the systematic surveillance of the force's area of operations. The G2 element, in conjunction with the G3 element, develops priorities to insure coordination with current operational requirements.

h. Integrates Current Collection Efforts with Collection Activities of Other Commands. The G2 element coordinates with higher, adjacent, and supporting elements and with other Services those portions of the force collection plan for which mutual assistance is possible. The G2 element also accomplishes maximum exchange of information with the collection efforts of other commands.

i. Prepares Intelligence Portions of Fragmentary Orders and Summaries, as Required, to Support Current Operations. The G2 element prepares the intelligence portions of fragmentary orders, intelligence collection orders, and intelligence summaries pertaining to current operations. Information or intelligence of immediate value is disseminated directly to interested TOC elements and affected units of the command.

j. Supervises and Coordinates Counterintelligence Activities as They Influence Current Tactical Operations. When changes in current operations dictate changes in counterintelligence measures, the G2 element prepares appropriate recommendations, coordinates with the G3 element, insures capability with tactical cover and deception plans, and supervises the preparation of implementing instructions and the execution of instructions. Active counterintelligence measures often have an impact on tactical operations and, consequently, require more coordination than passive measures. The G2 element is responsible for recommending counterintelligence measures.
and accomplishing the necessary coordination with other TOC elements and with units that might be affected.

k. Recommends to the G3 Element the Employment of Reconnaissance Resources. The G2 element coordinates its requirements for employment of subordinate units of the command (other than intelligence units) in intelligence collection missions with the G3 element. This coordination is required to accomplish the collection plan and to prevent interference with missions of combat units.

l. Coordinates the Intelligence Collection Plan With the G3 Element. The G2 element assigns, cancels, or adjusts requirements for collection of information in accordance with changes in the operation. When the EEI are satisfied, the element changes the collection plan, as required, and prepares implementing instructions. The G2 element issues changes in instructions to intelligence agencies directly and coordinates instructions to subordinate units of the command with the G3 element.

m. Evaluates and Validates Incoming Information and Makes Appropriate Dissemination. The G2 element validates information received through the normal intelligence production procedures and disseminates it according to SOP. Exceptions are made to this procedure when information is vital to a specific operation or when information on fleeting vulnerable targets is reported. The G2 element provides such information to the FSE for appropriate attack of the targets so reported.

n. Maintains Weather Data for Periods Specified by SOP or Current Requirements. Reports of current weather and weather forecasts are used in connection with current combat operations, operations of aircraft, employment of nuclear weapons and chemical agents, and other activities. The Air Weather Service provides weather forecasts to the G2 element. The G2 element maintains these forecasts for use by TOC elements and makes dissemination as required by SOP or the current situation.

o. Estimates the Effect of Nuclear Attacks, Including Predicted Fallout, on Enemy Capabilities. The G2 element receives FSE predictions of the effects of friendly nuclear attacks, including fallout, for estimation of effect on enemy capabilities. This estimate is disseminated within the TOC for planning purposes. If time and resources permit, a tactical damage evalu-

J-17. Fire Support Element

The primary function of the FSE is to provide command coordination of fire support on surface targets, as required, to support most effectively the plan of operation. Under the supervision of the assistant fire support coordinator (FSCoord), who is the chief of the FSE, the FSE provides a central facility through which matters pertaining to fire support requiring command coordination are processed. Field artillery personnel and equipment for the FSE are authorized in the appropriate field artillery tables of organization and equipment (TOE) at division and corps and in the artillery section of the army headquarters and headquarters company TOE. The FSE—

a. Maintains Current Status and Capabilities of Fire Support Resources. The FSE insures that the commander's guidance on fire support is executed and the plan of operation is effectively and economically supported. Execution of this activity requires the FSE to maintain the current status and capabilities of all fire support resources available to the command for attack of surface targets.

b. Maintains the Fire Support Situation Map and Records. Maintenance of a fire support situation map depicting locations of fire support resources and the tactical situation, along with the expenditure record, enables the FSE to assess the situation rapidly and to determine fire support units or resources capable of delivering fire on designated surface targets.

c. Coordinates Fire Support on Surface Targets. The FSE coordinates all fire support used against surface targets delivered by resources under the control of or in support of the command. The FSE—

(1) Prepares the fire support portion of the operation order, to include the fire support annex. The FSE insures that all fire support used against surface targets is integrated by reviewing the component fire support appendixes (e.g., field artillery, aerial field artillery, close air support, naval gunfire, nuclear, chemical) and ADM used in the barrier and denial plan.

