CHAPTER 8
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Section 1. GENERAL

233. Definition
An amphibious operation is an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces. It involves a landing on a hostile shore and normally includes extensive air participation. Lesser included operations are amphibious withdrawals, demonstrations and raids. Airborne operations may be conducted as a part of or in conjunction with amphibious operations. Army forces may be employed in all types of amphibious operations.

234. Purpose and Scope of Amphibious Operations
a. Amphibious operations are conducted to establish a landing force on a hostile shore in order to:
   (1) Prosecute further combat operations.
   (2) Obtain a site for an advanced naval or air base.
   (3) Deny the use of an area or facilities to the enemy.

b. The amphibious operation includes planning, embarkation of troops and equipment, rehearsals, movement to the objective area, assault landing of troops and accompanying supplies and equipment, and support of the landing force until termination of the amphibious operation. The amphibious operation does not include marshalling of forces, preliminary training in amphibious techniques, and operations subsequent to the establishment of the landing force ashore.

235. Force Requirements
a. An amphibious operation integrates virtually all types of land, sea, and air forces into a coordinated military effort. Clear command relationships, close cooperation, and coordination among all participating forces are essential.

b. In order to achieve success, an amphibious operation must be assured naval supremacy against enemy surface and submarine forces, preponderant air superiority, substantial superiority over enemy land forces in the objective area, and a reduction in the defender’s nuclear capability to a level justifying the risk involved. In addition to superior power within the objective area, an amphibious task force should have reasonable assurance of freedom from effective interference during the assault landing by enemy forces from outside the objective. The amphibious task force must
be capable of providing continuous tactical and logistical support to the forces ashore. In the face of compelling necessity, an amphibious operation may be undertaken on the basis of a reasonable superiority of the total combat power of the amphibious task force. For example, naval and air superiority may justify the operation even though the amphibious task force lacks the desired superiority in landing forces, provided its naval and air components can be employed effectively in offsetting the enemy's ground superiority.

236. Concept of Operations

a. The concept of amphibious operations envisages a quick, but thorough firepower preparation (delivered by naval guns, missiles, and aircraft) followed by an assault landing accomplished by forces moving rapidly from ship to shore in landing craft, air and amphibious vehicles and frequently in conjunction with an airborne operation. Following seizure of initial objectives, the landing force continues to move rapidly to intermediate and final objectives. The force is supported by naval means until adequate organic combat and administrative support forces are established ashore. Enemy nuclear capability may make it necessary to employ relatively small forces to proceed directly to deep initial objectives without halting at the waterline. This type of action will add depth to the beachhead through simultaneous operations.

b. An associated airborne operation facilitates establishing forces ashore from the sea and greatly enhances the amphibious capability. Such airborne operations may be conducted either as an integrated part of the amphibious operation or as a separate but coordinated supporting operation. Such airborne operations may precede, be concurrent with, or follow the amphibious assault.

237. Operational Phases

a. Concurrent with or prior to the planning for an amphibious operation, participating units must be trained in amphibious techniques and marshalled for the embarkation. Reconnaissance of the objective area and other supporting operations considered necessary are initiated.

b. The operational phase of the amphibious operation commences with the embarkation of troops and supplies and continues through the rehearsal, movement, assault, and seizure of initial objectives ashore, until this phase is terminated by competent authority.

c. Following the amphibious operation, and particularly when extensive land operations are to be pursued from the lodgement seized, a period of consolidation and buildup may be necessary.
before further operations can be initiated. During this period
the lodgement is consolidated, logistical buildup proceeds, and
facilities for further operations are established.

**Section II. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND**

238. **Command Relationships**

   a. The directive issued by the commander initiating the am-
   phibious operation allocates the component forces from the part-
   icipating Services, and establishes the command relationships.

   b. The command structure for the amphibious operation will
   depend upon the purpose, extent, and complexity of the operation,
   as well as the magnitude and type of forces involved. Where sev-
   eral landings are conducted simultaneously in conjunction with
   extensive airborne operations, it may be necessary to vest the con-
   trol of the operation in a unified command or joint task force and
   one or more joint amphibious task forces. Where the operation is
   less extensive or less complex, a single joint amphibious task force
   may suffice.

239. **Joint Amphibious Task Force**

   The organization formed for the purpose of assaulting the
   hostile shore is the amphibious task force. It is activated prior
   to embarkation and includes a naval force and a landing force,
   and may include Air Force elements. The naval force includes
   elements necessary to move the landing force to the objective area,
   provide protection en route and in the objective area, accomplish
   the final preparation of the objective area, land assault forces
   with accompanying supplies and equipment, and support the land-
   ing force ashore. The amphibious task force commander is a naval
   officer and is usually the commander of the naval component.

240. **The Landing Force**

   The landing force comprises the troop units assigned to conduct
   the amphibious assault. It may be formed from Army forces,
   Marine Corps forces, or a combination thereof. The landing force
   normally operates under a single tactical commander; however
   on occasion subordinate groups may be formed with specific dele-
   gation of command authority.

241. **Formation of Subordinate Forces**

   a. The amphibious task force may be divided into subordinate
   forces if simultaneous or nearly simultaneous assaults are to be
   launched in widely separated areas, or if other factors prevent
effective centralized control. In such cases a naval attack group and a corresponding landing group are formed.

b. The command relations between the attack group commander and the corresponding landing group commander are jointly agreed between the amphibious task force commander and the landing force commander during the planning phase.

242. Fire Support Coordination

Detailed fire support coordination and planning are of utmost importance in amphibious operations because the landing force is initially dependent on naval fire support. The amphibious task force commander is responsible for coordinating fire support during the early stages of the landing. When conditions warrant and coordination agencies are established ashore, the amphibious task force commander passes this responsibility to the landing force commander. Thereafter, the fire coordination facilities of the amphibious task force revert to a standby basis and are available to take over fire support coordination functions in emergencies.

243. Termination of the Amphibious Operation

a. The amphibious operation terminates upon the accomplishment of the mission specified in the directive initiating the operation. The firm establishment of the landing force ashore is invariably specified as a condition of such accomplishment.

b. The landing force is regarded as firmly established ashore, when in the opinion of the landing force commander:

1. The force beachhead has been secured.
2. Sufficient tactical and supporting forces have been established ashore to insure the continuous landing of troops and supplies required for subsequent operations.
3. Command, communications, and supporting arms coordination facilities have been established ashore.

Section III. INTELLIGENCE

244. Responsibilities

Intelligence activities in support of amphibious operations are complicated by the remoteness of the enemy and the dependence of subordinate echelons on information and intelligence provided by higher echelons. The information required in planning an amphibious operation includes coverage of weather; hydrographic conditions of the beaches, ports, and harbors; airfields; landing and drop zones; enemy political, sociological, and economic conditions; and the combat intelligence including enemy order of battle data required to conduct land operations in the objective
area. During the planning phase, the joint amphibious task force commander is responsible for coordinating the intelligence plans of the various elements of the amphibious task force and for requesting the necessary support from higher headquarters. As subordinate elements become active components of the force, normal intelligence relationships are established to facilitate the exchange of intelligence. During the movement to the objective area, higher echelons continue to assist the amphibious task force commander in the collection and processing of information required by the task force. The intelligence collection agencies of higher echelons which may include surface and subsurface vessels, underwater demolition teams, amphibious reconnaissance units, and covert networks, are used to the maximum extent in a coordinated effort to provide timely and accurate combat and strategic intelligence. When the amphibious task force reaches the objective area, the collection agencies of the force become active, and greater emphasis is placed on producing the required intelligence within the force.

245. Counterintelligence and Communication and Electronics Security

Counterintelligence, communication security, and electronic security are essential since amphibious forces are extremely vulnerable during preparation, rehearsal, movement to the objective area, and during the initial stages of the assault.

Section IV. PLANS AND OPERATIONS

246. Operational Planning Considerations

a. While the basic considerations of military planning are applicable, planning for an amphibious operation is complicated by several factors:

(1) The security of the various forces participating and the necessity for attaining maximum strategic and tactical surprise dictate that the movement of forces originate from widely separated areas and converge in the objective area at the appropriate time. The problem becomes more complex when preassault operations are required to gain air, naval, and fire superiority, and to reduce the enemy reinforcement capabilities. Only by the closest and most detailed joint planning can the various joint and supporting uni-Service plans be coordinated.

(2) Planning must frequently be based on incomplete information concerning the physical characteristics of the objective area and the strength, composition, and dis-
position of the enemy forces therein. The assumptions upon which planning is initiated may be invalidated as additional information becomes available. Enemy forces cannot be expected to remain static while planning, embarkation, and movement are completed. These contingencies will frequently dictate the preparation of several alternate plans. Flexibility is essential.

(3) Adequate combat support must be provided the landing force in the period between the initial assault and the establishment ashore of the landing force. During this period the landing force will require fire, communication, and logistic support from air and naval forces. Detailed planning is necessary to insure the adequacy, responsiveness, and continuity of such support.

b. Planning must be conducted concurrently at all echelons of the participating Services. To enable subordinate commanders within the landing forces to initiate their plans, they must be provided with the following information as soon as it has been determined:

(1) Assigned mission(s)
(2) Troop lists
(3) Available intelligence
(4) Levels of supply to accompany troops
(5) Allocation of shipping and transport aircraft
(6) Availability of landing craft and amphibian vehicles
(7) General landing areas
(8) Approximate date and time of operation
(9) Naval gunfire and air support allocated to the operation
(10) Employment and allocation of atomic weapons

c. In order to gain surprise and reduce the vulnerability of the amphibious forces during embarkation, movement, and assault, cover and deception plans must be developed early in the planning phase. Such plans must be developed and implemented sufficiently in advance of the assault to be effective.

d. Rehearsals provide a valuable means of testing the adequacy of plans and the timing of various facets of the operation. Necessary rehearsal plans are formulated and incorporated in the overall plan for the operation.

e. A major consideration in planning is the determination of the nature and extent of preassault operations in the objective area. The decision regarding these operations must be based upon such factors as relative air, naval, and ground strengths; enemy reinforcement capabilities; the character and extent of enemy defensive installations; the effect of the loss of surprise that may result from such operations; the relationship with cover and
deception plans; and the availability of nuclear weapons. Pre-
assault operations may vary from a short, but intensive pre-H-
hour air, naval, and missile attack to a methodical, deliberate
reduction of the defender's capabilities by extensive operations
requiring a considerable period of time.

f. The threat of use of nuclear weapons by the enemy may pre-
clude massive concentrations of forces and supplies. Forces and
supplies for an amphibious operation must be dispersed during
staging and mounting, movement to the objective area, and during
the assault and seizure of the beachhead. Dispersion, which re-
quires the landing of forces on widely separated beaches and land-
ing zones, necessitates the organization of the forces into balanced,
mobile, landing teams capable of independent action. Passive pro-
tection is particularly important.

247. Training

The troops of the landing force require specialized training
in amphibious techniques to include embarkation and debarka-
tion, loading and unloading equipment and supplies, naval gun-
fire and air support procedures, and ship-to-shore movement and
control. Provision of this training requires joint plans and joint
support.

248. Mounting and Embarkation Concentrations

Concentration of troops and equipment during mounting opera-
tions is avoided by establishing camps and staging areas at some
distance from embarkation sites. Troops are kept in marshalling
camps and staging areas for minimum periods of time. Considera-
tion should be given to outloading from widely separated points.

249. Ship-To-Shore Movement

a. The overall planning for and execution of the ship-to-shore
movement is the responsibility of the joint amphibious task force
commander.

b. The landing force commander is responsible for presenting
his requirements for landing craft, amphibians, and helicopters,
to the joint amphibious task force commander and for advising
him of landing craft, amphibians, and helicopters which will be
available from landing force sources for use in the ship-to-shore
movement.

c. The ship-to-shore movement plan is designed to support the
scheme of maneuver ashore and consequently cannot be completed
until the latter has been approved; however, such factors as
hydrographic conditions, availability of landing vehicles, availa-
bility of beaches and helicopter landing sites, frequently influence
the scheme of maneuver. Close coordination of the ship-to-shore movement plan and the scheme of maneuver is essential.

250. Scheme of Maneuver Ashore

a. The scheme of maneuver of the landing force ashore is based on the fundamentals applicable to normal ground combat, although certain considerations may require additional emphasis.

b. The objective of the landing force is seizure of sufficient terrain to accommodate troops, equipment, and supporting installations without dangerous congestion. This lodgement area should include terrain suitable for the defense in the event of a counteroffensive before the breakout.

c. Intermediate objectives must provide for the early seizure of critical terrain features which control beaches, boat and air lanes, and which might interfere with the subsequent ship-to-shore movement of troops and supplies.

d. The employment of airborne forces and the utilization of aircraft in the ship-to-shore movement may permit the seizure of final objectives prior to or concurrently with reduction of intermediate objectives. Such forces, landed deep in the lodgement, can materially contribute to the movement inland of the forces landed over the beaches.

e. While reserve forces are employed in a manner similar to that in other types of ground warfare, their employment is dependent upon the availability of landing craft, amphibians, and transport aircraft. Availability of these vehicles will rarely permit withholding any of them for exclusive use by reserve forces.

