# FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS—OPERATIONS

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CHAPTER 1
STRATEGY AND MILITARY FORCE

Section 1. GENERAL

1. Terms
   a. National Objectives. Those aims or goals whose attainment will further national interests or produce effects conducive to national security and well-being.
   b. National Policies. Broad but definite courses of action adopted and followed by governments. National policies serve as guidelines which control and establish limits for all actions directed toward the attainment of national objectives.
   c. National Strategy. The sum of the national policies, plans, and programs designed to support the national interests. National strategy, as the aggregate of national policies, provides for development and use of the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces during peace and during war, to secure national objectives.
   d. Elements of National Power. All the means (political, economic, military, and psychological) which are available for employment in the pursuit of national objectives.

2. National Objectives
   a. Each nation establishes broad objectives whose attainment will further its national interests, and formulates policies under which it pursues those objectives. These objectives and policies determine and control the governmental actions of the nation, its internal functions and its external relations alike.
   b. No two nations have precisely the same objectives; in a given set of circumstances, each will react according to its own needs. National objectives may bring a nation into conflict with others whose goals differ; they may lead to alliances with nations whose aims are similar.

3. National Strategy
   National strategy is the long range plan through which a nation applies its strength toward the attainment of its objectives. A national strategy in its broadest sense is applicable to either peace or war. It will encompass, and employ, all the elements of national power: political, economic, psychological, and military and will exploit other national assets such as geographic location and spiritual attitudes. Although it is flexible and adaptable to the

In brief, the national objectives of the United States are to insure its own security and freedom, and to establish and maintain worldwide conditions of peace, security, and justice. U.S. national strategy is designed to attain these objectives through peaceful measures; it rejects aggression as an acceptable course of action. The United States emphasizes deterrence of war; however, it is prepared to wage war at any level of intensity should deterrence fail.

5. Military Strategy

a. Military strategy directs the development and use of the military means which further national strategy through the direct or indirect application of military power. Military strategy is derived from, and is an integral part of, national strategy in either peace or war.

b. Because the purpose of war is the attainment of national objectives, military strategy must be geared to these objectives. Although military considerations enter into the development of national strategy, in the final analysis national objectives shape both national and military strategy. In consequence, a nation's military operations must be subordinated to, and be compatible with, its national objectives.

Section II. NATURE OF CONFLICT

6. Categories and Characteristics of Conflict

Conflicts between nations may vary from mere disagreements and conflicts of interest to basic and irreconcilable differences in national ideologies and objectives. The former are often subject to resolution by arbitration or concession and do not necessarily result in a state of war—declared or undeclared—between the nations concerned. The latter type of conflict may be considered a form of war whether characterized by the employment of military force or by the application of national power short of military force.

7. The Spectrum of War

The full range of forms which conflict can take may be considered as a spectrum of war which reflects the degree and magnitude of violence involved in each form. At one end of the spectrum
are those conflicts in which the application of national power short of military force is applied. This type of war is termed cold war. The other end of the spectrum represents the unrestricted application of military force termed general war. The center portion of the spectrum is defined as limited war and represents the wide range of conflicts between cold war and general war.

8. Cold War

Cold war includes the complete scope of actions, other than limited or general war, which can be used in a power struggle between contending nations or coalitions. The contending powers may seek an advantage in many ways, employing not only political, economic, and psychological strengths, but military strengths as well. Military forces have important cold war functions and can directly or indirectly contribute to the attainment of national objectives. Reserves may be mobilized or active forces deployed to deter another nation from use of force. Military forces may be used to encourage a friendly government in difficulty, to stabilize an unsettled area, to maintain or restore order, or to protect personnel and property. Although the basic characteristic of cold war is the absence of overt armed conflict between the military forces of the contending nations, the dividing line between cold war and limited war is neither distinct nor absolute. Regular military forces may be required, therefore, to conduct cold war operations which are to all intents and purposes combat actions.

9. Limited War*

Limited war is characterized by conscious restraint on the part of the belligerents with regard to one or more of its aspects; e.g., objectives, weapons, locale, or participants. The scope, intensity, and duration of limited wars may vary widely, depending upon the degree of restraint applied. The term "limited" does not imply that a limited war is little or that it is ever unimportant. It may be armed conflict between small forces in a relatively restricted area, in which only conventional weapons are used. On the other hand, it may involve extremely large forces, engaged over a large area. It is impossible to locate with precision the point at which any further relaxation of restraints will transform limited war into general war. Fundamentally, however, a limited war is any conflict which does not involve the unrestricted employment of all available resources. Its upper limit is not exceeded until one belligerent concludes that his national survival is directly and immediately at stake, and discards all restraints.

* This term describes a wide range of armed conflicts among which are those commonly called local aggressions, conventional war, or limited nuclear war.
10. General War**

General war is an armed conflict in which opposing nuclear powers or coalitions employ all the means available to them. It is characterized by the absence of restraints and by nuclear strikes against the homeland of either side. General war is a specialized category of conflict, undertaken in response to a direct and immediate threat to national security when no other course offers a chance of attaining national objectives.

Section III. THE NATURE OF MILITARY POWER

11. General

a. Military power is that element of national strength which is designed to apply physical force in the implementation of national policy and in the attainment of national objectives. The measure of its effectiveness is the degree to which is can support the broad national purpose.

b. Military power is subordinate to and must be compatible with national policies and goals. Military forces, the operative element of military power, must be capable of exerting physical force in a manner and on a scale which will insure the attainment of these goals.

12. Characteristics of Military Forces

Military forces consist of men, weapons and other materiel formed into units capable of military operations. They reflect the objectives of their nation, the shape of the threats it faces, and its international commitments. Thus, no two nations will provide themselves with precisely the same types of forces, nor organize them for combat in precisely the same manner. Allies and members of coalitions will often attain some degree of standardization in weapons and materiel, in general organization, and in doctrine. They may even rely on each other for certain specialized functions. As a rule, however, military forces are national in character, reflecting the aims and problems of the nations which raise them.

13. U.S. Military Power

a. The United States faces a threat which is broad and diverse and which is directed by a flexible and pragmatic strategy. In meeting this threat, and in the pursuit of its national objectives, the United States has worldwide commitments to other nations. As a consequence its Armed Forces must not only be capable of

** The term is synonymous with "general nuclear war" or "total nuclear war."
insuring the security of the United States, but must also be designed to:

(1) Deter aggression at any level,

(2) Defeat aggression wherever and in whatever form it may occur; and

(3) Support both military and nonmilitary programs of the United States and its allies.

b. To meet these broad and complex requirements the United States must maintain land, sea, and air forces which, operating under unified direction and command, can—

(1) **Deliver certain and devastating thermonuclear attack upon any aggressor**, even after sustaining the first strike of a general war. Long range nuclear strike forces will be the offensive element of this capability; air defense and antimissile forces, protecting the strike force and key population and production centers, are its defensive element. In order to gain and maintain control over the people and land areas necessary to the achievement of United States’ objectives, balanced ground, sea, and air forces in being, or readily mobilized must be available to follow up advantages gained from the nuclear attack.

(2) **Defeat aggression short of general war in a manner which minimizes the risk of the conflict expanding to general war.** A portion of the forces which provide this capability will be deployed overseas; others will be held in strategic reserve in the United States. The latter will reinforce the deployed forces or intervene rapidly in threatened areas where U.S. forces are not regularly stationed. Whether deployed or held in strategic reserve, these forces must be capable of fighting with or without nuclear weapons.

(3) **Meet their logistic requirements by means of stockpiles of equipment and supplies, and with the support of an adequate production and mobilization base.**

(4) **Sustain themselves in combat, building up rapidly to required levels by mobilizing high quality reserve forces and employing a sound training base.**

(5) **Assist, through military assistance programs, in the development of allied military strength and the strength of other selected nations.**

c. A military structure which can perform the functions set forth above provides the complementary military capabilities which comprise a complete deterrent.
14. Employment of Military Forces

a. General.

(1) Military force may be employed in any form of conflict. Its utility is not restricted to overt hostilities. Force, or the threat of force, is normal in relations between nations when major conflicting objectives are involved; however, military forces cannot effectively apply force or credibly threaten it unless they can do so selectively. The type and degree of force available must be compatible with the nature and setting of the conflict at hand and the objectives sought. Forces, strategy, doctrine, and weapons alike must possess the inherent flexibility which enables them to serve national policy in any contingency and at any selected level of violence.

(2) Military objectives selected must be compatible with the limitations which national policies impose upon the area of conflict, weapons, participants, or other factors. The principle of primacy of national objectives is not in conflict with the sound military concepts expressed in the Principles of War (ch. 5). To the contrary, it is completely in accord with the Principle of the Objective. A military operation is futile unless it is directed toward attainment of the objective set for it, no matter what else it may accomplish. The strategy by which these military objectives are to be attained is circumscribed by the same limitations, but thereafter military objectives are pursued energetically, and military power is applied forcefully and decisively in accord with the chosen strategy. Military force need not be unrestrained to be effective. Subordination to broad national interests does not diminish the force and vigor with which military operations are executed.

b. Flexibility and Adaptability in Employment.

(1) United States military forces must be able to operate effectively across the entire spectrum of war, in any area where conflict may occur, and under any foreseeable restraints, employing their military power selectively in accordance with assigned missions and prescribed limitations. The force they apply must be both adequate to, and consistent with, assigned objectives. United States military forces must, therefore, be capable of operating effectively throughout the world in—

(a) Cold war in which tension or violence might at any time lead to limited nonnuclear or limited nuclear war;
(b) Limited wars in infinite combinations of locale, inten-
sity, duration, and participants. These may be non-
nuclear war with little or no threat of nuclear conflict, 
nonnuclear war in which nuclear operations are a clear 
and imminent threat, or limited tactical nuclear war. 
In each case the essential objective of United States 
military forces will be to terminate the conflict rapidly 
and decisively in a manner best calculated to prevent 
its spread to general war and to advance the national 
objectives.

(c) General nuclear warfare growing from limited war, 
or initiated with a sudden thermonuclear exchange.

(2) A wide range of political and military considerations 
determine the limitations placed on the use of military 
force in war. Normally it will be impossible to predict 
beforehand the precise nature of these limitations, and 
to determine with certainty whether nuclear, chemical, 
biological or other special weapons will be available to 
the military commander. It is impractical however, to 
develop new types of forces or weapons only after the 
enemy has initiated their use, or national authority has 
modified original restraints. United States military 
forces must be able to adapt to any form of conflict in-
stantly. In the nuclear age they must, therefore, have 
an existing dual capability. They must be organized, 
equipped, and trained for immediate and successful em-
ployment with or without nuclear (and other special) 
weapons. The following doctrine is applicable to the 
employment of dual capable forces:

(a) The disposition of any military force will depend on 
the commander's assessment of the threat of nuclear 
attack and the requirements of his mission. Calculat-
ing the risks involved, he will determine the degree 
to which the force will disperse, and the location and 
state of readiness of his nuclear delivery means.

(b) Basic limitations on the use of military force, includ-
ing the use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weap-
ons, will be imposed at the national level. Nevertheless, 
within such limitations, field commanders will be al-
lowed some latitude. To exercise this discretion pro-
perly, these commanders must be thoroughly conversant 
with the national objectives underlying whatever re-
straints have been applied.

(c) Control of weapons capable of delivering nuclear fires 
should be decentralized to the lowest level consistent 
with efficiency and compliance with national restraints.
c. Readiness.
(1) The destructive power of modern weapons and the speed with which they can be brought to bear have increased the importance of combat readiness. Long range strike forces, deployed forces, mobile strategic reserves and air/missile defense forces must be maintained in a state of readiness commensurate with the warning they can expect and their assigned missions. For the same reasons, forces of the reserve components must also be kept at a high state of readiness.

(2) Accurate, complete, and timely intelligence is vital both to readiness and to success in military operations. Detailed intelligence on actual or potential theaters of war must be available to commanders at all levels, as must intelligence on enemy strengths, weaknesses, dispositions, capabilities and probable actions. Timely and thorough assessments of these factors are of particular importance in cold and limited war. It is essential to avoid being surprised by sudden changes in the scope, type, or intensity of conflict.

d. Employment in Coalition Warfare.
(1) In coalition warfare, two or more nations commit their military and other strengths to the attainment of a common objective. Coalition objectives are generally similar to, if not identical with, the national objectives of the participating states. In any case, coalition warfare also requires the subordination of military objectives, forces, and strategies to broader objectives and policies.

(2) The success of coalition efforts, in peace or war, depends upon mutual purpose, mutual confidence, and sound combined organization and planning. These in turn depend upon the existence of military power which is sufficiently flexible and diverse to serve the interests of all members of the coalition. Membership in, and particularly leadership of, a coalition requires, therefore, the commitment of military forces which can contribute materially to meeting the full range of the threat to each of the coalition’s members, under any of a wide variety of circumstances.

Section IV. THE NATURE AND ROLE OF LAND FORCES

15. General
Land forces are those military forces organized, trained, and equipped for sustained combat incident to operations in the land environment. The land environment consists of the earth’s land
surfaces and the contiguous boundary layers of air and water. Land forces, therefore, include not only ground units, but certain ground/air systems and waterborne elements as well.

a. The United States Department of Defense is organized on the premise that the day of separate land, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. No single element of the nation's overall military power will suffice. Nor can the nation dispense with any element of its strength. Land, sea, and airpower are interdependent elements to be applied under unified direction and command toward the attainment of United States' objectives.

b. Landpower is the power to exercise direct, continuous and comprehensive control over the land, over its resources, and over its peoples. In peace, landpower is the basis of the stability, law, and order essential to a free society. In war the ultimate and decisive act is the exercise of landpower. War is won only when one nation imposes its will upon another, a process in which landpower is the matrix of national power. The ultimate aim of both sea and airpower is to influence the situation and operations on land; landpower makes permanent the otherwise transient advantages which air and naval forces can gain.

c. The nature of the environment in which it operates has a marked effect on the philosophy and doctrine of a military force. The sea and air are homogeneous, uniform elements; land is not. The land is a surface of infinite variety which is complicated by vegetation, by climatic extremes, and by the presence of man. The problems of land combat, therefore, are not susceptible to any simple solution; there is no formula or rule of thumb which can be applied in all circumstances. There is, therefore, no simple dogma or slogan which captures the essence of landpower. Planning for land operations is inevitably complex, detailed, and hedged about with provisions for various contingencies. Similarly, the tactics and organization of land forces are complicated, and cannot readily be evaluated by mathematical methods. These qualities do not signify a lack of precision; they stem from a deep, organic flexibility essential to success in sustained combat on land. The hallmark of an effective military force is the ability to adapt to the environment in which it operates, to the enemy it faces, and to the national policy it serves.

16. The Role of U.S. Land Forces

a. Cold War.

(1) Stability, law, and order are essential to the success of the United States' overall cold war effort. The nonmilitary, nonviolent programs chosen by the United States are designed to foster freedom in such an atmosphere. These are sound, valid programs, but they will fail in
an atmosphere of violence inspired by hostile states. The Armed Forces of the United States must therefore provide a solid military foundation for the cold war effort. It is their task to insure that the cold war is conducted in an environment conducive to the attainment of national objectives.

(2) Land forces are unique among the services in their ability to establish and maintain stability, to deter or cope with disorder, and to support legal authority. Land forces in oversea areas are a real and credible deterrent to the violence of cold war, and a means by which the United States can assist its allies to deal with disorders inspired and directed by hostile states. Over and above their physical contribution, these forces play an important role in the psychology of deterrence. The presence of armed and disciplined men inhibits violence as no other manifestation of military power can. These forces are also a tangible, visible guarantee that the United States honors its international commitments. U.S. land forces deployed under collective security arrangements are a concrete manifestation of the mutual trust and confidence, upon which collective security—an essential ingredient of United States security—depends. A strategic reserve of land forces must be available to perform similar functions in areas where United States land forces are not regularly stationed.

b. Limited War.

(1) Limited aggression presents a double problem. On the one hand, aggression must be opposed, met promptly and dealt with forcibly. On the other hand, force must be applied so as to minimize the risk that the conflict will expand to general war. Military objectives, as always, are subordinated to national objectives; military operations must be conducted within the limits established by national policy. The flexibility and versatility of land forces offer the United States a variety of military measures from which to select a course of action both appropriate to the aggression and compatible with the national security interests. From a reinforced company to a force of several Army corps, a land force can field self-contained units tailored to the tasks which may face the United States and its allies. These forces can be provided any of several major capabilities. They can be designed to enter combat by parachute assault; they can be basically armored forces or they can be designed to
take advantage of the foot mobility of the infantry; they can be provided with organic nuclear fire support as a supplement to their conventional fires; and they can be provided with the combat support forces which give them the ability to conduct sustained combat operations until the objective is accomplished.

(2) Deployed land forces, and a strategic reserve of land forces, are the backbone of the deterrent to limited aggression. Able to defend land, people, and resources without destroying them, to meet aggression in a manner compatible with Free World and U.S. security interests, they serve notice that the Free World has alternatives other than total nuclear war or inaction, and hence cannot be blackmailed into accepting marginal or creeping aggression.

c. General War.

(1) General war will be fought in two phases. The first will involve the massive nuclear exchange, the second will consist of operations in which each belligerent attempts to impose his will upon the enemy, to consolidate and exploit any advantage gained in the first phase, and to bring the conflict to a conclusion on his own terms.

(2) The United States and its allies must be prepared to fight a general war to a successful conclusion. This requires attention to the second as well as the first phase, for while effectiveness in the thermonuclear exchange is important, it is the second phase which will be conclusive. Any advantage gained in the first phase would be dissipated should the United States and its allies be unable to capitalize upon it. Also, and equally serious, a potential enemy might come to believe, to the detriment of the deterrent, that he could recoup or counterbalance first phase losses through unopposed conquest in the subsequent phase.

(3) Land forces play a significant part in the deterrent to total nuclear war. For example, the United States Army's air defense weapons reduce the vulnerability of the long range strike forces and protect key areas within the United States. The Army's deployed forces, in conjunction with allied forces, stand between potential aggressors and critical resources, serving notice that there will be no easy conquests in the second phase. The strategic reserve of land forces lends weight and authority to the deterrent effect of United States and allied land forces throughout the world.
In the event of general war, the military forces of the United States and its allies must be capable of devastating retaliation against the aggressor, while at the same time minimizing domestic damage and aiding in the process of recuperation; of withstanding conventional aggressor forces in their inevitable surge toward key strategic areas; and of undertaking military operations which will establish the degree of control over hostile populations necessary to conclude the conflict on terms compatible with United States and Free World interests. In all of these actions, armies will play a major role and in some they will be the decisive force. Air defense forces will minimize damage to the nuclear strike forces and to key control, population, and the production centers. Both active and reserve forces will aid and support civil authority in national recuperation. Armies will provide the backbone of the defense of the Free World perimeter, denying to the aggressor and securing for the Free World those resources which will later facilitate decisive operations. This initially defensive mission is all-important, for control of residual resources of the post-strike world, natural and manmade alike, will be essential to survival. In combination with control of strategic areas and routes, these resources will give to whichever belligerent controls them, the decisive advantage. Land forces provide a means of insuring that resources, routes and areas alike are available to the United States and its allies.
CHAPTER 2
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Section I. GENERAL

17. Basic Considerations

a. The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces and which bear on the decisions of the commander. Major elements comprising the operational environment include: national objectives sought by the operations involved and the supporting national policy considerations which influence the manner of accomplishment of those objectives; the military objectives of the operation; the physical features of the area of operations and the characteristics and attitudes of its peoples; the composition, and missions, of the opposing forces; and the weapon systems employed or portended. The operational environment not only influences the manner in which military forces are employed, but also the size and composition of such forces and their command and organizational structure.

b. Each element of the operational environment is a complex variable. The combination of these variable elements into operational environments creates further complexity and a wide range of conditions and circumstances within which military forces must be capable of operating effectively. It is this wide environmental spectrum that makes it impossible to reduce the conduct of military operations to a series of precise axioms and simple directions.

c. The operational environment will, on occasion, impose certain limitations on the freedom of action of commanders at all levels. Such restrictions are normal and will occur in all forms of military operations. The restraints imposed in general war, however, will be less frequent and less specific than those imposed in limited or cold war.

d. While subsequent chapters of this manual set forth broad principles and concepts for the conduct of military operations, the application of these principles and concepts is qualified by the operational environment which prevails at a given time. The degree and manner of their application must be tempered by professional knowledge and sound military judgment.

Section II. ELEMENTS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THEIR EFFECT

18. National Policy

a. National policy translates national objectives into broad
courses of action. It affects assignment of objectives to military forces, the size and composition of such forces, the resources with which they are provided and the manner in which they are employed to include the limitations within which they operate. National policy also influences relations with allied military forces, the command and organization of combined forces, and relations with local populations.

b. National policies are frequently tempered by international coalitions, alliances, and agreements and by the additional influence of opinions and attitudes of neutralist nations. The influence of these extra-national opinions and attitudes may be reflected in confinement of the area of operations, in limitations in military objectives, or in restrictions in the employment of certain weapons.

19. The Area of Operations

a. The physical features, climate, and weather of the area of operations affect the organization and composition of military forces and the manner in which they are employed.

b. The size, composition, and organization of forces are affected by the size and configuration of the area of operations, which may vary from an island or archipelago to a large, continental, land mass. Closely allied to size and configuration are the resources available within the area, the existing highway nets, rail systems, port facilities, and airfields, and the length of lines of communication. Other important factors include the density and distribution of the population and the number and location of critical areas that must be seized or held to insure control. These interrelated factors determine the number of troops that can be employed and sustained, as well as the proportion of combat to logistic and administrative support forces. This in turn affects the organizational and command structure. The configuration of the terrain and the extent and type of vegetation within the area of operations influence the type of forces assigned, especially where these factors present difficulties in the operation, support, and maintenance of heavy equipment or require that special equipment be issued the troops.

c. Such factors as natural obstacles and extreme conditions of weather and climate reduce the operational capabilities of troops and increase the difficulty of supporting them. For this reason modification of the operational concepts in chapter 5 and the tactical principles in chapter 6 is frequently necessary to meet local conditions. For further discussion see paragraphs 177 through 184.

20. Local Populations

The local population within the area of operations may exert
considerable influence upon the operational environment. Its attitude, actions and capabilities may facilitate or hinder military operations. Additionally, the requirements of the local population for food, medical support, and assistance in rehabilitating the local government and reestablishing municipal operations, such as water supply, sanitation, and power, may require military effort that would otherwise be available for support of combat operations. Where the population is actively sympathetic to the enemy, it may become necessary to divert a significant number of combat troops to rear area security.

21. Opposing Forces

a. Missions. The missions assigned their respective military forces by opposing belligerents may be similar or widely divergent. Each may seek the ultimate subjugation of the other and the destruction of his war-making potential, the usual case in general war. When this is so, there is relatively little restraint in the means employed by the belligerents. In situations short of general war one belligerent may seek the destruction of the other while the latter may seek restoration of the prior situation; or, each belligerent may seek to gain control of a limited area or to deny the area to the other. In other situations, where dissident elements within a country are supported covertly by an external power in their attempts to overthrow a friendly government, military forces may be employed merely to assist the friendly government in maintaining law and order. This assistance may be provided unilaterally or under the aegis of an international organization. In every situation the means employed by military forces and the manner in which operations are conducted is influenced by the mission assigned the opposing forces.

b. Strength and Composition.

(1) Enemy forces may consist of loosely organized bands of irregular forces, massive formations of regular forces provided with minimal equipment and marginal combat and administrative support; highly trained, modern forces with ample combat and administrative support, or combinations of each of these. U.S. forces must adopt tactics, organization, and procedures as necessary to operate effectively against the specific enemy force encountered.

(2) U.S. forces assigned to an area of operations may vary from relatively small task forces to a full array of large land, sea, and air forces. The U.S. Army element in the friendly force structure may vary from a division or less to one or more army groups with the necessary combat
and administrative support in each case. The command and organizational structure will vary directly in complexity with the size of the force and the extent of participation by other Services and allied forces.

22. Weapon Systems

a. When authorized for employment by national directive, mass destruction weapon systems, i.e., those delivering nuclear, chemical, and biological munitions, exercise an intensive influence on the conduct of operations. When the authority to employ these munitions is granted, the combat power available to commanders is increased tremendously and the capability of forces at all echelons is correspondingly enhanced in both offensive and defensive combat. The results of an engagement are determined in far less time than would otherwise be required. These same factors, however, dictate special measures to reduce the vulnerability of friendly forces and installations. Dispersion, mobility, decentralization of control, rapid exploitation, and the reduction of reaction time are primary considerations.

b. The availability of mass destruction weapons to either force may exercise considerable influence on the operational environment. The degree of influence depends on the imminence of employment. In some situations the likelihood of employment may be of major concern in the development and execution of operational plans. Again, the threat may be so remote as to be of small concern. Operations plans must be based upon the situation at hand with due regard to probability of a sudden change in the operational environment brought about by the decision to implement nuclear warfare. The pattern and tempo of operations of an environment conditioned by mass destruction weapons cannot be blindly employed in a situation where such weapons are not employed.

c. Further discussion of the effects of mass destruction weapons on the operational environment is contained in paragraphs 143 through 147.
CHAPTER 3
COMMAND

Section I. THE COMMANDER

23. General

The authority vested in an individual to direct and control military forces is termed command. This authority, which derives both from law and regulation, is accompanied by commensurate responsibility which cannot be delegated. The commander alone is responsible for the success or failure of his command under all circumstances.

24. Authority

In the discharge of his responsibility the commander exerts his authority to direct such actions and to establish such standards as will insure the accomplishment of his mission. In so doing, the soundness of his judgment and the principles and techniques which he employs determine the effectiveness of his leadership.

25. Leadership

a. Leadership is a personal and intangible quality which is a combination of example, persuasion, and compulsion. It is an extension of the commander's self, his personality, and his character.

b. In the exercise of leadership the commander must devise means to project his character and personality to create a positive impression on the units and individuals of his command. He must be identified by his troops as a dynamic, vibrant source of direction, guidance, and motivation rather than as a detached and obscure source of authority.

26. Characteristics

While personality varies widely with individuals, the basic characteristics of high moral purpose, integrity and courage, both moral and physical, are indispensable ingredients of leadership. In addition, the commander must demonstrate such knowledge, judgment, decisiveness, initiative, and resourcefulness as to command the respect and confidence of his troops. The selflessness, dedication, loyalty, and physical hardihood which he displays inspire the efforts of his entire command.

27. The Human Element

Despite advances in technology, success in war depends on man.
Man remains the essential element on the battlefield. The commander must be acutely sensitive to the physical and mental condition of his troops, and his plans must take account of their strengths and weaknesses. He must make allowance for the frailties to which the stresses and strains of combat subject the human mind and body. His actions must inspire and motivate his command with the will to succeed under the most adverse conditions, and must also assure his troops that hardship and sacrifice will not be needlessly imposed, and that their well-being is of primary concern.

28. Subordinates

The accomplishment of the command as a whole is the sum of the accomplishments of its component elements. Each subordinate commander and staff member is an effective instrument in the hands of the commander. The degree of skill and understanding with which he employs his subordinates is reflected in the operations of his command. Subordinates must be carefully trained and motivated and full advantage must be taken of their individual qualities and capabilities.

29. Techniques

a. The successful commander avoids oversupervision. While the direct personal touch with subordinates is essential to effective command, he must establish policies within which his staff can take action during his absence. He fosters initiative and self-confidence in subordinate commanders by permitting them appropriate latitude within the scope of their responsibilities.

b. Modern warfare demands prompt action, decentralization, and a high degree of individual initiative. Detailed instructions must frequently give way to broad direction which subordinates can interpret and implement in accordance with the situation which prevails at the time of execution.

Section II. CHAIN OF COMMAND

30. General

a. The successive commanders through which command actions are channeled form the chain of command. The chain of command extends downward from superior to subordinate and upward from subordinate to superior.

b. Effective military operations demand strict adherence to the chain of command. Violation of the chain of command usurps the prerogatives of the intermediate commander concerned, and
abrogates his authority without a commensurate lessening of his responsibility.

31. Bypassing the Chain of Command

Under certain unusual or extreme conditions, such as the imperative need for speed of action or where communication with intermediate units is lost, the commander may bypass the chain of command. In such event the normal chain of command must be reestablished at the earliest opportunity and the intermediate commanders concerned informed of the action taken.

32. Initiative

On occasion, the loss of communication may preclude receipt of specific orders or direction by a subordinate commander. In such event he will deduce the action required based on his knowledge of the existing situation and will act on his own initiative. Inaction in the absence of orders is inexcusable.

33. Continuity of Command

Commanders at all echelons must make adequate provision for uninterrupted perpetuation of the chain of command. The succession of command must be prescribed for all contingencies ranging from the temporary absence of the commander to the loss of the commander and staff.

Section III. COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONS

34. Purpose of the Staff

The staff provides advice and assistance to the commander in his exercise of command. Staff personnel may be characterized as divisions of the commander himself into specialized advisory segments. The larger an organization, the greater the requirement for staff advisors to assist the commander in the accomplishment of his responsibilities. For detailed discussion of staff organization and procedures see FM 101-5.

35. Staff Functions

a. The staff embodies no authority within itself. Its authority derives from the commander and must be exercised in his name.

b. Details belong to the staff. The commander addresses his attention to the broad essentials critical to the problem at hand. He must rely on his staff for development of the detailed considerations required for his estimates, plans, and orders.

c. The staff acts within the policies and concepts established by the commander. In the absence of policy the staff refers to the
commander for guidance, or if this is impossible, bases its actions on an interpretation of what the commander's policy would be.

d. The advice provided the commander by his staff is calculated solely to further the accomplishment of the mission. Complete honesty of opinion and frankness of presentation are essential. Staff recommendations must carry the courage of conviction until a decision is made by the commander. Thereafter full and complete staff effort is devoted to support the decision.

36. Staff Relationships

a. Maximum efficiency obtains when the commander and his staff function as a single entity in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and respect. In establishing such a relationship however, the commander must preserve his identity. He must remain sufficiently detached to retain his perspective and to insure prompt response to his orders.

b. In its relations with subordinate commands the staff operates in a spirit of service, cooperation, and assistance. It translates the commander's decision into timely, concise, and clearly understandable directives. It keeps abreast of the situation, circumstances, and problems in subordinate units and advises the commander accordingly. By so doing it serves the troops as well as the commander. In establishing the relations between his staff and subordinate commanders, the commander must insure that prerogatives for direct dealing by subordinate commanders are not usurped by the staff.

c. Proper staff relations with higher and adjacent headquarters contribute materially to operational efficiency. Frequent contact and full exchange of information among staffs result in mutual understanding, keep their commanders abreast of the overall situation, and apprises them of future plans on which they can take timely and appropriate action.

Section IV. DECISION MAKING

37. General

Decision making is the fundamental responsibility of command. All military operations are based on decisions. Command and staff actions are merely implementations of decisions. Sound decisions are reflected in successful operations. While decisions are required in all areas of military activity, this section addresses itself only to major decisions incumbent on a commander under operational conditions.

38. Basis for Decisions

Decisions are based on the requirements of the mission, the
courses of action open to the commander, and consideration of the factors which bear on the two. Certain of these factors may be clearly defined, while others may be clouded by incomplete information or a complete lack of information.

39. The Mission

In arriving at a decision the commander's basic consideration is the mission. The mission is usually stated in terms sufficiently broad to permit the commander considerable freedom in determining his course of action. As the battle progresses, modifications and changes in mission may be anticipated. As the situation becomes more fluid the mission may be correspondingly broadened with increased reliance placed on the initiative of subordinate commanders.

40. Other Considerations Affecting the Decision

As they relate to the mission, other important considerations affect the commander's decision. Among these are the relative combat power and disposition of the opposing forces and the characteristics of the area of operations. In developing the information required to evaluate these considerations the commander relies heavily on the advice of his staff. His staff provides him detailed information obtained from higher, lower, and adjacent units.

41. Intangibles of Battle

In arriving at a decision the commander is confronted with certain intangibles. Among these are troop morale, unit effectiveness, and the enemy's determination and will to resist. Although no precise method exists for gaging these factors, they must nevertheless be considered as having a direct bearing on the commander's decision.

42. Process of Arriving at Decision

a. The process by which the staff evaluates the pertinent factors in terms of the mission and courses of action and which culminates in recommendations to the commander is termed the estimate of the situation. The process by which the commander applies his own knowledge and considers the recommendation of his staff in arriving at a decision is termed the commander's estimate of the situation.

b. The decision must be reevaluated constantly and changed as necessary in the light of new directions, additional information and other factors which are developed as the battle progresses. Thus the estimate of the situation by both the commander and his staff is a continuing process.
c. For detailed discussion of the estimate of the situation see FM 101-5.

43. The Decision

Although arrived at through a methodical, orderly process, the commander's decision is not merely a mathematical computation. It is a creative act based on consideration of all the factors involved. Its soundess is a reflection of the commander's professional competence, experience, intelligence, perception, and strength of character.

Section V. PLANNING AND EXECUTION

44. Planning

a. The commander's decision, once made, is reflected in plans which are designed to accomplish the mission through implementation of the decision. Such plans, covering all facets of the projected operation, form the basis for detailed orders to subordinate commanders.

b. Planning is a progressive and continuing process. During the course of the current operation plans are developed for future operations, and alternate plans are developed for all foreseeable contingencies. The planning process must not, however, interfere with the conduct and supervision of the current battle.

45. Execution

Full execution of a sound plan insures accomplishment of the mission. Once undertaken, the execution of the operation assumes paramount importance and must receive the close and immediate attention and supervision of both the commander and his staff. The commander must sense the critical actions in process as the battle progresses and must bring to bear thereon the full effect of his leadership and authority.

Section VI. COMMAND IN JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

46. General

a. Joint operations are operations participated in by more than one of the services of the Department of Defense. Combined operations are operations participated in by the armed forces of two or more allied nations. Both types of operations may be embodied in a single operation.

b. As in any operation, the successful conduct of joint and com-
bined operations requires coordination of effort and effective direction of participating forces. The principles of command and organization for joint forces are contained in JCS Pub. 2, *Unified Action, Armed Forces* (UNAAF). The command and organizational structure for combined forces are determined as required by international agreement between the nations concerned.

47. **Unity of Effort**

The requirement for unity of effort in joint and combined operations directed toward a common objective is best achieved by the designation of a single commander. Such a commander must be provided authority and resources commensurate with his mission.