(2) Coordinates with the ACE on fire sup-
port requirements for airspace utilization and for allocation of air defense (AD) and Army aviation fires on surface targets; coordinates with the G3 element on the barrier and denial plan and the use of ADM therein.

(3) Receives requests from subordinate units for fire support, evaluates the requests in view of other fire support requirements and the fire support resources available, makes decisions within delegated authority to furnish requested fire support, substitutes other types of support for that requested, or disapproves the request.

(4) Designates attack by fire support means, as required.

d. Recommends Current Fire Support Coordination Measures. To facilitate the coordination of fire support, the rapid processing of fire support, and the assignment of fire missions, when required, the FSE keeps informed on the current fire support coordination measures in effect, to include boundaries, fire coordination lines, fire support coordination lines, no-fire lines, no-fire areas, free-fire area, fire coordination areas, and restrictive fire plans. The FSE recommends additional coordination measures and changes to existing measures, as required.

e. Recommends Targets to be Attacked With Nuclear Weapons. Based on target intelligence from the G2 element and organic field artillery resources, the FSE evaluates surface targets to determine those suitable for nuclear attack. Targets considered suitable are analyzed to determine tentative method of delivery, desired ground zero, yield and height of burst, expected results, and prediction of fallout. The FSE submits the result of the analysis as a recommendation to the G3 element. When a target is attacked, the FSE coordinates the necessary reconnaissance to ascertain actual damage resulting from the strike and informs other TOC elements of the results. Target analysis and damage assessment are made on a continuing basis regardless of the level of intensity in the use of nuclear weapons.

f. Recommends Employment of Chemical Agents. In accordance with established policies and directives, the FSE recommends the employment of chemical agents. Targets are analyzed to determine their vulnerability to chemical agents, and recommendations on the types of agents, amount, form of agents, time of attack, and delivery means to employ are submitted to the G3 element.

g. Recommends Allocation and Reallocation of Fire Support Resources. Based on the commander’s concept of the operation and missions assigned to subordinate commands, the FSE recommends allocation of available fire support resources for the attack of surface targets. As changes in the situation occur, the FSE reexamines all considerations and recommends reallocation as deemed necessary.

h. Develops and Maintains Targets. The FSE obtains and maintains current information on potential targets from organic field artillery resources and all other intelligence sources (e.g., tactical air reconnaissance, United States Army Security Agency (USASA), and combat surveillance units) and develops confirmed targets from this information.

J-18. Tactical Air Support Element

The primary functions of the TASE are supervision and coordination of tactical air support operations. The TASE—

a. Supervises and Coordinates Requirements for Army or Other Services Tactical Air Reconnaissance and Close Air Support. The TASE receives (monitors immediate requests), processes, and coordinates requests for tactical air reconnaissance and close air support; approves or disapproves the requests; establishes priorities for approved requests; notifies the requester of action taken; and forwards approved preplanned requests to the appropriate agency. Requests for close air support are coordinated with the FSE before approval.

b. Coordinates Tactical Air Reconnaissance and Close Air Support Requests With the ACE. The TASE notifies the ACE of all preplanned and immediate air support requests and missions. The ACE takes necessary action to coordinate the use of airspace and notifies the TASE of restrictions.

c. Prepares the Close Air Support and Tactical Air Reconnaissance Portion of Operation Plans and Orders.

d. Requests Additional Tactical Air Reconnaissance and/or Close Air Support Over and Above That Allocated. For immediate requirements that cannot be fulfilled with the sorties allocated, the TASE obtains additional sorties, integrates the request with another mission, or accomplishes it rather than a lower priority preplanned mission. The TASE notifies the requester of final action taken on the request.
e. Coordinates With Other Services, as Necessary, on Tactical Air Reconnaissance and Close Air Support Matters. The TASE maintains liaison with the coordinates tactical air support matters with other Services, to include exchange of information.

f. Collocates With the ACE and the FSE. The TASE, ACE, and FSE are normally collocated to facilitate coordination.