251. Security

Special measures are required to safeguard the security of the operation with particular emphasis on communication and electronic security measures. Disclosure of planning information is held to a strict need-to-know basis. Personnel with knowledge of the operation are not permitted to take part in prior operations where they would be subject to capture. Briefing of troops is delayed until they arrive in sealed marshalling areas or until after embarkation and sailing of convoys.

252. Communication Requirements

Coordination between corresponding echelons of the participating Services and within the Services places a heavy burden on signal communication facilities. The amphibious task force commander is responsible for providing adequate secure signal communication facilities to the landing force commander until organic communication facilities have been established ashore.
Section V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

253. Shore Party

Logistical support for landing force units within the beach support area during the early phases of an amphibious operation is provided by a composite Army and Navy task organization commanded by an officer of the landing force.

254. Logistical Support Operations

Supplies must be unloaded rapidly and dispersed in balanced supply points well inland. Minimum supply levels must be maintained during the initial stages of the operation. To avoid undue concentration, careful scheduling, rapid unloading, and dispersion of supply ships are required. Ship-to-shore vehicles used for logistical purposes speed unloading, facilitate dispersion, and increase flexibility of administrative support operations.

255. Administrative Support Responsibilities

The component force commanders of the amphibious task force are responsible for determining administrative support requirements of their commands and for making arrangements for such support from appropriate agencies, either of their own Services or of other Services when common servicing, joint servicing, or cross servicing agreements or assignments are in effect. The amphibious task force commander is responsible for the overall supervision of the administrative activities of the component force commanders to insure that shipping and handling facilities are adequate for the administrative support of all elements of the amphibious task force.

256. Types of Logistical Support

In invasion type amphibious operations, the logistical buildup of forces and materiel to support future combat operations must be accomplished concurrently with operations against the enemy. In a limited objective type amphibious operation, logistical support usually is limited to maintaining the current requirements of the force.
CHAPTER 9
COMMAND OF THE AIR

Section 1. GENERAL

257. Scope
This chapter relates to command of the air in a theater of operations. It is not intended to guide Army forces engaged in the air defense of North America.

258. Relationship of Land and Air Operations
a. Land operations are critically affected by and are inseparable from air operations. The land force commander is vitally concerned with the ability of either side to use the air to influence the land battle.
b. Opposing forces seek to gain command of the air, to assist their land forces and hinder those of the enemy by attack with missiles and aircraft.

259. Command of the Air
a. Command of the air is the capability of one force over another that permits it to conduct air operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the air force, missile, or air defense artillery action of the other.
b. Command of the air denies the enemy profitable use of the air in a given area. It permits land operations without prohibitive interference from hostile air reconnaissance or attack by aircraft or missile. Command of the air enables the force to conduct air operations in conjunction with its land operations.
c. Command of the air is relative in area, degree, and duration. Its influence on land operations depends upon the nature of enemy weapons, on force vulnerability, and on the degree of risk which the commander assumes.
d. Command of the air is a prerequisite for large scale land operations; its achievement is a primary concern of land force commanders.

260. Attainment and Maintenance of Command of the Air
a. Command of the air is gained and maintained only through offensive and defensive operations that exploit the capabilities of all participating forces. Both types of operations are essential; neither alone can provide the degree of command of the air needed for the decisive joint application of military power.
b. Operations of offensive counter-firepower and active air defense means are directed to the following tasks:

(1) **Offensive counter-firepower means.**
   
   (a) Seek out and destroy hostile cruise or ballistic type missile, aircraft including drones, and artillery by attacks against such means on the ground.

   (b) Deny establishment of and destroy enemy installations required to apply and support his offensive firepower and active air defense means.

   (c) Nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile missile, aircraft including drones, and artillery by electronic warfare against such means on the ground.

   (d) Wage offensive warfare against the sources of enemy military and economic strength under approved war policies.

(2) **Active air defense means.**

   (a) Attack and destroy hostile missiles and aircraft including drones with fires of air defense artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and fighter-interceptor aircraft against such means in the air.

   (b) Nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile missiles, aircraft including drones, and artillery by electronic warfare against electromagnetic radiations used by such enemy means for airborne communications, navigation, fire control, identification, electronic warfare, fuzing, or other purposes.

   (c) Assist in accomplishing the tasks of offensive counter-firepower means by using active air defense means in their secondary role.

c. All forces take passive air defense measures. These include all measures, other than active air defense operations, to minimize the effects of hostile missiles and aircraft including drones, e.g., use of cover and concealment, dispersion, control of movement, and appropriate communication and electronic security measures.

d. Offensive counter-firepower and active air defense operations in a theater of operations support strategic and tactical plans. These operations are usually joint in nature; their success is assured only by adequate joint planning and training.

e. Complete command of the air results only from total destruction of the enemy's aviation, missiles, and artillery. Since this is seldom practicable, offensive counter-firepower operations must be continuous and intensive, while effective air defense must be constantly maintained. Both offensive counter-firepower and air defense operations seek to gain and maintain the requisite degree
of command of the air and to provide security from hostile offensive firepower operations.

f. Offensive counter-firepower and active air defense means must be able to shift quickly from one objective to another in a theater of operations. This flexibility is attained only by close coordination of the operations of participating units.

g. Command of the air may result by default when the enemy does not possess, or fully employ, significant air and missile capabilities. Such conditions may exist in a limited war.

261. Operational Considerations in Land Operations

a. Long-range offensive counter-firepower and active air defense operations may precede or accompany the initial contact of surface forces. The success of early long-range offensive counter-firepower operations and air defense aids in the orderly mobilization and strategic concentration of field forces and in the movement of such forces from concentration areas under strategic plans.

b. The degree of command of the air which can be achieved is a major consideration in assigning strategic and tactical tasks to land forces. In determining the required degree of command of the air the commander must weigh the risk involved. A commander may have to conduct or order land operations when command of the air is marginal or lacking.

Section II. ARMY CAPABILITIES FOR COMMAND OF THE AIR OPERATIONS

262. General

Army weapons and forces participate in offensive and defensive operations to gain and maintain command of the air. Offensive means include weapons with surface-to-surface capabilities, the maneuver of land forces and employment of guerrilla forces. Defensive means include surface-to-air weapons, electronic warfare, and passive defense measures.

263. Army Surface-to-Surface and Surface-to-Air Weapons

a. Army surface-to-surface weapons are used in offensive operations to gain command of the air as part of Army fire support plans and Army or joint interdiction programs.

b. Army surface-to-air weapons are used to defend the combat zone, the communications zone, and critical installations throughout the area of operations.
264. Maneuver of Land Forces

The maneuver of land forces may contribute to command of the air operations. By threatening enemy bases or cutting lines of communication to enemy airbases and missile sites, land forces may make such areas untenable and may place friendly offensive counter-firepower means in a more advantageous position. Such maneuvers may force the enemy to commit his aircraft and missiles under conditions that reduce their effectiveness. Air mobile and airborne forces are particularly suited for offensive operations against enemy bases.

265. Guerrilla Forces

Guerrilla forces participate in command of the air operations by sabotage, subversion, and attack against aircraft and missile bases including launching and support installations, lines of communication critical to enemy air and missile capabilities, and the production base.

266. Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare is used to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile aircraft, missiles, and electronically fuzed artillery projectiles. Electronic warfare is directed against enemy electromagnetic means for airborne communications, navigation, fire control, identification, electronic warfare, fuzing, or other purposes.

Section III. AIR DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

267. Organizational Requirements

Air defense systems must—

a. Respond instantly to the direction of responsible commanders.

b. Provide for maximum decentralization of execution of active air defense operations while providing for centralized direction of such operations.

c. Provide for appropriate integration of air defense means with all other means of the combined arms force to gain maximum combat power.

d. Insure mutual understanding and confidence, particularly in the use of air space, among agencies participating in active air defense and offensive counter-firepower operations and those performing other forms of aviation operations.

e. Incorporate intelligence systems capable of high speed data collection, collation, and dissemination.

f. Permit timely identification of friendly aircraft.
g. Incorporate air defense command control capable of rapid coordination of facilities with adequate secure communications and integrated staffs and direction of force employment and operations at all levels.

268. The Theater Commander

The theater commander determines air defense priorities and allocates air defense means thereto. He organizes a theater joint air defense command whose commander, normally an air component commander, is responsible for air defense. The air defense commander exercises the authority of the theater commander to coordinate all air defense forces. This authority does not lessen subordinate commanders' responsibilities for the defense of their forces against all forms of attack, but it includes authority to prescribe coordinating procedures for Army, Navy and Air Force air defense weapon systems as directed by the theater commander.

269. The Field Army

The field army commander is responsible for Army operations in and over the field army area including enemy-held territory to a depth designated by higher headquarters. He is provided means and authority commensurate with this responsibility, including weapons and forces, to defend against air attack. He retains full control of the organic air defense means of his area, subject to the commander's operational procedures and the coordinating procedures prescribed by the joint air defense commander.

270. Coordination of Air Defense in the Combat Zone

a. All air defense artillery weapons, air defense electronic warfare units, and air defense elements of the tactical air force contribute to the air defense of the field army. In supervision of engagement control, intelligence, and communications all air defense artillery and land based air defense electronic warfare units in the field army are integrated into a highly coordinated system to insure their effectiveness.

b. The field army commander designates a field army air defense commander who is responsible for the active air defense of the field army. The field army air defense commander commands all active air defense means assigned or attached to the field army less those assigned or attached to subordinate echelons. He prescribes, to the degree necessary, coordinating procedures for all active air defense units in the field army area as approved by the field army commander. He coordinates all air defense fires and air defense forces so that their efforts are fully integrated with those of the force as a whole.
c. The field army has staff means for coordinating air defense with other combat and combat support means.

271. Defense of the Communications Zone

a. All air defense resources behind the field army rear boundary are under the operational command of the theater joint air defense commander. The theater commander determines the priority of defense of areas in the communications zone.

b. A theater army air defense commander commands all army air defense forces participating in the defense of the communications zone. He may also be the theater air defense commander. The theater joint air defense commander has operational command of the theater army air defense force.

Section IV. AIR DEFENSE PLANNING

272. General

The objective of air defense planning is to provide the various portions of the defended area with a capability to deny penetration proportional to their overall strategic or tactical value and consistent with the estimated threat of attack. The accomplishment of the objective may vary with the mission of the planner, e.g., determining the number of each type of air defense units to provide a specific degree of protection of an industrial, metropolitan, or military area of strategic or tactical importance; or planning the best allocation and disposition of a fixed number of units for any of these areas. The nature of the threat precludes an impregnable defense.

273. Planning Considerations

Air defense planning is based upon—

a. Air defense means available.

b. Relative priorities of areas to be defended.

c. Specific attack threats for each area to be defended.

d. Amount of damage that can be sustained by defended areas and still permit the occupying installations and organizations to accomplish their missions.

274. Determination of Priorities

Criteria that determine air defense priorities are—

a. The importance of the area, force, or installation in accomplishment of the force mission.

b. The enemy's ability to hit a particular installation.

c. The susceptibility of a particular installation or force to damage from a given type of attack.
d. The ease and speed with which an installation of force can be restored if it is damaged or destroyed.

e. The importance of an area as a source of United States or allied military or economic strength.

275. Standing Operating Procedures

The theater joint air defense commander prescribes joint air defense standing operating procedures as approved by the theater commander. These standing operating procedures insure the efficient employment of air defense weapons, eliminate interference in the performance of missions, and provide protection to friendly aircraft and troops. Missions assigned to uni-Service commands may involve operational functions and responsibilities that affect other forces participating in the air defense of an area; these overlapping functions must be defined clearly to insure an effective air defense. The details of air defense standing operating procedures vary widely with operational conditions.
CHAPTER 10
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Section I. GENERAL

276. General

a. Unconventional warfare is conducted within the enemy's sphere of influence largely by local personnel and resources to further military, political, or economic objectives. It consists of three interrelated fields: guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion.

b. Unconventional warfare operations exploit the vulnerabilities of an opposing nation that derive from the fundamental attitudes and characteristics of the nation and its people. These vulnerabilities are most acute when the governmental or other controlling process is oppressive to the people.

c. The ability of relatively small clandestine and covert forces to attack targets deep in enemy territory is a unique capability that cannot be reckoned with in the conventional manner. The importance of the targets that can be attacked is the primary consideration rather than the size and composition of such forces.

277. Conduct of Operations

Unconventional warfare is conducted by field organizations trained, equipped, and directed to operate directly against sources of enemy strength. It is closely integrated with economic, political, and psychological warfare. It differs from other military operations because it involves close working relationships with the local population of enemy controlled areas. Due to its operational environment, it requires that special emphasis be placed on counterintelligence measures.