48. **Command of Joint and Combined Operations**

a. Joint and combined forces are characterized by certain inherent differences which exist in the military systems of the component forces. Among the Armed Services of the United States certain divergencies exist in doctrine, techniques and customs. The same variations are encountered in combined forces and differences in political, religious and cultural backgrounds, and philosophies add complexity to the operation.

b. The commander of a joint or combined force must recognize and appreciate these divergencies and variations which may give rise to misunderstandings and differences of opinion. He must combine tact with determination and patience with enthusiasm to insure maximum operational efficiency of the force as a whole. If necessary, he must subordinate his methods and procedures to the common unity. In combined operations, the commander must also insure that national interests are not permitted to prevent proper decisions, and he must insist on the exercise of command through established channels regardless of the difficulties imposed by procedural differences and language barriers.

49. **Staff for Joint and Combined Forces**

a. Joint forces are provided with a joint or augmented staff in accordance with the provisions of JCS Pub. 2.

b. In the case of combined forces, a combined staff may be established or the staff of the larger allied forces may be augmented to give balanced representation to the other allied forces assigned.
CHAPTER 4
ORGANIZATION AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF FIELD FORCES

Section I. GENERAL

50. Scope
This chapter is limited to consideration of the Army field forces under operational conditions and within a theater of operations. It does not include consideration of the headquarters, commands, installations or activities located within the continental United States except as the United States may be considered a theater of war.

51. Doctrinal Basis
The doctrine reflected in this chapter is based on JCS Pub. 2, and JCS Pub. 3, Joint Logistics and Personnel Policy and Guidance.

52. Definition of Field Forces
The Army field forces include all elements of the Department of Army, both active and reserve component, except that part defined as Headquarters, Department of the Army.

53. Territorial Organization

a. Theater (area) of War. The theater of war is that area of land, sea and air which is, or may become, involved directly in the operations of war. It is subdivided in accordance with the nature of the operations planned or in being.

b. Theater (area) of Operations. The theater of operations is that portion of a theater of war necessary for the conduct and support of military operations pursuant to an assigned mission. More than one theater of operations may comprise a theater of war. The geographic limits of a theater of operations are established by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Zone of the Interior. The zone of the interior is that part of the national territory not included in the theater of operations.

54. Employment of Army Field Forces
The Army field forces may be employed in operations involving only the Army; in operations, involving two or more of the Armed Services of the United States, defined as joint operations; in op-
operations, involving the armed services of two or more allied nations, defined as combined operations; or in any combination of the above.

Section II. THEATER (AREA) OF OPERATIONS

55. General Organization

a. While there is no standard organization for a theater of operations, the theater is normally divided geographically into a combat zone and a communication zone. The combat zone contains those land and sea areas and air masses required for ground combat operations and the immediate administrative support thereof. The communication zone consists of those land and sea areas and air masses required for the administrative support of the theater as a whole.

b. Initially, a theater of operations may consist of only the combat zone, with administrative support provided by facilities and installations in the zone of the interior. On occasion a requirement may exist for the conduct of operations outside established theaters of operations. In such event a small subordinate theater of operations may be established to conduct the operation. Such theaters are designed and organized to employ and support small tactical combat forces.

e. The theater command established in a theater of operations may be a combined command established by coalition agreement or a unified command established by the United States.

56. Responsibility for Organization

The theater commander is responsible for the organizational structure of his command. In establishing an organizational structure administrative support considerations must be keyed to operational effectiveness.

57. Organizational Consideration

a. The task of organization may be complicated by differences in national policies of the nations involved and by differences in concepts between the United States Service components assigned. The staff organization established must embody personnel who have wide knowledge and experience in their own Service, and who also are well-versed in the methods, capabilities, and characteristics of other service or national forces assigned.

b. The command structure established must be simple and must insure a manageable span of control, with a minimum number of command echelons. A single individual may frequently act con-
currently as commander of a uni-service force, a joint force and a combined force.

58. Organizational Principles
   a. The command structure established must insure centralized direction of the operation as a whole, but must also insure the maximum degree of decentralized execution to provide flexibility and freedom of action to subordinate commanders.
   b. Clear lines of control and positive delineation of command responsibility must be established within the theater.
   c. Operational commands must be organized to accomplish specific major tasks with minimum duplication of effort and overlapping of functions.
   d. Administrative support should be organized to provide maximum cross-servicing between national forces consistent with operational efficiency.
   e. Administrative support of national forces should normally be provided on a national basis.

59. Organization of Subordinate Commands
   a. Subordinate commands must be provided the forces required to accomplish the assigned mission, whether such forces are from more than one Service or nation.
   b. When the task assigned a subordinate command requires the capabilities inherent in more than one United States Service a unified or joint command should be established. When the capabilities of the armed forces of more than one nation are required a combined command should be established.
   c. Unity of effort in subordinate commands should be insured by the provision of clear cut direction to service components thereof by the theater commander upon their assignment, and by coalition agreement for the employment of combined forces where such are assigned. The staffs of subordinate joint and combined commands must include appropriate representation from all significant service or national forces involved.

60. Organization of the Combat Zone
   a. The combat zone should include sufficient maneuver area to permit deployment of all elements of the major force and to permit establishment, without congestion, of essential administrative support facilities.
   b. The forward limits of the combat zone should extent to the distance necessary for the commander to fully exploit all means under his control.
   c. Major force commanders must be provided the means and
authority to direct land, sea and air operations against the enemy in their area(s) of operation. Procedures and facilities must be provided to regulate air traffic over the combat zone.

61. Communication Zone

a. The communications zone contains the principal administrative support installations and lines of communication facilities for the theater. It provides the connecting link between the combat zone and the zone of interior.

b. Administrative support activities frequently have combat support aspects, and conversely some elements whose major function is combat, such as air defense units, may be located in the communication zone. The communication zone should include sufficient area for the location without congestion of required installations or units. It may be located on the same land mass as the combat zone, or in whole or in part on an offshore base.

62. Administrative Support Considerations

a. Routine details of administrative support not involving theater policy are handled directly by the Service components with their support structure in the zone of interior.

b. Port and air terminal operations are normally assigned to Uni-Service commands with necessary augmentation from other Services.

c. For further detailed discussion see JCS Pub. 3.

Section III. ORGANIZATION OF ARMY FORCES

63. General

Army forces assigned to a theater of operations include appropriate control headquarters and necessary elements of the several arms and services. The latter consist of close combat, fire support, combat support, air defense, and administrative support elements. These forces are combined in accordance with the requirements of the mission, and the nature of the operation. The characteristics of various army units and the principles of organizing them into efficient forces are discussed hereinafter.

64. Allocation of Forces

The number and type of forces provided subordinate commanders within the theater is dependent on the mission assigned and the nature of the operation. These forces may be assigned, attached or placed in support of the command concerned.

a. Forces for which there is a continuing demand are usually assigned.
b. Forces required for specific tasks or for a limited period of time are normally pooled at higher echelons and attached as required.

c. Forces whose capabilities exceed the requirements of a single command, or whose attachment to a subordinate command would unduly burden the commander thereof, are held under centralized control and placed in support of one or more subordinate commands.

65. Dual Capability

The organization of Army forces must provide the capability to conduct successful operations in either a nuclear or nonnuclear environment without major change in organization and equipment. This dual capability is required to provide flexibility in the application of combat power and to avoid surprise. It is achieved by combining units that have maximum utility in both environments. Such a combination should permit effective maneuver and delivery of fires, adequate combat and administrative support, and effective command and control, in either environment.

66. The Army Group, Field Army, and Corps

a. The army group, the field army, and the corps are the larger Army operational commands. None of these has a fixed composition; each is tailored for the accomplishment of specific missions and each can serve as the nucleus of a joint or combined force.

b. An army group is normally organized to direct the operations of two or more field armies. Its responsibilities are primarily tactical and include planning and allocation of means.

67. The Field Army

The field army directs tactical operations and provides for the administrative support of assigned and attached units. It consists of a headquarters; certain organic troops; a variable number of attached corps; a variable number of divisions normally attached to corps; and other attached combat, combat support, and administrative support units. A field army may be organized with a small number of divisions, without utilizing the corps echelon.

68. The Corps

The corps is essentially a large task force, consisting of a variable number of divisions and other combat and combat support units. Frequently corps will be reinforced by attachment of administrative support elements. A corps so reinforced approaches the capabilities and characteristics of a small field army and is referred to as an independent corps. When operating as part of
a field army, a corps normally will have few administrative support responsibilities, receiving such support directly from field army units.

69. The Division

The division is the basic Army unit of the combined arms and services. Like the army group, field army and corps, the division is tailored for the environment and the accomplishment of specific missions. It has both tactical and administrative functions. The division conducts operations either independently or as part of a larger force, normally the corps. The division achieves flexibility through the tailoring of its components to meet tactical and strategic requirements and through its capability to vary its organization for combat. Exceptionally, it may serve as the framework of a combined or joint force. When organized, Army divisions may be characterized as either infantry, mechanized infantry, armored, or airborne. These divisions are capable of operating independently or in conjunction with each other, in all forms of war, and in either a nuclear or nonnuclear environment.

70. Infantry Divisions

Infantry divisions are versatile organizations capable of sustained ground combat under all conditions of weather and terrain. They are formed by the assignment of predominantly infantry units. They readily conduct air transported operations, some of which are performed with organic Army aircraft. Appropriately reinforced with ground and/or air transport means, infantry divisions can conduct highly mobile operations.

71. Mechanized Infantry Divisions

Mechanized infantry divisions are formed by the assignment of mechanized infantry and armor units, predominantly mechanized infantry units. They are capable of covering extended frontages, relatively deep zones of action, and of operating in widely dispersed formations. The organic vehicles of the subordinate units of the division, together with organic Army aviation, provide a high degree of tactical mobility. They are relatively sensitive to terrain. The bulk and weight of the armored vehicles of mechanized divisions are disadvantages in strategic movement. However, mechanized divisions are organized for deployment to theaters of operation which permit the exploitation of their inherent capabilities. While the shot action and firepower of the mechanized division is normally less than that of an armored division, mechanized divisions are especially suited for operation in conjunction with armored divisions.
72. Armored Divisions

Armored divisions are formed by the assignment of armor and mechanized infantry elements, predominantly armor. They are capable of covering extensive fronts, deep zones of action, and operating in dispersed formations. They are more sensitive to terrain than infantry divisions. The organic track-laying vehicles and wheeled vehicles of armored divisions, together with organic Army aircraft, give them a high degree of tactical mobility. They are primarily powerful offensive forces having some special purpose characteristics. Armor protection afforded by the tanks and personnel carriers is a disadvantage in strategic movement because of the limiting factors of weight and cubage. Once an armored division is deployed, the tactical mobility and protection afforded by these vehicles is a distinct asset.

73. Airborne Divisions

Airborne divisions are specially trained and equipped for airborne assault and air-landed operations. Air transport means must be provided in this role. While they have a greater degree of strategic mobility than other divisions, appropriate reinforcements are required to provide them with capabilities for sustained combat which are comparable to infantry divisions.

74. The Army Missile Command

a. An Army missile command is a mobile organization primarily designed to furnish nuclear fires in support of land forces of allied nations. In addition to its use with allied forces, a missile command may also be employed by the theater or other appropriate command to provide nuclear fires in support of ground forces in designated critical areas. Types of missile commands (air-transportable, medium, and heavy) are characterized by their organic weapons and mobility. A missile command can serve as the framework for a joint force.

b. In fulfilling its mission each missile command performs the functions of fire support, liaison, language interpretation and translation, target acquisition, target analysis, signal communication, intelligence, internal security, and limited logistical support. When a missile command operates with allied forces and removed from U.S. support facilities, augmentation may be required to provide additional logistical, local security, air defense, and intelligence support.

c. The commander of the missile command keeps the supported force commander informed of the capabilities of his command and makes recommendations concerning its employment. Within the limitations prescribed by U.S. and theater policy, the missile command provides fires requested by the supported force commander.
75. **Logistical Commands**

Logistical commands are assigned the primary mission of providing administrative and logistic support to other field forces. Logistical commands vary in size from a small area command to a theater communication zone command. Such commands are normally designated as numbered TOE logistical commands, with subordinate units assigned or attached as directed by the Army component commander of the theater of operations. They may contain combat forces such as air defense and security forces. Logistical commands, when suitably augmented, are adaptable for use as joint or combined headquarters.

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Section IV. **CLOSE COMBAT ELEMENTS**

76. **General**

a. A close combat element is distinguished by its ability to employ fire and maneuver to close with the enemy in combat. Its mission may be to destroy or capture the enemy; seize, control, or deny terrain; protect a larger force; or gain information. It uses both direct and indirect fires; close combat elements are trained, organized, and equipped to operate in direct contact with the enemy.

b. The mission and operational environment dictate the organization of close combat elements of a force. Force composition should be adaptable to a variety of environments without major change. Combat formations may contain close combat elements of a single type, or various combinations of types. The composition of close combat elements within a larger force may be modified by attachment or detachment as required.

c. Close combat elements are normally combined arms teams which include infantry, armor, artillery, and combat engineers. The infantry battalion, the mechanized infantry battalion, the airborne infantry battalion, the tank battalion, and the cavalry squadron are the basic close combat elements from which combat formations are organized.

d. These fighting units take the greatest risks and endure the greatest hardships. Close combat forces require the highest order of leadership, training, discipline, endurance, tenacity, and *esprit de corps*. The relative contribution of close combat forces to the success of the Army in combat far exceeds their proportion of Army strength. All other components of land forces exist to support these forces.

77. **Basic Functions**

A close combat element is designed to perform either an in-
fantry, armor, or cavalry function. These functions may overlap, or a force designed for one function may perform another. A close combat element possesses the following characteristics in varying combinations and degrees:

a. Protection varying from no armor to complete armor.

b. Mobility varying from foot mobility, through complete mechanization, to complete air mobility.

c. Firepower which may vary from small individual weapons, through crew-served weapons of various sizes, to tank armament, vehicular mounted recoilless rifles, and armed aircraft. Close combat elements may have organic or attached low-yield nuclear delivery means.

78. Infantry Function

a. The basic infantry function is to close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver and shock action. The essential characteristic of infantry close combat elements is the ability to fight on foot in all types of terrain and under all conditions of weather, coupled with the ability to move and fight with any means of mobility provided, either organic or attached.

b. Mechanized infantry in conjunction with tanks can perform an armor function. Infantry provided with air transport can conduct airmobile operations. A high degree of training is required to achieve and maintain this versatility.

c. Mechanized infantry and air transported infantry require large amounts of logistical support, principally fuel lubricants and vehicular maintenance. The weight and bulk of the armored personnel carriers of mechanized units restrict their strategic mobility by air movement.

d. Infantry seizes, holds, or controls ground by physical occupation or by the use of firepower. Infantry can maneuver in adverse weather and over terrain impassable to armor. The ability of infantry to move in small, inconspicuous formations in all types of terrain enables it to take advantage of covered routes of approach and variations of the ground to overcome strong positions or to infiltrate the enemy. Without protection infantry is particularly vulnerable to the effects of nuclear weapons. It reduces this vulnerability by avoiding detection through the use of cover, concealment, camouflage, and dispersion and appropriate communication and electronic security measures.

79. Armor Function

a. The basic armor function is to attack, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces by fire, maneuver, and shock action. The essential characteristics of armor close combat elements are organic mecha-
nization, which provides excellent tactical mobility, protection and great striking power. The mounted combat capability of armor close combat elements is derived from its principal weapon—the tank. When infantry is part of an armor close combat element, it is normally mounted in armored carriers and dismounts to fight.

b. Armor can maneuver through fire swept or moderately contaminated areas, deliver an intense volume of destructive firepower, and carry physical and psychological shock to the enemy. It can concentrate or disperse rapidly over extended distances in combat ready formations. Both the organization and the direction of effort of the formations can be changed quickly. Armor requires large amounts of logistical support, principally ammunition, fuel, lubricants, and vehicle maintenance. The weight and bulk of armor vehicles and equipment restrict their strategic mobility in air movement. Although especially suited to offensive operations, particularly exploitation, armor is prepared to fight in all phases of a war, in all forms of combat, and under adverse conditions of terrain and weather.

80. Cavalry Function

a. The basic cavalry functions are reconnaissance and security. The essential requirement for cavalry close combat elements is to achieve favorable mobility in relation to the enemy and to other friendly formations. Although cavalry close combat elements can fight mounted—in air or ground vehicles—or dismounted, their capability for sustained close combat is sacrificed in part in achieving the degree of mobility required for the cavalry function.

b. Cavalry close combat elements can defend, delay, screen wide fronts, maintain contact with the enemy or between friendly forces, and conduct raids deep in the enemy rear. Air mobility extends reconnaissance, increases observation and surveillance capabilities, and enables the transport of lightly armed and equipped patrols. The capabilities of cavalry units make them important information (or field intelligence) gathering means. The command control facilities and the mobility of a cavalry unit make it a sound structure around which to tailor task forces.

Section V. FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENTS

81. General

a. Fire support elements have the primary function of supporting close combat elements by neutralizing, or destroying with fire, those targets most likely to hinder the accomplishment of their mission. These fire support elements provide the commander with a powerful means of rapidly influencing the course of the battle.
They add depth to combat by counterfire and by attacking hostile reserves and rear installations; they isolate the battlefield by restricting the enemy's movement in rear areas and by disrupting his command, control, and transportation facilities.

b. Fire support elements include manned aircraft, guided missiles, free rockets, cannon, and mortars. These elements are capable of delivering high explosive, chemical, incendiary, biological, and nuclear fires, with a great variety of effects.

c. At each echelon of command the plan for employment of fire support must be integrated with the plan for employment of close combat elements. These combined plans must insure the application of appropriate combat power and the responsiveness of fire support to the requirements of the maneuver elements.

82. Types of Fires

a. Nuclear fires provide the commander the most powerful fire means and are available in a wide range of yields. A nuclear air-burst produces blast, thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and may produce induced residual radiation. Surface bursts produce the same effects to a lesser extent and, in addition, produce radioactive fallout, which creates large areas of radiological contamination. Winds in and near the detonation area are governing considerations in the use of surface burst nuclear weapons.

b. High-explosive fires are used separately or to complement nuclear fires. High-explosive fires vary from mortar rounds to aerial bombs of several tons. High-explosive fires produce their effects through blast and fragmentation.

c. Incendiary fires are effective against personnel and many types of materiel and installations. These munitions are used separately or to supplement other fires.

d. Toxic chemical and biological fires are antipersonnel fires. Like high-explosive fires, they can be used to complement nuclear fires or to achieve casualty effects when nuclear fires are not used. Chemical agents can be used to deny areas to the enemy. The use of toxic chemicals and biological agents can produce a wide range of selected effects on personnel without accompanying destruction of material and facilities. Casualties vary from immediate to delayed and from lethal to mild incapacitation. Toxic chemical and biological fires can be employed against personnel well protected from other fires.

83. Fire Delivery Means

a. Guided missiles are capable of delivering all types of fires. They are less vulnerable to weather and enemy countermeasures than are manned aircraft. Guided missiles vary in range, accu-
racy, velocity, and vulnerability to weather and enemy countermeasures.

b. Free rockets are capable of delivering all types of fires. These missiles are generally characterized by higher mobility, less accuracy, and less range than guided missiles.

c. Cannon are capable of delivering all types of fires. They are characterized by flexibility in employment, accuracy, the ability to shift fires quickly, a high rate of sustained fire, and the ability to mass large volumes of fire from dispersed positions under all conditions of weather and terrain. Cannon have restricted mobility in difficult terrain, relatively short ranges, and comparatively heavy tonnage requirements for ammunition.

d. Heavy mortars have capabilities similar to cannon. They differ from cannon primarily in their higher trajectory, shorter minimum and maximum ranges, and greater volume of fire per tube. They are readily moved by air and can be emplaced in positions inaccessible to ground vehicles. They are useful in providing large volumes of fire in support of close combat forces.

e. Manned aircraft are capable of delivering all types of fires. Their ability to attack from any direction and to establish visual contact with the target provides great flexibility in delivery. Aircraft are limited, however, by vulnerability to enemy countermeasures, adverse weather conditions, and delivery errors inherent in some munitions. Since they are not normally under operational control of the ground force commander, they may not be completely responsive to his requirements.

84. Field Artillery

a. Field artillery, organized basically into battalions and separate batteries, provides the principal fire delivery systems of the Army. Its units are equipped with cannon, free rockets, or guided missiles.

b. Within the division the organization of the field artillery is relatively fixed, although it can be varied by attachment of additional units. Support of the close combat elements is provided by placing fire support elements in support of, or attached to, maneuver elements. The division artillery can deliver all types of fire.

c. At corps and army levels there are no organic fire delivery units. Fire support is provided by attaching or assigning the numbers and types of field artillery units required by the situation and the mission. Corps and army artillery may be retained in support of the force as a whole or employed to reinforce subordinate elements of the force. Where the division artillery is insufficient in numbers or type, elements of the corps artillery may be attached to the divisions.
d. Field artillery is more effective when control is centralized at the highest level consistent with its capabilities and the requirements of the mission. When control is thus centralized, maximum flexibility is achieved which provides maximum support to each subordinate element of the command.

e. In mobile operations, particularly when nuclear weapons are employed, the increased dispersion of forces, the quickened tempo of action, and the decentralization of control of maneuver elements may militate against centralized control of field artillery, particularly with respect to weapons of shorter range. As the level of usage of nuclear weapons increases, or the battle becomes more fluid, a corresponding requirement is normally created for attachment of field artillery to maneuver elements.

f. Nonnuclear fires are required in any operational environment, even in the nuclear environment. In such an environment the employment of high explosive, incendiary, chemical and biological fires will complement and expand the effects of nuclear fires, and such fires are also required to provide support and protection for close combat units.

Section VI. COMBAT SUPPORT ELEMENTS

85. General

Although close combat and fire support elements are the primary sources of the combat power of a force, important elements of combat power are provided by combat support forces. Each force structure includes combat support forces appropriate to its requirements.

86. Combat Support and Administrative Support Relationships

Combat support is operational assistance furnished directly to tactical commands in combat. It facilitates the combat task of applying pressure against the enemy and is peculiar to the combat mission. Administrative support is the assistance furnished to sustain elements both in and out of combat. Distinction between the functions of combat support and administrative support units cannot be precise. Certain combat and administrative support units are designed to perform both functions.

87. Allocation of Units

The allocation of combat support units must be carefully controlled to insure economical and efficient use. Normally combat support elements are assigned at force level and either attached to, or placed in support of, subordinate units to perform required tasks. Combat support elements are described in this manual in
terms of their function rather than primarily in terms of branch service.

88. Signal

Signal communication combat support provides electrical, electronic, and messenger communications and related support. Signal communication tasks include provision of signal communications with other commands as well as technical supervision of the signal communication system of the supported force.

89. Engineer

Engineer combat support includes construction, destruction, and other operations which facilitate the offensive effort and increase the defensive strength of field forces. Engineer combat support tasks include support of river-crossing, amphibious, barrier and denial, and tactical cover and deception operations; camouflage activities; construction and maintenance of routes of communication; field engineering tasks such as field fortifications and demolitions; map and aerial photograph reproduction and supply; terrain studies; and surveying.

90. Army Aviation

Army aviation combat support includes observation; airlift for airmobile combat operations; airlift for movement of troops and high priority supplies in the immediate battle area; and air mobility for ground reconnaissance, surveillance, command liaison, and communication. In order to provide maximum flexibility some aviation units are pooled at a higher level and allocated to subordinate units as required.

91. Transportation

Transportation combat support includes surface and air transportation which is provided combat and combat support units in support of tactical operations. This support is accomplished by attaching or placing transportation units in support of subordinate units in accordance with the requirements of the tactical plan. Transportation combat support tasks include surface and airlift for troop movements and movements of supplies in the combat zone by air and surface vehicles.

92. Chemical

Chemical combat support provides technical advice and assistance to commanders and staffs in the employment of, and defense against, chemical and biological agents and radioactive fallout. It includes tactical support in the employment of smoke generating equipment for the production of large protective smoke screens.
93. Military Police

Military police combat support includes traffic control in the forward areas to expedite vehicular movements in accordance with the scheme of maneuver and established priorities, rapid collection and evacuation of prisoners of war and civilian internees from tactical units, and control and direction of refugees to prevent interference with tactical movements.

94. Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare combat support includes electronic countermeasures, electronic counter-countermeasures, and related activities. Electronic warfare measures are designed to interfere with the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum and to facilitate its use by friendly forces.

95. Psychological Operations

Psychological operations combat support includes all measures taken to influence the behavior of enemy troops and hostile, friendly, or neutral foreign populations. The measures include the preparation and dissemination of propaganda and the development and the execution of policies, courses of action, and specific acts designed to obtain, by means of persuasion, the active support of the people in the theater of operations and in contiguous areas to reduce the military power of the enemy.

96. Tactical Cover and Deception

Tactical cover and deception support is rendered by specially equipped and trained units whose primary mission is to assist other units in implementing the tactical cover and deception plan.

97. Intelligence

All individuals and units have an intelligence function. This function is organic to close combat and fire support elements and is inseparable from operations. In addition, intelligence combat support is rendered by specialized intelligence units which provide the commander with information on the enemy, the weather, and the terrain. Military intelligence units provide trained specialists for support of tactical units. Technical intelligence of enemy equipment is provided by technical intelligence teams having responsibility for that type of equipment. Special units provide communication and electronic intelligence.

Section VII. AIR DEFENSE ELEMENTS

98. General

a. The mission of air defense elements is to destroy, nullify,
or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile aircraft, guided missiles, or ballistic missiles after they are airborne.

b. Forces used in the air defense effort consist of air-to-air weapons systems, surface-to-air weapons systems, electronic warfare systems, and information and warning systems.

c. Air defense measures within the area of operations are coordinated by a theater-level joint air defense command. This coordination generally involves the longer range, more complex and more powerful air defense means of all the Services, including the Army. Air defense means designed for local air defense may also be included in this coordination. More often, however, they are made the responsibility of the Service to which they are organic.

99. Air Defense Means

a. Means used for air defense include air defense missiles, electronic warfare means, air defense guns, automatic weapons, and armed aircraft.

b. Air defense missiles are very high-velocity weapons with high kill probability and warhead lethality including a nuclear capability. They provide effective integrated air defense of an area against high- and low-level attack by multiple and single aircraft and guided missiles.

c. Electronic warfare reduces the enemy's effective use of electronic ranging, detection, guidance, fuzing, and radio communication equipment, and aids in deceiving the enemy as to targets in the area of operations.

d. Air defense guns can deliver a heavy volume of accurate fire against aerial targets and can provide local protection of field forces and important ground establishments under all conditions of visibility.

e. Air defense automatic weapons are an important part of the air defense effort in forward areas or in local defense of installations.

f. Armed Air Force, Navy or Marine aircraft in support of ground forces can engage enemy aviation.

100. Organization

The air defense structure of a force integrates all weapons regardless of Service origin to achieve the maximum protection of the force against attack from the air by exploiting the capabilities of all air defense means. Major considerations in the organization for air defense include—

a. Allocating means required for the air defense of the force. This requires a command decision based on consideration of the
risks in view of enemy capabilities, vulnerability of the force, and the mission and plan of operations.

b. Establishing an air defense command. The air defense commander coordinates all air defense activities of the force, and coordinates with air defense elements of other forces and areas.

c. Employing surface-to-air missile weapons systems to provide a coordinated and effective air defense for the entire force. Air defense guns and automatic weapons are employed to augment surface-to-air missile units.

d. Providing air defense capabilities to the subordinate echelon by attaching air defense guns and automatic weapons units. All echelons operate under the protection of the overall air defense system established by the land and area force.

e. The possibility of using certain air defense means in a surface-to-surface role to support the operations of the forces. This dual role facilitates flexibility and economy in force planning.

Section VIII. ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT ELEMENTS

101. Organizations for Administrative Support

a. Table of Organization and Equipment Units. Units organized under tables of organization and equipment are the basic elements provided for administrative support. They vary from cellular teams, through separate companies, to battalions of the various administrative and technical branches of the Army. Separate battalion, group, and logistical command headquarters are provided for the purpose of commanding appropriate groupments of the basic organizations.

b. Area Organizations. Area commands may be established as subordinates of any designated headquarters for the purpose of fixing responsibility for administrative support, including civil affairs operations, with particular attention to such matters as traffic regulation, use of local resources; and rear area security and area damage control. The organizational structure of area commands is tailored to satisfy existing operational requirements. Based on availability, tactical units may be assigned to the area commands for security purposes to meet local requirements. In highly developed locations area commands may also be required as subordinate agencies of tactical units in the combat zone.

c. Intersectional Services. Exceptions to the foregoing are organizations designed to provide a service or product of common necessity or of such importance as to justify and necessitate strong central control throughout the area of operations regardless of area boundaries. Examples of these organizations are: the
communications intersectional service, the POL international service and transportation intersectional service.

102. Control of Administrative Support Activities

The control of administrative support activities within the field forces involves three major considerations: command and technical responsibilities; routine techniques of control; and physical facilities.

a. Command and Responsibility. All commanders are responsible for the control of the administrative support activities and organizations assigned or attached to their commands. This responsibility encompasses the adequacy and timeliness of administrative support provided to their subordinates as well as timely presentation of valid requirements to higher echelons. Generally, an Army corps, not being administrative, only establishes priorities for allocations of administrative support.

b. Techniques of Control. The effectiveness of control of administrative support activities is largely dependent upon the various techniques of communication, packaging, recording, reporting, data analysis, data display and decision making. Knowledge by the commander of current techniques of control of administrative support activities is not only essential for control, but also for the establishment of valid plans and requirements.

c. Facilities. Effective control of logistic support activities within the area of operations is largely dependent upon the facilities available for receipt, storage, protection, and distribution of supplies, and the availability of personnel. Effective control of personnel support activities within the area of operations is largely dependent upon the facilities available for insuring the uninterrupted and rapid movement of personnel replacements to their unit of assignment. These facilities include ports and beaches, airfields, storage sites, railways, waterways, highways, and transportation means. Generally, the more underdeveloped the area of operations, the more the consideration of facilities serves to limit the quantity and quality of administrative support. Similarly, the more dispersed the combat forces and the greater the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy, the less reliance can be placed upon indigenous and fixed facilities for purposes of administrative support. Every alternate means must therefore be exploited and developed to decrease dependence on indigenous and fixed facilities.

103. Characteristics of Administrative Support Elements

Administrative support elements must provide operational flexibility, and the ability to function under nuclear conditions. They
must take advantage of the latest technological advances and managerial aids to increase the support capability.

a. Fixed Capabilities. Administrative support organizations have finite capabilities, usually translatable into time, space, or tonnage limitations. In emergencies and for short periods of time, exceptional support efforts can be demanded and expected.

b. Vulnerability. While generally capable of fighting in a defensive role as infantry, administrative support organizations are highly vulnerable to determined enemy attack. This vulnerability is in direct proportion to the degree of dispersion required for effective operations. On the other hand, concentration of administrative support activities for protection against ground action may reduce their support capability and increase their vulnerability to enemy attack by conventional and nuclear fires. The commander must evaluate the impact of these conflicting conditions and make his dispositions accordingly.

c. Planning Factors. Realistic austere planning factors should be used to determine the requirements for administrative support elements.

Section IX. MUTUAL SUPPORT

104. General

Army field forces operate as a team with other U.S. and Allied forces of the area of operations. Economy and efficiency dictate minimum duplication of effort among Services. Functions which can be performed by one Service for all Services should normally be performed by that Service. Service cooperation is effected in accordance with the policies announced by the unified commander.

105. Army Support

Army support to other forces in the area of operations includes long-range artillery and missile fires, operations against land objectives, rear area security and area damage control, air defense, logistical operations, civil affairs, and other administrative support as directed by the commander.

106. Naval Support

Naval support includes air support from carrier striking forces and land-based Navy or Marine aircraft; air defense by manned aircraft or surface-to-air missiles; lift for amphibious forces; assault shipping; antisubmarine protection, minesweeping, maintenance of sea lines of communication, and surface protection of coastal flanks; naval gunfire and missile support; Marine Corps
combat support and administrative support as directed by the theater commander.

107. Air Force Support

Air Force support includes fire from missiles and manned aircraft; reconnaissance; air defense; airlift, both within and outside of the area of operations; weather service; and administrative support as directed by the theater commander.

Section X. SUPPORT FROM OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

108. State Department

A State Department political advisor is provided for the staff of the senior commander in an area of operations. In situations short of war and in areas where U.S. forces are deployed in peacetime, the Department of State will have primary responsibility for political activities and civil affairs policy.

109. Other Agencies

The senior military commander will also normally receive support from the Central Intelligence Agency, The U.S. Information Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and other governmental agencies as appropriate.
CHAPTER 5
THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

Section I. PRINCIPLES OF WAR

110. General
The principles of war are fundamental truths governing the prosecution of war. Their proper application is essential to the exercise of command and to successful conduct of military operations. These principles are interrelated and, dependent on the circumstances, may tend to reinforce one another or to be in conflict. Consequently, the degree of application of any specific principle will vary with the situation.

111. Principle of the Objective
Every military operation must be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. The ultimate military objective of war is the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces and his will to fight. The objective of each operation must contribute to this ultimate objective. Each intermediate objective must be such that its attainment will most directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. The selection of an objective is based upon consideration of the means available, the enemy, and the area of operations. Every commander must understand and clearly define his objective and consider each contemplated action in light thereof.

112. Principle of the Offensive
Offensive action is necessary to achieve decisive results and to maintain freedom of action. It permits the commander to exercise initiative and impose his will upon the enemy; to set the pace and determine the course of battle; to exploit enemy weaknesses and rapidly changing situations, and to meet unexpected developments. The defensive may be forced on the commander, but it should be deliberately adopted only as a temporary expedient while awaiting an opportunity for offensive action or for the purpose of economizing forces on a front where a decision is not sought. Even on the defensive the commander seeks every opportunity to seize the initiative and achieve decisive results by offensive action.

113. Principle of Mass
Superior combat power must be concentrated at the critical time and place for a decisive purpose. Superiority results from the
proper combination of the elements of combat power. Proper application of the principle of mass, in conjunction with the other principles of war, may permit numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive combat superiority.