J—19. Airspace Control Element

The primary purpose of the ACE is to coordinate all airspace management functions among Army airspace users and with other Services. The element also provides information on the current status of ADA and on Army aviation capabilities. The ACE—

a. Coordinates the use of Airspace. In compliance with the directives of higher headquarters and the commander’s concept for the use of airspace by organic forces, the ACE coordinates airspace requirements and insures airspace coordination, based on SOP’s, orders, data displays, knowledge of the situation, and information from the FSE, TASE, Army air defense command post (AADCP), Army aviation, and the other Services. To facilitate the coordination of the use of airspace, the ACE—

(1) Maintains airspace utilization displays, including the airspace utilization map and airspace utilization board, that include information regarding preplanned and immediate air activity, Army air traffic control, and standing and temporary regulatory/restrictive measures.

(2) Provides airspace utilization advice and information to other TOC elements, as required.

(3) Issues or relays supplementary instructions to airspace users, as required by the situation, within the scope of established policies and procedures.

(4) Recommends changes to SOP’s, plans, orders, policies, and directives in accordance with the requirements of the situation and the lessons learned.

(5) Prepares the airspace utilization annex to the force operation plan or order when a staff element outside the TOC has not done so.

b. Provides Information on Aviation Status and Recommends the Allocation and Reallocation of Army Aviation Resources. The ACE provides information to the TOC on the status of aviation resources controlled by the command. Based on the command mission, the requests of subordinate commanders, and the mission assigned to subordinate commands, the ACE recommends those aviation means to be allocated to the subordinate commands and the command relationships between aviation units and subordinate commands. As changes in the situation occur, the element reexamines all considerations and recommends the necessary reallocation of resources. The ACE further recommends to the ACoSF, G3, based on the requirements of the ACoSF, G1, and ACoSF, G4, representatives and the aviation support available, the amount and type of aviation means to be allocated for administrative and combat service support. These requirements may be recommended on a mission basis rather than on allocation.

c. Coordinates Army ADA Operations. The ACE coordinates current ADA operations with combat and other combat support operations. To accomplish this, the ACE—

(1) Maintains ADA displays and provides information and advice to other TOC elements, as required. Typical displays include the AD situation map and the AD status board. They display ADA unit locations, types, designations, and states of alert; ammunition levels; and the prevailing condition of readiness, state of AD warning, weapon control status, and weapon control case. Typical information required besides that provided by the displays includes AD priorities; AD capabilities, limitations, and employment; AD coverage; capabilities to attack surface targets; critical ammunition shortages; and postattack data.

(2) Makes a continuous estimate of the AD situation.

(3) Coordinates ADA operations with combat and other combat support operations.

(4) Coordinates ADA operations with higher, lower, and adjacent commands and with other Services and allies.

(5) Recommends changes to the AD SOP, plan, task organization, nuclear weapon allocations, unit deployments, and policies and directives in accordance with requirements of the current situation and the lessons learned.

(6) Participates in coordination of ground fire support missions accomplished by ADA units.

(7) Issues or relays supplementary weapon control and coordinating instructions to ADA units, as required by the situation, within the scope of established policies and procedures.
(8) Coordinates the use of nuclear weapons in AD operations, to include recommendations for—

(a) Revision of minimum normal burst altitudes, as proper for the tactical situation, in consonance with established field army policies and theater directives.

(b) Nuclear-safe areas for aircraft outside corridors, when appropriate, in coordination with the FSE and the TASE.