278. Employment of Means

a. The means used in unconventional warfare vary from clandestine passive resistance to the use of weapons of great destructive power.

b. The ideological nature of modern conflict gives unconventional warfare an important role in all forms of war. Particularly in cold war the struggle for influence over the minds of men makes unconventional warfare a key element. Successful conduct of unconventional warfare could be decisive in achieving national objectives. Counter unconventional warfare is equally important.
279. Coordination of Operations
   a. Unconventional warfare is planned and coordinated at the national level and requires participation by many governmental agencies.
   b. During military operations, the senior commander in the field plans, coordinates, and executes unconventional warfare operations appropriate to his mission.
   c. The theater commander normally establishes a joint unconventional warfare task force. Under exceptional circumstances a service component commander may be made responsible for these operations.

280. Related Activities
   a. The unconventional warfare organization may use a psychological warfare campaign. Unconventional warfare may contribute to or support political and economic warfare and vice versa.
   b. Unconventional warfare forces produce intelligence to support their operations. They can also provide intelligence support to conventional military commanders; however, such support must not impair their primary capabilities.

Section II. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS

281. General
   a. Commanders in the field insure that unconventional warfare supports all other military operations.
   b. Unconventional warfare increases in important with the expansion of the ideological struggle, the increasing effectiveness of mass media of communication, the advent of new weapons, the availability of special forces type units, the increasing scope of psychological warfare operations, and improvements in transportation.
   c. Unconventional warfare is particularly useful when the use of force must be limited. Unconventional warfare operations can be directed against selected portions of the enemy’s economy or against specific political factions; such action may achieve the objective of a campaign with minimum commitment of conventional forces. Under certain circumstances in limited war or cold war military operations may be primarily concerned with directing unconventional forces or combating them.

282. Psychological, Political, and Economic Influences
   a. Psychological, political, and economic effects of other military
operations may have immediate or long term effects on unconventional warfare.

b. Since support by a portion of the local population depends on political and economic factors, the United States or coalition political and economic policies toward the country concerned directly affect the development of unconventional forces. Close coordination of conventional operations, psychological warfare, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare being conducted by the command assists in obtaining the necessary support of the local population.

c. The commander considers the political consequences of sponsoring guerrilla or subversive forces. Prestige out of proportion to the support rendered may accrue to their leaders. Support of political groups not popular with the local people or not compatible with friendly national or coalition interests for reasons of expediency may be detrimental to long term objectives. The commander may be directed to sponsor certain indigenous elements primarily for political reasons, including furtherance of post-war political objectives.

d. Guerrilla forces may develop diverse political objectives. Rivalry may occur among leaders over personal post-war political ambitions. Every effort must be made to insure that the operations of all guerrilla forces are directed against the enemy and not against one another. It may become necessary, however, to conduct operations against rival guerrilla forces whose objectives are not reconcilable with those of sponsored guerrilla forces.

283. Influence of Conventional Operations

a. Conventional operations of a command affect the attitudes of people and influence effectiveness of unconventional warfare operations. Use of excessive force; destruction of religious, cultural, social, agricultural, and humanitarian facilities; and intentional violation of the rules of warfare alienate the populace, making operational tasks more difficult.

b. Psychological warfare operations directed at the enemy civil population can contribute to popular acceptance of the military activities of the command and influence the people to assist the operations of the force.

284. Refugees

Refugees are a valuable source of manpower for unconventional warfare operations. Close coordination with civil affairs, military police, and intelligence elements is required to exploit this source.

285. Effect on Operations

Destruction of facilities in the enemy rear area by unconven-
tional forces directly affects conventional operations. It may be desirable to destroy certain installations in an enemy occupied area. Conversely, if friendly forces will soon arrive in the area guerrilla forces may prevent the enemy from destroying these same installations.

286. Counter Unconventional Warfare

Enemy unconventional warfare operations must be countered. Measures include the use of consolidation psychological warfare operations in conjunction with civil affairs, and the use of combat troops or friendly guerrillas in an antiguerrilla role.

Section III. GUERRILLA WARFARE

287. General

a. Guerrilla warfare comprises combat operations in enemy-held territory by predominantly indigenous forces on a military or paramilitary basis to reduce the combat effectiveness, industrial capacity, and morale of the enemy.

b. The primary mission of guerrilla forces is to interdict enemy lines of communication, installations, and centers of war production in support of conventional operations. Other missions of guerrilla forces are intelligence, psychological warfare, evasion and escape operations, and subversion.

c. Guerrilla operations are offensive actions carried out by relatively small forces. In addition to attacks on targets, guerrilla forces use the tactics of passive and active resistance, espionage, subversion, sabotage, diversion, reprisal, and propaganda. In many instances guerrilla operations resemble civil war.

d. Tactical guerrilla operations are closely coordinated with the tactical operations of conventional forces. Strategic guerrilla operations are conducted independently against target complexes deep in enemy territory. Guerrilla forces may make a major contribution to a campaign.

e. In nuclear war the fluidity of operations and dispersion of units increase the difficulty of maintaining authority over the population in an area and may create opportunities for development and effective employment of guerrilla forces. The unrestricted scale of use of nuclear weapons facilitates guerrilla operations because of the severely reduced effectiveness of enemy security forces due to destruction of communications, records and other facilities. The mass movement of people further complicates the problems of security forces.

f. Mountains, forests, jungles, and swamps are favorable types of terrain in and from which guerrilla forces operate. However,
advantages accruing from terrain may be countered if the enemy commits sufficient security forces to deny the area to guerrillas or uses airmobile forces against them.

$g$. In exceptional circumstances conventional forces may conduct guerrilla operations.

288. Influence of Popular Opinion

Guerrilla warfare operations are most effective when the guerrilla force has the approval of the local populace; support is normally given to forces representing the aspirations of the majority. The most common and powerful motivation of a people is the desire to be liberated from oppression. However, this desire, even though strong, will not normally be manifested by overt action or support of dissident elements unless there appears to be a reasonable chance of success. Operations, both conventional and unconventional, can be used to convince the people of the inevitability of ultimate victory which will secure them from the revenge of the enemy. Existing resistance potential should be exploited or such potential generated where it does not already exist.

289. Spontaneous Resistance

Resistance elements may spontaneously initiate immediate and effective guerrilla action. Weapons and other supplies may be distributed to selected elements of a population in enemy-occupied areas to exploit spontaneous resistance or to assist groups in revolt against the enemy. A psychological warfare campaign should accompany the distribution of weapons to guide the efforts of the people and to provide additional motivation. This process is most likely to be effective in areas where a strong resentment to the enemy exists, where effective local leaders are on hand, and where the temperament of the people is such that significant numbers will openly resist the enemy if given the means. The disadvantage of arming in this manner is that the resulting guerrilla organizations are difficult to control and coordinate with other operations and may later cause major unpredictable political problems. For this reason it is best to infiltrate special forces teams to insure an adequate degree of control.

290. Special Forces

a. When available, special forces teams are used to develop, organize, equip, train, support, and control guerrilla forces and to conduct guerrilla warfare. These teams are organized and trained to operate indefinitely with guerrilla forces. They enter enemy held territory by infiltrating by air, water or land means or, during retrograde operations, by staying behind after the withdrawal of friendly forces.
b. A special forces operational base, a headquarters physically located behind friendly lines, commands; administers; trains; and provides intelligence, technical operational and logistical support for special forces teams.

291. Coordination with Conventional Forces

a. Guerrilla forces normally are commanded by local leaders. These leaders may not be commanded by United States commanders. In such cases unity of effort is attained through cooperation rather than command.

b. The theater commander coordinates the entire guerrilla effort with his overall operational plan. The theater joint unconventional warfare task force plans, coordinates, and executes the guerrilla warfare operations.

c. As land forces approach areas in which friendly guerrilla forces are operating, the land force commander may be given the authority to assign missions to the guerrilla forces. When this occurs, liaison personnel from the theater unconventional warfare joint task force are attached to his staff to facilitate coordination of unconventional and conventional operations. When link-up with the guerrilla forces becomes imminent, operational control of the forces should pass to the appropriate land force commander who normally exerts his control through the designated special forces detachment. Operational control continues after link-up until tactical developments dictate otherwise. Upon link-up guerrilla units may be attached to specific United States units, e.g., divisions.

292. Guerrilla Missions

a. Guerrilla forces render the maximum assistance in the accomplishment of a field force mission by attacking targets in the rear areas at decisive times and places in conjunction with field force operations; or by conducting operations over a prolonged period to disrupt command and control, to cause withdrawal of troops from forward areas, and to tax enemy transportation, repair, and maintenance capabilities.

b. Guerrilla interdiction operations should be coordinated with the overall interdiction program. Lack of friendly command of the air greatly increases the requirement for interdiction by guerrilla forces.

c. Missions assigned guerrilla forces must be within their capabilities or their potential may be dissipated without achieving effective results. Static, difficult to guard, yet vital targets will normally yield the greatest return for the effort expended.

d. Guerrilla forces may be used to assist airborne and airmobile operations by performing offensive, interdiction, or intelligence and reconnaissance missions.
e. After link-up, guerrillas can assist civil affairs and counterintelligence units, protect routes and installations, mop-up bypassed resistance and provide guides. If the training and organization of the units are suitable, guerrillas can be assigned missions involving conventional combat.

293. Fire Coordination

a. Guerrilla forces can furnish target information, exploit the effects of nuclear and other fires and gather data for damage assessment.

b. Nuclear fires and close air support may be furnished by conventional forces to support guerrilla operations.

c. The commander considers the safety of guerrilla forces and coordinates with these forces when chemical or biological agents or nuclear fires are to be delivered into areas of guerrilla operations. Indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons in these areas will have a marked adverse effect on the attitudes of guerrilla elements and the population from which they derive their support. Guerrillas may be reluctant to provide information that might result in nuclear fires on their home areas.

294. Reinforcement of Guerrilla Forces

Guerrilla forces may be reinforced with fire support, aviation, and other tactical and tactical support elements. Army aviation can assist guerrilla units with logistical support, transportation, communications, and fire support. Airmobile, airborne, or surface-infiltrated elements may reinforce guerrilla units in the accomplishment of specific missions.

295. Communications

Guerrilla forces should be provided with communication equipment and cryptographic means. Alternate means of communication must be available because of the security risk and susceptibility to jamming inherent in radio. Extended ranges and need for portability may require special purpose radio equipment. Communication means to meet these requirements are provided by special forces teams.

296. Logistical Considerations

a. Guerrilla forces make maximum use of supplies available from both civilian sources and the enemy. However, if guerrilla forces are to achieve maximum effectiveness, a significant part of basic supplies such as medicine, signal communication equipment, arms and ammunition, must usually be delivered to them. Adequate logistical support increases the operational effectiveness of
guerrilla forces because it permits them to direct their efforts to their mission rather than to foraging. It also decreases the burden on the friendly population supporting the guerrilla force.

b. Initial logistical support consists of minimum essential supplies and equipment commensurate with the size and intended operations of the guerrilla force. The requirement for guerrilla support should be anticipated in long-range logistical plans. Foreign and nonstandard items may be required to support guerrilla forces adequately. Guerrilla force support may compete with the requirements of conventional forces.

c. Normally, air transport is the most effective method of delivering supplies to guerrilla forces, although delivery across beaches may be required. In determining quantities to be delivered, consideration is given to the guerrillas’ capabilities to move the supplies from the delivery area prior to detection by enemy forces.

d. An effective way of influencing guerrilla activities is to withhold logistical support from uncooperative guerrilla forces. Before arriving at such a decision, however, the commander must consider the effects the resulting decrease in guerrilla operations will have against the enemy.

297. Demobilization

As friendly conventional forces move into the areas of guerrilla operations, the ability of guerrilla forces to support military operations gradually ceases. At this time the guerrilla units should be demobilized. If retained beyond their usefulness guerrillas become a liability to the conventional force and a source of potential trouble.

Section IV. EVASION AND ESCAPE

298. General

a. Evasion and escape is that part of unconventional warfare whereby friendly military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from enemy held or unfriendly areas to areas under allied control.

b. The objectives of evasion and escape are to obtain or return the maximum number of military personnel to friendly control and to obtain or free key civilians such as scientists or political leaders.

c. The infiltration of selected personnel into and out of enemy occupied areas is an integral part of unconventional warfare. However, the evasion and escape mechanisms may be organized independently of guerrilla forces.

d. Dispersion and instability on the nuclear battlefield create
frequent opportunities for unconventional forces to assist evaders and escapees.