114. Principle of Economy of Force

Skillful and prudent use of combat power will enable the commander to accomplish the mission with minimum expenditure of resources. This principle is the corollary of the principle of mass. It does not imply husbanding but rather the measured allocation of available combat power to the primary task as well as secondary tasks such as limited attacks, the defense, deception or even retrograde action in order to insure sufficient combat power at the point of decision.

115. Principle of Maneuver

Maneuver is an essential ingredient of combat power. It contributes materially in exploiting successes and in preserving freedom of action and reducing vulnerability. The object of maneuver is to dispose a force in such a manner as to place the enemy at a relative disadvantage and thus achieve results which would otherwise be more costly in men and materiel. Successful maneuver requires flexibility in organization, administrative support, and command and control. It is the antithesis of permanence of location and implies avoidance of stereotyped patterns of operation.

116. Principle of Unity of Command

The decisive application of full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. While coordination may be attained by cooperation, it is best achieved by vesting a single commander with the requisite authority.

117. Principle of Security

Security is essential to the preservation of combat power. Security is achieved by measures taken to prevent surprise, preserve freedom of action, and deny the enemy information of friendly forces. Since risk is inherent in war, application of the principle of security does not imply undue caution and the avoidance of calculated risk. Security frequently is enhanced by bold seizure and retention of the initiative, which denies the enemy the opportunity to interfere.

118. Principle of Surprise

Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By surprise, success out of proportion to the effort expended may be
obtained. Surprise results from striking an enemy at a time, place, and in a manner for which he is not prepared. It is not essential that the enemy be taken unaware but only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed, deception, application of unexpected combat power, effective intelligence and counterintelligences, to include communication and electronic security, and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

119. Principle of Simplicity

Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Direct, simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. If other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferred.

Section II. COMBAT POWER

120. General

a. Combat power is a combination of the physical means available to a commander and the moral strength of his command. It is significant only in relation to the combat power of the opposing forces. In applying the principles of war, the development and application of combat power are essential to decisive results.

b. The development of combat power relates directly to the principles of mass and economy of force. The application of combat power is qualified by the intelligent application of the remaining principles of war.

c. The degree of combat power attained reflects the commander's imaginative planning and leadership and the organization, training and discipline of his forces as well as their morale and esprit. The successful application of combat power requires vigorous execution.

Section III. RELATED FACTORS

121. General

There are certain factors which bear directly on combat power. When properly applied, and in consideration of the principles of war, these factors insure full development and decisive application of combat power.

122. Terrain

a. Terrain is an important factor in the application of combat power. Proper utilization of terrain provides observation while
denying this opportunity to the enemy; it creates favorable opportunities for the employment of weapons to generate maximum combat power; it provides cover and assists in concealing the activities of the friendly force, thereby contributing to its security; it provides the lines of communication essential to decisive maneuver and the support thereof; it assists in the development of mass through economy of force; it provides favorable avenues of approach for offensive operations; it can force the enemy to operate in unfavorable areas. Full utilization of terrain permits the commander to control the battle and to make the enemy fight on his terms.

b. The significance of terrain varies with the echelon of command and the nature of the operation. The commander evaluates the terrain in consideration of his mission and seeks to turn it to his advantage at the expense of the enemy.

c. The control of high ground permits ground observation over the surrounding area and denies such observation to the enemy. It provides favorable positions for line-of-sight weapons and is also significant in view of the line-of-sight characteristics of modern communications and electronic surveillance equipment. The occupation of high ground places the friendly force in a favorable tactical position in relation to the enemy. Control of high ground is not necessarily dependent on its occupation. Under suitable conditions, high ground may be neutralized or denied the enemy by fire or by the employment of screening agents.

d. Major barriers such as rivers, lakes, mountains, forests and swamps exert a significant influence on military operations. Cross compartments interfere with the progress of offensive operations and generally favor the defense. Obstacles, including those artificially created, may form lines of resistance and permit defense with minimum forces, while forcing the attacker to develop greater relative combat power. Conversely, favorable avenues of approach facilitate offensive action and permit the application of combat power through maneuver.

123. Climate and Weather

Climate and weather have a significant effect on all types of military operations. Weather affects observation, trafficability, control, performance of personnel, functioning of materiel, air support and the range and effects of weapons. Both climate and weather may affect logistical requirements. As in the case of terrain, the commander seeks to take advantage of weather in developing and applying combat power in the pursuit of his objectives.

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124. Tactical Cover and Deception

a. Tactical cover and deception contribute to security and surprise, and enhance the likelihood of operational success by misleading the enemy, and causing him to react in a manner advantageous to the friendly force. They may be used to compensate for relatively inferior combat power to permit economical use of men, materiel, and time. The commander employs tactical cover and deception to disguise or conceal his true dispositions, capabilities and intentions.

b. Tactical cover and deception plans are an integral part of all operational planning. In developing such plans the commander must visualize and understand the enemy viewpoint and he must take into account the impact on his operations should the deception fail. The plans adopted must be such that if unsuccessful they will not cause the operation to fail. Coordination of tactical cover and deception plans with higher, adjacent and lower units is essential to insure against compromise of other operational or deception plans.

c. For detailed discussion of tactical cover and deception see FM 31-40.

125. Interdiction

a. The purpose of interdiction is to deny or hinder the enemy use of areas or routes. Successful interdiction restricts enemy movement and interferes with the command and control of his forces. It hinders or prevents enemy movement into, out of, or within the commanders area of interest. It contributes to security by preventing sudden and unfavorable changes in relative combat power.

b. Interdiction is accomplished by the use of fires, combat troops, guerrilla forces and by barrier and denial operations. Chemical agents and high yield nuclear weapons provide an area interdiction capability against large, poorly defined, targets.

c. A successful interdiction effort is characterized by thorough and imaginative planning, timely and accurate intelligence and coordinated execution. Continuous surveillance of the area of interdiction must be maintained to assess the effectiveness of the effort and to develop new targets. The enemy may be expected to adopt measures designed to thwart the interdiction effort. The availability of resources and the capability of weapons systems will rarely permit complete interdiction. The application of resources to interdiction must be weighed against the overall requirements of the mission.

d. Interdiction plans must be designed to insure timely contribution to the accomplishment of the mission and must con-
centrate on targets which have a significant effect on the combat power of the enemy forces directly opposing the command concerned. Each successive echelon focuses its interdiction effort at a greater range. Higher echelons integrate and expand the interdiction effect of subordinate elements.

126. Coordination and Control

a. The effective application of combat power requires full coordination of effort throughout all echelons. Coordination is a basic function of command, and is particularly significant in deriving full advantage from fire and maneuver. Coordination of fire support insures the maximum benefit from available firepower resources and enhances the effectiveness of maneuver.

b. Coordination of effort requires adequate means of control. The basic means for control are adequate secure communications, timely orders, and effective command facilities.

c. Communication plans must be flexible and capable of supporting maximum operational requirements. Reliance on a single means of communication must be avoided.

d. Orders must be timely, simple, clear and concise. Mission type orders are used to the greatest practicable extent, but should provide the commanders concept, or intent, to insure that subordinate commanders, acting on their own initiative, direct their efforts to the attainment of the overall objective. Coordination between units is achieved by prescribing boundaries, limiting points and objectives. Liaison officers are used when required to insure that orders are understood or that coordination is effected.

e. Command posts provide the physical facilities to exercise control and form the nerve centers of all units. Command posts must be mobile, capable of continuous operation and secure from enemy action. The location of command posts must facilitate communication with higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters.

127. Vulnerability and Risk

a. Vulnerability is the susceptibility of a force to damage by enemy action. The extensive area of destruction resulting from nuclear weapon attack requires special attention to the reduction of vulnerability. Vulnerability is reduced by measures such as deception, dispersion, cover, concealment, movement and speed of reaction, electronic countermeasures, air defense, and counterbattery fires. However, measures to reduce vulnerability to one form of attack may increase vulnerability to other forms of attack and may detract from the effectiveness of the force. Dispersion increases vulnerability to infiltration. Mobility and the offensive or effective means of reducing vulnerability.
b. Risk is inherent in war and is involved in every mission. Risk also is related to gain; normally, greater gain involves greater risk. Risk is common to both action and inaction. Part of risk is the uncontrollable element of chance. In a nuclear war the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the magnitude of both risk and gain are multiplied and the consequences of mistakes are greater. Although the commander avoids unnecessary risks, the accomplishment of the mission is the most important consideration. Each course of action is carefully evaluated in terms of relative vulnerability and risk. The commander must recognize risks to be assumed by subordinate commanders in accomplishing their missions. If the risk is unacceptable, he must revise the plan.

Section IV. INTELLIGENCE

128. Intelligence Effort

Intelligence is knowledge of an enemy or an area of operations with the conclusions drawn therefrom. It includes current and future enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. The commander's decision is strongly influenced by intelligence. Intelligence and operations must be integrated. The intelligence effort of the command must provide timely intelligence required to make decisions, prepare plans, conduct operations, and avoid surprise. Priority is given in the intelligence effort to those aspects of the situation which represent the greatest prospect of success and the greatest threat to the accomplishment of the mission. Systematic procedures and effective communications are essential for collection and use of intelligence. Intelligence is of importance to all elements of the command and to higher and adjacent commands.

129. Combat Intelligence

Combat intelligence is knowledge of the enemy, the weather, and the geographic features used in the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Combat intelligence seeks to reduce the unknown aspects of the enemy and the area of operations. It contributes to accuracy of evaluation of risks and successful application of combat power. Logical conclusions concerning the area of operations and enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities permit the determination of their probable effect on courses of action.

130. Strategic Intelligence

Strategic intelligence is that knowledge pertaining to the capabilities and vulnerabilities of foreign nations which is required by national planners for an adequate national defense in time of
peace and forms the basis for projected military operations in time of war. Strategic intelligence sources may provide information of particular significance in tactical operations. Strategic intelligence and combat intelligence are closely related; the primary difference being in level of production and utilization. Strategic intelligence is oriented on national objectives and is usually produced slowly by study and assembly of a large volume of detailed information. Combat intelligence usually involves rapid evaluation and interpretation of current information.

131. Counterintelligence and Communication and Electronic Security

Counterintelligence and communication and electronic security are the denial of information to the enemy. They include measures to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's intelligence collection effort. They are a fundamental requirement for surprise and security. All personnel must be thoroughly trained in the importance of counterintelligence and communication security, and the measures contributing to their effectiveness.

132. Target Acquisition

Acquisition of targets is one of the more important intelligence tasks. All agencies and means are used in coordination to obtain accurate, timely intelligence in sufficient detail to permit target analysis and the effective employment of weapons. A knowledge of enemy doctrine, weapons and practices is particularly valuable in indicating areas for target acquisition effort.

133. Reconnaissance

a. Reconnaissance is the effort of field agencies directed toward obtaining information through observation of the enemy, weather, terrain, and other environmental factors of the area of operations. It is also directed toward locating or verifying the locations of friendly units. Accurate knowledge of the location of all friendly troops operating within the commander's zone of responsibility is necessary for effective employment of complex weapon systems.

b. Most units have reconnaissance capabilities; however, certain elements are specifically organized for reconnaissance operation. To be fully effective, reconnaissance operations require freedom of maneuver and a favorable mobility differential over the enemy. Reconnaissance efforts are directed toward gaining and maintaining contact. Information is obtained by stealth, if possible; however, it is frequently necessary to fight to get information. Reconnaissance operations are facilitated by use of electronic equipment.

c. Division and higher units normally are supported by surveil-
lance units for search, intercept, and monitoring of enemy electronic means. These units extend the depth of observation and contribute significantly to target acquisition.

134. Reconnaissance by Fire or Force

Reconnaissance by fire or in force may be used when stealth is not essential. Reconnaissance by fire is used against suspected enemy locations to destroy camouflage and cause the enemy to reveal himself by movement or by returning the fire; it has the important advantage of speed. Reconnaissance in forces in an attack by a sizable force to discover and test the enemy's strength, dispositions, or composition. The commander directing such an operation must be prepared to exploit success. He must, however, consider that either the reconnaissance in force or by fire may disclose his own dispositions and provoke a strong enemy reaction.

135. Combat Surveillance

Combat surveillance, a part of combat intelligence, involves a continuous, all-weather, day and night, systematic watch over the battle area to provide timely information for tactical ground operations. It involves the systematic observation of air, surface, or subsurface areas by visual, electronic, photographic, or other means for combat intelligence purposes. Combat surveillance is the integration of all available means of battlefield surveillance including air reconnaissance. It is capable of rapid and continuous coverage and is characterized by an immediate responsiveness to the needs of the tactical commander.

136. Air Reconnaissance

Air reconnaissance is the search by day and night for information of military significance by drones, aircraft, and missiles equipped to conduct visual, electronic, and photographic observation. Air reconnaissance is capable of providing rapid coverage of large areas; however, it may be severely limited by enemy defensive measures and weather conditions. An effective intelligence system requires the availability of timely air reconnaissance responsive to the requirement of each echelon.

137. Counterreconnaissance

Counterreconnaissance includes all measures taken to deny or neutralize enemy reconnaissance. Offensive counterreconnaissance seeks out and destroys the enemy reconnaissance forces. Defensive counterreconnaissance denies, by combat if necessary, enemy access to certain areas. Counterreconnaissance forces are echeloned in depth and oriented and adjusted to friendly dispositions.
Section V. SUBSIDIARY AND SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

138. General
There are certain subsidiary operations which are significant in relation to all types of military operations. These subsidiary operations are designed to support the basic operation and to contribute to the development and application of combat power.

139. Psychological Operations

a. General. The military commander employs psychological operations as a coordinated element of strategy for the purpose of influencing the behavior of foreign people in ways which will help accomplish his mission while conforming to and supporting national policies. The lines of persuasion employed must be carefully selected to contribute to the military objective and must be consistent, timely, and credible. Accordingly, they are coordinated with other agencies of government and with related activities of the command, including cover and deception, counterintelligence, communication security, censorship, troop information, character guidance, public information, community relations, and civil affairs. The effects of psychological operations are cumulative and depend on judicious execution in coordination with tactical operations of a carefully planned campaign.

b. Psychological Actions and Propaganda. Psychological operations consist of actions reinforced by propaganda. Psychological actions include specific acts, policies, courses of action, rallies, meetings, or demonstrations and may be taken by any element of the command. Propaganda is prepared and disseminated by propaganda units through loudspeakers, leaflets, periodicals, local radio, television, and educational and entertainment media. Covert propaganda is disseminated through front organizations and agents.

c. Capabilities and Limitations. Psychological operations reduce the morale and combat efficiency of enemy troops and promote dissidence and defection. They support the cover and deception plan. They are employed to abet and coordinate resistance against a hostile regime, to promote cooperation of neutrals, to sustain the morale of allies, and to counter enemy subversion and propaganda. They cannot by their own force accomplish military objectives; they can only support them. Their effect is limited by security requirements, policy restrictions, inadequacies of communication media, language barriers, the prejudices of the audience, and enemy countermeasures. Many of these limitations are overcome by foresighted measures based on effective specialized intelligence and evaluation.
d. Support of the Field Army. Psychological operations in support of the field army are designed primarily to reduce the combat effectiveness of enemy forces and are based on its immediate response to the situation. Operations are mobile and decentralized and provide direct support to tactical units. Opportunities determined through the continuous evaluation of intelligence are quickly exploited. Close cooperation and coordination are required between operations, intelligence, and psychological operations staffs to insure maximum effectiveness.

e. Support of Unconventional Warfare Operations. Psychological operations support all phases of unconventional warfare. Prior to the infiltration of special forces teams they originate outside the planned operational area and are employed to create and develop resistance. Resistance elements are then prepared for integration with special forces teams and are given dignity and status through emphasis of the righteousness and legality of their cause. Following the infiltration of special forces teams these operations are supplemented by the psychological operations of guerrilla forces. Specially trained propaganda teams are infiltrated to assist operations of resistance elements. During exploitation and consolidation, psychological operations insure an orderly transition, culminating in the demobilization of guerrilla forces and the establishment of an acceptable regime.

f. Support of Civil Affairs. Civil affairs are supported by consolidation psychological operations which promote maximum cooperation among the civil populace. In areas subject to enemy subversion, consolidation psychological operations in support of a friendly government are one of the first effective means that the military commander has for maintaining stability. During hostilities they help to prevent espionage, sabotage, and enemy unconventional warfare operations.

g. Situations Short of War. In situations short of war, psychological operations are a primary means for achieving the force objective. Emphasis is placed on the unobtrusive demonstration of military power, efficiency, good will, and sincere interest in mutual security. Psychological operations are undertaken in close coordination with the civilian agencies of government and public information media. Indigenous military forces are trained and assisted in operations designed to counter enemy subversion and gain public support.

140. Electronic Operations

a. Electronic warfare is an integral part of operations. Used offensively, it can reduce the enemy commander's control by impairing or destroying his means of communication at a critical time, and can mislead him by transmitting deceptive data. Used
defensively, electronic warfare reduces effectiveness of enemy communication surveillance means. Electronic warfare should be controlled at a level capable of weighting the benefits derived against the interference with friendly electronic systems. The long-range benefits derived from intelligence obtained by friendly electronic devices may outweigh the immediate tactical advantages of jamming enemy communications. Intimate coordination is required between intelligence and operations.

b. The commander employs electronic warfare to support combat operations by using electronic countermeasures, electronic deception, and electronic counter-countermeasures. Electronic counter-countermeasures facilitate employment of friendly electronic systems and reduce their vulnerability to enemy jamming. Active countermeasures include jamming or deception of electronically controlled guided missiles, electronic fuzes, radio communications, blind bombing radar, countermortar radar, aids to navigation, and other electronic systems. The increasing importance of electronic equipment to military operations requires protection of friendly electronic systems and interference with enemy systems.

141. Barrier and Denial Operations

a. General. A barrier is a coordinated series of obstacles designed to canalize or delay movement of an opposing force. A denial operation is designed to prevent or hinder enemy occupation of or benefit from areas having tactical or strategic value. Barrier and denial plans are incorporated into operations plans.

b. Barriers.

1) Natural obstacles are used to the maximum extent possible during the conduct of tactical operations. Natural obstacles are augmented by artificial obstacles to increase delay and canalization of the enemy and to produce a favorable mobility differential.

2) On the battlefield there will seldom be sufficient resources or time to construct massive barrier systems throughout an area of operations. Rather, barrier operations will be directed toward placing obstacles across the most likely enemy avenues of approach and upon certain key terrain to reduce the enemy's mobility and canalize him into areas where his destruction by fire and maneuver will be facilitated.

3) Mines, engineer equipment, atomic demolition munitions, and chemicals provide an increased capability for rapidly developing and improving obstacles to fit the needs of the commander.

4) Barriers are integrated with the scheme of maneuver and fire support plans to—
(a) Make the most efficient use of available barrier resources in support of the tactical operation.
(b) Avoid interference with friendly tactical operations.
(c) Cover barriers with fire to make them fully effective.
(5) Barrier construction may require extensive logistical support. Planned barrier must be economical of achievement in terms of manpower, materiels, transportation, and time. Within the rules of land warfare, civilian labor may be used to construct barriers.
(6) Proper use of obstacles may produce a favorable mobility differential.

142. Denial Operations

a. The theater commander establishes policy to govern denial operations to support offensive and defensive operations. Denial operations may vary in scope from "scorched earth" to those effecting a temporary limitation upon enemy use of an area or facility.
b. The theater commander's denial policy is implemented by subordinate commanders. Subordinate units execute assigned denial operations in accordance with and as a part of the theater commander's overall denial plan.
CHAPTER 6
CONDUCT OF BATTLE

Section I. GENERAL

143. Purpose of Battle

a. Battle is fought by a combination of offensive and defensive action with the ultimate purpose of defeating the enemy. In their broadest sense, the terms offense and defense encompass the entire range of tactical operations in which combat power is employed.

b. The commander selects that combination of offensive and defensive action which will most effectively accomplish his mission. A command may conduct an offensive even though large portions of the force are employed defensively. Conversely, the defense depends for success on the use of a part of the force offensively. Under fluid, dispersed battlefield conditions operations may have both an offensive and defensive purpose.

144. Scope

This chapter presents the fundamentals of both offensive and defensive operations. Paragraphs 143 through 188 deal with non-nuclear operations and operations under intermediate scale use of nuclear weapons (par. 146). Paragraphs 189 through 192 present operational doctrine for the unrestricted scale of use of nuclear weapons.

145. Comparison of Nonnuclear and Nuclear Operations

The conduct of both nuclear and nonnuclear operations is based upon the application of combat power in accordance with the principles of war. Nuclear operations may differ considerably from nonnuclear. The difference arises primarily from the increased combat power provided by nuclear weapons, the sharply increased vulnerability of troops and installations in the nuclear environment, and from the measures required to counteract this increased vulnerability to include increased security requirements for nuclear weapons and their associated delivery and support units. In general the difference is reflected in the following areas:

a. Areas of Responsibility and Interest. In order to offset their vulnerability it is imperative that forces operating in a nuclear environment be dispersed to minimize the presentation of remunerative targets susceptible to attack by nuclear weapons. This creates the requirement for the assignment of increased areas of responsibility. In such an environment the increased potency of combat
power, the corresponding vulnerability of the enemy, improved control systems and enhanced mobility permit forces to operate effectively in these increased areas of responsibility. The increased areas of responsibility broaden the areas of interest. In a non-nuclear environment with its attendant reduction in available firepower, the vulnerability of forces is less, the area that can be controlled is smaller, and greater concentration of forces is required. Consequently the areas of responsibility and interest are less.

b. Dispersion. The dispersion of tactical units and control and administrative installations must be governed by the operational environment. The dispersed formations required by the nuclear environment will engender defeat in detail. While dispersion is generally proportional to the level of employment of nuclear weapons, there are limiting factors, which include—

(1) The assigned mission.
(2) Control of subordinate units.
(3) Adequacy of combat intelligence.
(4) Responsiveness of the logistic system.
(5) Weather and terrain.
(6) Mobility of forces.
(7) Nature and disposition of enemy forces.

c. Mobility. In the nuclear environment combat forces must be highly mobile in order to reduce vulnerability, facilitate control of extended areas of responsibility, provide mutual support, maintain freedom of action, and exploit the effects of nuclear fires. The enhanced mobility required by the nuclear environment also has application in the nonnuclear environment, although frequently not to the same degree. The reduced fire power of the latter environment, together with the more restricted areas of responsibility and the greater concentration of forces, may not present the frequent opportunities for deep, exploiting maneuver that characterize the nuclear environment.

d. Fire and Maneuver. In the nonnuclear environment and in nuclear environment wherein nuclear weapons are employed with selectivity and at the lower levels of usage, both fire and maneuver receive equal consideration by the commander in determining the appropriate combat power to be applied. Even though a major portion of the combat power to be exerted may be in the form of nuclear fires, maneuver is required to exploit their effects and insure favorable decision. As the level of employment of nuclear weapons rises, that is to say, as the frequency of employment and the yields selected become greater, the effects of these weapons will begin to saturate the battle area. Close combat elements will then find it increasingly difficult to maneuver decisively without prohibitive losses. Because of the destructiveness involved, situa-
tions of this type will be of relatively short duration. Success will accrue to the combatant who can first reconstitute an effective maneuver and exploitation force.

e. Tempo of Operations. The combination of nuclear firepower and enhanced mobility will significantly accelerate the tempo of operations in the nuclear environment. Engagement of forces will be of shorter duration, characterized by extreme violence. Deep, decisive objectives will be sought, causing the battle to be waged in great depth. In nonnuclear operations the tempo will be more deliberate; engagements that would be decided in a matter of hours in the nuclear environment may require several days.

f. Organization for Combat. The factors of dispersion, mobility, vulnerability, and tempo of operations affect the organization for combat. In the nonnuclear environment greater centralization of control is practicable, particularly the control of fire support and combat support. The commander can exert greater personal direction of the course of battle, giving more deliberate and detailed instructions to his subordinates, both before and during operations. In a nuclear environment the opposite will be true. Combat forces will tend to operate semi-independently under mission-type orders. Direct support type fire units will normally be attached to close combat elements. The control of combat support units will be similarly decentralized to a significant degree. Although modern communication systems will permit the interchange of essential orders and information, the commander must place greater reliance upon the initiative, integrity, courage, and professional ability of his subordinate commanders.

g. Casualties. In operations where nuclear weapons are employed, commanders and staffs at all echelons must anticipate sudden, severe, personnel losses within very short periods of time. These losses may be of such extent as to cause the combat effectiveness of both combatants to be temporarily destroyed. Thus Army forces must be trained and indoctrinated in rapid reorganization and in the treatment of mass casualties with minimal professional medical assistance.

146. Scales of Usage of Nuclear Weapons

To provide a framework for subsequent discussion of the conduct of battle the terms intermediate scale of use of nuclear weapons and unrestricted scale of use of nuclear weapons are used. These terms are necessarily relative, as there is no sharp differentiation between the two.

a. The term intermediate scale of use of nuclear weapons is used to denote a range of operational environments wherein the employment of nuclear weapons, in both quantity and yield, is
selective and wherein the effects therefrom do not reach a level that will materially reduce the ability of combat units to maneuver effectively.

b. The term *unrestricted scale of use of nuclear weapons* is used to depict a level of employment of nuclear weapons that is sufficiently high to degrade appreciably the effectiveness of maneuver by combat units.

147. **Toxic Chemical and Biological Munitions**

a. The capabilities of chemical and biological munitions and the tactics and techniques of their employment are covered in FM 3-5.

b. Toxic chemical and biological munitions may be effectively employed in either the nonnuclear or nuclear environment. They are an additional means available to the commander in accomplishing his mission.

1 Biological weapons, primarily because of the delay occurring between employment and effect, have greater applicability against strategic targets than against tactical ones. These delayed effects may be appropriate in tactical operations, however, where the effects can be coordinated with future operations, biological munitions may also be appropriate in retrograde operations.

2 Toxic chemical munitions, which produce an immediate reaction against unprotected personnel, have considerable applicability in tactical operations. They may permit the seizure of physical facilities intact and without the widespread destruction that results from nuclear and high-explosive fires. These munitions may be of particular applicability in the nuclear environment when it is desired to inflict mass personnel casualties and, at the same time, avoid the obstacles that would be created by nuclear blast and contamination. Persistent chemical concentrations may be effectively employed in barrier and denial operations.

c. Chemical and biological munitions have the greatest effect when their employment is coordinated with the scheme of maneuver, other fires, and special operational plans such as barrier plans. Such employment fosters the full exploitation of the combined effects of fire and maneuver.

d. The employment of chemical and biological munitions introduces additional factors into the planning process.

1 Local weather conditions, particularly wind speed and direction have considerable bearing upon the decision to employ such munitions.
(2) Troops must be prepared to react promptly in exploitation of the effects of these munitions.
(3) Special intelligence effort and protective measures are required to reduce the effectiveness of enemy chemical and biological attack.
(4) Where protective clothing and equipment is required by troops for long periods of time, their combat effectiveness is lowered.
(5) Airmobile operations are of increasing importance as a means of traversing contaminated areas.

Section II. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

148. General

Offensive operations are those undertaken to carry the battle to the enemy; the initiative lies with the attacker. The purpose of offensive operations is to accomplish one or more of the following:

a. Destroy enemy forces.
b. Deprive the enemy of required resources.
c. Seize territory or terrain.
d. Develop enemy dispositions.
e. Divert the enemy's attention from other areas.

149. Considerations Affecting Offensive Operations

a. The commander visualizes offensive operations in terms of time and space. Analysis of the situation indicates the particular combination of these factors offering the highest assurance of success. This analysis also includes an evaluation of the pertinent elements of combat power. In offensive operations, the most decisive results are obtained by strong, mobile exploiting forces. Offensive missions frequently have terrain objectives, although an enemy force may be designated as an objective. To reach an objective, a force goes through, over, or around the enemy.

b. A nuclear environment favors the use of small, highly mobile combat forces moving on the ground, through the air, or both. These forces make every effort to maintain their forward movement. Enemy forces are destroyed by fire, bypassed, contained, or where necessary reduced by close combat. The plan of attack is designed either to divide the enemy force and defeat it in detail or to concentrate it to an extent where it can be destroyed by nuclear weapons. Should it become necessary for the commander to concentrate his force, he does so only at the decisive point, in close proximity to the enemy, and for the shortest practicable time. Under a nonnuclear environment greater concentration of maneuver forces may be acceptable.
To insure rapid execution of the attack, the commander exploits fully all means of tactical mobility. He selects the appropriate combination of ground vehicles and aircraft necessary to provide the desired degree of flexibility in his scheme of maneuver.

d. In situations created by opposing, maneuvering forces seeking a tactical advantage, the commander must react with maximum speed. These situations may develop in the advance to contact, the meeting engagement, the reconnaissance in force, and the exploitation. Other operations, such as the attack of an organized or fortified position, permit a more deliberate, planned, and coordinated attack, undertaken after thorough reconnaissance, methodical evaluation of relative combat power, acquisition and development of targets, and analysis of all other factors affecting the situation. Although such deliberate attacks are frequent in nonnuclear warfare, they occur less frequently in nuclear operations because of the vulnerability of the force during the preparatory period.

150. MANEUVER IN THE OFFENSE

In offensive operations the attacking forces are maneuvered to gain an advantage over the enemy and to close with him and to destroy him. The forms of maneuver in the attack are the envelopment, the turning movement, the penetration, and the frontal attack. The attacking force frequently uses a combination of these forms; for example, one echelon of the force may attack frontally while another is making an envelopment.

a. Envelopment. In an envelopment the main effort is directed toward the seizure of an objective in the enemy's rear that will cut his routes of escape and subject him to the risk of destruction in his present location. This is accomplished by striking an assailable flank and by avoiding his main strength en route to the objective. A secondary attack pins down the enemy to prevent his escape and reduce his capability of reacting against the main effort by forcing him to fight in two directions simultaneously. In some situations the secondary attack also deceives the enemy as to the location or existence of the main attack. The envelopment is facilitated by relatively superior mobility and by surprise. Aircraft are particularly valuable in increasing the mobility of the enveloping echelon. The success of an envelopment is dependent to a large extent upon the ability of the secondary attack to fix the enemy. Where the situation permits a choice in the type of maneuver to be employed by the main attack, the envelopment is usually preferable to either the penetration or the frontal attack since it offers a better opportunity of applying combat power to the greatest advantage. A variation of the envelopment is the double envelopment. In this evolution the attacker seeks to pass simultaneously
around both flanks of the enemy. The attacking force must have superior combat power and mobility; precise coordination and timing are required. Deficiency in any of these factors may subject the attacking force to defeat in detail.

b. Turning Movement. In the turning movement the attacking force seeks to pass around the enemy, avoiding his main force, to secure an objective deep in the hostile rear. The purpose of this maneuver is to force the enemy to abandon his position or divert major forces to meet the threat. He is then destroyed at a time and place of the attacker's choosing. As in the case of the envelopment a secondary attack is required to fix the enemy. Since the force executing the turning movement is usually out of supporting distance of other elements of the force, it must be sufficiently mobile and strong to operate independently. Air transport is particularly applicable for movement and initial support of this maneuver. Mobility superior to that of the enemy, as well as secrecy and deception, enhances the opportunity for successful accomplishment of a turning movement.

c. Penetration. In the penetration the main attack passes through the principal defensive position of the enemy. The purpose of the maneuver is to destroy the continuity of the enemy force, divide it, and defeat it in detail. After the enemy position has been ruptured, additional forces are committed as necessary to widen the breach, destroy the defending garrison, and exploit the initial success by seizing vital objectives deep in the hostile rear. A successful penetration requires the concentration of superior combat power at the point selected for breaching the enemy defenses. It is appropriate where strong fire support is available and where the enemy is over-extended, or when his flanks are unassailable. If sufficient preponderance of combat power is available, a multiple penetration may be launched. In such cases the exploitation forces may converge upon a single, deep objective, or they may seize independent objectives. Where it is impracticable to sustain more than one penetration, the one enjoying the greatest success is exploited.

d. Frontal Attack. The frontal attack strikes the enemy all along his front. It is employed to overrun and destroy a weaker enemy or as a secondary effort in conjunction with other forms of maneuver.

151. Infiltration

a. Infiltration is a technique of movement used in conjunction with the several forms of maneuver. The attacking force moves by individuals or small groups to a previously designated assembly area in the enemy rear. During the movement these individuals
and small groups seek to avoid detection and engagement by the enemy. By this means a strong force may frequently be deployed into the enemy rear without being subjected as an entity to decisive enemy action during movement. Once assembled the force proceeds in the execution of its assigned mission. Infiltration is an important means of achieving surprise.

b. The dispersed pattern of a nuclear battlefield will present frequent opportunities for movement of units by infiltration. In such an environment movement by infiltration is an important technique for reducing the vulnerability of troops to nuclear attack.

152. Night Maneuver

a. Night attacks and night movement are normal operations that offer an excellent opportunity for deception and surprise. The principles of the daylight attack apply; however, maintaining direction and control require special measures. The degree of success attained by night attacks is largely dependent on the training and conditioning of troops, prior reconnaissance, simplicity of the plan, effective control measures, and the enemy's night surveillance capability. Infiltration can be particularly effective in night operations. The objectives for a night attack are generally limited in depth by the difficulty in maintaining control, particularly after the enemy has been alerted. When nuclear weapons are employed, the devastating effect upon enemy defenses may permit the assignment of deeper objectives.

b. Battlefield illumination and surveillance equipment increase the efficiency of units operating at night and facilitate the employment of supporting fires.

c. When friendly nuclear fires are used at night, adequate warning is required to reduce the problems of dazzle and loss of dark adaptation. These fires should be carefully coordinated with the operations of other friendly units. Coordination must be effected to integrate nuclear fires and the scheme of maneuver. This will assist in preventing the creation of obstacles to the maneuvering elements or the alteration of terrain features selected as control measures. Quick-acting toxic chemicals can be used for casualty effect on targets where creation of obstacles by nuclear fires is unacceptable. Enemy use of nuclear weapons during the attack may cause dazzle or loss of night vision by friendly troops.