(9) Supervises the application of activities by ADA units in coordination with the EWE.

(10) Compiles statistical data and operational reports as a basis for evaluation and future plans.

d. Coordinates Army Air Traffic. The ACE determines prohibited or restricted AD areas or other restrictions possibly imposed on air traffic by the commander, higher headquarters, or theater AD commander, FSE, or through agreement with other Services. Based on these restrictions, the ACE disseminates aviation control guidance (e.g., corridors, altitudes, areas in which all flights must be cleared), provides information for the preparation of the air traffic regulation plan to be included in the airspace utilization annex, and coordinates the plan. On approval by the G3 element, the ACE disseminates the plan to the TOC, the direct air support center (DASC), and the Army aviation and ADA units, as required. Through liaison with other TOC elements, the ACE determines those combat and combat support activities that will influence air traffic and disseminates changes to the air traffic control plan, as required.

e. Provides Intelligence Obtained Through AD Channels. The ACE receives intelligence information through its link with the AADCP and Air Force command and control facilities. The ACE furnishes this information to the TOC G2 element and other elements, as required.

f. Collocates With the TASE and the FSE. The ACE should be collocated with the TASE and FSE whenever possible to facilitate coordination.

J-20. Electronic Warfare Element

The EWE plans, controls, and evaluates EW activities in support of impending or current tactical operations. The EWE coordinates and furnishes advice on the capabilities and limitations of EW, evaluates the supported command's intelligence requirements in terms of USASA and organic EW mission capabilities, and serves as the point of entry into the TOC for coordination of all EW information. The EWE—

a. Receives Information and Advises Other TOC Elements of Detailed Data on Assigned, Attached, or Supporting EW Units and Their Status, Capabilities, and Limitations. The EWE maintains information on such units operating in areas other than those for which it has responsibility, to include information concerning operations of counterpart organizations of other Services. This information is provided the EWE by the ACofS, G2, and the supporting USASA organization.

b. Maintains a Continuous Estimate of the EW Situation. The EWE maintains constant surveillance over EW activities and evaluates pertinent information as it influences the current situation. An important aspect of this function is consideration of the C-E order of battle. The G2 element receives from the EWE the requirements for SIGINT support, levies these requirements on assigned or attached units with an SIGINT capability, and provides pertinent information that assists the EWE in its activities.

c. Recommends the Employment of EW Resources. The EWE recommends to the G3 element changes in location of Army EW units. The EWE also recommends changes or adjustments of missions, as required, to support the combat commander's concept of operations. The EWE translates guidance from the ACofS, G3, for EW support into missions for Army EW units.

d. Coordinates Friendly EW Operations. The EWE assigns missions to EW units as required by the supported command. The EWE is responsible for resolving problems where EW operations may conflict with operations of subordinate and supporting commands and units. Of particular interest are those problems arising from organic or nonorganic C-E activities wherein their performance is susceptible to interference from friendly or enemy EW operations. In this respect, the EWE coordinates and implements action required for the maintenance of GUARDED/PROTECTED/TABOO frequencies and the resolution of meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion reports.

e. Prepares the EW Portion of Orders and Plans. The EWE provides technical input to plans and orders required by the G3 element.

f. Interprets and Advises on Enemy EW Op-
The EWE interprets these data in relation to the current situation to assist in reporting determinations of friendly C-E vulnerabilities. The EWE correlates and evaluates the results of all EW operations to provide current information to assist the execution of planned or ongoing operations.

J-21. Administration Section

a. The primary function of the administration section is to act as a message-screening agency and an administrative center for the TOC. Included in this mission are the functions of receiving, dispatching, and routing all record communications received at the TOC; recording and filing all record communications received and dispatched by the TOC, to include memorandum-for-record journal entries of messages received or disseminated directly by TOC elements; and assigning the communication means to be used for dispatch of record communications originated at the TOC (e.g., common-user teletypewriter, point-to-point teletypewriter, motor messenger, air courier). The major tasks of the administration section are—

(1) To determine whether the TOC or some other agency within the headquarters should receive these data, i.e., messages, letters, overlays, plans, reports.