Section V. SUBVERSION

299. General

Subversion against hostile states (resistance) comprises the actions by underground resistance groups for the purpose of reducing the military, economic, psychological, or political potential of an enemy. As resistance groups develop strength, their actions may become overt and their status shift to that of a guerrilla force.
CHAPTER 11
MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST IRREGULAR FORCES

Section I.  GENERAL

300.  General

Irregular forces characteristically employ tactics designed to offset the superior combat power of conventional military organizations. Through such tactics, relatively small numbers of individuals can tie down and inflict extensive damage on much larger, more highly organized forces, untrained in this form of warfare. Army forces must, therefore, be prepared to operate effectively against and to defeat such an enemy.

301.  Purpose and Scope

This chapter provides broad doctrine and principles for the employment of combined arms forces against irregular forces blocking or hampering the attainment of U.S. objectives, where such operations are the primary mission of the Army force involved, or when the irregular activities are of such magnitude as to be beyond the capability of normal security measures and forces to control, including those in rear areas. While many similarities exist, these operations transcend tactical operations as a part of normal rear area security. Operations against irregular forces may occur during or in the aftermath of a general war or limited war, and are common in situations short of war.

302.  Extent of Authority

a.  The measures which U.S. military commanders may take against irregular forces during hostilities and in occupied enemy territory are limited to those which are authorized by the laws of land warfare (FM 27-10).

b.  In liberated areas in which a friendly foreign government has been reestablished and in sovereign foreign countries in time of peace, the authority which United States military commanders may exercise against irregular forces is limited to that permitted by the provisions of agreements which are concluded with responsible authorities of the sovereign government concerned.

303.  Explanation of Term

a.  The term irregular, used in combinations such as irregular forces, irregular activities, counterirregular operations, etc., is used in the broad sense to refer to all types of nonconventional
forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, insurgent, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel, organizations and methods.

b. Irregular activities include acts of a military, political, psychological, and economic nature, conducted predominantly by inhabitants of a nation for the purpose of eliminating or weakening the authority of the local government or an occupying power, and using primarily irregular and informal groupings and measures.

304. Operational Environment

a. Military units employed against irregular forces normally operate in an environment which is inherently sensitive, both politically and militarily. The scope and nature of missions assigned will frequently include political and administrative aspects and objectives not usually considered normal to military operations.

b. The fundamental cause of large-scale irregular activities stems from the dissatisfaction of some significant portion of the population, with the political, social, and economic conditions prevalent in the area. This dissatisfaction is usually expressed as a desire for one or more of the following: National independence, elimination of foreign exploitation, alleviation of economic conditions, elimination of corruption, increased emphasis on religion, and other relief from actual or alleged oppression. The ideological basis of an irregular force frequently is inspired by out-of-country elements who create and sponsor irregular forces as a means of promoting their own cause. Irregular forces usually develop in areas characterized by one or more of the following:

(1) An agrarian society with underdeveloped resources and industry, inadequate transportation, communication and food distribution systems; and a low standard of living.
(2) Periodic crop failure with accompanying famine or acute privation.
(3) High illiteracy rate, lack of educational institutions, medical and sanitation facilities.

c. Immediate decisive results of operations against irregular forces can seldom be observed. Operations are conducted against a violent, destructive force which presents an elusive target, tends to disperse before superior opposition, and then reforms to strike again. There may or may not be a front or rear in the normal military sense.

d. The organization and operations of irregular forces vary according to the terrain, character and density of population, availability of food, medical supplies, arms and equipment, quality of leadership, amount and nature of external support available, and countermeasures used against them. They may vary in size
from informal groups of relatively few individuals to organized units of division size or larger. They may or may not observe rules of land warfare. As the elements of an irregular force grow and approach regular units in organization, equipment, training, and leadership, their capabilities and tactics likewise change and become similar to those of a regular unit.

e. An irregular force normally consists of two primary, mutually supporting elements: A guerrilla element which operates overtly, and a subversive element or underground which operates covertly. Both elements may be supported by individuals or small groups in the area who are not formal members of either element but who assist in intelligence, evasion and escape, and logistics. The bases of the guerrilla element are usually found in areas where terrain minimizes the mobility, surveillance, and firepower advantage of the opposing force, but guerrillas can operate in any terrain by using appropriate tactics and formations. The subversive element or underground is the major irregular force in areas in which the opposing force maintains sufficient control to preclude the overt operations of guerrillas; however, clandestine elements are also important in guerrilla base areas. These areas overlap to a significant degree and the two elements may often be in a single organization under central control. An individual may participate in one or more types of operation. Irregular force operations therefore include overt and covert activities, both of which are usually very difficult to detect.

(1) Overt activities are characterized by individuals and groups openly conducting operations in the field. Such operations capitalize on stealth, surprise, unorthodox tactics, and rapid withdrawal or dispersal when effective opposition is encountered. They include: Acts of destruction against public and private property, transportation and communication systems; raids and ambushes against military and police personnel, headquarters, garrisons, convoys, patrols, and depots, terrorism by assassination, bombing, extortion, armed robbery, torture, mutilation and kidnaping; provocative incidents, reprisals, and holding of hostages; and denial activities, such as arson, flooding, demolition, use of chemical or biological agents, or other acts designed to prevent use of an installation, area, product, or facility.

(2) Covert activities are characterized by individuals and groups secretly conducting operations while outwardly maintaining normal identities. They include: Espionage and sabotage; dissemination of selected biological and chemical agents; fomenting of riots and demonstrations;
dissemination of propaganda, rumors, or false, misleading, delayed or misdirected orders or reports; assassination, kidnaping, extortion, blackmail, theft, and counterfeiting; and identifying individuals for terroristic attack. They support guerrillas in their operations by giving warning, intelligence, guides, food, medical supplies, etc.

f. The presence of foreign troops operating against irregular forces will invariably be exploited by propaganda for the purpose of discrediting the government in power and the foreign power.

305. Concept of Operations

a. Operations to suppress and eliminate irregular forces are primarily offensive in nature. Thus, the conventional force must plan for and seize the initiative at the outset and retain it throughout the conduct of the operation. These operations may be required in situations wherein an irregular force either constitutes the only enemy, or threatens rear areas of regular military forces which are conducting conventional operations. The operations are similar in either case.

b. Operations of the covert elements of irregular forces are often a more serious threat to conventional forces than those of the overt elements. However, countermeasures against both aspects of irregular forces must be coordinated and integrated at all levels if irregulars are to be eliminated or neutralized.

c. The initial force assigned to combat the irregular force should be adequate to complete the mission. Assignment of insufficient means will permit the irregular force to grow and may later necessitate the employment of many times the originally required number.

d. Within the restrictions of international law, maximum use is made of non-U.S. forces and personnel for all activities in which they may be profitably employed. These include combat operations, security of the civil populace and critical facilities and installations, guides and interpreters, intelligence and counterintelligence tasks, new construction and reconstruction in devastated areas and psychological activities.

e. Irregular forces lose effectiveness when not supported by the civil population, whether such support is provided willingly or is gained through coercion. They increase their effectiveness when supported by an external power. Thus, operations against irregular forces must make provision for isolating the irregular elements from these sources of support.

f. The irregular force itself is usually a result and not the cause of the problem. The destruction of an existing irregular force normally does not provide a complete solution. The population must be
convinced that the conduct or support of irregular activities will not only fail to gain the desired results, but may result in the imposition of sanctions and actually delay the elimination of the causes of discontent.

g. Irregular forces accompany their operations with extensive propaganda designed to gain support of the local population. As a countermeasure, the local government being supported by the U.S., as well as U.S. forces, must present a concrete program which will win popular support. Such action includes maximum exploitation of civil affairs and psychological warfare capabilities.

306. Employment of Forces

a. Major conventional units will normally be organized for combat into a number of small, variable size, task forces (squad to brigade) capable of semi-independent action without the combat support normally provided by division, corps and army. Organization is predicated upon the irregular activity in the area; i.e., guerrilla controlled, active, cleared, or dormant; and other area factors such as terrain and weather. Centralized command, however, is normally maintained.

b. A mobility differential over the irregular force must be attained. Dependent upon the area of operations, this will require a high degree of training in foot movement over difficult terrain and under adverse conditions, extensive use of transport aviation armed with weapon system, armed observation or utility helicopters, and or a high degree of motorization or mechanization.

c. Heavy combat support units are frequently held in a state of constant readiness at central locations until situations develop which permit their effective employment.

d. Administrative support units are adapted to fulfill the requirements of the force being supported. Normally this will necessitate their operating from a large number of widely separated localities. In such instances, it will frequently be necessary to form small, composite administrative support units on a provisional basis. These units can perform their functions with a minimum of troops and will also be capable of maintaining support in extreme situations when provided with sufficient aerial supply vehicles.

e. It may become necessary to employ regular military units to protect populated places of varying size. Regular forces should be replaced in this task, when practicable, by civilian self-defense units as rapidly as they can be recruited, entrusted with responsibility, trained, and equipped by the local authorities.

f. Critical fixed installations and lines of communication are normally secured by utilizing dispositions and tactics set forth for units not restricted to fixed installations.
g. An extensive communication system is established. All communication means are exploited. Wire lines are extremely vulnerable, and their lack of security in a hostile area requires that emphasis be placed on other means. The extreme dispersion of small military units, the rugged terrain which is the usual operational area, and the requirements for detailed area surveillance and rapid, responsive, and continuous communication, usually demand air and ground electronic surveillance and air and ground communication capabilities which exceed those of organic signal equipment. Thus, augmentation may be provided when required. The use of army aircraft is effective for command control purposes and can provide a mobile command post and limited communication centrals. Local civil communication facilities are usually vulnerable to irregular force action. However, they should be used to the maximum extent possible to supplement military communication channels when consistent with security and reliability requirements.

h. Effective intelligence and counterintelligence measures are essential to success. Local sources are exploited to the maximum extent possible and a wide informant system is established among the population. Every effort is made to infiltrate the irregular force itself and to identify leaders and members. Augmentation of intelligence units is available from theater army as warranted by the magnitude of irregular activities.

i. Plans are made to employ all available weapons which are authorized for a given operation.

j. Once the conventional force is committed to action, the following measures are instituted:

(1) The irregular force is isolated from its sources of internal and/or external supply, recruiting, and reinforcement support. These measures may involve one or more of the following: Sealing of a border which is contiguous with a power friendly to the irregular force; establishment of an air and/or naval blockade; creation of restricted zones to isolate population centers and redoubt areas; resettlement or concentration of irregular force sympathizers in secure areas; stringent controls on food, medicines, and arms; and extensive ground and air search for and destruction of irregular force supply caches and installations.

(2) Strong points are established at critical points as area control bases. Prompt measures are taken to quell civilian disturbances and to identify and eliminate covert irregular elements by police type actions. Continued military pressure is maintained by intensive patrolling to locate
and maintain contact with overt irregular forces. Extensive aerial patrols, conducted in armed helicopters, are established and maintained in conjunction with and in support of the area control bases. Raids, ambushes, attacks followed by pursuit, and search and seizure operations are conducted to keep irregular forces in a constant state of alarm for their security, to prevent rest, and to hinder their conduct of operations. As overt groups are located, identified, and fixed in place, standby mobile units in sufficient strength to destroy them assemble to conduct the attack. Pending arrival of adequate forces to conduct the attack, armed helicopters assist in maintaining contact through observation and harassing fires. Heavy combat support elements are brought into the operation as required.

(3) Those irregular forces willing to fight in open battle are isolated to prevent escape and are immediately attacked; those which avoid open battle are forced by a series of police and military actions, into areas which permit encirclement. Once surrounded, such forces are destroyed by continuous determined attack. Should lack of time or nature of the terrain prevent complete encirclement or the effective blocking of escape routes, partial encirclement and surprise attack followed by aggressive pursuit should prove effective. Due to the reluctance of irregular forces to form large groups, the problems of identification, and the difficult terrain normally associated with an irregular force, it is usually necessary to isolate small bands or groups and destroy them individually. Psychological warfare exploitation of military success will include operations to induce surrender by irregular forces.

(4) Frequently, the extent of the area of operations and the forces available will preclude simultaneous concentration of sufficient effort throughout the commander's entire zone of responsibility. In such instances the overall area may be divided, be assigned to subcommanders, and be cleared piecemeal. This technique requires the sealing off of the subarea(s) in which the main effort is concentrated to prevent escape of irregular elements. Here, operations are conducted as outlined in (2) and (3) above. Once the subarea is cleared, the main combat force moves to the next subarea and repeats the process. Sufficient forces are retained in areas which have not been cleared, to conduct operations as outlined in (2) above until the main combat force is available. In areas
which have been cleared, sufficient forces must remain to maintain area control, to maintain psychological warfare pressure, to prevent the development of new irregular forces, and to apprehend irregular elements exfiltrating from uncleared areas.

k. Continuity of command and maintenance of the same units within an area are desirable to permit commanders, staffs, and troops to become thoroughly acquainted with the terrain and the local irregular force organization and techniques of operations.

l. Small special units may be organized, equipped, and trained to combat irregular forces by using the tactics and techniques of the latter. Special units can be very effective in maintaining the initiative with a minimum of troops, and often they are more effective than standard troop units. A type special unit might be composed of selected U.S. and allied military and police units augmented by trackers and guides, and supported by civil affairs and psychological warfare personnel where practicable. The unit is designed to hunt down and destroy small guerrilla elements of the irregular force, to establish and maintain contact with large guerrilla formation until arrival of friendly reinforcements, to maintain surveillance of areas, and to continually harass the irregular forces. Such units take maximum advantage of their superiority over the irregular force in mobility, communications, and supply.