153. Planning

a. Planning for an attack, like other operations, is initiated by the development of estimates of the situation by the staff. These are followed by the commander's estimate, his concept of operations, and other guidance for the development of the plan.
b. The mission is the governing factor in the preparation of estimates and subsequently the operation plan. All elements of both must be continuously compared with the mission to insure that the details of the operation contribute to its accomplishment. The mission may be to seize an area or to destroy an enemy force. In order to facilitate planning, coordination, and control, it is usually translated into specific terrain objectives, the seizure of which will permit control of the area or facilitate destruction of the enemy force.

c. The objectives selected become the basis for determining the scheme of maneuver. Objectives are considered in relation to the enemy's posture, the terrain, and the anticipated weather conditions. These factors, when compared to the strength, disposition, and capabilities of friendly forces, indicate the various courses of action open. Final selection of the scheme of maneuver is then determined in the light of relative vulnerability, risk, and probability of success.

d. After the objectives and scheme of maneuver have been selected, the available forces, supporting fires, and combat support are allocated. The means available will seldom permit all attacking forces and the reserve to be equally weighted in combat power. Furthermore, it is usually undesirable to expend excessive combat power against main enemy strength when it can be employed elsewhere with more effectiveness and greater economy. For these reasons it is usually desirable to designate a main attack and one or more secondary attacks. The attack anticipated to produce the most decisive result and having the greatest probability of success is designated the main attack. It is weighted with the preponderance of forces, supporting fires, and combat support. Secondary attacks which are employed primarily to fix the enemy and reduce his capability to react against the main attack are allocated the minimum resources required. When nuclear weapons are authorized, a nuclear preparation may reduce the enemy's strength sufficiently to make multiple, equally weighted attacks appropriate.

e. A portion of the combat power of the force is held in reserve to be employed at a decisive time and place to obtain a favorable decision. The reserve is used to exploit the success of the attack, maintain the momentum of the attack, or provide additional security. It is one of the commander's principal means of influencing the action once the operation is underway. The strength and composition of the reserve vary with its contemplated mission, the forces available, the type of maneuver, the terrain, possible hostile reaction, and the clarity of the situation. When the situation is relatively clear and enemy capabilities are limited, the reserve may consist of a small fraction of the force. When the situation is
obscure, the reserve may consist initially of the bulk of the command, prepared for employment at any point. While the reserve should be large enough to obtain a decision when it is committed, the forces allocated to it must not unduly weaken the main attack. It must be provided adequate fire support and combat support, to include the necessary transportation, both air and ground, to achieve the requisite mobility. Once the reserve is committed, a new reserve is immediately reconstituted.

f. Fire support plans must be developed in consonance with the scheme of maneuver. In the nonnuclear environment these plans are normally developed to support the maneuver elements. While this principle is applicable to the nuclear environment, there will also be occasions where the scheme of maneuver is designed to exploit the effects of nuclear fires. The fire support plan provides fire support elements in direct support of the maneuver elements and in general support of the force as a whole. Provision is made for adequate support of the reserve when it is committed. An important consideration is the decision as to whether or not a preparation should be fired. Such a decision is based upon knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, available ammunition, and the results expected considering the loss of surprise. Where nuclear weapons are to be employed, the plan includes the general allocation of nuclear weapons and fires to subordinate units; the use of nuclear weapons in the preparation, if fired; and the numbers and types of weapons to be held in reserve. Retention of nuclear weapons in reserve gives the commander an additional, powerful means of influencing the course of the operation. A series of prearranged fires is prepared for those areas wherein reserve weapons are likely to be employed. Certain areas may be so critical to the success of the operation as to warrant allocation of specific weapons and the establishment of rapid, prearranged procedures for calling for the fires. Where nuclear weapons are to be employed in the preparation, the probability of their effects creating obstacles to the movement of friendly troops must be evaluated.

g. Attack plans include the measures for coordination and control of the various aspects of the operations. As a minimum, objectives and the time of attack are prescribed. Additional measures may include the assignment of zones of action, axes of advance, direction of attack, lines of departure, and phase lines. Undue restriction of the freedom of action of subordinate commanders is avoided. Where the situation is fluid, the minimum restrictions necessary to prevent mutual interference are prescribed.

154. Execution

a. The attack is characterized by fire and maneuver, combined
and controlled to create a preponderance of combat power that culminates in a powerful and violent assault in the decisive area.

b. Once the attack is launched, flexibility and speed in the employment of combat power are paramount. The attack is characterized by a series of rapid advances and assaults by maneuver and fire until the final objective is secured. The attack is executed vigorously and all favorable developments exploited. If the advance lags in any portion of the zone, the weight of the attack should be shifted quickly to another part of the zone offering greater opportunity for success. The attack maintains continuous momentum and is not delayed to preserve the alinement of units or to adhere closely to the preconceived plan of attack. Momentum is maintained by—

(1) The timely employment of reserves, the airlift of combat elements, the redirection of units on intermediate objectives, and the provision of adequate combat and administrative support or combination of these means. In some instances, commitment of a portion of the reserve may be sufficient to accomplish the desired task.

(2) Attacking echelons advancing as rapidly as possible to their objectives. Enemy resistance is bypassed unless it can be quickly overrun or is so strong as to interfere with accomplishment of the mission. The decision to bypass enemy strong points must recognize the danger of subsequent entrapment, as well as the effect the bypassed forces may have upon succeeding phases of the operation.

(3) Timely displacement of fire support elements and providing plans for close-in protective fires and fires to support the continuation of the attack.

c. The commander must keep informed of the progress of the attack, enemy reactions, and the situation confronting subordinate units in order to maneuver forces most effectively and employ fires to gain his objectives. During the attack, control may be increasingly decentralized to subordinate commanders to permit them to react more rapidly to changes in the situation. Through knowledge of the situation and of the higher commander's concept of the operation, the subordinate commander modifies and implements the plan.

d. Between areas of enemy opposition, attacking forces move rapidly by ground and air. When enemy resistance which must be reduced is encountered, the commander’s first consideration will be to accomplish this by having his leading elements, supported by fire, rapidly overrun and destroy the enemy. If a more deliberate attack must be made, attacking echelons move within assaulting distance of the hostile position under the protection of supporting
fires and smoke. In a short, violent, and well-coordinated attack the assault force destroys the enemy by maneuver or fires or a combination thereof. Where nuclear weapons are employed, this latter, deliberate attack is usually unnecessary.

e. The commander provides security without sacrificing the momentum of the attack. Plans and procedures should prescribe actions to be taken in event of an enemy counterattack. Bypassed enemy must be contained or kept under surveillance pending subsequent elimination. Covering forces, patrols, flank guards, echeloned reserves and firepower protect exposed flanks and gaps between units. Protection from ground attack may frequently be required for administrative and combat support units when areas in rear of attacking echelons have not been cleared. Halts are kept to the minimum; they permit the enemy to reorganize and may sacrifice the momentum of the attack. In nuclear warfare, especially, the failure to exploit an advantage relentlessly may nullify the success achieved. When units must be rested and resupplied, they are replaced by fresh units or reserves to preserve the impetus of the attack. For those units authorized to halt, orders should include the time and area of the halt, missions and locations of supporting units, and command and control measures. Some units may be diverted into dispersal areas to prevent congestion during the halt. Dispersal areas are planned to provide concealment, to aid defense, to minimize vulnerability to enemy attacks, and to facilitate resumption of the attack. Units in dispersal areas take protective measures to reduce their vulnerability.

f. Minimum forces, making maximum use of supporting fires, secure the objectives. The remainder of the command disperses and reorganizes to continue the attack without delay. Designated combat elements maintain contact and obtain information upon which the commander plans future actions. Continuation of the attack with fresh troops, a new direction of attack, or exploitation of success by the reserve may require a passage of lines. Passage of lines must be executed with great speed under nuclear conditions. Use of the wide zone, characteristic of nuclear warfare, provides gaps between friendly units that can be effectively utilized by the passing forces.

155. Advance to Contact

a. The advance to contact is a tactical operation which occurs frequently in mobile warfare. It is designed to gain contact or to reestablish it. In addition, the objective of friendly forces during the advance is to gain an advantage over the enemy that will facilitate future operations. Maximum advantage of position at the time of contact is achieved by properly organizing the force for combat...
and maneuvering the force components. The advance is pushed forward aggressively to gain the objective before the enemy can react. Every intelligence and security agency is used in order that the main force will become engaged under the most favorable conditions. Army air reconnaissance and security units may be effectively employed as intelligence and security agencies in the advance to contact. Tactical aircraft and long-range missile fires may be employed early to achieve fire superiority. The bulk of the combat power of the force should remain uncommitted to permit flexible employment upon contact with the enemy. Execution is decentralized but sufficient control is maintained to permit effective use of long-range supporting fires.

b. The advance is normally made in multiple columns. The command is normally organized into a covering force, a main body, and security forces. Subordinate tactical groupings employ various formations as required by their individual situations and missions.

c. The composition, size, and operations of the covering force may influence the entire course of the battle. The mission assigned the covering force is to develop the enemy situation and prevent unnecessary delay of the main body. Its operations may include attacking to destroy enemy resistance, seizing and holding critical terrain, or containing large enemy units. The covering force is tailored to accomplish its mission well forward of the main body. A highly mobile, well-balanced force is required. Close coordination of the covering force is essential. Normally control is retained by the overall commander of the force advancing to contact. However, widely dispersed operations may favor decentralizing control to column commanders.

d. Units of the main body are organized for combat and positioned to permit maximum flexibility for employment during the advance and after contact is established. Each column of the main body is responsible for its own security. Flank and rear security forces protect the main body from ground observation and surprise attack. Close coordination with reconnaissance, observation and surveillance aviation contributes to the security of the main body. The advance to contact may be frequently made at night or during other periods of reduced visibility. This requires all units to be skilled in night movement.

e. The advance to contact terminates when major enemy resistance necessitates the deployment of the main force.

156. **Reconnaissance in Force**

A reconnaissance in force is a highly mobile operation, consisting of an attack conducted by all or a sizable part of a force for
the purpose of discovering and testing the enemy’s strength, composition, and dispositions. The commander ordering such an operation must be prepared to exploit any unexpected success or to take additional security measures required. The reconnaissance in force is particularly adaptable to the fluid characteristics of the nuclear battlefield and will serve as the basis for many offensive operations.

157. Exploitation

a. The exploitation is an operation which occurs frequently in mobile warfare. It is designed to take full advantage of success in battle. The purpose of the exploitation is to destroy the enemy’s ability to reconstitute an organized defense or to engage in an orderly retrograde movement. The psychological effect of exploitation creates confusion and apprehension throughout the enemy command, reduces the enemy capacity to react, and may be decisive.

b. Planning for exploitation should provide for rapid continuous advance, fire support, adequate logistical support, and the selection of decisive objectives. Provision must be made for regrouping of component elements while other elements continue the advance.

c. The missions of exploiting forces include the seizure of deep objectives to cut enemy lines of communication and disrupt enemy command and control facilities. The mission assigned to the exploiting force commander should be sufficiently broad to avoid restricting opportunities to disrupt and destroy the enemy. The commander must realize that troops and their leaders frequently are tired at the time opportunity for exploitation occurs and that aggressive demanding leadership is required.

d. Exploitation is usually initiated when the enemy force is having recognizable difficulty in maintaining his position. This condition is indicated by decisive gains by friendly forces; lessening of enemy resistance, particularly supporting fires; and an increase in the number of prisoners captured and equipment abandoned. Once begun, the exploitation is executed relentlessly to deny the enemy any respite from offensive pressure in the drive to the final objective.

e. Forces in the exploitation normally advance on a wide front depending upon the mobility of the force, road net, and other aspects of the terrain. Only those reserves which are necessary to insure flexibility of operation, momentum in the advance, and minimum essential security are retained. Airmobile and airborne forces are used to seize objectives critical to the advance and to cut enemy lines of escape. Swift raids, thrusts, and envelopments
by ground and airmobile forces delay or prevent enemy reorganization. Actions are characterized by boldness, prompt use of available firepower, and rapid and unhesitating employment of uncommitted units. The exploiting force is committed in the decisive direction.

f. The exploiting force commander must be alert to prevent the dissipation of combat power in achieving minor tactical successes or in reducing small enemy forces. The aim is to reach the objective with the maximum strength as rapidly as possible. Control is vital to prevent overextension of the exploiting force if the enemy is capable of regrouping unexpectedly to attack the command. Nuclear and other fires are employed to destroy enemy forces which cannot be bypassed or contained. Security from enemy nuclear attack is enhanced by rapid advances to keep enemy forces off balance and neutralize the enemy intelligence and surveillance system.

158. Pursuit

a. The pursuit is an operation designed to cut off and annihilate a hostile force attempting to escape. As enemy demoralization begins and enemy forces disintegrate under relentless pressure, an exploitation may develop into a pursuit. A pursuit may also occur in any operation in which the enemy has lost his ability to operate effectively and attempts to disengage. In a pursuit the enemy loses his ability to influence the situation and acts in accordance with the pursuer's actions.

b. In the conduct of a pursuit direct pressure against retreating forces is maintained relentlessly while an enveloping or turning force cuts the enemy lines of retreat. Double envelopments of the retreating main force are executed when conditions permit. Maximum use should be made of airmobile and airborne elements in the enveloping forces.

c. Pursuit operations are conducted aggressively and under decentralized control. Commanders remain well forward to provide impetus to the operation and must take decisive action to overcome any inertia in the command. Pursuit is pushed to the utmost limit of endurance of troops and equipment. Continuity of administrative support is vital to the success of this type of operation.

Section III. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

159. Purpose

a. Defensive operations are the employment of all means and methods available to prevent, resist, or destroy an enemy attack. The purpose of a defensive operation may be to—
(1) Develop more favorable conditions for offensive action.
(2) Economize forces in one area in order to apply decisive force elsewhere.
(3) Destroy or trap a hostile force.
(4) Reduce the enemy capacity for offensive action, or
(5) Deny an enemy entry into an area.

b. In the defense the commander seeks to use the area of operations and means available to his advantage and to the enemy’s disadvantage.

160. Defensive Considerations

a. In defensive operations the defender seeks to seize and retain a degree of initiative by selecting the area of battle, by forcing the enemy to react in conformity with the defensive plan, and by exploiting enemy weakness and error. Defensive operations may be imposed by an inability to attack. However, the commander, particularly under fluid, nuclear battlefield conditions, may deliberately undertake defensive operations in combination with deception to destroy the enemy.

b. Under nuclear conditions the deliberate shift from offense to defense or vice-versa, may occur rapidly and with considerable frequency. A defensive operation usually is a composite of major and minor actions and engagements. Elements of the command may be holding on position, delaying, attacking, feinting, or delivering fires as part of the defense.

c. An offensive attitude is necessary to seize opportunities to destroy the enemy. Psychological preparation of troops and strong leadership in the defense are essential to maintain high morale, alertness, and aggressive attitude. The troops must understand that an effective defense is an opportunity to destroy the enemy.

d. The conduct of defensive operations under adverse conditions is the supreme test of the field commander. The defender must fully use those advantages which he possesses and can improvise. He must take greater risks and conserve his resources, yet commit them unhesitatingly and decisively at the proper time. He must deal with the serious problems of leading troops without the evident success of offensive combat. The highest order of leadership and tactical skill is demanded.

e. Defensive operations are normally most effective when minimum restrictions are imposed on subordinate commanders. The mission and the area to be defended should be stated in terms which permit the commander to use his means to maximum advantage with minimum restriction on specific terrain features to be held. Defensive operations, however, inherently require restrictions not present in offensive operations. These result from the
need for some degree of centralized control to insure the most effective use of resources, so that an adequate reserve remains for the decisive portion of the action.

161. Organization for Defense

Development of the best overall defense requires careful consideration of the mission, the nature of the terrain, and the degree to which specific terrain must be held, the depth of the defensive area, the relative combat power of opposing forces, the relative air and nuclear situations, and relative mobility.

162. Forms of Defense

a. Mobile Defense. The mobile defense is the method of defense in which minimum forces are deployed forward to warn of impending attack, canalize the attacking forces into less favorable terrain, and impede, harass, and disorganize them. The bulk of the defending force is employed in vigorous offensive action to destroy the enemy at a decisive time and place. In general the forward forces employ the principles of the delaying action, while the remainder of the force utilizes the principles of offensive combat. In nonnuclear operations the mobile defense is applicable to highly mobile warfare and situations where broad frontages must be covered by minimum forces. This type of defense is of prime importance in the nuclear environment, since the defending forces are able to retain their mobility and freedom of action. In both environments, the mobile defense offers an opportunity to destroy the attacking force and regain the initiative. Set patterns of action are avoided. The defending commander must retain freedom of action to choose the decisive time and place to launch his counterblow. This form of defense requires that the defending force have mobility comparable or superior to that of the enemy.

b. Area Defense. This is a defense based on retention of specific terrain.

(1) When retention of specific terrain is mandatory, the commander places primary reliance on the ability of fires and forces deployed on position to stop and repulse the attacker. The force may or may not be physically on the key terrain or its approaches prior to the enemy attack with his close combat units, particularly under nuclear conditions. In retaining specific terrain the commander must use sufficient forces in the forward area to create the necessary combat power on or to dominate the terrain to be defended. The forward area normally has a higher priority for forces than does the reserve. The reserve is employed to block and destroy the enemy, to
eliminate penetrations if they occur, or to reinforce threatened areas. The defensive concept requires detailed fire plans, organization of the area to exploit the natural defensive strength of the terrain, and plans for the maneuver of the reserve.

(2) The area defense normally takes maximum advantage of existing obstacles, reduces the danger of attack at night or by infiltration, and forces the attacker to employ maximum combat power to effect a penetration.

(3) Since the troops conducting an area defense are apt to be quite vulnerable to nuclear attack due to their relatively fixed positions, this type of operation is more suitable to the nonnuclear environment, although it may be adapted to a low-level nuclear environment. When it becomes necessary to employ the area defense in a nuclear environment, caution must be exercised in organizing the ground to reduce the vulnerability of the defending units to nuclear fires and to avoid creation of dangerous vulnerabilities to other forms of attack.

c. Variations in Defensive Operations.

(1) The area defense and the mobile defense lie at opposite ends of a scale of wide variations in the form of defensive operations. Frequently, neither of these basic patterns will be suitable to a given situation and mission. In such cases a variation incorporating applicable portions of each must be devised.

(2) Within a larger force conducting the defense, the operations of the various component units may encompass both defensive patterns and delaying operations as well, with certain units being assigned primarily an offensive role.

163. Maneuver in the Defense

a. Maneuver by combat elements in the defense includes the spoiling attack, the counterattack, the counteroffensive, and the delaying action. Offensive maneuver is important in all forms of defense and is of particular significance in the mobile defense. Offensive maneuver is undertaken to exploit the results of attack by nuclear and other weapons, to destroy a penetrating force at a time and place of the defender's choosing, to strike the enemy when he is unprepared and thus achieve significant results, or to assist in disengaging a force. The delaying action is employed to permit units to move to other positions from which they can execute either offensive or defensive missions or to gain space for employment of nuclear weapons.
b. A spoiling attack is an offensive operation launched by a defender against enemy formations outside the defended area. Its purpose may be to destroy a portion of the enemy force, to throw the enemy off balance, to seize terrain from which to launch an attack, or to deny the enemy ground observation and surveillance of the defended area.

164. Defensive Echelons

a. The defensive echelons are the security zone, forward defense area, and reserve. Forces and fires of the command are allocated to these echelons in accordance with the defensive plan. The general scheme of maneuver of defensive organization of each of these elements is prescribed in sufficient detail to permit intelligent execution of the plan.

b. Forces of the security zone furnish information of the enemy, deceive him, and provide a counterreconnaissance screen. Within their capability they delay the enemy and reduce his combat power. Under active nuclear conditions an important additional mission is locating and developing nuclear targets. Elements of the security force may be designated to stay behind advancing enemy elements. The composition and support of the security force includes long-range reconnaissance and observation means, both ground and air; strong firepower; a high degree of mobility; and excellent secure communications.

c. The composition of forward area defensive forces varies with the defensive purpose.

(1) When the defense is based on the retention of specific key terrain, major forces are used to organize the ground. Because of the inability to develop an impregnable defense, a reserve is required to maintain the continuity of the defense.

(2) The forces allocated to the forward defensive area in a mobile defense, while not as strong as those in the area defense, must be capable of forcing the enemy to deploy. They require long-range fire capabilities and normally a mobility equal to or greater than that of the enemy.

d. The forces of the reserve are the primary means by which the defender regains the initiative. Retention of a relatively large reserve, consistent with the requirement for forces in other echelons, permits offensive action both within and forward of the battle area. Where the mobile defense is employed, the reserve is the largest and most decisive element of the force. While it may be required to perform defensive actions, its primary mission is to defeat the enemy by offensive combat. The combat power allocated the reserve includes fires as well as close combat elements. When
nuclear fires are authorized, their ability to concentrate overwhelming combat power quickly in a given area greatly increases the offensive capabilities of the reserve. In addition the reserve provides flexibility and may be used to—

1. Reinforce hard-pressed forward units.
2. Occupy positions.
3. Insure retention of key terrain.
4. Assist in disengagement of units.
5. Replace forward units.
6. Extend flanks, or
7. Counterguerrilla, infiltration, and airborne operations.

165. Planning

a. Development of the best overall defense plan requires consideration of—

1. The mission.
2. The nature of the terrain and the degree to which specific terrain must be held.
3. Relative mobility.
4. The depth of the defensive area.
5. The relative combat power of opposing forces.
6. The relative air and nuclear situations.
7. Reserves available at higher echelons.

b. The means available to the commander in planning defensive operations include forces deployed in defensive positions, fires responsive to the commander, and units maneuvering in conformance with the defensive plan. Each of these means depends upon the others for maximum effect. The defender's task is to combine these means in proper proportion to accomplish the defensive mission. Considerations are—

1. Facilitating the use of these means by exploiting the natural defensive strength of the terrain. The natural strength of the area can be increased by the aggressive, offensive-minded use of fortifications and barriers and by the development of detailed fire and maneuver plans. Normally, the defender can select and reconnoiter the defended area prior to its organization and thus influence the attacker to conform to the defensive plan.

2. Holding or controlling specific terrain as indicated by the mission. The terrain is analyzed to determine the relative criticality of avenues of approach into the defensive area, existing or potential obstacles, which, if developed, will strengthen the defense, and areas suitable for offensive action.

c. Fires are planned to destroy the enemy force or to permit ex-
ploitation by maneuvering elements to complete his destruction. As the level of usage of nuclear weapons increases, the relative importance of fires in defensive operations increases. Fires are planned to permit engaging the enemy force early, although in some instances fire may be withheld to develop maximum surprise and shock. The decision to fire at long range or to withhold fires is a critical one, made by the commander in each case. Thus plans must be sufficiently flexible to permit this latitude. Fires are planned against all elements of enemy combat power, such as enemy fire delivery means, reserves, command and support installations, and units in contact.

d. Effective combat intelligence is critical and normally difficult to obtain because the defender lacks the initiative and is frequently inferior in combat power and reconnaissance means. Thus the defender must make the most effective use of the means available. His detailed knowledge of the area of operations, plus the increased susceptibility to detection of the attacker on the move, permits him to concentrate his effort on likely assembly areas, critical defiles, and other areas the enemy is likely to use.

e. The counterattack is a basic element of the defense. Its function varies in accordance with the type of defense being conducted. Although there are occasions wherein the counterattack is made by fire alone, more decisive results usually accrue from a combination of fire and maneuver. The principles of offensive combat are applicable to the conduct of the counterattack. Plans for the defense include counterattack plans in those areas wherein they are most likely to be required.

(1) In the area defense the function of the counterattack is to destroy or eject the penetrating force and thus regain control of the battle area.

(2) In the mobile defense the counterattack is the decisive element by which the commander accomplishes his mission. The objective is the destruction of the enemy force and the exploitation of the ensuing opportunity to regain the initiative, to include operations within the enemy's rear area.

f. The employment of chemical and biological weapons is planned for defensive operations. Use of persistent chemical concentrations may increase the effectiveness of fires against known enemy weapons positions and enemy reserves not suitable for nuclear attack. Persistent chemical concentrations are also used to contaminate barriers, obstacles created by demolitions, and defiles as an aid in impeding enemy movement and canalizing his advance. Nonpersistent chemical concentrations may be employed against targets of opportunity and against concentrations of
troops in the attack. Chemical minefields are included in barrier plans.

g. Barrier plans are developed concurrently with other plans. It is necessary to take maximum advantage of natural obstacles and to improve them. The effectiveness of obstacles is increased considerably when they are covered by observation and fire. Lanes and gaps are required for the necessary movement of reserves and other forces within the battle area. Barrier plans establish the location of barriers, responsibility for construction, and priority in completion. The barrier plan is developed concurrently with antitank and fire plans and must be carefully coordinated with counterattack plans.

166. Defense against Armor

a. Effective operations against an enemy possessing a significant armor capability require antitank defenses throughout the area of operation. Such defenses are planned to cover those avenues of approach presenting the greatest threat to the command.

b. Armor is attacked most effectively in assembly areas; therefore, early detection of tank formations is essential. Warning systems are established to insure that all antitank weapons can be brought to bear on enemy armor and destroy it outside the area of friendly troop dispositions.

c. Maximum use is made of natural obstacles and antitank minefields, facilitating the destruction of enemy armor by canalizing it into the fields of fire of antitank weapons. The entire antitank weapons system is used. This includes individual antitank weapons, mines, tanks, artillery, and nuclear weapons. The antitank defense is established in depth throughout the defended area. Artillery fires, including chemical agents, may be used on tanks to destroy the crews and separate or destroy accompanying infantry.

d. If the enemy armor succeeds in overrunning forward areas, antitank weapons located in depth seek to stop this advance. Forces in the forward areas must remain in position to prevent enemy infantry from accompanying its armor as well as contributing to the destruction of the penetrating tanks. Reserve forces heavy in armor are then committed to destroy the penetration.

167. Execution

a. In the defense a continuous aggressive intelligence collection effort, including the use of air and guerrillas, is essential in determining the probable strength, composition, direction, and time of the enemy attack.

b. The action of close combat units on position may vary from
delay to defense at all costs. Combat units employed in defensive positions accomplish their mission by destroying the enemy with fires and by impeding his advance to an extent that he can be destroyed by fire and maneuver. Close combat units may disengage and shift rapidly from defensive to offensive maneuvers.

c. Unless surprise offers a greater opportunity for success, the attacking forces are taken under fire as early as possible by aircraft and long-range artillery. As the enemy advances he is taken under fire by elements in the security zone. Security forces warn, deceive, develop intelligence, and, if part of the mission, execute maximum delay without becoming decisively engaged. They attempt to inflict maximum casualties on the advancing enemy and force him to deploy. As a means of collecting target information, security elements may remain in the area after passage by the enemy.

d. The attacker's disposition forward of the defensive area may favor a spoiling attack. When considering such an attack, the commander must evaluate the risks involved in terms of their effects upon the accomplishment of his mission.

e. As the attacker approaches the forward defensive area, he is taken under fire by all weapons within effective range, unless fires are deliberately to be withheld as a surprise measure. Previously selected target areas are kept under close surveillance. For maximum effect on fleeting targets, fires must be readily responsive to the commander.

f. In the conduct of the mobile defense, the forward elements conduct their portion of the action essentially as a delaying action. Such operations may extend over considerable depth within the battle area. They must, however, be prepared to stop and hold terrain on short notice to assist the success of the decisive counterattack. The mobile defense is based on the counterattack as the decisive element. Therefore, the counterattack is launched when the offensive power of the defender relative to the attacker is at a maximum. Criteria for determining when the counterattack should be launched are primarily those for assessing offensive maneuver. Among the significant considerations are the degree to which the forward area forces have succeeded in weakening the attacker and the potential remaining for further reducing his effectiveness. It is desirable that the enemy be stopped or slowed down and that he be disorganized, but these are not requirements and should not inhibit initiative in launching the counterattack.

(1) The counterattacking capability is not dissipated against minor enemy success. When the counterattack is launched, it is given the full means to accomplish the
mission. Piecemeal commitment of counterattacking forces jeopardizes the success of the operation. The counterattack is carried out rapidly and violently, employing all the combat power necessary to insure success.

(2) On occasions it may be necessary to launch separate counterattacks against two or more enemy forces. The more effective method is the elimination of enemy forces in order of the seriousness of their threat. Simultaneous counterattacks by elements of the reserve divide the available combat power and should be avoided, but such action may be required in some situations.

(3) Although plans for the counterattack are prepared in advance, it may be launched before or after the times planned and in an entirely different area than anticipated. The probability of successful accomplishment of the mission is the controlling factor.

(4) Local counterattacks on a small scale may be used to assist in disengagement of a force or to cause the enemy to change his plans. Small-scale attacks conducted with skill and determination may have an effect on the enemy out of proportion to the actual combat power involved.

g. The area defense is conducted in recognition of the fact that the battle area has been organized to halt the enemy, or if he penetrates, to canalize and delay him and force him into areas favoring the counterattack. The counterattack is the principal means for eliminating the penetration. The time to launch it is one of the most difficult decisions required of the commander. It should be launched at the time when the attacking force is most vulnerable. It may, however, be launched as a result of an inability to cause the enemy to react to the defensive plan. Following penetration of the forward defensive area, there is a period during which the momentum of the attack may be slowed, the attacking force somewhat disorganized, or the attacker's combat power dissipated to the extent that he is vulnerable to attack. Considerations in selecting the time and place for the counterattack are similar to those of the mobile defense. Additional considerations peculiar to the area defense are: dissipation of fires and reserves against minor penetrations may leave the defender without means to react against major penetrations; penetrations may be allowed to develop to great depths in accordance with a deliberate plan to destroy the enemy force by nuclear-supported counterattack; or, if the penetration achieves such success that a counterattack would be ineffective, it may be necessary to use the reserves in a blocking role and depend upon higher echelons to conduct the counterattack.
168. Types

A retrograde movement is any movement of a command to the rear or away from the enemy. Retrograde movements are further classified into withdrawal, delaying action, and retirement. They may be forced by enemy action or may be made voluntarily. A force executes a retrograde operation voluntarily only when a distinct advantage is to be gained. In either event such an action must be approved by the higher commander. To be successful it must be executed according to well organized plans. A disorganized retrograde operation in the face of enemy strength invites disaster.

a. Withdrawal. A withdrawal is an operation by which all or part of a deployed force disengages from the enemy.

b. Delaying Action. A delaying action is an action in which a unit trades space for time and inflicts maximum punishment on the enemy without becoming decisively involved in combat.

c. Retirement. A retirement is an operation in which a force not in contact moves away from the enemy.

d. Combination of Types. Within a large command which is in contact with the enemy a combination of these types usually is necessary, either simultaneously by adjacent units, or by one developing into the other. For instance, a retirement is frequently preceded by a withdrawal. A retirement may be covered by a force executing a delaying action.

169. Purpose

a. Forced or voluntary retrograde movements are conducted to accomplish one or more of the following:

(1) To harass, exhaust, and inflict punishment on the enemy.
(2) To draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.
(3) To permit employment of the command or a portion thereof elsewhere.
(4) To avoid combat under undesirable conditions.
(5) To gain time without fighting a decisive engagement.
(6) To disengage from battle.
(7) To conform to movements of friendly troops.

b. Retrograde operations by a defender may permit him with the lesser portion of his force to reduce the combat effectiveness of an attacker so that these two forces approach parity. Nuclear fires enhance the effect of a delaying force. The resulting situation permits the defender to seize the initiative with offensive action by his reserve elements. Skillful use of terrain to slow down and confuse and deceive the enemy is exploited by firepower, demoli-
tions, and raids to make the enemy pay a high price in casualties for the ground he gains.

c. The underlying reason for all retrograde action is to gain by the sacrifice of terrain the time in which to reduce the enemy's combat effectiveness, to bring up additional forces, to allow for a buildup elsewhere for an attack, to prepare stronger defensive positions to the rear, or to maneuver the enemy into areas for destruction by fire and maneuver.

170. Withdrawal

a. Local withdrawals are normal in defensive operations. Combat units may frequently make withdrawals in order to move to perform other missions. These withdrawals may involve disengagement by the attacking force. Under certain circumstances it may be necessary for the defending force, or an element thereof, to execute a general withdrawal. A general withdrawal may be part of a plan, as in a delaying action. A withdrawal may be executed either under pressure or not under pressure.

b. A withdrawal when not under enemy pressure requires the use of effective countermeasures against visual and electronic detection and depends primarily on speed of execution and deception. It may be accomplished by stealth or in conjunction with a nuclear or ground attack to divert the enemy's attention. Plans must include provisions for the eventuality of detection and interference with the attempted operation. Successful withdrawals of this type will normally be limited to periods of darkness of poor visibility, or to close terrain under conditions of friendly air superiority. Poor visibility and close terrain also complicate friendly control. The use of smoke and concealed routes assist in reducing the enemy capability to observe friendly movements. Enemy interference by use of airborne or airmobile troops must be anticipated.

c. A withdrawal when under enemy pressure depends on maneuver, firepower, and control. Nuclear and other fires against enemy forward elements and fire support agencies may be used to facilitate withdrawal of closely engaged forces. Forward units move to the rear by aggressively employing small unit delaying tactics. The rearward movement must be coordinated.

d. When simultaneous withdrawal is not practicable, the commander must determine the order of withdrawal. Withdrawing the most heavily engaged units first from the areas of greatest enemy pressure may subject major elements of the command to encirclement and destruction. Withdrawing the least heavily engaged units first may result in loss of all or a major portion of the most heavily engaged units. The decision must be based on
determining which plan best preserves the integrity of the force and which best contributes to the accomplishment of the mission.

e. Reserves are deployed well forward to assist in the withdrawal by fire or ground attack. When withdrawing under pressure, the reserve frequently will launch spoiling attacks to disorganize, disrupt, and delay the enemy attack. Reserves may also be used to cover the withdrawal by blocking enemy routes.

f. A withdrawal may not always involve disengagement, and sometimes planned disengagements are not accomplished by a withdrawing force. When, however, a withdrawing force does break contact, its continued retrograde movement becomes a retirement (par. 172).