(2) To determine disposition of data received in the TOC.

(3) To initiate followup actions to obtain information that should logically be available. For example, the administration section should maintain a suspense system to insure that periodic reports required by TOC elements are received on time and routed to the appropriate TOC element.

b. To accomplish its mission and functions, the administration section—

(1) Screens incoming communications and routes the information directly to the proper TOC staff element or elements. If necessary, communications are routed to the G3 element or the G2 element for determination of action assignment.

(2) Coordinates internal TOC administration and operates an internal TOC distribution center.

J-22. Augmentation

ACofS, G4; ACofS, G5; chemical engineer; C-E; or other representation will be established in the TOC, when and as required. This requirement is anticipated only in operational situations where one or more of these combat support or combat service support functions assume more than routine importance to the current tactical mission and where an increase in coordination or supervision is required. The special ammunition logistic element, formed at corps, field army, and theater army, is an example (FM 9-6). The chemical, biological, and radiological element (CBRE) is formed by consolidating the CBR functions and personnel described for the G3 element and the chemical section. The CBRE, therefore, is responsible for chemical and radiological functions and biological defense functions. FM 21-40 and FM 3-12 contain detailed information pertaining to organization, missions, functions, and capabilities of the CBRE.

Section VI. MANNING REQUIREMENTS

J-23. General

This section lists the personnel requirements for the type of organization shown in figure J-1 to maintain sustained TOC operations at the levels of command indicated. Personnel shown are not necessarily provided in current TOE's. The commander may modify or realign this manning structure to meet his particular operational needs.

J-24. Division Tactical Operations Center

a. G3 Element.

First shift:

1 MAJ, asst G3
1 CPT, asst G3
1 NCO, ops SGT
2 EM, ops asst
1 EM, clerk-typist

Second shift:

1 MAJ, asst G3
1 CPT, asst G3
1 NCO, ops SGT
2 EM, ops asst
1 EM, clerk-typist
b. **G2 Element.**

   First shift:
   
   1 MAJ, asst G2  
   1 CPT, asst G2  
   1 NCO, intel SGT  
   1 EM, intel asst  
   1 EM, clerk-typist

   Second shift:
   
   1 MAJ, asst G2  
   1 CPT, asst G2  
   1 EM, intel sp  
   1 EM, intel asst  
   1 EM, clerk-typist

c. **FSE.**

   First shift:
   
   1 LTC, asst FSCOORD  
   1 CPT, tgt anal  
   1 MAJ, FA intel off  
   1 CPT, cm1 off  
   1 sr NCO, ops SGT  
   1 NCO, FD cmpt  
   1 NCO, RATT tm chief  
   1 EM, clerk-typist

   Second shift:
   
   1 MAJ, asst FSCOORD  
   1 CPT, tgt anal  
   1 sr NCO, intel SGT  
   1 NCO, FD cmpt  
   1 EM, RATT op

   Attachments: ANGLICO division naval gunfire team (when naval gunfire in support).

d. **TASE.**

   First shift:
   
   1 MAJ, G3 air  
   1 CPT, G2 air  
   1 sr NCO, G2 air intel SGT  
   1 NCO, G3 air ops SGT

   Second shift:
   
   1 MAJ, G2 air  
   1 CPT, G3 air  
   1 NCO, air intel SGT  
   1 sr NCO, G3 air ops SGT

   Attachments: Air Force TACP.