307. Legal Aspects

a. Guerrilla warfare is bound by the rules of the Geneva Conventions (The Law of Land Warfare, FM 27–10). When the following four factors are present, a guerrilla has legal status and when captured, is entitled to the same treatment as a regular prisoner of war:

(1) Commanded by persons responsible for his subordinates.
(2) Wearing a fixed and distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
(3) Carrying arms openly.
(4) Conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

b. The covert elements of an irregular force normally do not hold legal status.

Section II. COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

308. General

Army operations against irregular forces in a general or limited war will usually be conducted within the command structure established for the particular theater. Thus, the senior head-
quarters actually conducting the operations may be joint, combined, or uni-Service. If an established communications zone exists, control of Army operations against irregular forces in this area will normally be a responsibility of the theater army logistical command or the appropriate section headquarters. Operations against irregular forces must be correlated with civil affairs operations in the area.

309. Command and Staff Relationships

a. Uni-Service headquarters frequently control operations against irregular forces in a situation short of war. However, immediate establishment of a joint command is usually advantageous when forces of more than one service are involved. Participation by allies may make a combined command desirable. Political considerations will materially influence military operations. A political advisor is normally provided the military commander, and the campaign is planned and conducted in close coordination with Department of State, Department of Defense and other U.S. or allied agencies represented in the area. The limits of the military commander's authority are carefully prescribed, particularly in relation to civil responsibilities.

b. Full responsibility for liberated areas is to be transferred to local civil authorities as soon as an effective local government has, in the considered judgment of the commander, been reestablished. The authority of U.S. military commanders in these areas after the reestablishment of an effective local government will be that provided by treaty or agreement.

Section III. TRAINING

310. General

Operations against irregular forces are often characterized by small unit or combat patrol actions in difficult terrain. Frequently, the military units will have available only the supporting fires of those heavy weapons which can be man or animal packed or lifted by helicopter. In many instances, elements will be required to be logistically self-sufficient for extended periods of time. In others, only aerial supply may be possible.

311. Training

Training for such operations will be integrated into field exercises and maneuvers as well as included in individual and small unit training programs. Aggressor forces in training exercises should include irregular activities, both covert and overt.
\section*{312. Individual and Small Unit Training}

Individual and small unit training should emphasize:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [a.] Tactics and techniques, to include use of supporting weapons, used by small units in expected operational environments; i.e., built-up areas, mountains, deserts, and swamps.
  \item [b.] Long range combat patrol operations under primitive conditions and utilizing only such supplies as can be transported with the patrol.
  \item [c.] Immediate reaction to unexpected combat situations.
  \item [d.] Techniques of raids, ambushes and defensive and security measures against these types of operations.
  \item [e.] Employment of Army aviation, to include tactics and techniques of helicopterborne assault, and techniques of command control utilizing army aircraft.
  \item [f.] Aerial supply by army and air force aircraft to include drop zone marking and materiel recovery techniques.
  \item [g.] Aircraft loading and unloading to include litter patients and external and internal loads of materiel.
  \item [h.] Cross-country movement at night and under adverse weather conditions to include tracking and land navigation.
  \item [i.] Support by psychological warfare units.
  \item [j.] Police type search and seizure techniques, counterintelligence and interrogation measures.
  \item [k.] Guard duty, police type patrolling and control of civilians, to include the operation of road blocks and check points; riot control and civil disturbances, to include employment of irritant chemical agents.
  \item [l.] Convoy escort and security to include the use of armed helicopters.
  \item [m.] Advanced first aid.
  \item [n.] Cross training on all communication equipment available within the type unit and all communication techniques.
  \item [o.] Cross training in all individual and crew served weapons available within the type unit.
  \item [p.] Orientation on the nature of the motivations and objectives of the irregular forces to include counter-propaganda training and orientation on the need to engage in such operations.
  \item [q.] Civil affairs training.
\end{itemize}

\section*{313. Specialized Training}

Dependent upon the characteristics of the area of operations, further specialized training may be required, to include:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [a.] Indoctrination in the local language, customs, cultural background, or personalities of irregular force and friendly leaders, to improve ability to understand, communicate and get along with the
local populace. (To be accomplished prior to arrival in the area, and continued throughout the operation.)

b. Terrain appreciation, camouflage and concealment, to include individual techniques for prolonged periods of isolated surveillance.

c. Survival techniques, to include manner and technique of living off the land for short periods.

d. The use of animal transport for weapons and logistical support.

e. Movement techniques in mountains, jungles, or swamps.

f. Cold weather movement and survival to include ski and sled operations.

g. Utilization of water means to gain access into areas occupied by irregular forces.

314. **Morale and Psychological Considerations**

a. Troops employed against irregular forces are subject to morale and psychological pressures different from those normally present in conventional operations. This is particularly true in situations short of war and results to a large degree from:

(1) The ingrained reluctance of the soldier to take repressive measures against the women, children, and old men who often are active in both overt and covert operations or must be resettled or concentrated for security reasons.

(2) The difficulty of understanding the reasons why such operations are necessary when the safety of the soldier's own nation is not visibly threatened.

(3) A natural sympathy on the part of the individual with many of the broad objectives of the irregular force.

(4) The action required to prevent soldiers taking vindictive retaliatory measures.

(5) The characteristics of the operations themselves to include:

(a) The difficulty in realizing or observing tangible short term results.

(b) The primitive living and operating conditions in difficult terrain.

(c) The long periods of inactivity which may occur when troops are assigned to static security tasks.

(d) Inexperience in guerrilla and other irregular tactics and dislike of police type work.

b. Commanders at all echelons must plan and carry out on a continuing basis, an indoctrination, education and training program which will effectively offset these morale and psychological pressures. Disciplinary cases must be handled forcefully and ex-
peditiously to insure a successful program for establishing good will and cooperation, and preventing antagonisms on the part of the local population.

Section IV. INTELLIGENCE

315. Intelligence

a. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is essential to successful operations against irregular forces. The detection of existing or developing sentiment or activity within an area is inherent in the countersubversion mission of the intelligence support organization of the command. The nature of the enemy, tactical deployment of U.S. troops and presence of both friendly and hostile non-U.S. personnel in the combat area require modification of normal procedures.

b. Intelligence activities will be characterized by extensive employment of police type techniques. Among these are:

1. Search and seizure operations.
2. Check points and road blocks.
3. Documentation of civilians for identification with central files.
4. Civil censorship.
5. Physical and electronic surveillance of suspects, meeting places, etc.
7. Judicious use of confidential funds and supplies for the obtaining of information.

c. Clandestine operations are a primary source of information. Every effort is made to infiltrate the irregular force itself. Although non-U.S. agents may be used to infiltrate irregular forces, these agents frequently operate as double agents and will relate information gained about friendly forces to the irregular force.

d. The nature of intelligence operations described above requires a knowledge of local customs, languages, cultural background and personalities not attainable by U.S. personnel in the time normally allowed. As a result, local police, security and government organizations must be exploited to the maximum extent possible. Liaison personnel, interpreters, guides, trackers and clandestine agents are normally required. The loyalty and trustworthiness of these personnel must be firmly established. Frequently, these personnel cooperate with both opposing forces in an effort to achieve the maximum personal gain.

e. Counterintelligence is complicated by the degree of reliance which must be placed on local organizations and individuals in
operations and the difficulty in distinguishing between friendly and hostile members of the population. Political considerations will frequently hinder proper counterintelligence screening. Close and continuing coordination and liaison with civil affairs staff sections and units will assist in resolving these problems. Among the measures which may be taken to contribute to security are:

1. Extensive use of tactical cover and deception measures.
2. Centralized planning of operations.
3. Sealing of area control or other unit bases prior to issuance of operations orders.
4. Electronic countermeasures.
5. Psychological warfare.
6. Designating and posting restricted areas in the vicinity of populated areas and the control of farm occupants and herdsmen.

f. Military map coverage of the area will frequently be inadequate for small unit operations. Intelligence planning should provide for suitable substitutes such as large scale photo coverage.

g. Army aviation should be exploited to its fullest extent as an intelligence collection agency.

Section V. LOGISTICS

316. General

Logistical support of military units committed against irregular forces is normally characterized by both organizational and geographical decentralization. The deployment of the command and its organization for combat will usually dictate modification of conventional logistical structures and procedures to provide effective support of combat operations.

317. Supply

a. Supply planning must recognize the lack of valid experience data for a wide variety of environments in which these type operations will occur. Established consumption factors, basic loads, stockage levels, and bases of issue must be adjusted to fit the local requirement. Similar factors must be developed for non-U.S. forces which may have to be supported in whole or part from U.S. stocks. The abnormal need for specialized items of material must be taken into consideration early in coordination with responsible commanders and staff agencies.

b. It frequently will be necessary to establish and maintain stockage levels of all classes of supply at echelons below those where such stockage is normally required. Area control bases, outposts, garrisons, and security detachments are examples of
localities where significant levels may be necessary on a continuing basis.

c. The command must be prepared to provide minimum essential items to elements of the civilian population. These elements may include victims of irregular force attack, isolated population centers, and/or groups which have been relocated or concentrated for security reasons. Such supply will normally be limited to Class I but may include other survival necessities such as medical supplies, clothing, construction materials and fuel.

d. Supervision of the distribution of non-U.S. supplies destined for civilian consumption will often be necessary. This requires establishment of strict controls governing assembly, storage, and issue of those items which could be used by irregular forces. While non-U.S. personnel are employed in this task to the maximum extent possible, the situation may be such that all or part of the effort may fall on the U.S. command supply agencies.

e. Security of supply installations is more critical than in conventional warfare. Not only must supplies be conserved for friendly consumption but their use must be denied to irregular elements. Supply personnel must be prepared and equipped to cope with irregular force attack, and must guard against contamination, pilferage, and robbery of supplies by both friendly and hostile members of the populace.

318. Transportation

a. Transportation planning and operations must recognize the increased problems inherent in supporting operations against irregular forces. These result primarily from:

(1) Distances usually existing between area control bases, garrisons, security detachments, and combat units operating in the field.

(2) The extremely difficult terrain and lack of communications existing in underdeveloped areas where such operations are apt to occur.

(3) The high degree of probability that movements will be subject to ground attack or harassment and delay.

b. Organic transportation means normally require augmentation from both U.S. and local sources. TOE materiel may be of little use in a given locality and may have to be replaced by items more suitable to the area. Dependent upon the conditions under which the command is operating, provision of adequate transportation may require such measures as:

(1) Recruiting non-U.S. bearer units for man pack operations.

(2) Organizing provisional animal pack units, to include the
necessary logistic support backup, from whatever resources are available.

(3) Exploitation of available waterways for small boat or raft movement.

(4) Exploitation of local land transportation to include railway and highway equipment.

c. En route security will normally be provided all surface movements. Appropriate measures include:

(1) Intensive combat training of drivers and the arming of vehicles involved.

(2) Use of armed helicopter escorts.

(3) Provision of convoy ground escorts. If available, and if terrain permits their use, tanks and armored vehicles are well suited for this purpose.

d. Because of their speed, relative security from ground attack, lack of sensitivity to terrain conditions, and adaptability to small unit movement, aircraft are frequently the most effective means of supply or troop movement. Both Army aviation and Air Force units are utilized. Terrain, the tactical situation, and airstrip availability will normally require employment of air dropped as well as air landed resupply.

319. Evacuation and Hospitalization

a. Normal medical service organization and procedures will require some adaptation to the type combat operations envisioned. Effective medical support is complicated by:

(1) The distances between and number of fixed installations where support must be provided.

(2) The habitual use of small mobile units in independent or semi-independent combat operations in hostile areas through which secure ground evacuation may be impossible and/or from which aerial evacuation of patients cannot be accomplished.

(3) The vulnerability of ground evacuation means to guerrilla ambush and attack and the inability to rely completely upon scheduled convoy movements.

b. The following measures are among those which may be adopted to cope with the complicating factors outlined above:

(1) Establishment of aid stations or dispensaries with a treatment and holding capacity at much lower echelons than is normal. These echelons include area control bases, security detachments, etc. Patients to be evacuated by ground transport will be held until movement with a secure convoy is possible.

(2) Provision of sufficient air or ground means to move medical units/elements rapidly to:
(a) Establish, or reinforce existing treatment and holding installations where patients have become unexpectedly numerous.

(b) Provide unit level medical service to small combat units operating away from their base or temporary medical support to civilian localities which have been subjected to irregular force attack.