171. Delaying Action

a. The delaying action is a defensive operation in which a force inflicts maximum delay and damage upon an attacker without becoming decisively engaged. This is the type of action normally fought by the forward echelons of the mobile defense, although these forces may have some additional restriction on their maneuver and area of operation. Entrapments may also be facilitated by a delaying force.

b. In the delaying action most of the combat power of the force conducting the operation is disposed in forward areas. Fires are decentralized. Reserves are employed primarily to assist in the disengagement of forward elements.

c. A delaying action may be accomplished on a single position, on successive positions, on alternate positions, or by suitable combinations of these. Delaying positions are organized in limited depth, since full reliance is placed on long-range fires to facilitate the delay. Close combat is avoided.

d. The integration of a delaying action into the mobile defense is covered in paragraph 162a. It is employed in a similar manner in operations designed to entrap an enemy force.

e. In the conduct of a delaying action, forces engage the enemy at long ranges to cause casualties and to force him to execute time-consuming deployments. In some situations, however, long-range fires may be deliberately withheld for deception purposes. Delaying forces strive to offer sufficient resistance to prevent infiltration and to force the enemy to concentrate for deliberate attacks. A concentrating enemy is attacked and destroyed by fire and, where appropriate, exploited by maneuver. If the operation is not designed to deceive or entrap, the commander of the delaying force subjects the advancing enemy column to repeated flank attacks by aggressive mobile forces, inflicting maximum destruction consistent with avoiding decisive engagement. The availa-
bility of low-yield nuclear weapons and precision delivery systems will assist disengagement and may permit the command to accept closer engagement than would otherwise be practicable.

172. Retirement

a. A retirement normally will be covered by security forces which may execute delaying operations. The retiring force may be subjected to guerrilla attacks, airborne raids, long-range fires, and enemy psychological warfare operations. Movement may also be impeded by refugees.

b. Security is an important consideration when executing a retirement. Movement by night is emphasized; day movement may be possible only by infiltration of small groups. Maximum advantage is taken of air mobility. In the initial phases of the retirement elements of the command may separate and move in dispersed groups to designated assembly areas. The retiring force fights only as required by its mission. Maximum use is made of communication security measures, especially radio silence.

Section V. SPECIAL DEFENSIVE CONSIDERATIONS

173. General

a. The enemy capability for airborne, guerrilla, or infiltration operations presents a continuous threat to the rear areas of a command. Successful employment of these capabilities by an enemy can have a demoralizing and decisive effect on an unprepared force and can disrupt its administrative support.

b. Plans to secure the rear area must be prepared to counter this enemy threat. The composition and strength of combat forces assigned the mission of rear area security must be based upon the evaluation of the primary mission of the overall force and enemy capability to make such attacks. Further, such plans integrate all means to include service troops, friendly partisans, militia, civil defense troops, and TOE unit replacements awaiting assignment.

c. Forces committed to rear area security should be adequate to counter the most likely enemy threat or combination of threats. Units located in the rear area must be fully utilized to contribute to the defense. Effective rear area security requires that each installation plan, prepare, and rehearse for its own defense and its part in the rear area security plan. The nature of the threat will frequently require locating or organizing highly mobile combat forces in rear areas. Positive command authority and staff areas of responsibility must be established, as well as adequate secure communication and warning nets. Locating and fixing
the enemy is one of the major problems in rear area security. Frequently, this may best be accomplished by controlling areas logical for enemy attack until the enemy reveals his location and permits the launching of operations to destroy him.

d. Plans must provide for the defense of critical areas or installations. First priority must be given to the use of administrative support troops for security of their own installations. A security force may also have to be disposed in dispersed locations where elements can move to block enemy threats. When the enemy is located, those elements of the security force not engaged in blocking are assembled rapidly for decisive action to destroy the enemy. Units may act on their own initiative; however, control must be established to insure coordinated action as the nature of the threat is clarified.

174. Defense against Airborne and Airmobile Attack

a. Defense against airborne attack includes air defense measures, a warning system, troops disposed or available to defend likely airborne objectives, and a mobile reserve. Every effort is made to isolate and prevent reinforcement of the airborne forces. If local forces are not able to defeat the attacker, they form a base for counterattack by stronger, mobile reserves. Armor is effective against airborne forces when available and when the terrain permits its use.

b. A major problem is to obtain accurate information of the location and extent of the landings. This problem is caused by exaggeration in reports, scattered landings, and communication breakdowns in the affected areas. All means of observation and communication are used. Unless ground vehicles are air transported in large numbers, airborne forces are relatively immobile after landing. This usually requires that airborne forces land on or near their objectives. This fact can be used to advantage by the commander in planning his defense. It assists in deciding where to deploy forces in anticipation of airborne attack, and how to employ them during the attack. Consistent with troop safety, nuclear weapons are used against enemy formations in the air and during landing or on their assembly areas where they can be located.

c. When a major airborne threat justifies the expenditure of resources, and when time permits, antiairborne obstacles and barriers are improved or constructed in likely drop and landing zones and in exits toward logical airborne objectives. Frequently, obstacles and barriers will be of limited effectiveness. Inundation, prepositioned nuclear demolitions and chemical agents should be considered in antiairborne defense.
175. Defense against Infiltration

a. Defense against infiltration becomes increasingly important as dispersion on the battlefield increases. Enemy forces may infiltrate to assemble in rear areas for attack. An infiltrated enemy force constitutes an enemy target acquisition agency that can call down accurate, long-range fires. Early detection and elimination of these forces are essential.

b. Measures that aid in controlling infiltration include extensive counterreconnaissance, combat patrols, antipersonnel obstacles, warning devices, and electronic surveillance devices. If the enemy succeeds in infiltrating, he is located and destroyed. When the enemy attempts to infiltrate entire units, every effort is made to identify likely enemy assembly areas in rear of friendly forces. Priority is given to destroying the enemy in these areas before he can reorganize and launch his attack.

176. Defense against Guerrillas

a. All units and installations in an area of guerrilla operations are subject to attack. Effective local security is essential to the defense against these attacks. Special provisions are made for—

   (1) Ground and aerial reconnaissance of rear areas.
   (2) Mutual assistance by adjacent units.
   (3) Defense of installations and critical areas.
   (4) Armed escorts.
   (5) Use of friendly civilians as guides, agents, or antiguerilla units.
   (6) Mobile combat forces to take offensive action against guerrillas.

b. Intelligence is required on areas suitable for hideouts, identity of guerrilla leaders and civilian supporters, communication facilities, and sources of supply. Guerrilla effectiveness depends in great measure on current information. Thus, care must be taken to prevent their securing information of operations, installations, and troop movements. Particular attention must be given to communication security, especially transmission security measures.

c. The political, administrative, and economic aspects of the area are considered in defense planning. Special attention should be given to measures to deny logistical support to the guerrilla force. Guerrilla forces cannot operate effectively unless supported in some degree by the local populace. Continuous effort must be placed upon gaining support by the local populace for counter-guerrilla operations. Planning is coordinated with overall rear area security and rear area damage control planning.
Section VI. BATTLE UNDER SPECIAL CONDITIONS

177. General

Battle under special conditions encompasses those operations in which the natural and man-made characteristics of the area, or the nature of the operations, or the unique conditions under which the operations may be conducted, or a combination of these, may require specially trained troops, techniques, tactics, or materiel. All Army forces are capable of operations under these conditions, but special training and equipment may be required.

178. Fortified Areas

a. A fortified area is characterized by numerous mutually supporting defensive works and localities, organized in width and depth. Seldom will the fortified area be a single strongly organized locality. Fortified areas provide the defender with maximum protection and permit economy of force. Defensive works may consist of permanent-type fortifications and extensively developed field fortifications located within an extensive barrier system. Additional characteristics of a fortified area include a strong outpost system which, in itself, may be fortified; a well-developed road and signal net; and a highly mobile reserve centrally located and provided with an extensive network of covered approaches.

b. In offensive operations enemy fortified areas are normally contained by minimum forces while the main force bypasses and continues the advance to more distant and decisive objectives. Action to reduce a fortified area may include a siege or an attack from the rear. Nuclear, chemical, and biological munitions facilitate the destruction and neutralization of fortified areas. The ability of chemical and biological agents to penetrate structures and fortifications lessens the effectiveness of cover. Surface and subsurface nuclear bursts may be employed to create gaps in the fortified area or to isolate sections of it. If such nuclear bursts are used, they must be carefully coordinated with adjacent forces and evaluated as to possible interference with friendly maneuver.

c. A primary purpose for the defense of a fortified area is to involve the enemy in the task of reducing fortified positions to the end that he dissipates his power and becomes vulnerable to counterattacking forces. Such a defense permits economy of force in forward areas, thus making available proportionately larger reserves for a counterattack. The reserve must be highly mobile and aggressively employed to insure the successful defense of a fortified area.

179. Built-Up Areas

a. Built-up areas containing solid masonry or concrete and steel
structures modified for defense purposes resemble fortified areas. They consist primarily of cities containing blocklike construction or those areas consisting of large complexes of industrial structures. Such areas are conspicuous topographical features for which details are usually available. They offer cover and concealment for troops and weapons. Built-up areas may be untenable because of their susceptibility to neutralization or destruction by conventional or nuclear munitions. These areas are also vulnerable to neutralization by chemical or biological munitions. Extensive subterranean systems may provide the defender with additional protection. Built-up areas reduced to rubble retain their defensive characteristics and restrict the use of motorized or mechanized forces. Fighting in built-up areas is characterized by close combat, limited fields of fire and observation, canalization of vehicular movement, and difficulty in control of troops. In employing nuclear weapons, the effect on the civilian population must be considered and plans made for their control and evacuation.

b. When practicable built-up areas are bypassed and isolated. If they must be reduced, methods applicable to reduction of fortified areas are employed. Terrain dominating the approaches is seized to isolate the area. Mobile forces are best utilized in the enveloping role. Objectives within the built-up area are selected to divide the enemy defense. In the nuclear environment the advantages gained through the use of nuclear weapons must be weighed against the creation of obstacles to the assault force.

c. The defense of a built-up area should be organized around key features whose retention preserves the integrity of the defense and permits the defender to move readily. Plans should provide for using subterranean systems as a means of defense against nuclear attack. A built-up area is primarily an obstacle to the attacker but may also be an obstacle to the defender in counterattack operations. Consequently, consideration should be given to defending outside the built-up area. Defense of a built-up area must provide for a reserve of maneuver elements and fire support to counter enemy action within the built-up area and on the dominating terrain outside the area.

180. River Lines

a. Wide, unfordable rivers impose restrictions on movement and maneuver. They constitute obstacles to the attacker and form natural lines of resistance for the defender. An attack across an unfordable river requires tactical and technical preparations proportionate to the size of the river and the relative strength of opposing forces. Other requirements for the attack of a river line are special types of intelligence, specialized training, close coor-
dination of all forces, crossing equipment, and adequate means for control during the crossing. The timely use of airmobile and airborne forces facilitates river crossings and should be fully exploited.

b. As a result of the planning initiated during the advance to the river, the commander deploys forces in a manner that insures that essential crossing means are readily available when the river is reached. The advance to an unfordable river is made with great speed on a broad front. Speed and violence in the attack, plus the confusion of battle, may create an opportunity to seize bridges before the enemy destroys them. The actual crossing of a river is a phase in an overall operation and not the primary objective. Supporting fires, particularly nuclear or chemical, may be used to seize a bridge intact by neutralizing the personnel defending the bridge. The advantage gained by capturing a bridge must be exploited. A bridgehead must be promptly established to secure the bridge and permit crossing of the remainder of the command.

c. In a nuclear environment the capability of the defender to employ nuclear weapons amplifies the requirement for multiple crossings on extended frontages. Continuous movement, without delay for buildup, is essential. Assault forces mounted in amphibious armored vehicles speed the crossing and reduce the dependence on bridges.

d. Defense of a river line is facilitated by the organization for defense which best exploits the natural terrain features and the resources available. Only screening forces may be at the river line when the defense is being conducted primarily by nuclear fires.

181. Jungle

a. Jungles are areas of tropical rain forest and secondary growth varying in locale from mountains to low-lying swampy plains. They are further defined as lacking industrial or cultural development and fully developed lines of communications. Jungle terrain and climate limit movement, observation, fields of fire, communications, and control. Because of these limitations, the difficulties of jungle operations increase in proportion to the size of the force involved. Cover and concealment are excellent in this type of terrain, thus increasing the possibility of achieving surprise. As a result, both the attacker and defender commit large portions of available forces to security missions. Critical terrain features in jungles include trails, navigable rivers, high ground, and communication centers. These features are difficult to identify because of inferior maps and limited visibility. The value of high ground may be reduced by restrictions on observation and fields of fire. An additional characteristic of jungle operations is the
reduced capability to acquire targets. Heavy forests have characteristics similar to those of jungles.

b. In the offensive, security elements are essential to prevent surprise and to protect the command. In jungles, successful security force operations are dependent on proper training and conditioning of troops in off-trail movement. Airmobile and airborne units and air lines of supply facilitate jungle operations. Since the size of offensive operations is often limited by the capability to resupply the force, bases of supply are profitable targets for attack.

c. The critical aspect of a defense in jungles is the communication net. To guard against surprise, the defense must be organized in depth, provide all-around defense, and contain well-organized security forces both for the defended area and for supply routes. Provision must be made for a mobile reserve. Chemical and biological agents are particularly effective in jungle operations because of the nature of the terrain and atmospheric conditions. If nuclear weapons are being employed, they can be used to strengthen natural obstacles by blast and contamination.

182. Desert

a. Deserts are semiarid and arid regions containing a wide variety of soils in a varying relief. Deserts have one common characteristic—a lack of precipitation and a resultant limited water supply. However, flash floods will occur in these regions. Because of the shortage of water, vegetation is scarce. In these areas military operations depend on control of sources of water. Depending on the terrain relief and the trafficability of the soil, the lack of roads may or may not canalize operations. A greater freedom of movement exists in these regions than in other areas. Highly mobile forces may play a dominant role in operations in semiarid and arid regions. Freedom of maneuver and the vastness of these regions favor a fluid type of warfare characterized by dispersed formations on extended frontages with considerable depth and increased problems of control. Additional characteristics include limited concealment, difficulty in determining location and maintaining direction, increased logistical support and equipment maintenance problems, and a requirement for specialized training and acclimation of all personnel. Ground reconnaissance forces, provided with armor and air defense means, and air reconnaissance elements are essential to prevent surprise. Air superiority is extremely important to successful desert operations.

b. During offensive operations in semiarid and arid regions, wide envelopments by armored, mechanized or motorized forces are favored because of freedom of maneuver. Because of limited
concealment, surprise must be attained by deception, appropriate communications security measures, and rapid movement. Periods of limited visibility should be exploited. Objectives for the attack include enemy troops, communication centers, supply bases, and water sources. The influence of climate and terrain in arid regions must be considered in planning the use of nuclear weapons. Likely nuclear targets include logistical and air installations.

c. Defensive operations in these regions emphasize mobility and flexibility. Provision should be made for direct fire weapons, a high degree of mobility, and adequate secure communications. The organization of the defense should emphasize measures against air and armor attack.

183. Mountains

a. Mountains cause compartmentation of military operations. Their rugged characteristics limit road nets. Vegetation may vary from jungle to bare slopes. The weather is characterized by rapid, extreme changes in temperature accompanied by mist, rain, or snow. Operations in mountains frequently require special equipment and training. Mountainous terrain retards and restricts mobility, reduces the effect of firepower, and makes communications and supply difficult. Critical terrain features include heights which dominate lines of communication, mountain passes, roads, and railroads. Within altitude capabilities, helicopters are valuable for moving both equipment and personnel. Nuclear weapons and chemical munitions can be used in mountain operations to restrict movement. Increased reliance must be placed on weapons having a high angle of fire. Aerial reconnaissance and observation facilitate mountain operations.

b. In mountain operations, direct attack of an enemy position is avoided whenever possible. Envelopment of enemy positions is facilitated by the crossing of difficult terrain employing specially trained and organized forces. Air-transported forces are ideally suited for envelopments. Although centrally planned, the execution of attacks is normally decentralized because the capability for control is limited by terrain. The use of armor in the maneuver force will be reduced, but its direct fire capabilities are used when possible. Flanks, defiles, road nets, and communication centers must be secured. When nuclear weapons are available to support the attack, small yield weapons may be favored to avoid blocking restricted avenues of approach.

c. Control of dominating terrain protecting road nets or passes normally is the key to the organization of a defense in mountainous areas. Security forces are required to prevent surprise, particularly of observation posts and patrols. Air reconnaissance is use-
ful as a security means. Although counterattacks are difficult to plan and execute, their execution can be decisive if timed properly. Nuclear weapons and chemical munitions can canalize the enemy or augment barrier plans.

184. Deep Snow and Extreme Cold Operations

a. Deep snow and extreme cold are found in the arctic, subarctic, and temperate zones, and at high altitude in all zones. The areas in which these conditions exist vary from forested to relatively barren regions and vary extensively in population. The subarctic and arctic regions of the world constitute the largest areas of deep snow and extreme cold. An additional characteristic of these areas is the obstacles to movement created by thaws.

b. The conduct of operations in such areas will require the application of special techniques and equipment and will be affected by the following factors:

(1) During the winter cold, snow, frozen waterways, permafrost, and short periods of daylight prevail. These factors create problems, such as constant need for shelter and heat, increased dependence of tactical operations on close administrative support, difficulties in the construction of field fortifications, and need for special winter equipment and clothing. Deep snow does not necessarily reduce the mobility of properly trained and equipped troops. In certain terrain it may enhance their mobility. Use of aircraft may be facilitated by using frozen lakes and rivers for landing areas.

(2) During the summer the area is characterized by numerous, extensive swamps, lakes, and rivers; abundant insects; and at times continuous daylight. Special equipment, such as boats and low ground pressure tracked vehicles, are needed. The extensive daylight requires special skill in movements.

(3) During the spring breakup sudden thaws weaken the ice on waterways and swamps and make existing roads almost impassable. The ground thaws to a depth varying from a few inches to several feet depending on the geographical location of the area. These factors will hamper extensive overland movement.

(4) During the fall freezeup ground and waterways frequently freeze before heavy snow falls. Prior to such snowfall, troops and vehicles can move cross-country with ease; however, in some cases early snowfall will insulate the ground and prevent its freezing until late in winter. This condition impedes cross-country mobility.
(5) During all seasons the lack or scarcity of roads affects large-scale operations, particularly administrative support, which points up the requirement for increased engineer support. Limited map coverage adds importance to effective navigation and control measures. Extensive forests or barren land above the tree line complicate all types of operations.

b. Offensive and defensive operations in these areas are conducted as in other climates. Since roadbound troops are extremely vulnerable to all types of enemy action, the capability to move crosscountry is requisite to successful operations. The control of land routes of communication is vital in both offensive and defensive operations. Typical nuclear targets include logistical installations and communication centers.

c. For details, see FM 31–70 and FM 31–71.

Section VII. RELIEF OF COMBAT UNITS

185. General

a. When tactical operations continue for a prolonged period, conservation of fighting power, maintenance of effectiveness, and the requirements of the tactical plan may necessitate the periodic relief of units. Such reliefs will be effected by a relief in place, passage through friendly positions, or withdrawal through a rearward position.

b. The congestion inherent in each of these operations requires detailed consideration of measures to reduce vulnerability and risk of enemy attack. Close cooperation and coordination of plans among the units involved are essential. The appearance of normal activity should be maintained during these operations. Maximum use is made of periods of darkness and poor visibility. Secrecy, deception, and speed of execution are emphasized. Arrangements must provide for the transfer of command between the commanders involved. Under nuclear conditions, the relief in place and passage of lines are highly vulnerable operations which, when required, must be conducted with speed and secrecy. Particular attention must be given to communication security measures.

186. Relief in Place

a. A relief in place is an operation in which all or part of a unit is replaced by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced elements, which may involve attack or defense, are transferred to the incoming unit. The incoming unit may be assigned a new mission upon completion of the relief.

b. The commander of a unit being relieved is responsible for
the defense of his assigned sector until the passage of command. The time of passage of command is determined by mutual agreement of the affected commanders unless it has been specified by higher headquarters. This passage normally occurs when the forward area commanders have assumed area responsibility and the incoming force commander has established necessary communications to control the entire sector.

c. In a relief in place for continuation of the defense, the incoming unit must conform to the general defense plan of the outgoing unit until passage of command. Every effort must be made to effect the relief without weakening the tactical integrity of the position. Combat support units should normally not be relieved at the same time as close combat elements.

187. Passage of Lines

A passage of lines is an operation in which a unit attacks through a unit which is in contact with the enemy. Units of the force being passed through normally remain in position until their fires have been masked, at which time they may undertake another mission. In this operation, the unit being passed through provides maximum assistance, including fire support, to the attacking unit. The passing unit normally is given priority in the use of facilities. The passage is made as rapidly as possible to reduce vulnerability to attack.

188. Withdrawal Through a Rearward Position

A withdrawal through a rearward position is an operation in which a unit withdraws through a unit occupying a defensive position. The unit in position provides maximum assistance to the withdrawing unit and maintains the defense after the passage has been completed. The withdrawing unit is given priority on roads and facilities, provided it does not interfere with the defense. The defensive plan must be considered in selecting points for the passage. The points and routes should be kept to a minimum, consistent with the need to minimize vulnerability and to avoid occupied defensive positions. Measures should be adopted for mutual recognition of the affected units and notification of the defending force when the withdrawal is complete.

Section VIII. OPERATIONS DURING UNRESTRICTED SCALE OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

189. General

a. This section is devoted to the operational employment of Army forces during periods of unrestricted scale of use of nuclear weapons as defined in paragraph 146b.
b. The environment visualized herein is one in which nuclear weapons are employed in both quantity and yield to such an extent that their efforts will saturate the battle area. As a result the ability of ground forces to maneuver decisively will temporarily be drastically reduced. While larger forces will normally be unable to maneuver without prohibitive losses, small units up to company size will frequently be able to move with sufficient freedom to permit them to continue effective operations. Furthermore, there will be local variations in the level of effects that will allow forces of substantial size to continue their assigned missions without being unduly restricted in their ability to maneuver.

c. Because a prolonged, intensive exchange of nuclear fires is extremely devastating and results in widespread destruction of both military forces and the civilian population, such operations can be expected to be of relatively short duration.

d. Decisive results will accrue to the combat force which can gain nuclear fire superiority in the exchange and at the same time preserve sufficient maneuver elements to exploit the fire ascendency when achieved.

e. The full capabilities of nuclear weapons delivery systems are employed to achieve fire superiority. High priority targets include enemy nuclear delivery sites and associated control systems, weapons stockpiles, and command and communication facilities. Intelligence efforts are focused upon the development of these targets.

f. The major consideration is the reduction of the nuclear effects level to an extent that will permit combat forces to resume effective maneuver. It is to this end that fire superiority over the opposing force is sought, even though the efforts in this behalf may temporarily raise the level of nuclear effects. Once the enemy's nuclear delivery capability has been reduced to a significant degree, the nuclear effects level can be permitted to subside, and combat forces can again employ maneuver decisively.

g. During periods of unrestricted scale of use of nuclear weapons Army forces will participate in the efforts to gain nuclear fire superiority, conduct limited offensive and defensive operations, and preserve force integrity for the subsequent exploitation phase.

h. Small, close-combat units, in addition to performing reconnaissance and security missions, are employed in limited offensive and defensive operations. Appropriate offensive tasks include infiltration of enemy-controlled areas to seize key terrain and destroy important installations. Defensively, these units are employed to counter similar attacks by the enemy. Offensive efforts should not be permitted to compromise the integrity and effectiveness of the major force through a series of unprofitable actions.
i. Guerrilla forces may be used to obtain information, conduct interdiction operations, and attack enemy communications, control facilities, and other critical installations.

j. Deception operations are initiated to mislead the enemy as to the location of friendly troops and critical installations and to cause him to expend his nuclear weapons on unprofitable targets. Electronic warfare operations (including communications and electronic security measures) are integrated into the deception plan. Additionally, active electronic countermeasures are taken against enemy aircraft and missile delivery systems and communication and control circuits.

190. Force Integrity
Those forces which cannot be profitably employed in the efforts to gain fire superiority must be preserved for the exploitation phase that follows. Normally, a significant amount of the close-combat and maneuver elements of a force will fall into this category. These forces are dispersed and concealed in protected positions in a defensive posture. Their primary mission is retention of operational integrity and survival.

191. Support Elements
Support forces which can contribute to the efforts to gain fire ascendancy are so employed. Other supporting forces devote their efforts to the preservation of their resources for the exploitation phase and to survival.

192. Exploitation
Following the nuclear exchange, the maneuver, fire support, and combat support elements must be reconstituted rapidly to resume or initiate mobile operations. Since both combatants will undoubtedly suffer severe damage during the nuclear fire fight, even a small, highly mobile exploitation force may achieve decisive results when employed aggressively and in a timely manner. Additional forces are reconstituted, refitted, and committed to action as resources permit.
CHAPTER 7
AIRBORNE AND AIRMObILE OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

193. General
The advent of nuclear weapons and the improvement of other weapons has weighted the fire-maneuver balance in favor of fire. This imbalance can be corrected only by a substantial increase in mobility. The use of aircraft adds new dimension to the land battle by permitting maneuver through the air. Aircraft utilized in land force operations permit the rapid movement of combat power to and within the battlefield with minimum regard for terrain barriers and trafficability. A significant increase in mobility and maneuverability required to complement increased firepower is thus provided.

194. Scope
This chapter deals with the special considerations involved in the entry and sustenance of land forces in combat by means of aircraft. Consideration is given, in other portions of this manual, to the use of aircraft in performing the functions of reconnaissance, fire support, supply, troop movement and evacuation.

195. Types of Operations
a. Airborne operations involve the movement and delivery by air of combat forces and their logistical support into an objective area for the execution of either a tactical or strategic mission. Such operations may be conducted for extended periods of time and over great distances. Airborne operations are joint in nature and are conducted by combat forces of the Army and Air Force or Navy, employing forces organized, equipped and trained for this purpose. A variety of combinations of airborne and air-transportable units with assault, troop-carrier and transport aircraft units permits the fashioning of an airborne force to meet the requirements of the particular mission.

b. Airmobile operations involve the movement of land combat elements and their equipment about the battlefield by means of aircraft organic or attached to the land combat force for the execution of a tactical mission. These operations are unilateral in nature and are normally characterized by a limited mission and range and consequently are of relatively short duration.
Section II. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

196. Concepts of Employment

a. The flexibility of airborne and airmobile forces permits wide latitude in selecting the route of approach and the area in which they are committed.

b. The ability of such forces to move rapidly and to land on or near their objectives enhances the achievement of surprise and facilitates the massing of combat power.

c. The presence of such forces constitutes a threat which affects the enemy's capabilities by compelling him to deploy his combat power to protect vital installations in his rear areas as well as in the combat zone.

d. The primary prerequisites to success in such operations are the capability to move forces to an objective area without incurring unacceptable losses and the capability to provide them with required combat and logistical support.

197. Nuclear Environment

a. The nature of an airborne operation is such that the forces involved are vulnerable to enemy nuclear attack. Consequently, the enemy nuclear capability and the manner in which it may be employed must be carefully evaluated.

b. Reduction of the vulnerability of the force can be accomplished by minimizing the time spent in execution of each phase of the operation and strict observance of appropriate communication security measures during the planning and execution phases of operation. Additional considerations, contributory to the lessening of vulnerability, are dispersed marshalling areas, multiple air columns and small serials, and a large airhead complex.

c. Small, airmobile operations are difficult nuclear targets because of their fleeting nature. For this reason such operations are less vulnerable to nuclear attack.

198. Influence of Enemy Armor

Consideration must be given to the threat presented by enemy armor. When an enemy armored threat exists, weapons capable of defeating armor must accompany the assault forces. In countering enemy armor, the airborne force employs fires, exploits terrain which limits armor employment and concentrates antitank means along avenues of approach. Organic fires, antitank weapon systems, barriers, and air support facilitate destruction of enemy armor.

199. Weather Considerations

Airborne operations, and to a lesser extent airmobile operations,
are especially sensitive to weather conditions. Means of providing current weather information at departure sites, along approach routes and in the objective area are essential. A weather minimum must be prescribed for each operation.

200. Support Requirements

The capacity and availability of aircraft limit the equipment which can be moved to the objective area. Ground mobility in airborne operations is reduced by the shortage of organic vehicles. While airmobile units have few ground vehicles, they retain considerable mobility through employment of the helicopter for delivery and pickup of ground elements in the vicinity of their objective. Long-range fire support for airborne operations and subsequent operations in the battle area is provided primarily by tactical air and missiles.

Section III. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

201. Strategic Considerations

Land forces located in the United States or overseas are maintained as part of strategic mobile Army forces capable of rapid deployment to any part of the world. The rapid commitment of these forces is facilitated by deployment to advance bases and areas. Execution of the strategic airborne capability is directly dependent upon availability of long-range transport aircraft. Strategic airborne forces are organized and equipped as highly mobile, completely air-transportable units. Movement by long-range aircraft allows timely intertheater, as well as intratheater, deployment of such forces to execute military operations. These forces may be moved directly to the area of employment or may be moved to forward bases from which they can be relifted by medium and assault transport aircraft to conduct airborne assault operations. Stockpiling supplies and aerial delivery equipment near areas of anticipated employment increases strategic mobility by reducing the requirement for long-range aircraft.

202. Characteristics

Airborne operations combine the speed and flexibility of high speed medium and heavy transport aircraft with the land combat capability of Army forces. Airborne forces are organized, trained and equipped to capitalize on the advantages of movement by modern air transport means.

203. Concepts

Due to concentration in mass and speed of landing, assault
forces are normally stronger than enemy forces in an objective area during and for a period after landing. Such forces have the advantage of initiative, surprise, and shock effect. In addition, assault forces will frequently be at full strength and will have the advantage of special training and, when feasible, operational rehearsals. Large-scale airborne operations require multiple dispersed airfields in the departure area and suitable landing zones in the objective area if air-landings are planned.

204. Effects of Nuclear Weapons
   a. In a nuclear environment, the use of large airborne forces may become difficult, due to the ease with which air movements are detected and the effect of nuclear weapons against large air formations. For these reasons, en route air columns and tactical forces in the objective area are dispersed to the maximum extent consistent with missions and control capabilities.

   b. The battalion may be the basic unit is an airhead. A division airborne operation may really be a series of coordinated but separate operations. Corps airborne operations in which the bulk of the combat forces are parachuted into the objective area may become rare.

   c. Nuclear attack in the objective area may facilitate its seizure by airborne forces. However, the reduced ground mobility of airborne units increases their vulnerability to enemy nuclear attack once they have landed.

   d. The success of airborne operations in a nuclear war will depend upon the ability of reinforced battle group sized units to conduct semi-independent operations effectively.

205. Classification
   a. Airborne operations are classified by type as either short duration or long duration operations.

   b. Short duration operations normally will be conducted with minimum reinforcement and air-delivered followup supply. Only essential administrative support is provided in the objective area. The operation terminates with the early link-up, relief, withdrawal, or relift of the force for subsequent operations.

   c. Long duration operations require reinforcement of airborne units by combat, combat support, and administrative support units and include substantial use of nonairborne units in an air-landing and followup role. The forces employed are usually committed to sustained ground combat. Long duration operations involve a substantial buildup of troops, supplies, and equipment by air.
206. Operational Phases

Airborne operations normally are initiated by an assault consisting of the landing and seizure of initial objectives. The force then consolidates the objectives and defends the airhead area, conducts further offensive operations, links up with other forces, or is relifted or withdrawn to engage in subsequent operations. Offensive operations may be conducted concurrently with the consolidation to seize additional objectives to facilitate the defense or future operations. The offensive phase, if undertaken, is initiated as soon after the assault as possible.

207. Coordination with Other Forces

All participating forces in an airborne operation must be completely integrated and under a single command. Operations must be thoroughly coordinated with other forces operating in close proximity to or whose weapons are within range of the objective area.

208. Command, Control, and Functions

The command relationships for the component forces in joint airborne operations are specified by the commander exercising control and supervision over the operation. Factors considered in determining command relationships include the mission and duration of the operation, the functions and capabilities of the units involved, the nature and size of the forces to be furnished by each Service, the organization of the area, geographical location of the operations, and the strength and capabilities of friendly and enemy forces.

209. Organization of Airborne Forces

The theater commander may establish a unified airborne command for planning and executing airborne operations on a continuing basis. Such a command would include all airborne units in the theater except those temporarily assigned to other forces. The airborne command plans and executes operations employing the major portion of the theater airborne units and establishes subordinate joint airborne task forces for the execution of operations which employ lesser portions of the theater forces. If a unified airborne command subordinate to theater is not established, the theater commander may establish a joint airborne task force for a specific operation. If a unified command or joint airborne task force is not established, the theater commander may direct that an airborne operation involving elements of two or more Services be conducted by attachment of elements of one Service to another for operational control. The authority directing attach-
ment will specify the purpose or mission, effective date and duration of attachment, and extent of authority to be exercised by the commander of the unit to which other forces are attached.

210. Responsibility for Planning
The unified or joint task force commander directs the planning for the operation. He assigns responsibility for planning, preparation, and execution of the ground phase of the airborne operation to the Army component commander. He assigns responsibility for planning, preparation, and execution of the air movement and certain related activities to the commander of the Air Force component. The theater commander allocates means to support the approved missions.

211. Airborne Corps
a. A corps headquarters should be designated or established to control operations involving two or more divisions. A corps headquarters properly augmented with qualified airborne staff personnel is able to conduct large airborne operations. An airborne corps headquarters should be organized, trained and equipped when frequent large scale airborne operations are to be conducted.

b. Any corps can supervise the conduct of airborne operations by one or more of its subordinate elements when the corps, as a whole, is not employed in the airborne operation. The size and complexity of the airborne operation are the basis for determining whether or not such a corps headquarters requires staff augmentation by qualified airborne planners. Normally, in a division-size joint airborne operation, an airborne division can accomplish its own planning as well as supply a limited number of airborne planners to the corps staff.

212. Airborne Divisions
Airborne divisions are the largest units of combined arms and services organized primarily for the execution of airborne assaults. They are specially trained to enter combat by parachute and are capable of landing in unprepared and defended areas to engage the enemy immediately and effectively.

213. Infantry Divisions
Infantry divisions can be employed in airborne operations in air-landed roles to assist in expanding an airhead, to assume responsibility for a portion of the airhead, to act as an exploitation force or part of such a force, or to become a reserve.

Section IV. AIRMObILE OPERATIONS

214. General
Airmobile operations are characterized by rapid shifts of com-
bat forces within the combat zone with little regard to intervening obstacles. Airmobile operations normally employ aviation, infantry, artillery, cavalry, and reconnaissance units organic to the field army. Airmobile operations present fewer command and control problems than airborne operations, and airmobile operations are immediately responsive to the desires of the force commander.