   ANGLICO division TACP (when Navy/Marine air in support).

e. **ACE.**

   First shift:
   
   1 MAJ, ADA ops off  
   1 MAJ, avn off  
   1 sr NCO, ops SGT  
   1 NCO, ADA ops SGT  
   1 EM, clerk-typist

   Second shift:
   
   1 MAJ, avn off  
   1 CPT, ADA ops off  
   1 NCO, ops SGT  
   1 NCO, ADA ops SGT

f. **EWE.**

   First shift:
   
   1 MAJ, EW/crypto off  
   1 CPT, EW off  
   1 sr NCO, G2 intel SGT  
   1 EM, sr tfc anal  
   1 EM, clerk-typist

   Second shift:
   
   1 CPT, EW off  
   1 sr NCO, G3 asst ops SGT  
   1 NCO, EW ops anal  
   1 EM, clerk-typist

g. **Administration Section.**

   First shift:
   
   1 sr NCO, admin SGT  
   1 EM, admin sp  
   1 EM, clerk-typist

   Second shift:
   
   1 sr NCO, admin SGT  
   1 EM, admin sp  
   1 EM, clerk-typist

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*Not available in airmobile division; limited FSE in airborne division.*
*Chief of ACE is designated by the commander.*
*Personnel for this element, as required, from attached USASA unit.*
J-25. Corps Tactical Operations Center

a. G3 Element.

1 LTC, asst G3 (chief of element)

First shift:

1 LTC, asst G3
1 MAJ, asst G3 cml
1 MAJ, asst G3
1 CPT, asst G3
1 sr NCO, ops SGT
2 EM, ops asst
2 EM, clerk-typist

Second shift:

1 LTC, asst G3
1 MAJ, asst G3
1 MAJ, asst G3 cml
1 CPT, asst G3
1 NCO, ops SGT
2 EM, ops asst
2 EM, clerk-typist

b. G2 Element.

1 LTC, asst G2 (chief of element)

First shift:

1 MAJ, asst G2
1 MAJ, asst G2 tgt off
1 CPT, asst G2
1 sr NCO, intel SGT
1 EM, intel anal
2 EM, clerk-typist

Second shift:

1 MAJ, asst G2
1 CPT, asst G2 tgt off
1 CPT, asst G2
1 NCO, intel SGT
1 EM, intel anal
2 EM, clerk-typist

c. FSE.

1 LTC, asst FSCOORD (chief of element)

First shift:

1 MAJ, tm chief
1 CPT, cml off
1 CPT, FA intel off
1 CPT, tgt anal
1 sr NCO, ops SGT
1 NCO, RATT tm chief
2 EM, ops sp
1 EM, intel sp
2 EM, RATT op
2 EM, tt op
1 EM, clerk-typist

Second shift:

1 MAJ, tm chief
1 CPT, FA intel off
1 CPT, tgt anal
1 NCO, ops SGT
2 EM, ops sp
1 EM, intel sp
2 EM, RATT op
1 EM, tt op
1 EM, clerk-typist

d. TASE.

First shift:

1 LTC, G3 air
1 MAJ, asst G3 air
1 sr NCO, G3 air ops SGT
1 NCO, air intel SGT
1 EM, clerk-typist

Second shift:

1 LTC, G2 air
1 MAJ, asst G3 air
1 NCO, G3 air ops SGT
1 NCO, air intel SGT

Attachments: Air Force TACP and DASC.

e. ACE.*

First shift:

1 LTC, sr avn off
1 MAJ, ADA ops off
1 CPT, avn off

Second shift:

1 LTC, sr ADA off
1 MAJ, ADA ops off
1 MAJ, avn off

*Chief of ACE is designated by the commander.
1 CPT, ADA ops off
1 NCO, ops SGT
1 NCO, ADA ops SGT
1 EM, clerk-typist

f. EWE:
First shift:
1 LTC, EW/crypto off
1 MAJ, EW off
1 sr NCO, G3 asst ops SGT
1 NCO, sr tfc anal
1 EM, clerk-typist

Second shift:
1 MAJ, EW/crypto off
1 sr NCO, G2 intel SGT
1 NCO, sr tfc anal
1 EM, clerk-typist

g. Administration Section.
First shift:
1 sr NCO, admin SGT
2 EM, admin sp
2 EM, clerk-typist