(3) Maximum utilization of air evacuation means. This includes both scheduled and oncall evacuation support of fixed installations and combat elements in the field.

(4) Improvisation of small medical elements to provide unit level medical support to tactical units on long-range missions.

(5) Formation of non-U.S. litter bearer teams to accompany combat units in those situations where limitations of terrain or available means preclude patient transportation or evacuation by other methods.

(6) Strict supervision of sanitation measures, maintenance of individual medical equipment, and advanced first aid training throughout the command.

(7) Increased emphasis on basic combat training of medical service personnel; increased arming of medical service personnel as required; increased use of armored carriers for ground evacuation where feasible.

320. Construction

a. The underdeveloped communication system and the difficult terrain conditions normal to areas in which operations against irregular forces may be conducted will frequently require more light construction support than conventional operations by a similar size command. The situation is usually aggravated by the large-scale demolition and other sabotage operations of irregular forces.

b. Construction planning should provide for:

(1) Area control bases and their defenses.
(2) An adequate ground communication system.
(3) Mobile repair teams capable of rapid movement to facilities damaged by irregular forces.
(4) Extensive airstrip and helicopter pad construction in difficult terrain.
(5) Essential concentration or resettlement areas for non-U.S. personnel.
(6) Required support to the local populace.

c. The scope of the construction effort requires maximum exploitation of local labor and materiel resources. Additionally, combat units will be required to participate to a larger degree than normal in the construction of facilities for their own use.
Section VI. CIVIL AFFAIRS

321. General

In military operations against irregular forces the civilian support rendered to either our own or allied forces and the irregular forces is often of such importance as to mean the difference between success or failure. Success is dependent upon a definite program of civil affairs and psychological warfare activities to create proper attitudes and relationships with the people in the area both as individuals and as members of the community. The acceptance and understanding of this program by the civilian population are vital to its success. The commander must be provided with the full capability of conducting the civil affairs activities required to accomplish his objective.

322. Planning

a. Civil Affairs plans for combating irregular force operations must be based upon detailed instructions and guidance on U.S. policies and objectives within the area of operations.

b. Plans will provide for draft civil affairs agreements which can be negotiated without delay as the need for such agreement arises. Agreements must consider political as well as military aspects of the operation. The most propitious time for negotiating such agreements is prior to entry of our troops into the area. This will hold to a minimum those initial problems and difficulties arising from military-civil relationships.

c. Relationships with the central national government and the subordinate governmental agencies as well as relationships with military forces within the area, are dependent upon U.S. and allied policies and objectives. They must be defined in operational planning with appropriate instructions and guidance to the commander. When accredited U.S. diplomatic representatives are present and functioning, the relations of the commander on the one hand, and the U.S. diplomatic representatives on the other relating to responsibilities, authority and coordination will be delineated if necessary, by executive order.

d. In order for the commander to formulate operational plans, adequate political and military intelligence of the area must be made available to him.

323. Operations

a. Commanders will take full advantage at all times of opportunities to further U.S. national and allied policy through relationships between the local population and U.S. and allied personnel. Types of activities which should be considered are:
(1) Use of humanitarianism and justice in dealing with the people. Treat them properly, respect their customs, and win them as friends.

(2) Alleviation of suffering and want—provide the basic necessities until the economy is capable of assuming this responsibility, and be interested in the welfare of the people.

(3) Participation in cooperative self-help projects in the economic and social fields to raise living standards.

(4) Helping to establish an effective civil governmental administration. Govern for the benefit of the governed. Determine that local government is properly constituted and properly functioning with justice to all.

(5) Screening officials to eliminate dissident elements.

(6) Providing for the care of refugees and displaced persons.

(7) Keeping the people properly informed.

b. The commander must make continuous appraisal of the attitude of the civilian population toward the individual soldier. The individual soldier's conduct and attitude toward the population must be that of a friend and assistant in the promulgation of democratic principles and practices. Individuals must be cognizant of their responsibility to demonstrate to the local population as well as the irregular forces that they are well trained, considerate, and resourceful soldiers, capable of performing assigned duties under any conditions or within any environment.

c. A properly directed information program through local public news media is a major means of gaining and retaining essential public support.

(1) Local news media may operate independently, under partial control of the friendly government we are supporting, or under varying degrees of control by those conducting civil affairs and psychological operations. Public information principles govern where there is no media control; in situations of controlled media, programs are conducted in consonance with civil information principles.

(2) Under all conditions, the decentralized nature of operations against irregular forces places the responsibility for information program execution at lower levels than in conventional operations. Therefore, thorough indoctrination of commanders of all echelons in information responsibilities and relations with local news media representatives is necessary.

d. In relations with the population and governments in the area civic action of the commander will frequently be utilized as one of
the forces within his command. Civic action of the command is any
action performed by the military forces utilizing available human
and material resources for the well-being and improvement of the
community. It can be a major contributing factor to the develop-
ment of favorable public opinion and in accomplishing his mission
of defeating the irregular forces. Commanders, utilizing available
resources, will cooperate with local military and civic leaders in
the development of programs and projects for civic action. In
addition, the commander will frequently be responsible for civil
affairs activities such as administration of U.S. economic or social
programs within the area of operations. Detailed attention to the
success of these operations will be a contributing factor to accom-
plishing his mission against irregular forces.

e. In many actions against irregular forces it will be vital to the
successful accomplishment of the commander's missions that some
measure of civil control be initiated, in accordance with current
policy, doctrine and pertinent agreements. In all cases restriction
of civilian freedom will be minimal and will utilize to a maximum
local military and civil organizations as enforcing agencies. In all
cases a vigorous public education and civil information program
will be utilized to show that these actions are vital to the success
of the allied cause, that control measures are of a temporary
nature, and that they will be discontinued as soon as our mission
is accomplished.
324. Definition

a. Situations short of war are those specific circumstances and incidents of cold war in which military force is moved to an area directly and is employed to attain national objectives in operations not involving formal open hostilities between nations. Such operations are conducted within the authority granted by the Congress and within the provisions of the Constitution.

b. The term "Situations Short of War" does not apply to the normal and continuing deterrence functions of currently deployed oversea forces. However, component elements of such forces may be further deployed to cope with a "Situation Short of War" in an adjacent or local area.

325. Characteristics

a. Situations short of war develop from the underlying condition of cold war. They can and often do, however, involve some combat, usually against guerrillas or rebel type forces. The direct cause of the specific situation may be a threat to U.S. interests by acts of a hostile power against another state or nation by illegal occupation, subversion, or coercion through embargo, blockade or a show of force.

b. The objectives of such actions by a hostile state may include seizure of control of a friendly government, occupation or intimidation of a weaker country, or defeat of friendly elements within the country.

326. U.S. Forces Participation

United States participation in situations short of war often results from alliances or coalition agreements. United States military forces participate in such actions only by specific order of responsible governmental authority. Within the broad scope of situations short of war, military operations may be designed to achieve the following:

a. Encourage a weak and faltering government.
b. Stabilize a restless area.
c. Deter or thwart aggression.
d. Reinforce a threatened area.
e. Check or counter aggressive moves by opposing powers.
f. Maintain or restore order.
327. Force Capabilities and Requirements

a. Operations in situations short of war normally involve limited forces which are characterized by strategic mobility, self-sufficiency and the ability to apply measured force. Highly ready strategic mobile forces held in reserve in the United States or deployed to overseas bases are appropriate for employment in such situations.

b. A division type organization is particularly suitable in operations short of war. Certain divisions in the strategic reserve are specifically tailored to provide the balanced strategic mobility and combat capability required for these operations.

328. Missions

a. Missions assigned forces in situations short of war include the following:

   (1) Show of force.
   (2) Truce enforcement.
   (3) International police action.
   (4) Legal occupation.

b. Specific operations within these missions may include parades, maneuvers, demonstrations, police and patrol duty, or limited combat action against irregular or partisan forces.

Section II. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

329. Command Requirements and Limitations

a. Situations short of war normally entail mission type orders. While the limits of the commander's authority will be prescribed, particularly in relation to State Department responsibility and that of its representatives, the commander will usually be given necessary latitude in determining how to accomplish his assigned mission.

b. The commander must use the minimum amount of force required to accomplish force objectives and discontinue the use of force when it is no longer required. Only the commander on the ground is in a position to estimate the degree of force that must be used. The excessive use of force can seldom be justified; it can only lead to the need to apply ever-increasing force to maintain the same degree of order, and to the loss of sympathy and support of the local populace. At the same time, the use of inadequate force not only will jeopardize accomplishment of the mission but also will have an adverse or reduced impact on the local populace. If efforts to gain confidence of the local populace are not to be defeated, hostile terrorists and guerrillas must be treated with re-
spect and humanity when captured, no matter how despicable their acts.

330. Joint and Combined Operations

Situations short of war operations usually involve cooperation and coordination with other services. Army forces require the support of other services for transportation to the area. Frequently, support will be required for the establishment of supply bases and for combat and service support. The Army force may be subordinated to another service which may have overall responsibility for the operation, or it may be the predominant force and have Navy and Air Force support. The military service which is predominant in strength will normally be charged with cross-service or common service support to other elements of the joint force. The commander often will find himself cooperating with allied forces or acting as a subordinate of an allied commander. The commander and his staff must understand joint and allied command staff relationships and procedures.

331. Relationships with Foreign Governments

a. Department of State officials handle transactions with the foreign government when such officials are present and the civil government exists. In those cases where permanent Department of State officials are not present, the commander should be provided with a political adviser. In most instances, in situations short of war, political considerations are overriding. The commander's authority in the political area will normally be specifically prescribed. Sound and cooperative working relationships must be established and maintained with the responsible United States political authorities.

b. Whatever political arrangements exist, commanders will normally have to deal with foreign governmental officials, local military personnel, and civil leaders. Therefore, it is vital that they understand the responsibilities of the local government as they affect the responsibilities of the commander concerned. If the local civil government becomes ineffective, commanders may be required to play a major role in its reestablishment. Publication of guidelines for subordinate commanders in their relationships with military and civil officials can assist in avoiding misunderstanding and can foster cooperation.

c. Most operations in situations short of war are conducted in politically unstable areas in which actual war is an ever-present threat. Under such circumstances, the commander must condition his actions to maintain a posture of military readiness for his unit even though his immediate mission may not require it; or he may
have to execute his mission with the knowledge that his unit may be placed in a position of disadvantage initially if the situation erupts into war. In either event, the commander must insure that his actions do not inadvertently convert a situation short of war into an actual war.

332. Legal Implications

a. In carrying out the mission, the force commander may be required to make decisions that involve life and property and civil matters in a sovereign country. These are matters for which he may be later held responsible by the foreign government, by its civil courts, or by foreign or international public opinion. It is essential that the actions of the force commander recognize the impact of local law and custom and further that he have the advice of a competent legal staff. When the legality of an action cannot be determined, his actions must not exceed those which can be justified by military operations and necessity, tempered by justness that can be universally recognized.

b. Operations with a civil government may be subject to review or court proceedings. Therefore, it is important to keep an official record of all important transactions and decisions and the reasons therefor.

Section III. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

333. Intelligence

a. Intelligence is particularly significant in situations short of war; intelligence activities are wider in scope and more difficult than those experienced in combat operations.

b. Commanders of higher echelon forces must obtain and maintain current general knowledge of conditions in areas of the world in which United States forces may be employed. Intelligence summaries of critical areas should be furnished to such commanders.

c. When the mission is assigned, the force commander must be given strategic intelligence of the specific area of operations. In addition, he must be informed of United States and allied intelligence services which are available and authorized for use when the force arrives in the operational area.

d. After arrival in the area of employment, the commander must evaluate and exploit the intelligence agencies at his disposal and insure that his own intelligence collection efforts contribute to the broad requirement of interested United States agencies.

e. On arrival in the area, the development of an efficient and secure operational intelligence system is essential. This system must develop the background of the unrest, identify dissident ele-
ments, and provide detailed information and topographical data on which military action can be based. Close cooperation with the local police establishment is normally required. Where local police cannot be used, the commander may be required to develop his own indigenous intelligence system. In this event, authority must be granted to develop this system with safeguards to insure that such operations do not conflict with the assigned responsibility of other established agencies.

334. Security

a. Security precautions are essential from receipt of the mission through movement to the objective area. Situations short of war objectives can be compromised by enemy counteractions if prematurely disclosed.

b. Security of planning and operations in the objectives area is complicated by transactions with local civilian officials, allies, and by the absence of the protection normally afforded by military censorship. The enemy knows that the individual is the best intelligence target. Therefore, the individual soldier must be made security conscious. The security of communications, supplies, equipment, and installations must be insured. Neglect leads to pilferage and black-marketing activity, provides a source of supplies and arms for dissidents, and provides a basis for hostile propaganda to discredit the friendly force. Adequate security measures must be established to counter enemy guerrilla actions.

c. The unrestricted flow of information through personal correspondence and the public information media, when censorship regulations are not in force, will present security problems to the command. Within security limitations, cordial and straightforward treatment of accredited correspondents and an effective troop information program will contribute to public understanding of the issues and facilitate accomplishment of the mission.