215. Army Aircraft

a. Characteristics of Army aircraft minimize the requirement for airfields and improved air-landing facilities. Fixed wing aircraft require landing areas free from obstacles. Such an area is also desirable for helicopters; however, the helicopter can overcome many obstacles by its ability to hover a short distance above the ground and deliver its load without actually landing.

b. When employed tactically, Army aircraft fly at those altitudes best calculated to avoid detection and escape enemy fires. Flight routes are planned to take advantage of any protection afforded by valleys, forests, and other terrain features. Known enemy locations are avoided when possible. Enemy occupied areas that cannot be avoided are neutralized by supporting fires.

216. Concepts of Employment

a. Airmobile operations can be employed to seize critical, lightly held or unoccupied objectives; exploit the effects of weapons; outflank enemy positions; conduct reconnaissance, security and screening missions; and conduct raids. During offensive operations, troops and their fire support may be shifted rapidly to gain a tactical advantage or to counter an enemy attack. To reduce vulnerability to nuclear weapons, aircraft are used to effect required concentration of forces from dispersed locations just prior to employment, to disperse forces rapidly, to shift forces, and to move reserves.

b. In the defense, forces required for forward defensive areas may be reduced by organizing strong airmobile reserves in dispersed areas for timely delivery to critical areas.

c. Limited offensive and defensive airmobile operations may be conducted during periods of limited visibility by using low-level flight techniques.

217. Composition of Airmobile Forces

Airmobile forces, although normally composed of close combat elements and their organic support, may be specifically organized to include fire support elements or other nonorganic combat support elements. Infantry close combat elements are the most adaptable to airmobile operations because they are readily transportable by all types of aircraft.
218. Control of Aviation Units

a. Aircraft for Army airmobile operations conducted by divisions are normally provided from organic means or by attaching or placing corps or field army aviation units in support. Aviation control personnel and equipment are provided concurrently.

b. Operational control of aviation units to include control of air movement is normally assigned to the echelon responsible for the overall operation. Aviation attached to the division for airmobile operations may be reattached to or placed in support of subordinate elements of the division as required.

c. Independent airmobile operations may be conducted under corps control.

d. Certain specialized units may be specifically organized as airmobile to include necessary organic equipment. These units are designated as "aerial" units and are principally organized for reconnaissance and security missions.

Section V. PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

219. Procedures

a. Planning procedures for airmobile and airborne operations are similar. However, airmobile operations require less time and detail in planning because of their size, simplified command structure, and scope, and are conducted frequently throughout the battle area.

b. Despite their differences in scope, both types of operations require data on the availability of airlift, departure areas special measures required to safeguard the security of the operation (par. 251), and combat intelligence particularly on the enemy in the objective area, landing areas, and the weather. In both types of operations, planning is continuous until the operation is executed or canceled.

220. Planning Responsibility and Coordination

a. A senior headquarters considers numerous airborne operations and assigns planning responsibility for certain of these to subordinate headquarters. To assist participating and planning headquarters to develop plans concurrently, to reduce planning time, and to insure coordination, the senior headquarters issues planning directives which contain operational information, intelligence, weather information, and necessary administrative support information. The detailed plans are developed by the command charged with the execution of the specific operation.
Aircraft requirements and the availability of aircraft must be determined at the earliest practicable time to include communication security measures to be observed.

b. Plans for airmobile operations are normally developed at lower echelons than for airborne operations. Overall planning is normally accomplished at division or corps level.

c. In airborne operations inter-Service coordination must provide a clear understanding of marshalling procedures, the concept of operations in the objective area, and supply by air. Coordination between Army forces and units providing the airlift must be initiated early in the planning phase and must be continuous.

221. The Tactical Plan

a. Planning is conducted in a backward sequence starting with mission analysis. The tactical plan forms the basis for all other plans. The assigned mission is translated into objectives whose early seizure, destruction, or neutralization are required to accomplish the mission.

b. In an airborne operation there may be multiple airheads in the objective area. In selecting the airhead or objective area, consideration is given to enemy capabilities, particularly his nuclear capability and the probability of its use.

c. The tactical plan includes a determination of the strength, composition and deployment of the forces required to accomplish early seizure and defense of the airhead. The tactical plan must be logistically feasible.

d. Based on the tactical plan, the force commander prescribes priority of movement and phasing of units into the objective area.

222. The Landing Plan

Based on the requirements of the tactical plan, the landing plan is developed to indicate the sequence, time, and place of arrival of troops and materiel in the objective area. Landing areas should be of sufficient number and size to accommodate the forces involved, reduce their vulnerability, and position them to implement the tactical plan.

223. Air Movement Plan

a. The air movement plan phases the force into the objective area. The plan prescribes the use and allocation of aircraft and related facilities to meet the requirements of the force commander within technical and tactical limitations.

b. In airborne operations, the air movement plan is prepared jointly by the Army and Air Force elements of the joint airborne force and is approved by the joint force commander.
224. The Marshalling Plan

a. The marshalling plan in airborne operations or loading plan in airmobile operations is based on the air movement plan.

b. In airborne operations the marshalling plan schedules the movement of units of the force to departure airfields or air-landing facilities. The plan delineates responsibility for providing facilities and services while units are marshalling in dispersed areas and includes plans for loading aircraft and briefing troops for the forthcoming operations.

c. In airmobile operations the amount of detail required in the loading plan varies with the size and composition of the airmobile force, the experience of participating personnel, the availability of suitable loading areas, and the complexity of the air movement plan.

225. Subsequent Operation Planning

Plans should include the action to be taken after seizure of the initial objective. Although many airmobile operations are of relatively short duration and terminate in an early link-up or relift, major airborne operations may phase troops and supplies into the objective area to support operations out of the airhead in accordance with the overall mission of the force.

226. The Assault

Airborne and airmobile operations are normally initiated by an assault phase during which units are landed under decentralized control to seize initial objectives, interdict areas, and prepare for the landing of followup elements. Depending on the terrain and the enemy situation, the assault in airborne operations is normally conducted by airborne units delivered into the objective area by parachute and assault aircraft; in airmobile operations, air-landed elements may be preceded by small forces landing by parachute or combat air vehicles. Normally, air-landings, as opposed to assault landings, are conducted in protected areas or areas free of the enemy.

227. Seizure and Organization of Objectives

The seizure of assault objectives, organization of the airhead, offensive operations in the objective area, and establishment of security are initiated during the early part of the assault phase to capitalize on the elements of surprise and shock action inherent in the air-delivered assault. The degree to which the airhead is occupied and organized for defense is determined by the mission, the type airborne or airmobile operation being conducted, enemy capabilities, and the characteristics of the area of operations.
buildup within the airhead proceeds concurrently with its seizure and organization. Both airmobile and airborne operations may be entirely offensive in nature, and may require no seizure or defense of an airhead. The successful conduct of purely offensive operations requires a high degree of both air and ground mobility.

228. Dispositions Within Airheads

a. Airborne forces within an airhead normally are disposed for defense of key terrain and are dispersed to minimize vulnerability to nuclear attack. Multiple defensive positions are organized covering the main routes of approach. Avenues of approach and gaps between defensive positions are covered by nuclear and other fires, small ground and aerial combat detachments, and antitank weapons. Natural obstacles are exploited in the defense. Air reconnaissance and airmobile reconnaissance patrols provide information of enemy operations. Reserves are held in readiness in central locations to facilitate their rapid movement within the airhead. The reserve may be reinforced by units from forces not heavily engaged.

b. Missile and air support are used to execute long-range interdiction missions to destroy or delay enemy reinforcements. Air support immediately responsive to the requirements of the force must be provided. Reconnaissance air support is employed to detect and report enemy activities which may affect the forces in the airhead.

229. Withdrawal

Withdrawal from an objective area may be preplanned or may be forced by the enemy; a forced withdrawal is a difficult operation. The force may be withdrawn by air, land, sea, or a combination thereof. Alternate plans for withdrawal must be prepared before initiating the operation.

230. Link-Up

a. When a link-up between airborne forces and other friendly forces is planned, detailed coordination between the forces is essential. Provision must be made for link-up points, command and staff liaison, assumption of command, a system of mutual recognition and identification, early radio contact to establish forward positions, fire coordination measures, and actions following link-up.

b. Command of the Army element of an airborne force normally will pass to the senior commander in whose zone it is operating when he is able to control, support, or influence the action of the airborne force.
Section VI. AIR TRAFFIC REGULATION

231. Control

The joint force commander controls all friendly aircraft operating within his area through a joint air traffic control agency established within the objective area. In airmobile operations, air traffic regulation remains with the commander responsible for the operation.

232. Regulation

Air traffic regulation procedures, suitable for all flight conditions, should be developed by the joint force commander early in the planning phase of each airborne operation. Procedures should be developed in coordination with the Army, Air Force, and Navy commanders concerned and should permit maximum freedom of operation of all aircraft consistent with safety and other requirements.
CHAPTER 8
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Section I. GENERAL

233. Definition
An amphibious operation is an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces. It involves a landing on a hostile shore and normally includes extensive air participation. Lesser included operations are amphibious withdrawals, demonstrations and raids. Airborne operations may be conducted as a part of or in conjunction with amphibious operations. Army forces may be employed in all types of amphibious operations.

234. Purpose and Scope of Amphibious Operations
a. Amphibious operations are conducted to establish a landing force on a hostile shore in order to:
   (1) Prosecute further combat operations.
   (2) Obtain a site for an advanced naval or air base.
   (3) Deny the use of an area or facilities to the enemy.

b. The amphibious operation includes planning, embarkation of troops and equipment, rehearsals, movement to the objective area, assault landing of troops and accompanying supplies and equipment, and support of the landing force until termination of the amphibious operation. The amphibious operation does not include marshalling of forces, preliminary training in amphibious techniques, and operations subsequent to the establishment of the landing force ashore.

235. Force Requirements
a. An amphibious operation integrates virtually all types of land, sea, and air forces into a coordinated military effort. Clear command relationships, close cooperation, and coordination among all participating forces are essential.

b. In order to achieve success, an amphibious operation must be assured naval supremacy against enemy surface and submarine forces, preponderant air superiority, substantial superiority over enemy land forces in the objective area, and a reduction in the defender's nuclear capability to a level justifying the risk involved. In addition to superior power within the objective area, an amphibious task force should have reasonable assurance of freedom from effective interference during the assault landing by enemy forces from outside the objective. The amphibious task force must
be capable of providing continuous tactical and logistical support to the forces ashore. In the face of compelling necessity, an amphibious operation may be undertaken on the basis of a reasonable superiority of the total combat power of the amphibious task force. For example, naval and air superiority may justify the operation even though the amphibious task force lacks the desired superiority in landing forces, provided its naval and air components can be employed effectively in offsetting the enemy's ground superiority.

236. Concept of Operations

a. The concept of amphibious operations envisages a quick, but thorough firepower preparation (delivered by naval guns, missiles, and aircraft) followed by an assault landing accomplished by forces moving rapidly from ship to shore in landing craft, air and amphibious vehicles and frequently in conjunction with an airborne operation. Following seizure of initial objectives, the landing force continues to move rapidly to intermediate and final objectives. The force is supported by naval means until adequate organic combat and administrative support forces are established ashore. Enemy nuclear capability may make it necessary to employ relatively small forces to proceed directly to deep initial objectives without halting at the waterline. This type of action will add depth to the beachhead through simultaneous operations.

b. An associated airborne operation facilitates establishing forces ashore from the sea and greatly enhances the amphibious capability. Such airborne operations may be conducted either as an integrated part of the amphibious operation or as a separate but coordinated supporting operation. Such airborne operations may precede, be concurrent with, or follow the amphibious assault.

237. Operational Phases

a. Concurrent with or prior to the planning for an amphibious operation, participating units must be trained in amphibious techniques and marshalled for the embarkation. Reconnaissance of the objective area and other supporting operations considered necessary are initiated.

b. The operational phase of the amphibious operation commences with the embarkation of troops and supplies and continues through the rehearsal, movement, assault, and seizure of initial objectives ashore, until this phase is terminated by competent authority.

c. Following the amphibious operation, and particularly when extensive land operations are to be pursued from the lodgement seized, a period of consolidation and buildup may be necessary.
before further operations can be initiated. During this period the lodgement is consolidated, logistical buildup proceeds, and facilities for further operations are established.

Section II. ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND

238. Command Relationships

a. The directive issued by the commander initiating the amphibious operation allocates the component forces from the participating Services, and establishes the command relationships.

b. The command structure for the amphibious operation will depend upon the purpose, extent, and complexity of the operation, as well as the magnitude and type of forces involved. Where several landings are conducted simultaneously in conjunction with extensive airborne operations, it may be necessary to vest the control of the operation in a unified command or joint task force and one or more joint amphibious task forces. Where the operation is less extensive or less complex, a single joint amphibious task force may suffice.

239. Joint Amphibious Task Force

The organization formed for the purpose of assaulting the hostile shore is the amphibious task force. It is activated prior to embarkation and includes a naval force and a landing force, and may include Air Force elements. The naval force includes elements necessary to move the landing force to the objective area, provide protection en route and in the objective area, accomplish the final preparation of the objective area, land assault forces with accompanying supplies and equipment, and support the landing force ashore. The amphibious task force commander is a naval officer and is usually the commander of the naval component.

240. The Landing Force

The landing force comprises the troop units assigned to conduct the amphibious assault. It may be formed from Army forces, Marine Corps forces, or a combination thereof. The landing force normally operates under a single tactical commander; however on occasion subordinate groups may be formed with specific delegation of command authority.

241. Formation of Subordinate Forces

a. The amphibious task force may be divided into subordinate forces if simultaneous or nearly simultaneous assaults are to be launched in widely separated areas, or if other factors prevent
effective centralized control. In such cases a naval attack group and a corresponding landing group are formed.

b. The command relations between the attack group commander and the corresponding landing group commander are jointly agreed between the amphibious task force commander and the landing force commander during the planning phase.

242. Fire Support Coordination

Detailed fire support coordination and planning are of utmost importance in amphibious operations because the landing force is initially dependent on naval fire support. The amphibious task force commander is responsible for coordinating fire support during the early stages of the landing. When conditions warrant and coordination agencies are established ashore, the amphibious task force commander passes this responsibility to the landing force commander. Thereafter, the fire coordination facilities of the amphibious task force revert to a standby basis and are available to take over fire support coordination functions in emergencies.

243. Termination of the Amphibious Operation

a. The amphibious operation terminates upon the accomplishment of the mission specified in the directive initiating the operation. The firm establishment of the landing force ashore is invariably specified as a condition of such accomplishment.

b. The landing force is regarded as firmly established ashore, when in the opinion of the landing force commander:

(1) The force beachhead has been secured.

(2) Sufficient tactical and supporting forces have been established ashore to insure the continuous landing of troops and supplies required for subsequent operations.

(3) Command, communications, and supporting arms coordination facilities have been established ashore.

Section III. INTELLIGENCE

244. Responsibilities

Intelligence activities in support of amphibious operations are complicated by the remoteness of the enemy and the dependence of subordinate echelons on information and intelligence provided by higher echelons. The information required in planning an amphibious operation includes coverage of weather; hydrographic conditions of the beaches, ports, and harbors; airfields; landing and drop zones; enemy political, sociological, and economic conditions; and the combat intelligence including enemy order of battle data required to conduct land operations in the objective
area. During the planning phase, the joint amphibious task force commander is responsible for coordinating the intelligence plans of the various elements of the amphibious task force and for requesting the necessary support from higher headquarters. As subordinate elements become active components of the force, normal intelligence relationships are established to facilitate the exchange of intelligence. During the movement to the objective area, higher echelons continue to assist the amphibious task force commander in the collection and processing of information required by the task force. The intelligence collection agencies of higher echelons which may include surface and subsurface vessels, underwater demolition teams, amphibious reconnaissance units, and covert networks, are used to the maximum extent in a coordinated effort to provide timely and accurate combat and strategic intelligence. When the amphibious task force reaches the objective area, the collection agencies of the force become active, and greater emphasis is placed on producing the required intelligence within the force.

245. Counterintelligence and Communication and Electronics Security

Counterintelligence, communication security, and electronic security are essential since amphibious forces are extremely vulnerable during preparation, rehearsal, movement to the objective area, and during the initial stages of the assault.

Section IV. PLANS AND OPERATIONS

246. Operational Planning Considerations

a. While the basic considerations of military planning are applicable, planning for an amphibious operation is complicated by several factors:

(1) The security of the various forces participating and the necessity for attaining maximum strategic and tactical surprise dictate that the movement of forces originate from widely separated areas and converge in the objective area at the appropriate time. The problem becomes more complex when preassault operations are required to gain air, naval, and fire superiority, and to reduce the enemy reinforcement capabilities. Only by the closest and most detailed joint planning can the various joint and supporting uni-Service plans be coordinated.

(2) Planning must frequently be based on incomplete information concerning the physical characteristics of the objective area and the strength, composition, and dis-
position of the enemy forces therein. The assumptions upon which planning is initiated may be invalidated as additional information becomes available. Enemy forces cannot be expected to remain static while planning, embarkation, and movement are completed. These contingencies will frequently dictate the preparation of several alternate plans. Flexibility is essential.

(3) Adequate combat support must be provided the landing force in the period between the initial assault and the establishment ashore of the landing force. During this period the landing force will require fire, communication, and logistic support from air and naval forces. Detailed planning is necessary to insure the adequacy, responsiveness, and continuity of such support.

b. Planning must be conducted concurrently at all echelons of the participating Services. To enable subordinate commanders within the landing forces to initiate their plans, they must be provided with the following information as soon as it has been determined:

1. Assigned mission(s)
2. Troop lists
3. Available intelligence
4. Levels of supply to accompany troops
5. Allocation of shipping and transport aircraft
6. Availability of landing craft and amphibian vehicles
7. General landing areas
8. Approximate date and time of operation
9. Naval gunfire and air support allocated to the operation
10. Employment and allocation of atomic weapons

c. In order to gain surprise and reduce the vulnerability of the amphibious forces during embarkation, movement, and assault, cover and deception plans must be developed early in the planning phase. Such plans must be developed and implemented sufficiently in advance of the assault to be effective.

d. Rehearsals provide a valuable means of testing the adequacy of plans and the timing of various facets of the operation. Necessary rehearsal plans are formulated and incorporated in the overall plan for the operation.

e. A major consideration in planning is the determination of the nature and extent of preassault operations in the objective area. The decision regarding these operations must be based upon such factors as relative air, naval, and ground strengths; enemy reinforcement capabilities; the character and extent of enemy defensive installations; the effect of the loss of surprise that may result from such operations; the relationship with cover and
deception plans; and the availability of nuclear weapons. Pre-assault operations may vary from a short, but intensive pre-H-hour air, naval, and missile attack to a methodical, deliberate reduction of the defender's capabilities by extensive operations requiring a considerable period of time.

f. The threat of use of nuclear weapons by the enemy may preclude massive concentrations of forces and supplies. Forces and supplies for an amphibious operation must be dispersed during staging and mounting, movement to the objective area, and during the assault and seizure of the beachhead. Dispersion, which requires the landing of forces on widely separated beaches and landing zones, necessitates the organization of the forces into balanced, mobile, landing teams capable of independent action. Passive protection is particularly important.

247. Training

The troops of the landing force require specialized training in amphibious techniques to include embarkation and debarkation, loading and unloading equipment and supplies, naval gunfire and air support procedures, and ship-to-shore movement and control. Provision of this training requires joint plans and joint support.

248. Mounting and Embarkation Concentrations

Concentration of troops and equipment during mounting operations is avoided by establishing camps and staging areas at some distance from embarkation sites. Troops are kept in marshalling camps and staging areas for minimum periods of time. Consideration should be given to outloading from widely separated points.

249. Ship-To-Shore Movement

a. The overall planning for and execution of the ship-to-shore movement is the responsibility of the joint amphibious task force commander.

b. The landing force commander is responsible for presenting his requirements for landing craft, amphibians, and helicopters, to the joint amphibious task force commander and for advising him of landing craft, amphibians, and helicopters which will be available from landing force sources for use in the ship-to-shore movement.

c. The ship-to-shore movement plan is designed to support the scheme of maneuver ashore and consequently cannot be completed until the latter has been approved; however, such factors as hydrographic conditions, availability of landing vehicles, availability of beaches and helicopter landing sites, frequently influence
the scheme of maneuver. Close coordination of the ship-to-shore movement plan and the scheme of maneuver is essential.

**250. Scheme of Maneuver Ashore**

a. The scheme of maneuver of the landing force ashore is based on the fundamentals applicable to normal ground combat, although certain considerations may require additional emphasis.

b. The objective of the landing force is seizure of sufficient terrain to accommodate troops, equipment, and supporting installations without dangerous congestion. This lodgement area should include terrain suitable for the defense in the event of a counter-offensive before the breakout.

c. Intermediate objectives must provide for the early seizure of critical terrain features which control beaches, boat and air lanes, and which might interfere with the subsequent ship-to-shore movement of troops and supplies.

d. The employment of airborne forces and the utilization of aircraft in the ship-to-shore movement may permit the seizure of final objectives prior to or concurrently with reduction of intermediate objectives. Such forces, landed deep in the lodgement, can materially contribute to the movement inland of the forces landed over the beaches.

e. While reserve forces are employed in a manner similar to that in other types of ground warfare, their employment is dependent upon the availability of landing craft, amphibians, and transport aircraft. Availability of these vehicles will rarely permit withholding any of them for exclusive use by reserve forces.

**251. Security**

Special measures are required to safeguard the security of the operation with particular emphasis on communication and electronic security measures. Disclosure of planning information is held to a strict need-to-know basis. Personnel with knowledge of the operation are not permitted to take part in prior operations where they would be subject to capture. Briefing of troops is delayed until they arrive in sealed marshalling areas or until after embarkation and sailing of convoys.

**252. Communication Requirements**

Coordination between corresponding echelons of the participating Services and within the Services places a heavy burden on signal communication facilities. The amphibious task force commander is responsible for providing adequate secure signal communication facilities to the landing force commander until organic communication facilities have been established ashore.
Section V. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

253. Shore Party

Logistical support for landing force units within the beach support area during the early phases of an amphibious operation is provided by a composite Army and Navy task organization commanded by an officer of the landing force.

254. Logistical Support Operations

Supplies must be unloaded rapidly and dispersed in balanced supply points well inland. Minimum supply levels must be maintained during the initial stages of the operation. To avoid undue concentration, careful scheduling, rapid unloading, and dispersion of supply ships are required. Ship-to-shore vehicles used for logistical purposes speed unloading, facilitate dispersion, and increase flexibility of administrative support operations.

255. Administrative Support Responsibilities

The component force commanders of the amphibious task force are responsible for determining administrative support requirements of their commands and for making arrangements for such support from appropriate agencies, either of their own Services or of other Services when common servicing, joint servicing, or cross servicing agreements or assignments are in effect. The amphibious task force commander is responsible for the overall supervision of the administrative activities of the component force commanders to insure that shipping and handling facilities are adequate for the administrative support of all elements of the amphibious task force.

256. Types of Logistical Support

In invasion type amphibious operations, the logistical buildup of forces and materiel to support future combat operations must be accomplished concurrently with operations against the enemy. In a limited objective type amphibious operation, logistical support usually is limited to maintaining the current requirements of the force.
CHAPTER 9
COMMAND OF THE AIR

Section I. GENERAL

257. Scope
This chapter relates to command of the air in a theater of operations. It is not intended to guide Army forces engaged in the air defense of North America.

258. Relationship of Land and Air Operations
a. Land operations are critically affected by and are inseparable from air operations. The land force commander is vitally concerned with the ability of either side to use the air to influence the land battle.
b. Opposing forces seek to gain command of the air, to assist their land forces and hinder those of the enemy by attack with missiles and aircraft.

259. Command of the Air
a. Command of the air is the capability of one force over another that permits it to conduct air operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the air force, missile, or air defense artillery action of the other.
b. Command of the air denies the enemy profitable use of the air in a given area. It permits land operations without prohibitive interference from hostile air reconnaissance or attack by aircraft or missile. Command of the air enables the force to conduct air operations in conjunction with its land operations.
c. Command of the air is relative in area, degree, and duration. Its influence on land operations depends upon the nature of enemy weapons, on force vulnerability, and on the degree of risk which the commander assumes.
d. Command of the air is a prerequisite for large scale land operations; its achievement is a primary concern of land force commanders.

260. Attainment and Maintenance of Command of the Air
a. Command of the air is gained and maintained only through offensive and defensive operations that exploit the capabilities of all participating forces. Both types of operations are essential; neither alone can provide the degree of command of the air needed for the decisive joint application of military power.
b. Operations of offensive counter-firepower and active air defense means are directed to the following tasks:

   (1) **Offensive counter-firepower means.**

   (a) Seek out and destroy hostile cruise or ballistic type missile, aircraft including drones, and artillery by attacks against such means on the ground.

   (b) Deny establishment of and destroy enemy installations required to apply and support his offensive firepower and active air defense means.

   (c) Nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile missile, aircraft including drones, and artillery by electronic warfare against such means on the ground.

   (d) Wage offensive warfare against the sources of enemy military and economic strength under approved war policies.

   (2) **Active air defense means.**

   (a) Attack and destroy hostile missiles and aircraft including drones with fires of air defense artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and fighter-interceptor aircraft against such means in the air.

   (b) Nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile missiles, aircraft including drones, and artillery by electronic warfare against electromagnetic radiations used by such enemy means for airborne communications, navigation, fire control, identification, electronic warfare, fuzing, or other purposes.

   (c) Assist in accomplishing the tasks of offensive counter-firepower means by using active air defense means in their secondary role.

c. All forces take passive air defense measures. These include all measures, other than active air defense operations, to minimize the effects of hostile missiles and aircraft including drones, e.g., use of cover and concealment, dispersion, control of movement, and appropriate communication and electronic security measures.

d. Offensive counter-firepower and active air defense operations in a theater of operations support strategic and tactical plans. These operations are usually joint in nature; their success is assured only by adequate joint planning and training.

e. Complete command of the air results only from total destruction of the enemy's aviation, missiles, and artillery. Since this is seldom practicable, offensive counter-firepower operations must be continuous and intensive, while effective air defense must be constantly maintained. Both offensive counter-firepower and air defense operations seek to gain and maintain the requisite degree
of command of the air and to provide security from hostile offensive firepower operations.

f. Offensive counter-firepower and active air defense means must be able to shift quickly from one objective to another in a theater of operations. This flexibility is attained only by close coordination of the operations of participating units.

g. Command of the air may result by default when the enemy does not possess, or fully employ, significant air and missile capabilities. Such conditions may exist in a limited war.

261. Operational Considerations in Land Operations

a. Long-range offensive counter-firepower and active air defense operations may precede or accompany the initial contact of surface forces. The success of early long-range offensive counter-firepower operations and air defense aids in the orderly mobilization and strategic concentration of field forces and in the movement of such forces from concentration areas under strategic plans.

b. The degree of command of the air which can be achieved is a major consideration in assigning strategic and tactical tasks to land forces. In determining the required degree of command of the air the commander must weigh the risk involved. A commander may have to conduct or order land operations when command of the air is marginal or lacking.

Section II. ARMY CAPABILITIES FOR COMMAND OF THE AIR OPERATIONS

262. General

Army weapons and forces participate in offensive and defensive operations to gain and maintain command of the air. Offensive means include weapons with surface-to-surface capabilities, the maneuver of land forces and employment of guerrilla forces. Defensive means include surface-to-air weapons, electronic warfare, and passive defense measures.

263. Army Surface-to-Surface and Surface-to-Air Weapons

a. Army surface-to-surface weapons are used in offensive operations to gain command of the air as part of Army fire support plans and Army or joint interdiction programs.

b. Army surface-to-air weapons are used to defend the combat zone, the communications zone, and critical installations throughout the area of operations.
264. Maneuver of Land Forces

The maneuver of land forces may contribute to command of the air operations. By threatening enemy bases or cutting lines of communication to enemy airbases and missile sites, land forces may make such areas untenable and may place friendly offensive counter-firepower means in a more advantageous position. Such maneuvers may force the enemy to commit his aircraft and missiles under conditions that reduce their effectiveness. Air mobile and airborne forces are particularly suited for offensive operations against enemy bases.

265. Guerrilla Forces

Guerrilla forces participate in command of the air operations by sabotage, subversion, and attack against aircraft and missile bases including launching and support installations, lines of communication critical to enemy air and missile capabilities, and the production base.

266. Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare is used to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile aircraft, missiles, and electronically fuzed artillery projectiles. Electronic warfare is directed against enemy electromagnetic means for airborne communications, navigation, fire control, identification, electronic warfare, fuzing, or other purposes.

Section III. AIR DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

267. Organizational Requirements

Air defense systems must—

a. Respond instantly to the direction of responsible commanders.

b. Provide for maximum decentralization of execution of active air defense operations while providing for centralized direction of such operations.

c. Provide for appropriate integration of air defense means with all other means of the combined arms force to gain maximum combat power.

d. Insure mutual understanding and confidence, particularly in the use of air space, among agencies participating in active air defense and offensive counter-firepower operations and those performing other forms of aviation operations.

e. Incorporate intelligence systems capable of high speed data collection, collation, and dissemination.

f. Permit timely identification of friendly aircraft.
g. Incorporate air defense command control capable of rapid coordination of facilities with adequate secure communications and integrated staffs and direction of force employment and operations at all levels.

268. The Theater Commander

The theater commander determines air defense priorities and allocates air defense means thereto. He organizes a theater joint air defense command whose commander, normally an air component commander, is responsible for air defense. The air defense commander exercises the authority of the theater commander to coordinate all air defense forces. This authority does not lessen subordinate commanders' responsibilities for the defense of their forces against all forms of attack, but it includes authority to prescribe coordinating procedures for Army, Navy and Air Force air defense weapon systems as directed by the theater commander.

269. The Field Army

The field army commander is responsible for Army operations in and over the field army area including enemy-held territory to a depth designated by higher headquarters. He is provided means and authority commensurate with this responsibility, including weapons and forces, to defend against air attack. He retains full control of the organic air defense means of his area, subject to the commander's operational procedures and the coordinating procedures prescribed by the joint air defense commander.

270. Coordination of Air Defense in the Combat Zone

a. All air defense artillery weapons, air defense electronic warfare units, and air defense elements of the tactical air force contribute to the air defense of the field army. In supervision of engagement control, intelligence, and communications all air defense artillery and land based air defense electronic warfare units in the field army are integrated into a highly coordinated system to insure their effectiveness.

b. The field army commander designates a field army air defense commander who is responsible for the active air defense of the field army. The field army air defense commander commands all active air defense means assigned or attached to the field army less those assigned or attached to subordinate echelons. He prescribes, to the degree necessary, coordinating procedures for all active air defense units in the field army area as approved by the field army commander. He coordinates all air defense fires and air defense forces so that their efforts are fully integrated with those of the force as a whole.
c. The field army has staff means for coordinating air defense with other combat and combat support means.

271. Defense of the Communications Zone

a. All air defense resources behind the field army rear boundary are under the operational command of the theater joint air defense commander. The theater commander determines the priority of defense of areas in the communications zone.

b. A theater army air defense commander commands all army air defense forces participating in the defense of the communications zone. He may also be the theater air defense commander. The theater joint air defense commander has operational command of the theater army air defense force.

Section IV. AIR DEFENSE PLANNING

272. General

The objective of air defense planning is to provide the various portions of the defended area with a capability to deny penetration proportional to their overall strategic or tactical value and consistent with the estimated threat of attack. The accomplishment of the objective may vary with the mission of the planner, e.g., determining the number of each type of air defense units to provide a specific degree of protection of an industrial, metropolitan, or military area of strategic or tactical importance; or planning the best allocation and disposition of a fixed number of units for any of these areas. The nature of the threat precludes an impregnable defense.

273. Planning Considerations

Air defense planning is based upon—

a. Air defense means available.

b. Relative priorities of areas to be defended.

c. Specific attack threats for each area to be defended.

d. Amount of damage that can be sustained by defended areas and still permit the occupying installations and organizations to accomplish their missions.

274. Determination of Priorities

Criteria that determine air defense priorities are—

a. The importance of the area, force, or installation in accomplishment of the force mission.

b. The enemy's ability to hit a particular installation.

c. The susceptibility of a particular installation or force to damage from a given type of attack.
d. The ease and speed with which an installation of force can be restored if it is damaged or destroyed.

e. The importance of an area as a source of United States or allied military or economic strength.

275. Standing Operating Procedures

The theater joint air defense commander prescribes joint air defense standing operating procedures as approved by the theater commander. These standing operating procedures insure the efficient employment of air defense weapons, eliminate interference in the performance of missions, and provide protection to friendly aircraft and troops. Missions assigned to uni-Service commands may involve operational functions and responsibilities that affect other forces participating in the air defense of an area; these overlapping functions must be defined clearly to insure an effective air defense. The details of air defense standing operating procedures vary widely with operational conditions.
CHAPTER 10
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Section I. GENERAL

276. General

a. Unconventional warfare is conducted within the enemy's sphere of influence largely by local personnel and resources to further military, political, or economic objectives. It consists of three interrelated fields: guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion.

b. Unconventional warfare operations exploit the vulnerabilities of an opposing nation that derive from the fundamental attitudes and characteristics of the nation and its people. These vulnerabilities are most acute when the governmental or other controlling process is oppressive to the people.

c. The ability of relatively small clandestine and covert forces to attack targets deep in enemy territory is a unique capability that cannot be reckoned with in the conventional manner. The importance of the targets that can be attacked is the primary consideration rather than the size and composition of such forces.

277. Conduct of Operations

Unconventional warfare is conducted by field organizations trained, equipped, and directed to operate directly against sources of enemy strength. It is closely integrated with economic, political, and psychological warfare. It differs from other military operations because it involves close working relationships with the local population of enemy controlled areas. Due to its operational environment, it requires that special emphasis be placed on counterintelligence measures.

278. Employment of Means

a. The means used in unconventional warfare vary from clandestine passive resistance to the use of weapons of great destructive power.

b. The ideological nature of modern conflict gives unconventional warfare an important role in all forms of war. Particularly in cold war the struggle for influence over the minds of men makes unconventional warfare a key element. Successful conduct of unconventional warfare could be decisive in achieving national objectives. Counter unconventional warfare is equally important.
279. **Coordination of Operations**

*a.* Unconventional warfare is planned and coordinated at the national level and requires participation by many governmental agencies.