Second shift:
1 sr NCO, admin SGT
2 EM, admin sp
2 EM, clerk-typist

J-26. Field Army Tactical Operations Center

a. G3 Element.
1 COL, asst G3 (chief of element)
First shift:
1 LTC, asst G3
1 LTC, action off
1 LTC, asst G3 cml
1 MAJ, asst G3
1 sr NCO, ops SGT
1 NCO, ops SGT
2 EM, ops asst
3 EM, clerk-typist

Second shift:
1 LTC, asst G3
1 LTC, action off
1 MAJ, asst G3
1 MAJ, asst G3 cml
1 sr NCO, ops SGT
1 NCO, ops SGT
2 EM, ops asst
3 EM, clerk-typist

b. G2 Element.
1 COL, asst G2 (chief of element)
First shift:
1 LTC, asst G2
1 MAJ, asst G2
1 MAJ, asst G2 air tgt
1 MAJ, asst G2 cml
1 NCO, asst intel SGT
2 EM, intel anal
2 EM, intel clerk
2 EM, clerk-typist

Second shift:
1 LTC, asst G2
1 MAJ, asst G2
1 MAJ, asst G2 air tgt
1 CPT, asst G2 cml
1 NCO, asst intel SGT
1 EM, intel anal
1 EM, ops asst
1 EM, intel clerk
2 EM, clerk-typist

c. FSE.
1 COL, ops off (chief of element)
First shift:
1 LTC, asst ops off
1 LTC, asst G2 cml
1 CPT, asst intel off

Second shift:
1 LTC, intel off
1 MAJ, asst ops off
1 MAJ, asst G3 cml

*Personnel for this element, as required, from attached USASA unit.
1 sr NCO, ops SGT
1 EM, ops sp
1 EM, clerk-typist

1 CPT, asst ops off
1 NCO, ops SGT
1 EM, ops sp
1 EM, clerk-typist

4a. TASE.
First shift:
1 COL, G3 air
1 LTC, asst G3 air
1 LTC, asst G2 air
1 MAJ, asst G2 air recon
1 MAJ, asst G2 air
1 NCO, air intel SGT
1 NCO, ops SGT
1 EM, clerk-typist

Attachments: Air Force TACP.

Second shift:
1 COL, G2 air
1 LTC, asst G3 air
1 LTC, asst G2 air
1 MAJ, asst G3
1 MAJ, asst G2 air recon
1 EM, G2 air ops asst
1 NCO, ops SGT
1 EM, clerk-typist

4b. ACE.
First shift:
1 COL, sr avn off
1 LTC, ADA ops off
1 MAJ, ADA ops off
1 MAJ, avn off
1 NCO, ADA ops SGT
1 NCO, ops SGT
2 EM, clerk-typist

Second shift:
1 COL, ADA off
1 LTC, ADA ops off
1 LTC, avn off
1 MAJ, ADA ops off
1 sr NCO, ADA ops SGT
1 EM, ADA ops asst
1 NCO, ops SGT
1 NCO, ADA ops SGT
1 EM, clerk-typist

4c. EWE.
First shift:
1 LTC, EW/crypto off
1 MAJ, EW/crypto off
1 MAJ, EW off
1 sr NCO, G3 asst ops SGT
1 NCO, sr tfc anal
1 NCO, EW ops anal
1 EM, clerk-typist

Second shift:
1 MAJ, EW/crypto off
1 CPT, EW off
1 sr NCO, G2 intel SGT
1 NCO, sr tfc anal
1 NCO, EW ops anal
1 EM, clerk-typist

4d. Administration Section.
First shift:
1 CPT, admin off
1 sr NCO, admin SGT
3 EM, admin sp
3 EM, clerk-typist

Second shift:
1 LT, admin off
1 sr NCO, admin SGT
3 EM, admin sp
3 EM, clerk-typist

*Chief of ACE is designated by the commander.
†Personnel for this element, as required, from attached USASA unit.
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Cover and deception

Operations center

Estimation, enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities

Evacuation and hospitalization

Evaders

EWE (electronic warfare element)

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