335. Use of Interpreters

Transactions with civil officials and the local populace will normally require interpreters. Arrangements must be made for obtaining and clearing interpreters locally. In addition, lists should be developed and maintained of language fluency of assigned personnel.

Section IV. EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

336. General

A force operating in situations short of war is confronted with a wide range of factors influencing operations. These include
political considerations, attitudes of the local populace, indigenous armed forces, enemy concepts and capabilities, environmental conditions, and command arrangements peculiar to the force organization and mission. Flexibility and imagination in leadership, and command and planning are required.

337. U.S. Army Component Capabilities

The following component elements of Army forces have characteristics and capabilities which make them particularly adaptable to operations in situations short of war:

a. Infantry units should be used to provide troops required for patrol operations, area search and security, outposts, strong points, and control posts and for action in terrain such as mountains, swamps, and jungle. Mobile infantry task forces equipped with Army aviation, armored carriers, and amphibious transportation are effective forces for employment against guerrillas.

b. Cavalry-type forces, because of their mobility and excellent communications, can provide reconnaissance and security forces capable of being deployed over wide areas.

c. Armor units are excellent show-of-force type units and can provide communications for other forces. When reinforced with motorized or mechanized infantry, armored units provide powerful mobile forces. When employed with dismounted infantry, or military police, tanks are effective in quelling riots and civil disturbance. Armor forces may also be used for convoy escort.

d. Army aviation units can conduct surveillance over wide areas, and provide troop lift, liaison, and courier service. These units can operate from hastily prepared airstrips within protected areas. Helicopters can be used to supply isolated outposts and detachments located away from the main body of the force. Airmobile forces are particularly valuable in the conduct of widely separated actions against dissident elements.

e. Engineer forces may be required for mine detection and removal, to construct airfields, fortifications, bridges, roads, and civil works.

f. Signal units are required to provide a communication network. Considerable reliance must be placed on radio because of the problems involved in maintenance of wire communication systems in areas which may be infested by hostile partisans.

g. Administrative support units are well suited to provide humane and civil relief services such as restoration of civil works, the provision and issue of food and clothing, and medical treatment. When required, and when the necessary units and supplies are available, assistance of this type facilitates accomplishment of the force mission.
h. The flexible organization of artillery units facilitates placing artillery in support of outposts and detachments. Nuclear weapons delivery means are particularly effective in a show of force or as deterrent to intervention of other international powers in a situation short of war.

i. Military police units can conduct surveillance, security, and liaison over wide areas. Military police units are effective in quelling riots and civil disturbances. Such units are especially effective against dissident elements through their knowledge of the area and constant patrolling.

338. Support by Other Services

a. Aviation units of component forces (Navy and Air Force) employed in situations short of war can be employed in a show of force role and can conduct long-range surveillance and reconnaissance, logistical support, and other missions assigned by the force commander.

b. Air movement of forces facilitates their flexible employment and redeployment over wide areas when sufficient organic or supporting aircraft are available.

Section V. DISCIPLINE AND TRAINING

339. Discipline

a. Operations in situations short of war call for the highest standards of discipline. The smart appearance of well-turned out and well-disciplined troops impresses the civil population, and courtesy combined with dignified bearing gives confidence in the forces of law and order. Troop and civilian curfews facilitate control and assist in maintaining discipline.

b. The sound troop discipline of combat units is the best possible basis for the special troop training required for operations in situations short of war. Intelligent, good behavior of troops is a prerequisite in these operations where the serious misbehavior of one individual may jeopardize the entire mission.

340. Training Considerations

a. During normal training, the commander must insure that troops receive orientation briefings on conditions in various areas of the world and on their roles in situations short of war. This orientation can be accomplished, in part, through a sound, continuing troop information program.

b. Either before or after arrival in the area of employment, troops must receive special combat training required by the specific mission. All units whose mission and capability create a possibil-
ity of their employment in situations short of war should receive specialized training in antiguerrilla warfare and riot control.

c. When the mission is received, the commander must insure that troops are oriented on the force mission, local customs, and conditions in the area of operations. Such orientation must include security procedures, relationships with the civilian populace, injunctions against black-marketing, and similar matters.

d. The psychological impact on troops of operations under difficult conditions of stress and restraint over long periods should be recognized and considered in the planning and conduct of operations.

341. Training of Local Forces

An operation in a situation short of war may require the organization and training of local military forces as an added mission. The military leaders selected by the local government for key positions in the local force must be reliable. As in all relations with the local government, the relations with these military leaders must be harmonious; mutual trust and confidence are prerequisites. Professional competence and attitudes of the soldiers and junior officers of training cadres, which may be provided by the force, will foster trust and confidence. National traits must be exploited to the maximum in training local forces.
342. Description

a. Administrative support consists of the interrelated functions of logistics, personnel, and civil affairs. The distinctions between administrative support, combat support, and combat operations are not absolute since administrative support activities also have some combat and combat support aspects. Organizational and operational doctrine for administrative support is contained in FM 100–10 Field Service Regulations—Administration, FM 101–5 Staff Officers Field Manual—Staff Organization and Procedure, FM 101–10 Staff Officers Field Manual—Organizational, Technical and Logistical Data, and FM 54–1 The Logistical Command. Detailed organizational and operational procedures are contained in appropriate field manuals pertaining to the separate arms and services.

b. Administrative support activities are connecting links in the theater of operations between the source of supplies and services, and the user. In addition each field echelon has its own administrative support activities. The objectives of any administrative support structure are to provide support to the combat forces when and where it is needed.

c. The capabilities and limitations of administrative support activities have a direct influence on and are closely interrelated with strategy and tactics. The commander of any force must balance and integrate the force operations with its administrative support to accomplish his mission. He must insure that his operations are planned and executed within administrative support capabilities.

343. Characteristics

a. Maximum efficiency in operation of administrative support activities is generally achieved by consolidation and concentration of facilities. Such consolidation and concentration takes full advantage of available storage and warehousing and personnel replacement facilities, road and rail nets, communication facilities, port facilities and transportation equipment. It permits maximum effort with minimum manpower and supervisory personnel.

b. On the other hand the concentration of administrative support activities substantially increases vulnerability to nuclear at-
tack. Large, consolidated supply installations, personnel replacement installations, port facilities and road and rail centers are particularly remunerative nuclear targets.

c. In a nuclear environment, either actual or immediately threatened, a balance must be maintained between vulnerability and operational requirements. In the absence of a nuclear threat, or probability, greater concentration is indicated to achieve operational efficiency. The course of action adopted in a given situation is a matter of judgment and is a responsibility of command.

d. Notwithstanding the above, however, administrative support activities are by nature less flexible, and mobile than are combat type units of comparable size. Such activities are incapable of the rapid transition from a nonnuclear to a nuclear environment which characterizes tactical units. Therefore, basic organizational structures and operational concepts for administrative support activities must provide for a dual operational capability which permits operations with minimum change regardless of the type environment encountered.

Section II. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

344. General

a. Environmental considerations affecting tactical operations exert equal or greater influence on administrative support operations. Proper planning and execution serve to minimize the effects of nuclear attacks. Particular emphasis is placed on achieving flexibility and mobility in the administrative support system and on concealing, dispersing, or protecting facilities and installations.

b. The composition of administrative support forces varies according to environmental considerations. Administrative support forces may range from those organized to support a small, independent task force in a situation short of war, through those organized for limited war, to those required for large-scale support of combat forces in general war. A high order of organizational flexibility is required to satisfy the wide variety of possible administrative support requirements.

c. Administrative support activities which are established and operated in peace must be fully compatible with those required under wartime conditions. Transition from peacetime to wartime conditions as required by any change in operational environment is thereby accomplished with minimum change in concept, organization, and procedures.

345. Dispersion

a. The dispersion of tactical forces both laterally and in depth
requires a corresponding dispersion of administrative support facilities to render adequate support. Dispersion of administrative support facilities is also required as a measure to minimize the effect of enemy nuclear attack.

b. Rapid movement of combat forces and the relative immobility and dispersion of administrative support facilities may result in considerable separation between combat forces and the various administrative support facilities. The areas between installations may be extensive and infested with guerrillas, bypassed enemy groups, and brigands. Only that degree of control is exercised over these areas which is required for the operation of installations and the movement of personnel and supplies between them.

c. The ability to cope with problems of dispersion and distance is a key factor in accomplishing the administrative support mission.

d. The effects of attacks by nuclear weapons may be minimized through the provision of multiple, small installations; the establishment of alternate key facilities; the proper arrangement of materiel being stored; the use of camouflage and dummy positions; target analysis of the installation location plan; the attainment of maximum dispersion consistent with control and risk; the utilization of protection to include terrain features, barricades, revetments, and underground shelters; and providing adequate area control planning and operations.

346. Mobility

Environmental considerations dictate the need for cross-country mobility, development and incorporation of appropriate technological advances into air and surface movement in administrative support operations, and mobility through use of conventional means of movement.

Section III. COMMAND AND CONTROL

347. Principles

a. Command of agencies providing administrative support is exercised by the number of echelons necessary to insure responsiveness to the supported forces and to provide continuous, effective support. The principle of centralized control with decentralized detailed execution and conduct of operations is applied in organizing the administrative support activities, in establishing procedures, and in assigning responsibilities.

b. All command echelons are responsible for administrative support. The command echelons which have the greater scope of administrative support activities are theater or unified command,
theater army, field army, and division. The function of the theater is to establish policy and exercise control over those activities which by their nature are of joint interest or are shared by the component Services. Theater army provides administrative support through its logistical command, civil affairs command and its replacement system. Army group (when used) and corps normally exercise control over administrative support principally by establishing priorities and allocating services and regulated items of supply to their subordinates. Due to the increased frequency of independent operations and the increased dispersion dictated by the nuclear battlefield the corps with augmentation may frequently be a command echelon for administrative support.

348. Planning

a. Outline strategic and tactical plans are tested for administrative feasibility before detailed planning is begun. Revision of outline operations plans is made where necessary to insure the adequacy of administrative support. A comprehensive administrative plan to support the adopted tactical or strategic plan is then developed concurrently and in coordination with the preparation of the detailed operations plan. Administrative plans within a theater of operations must take into account known enemy capabilities and the vulnerability of the friendly administrative support organizations, including the ocean line of communication from the zone of interior. Administrative planning must provide alternate means for insuring uninterrupted support of the operation.

b. Theater army administrative support plans are broad in scope and may be projected to include one or more campaigns. These plans indicate the phasing of support, the forces and supplies available to each command, the support available from and to be provided to other theater components, and the specific missions of each subordinate command. These plans are used by major subordinate commands as a basis for their own administrative planning. The development of detailed administrative plans within the field army is the responsibility of the field army commander. The theater army logistical command and the supported army group or field army are coequal commands. The relationship between them in planning and operating is one of coordination and cooperation; however, the mission of the former is to support the latter.

349. Responsibilities

a. The administrative support mission of theater army is to organize and provide administrative support for all U.S. Army forces in the theater; to allocate critical and regulated items of
supply; and to provide logistical support to other Services, forces, agencies, and civilians as directed by higher headquarters. The theater army commander normally establishes a theater army logistical command to execute his logistical support responsibilities. Except for personnel replacement support, theater army headquarters performs no administrative support functions but is primarily concerned with planning and establishing policy for administrative support to include joint and allied support.

b. Each echelon of control is assigned clearly defined responsibilities and delegated appropriate authority to carry out its assigned responsibilities. Overlap of administrative support responsibilities between theater, theater army, theater army logistical command, and other commands is avoided. Logistical functions are normally supervised by technical service staff officers who may exercise operational control over specified units when directed by the commander. Positive integration of the logistical functions is accomplished by the commander and his coordinating staff. The personnel replacement functions are supervised by the personnel staff officer.

c. Logistical operations and performance of assigned functions of the theater army logistical command are decentralized to subordinate base logistical command(s), advance logistical command(s) and area command(s). Appropriate TOE logistical command headquarters are used to provide the nucleus of these commands.

d. Personnel replacements are received, processed, and forwarded to all U.S. Army forces in the theater by the theater army replacement system. The system includes all army replacement units within the theater except those assigned or attached to the field armies.

e. The theater army civil affairs command, when established, exercises that prescribed control over governments, lands, inhabitants, resources, and the local economy under the jurisdiction of the theater army commander which has been exempted from the control of field armies or the theater army logistical command. In addition, the civil affairs command is the principal organization for implementing national policies, preparing appropriate plans and programs, and furnishing units for the conduct of civil affairs operations in support of combat or area missions. Due to the ideological nature of modern war and the effect of nuclear weapons on populations, the civil affairs function is of vastly increased importance.

f. Within field army subordinate support commands may be established to command the elements furnishing administrative support. Appropriate administrative headquarters organizations
may be used to provide the nucleus of these commands. Personnel are provided from within the authorized strength of the field army; personnel replacements should not be used for this purpose.

g. Within divisions, administrative support is furnished by the division support command. The support command contains both personnel and logistic units, however, it controls only the logistic units.

h. The capability of rapidly providing data on administrative support functions to a central control agency is essential to an effective support system. Automatic data processing systems are used as appropriate in administrative support operations. Specific areas of application may include supply control, stock control, storage of administrative support data, computation of requirements, maintenance of troop lists, cargo loading plans, movement control, damage control, personnel replacement and administration, and evacuation.

i. An administrative support operations center may be established at headquarters, installations, and activities as appropriate. The center is a facility that gathers critical information to assist the commander and his staff in reaching decisions.