*b.* During military operations, the senior commander in the field plans, coordinates, and executes unconventional warfare operations appropriate to his mission.

*c.* The theater commander normally establishes a joint unconventional warfare task force. Under exceptional circumstances a service component commander may be made responsible for these operations.

280. **Related Activities**

*a.* The unconventional warfare organization may use a psychological warfare campaign. Unconventional warfare may contribute to or support political and economic warfare and vice versa.

*b.* Unconventional warfare forces produce intelligence to support their operations. They can also provide intelligence support to conventional military commanders; however, such support must not impair their primary capabilities.

### Section II. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS

281. **General**

*a.* Commanders in the field insure that unconventional warfare supports all other military operations.

*b.* Unconventional warfare increases in importance with the expansion of the ideological struggle, the increasing effectiveness of mass media of communication, the advent of new weapons, the availability of special forces type units, the increasing scope of psychological warfare operations, and improvements in transportation.

*c.* Unconventional warfare is particularly useful when the use of force must be limited. Unconventional warfare operations can be directed against selected portions of the enemy’s economy or against specific political factions; such action may achieve the objective of a campaign with minimum commitment of conventional forces. Under certain circumstances in limited war or cold war military operations may be primarily concerned with directing unconventional forces or combating them.

282. **Psychological, Political, and Economic Influences**

*a.* Psychological, political, and economic effects of other military
operations may have immediate or long term effects on unconventional warfare.

b. Since support by a portion of the local population depends on political and economic factors, the United States or coalition political and economic policies toward the country concerned directly affect the development of unconventional forces. Close coordination of conventional operations, psychological warfare, civil affairs, and unconventional warfare being conducted by the command assists in obtaining the necessary support of the local population.

c. The commander considers the political consequences of sponsoring guerrilla or subsersive forces. Prestige out of proportion to the support rendered may accrue to their leaders. Support of political groups not popular with the local people or not compatible with friendly national or coalition interests for reasons of expediency may be detrimental to long term objectives. The commander may be directed to sponsor certain indigenous elements primarily for political reasons, including furtherance of post-war political objectives.

d. Guerrilla forces may develop diverse political objectives. Rivalry may occur among leaders over personal post-war political ambitions. Every effort must be made to insure that the operations of all guerrilla forces are directed against the enemy and not against one another. It may become necessary, however, to conduct operations against rival guerrilla forces whose objectives are not reconcilable with those of sponsored guerrilla forces.

283. Influence of Conventional Operations

a. Conventional operations of a command affect the attitudes of people and influence effectiveness of unconventional warfare operations. Use of excessive force; destruction of religious, cultural, social, agricultural, and humanitarian facilities; and intentional violation of the rules of warfare alienate the populace, making operational tasks more difficult.

b. Psychological warfare operations directed at the enemy civil population can contribute to popular acceptance of the military activities of the command and influence the people to assist the operations of the force.

284. Refugees

Refugees are a valuable source of manpower for unconventional warfare operations. Close coordination with civil affairs, military police, and intelligence elements is required to exploit this source.

285. Effect on Operations

Destruction of facilities in the enemy rear area by unconven-
tional forces directly affects conventional operations. It may be desirable to destroy certain installations in an enemy occupied area. Conversely, if friendly forces will soon arrive in the area, guerrilla forces may prevent the enemy from destroying these same installations.

286. **Counter Unconventional Warfare**

Enemy unconventional warfare operations must be countered. Measures include the use of consolidation psychological warfare operations in conjunction with civil affairs, and the use of combat troops or friendly guerrillas in an antiguerrilla role.

Section III. **GUERRILLA WARFARE**

287. **General**

a. Guerrilla warfare comprises combat operations in enemy-held territory by predominantly indigenous forces on a military or paramilitary basis to reduce the combat effectiveness, industrial capacity, and morale of the enemy.

b. The primary mission of guerrilla forces is to interdict enemy lines of communication, installations, and centers of war production in support of conventional operations. Other missions of guerrilla forces are intelligence, psychological warfare, evasion and escape operations, and subversion.

c. Guerrilla operations are offensive actions carried out by relatively small forces. In addition to attacks on targets, guerrilla forces use the tactics of passive and active resistance, espionage, subversion, sabotage, diversion, reprisal, and propaganda. In many instances guerrilla operations resemble civil war.

d. Tactical guerrilla operations are closely coordinated with the tactical operations of conventional forces. Strategic guerrilla operations are conducted independently against target complexes deep in enemy territory. Guerrilla forces may make a major contribution to a campaign.

e. In nuclear war the fluidity of operations and dispersion of units increase the difficulty of maintaining authority over the population in an area and may create opportunities for development and effective employment of guerrilla forces. The unrestricted scale of use of nuclear weapons facilitates guerrilla operations because of the severely reduced effectiveness of enemy security forces due to destruction of communications, records and other facilities. The mass movement of people further complicates the problems of security forces.

f. Mountains, forests, jungles, and swamps are favorable types of terrain in and from which guerrilla forces operate. However,
advantages accruing from terrain may be countered if the enemy commits sufficient security forces to deny the area to guerrillas or uses airmobile forces against them.

\( g \). In exceptional circumstances conventional forces may conduct guerrilla operations.

288. Influence of Popular Opinion

Guerrilla warfare operations are most effective when the guerrilla force has the approval of the local populace; support is normally given to forces representing the aspirations of the majority. The most common and powerful motivation of a people is the desire to be liberated from oppression. However, this desire, even though strong, will not normally be manifested by overt action or support of dissident elements unless there appears to be a reasonable chance of success. Operations, both conventional and unconventional, can be used to convince the people of the inevitability of ultimate victory which will secure them from the revenge of the enemy. Existing resistance potential should be exploited or such potential generated where it does not already exist.

289. Spontaneous Resistance

Resistance elements may spontaneously initiate immediate and effective guerrilla action. Weapons and other supplies may be distributed to selected elements of a population in enemy-occupied areas to exploit spontaneous resistance or to assist groups in revolt against the enemy. A psychological warfare campaign should accompany the distribution of weapons to guide the efforts of the people and to provide additional motivation. This process is most likely to be effective in areas where a strong resentment to the enemy exists, where effective local leaders are on hand, and where the temperament of the people is such that significant numbers will openly resist the enemy if given the means. The disadvantage of arming in this manner is that the resulting guerrilla organizations are difficult to control and coordinate with other operations and may later cause major unpredictable political problems. For this reason it is best to infiltrate special forces teams to insure an adequate degree of control.

290. Special Forces

\( a \). When available, special forces teams are used to develop, organize, equip, train, support, and control guerrilla forces and to conduct guerrilla warfare. These teams are organized and trained to operate indefinitely with guerrilla forces. They enter enemy held territory by infiltrating by air, water or land means or, during retrograde operations, by staying behind after the withdrawal of friendly forces.
b. A special forces operational base, a headquarters physically located behind friendly lines, commands; administers; trains; and provides intelligence, technical operational and logistical support for special forces teams.

291. Coordination with Conventional Forces

a. Guerrilla forces normally are commanded by local leaders. These leaders may not be commanded by United States commanders. In such cases unity of effort is attained through cooperation rather than command.

b. The theater commander coordinates the entire guerrilla effort with his overall operational plan. The theater joint unconventional warfare task force plans, coordinates, and executes the guerrilla warfare operations.

c. As land forces approach areas in which friendly guerrilla forces are operating, the land force commander may be given the authority to assign missions to the guerrilla forces. When this occurs, liaison personnel from the theater unconventional warfare joint task force are attached to his staff to facilitate coordination of unconventional and conventional operations. When link-up with the guerrilla forces becomes imminent, operational control of the forces should pass to the appropriate land force commander who normally exerts his control through the designated special forces detachment. Operational control continues after link-up until tactical developments dictate otherwise. Upon link-up guerrilla units may be attached to specific United States units, e.g., divisions.

292. Guerrilla Missions

a. Guerrilla forces render the maximum assistance in the accomplishment of a field force mission by attacking targets in the rear areas at decisive times and places in conjunction with field force operations; or by conducting operations over a prolonged period to disrupt command and control, to cause withdrawal of troops from forward areas, and to tax enemy transportation, repair, and maintenance capabilities.

b. Guerrilla interdiction operations should be coordinated with the overall interdiction program. Lack of friendly command of the air greatly increases the requirement for interdiction by guerrilla forces.

c. Missions assigned guerrilla forces must be within their capabilities or their potential may be dissipated without achieving effective results. Static, difficult to guard, yet vital targets will normally yield the greatest return for the effort expended.

d. Guerrilla forces may be used to assist airborne and airmobile operations by performing offensive, interdiction, or intelligence and reconnaissance missions.
e. After link-up, guerrillas can assist civil affairs and counterintelligence units, protect routes and installations, mop-up bypassed resistance and provide guides. If the training and organization of the units are suitable, guerrillas can be assigned missions involving conventional combat.

293. Fire Coordination

a. Guerrilla forces can furnish target information, exploit the effects of nuclear and other fires and gather data for damage assessment.

b. Nuclear fires and close air support may be furnished by conventional forces to support guerrilla operations.

c. The commander considers the safety of guerrilla forces and coordinates with these forces when chemical or biological agents or nuclear fires are to be delivered into areas of guerrilla operations. Indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons in these areas will have a marked adverse effect on the attitudes of guerrilla elements and the population from which they derive their support. Guerrillas may be reluctant to provide information that might result in nuclear fires on their home areas.

294. Reinforcement of Guerrilla Forces

Guerrilla forces may be reinforced with fire support, aviation, and other tactical and tactical support elements. Army aviation can assist guerrilla units with logistical support, transportation, communications, and fire support. Airmobile, airborne, or surface-infiltrated elements may reinforce guerrilla units in the accomplishment of specific missions.

295. Communications

Guerrilla forces should be provided with communication equipment and cryptographic means. Alternate means of communication must be available because of the security risk and susceptibility to jamming inherent in radio. Extended ranges and need for portability may require special purpose radio equipment. Communication means to meet these requirements are provided by special forces teams.

296. Logistical Considerations

a. Guerrilla forces make maximum use of supplies available from both civilian sources and the enemy. However, if guerrilla forces are to achieve maximum effectiveness, a significant part of basic supplies such as medicine, signal communication equipment, arms and ammunition, must usually be delivered to them. Adequate logistical support increases the operational effectiveness of
guerrilla forces because it permits them to direct their efforts to their mission rather than to foraging. It also decreases the burden on the friendly population supporting the guerrilla force.

b. Initial logistical support consists of minimum essential supplies and equipment commensurate with the size and intended operations of the guerrilla force. The requirement for guerrilla support should be anticipated in long-range logistical plans. Foreign and nonstandard items may be required to support guerrilla forces adequately. Guerrilla force support may compete with the requirements of conventional forces.

c. Normally, air transport is the most effective method of delivering supplies to guerrilla forces, although delivery across beaches may be required. In determining quantities to be delivered, consideration is given to the guerrillas' capabilities to move the supplies from the delivery area prior to detection by enemy forces.

d. An effective way of influencing guerrilla activities is to withhold logistical support from uncooperative guerrilla forces. Before arriving at such a decision, however, the commander must consider the effects the resulting decrease in guerrilla operations will have against the enemy.

297. Demobilization

As friendly conventional forces move into the areas of guerrilla operations, the ability of guerrilla forces to support military operations gradually ceases. At this time the guerrilla units should be demobilized. If retained beyond their usefulness guerrillas become a liability to the conventional force and a source of potential trouble.

Section IV. EVASION AND ESCAPE

298. General

a. Evasion and escape is that part of unconventional warfare whereby friendly military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from enemy held or unfriendly areas to areas under allied control.

b. The objectives of evasion and escape are to obtain or return the maximum number of military personnel to friendly control and to obtain or free key civilians such as scientists or political leaders.

c. The infiltration of selected personnel into and out of enemy occupied areas is an integral part of unconventional warfare. However, the evasion and escape mechanisms may be organized independently of guerrilla forces.

d. Dispersion and instability on the nuclear battlefield create
frequent opportunities for unconventional forces to assist evaders and escapees.

Section V. SUBVERSION

299. General
Subversion against hostile states (resistance) comprises the actions by underground resistance groups for the purpose of reducing the military, economic, psychological, or political potential of an enemy. As resistance groups develop strength, their actions may become overt and their status shift to that of a guerrilla force.
CHAPTER 11
MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST IRREGULAR FORCES

Section I. GENERAL

300. General
Irregular forces characteristically employ tactics designed to offset the superior combat power of conventional military organizations. Through such tactics, relatively small numbers of individuals can tie down and inflict extensive damage on much larger, more highly organized forces, untrained in this form of warfare. Army forces must, therefore, be prepared to operate effectively against and to defeat such an enemy.

301. Purpose and Scope
This chapter provides broad doctrine and principles for the employment of combined arms forces against irregular forces blocking or hampering the attainment of U.S. objectives, where such operations are the primary mission of the Army force involved, or when the irregular activities are of such magnitude as to be beyond the capability of normal security measures and forces to control, including those in rear areas. While many similarities exist, these operations transcend tactical operations as a part of normal rear area security. Operations against irregular forces may occur during or in the aftermath of a general war or limited war, and are common in situations short of war.

302. Extent of Authority
a. The measures which U.S. military commanders may take against irregular forces during hostilities and in occupied enemy territory are limited to those which are authorized by the laws of land warfare (FM 27–10).

b. In liberated areas in which a friendly foreign government has been reestablished and in sovereign foreign countries in time of peace, the authority which United States military commanders may exercise against irregular forces is limited to that permitted by the provisions of agreements which are concluded with responsible authorities of the sovereign government concerned.

303. Explanation of Term
a. The term irregular, used in combinations such as irregular forces, irregular activities, counterirregular operations, etc., is used in the broad sense to refer to all types of nonconventional
forces and operations. It includes guerrilla, insurgent, subversive, resistance, terrorist, revolutionary, and similar personnel, organizations and methods.

b. Irregular activities include acts of a military, political, psychological, and economic nature, conducted predominantly by inhabitants of a nation for the purpose of eliminating or weakening the authority of the local government or an occupying power, and using primarily irregular and informal groupings and measures.

304. Operational Environment

a. Military units employed against irregular forces normally operate in an environment which is inherently sensitive, both politically and militarily. The scope and nature of missions assigned will frequently include political and administrative aspects and objectives not usually considered normal to military operations.

b. The fundamental cause of large-scale irregular activities stems from the dissatisfaction of some significant portion of the population, with the political, social, and economic conditions prevalent in the area. This dissatisfaction is usually expressed as a desire for one or more of the following: National independence, elimination of foreign exploitation, alleviation of economic conditions, elimination of corruption, increased emphasis on religion, and other relief from actual or alleged oppression. The ideological basis of an irregular force frequently is inspired by out-of-country elements who create and sponsor irregular forces as a means of promoting their own cause. Irregular forces usually develop in areas characterized by one or more of the following:

(1) An agrarian society with underdeveloped resources and industry, inadequate transportation, communication and food distribution systems; and a low standard of living.
(2) Periodic crop failure with accompanying famine or acute privation.
(3) High illiteracy rate, lack of educational institutions, medical and sanitation facilities.

c. Immediate decisive results of operations against irregular forces can seldom be observed. Operations are conducted against a violent, destructive force which presents an elusive target, tends to disperse before superior opposition, and then reforms to strike again. There may or may not be a front or rear in the normal military sense.

d. The organization and operations of irregular forces vary according to the terrain, character and density of population, availability of food, medical supplies, arms and equipment, quality of leadership, amount and nature of external support available, and countermeasures used against them. They may vary in size
from informal groups of relatively few individuals to organized units of division size or larger. They may or may not observe rules of land warfare. As the elements of an irregular force grow and approach regular units in organization, equipment, training, and leadership, their capabilities and tactics likewise change and become similar to those of a regular unit.

e. An irregular force normally consists of two primary, mutually supporting elements: A guerrilla element which operates overtly, and a subversive element or underground which operates covertly. Both elements may be supported by individuals or small groups in the area who are not formal members of either element but who assist in intelligence, evasion and escape, and logistics. The bases of the guerrilla element are usually found in areas where terrain minimizes the mobility, surveillance, and firepower advantage of the opposing force, but guerrillas can operate in any terrain by using appropriate tactics and formations. The subversive element or underground is the major irregular force in areas in which the opposing force maintains sufficient control to preclude the overt operations of guerrillas; however, clandestine elements are also important in guerrilla base areas. These areas overlap to a significant degree and the two elements may often be in a single organization under central control. An individual may participate in one or more types of operation. Irregular force operations therefore include overt and covert activities, both of which are usually very difficult to detect.

(1) Overt activities are characterized by individuals and groups openly conducting operations in the field. Such operations capitalize on stealth, surprise, unorthodox tactics, and rapid withdrawal or dispersal when effective opposition is encountered. They include: Acts of destruction against public and private property, transportation and communication systems; raids and ambushes against military and police personnel, headquarters, garrisons, convoys, patrols, and depots, terrorism by assassination, bombing, extortion, armed robbery, torture, mutilation and kidnaping; provocative incidents, reprisals, and holding of hostages; and denial activities, such as arson, flooding, demolition, use of chemical or biological agents, or other acts designed to prevent use of an installation, area, product, or facility.

(2) Covert activities are characterized by individuals and groups secretly conducting operations while outwardly maintaining normal identities. They include: Espionage and sabotage; dissemination of selected biological and chemical agents; fomenting of riots and demonstrations;
dissemination of propaganda, rumors, or false, misleading, delayed or misdirected orders or reports; assassination, kidnaping, extortion, blackmail, theft, and counterfeiting; and identifying individuals for terroristic attack. They support guerrillas in their operations by giving warning, intelligence, guides, food, medical supplies, etc.

f. The presence of foreign troops operating against irregular forces will invariably be exploited by propaganda for the purpose of discrediting the government in power and the foreign power.

305. Concept of Operations

a. Operations to suppress and eliminate irregular forces are primarily offensive in nature. Thus, the conventional force must plan for and seize the initiative at the outset and retain it throughout the conduct of the operation. These operations may be required in situations wherein an irregular force either constitutes the only enemy, or threatens rear areas of regular military forces which are conducting conventional operations. The operations are similar in either case.

b. Operations of the covert elements of irregular forces are often a more serious threat to conventional forces than those of the overt elements. However, countermeasures against both aspects of irregular forces must be coordinated and integrated at all levels if irregulars are to be eliminated or neutralized.

c. The initial force assigned to combat the irregular force should be adequate to complete the mission. Assignment of insufficient means will permit the irregular force to grow and may later necessitate the employment of many times the originally required number.

d. Within the restrictions of international law, maximum use is made of non-U.S. forces and personnel for all activities in which they may be profitably employed. These include combat operations, security of the civil populace and critical facilities and installations, guides and interpreters, intelligence and counterintelligence tasks, new construction and reconstruction in devastated areas and psychological activities.

e. Irregular forces lose effectiveness when not supported by the civil population, whether such support is provided willingly or is gained through coercion. They increase their effectiveness when supported by an external power. Thus, operations against irregular forces must make provision for isolating the irregular elements from these sources of support.

f. The irregular force itself is usually a result and not the cause of the problem. The destruction of an existing irregular force normally does not provide a complete solution. The population must be
convinced that the conduct or support of irregular activities will not only fail to gain the desired results, but may result in the imposition of sanctions and actually delay the elimination of the causes of discontent.

g. Irregular forces accompany their operations with extensive propaganda designed to gain support of the local population. As a countermeasure, the local government being supported by the U.S., as well as U.S. forces, must present a concrete program which will win popular support. Such action includes maximum exploitation of civil affairs and psychological warfare capabilities.

306. Employment of Forces

a. Major conventional units will normally be organized for combat into a number of small, variable size, task forces (squad to brigade) capable of semi-independent action without the combat support normally provided by division, corps and army. Organization is predicated upon the irregular activity in the area; i.e., guerrilla controlled, active, cleared, or dormant; and other area factors such as terrain and weather. Centralized command, however, is normally maintained.

b. A mobility differential over the irregular force must be attained. Dependent upon the area of operations, this will require a high degree of training in foot movement over difficult terrain and under adverse conditions, extensive use of transport aviation armed with weapon system, armed observation or utility helicopters, and/or a high degree of motorization or mechanization.

c. Heavy combat support units are frequently held in a state of constant readiness at central locations until situations develop which permit their effective employment.

d. Administrative support units are adapted to fulfill the requirements of the force being supported. Normally this will necessitate their operating from a large number of widely separated localities. In such instances, it will frequently be necessary to form small, composite administrative support units on a provisional basis. These units can perform their functions with a minimum of troops and will also be capable of maintaining support in extreme situations when provided with sufficient aerial supply vehicles.

e. It may become necessary to employ regular military units to protect populated places of varying size. Regular forces should be replaced in this task, when practicable, by civilian self-defense units as rapidly as they can be recruited, entrusted with responsibility, trained, and equipped by the local authorities.

f. Critical fixed installations and lines of communication are normally secured by utilizing dispositions and tactics set forth for units not restricted to fixed installations.
g. An extensive communication system is established. All communication means are exploited. Wire lines are extremely vulnerable, and their lack of security in a hostile area requires that emphasis be placed on other means. The extreme dispersion of small military units, the rugged terrain which is the usual operational area, and the requirements for detailed area surveillance and rapid, responsive, and continuous communication, usually demand air and ground electronic surveillance and air and ground communication capabilities which exceed those of organic signal equipment. Thus, augmentation may be provided when required. The use of army aircraft is effective for command control purposes and can provide a mobile command post and limited communication centrals. Local civil communication facilities are usually vulnerable to irregular force action. However, they should be used to the maximum extent possible to supplement military communication channels when consistent with security and reliability requirements.

h. Effective intelligence and counterintelligence measures are essential to success. Local sources are exploited to the maximum extent possible and a wide informant system is established among the population. Every effort is made to infiltrate the irregular force itself and to identify leaders and members. Augmentation of intelligence units is available from theater army as warranted by the magnitude of irregular activities.

i. Plans are made to employ all available weapons which are authorized for a given operation.

j. Once the conventional force is committed to action, the following measures are instituted:

(1) The irregular force is isolated from its sources of internal and/or external supply, recruiting, and reinforcement support. These measures may involve one or more of the following: Sealing of a border which is contiguous with a power friendly to the irregular force; establishment of an air and/or naval blockade; creation of restricted zones to isolate population centers and redoubt areas; resettlement or concentration of irregular force sympathizers in secure areas; stringent controls on food, medicines, and arms; and extensive ground and air search for and destruction of irregular force supply caches and installations.

(2) Strong points are established at critical points as area control bases. Prompt measures are taken to quell civilian disturbances and to identify and eliminate covert irregular elements by police type actions. Continued military pressure is maintained by intensive patrolling to locate
and maintain contact with overt irregular forces. Extensive aerial patrols, conducted in armed helicopters, are established and maintained in conjunction with and in support of the area control bases. Raids, ambushes, attacks followed by pursuit, and search and seizure operations are conducted to keep irregular forces in a constant state of alarm for their security, to prevent rest, and to hinder their conduct of operations. As overt groups are located, identified, and fixed in place, standby mobile units in sufficient strength to destroy them assemble to conduct the attack. Pending arrival of adequate forces to conduct the attack, armed helicopters assist in maintaining contact through observation and harassing fires. Heavy combat support elements are brought into the operation as required.

(3) Those irregular forces willing to fight in open battle are isolated to prevent escape and are immediately attacked; those which avoid open battle are forced by a series of police and military actions, into areas which permit encirclement. Once surrounded, such forces are destroyed by continuous determined attack. Should lack of time or nature of the terrain prevent complete encirclement or the effective blocking of escape routes, partial encirclement and surprise attack followed by aggressive pursuit should prove effective. Due to the reluctance of irregular forces to form large groups, the problems of identification, and the difficult terrain normally associated with an irregular force, it is usually necessary to isolate small bands or groups and destroy them individually. Psychological warfare exploitation of military success will include operations to induce surrender by irregular forces.

(4) Frequently, the extent of the area of operations and the forces available will preclude simultaneous concentration of sufficient effort throughout the commander's entire zone of responsibility. In such instances the overall area may be divided, be assigned to subcommanders, and be cleared piecemeal. This technique requires the sealing off of the subarea(s) in which the main effort is concentrated to prevent escape of irregular elements. Here, operations are conducted as outlined in (2) and (3) above. Once the subarea is cleared, the main combat force moves to the next subarea and repeats the process. Sufficient forces are retained in areas which have not been cleared, to conduct operations as outlined in (2) above until the main combat force is available. In areas
which have been cleared, sufficient forces must remain to maintain area control, to maintain psychological warfare pressure, to prevent the development of new irregular forces, and to apprehend irregular elements exfiltrating from uncleared areas.

k. Continuity of command and maintenance of the same units within an area are desirable to permit commanders, staffs, and troops to become thoroughly acquainted with the terrain and the local irregular force organization and techniques of operations.

l. Small special units may be organized, equipped, and trained to combat irregular forces by using the tactics and techniques of the latter. Special units can be very effective in maintaining the initiative with a minimum of troops, and often they are more effective than standard troop units. A type special unit might be composed of selected U.S. and allied military and police units augmented by trackers and guides, and supported by civil affairs and psychological warfare personnel where practicable. The unit is designed to hunt down and destroy small guerrilla elements of the irregular force, to establish and maintain contact with large guerrilla formation until arrival of friendly reinforcements, to maintain surveillance of areas, and to continually harass the irregular forces. Such units take maximum advantage of their superiority over the irregular force in mobility, communications, and supply.

307. Legal Aspects

a. Guerrilla warfare is bound by the rules of the Geneva Conventions (The Law of Land Warfare, FM 27-10). When the following four factors are present, a guerrilla has legal status and when captured, is entitled to the same treatment as a regular prisoner of war:

(1) Commanded by persons responsible for his subordinates.
(2) Wearing a fixed and distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.
(3) Carrying arms openly.
(4) Conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

b. The covert elements of an irregular force normally do not hold legal status.

Section II. COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

308. General

Army operations against irregular forces in a general or limited war will usually be conducted within the command structure established for the particular theater. Thus, the senior head-
quarters actually conducting the operations may be joint, combined, or uni-Service. If an established communications zone exists, control of Army operations against irregular forces in this area will normally be a responsibility of the theater army logistical command or the appropriate section headquarters. Operations against irregular forces must be correlated with civil affairs operations in the area.

309. Command and Staff Relationships

a. Uni-Service headquarters frequently control operations against irregular forces in a situation short of war. However, immediate establishment of a joint command is usually advantageous when forces of more than one service are involved. Participation by allies may make a combined command desirable. Political considerations will materially influence military operations. A political advisor is normally provided the military commander, and the campaign is planned and conducted in close coordination with Department of State, Department of Defense and other U.S. or allied agencies represented in the area. The limits of the military commander's authority are carefully prescribed, particularly in relation to civil responsibilities.

b. Full responsibility for liberated areas is to be transferred to local civil authorities as soon as an effective local government has, in the considered judgment of the commander, been reestablished. The authority of U.S. military commanders in these areas after the reestablishment of an effective local government will be that provided by treaty or agreement.

Section III. TRAINING

310. General

Operations against irregular forces are often characterized by small unit or combat patrol actions in difficult terrain. Frequently, the military units will have available only the supporting fires of those heavy weapons which can be man or animal packed or lifted by helicopter. In many instances, elements will be required to be logistically self-sufficient for extended periods of time. In others, only aerial supply may be possible.

311. Training

Training for such operations will be integrated into field exercises and maneuvers as well as included in individual and small unit training programs. Aggressor forces in training exercises should include irregular activities, both covert and overt.
312. **Individual and Small Unit Training**

Individual and small unit training should emphasize:

a. Tactics and techniques, to include use of supporting weapons, used by small units in expected operational environments; i.e., built-up areas, mountains, deserts, and swamps.

b. Long range combat patrol operations under primitive conditions and utilizing only such supplies as can be transported with the patrol.

c. Immediate reaction to unexpected combat situations.

d. Techniques of raids, ambushes and defensive and security measures against these types of operations.

e. Employment of Army aviation, to include tactics and techniques of helicopterborne assault, and techniques of command control utilizing army aircraft.

f. Aerial supply by army and air force aircraft to include drop zone marking and materiel recovery techniques.

g. Aircraft loading and unloading to include litter patients and external and internal loads of materiel.

h. Cross-country movement at night and under adverse weather conditions to include tracking and land navigation.

i. Support by psychological warfare units.

j. Police type search and seizure techniques, counterintelligence and interrogation measures.

k. Guard duty, police type patrolling and control of civilians, to include the operation of road blocks and check points; riot control and civil disturbances, to include employment of irritant chemical agents.

l. Convoy escort and security to include the use of armed helicopters.

m. Advanced first aid.

n. Cross training on all communication equipment available within the type unit and all communication techniques.

o. Cross training in all individual and crew served weapons available within the type unit.

p. Orientation on the nature of the motivations and objectives of the irregular forces to include counter-propaganda training and orientation on the need to engage in such operations.

q. Civil affairs training.

313. **Specialized Training**

Dependent upon the characteristics of the area of operations, further specialized training may be required, to include:

a. Indoctrination in the local language, customs, cultural background, or personalities of irregular force and friendly leaders, to improve ability to understand, communicate and get along with the
local populace. (To be accomplished prior to arrival in the area, and continued throughout the operation.)

b. Terrain appreciation, camouflage and concealment, to include individual techniques for prolonged periods of isolated surveillance.

c. Survival techniques, to include manner and technique of living off the land for short periods.

d. The use of animal transport for weapons and logistical support.

e. Movement techniques in mountains, jungles, or swamps.

f. Cold weather movement and survival to include ski and sled operations.

g. Utilization of water means to gain access into areas occupied by irregular forces.

314. Morale and Psychological Considerations

a. Troops employed against irregular forces are subject to morale and psychological pressures different from those normally present in conventional operations. This is particularly true in situations short of war and results to a large degree from:

(1) The ingrained reluctance of the soldier to take repressive measures against the women, children, and old men who often are active in both overt and covert operations or must be resettled or concentrated for security reasons.

(2) The difficulty of understanding the reasons why such operations are necessary when the safety of the soldier's own nation is not visibly threatened.

(3) A natural sympathy on the part of the individual with many of the broad objectives of the irregular force.

(4) The action required to prevent soldiers taking vindictive retaliatory measures.

(5) The characteristics of the operations themselves to include:

(a) The difficulty in realizing or observing tangible short term results.

(b) The primitive living and operating conditions in difficult terrain.

(c) The long periods of inactivity which may occur when troops are assigned to static security tasks.

(d) Inexperience in guerrilla and other irregular tactics and dislike of police type work.

b. Commanders at all echelons must plan and carry out on a continuing basis, an indoctrination, education and training program which will effectively offset these morale and psychological pressures. Disciplinary cases must be handled forcefully and ex-
peditiously to insure a successful program for establishing good will and cooperation, and preventing antagonisms on the part of the local population.

Section IV. INTELLIGENCE

315. Intelligence

a. Accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence is essential to successful operations against irregular forces. The detection of existing or developing sentiment or activity within an area is inherent in the countersubversion mission of the intelligence support organization of the command. The nature of the enemy, tactical deployment of U.S. troops and presence of both friendly and hostile non-U.S. personnel in the combat area require modification of normal procedures.

b. Intelligence activities will be characterized by extensive employment of police type techniques. Among these are:

(1) Search and seizure operations.
(2) Check points and road blocks.
(3) Documentation of civilians for identification with central files.
(4) Civil censorship.
(5) Physical and electronic surveillance of suspects, meeting places, etc.
(6) Maintenance of extensive dossiers.
(7) Judicious use of confidential funds and supplies for the obtaining of information.

c. Clandestine operations are a primary source of information. Every effort is made to infiltrate the irregular force itself. Although non-U.S. agents may be used to infiltrate irregular forces, these agents frequently operate as double agents and will relate information gained about friendly forces to the irregular force.

d. The nature of intelligence operations described above requires a knowledge of local customs, languages, cultural background and personalities not attainable by U.S. personnel in the time normally allowed. As a result, local police, security and government organizations must be exploited to the maximum extent possible. Liaison personnel, interpreters, guides, trackers and clandestine agents are normally required. The loyalty and trustworthiness of these personnel must be firmly established. Frequently, these personnel cooperate with both opposing forces in an effort to achieve the maximum personal gain.

e. Counterintelligence is complicated by the degree of reliance which must be placed on local organizations and individuals in
operations and the difficulty in distinguishing between friendly and hostile members of the population. Political considerations will frequently hinder proper counterintelligence screening. Close and continuing coordination and liaison with civil affairs staff sections and units will assist in resolving these problems. Among the measures which may be taken to contribute to security are:

1. Extensive use of tactical cover and deception measures.
2. Centralized planning of operations.
3. Sealing of area control or other unit bases prior to issuance of operations orders.
4. Electronic countermeasures.
5. Psychological warfare.
6. Designating and posting restricted areas in the vicinity of populated areas and the control of farm occupants and herdsmen.

f. Military map coverage of the area will frequently be inadequate for small unit operations. Intelligence planning should provide for suitable substitutes such as large scale photo coverage.

g. Army aviation should be exploited to its fullest extent as an intelligence collection agency.

Section V. LOGISTICS

316. General

Logistical support of military units committed against irregular forces is normally characterized by both organizational and geographical decentralization. The deployment of the command and its organization for combat will usually dictate modification of conventional logistical structures and procedures to provide effective support of combat operations.

317. Supply

a. Supply planning must recognize the lack of valid experience data for a wide variety of environments in which these type operations will occur. Established consumption factors, basic loads, stockage levels, and bases of issue must be adjusted to fit the local requirement. Similar factors must be developed for non-U.S. forces which may have to be supported in whole or part from U.S. stocks. The abnormal need for specialized items of material must be taken into consideration early in coordination with responsible commanders and staff agencies.

b. It frequently will be necessary to establish and maintain stockage levels of all classes of supply at echelons below those where such stockage is normally required. Area control bases, outposts, garrisons, and security detachments are examples of
localities where significant levels may be necessary on a continuing basis.

c. The command must be prepared to provide minimum essential items to elements of the civilian population. These elements may include victims of irregular force attack, isolated population centers, and/or groups which have been relocated or concentrated for security reasons. Such supply will normally be limited to Class I but may include other survival necessities such as medical supplies, clothing, construction materials and fuel.

d. Supervision of the distribution of non-U.S. supplies destined for civilian consumption will often be necessary. This requires establishment of strict controls governing assembly, storage, and issue of those items which could be used by irregular forces. While non-U.S. personnel are employed in this task to the maximum extent possible, the situation may be such that all or part of the effort may fall on the U.S. command supply agencies.

e. Security of supply installations is more critical than in conventional warfare. Not only must supplies be conserved for friendly consumption but their use must be denied to irregular elements. Supply personnel must be prepared and equipped to cope with irregular force attack, and must guard against contamination, pilferage, and robbery of supplies by both friendly and hostile members of the populace.