Section IV. FUNCTIONS OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

350. Supply

a. Supply support is the provision of all categories of supply and includes the determination of requirements, requisitioning and procurement, storage, and distribution of supplies. Supply support is closely interrelated with all logistical functions.

b. A continuous flow of supplies, if moved long distance by a single carrier, results in minimum handling, decreased requirements for storage and materiel handling equipment, and greater security. Emphasis is placed on prompt and reliable delivery of supplies from source to user. Storage of reserves echeloned in depth within the supply system is normally required to counteract interrupted forward movement and to satisfy unexpected requirements.

c. Uniformity of supply procedures and operations is essential to the maximum extent practicable. Important, specialized, or newly introduced items of supply follow established supply channels whenever feasible in order to preserve simplicity.

d. Supply is supported by and depends on maintenance to conserve supply assets. Supply of repair parts and replacement for items of mechanical and electronic equipment may be accomplished in whole or in part through the maintenance channel. Cannibaliza-
tion of materiel provides a normal source of repair parts and component assemblies, and substantially reduces the need for the evacuation of unserviceable materiel.

e. The supply system within the theater must provide for—
   (1) A requisitioning system for the rapid transmission of accurate requirements from user to supplier.
   (2) An inventory management system providing supply control to balance demands for supplies against the quantities on hand and on requisition, and a stock control system to provide accurate information on the quantity, location, and condition of supplies on hand.
   (3) Clearly established procedures for distribution agencies for filling requisitions from available stocks or for forwarding requisitions to a higher echelon.
   (4) Procedures for rapidly allocating supplies if supplies available are inadequate to meet all demands.
   (5) Operating troops and facilities.
   (6) Emergency procedures in the event that the normal supply system is disrupted.

351. Movement

a. The movement system within a theater is organized to regulate and operate highway transport, air transport, railways, and inland waterways and to integrate all movement means available, including local movement systems.

b. The agency planning and operating the movement system must—
   (1) Provide for continued movement with minimum interruption to shipments.
   (2) Achieve a high degree of flexibility. Movement resources may be diverted, concentrated, or allocated as the situation demands. All means of movement are used and coordinated to provide a system over which movements may flow without restriction as to means employed or organizational boundaries. The most flexible means of movement, consistent with economy of operations, speed, reliability, and flexibility in support operations is used.
   (3) Achieve centralized control of the system and decentralized operation of the means. Control of movements is centralized at the highest echelon at which control can be adequately exercised.
   (4) Use movement means to capacity consistent with flexibility of the system and the characteristics of each means. Since carriers must return to the point of origin to provide continuous flow, each forward movement must be
completed and the emptied carrier released for reuse at
the earliest possible moment. Economy of use dictates
that each forward movement be balanced by a return load
to the extent possible. This in turn requires maximum
coordination with all other administrative support activi­
ties. Backhauling is avoided.

352. Maintenance

a. Maintenance is any action taken to keep materiel in a service­
able condition or to restore it to serviceability. It includes inspec­
tion, testing, servicing, classification as to serviceability, repair,
rebuilding and reclamation.

b. The extent of maintenance performed at each echelon within
the theater is that which will provide adequate support to the
combat forces with minimum drain on the other administrative
support resources.

c. Military equipment is designed to simplify maintenance at
the forward echelons, to effect onsite repair or replacement, and
to reduce the number of different parts and tools required.

d. Technical assistance is provided to maintenance units and
users of military equipment to insure maintenance and operation
of equipment.

353. Construction

a. Construction is the building and repair of facilities essential
for the use of the supported or supporting forces in the theater.
The primary task of construction in the area of operations is the
development and maintenance of adequate lines of communication.

b. The construction and development of bases are accomplished
when essential to the administrative support of combat forces.
Base development is the improvement and expansion of the re­
sources and facilities of an area. Nuclear warfare increases the
requirement for construction for protection in static phases of a
war.

c. Construction policies, priorities, and control procedures
established for the theater serve as a general basis for employ­
ment of construction troops and allocation of materiels. Construc­
tion in the theater is limited to minimum essential development of
installations and facilities. However, it must be recognized that
construction policies may be affected by political and economic
conditions in addition to operation plans.

d. Military labor and material requirements for construction
are reduced through the maximum use of local labor and materiels
when available.
354. Medical

a. Medical evacuation is the process of removing patients from the battlefield and subsequently moving them from the combat area to hospitals for treatment or to other installations for disposition. Hospitalization is the care provided at a medical installation designed and equipped to give medical and surgical treatment to the sick and wounded. The mission of the medical service in the area of operations is to conserve the fighting strength and to prevent the adverse effects of unevacuated patients on combat efficiency.

b. Evacuation and hospitalization are interrelated. A good evacuation system permits the maximum use of ideally located hospital sites. A properly developed hospitalization system takes advantage of the evacuation means to be employed with correspondingly reduced requirements for connecting evacuation means.

c. In planning the hospital system, it is necessary to establish the theater evacuation policy; this is the period a patient is retained for treatment in the theater hospital system before being returned to duty or evacuated from the theater. An evacuation policy may be applied to a hospital, a series of hospitals, a command, or any level of medical treatment and may fluctuate, particularly in subordinate commands within the theater. The evacuation policy of the area of operations is the shortest consistent with economical use of military means. Evacuation policy at the echelon concerned may be reduced to create reserve bed capacity.

d. The use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons may affect medical evacuation and hospitalization by—

1. Greatly increasing the number of patients in a single area in a very brief period of time. Increased numbers, as such, are not of great significance to the medical service, but the rate at which they are produced is of importance. The rate affects medical capabilities for immediate treatment, generates peak requirements for evacuation, and increases the need for hospitals. The rate of casualty production may frequently rise to levels which exceed the capacity of available medical evacuation and treatment facilities. This may necessitate holding considerable numbers of casualties in tactical unit aid stations. Consequently, troop units must be trained in the care and treatment of nuclear casualties with minimal professional medical assistance. Logistics plans should provide for rapid distribution of extra medical supplies to units faced with the situation.

2. Producing a different pattern of casualties. There will be many more burns, secondary missile injuries, casualties
from ionizing radiation, and diseases caused by biological agents and chemical casualties.

(3) Increasing numbers of casualties in rear areas. The collecting and evacuation system must be expanded to provide combat zone type medical service throughout the theater.

(4) Increasing destruction of medical facilities. Medical installations throughout the theater are vulnerable to destruction or neutralization by mass casualty weapons. This vulnerability imposes a need for great flexibility and reserve capacity. These problems are overcome by more rapid evacuation, by exploiting improved transportation and communication means and by greater use of civilian resources.

355. Labor

a. Labor normally is available from military service units, allied civilians, U.S. civilians, prisoners of war, enemy civilians, refugees and displaced persons. Labor is both static and mobile and includes professional, skilled, and unskilled personnel.

b. Plans provide for maximum practicable use of all sources of labor, to reduce requirements for military personnel.

356. Personnel Replacement and Services

a. Personnel functions include furnishing individual and unit replacements and providing personnel services within the areas of operations.

b. The purpose of the personnel replacement system is to maintain theater army units at authorized strengths and to contribute to the efficient use of military manpower in the theater. The replacement system must be capable of furnishing complete units, battalion and smaller, as replacements, in addition to individual replacements.

c. In nuclear warfare the rate of casualty production may frequently exceed the available replacement rate. Commanders will be forced to rely on reorganization and consolidation of units to reconstitute combat effectiveness.

d. Personnel services must meet the requirements of the operational environment consistent with austerity, conservation of manpower, and morale.

357. Civil Affairs

a. Civil affairs includes the authority exercised, responsibilities assumed, and actions taken by the military commander in an occupied or liberated area with respect to the lands, properties, and inhabitants thereof. Military government is the form of control
which may be established and maintained for the government of occupied areas. Such control is limited by international law and national policy. Civil affairs is that form of control established in friendly territory whereby a foreign government, pursuant to an agreement with the local government of the area concerned, may exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government.

b. The basic objectives of the civil affairs function are to support military operations, to fulfill national obligations, to support and implement national policies, and to provide for the transfer of responsibility from the military commander to a designated civil agency of government. Civil affairs functions are of great importance in modern war.

c. When tactical considerations are primary, civil affairs activities are normally directed by major subordinate commanders using the operational chain of command. A civil affairs chain of command is employed in areas where the situation is stabilized.

Section V. REAR AREA SECURITY AND AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

358. Purpose and Scope

a. Overall area security is the responsibility of the senior commander in the area, but rear area security presents problems which are different from those which exist in the forward area. The primary mission performed in rear areas is administrative support. The purpose of rear area security and area damage control is to prevent interruptions by the enemy of administrative support. In modern warfare the threat of such interruption is much greater than in the past. Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, airborne troops, guerrillas, infiltrators, and saboteurs are major components of this threat. Installations which were formerly protected by distance from the front are now within range of mass destruction weapons. Extended frontages and wide gaps between combat forces increase the vulnerability of rear areas to attack and require greater emphasis on rear area security (including counterintelligence measures) and damage control.

b. Rear area security measures include all actions taken to prevent, neutralize or destroy enemy attacks on units, activities, and installations in rear areas. These measures do not include active air defense operations. Attacks of such magnitude as to endanger the command as a whole are part of the main battle and beyond the scope of rear area security.

c. Area damage control includes those measures taken prior to,
during, and after attack by nuclear or other weapons including fallout, or by a natural disaster, to avoid and minimize the effects thereof, and to aid in the continuation or reestablishment of administrative support. Area damage control by definition does not include measures taken by commanders to fully restore the effectiveness of combat or combat support units which may have suffered heavy damage from enemy attack. In forward areas avoidance and control of damage to a significant extent is automatically included as a normal part of tactical planning and operations; for example, tactical warning and information nets and boundaries are used to delineate and control dispersion areas.

359. Command Arrangements

a. Within the rear area all commanders are responsible for local security and damage control for their own units and installations. Overall responsibility for rear area security/area damage control within a specific area is the responsibility of a designated commander. He is responsible for the integration of local security and damage control plans into the overall area plan. When necessary for operational controls and coordination, subareas are formed within the rear area. All units physically within the subarea including TOE unit replacements awaiting assignment, are integrated into the rear area security/area damage control plans for that subarea. These plans are coordinated between adjacent units and with higher headquarters.

b. Rear area security, area damage control, and administrative support activities are performed in the same geographic area and involve the same forces. Since the use of technical and administrative service units on rear area security/area damage control is a diversion of these units from their primary mission of administrative support to combat forces, the manner and extent to which these service units are diverted must be decided by a commander responsible for all these interrelated activities. Thus an effective system for rear area security and area damage control must possess the following characteristics:

1. A single commander responsible for all three functions in the same geographic area with the necessary staff and communications. These arrangements must not be temporary or improvised, or be established only after attack.
2. A definite fixing of geographic responsibility.
3. A control structure which prevents conflict and competition among agencies responsible for rear area security, rear area damage control, and administrative support.

360. Composition of Forces

a. Rear area security and area damage control forces consist of:
(1) Service units or elements thereof.
(2) Combat or combat support units specifically assigned rear area security/area damage control missions.
(3) Friendly national military, paramilitary, and police forces.
(4) TOE unit replacements awaiting assignments.

b. Service units or predesignated security detachments and damage control teams from these units are used for rear area security/area damage control functions in their own installations. They may be used in an emergency to reinforce other installations. When required, specific combat units are assigned the mission of assisting in overall security and damage control throughout the rear area. In an emergency they may be used to reinforce the capabilities of subareas.

Section VI. JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

361. Policy

a. The Secretary of Defense establishes basic policy for the conduct of administrative support. Administrative support of Service components of a joint force is primarily the responsibility of the parent Service. The degree of administrative support rendered one Service component by another is directed by the Secretary of Defense, a unified or specified commander, or as mutually agreed among the component Services concerned. A component commander may provide all, or part, of the common administrative support for all theater components.

b. The administrative support of national forces is a responsibility of the nation concerned. Within the provisions of U.S. national policy and international agreements, allied forces within an area of operations may be provided administrative support. Within these agreements and policy, the theater commander specifies the degree of support to be rendered and the procedures to be followed.