318. Transportation

a. Transportation planning and operations must recognize the increased problems inherent in supporting operations against irregular forces. These result primarily from:

(1) Distances usually existing between area control bases, garrisons, security detachments, and combat units operating in the field.

(2) The extremely difficult terrain and lack of communications existing in underdeveloped areas where such operations are apt to occur.

(3) The high degree of probability that movements will be subject to ground attack or harassment and delay.

b. Organic transportation means normally require augmentation from both U.S. and local sources. TOE materiel may be of little use in a given locality and may have to be replaced by items more suitable to the area. Dependent upon the conditions under which the command is operating, provision of adequate transportation may require such measures as:

(1) Recruiting non-U.S. bearer units for man pack operations.

(2) Organizing provisional animal pack units, to include the
necessary logistic support backup, from whatever resources are available.

(3) Exploitation of available waterways for small boat or raft movement.

(4) Exploitation of local land transportation to include railway and highway equipment.

c. En route security will normally be provided all surface movements. Appropriate measures include:

(1) Intensive combat training of drivers and the arming of vehicles involved.

(2) Use of armed helicopter escorts.

(3) Provision of convoy ground escorts. If available, and if terrain permits their use, tanks and armored vehicles are well suited for this purpose.

d. Because of their speed, relative security from ground attack, lack of sensitivity to terrain conditions, and adaptability to small unit movement, aircraft are frequently the most effective means of supply or troop movement. Both Army aviation and Air Force units are utilized. Terrain, the tactical situation, and airstrip availability will normally require employment of air dropped as well as air landed resupply.

319. Evacuation and Hospitalization

a. Normal medical service organization and procedures will require some adaptation to the type combat operations envisioned. Effective medical support is complicated by:

(1) The distances between and number of fixed installations where support must be provided.

(2) The habitual use of small mobile units in independent or semi-independent combat operations in hostile areas through which secure ground evacuation may be impossible and/or from which aerial evacuation of patients cannot be accomplished.

(3) The vulnerability of ground evacuation means to guerrilla ambush and attack and the inability to rely completely upon scheduled convoy movements.

b. The following measures are among those which may be adopted to cope with the complicating factors outlined above:

(1) Establishment of aid stations or dispensaries with a treatment and holding capacity at much lower echelons than is normal. These echelons include area control bases, security detachments, etc. Patients to be evacuated by ground transport will be held until movement with a secure convoy is possible.

(2) Provision of sufficient air or ground means to move medical units/elements rapidly to:
(a) Establish, or reinforce existing treatment and holding installations where patients have become unexpectedly numerous.

(b) Provide unit level medical service to small combat units operating away from their base or temporary medical support to civilian localities which have been subjected to irregular force attack.

(3) Maximum utilization of air evacuation means. This includes both scheduled and oncall evacuation support of fixed installations and combat elements in the field.

(4) Improvisation of small medical elements to provide unit level medical support to tactical units on long-range missions.

(5) Formation of non-U.S. litter bearer teams to accompany combat units in those situations where limitations of terrain or available means preclude patient transportation or evacuation by other methods.

(6) Strict supervision of sanitation measures, maintenance of individual medical equipment, and advanced first aid training throughout the command.

(7) Increased emphasis on basic combat training of medical service personnel; increased arming of medical service personnel as required; increased use of armored carriers for ground evacuation where feasible.

320. Construction

a. The underdeveloped communication system and the difficult terrain conditions normal to areas in which operations against irregular forces may be conducted will frequently require more light construction support than conventional operations by a similar size command. The situation is usually aggravated by the large-scale demolition and other sabotage operations of irregular forces.

b. Construction planning should provide for:

1. Area control bases and their defenses.
2. An adequate ground communication system.
3. Mobile repair teams capable of rapid movement to facilities damaged by irregular forces.
4. Extensive airstrip and helicopter pad construction in difficult terrain.
5. Essential concentration or resettlement areas for non-U.S. personnel.
6. Required support to the local populace.

c. The scope of the construction effort requires maximum exploitation of local labor and materiel resources. Additionally, combat units will be required to participate to a larger degree than normal in the construction of facilities for their own use.
Section VI. CIVIL AFFAIRS

321. General

In military operations against irregular forces the civilian support rendered to either our own or allied forces and the irregular forces is often of such importance as to mean the difference between success or failure. Success is dependent upon a definite program of civil affairs and psychological warfare activities to create proper attitudes and relationships with the people in the area both as individuals and as members of the community. The acceptance and understanding of this program by the civilian population are vital to its success. The commander must be provided with the full capability of conducting the civil affairs activities required to accomplish his objective.

322. Planning

a. Civil Affairs plans for combating irregular force operations must be based upon detailed instructions and guidance on U.S. policies and objectives within the area of operations.

b. Plans will provide for draft civil affairs agreements which can be negotiated without delay as the need for such agreement arises. Agreements must consider political as well as military aspects of the operation. The most propitious time for negotiating such agreements is prior to entry of our troops into the area. This will hold to a minimum those initial problems and difficulties arising from military-civil relationships.

c. Relationships with the central national government and the subordinate governmental agencies as well as relationships with military forces within the area, are dependent upon U.S. and allied policies and objectives. They must be defined in operational planning with appropriate instructions and guidance to the commander. When accredited U.S. diplomatic representatives are present and functioning, the relations of the commander on the one hand, and the U.S. diplomatic representatives on the other relating to responsibilities, authority and coordination will be delineated if necessary, by executive order.

d. In order for the commander to formulate operational plans, adequate political and military intelligence of the area must be made available to him.

323. Operations

a. Commanders will take full advantage at all times of opportunities to further U.S. national and allied policy through relationships between the local population and U.S. and allied personnel. Types of activities which should be considered are:
(1) Use of humanitarianism and justice in dealing with the people. Treat them properly, respect their customs, and win them as friends.

(2) Alleviation of suffering and want—provide the basic necessities until the economy is capable of assuming this responsibility, and be interested in the welfare of the people.

(3) Participation in cooperative self-help projects in the economic and social fields to raise living standards.

(4) Helping to establish an effective civil governmental administration. Govern for the benefit of the governed. Determine that local government is properly constituted and properly functioning with justice to all.

(5) Screening officials to eliminate dissident elements.

(6) Providing for the care of refugees and displaced persons.

(7) Keeping the people properly informed.

b. The commander must make continuous appraisal of the attitude of the civilian population toward the individual soldier. The individual soldier’s conduct and attitude toward the population must be that of a friend and assistant in the promulgation of democratic principles and practices. Individuals must be cognizant of their responsibility to demonstrate to the local population as well as the irregular forces that they are well trained, considerate, and resourceful soldiers, capable of performing assigned duties under any conditions or within any environment.

c. A properly directed information program through local public news media is a major means of gaining and retaining essential public support.

(1) Local news media may operate independently, under partial control of the friendly government we are supporting, or under varying degrees of control by those conducting civil affairs and psychological operations. Public information principles govern where there is no media control; in situations of controlled media, programs are conducted in consonance with civil information principles.

(2) Under all conditions, the decentralized nature of operations against irregular forces places the responsibility for information program execution at lower levels than in conventional operations. Therefore, thorough indoctrination of commanders of all echelons in information responsibilities and relations with local news media representatives is necessary.

d. In relations with the population and governments in the area civic action of the commander will frequently be utilized as one of
the forces within his command. Civic action of the command is any action performed by the military forces utilizing available human and material resources for the well-being and improvement of the community. It can be a major contributing factor to the development of favorable public opinion and in accomplishing his mission of defeating the irregular forces. Commanders, utilizing available resources, will cooperate with local military and civic leaders in the development of programs and projects for civic action. In addition, the commander will frequently be responsible for civil affairs activities such as administration of U.S. economic or social programs within the area of operations. Detailed attention to the success of these operations will be a contributing factor to accomplishing his mission against irregular forces.

e. In many actions against irregular forces it will be vital to the successful accomplishment of the commander's missions that some measure of civil control be initiated, in accordance with current policy, doctrine and pertinent agreements. In all cases restriction of civilian freedom will be minimal and will utilize to a maximum local military and civil organizations as enforcing agencies. In all cases a vigorous public education and civil information program will be utilized to show that these actions are vital to the success of the allied cause, that control measures are of a temporary nature, and that they will be discontinued as soon as our mission is accomplished.
CHAPTER 12
SITUATIONS SHORT OF WAR

Section I. GENERAL

324. Definition

a. Situations short of war are those specific circumstances and incidents of cold war in which military force is moved to an area directly and is employed to attain national objectives in operations not involving formal open hostilities between nations. Such operations are conducted within the authority granted by the Congress and within the provisions of the Constitution.

b. The term "Situations Short of War" does not apply to the normal and continuing deterrence functions of currently deployed overseas forces. However, component elements of such forces may be further deployed to cope with a "Situation Short of War" in an adjacent or local area.

325. Characteristics

a. Situations short of war develop from the underlying condition of cold war. They can and often do, however, involve some combat, usually against guerrillas or rebel type forces. The direct cause of the specific situation may be a threat to U.S. interests by acts of a hostile power against another state or nation by illegal occupation, subversion, or coercion through embargo, blockade or a show of force.

b. The objectives of such actions by a hostile state may include seizure of control of a friendly government, occupation or intimidation of a weaker country, or defeat of friendly elements within the country.

326. U.S. Forces Participation

United States participation in situations short of war often results from alliances or coalition agreements. United States military forces participate in such actions only by specific order of responsible governmental authority. Within the broad scope of situations short of war, military operations may be designed to achieve the following:

a. Encourage a weak and faltering government.

b. Stabilize a restless area.

c. Deter or thwart aggression.

d. Reinforce a threatened area.

e. Check or counter aggressive moves by opposing powers.

f. Maintain or restore order.
327. Force Capabilities and Requirements

a. Operations in situations short of war normally involve limited forces which are characterized by strategic mobility, self-sufficiency and the ability to apply measured force. Highly ready strategic mobile forces held in reserve in the United States or deployed to oversea bases are appropriate for employment in such situations.

b. A division type organization is particularly suitable in operations short of war. Certain divisions in the strategic reserve are specifically tailored to provide the balanced strategic mobility and combat capability required for these operations.

328. Missions

a. Missions assigned forces in situations short of war include the following:

   (1) Show of force.
   (2) Truce enforcement.
   (3) International police action.
   (4) Legal occupation.

b. Specific operations within these missions may include parades, maneuvers, demonstrations, police and patrol duty, or limited combat action against irregular or partisan forces.

Section II. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

329. Command Requirements and Limitations

a. Situations short of war normally entail mission type orders. While the limits of the commander's authority will be prescribed, particularly in relation to State Department responsibility and that of its representatives, the commander will usually be given necessary latitude in determining how to accomplish his assigned mission.

b. The commander must use the minimum amount of force required to accomplish force objectives and discontinue the use of force when it is no longer required. Only the commander on the ground is in a position to estimate the degree of force that must be used. The excessive use of force can seldom be justified; it can only lead to the need to apply ever-increasing force to maintain the same degree of order, and to the loss of sympathy and support of the local populace. At the same time, the use of inadequate force not only will jeopardize accomplishment of the mission but also will have an adverse or reduced impact on the local populace. If efforts to gain confidence of the local populace are not to be defeated, hostile terrorists and guerrillas must be treated with re-
spect and humanity when captured, no matter how despicable their acts.

330. Joint and Combined Operations

Situations short of war operations usually involve cooperation and coordination with other services. Army forces require the support of other services for transportation to the area. Frequently, support will be required for the establishment of supply bases and for combat and service support. The Army force may be subordinated to another service which may have overall responsibility for the operation, or it may be the predominant force and have Navy and Air Force support. The military service which is predominant in strength will normally be charged with cross-service or common service support to other elements of the joint force. The commander often will find himself cooperating with allied forces or acting as a subordinate of an allied commander. The commander and his staff must understand joint and allied command staff relationships and procedures.

331. Relationships with Foreign Governments

a. Department of State officials handle transactions with the foreign government when such officials are present and the civil government exists. In those cases where permanent Department of State officials are not present, the commander should be provided with a political adviser. In most instances, in situations short of war, political considerations are overriding. The commander's authority in the political area will normally be specifically prescribed. Sound and cooperative working relationships must be established and maintained with the responsible United States political authorities.

b. Whatever political arrangements exist, commanders will normally have to deal with foreign governmental officials, local military personnel, and civil leaders. Therefore, it is vital that they understand the responsibilities of the local government as they affect the responsibilities of the commander concerned. If the local civil government becomes ineffective, commanders may be required to play a major role in its reestablishment. Publication of guidelines for subordinate commanders in their relationships with military and civil officials can assist in avoiding misunderstanding and can foster cooperation.

c. Most operations in situations short of war are conducted in politically unstable areas in which actual war is an ever-present threat. Under such circumstances, the commander must condition his actions to maintain a posture of military readiness for his unit even though his immediate mission may not require it; or he may
have to execute his mission with the knowledge that his unit may be placed in a position of disadvantage initially if the situation erupts into war. In either event, the commander must insure that his actions do not inadvertently convert a situation short of war into an actual war.

332. Legal Implications

a. In carrying out the mission, the force commander may be required to make decisions that involve life and property and civil matters in a sovereign country. These are matters for which he may be later held responsible by the foreign government, by its civil courts, or by foreign or international public opinion. It is essential that the actions of the force commander recognize the impact of local law and custom and further that he have the advice of a competent legal staff. When the legality of an action cannot be determined, his actions must not exceed those which can be justified by military operations and necessity, tempered by justness that can be universally recognized.

b. Operations with a civil government may be subject to review or court proceedings. Therefore, it is important to keep an official record of all important transactions and decisions and the reasons therefor.

Section III. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

333. Intelligence

a. Intelligence is particularly significant in situations short of war; intelligence activities are wider in scope and more difficult than those experienced in combat operations.

b. Commanders of higher echelon forces must obtain and maintain current general knowledge of conditions in areas of the world in which United States forces may be employed. Intelligence summaries of critical areas should be furnished to such commanders.

c. When the mission is assigned, the force commander must be given strategic intelligence of the specific area of operations. In addition, he must be informed of United States and allied intelligence services which are available and authorized for use when the force arrives in the operational area.

d. After arrival in the area of employment, the commander must evaluate and exploit the intelligence agencies at his disposal and insure that his own intelligence collection efforts contribute to the broad requirement of interested United States agencies.

e. On arrival in the area, the development of an efficient and secure operational intelligence system is essential. This system must develop the background of the unrest, identify dissident ele-
ments, and provide detailed information and topographical data on which military action can be based. Close cooperation with the local police establishment is normally required. Where local police cannot be used, the commander may be required to develop his own indigenous intelligence system. In this event, authority must be granted to develop this system with safeguards to insure that such operations do not conflict with the assigned responsibility of other established agencies.

334. Security

a. Security precautions are essential from receipt of the mission through movement to the objective area. Situations short of war objectives can be compromised by enemy counteractions if prematurely disclosed.

b. Security of planning and operations in the objectives area is complicated by transactions with local civilian officials, allies, and by the absence of the protection normally afforded by military censorship. The enemy knows that the individual is the best intelligence target. Therefore, the individual soldier must be made security conscious. The security of communications, supplies, equipment, and installations must be insured. Neglect leads to pilferage and black-marketing activity, provides a source of supplies and arms for dissidents, and provides a basis for hostile propaganda to discredit the friendly force. Adequate security measures must be established to counter enemy guerrilla actions.

c. The unrestricted flow of information through personal correspondence and the public information media, when censorship regulations are not in force, will present security problems to the command. Within security limitations, cordial and straightforward treatment of accredited correspondents and an effective troop information program will contribute to public understanding of the issues and facilitate accomplishment of the mission.

335. Use of Interpreters

Transactions with civil officials and the local populace will normally require interpreters. Arrangements must be made for obtaining and clearing interpreters locally. In addition, lists should be developed and maintained of language fluency of assigned personnel.

Section IV. EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

336. General

A force operating in situations short of war is confronted with a wide range of factors influencing operations. These include
political considerations, attitudes of the local populace, indigenous armed forces, enemy concepts and capabilities, environmental conditions, and command arrangements peculiar to the force organization and mission. Flexibility and imagination in leadership, and command and planning are required.

337. U.S. Army Component Capabilities

The following component elements of Army forces have characteristics and capabilities which make them particularly adaptable to operations in situations short of war:

a. Infantry units should be used to provide troops required for patrol operations, area search and security, outposts, strong points, and control posts and for action in terrain such as mountains, swamps, and jungle. Mobile infantry task forces equipped with Army aviation, armored carriers, and amphibious transportation are effective forces for employment against guerrillas.

b. Cavalry-type forces, because of their mobility and excellent communications, can provide reconnaissance and security forces capable of being deployed over wide areas.

c. Armor units are excellent show-of-force type units and can provide communications for other forces. When reinforced with motorized or mechanized infantry, armored units provide powerful mobile forces. When employed with dismounted infantry, or military police, tanks are effective in quelling riots and civil disturbance. Armor forces may also be used for convoy escort.

d. Army aviation units can conduct surveillance over wide areas, and provide troop lift, liaison, and courier service. These units can operate from hastily prepared airstrips within protected areas. Helicopters can be used to supply isolated outposts and detachments located away from the main body of the force. Airmobile forces are particularly valuable in the conduct of widely separated actions against dissident elements.

e. Engineer forces may be required for mine detection and removal, to construct airfields, fortifications, bridges, roads, and civil works.

f. Signal units are required to provide a communication network. Considerable reliance must be placed on radio because of the problems involved in maintenance of wire communication systems in areas which may be infested by hostile partisans.

g. Administrative support units are well suited to provide humane and civil relief services such as restoration of civil works, the provision and issue of food and clothing, and medical treatment. When required, and when the necessary units and supplies are available, assistance of this type facilitates accomplishment of the force mission.
h. The flexible organization of artillery units facilitates placing artillery in support of outposts and detachments. Nuclear weapons delivery means are particularly effective in a show of force or as deterrent to intervention of other international powers in a situation short of war.

i. Military police units can conduct surveillance, security, and liaison over wide areas. Military police units are effective in quelling riots and civil disturbances. Such units are especially effective against dissident elements through their knowledge of the area and constant patrolling.

338. Support by Other Services

a. Aviation units of component forces (Navy and Air Force) employed in situations short of war can be employed in a show of force role and can conduct long-range surveillance and reconnaissance, logistical support, and other missions assigned by the force commander.

b. Air movement of forces facilitates their flexible employment and redeployment over wide areas when sufficient organic or supporting aircraft are available.

Section V. DISCIPLINE AND TRAINING

339. Discipline

a. Operations in situations short of war call for the highest standards of discipline. The smart appearance of well-turned out and well-disciplined troops impresses the civil population, and courtesy combined with dignified bearing gives confidence in the forces of law and order. Troop and civilian curfews facilitate control and assist in maintaining discipline.

b. The sound troop discipline of combat units is the best possible basis for the special troop training required for operations in situations short of war. Intelligent, good behavior of troops is a prerequisite in these operations where the serious misbehavior of one individual may jeopardize the entire mission.

340. Training Considerations

a. During normal training, the commander must insure that troops receive orientation briefings on conditions in various areas of the world and on their roles in situations short of war. This orientation can be accomplished, in part, through a sound, continuing troop information program.

b. Either before or after arrival in the area of employment, troops must receive special combat training required by the specific mission. All units whose mission and capability create a possibil-
ity of their employment in situations short of war should receive specialized training in antiguerrilla warfare and riot control.

c. When the mission is received, the commander must insure that troops are oriented on the force mission, local customs, and conditions in the area of operations. Such orientation must include security procedures, relationships with the civilian populace, injunctions against black-marketing, and similar matters.

d. The psychological impact on troops of operations under difficult conditions of stress and restraint over long periods should be recognized and considered in the planning and conduct of operations.

341. Training of Local Forces

An operation in a situation short of war may require the organization and training of local military forces as an added mission. The military leaders selected by the local government for key positions in the local force must be reliable. As in all relations with the local government, the relations with these military leaders must be harmonious; mutual trust and confidence are prerequisites. Professional competence and attitudes of the soldiers and junior officers of training cadres, which may be provided by the force, will foster trust and confidence. National traits must be exploited to the maximum in training local forces.
CHAPTER 13
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

Section I. GENERAL

342. Description

a. Administrative support consists of the interrelated functions of logistics, personnel, and civil affairs. The distinctions between administrative support, combat support, and combat operations are not absolute since administrative support activities also have some combat and combat support aspects. Organizational and operational doctrine for administrative support is contained in FM 100–10 Field Service Regulations—Administration, FM 101–5 Staff Officers Field Manual—Staff Organization and Procedure, FM 101–10 Staff Officers Field Manual—Organizational, Technical and Logistical Data, and FM 54–1 The Logistical Command. Detailed organizational and operational procedures are contained in appropriate field manuals pertaining to the separate arms and services.

b. Administrative support activities are connecting links in the theater of operations between the source of supplies and services, and the user. In addition each field echelon has its own administrative support activities. The objectives of any administrative support structure are to provide support to the combat forces when and where it is needed.

c. The capabilities and limitations of administrative support activities have a direct influence on and are closely interrelated with strategy and tactics. The commander of any force must balance and integrate the force operations with its administrative support to accomplish his mission. He must insure that his operations are planned and executed within administrative support capabilities.

343. Characteristics

a. Maximum efficiency in operation of administrative support activities is generally achieved by consolidation and concentration of facilities. Such consolidation and concentration takes full advantage of available storage and warehousing and personnel replacement facilities, road and rail nets, communication facilities, port facilities and transportation equipment. It permits maximum effort with minimum manpower and supervisory personnel.

b. On the other hand the concentration of administrative support activities substantially increases vulnerability to nuclear at-
tack. Large, consolidated supply installations, personnel replacement installations, port facilities and road and rail centers are particularly remunerative nuclear targets.

c. In a nuclear environment, either actual or immediately threatened, a balance must be maintained between vulnerability and operational requirements. In the absence of a nuclear threat, or probability, greater concentration is indicated to achieve operational efficiency. The course of action adopted in a given situation is a matter of judgment and is a responsibility of command.

d. Notwithstanding the above, however, administrative support activities are by nature less flexible, and mobile than are combat type units of comparable size. Such activities are incapable of the rapid transition from a nonnuclear to a nuclear environment which characterizes tactical units. Therefore, basic organizational structures and operational concepts for administrative support activities must provide for a dual operational capability which permits operations with minimum change regardless of the type environment encountered.

Section II. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

344. General

a. Environmental considerations affecting tactical operations exert equal or greater influence on administrative support operations. Proper planning and execution serve to minimize the effects of nuclear attacks. Particular emphasis is placed on achieving flexibility and mobility in the administrative support system and on concealing, dispersing, or protecting facilities and installations.

b. The composition of administrative support forces varies according to environmental considerations. Administrative support forces may range from those organized to support a small, independent task force in a situation short of war, through those organized for limited war, to those required for large-scale support of combat forces in general war. A high order of organizational flexibility is required to satisfy the wide variety of possible administrative support requirements.

c. Administrative support activities which are established and operated in peace must be fully compatible with those required under wartime conditions. Transition from peacetime to wartime conditions as required by any change in operational environment is thereby accomplished with minimum change in concept, organization, and procedures.

345. Dispersion

a. The dispersion of tactical forces both laterally and in depth
requires a corresponding dispersion of administrative support facilities to render adequate support. Dispersion of administrative support facilities is also required as a measure to minimize the effect of enemy nuclear attack.

b. Rapid movement of combat forces and the relative immobility and dispersion of administrative support facilities may result in considerable separation between combat forces and the various administrative support facilities. The areas between installations may be extensive and infested with guerrillas, bypassed enemy groups, and brigands. Only that degree of control is exercised over these areas which is required for the operation of installations and the movement of personnel and supplies between them.

c. The ability to cope with problems of dispersion and distance is a key factor in accomplishing the administrative support mission.

d. The effects of attacks by nuclear weapons may be minimized through the provision of multiple, small installations; the establishment of alternate key facilities; the proper arrangement of materiel being stored; the use of camouflage and dummy positions; target analysis of the installation location plan; the attainment of maximum dispersion consistent with control and risk; the utilization of protection to include terrain features, barricades, revetments, and underground shelters; and providing adequate area control planning and operations.

346. Mobility

Environmental considerations dictate the need for cross-country mobility, development and incorporation of appropriate technological advances into air and surface movement in administrative support operations, and mobility through use of conventional means of movement.

Section III. COMMAND AND CONTROL

347. Principles

a. Command of agencies providing administrative support is exercised by the number of echelons necessary to insure responsiveness to the supported forces and to provide continuous, effective support. The principle of centralized control with decentralized detailed execution and conduct of operations is applied in organizing the administrative support activities, in establishing procedures, and in assigning responsibilities.

b. All command echelons are responsible for administrative support. The command echelons which have the greater scope of administrative support activities are theater or unified command,
theater army, field army, and division. The function of the theater is to establish policy and exercise control over those activities which by their nature are of joint interest or are shared by the component Services. Theater army provides administrative support through its logistical command, civil affairs command and its replacement system. Army group (when used) and corps normally exercise control over administrative support principally by establishing priorities and allocating services and regulated items of supply to their subordinates. Due to the increased frequency of independent operations and the increased dispersion dictated by the nuclear battlefield the corps with augmentation may frequently be a command echelon for administrative support.

348. Planning

a. Outline strategic and tactical plans are tested for administrative feasibility before detailed planning is begun. Revision of outline operations plans is made where necessary to insure the adequacy of administrative support. A comprehensive administrative plan to support the adopted tactical or strategic plan is then developed concurrently and in coordination with the preparation of the detailed operations plan. Administrative plans within a theater of operations must take into account known enemy capabilities and the vulnerability of the friendly administrative support organizations, including the ocean line of communication from the zone of interior. Administrative planning must provide alternate means for insuring uninterrupted support of the operation.

b. Theater army administrative support plans are broad in scope and may be projected to include one or more campaigns. These plans indicate the phasing of support, the forces and supplies available to each command, the support available from and to be provided to other theater components, and the specific missions of each subordinate command. These plans are used by major subordinate commands as a basis for their own administrative planning. The development of detailed administrative plans within the field army is the responsibility of the field army commander. The theater army logistical command and the supported army group or field army are coequal commands. The relationship between them in planning and operating is one of coordination and cooperation; however, the mission of the former is to support the latter.

349. Responsibilities

a. The administrative support mission of theater army is to organize and provide administrative support for all U.S. Army forces in the theater; to allocate critical and regulated items of
supply; and to provide logistical support to other Services, forces, agencies, and civilians as directed by higher headquarters. The theater army commander normally establishes a theater army logistical command to execute his logistical support responsibilities. Except for personnel replacement support, theater army headquarters performs no administrative support functions but is primarily concerned with planning and establishing policy for administrative support to include joint and allied support.

b. Each echelon of control is assigned clearly defined responsibilities and delegated appropriate authority to carry out its assigned responsibilities. Overlap of administrative support responsibilities between theater, theater army, theater army logistical command, and other commands is avoided. Logistical functions are normally supervised by technical service staff officers who may exercise operational control over specified units when directed by the commander. Positive integration of the logistical functions is accomplished by the commander and his coordinating staff. The personnel replacement functions are supervised by the personnel staff officer.

c. Logistical operations and performance of assigned functions of the theater army logistical command are decentralized to subordinate base logistical command(s), advance logistical command(s), and area command(s). Appropriate TOE logistical command headquarters are used to provide the nucleus of these commands.

d. Personnel replacements are received, processed, and forwarded to all U.S. Army forces in the theater by the theater army replacement system. The system includes all army replacement units within the theater except those assigned or attached to the field armies.

e. The theater army civil affairs command, when established, exercises that prescribed control over governments, lands, inhabitants, resources, and the local economy under the jurisdiction of the theater army commander which has been exempted from the control of field armies or the theater army logistical command. In addition, the civil affairs command is the principal organization for implementing national policies, preparing appropriate plans and programs, and furnishing units for the conduct of civil affairs operations in support of combat or area missions. Due to the ideological nature of modern war and the effect of nuclear weapons on populations, the civil affairs function is of vastly increased importance.

f. Within field army subordinate support commands may be established to command the elements furnishing administrative support. Appropriate administrative headquarters organizations
may be used to provide the nucleus of these commands. Personnel are provided from within the authorized strength of the field army; personnel replacements should not be used for this purpose.

g. Within divisions, administrative support is furnished by the division support command. The support command contains both personnel and logistic units, however, it controls only the logistic units.

h. The capability of rapidly providing data on administrative support functions to a central control agency is essential to an effective support system. Automatic data processing systems are used as appropriate in administrative support operations. Specific areas of application may include supply control, stock control, storage of administrative support data, computation of requirements, maintenance of troop lists, cargo loading plans, movement control, damage control, personnel replacement and administration, and evacuation.

i. An administrative support operations center may be established at headquarters, installations, and activities as appropriate. The center is a facility that gathers critical information to assist the commander and his staff in reaching decisions.

Section IV. FUNCTIONS OF LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

350. Supply

a. Supply support is the provision of all categories of supply and includes the determination of requirements, requisitioning and procurement, storage, and distribution of supplies. Supply support is closely interrelated with all logistical functions.

b. A continuous flow of supplies, if moved long distance by a single carrier, results in minimum handling, decreased requirements for storage and materiel handling equipment, and greater security. Emphasis is placed on prompt and reliable delivery of supplies from source to user. Storage of reserves echeloned in depth within the supply system is normally required to counteract interrupted forward movement and to satisfy unexpected requirements.

c. Uniformity of supply procedures and operations is essential to the maximum extent practicable. Important, specialized, or newly introduced items of supply follow established supply channels whenever feasible in order to preserve simplicity.

d. Supply is supported by and depends on maintenance to conserve supply assets. Supply of repair parts and replacement for items of mechanical and electronic equipment may be accomplished in whole or in part through the maintenance channel. Cannibaliza-
tion of materiel provides a normal source of repair parts and com-
ponent assemblies, and substantially reduces the need for the
 evacuation of unserviceable materiel.

e. The supply system within the theater must provide for—
(1) A requisitioning system for the rapid transmission of
accurate requirements from user to supplier.
(2) An inventory management system providing supply con-
trol to balance demands for supplies against the quan-
tities on hand and on requisition, and a stock control
system to provide accurate information on the quantity,
location, and condition of supplies on hand.
(3) Clearly established procedures for distribution agencies
for filling requisitions from available stocks or for for-
warding requisitions to a higher echelon.
(4) Procedures for rapidly allocating supplies if supplies
available are inadequate to meet all demands.
(5) Operating troops and facilities.
(6) Emergency procedures in the event that the normal sup-
ply system is disrupted.

351. Movement

a. The movement system within a theater is organized to regu-
late and operate highway transport, air transport, railways, and
inland waterways and to integrate all movement means available,
including local movement systems.

b. The agency planning and operating the movement system
must—
(1) Provide for continued movement with minimum inter-
ruption to shipments.
(2) Achieve a high degree of flexibility. Movement resources
may be diverted, concentrated, or allocated as the situ-
tion demands. All means of movement are used and co-
ordinated to provide a system over which movements may
flow without restriction as to means employed or organi-
zational boundaries. The most flexible means of move-
ment, consistent with economy of operations, speed, reli-
bility, and flexibility in support operations is used.
(3) Achieve centralized control of the system and decentral-
ized operation of the means. Control of movements is
centralized at the highest echelon at which control can
be adequately exercised.
(4) Use movement means to capacity consistent with flexi-
bility of the system and the characteristics of each means.
Since carriers must return to the point of origin to pro-
vide continuous flow, each forward movement must be
completed and the emptied carrier released for reuse at the earliest possible moment. Economy of use dictates that each forward movement be balanced by a return load to the extent possible. This in turn requires maximum coordination with all other administrative support activities. Backhauling is avoided.

352. Maintenance

a. Maintenance is any action taken to keep materiel in a serviceable condition or to restore it to serviceability. It includes inspection, testing, servicing, classification as to serviceability, repair, rebuilding and reclamation.

b. The extent of maintenance performed at each echelon within the theater is that which will provide adequate support to the combat forces with minimum drain on the other administrative support resources.

c. Military equipment is designed to simplify maintenance at the forward echelons, to effect onsite repair or replacement, and to reduce the number of different parts and tools required.

d. Technical assistance is provided to maintenance units and users of military equipment to insure maintenance and operation of equipment.

353. Construction

a. Construction is the building and repair of facilities essential for the use of the supported or supporting forces in the theater. The primary task of construction in the area of operations is the development and maintenance of adequate lines of communication.

b. The construction and development of bases are accomplished when essential to the administrative support of combat forces. Base development is the improvement and expansion of the resources and facilities of an area. Nuclear warfare increases the requirement for construction for protection in static phases of a war.

c. Construction policies, priorities, and control procedures established for the theater serve as a general basis for employment of construction troops and allocation of materiels. Construction in the theater is limited to minimum essential development of installations and facilities. However, it must be recognized that construction policies may be affected by political and economic conditions in addition to operation plans.

d. Military labor and material requirements for construction are reduced through the maximum use of local labor and materiels when available.
354. Medical

a. Medical evacuation is the process of removing patients from the battlefield and subsequently moving them from the combat area to hospitals for treatment or to other installations for disposition. Hospitalization is the care provided at a medical installation designed and equipped to give medical and surgical treatment to the sick and wounded. The mission of the medical service in the area of operations is to conserve the fighting strength and to prevent the adverse effects of unevacuated patients on combat efficiency.

b. Evacuation and hospitalization are interrelated. A good evacuation system permits the maximum use of ideally located hospital sites. A properly developed hospitalization system takes advantage of the evacuation means to be employed with correspondingly reduced requirements for connecting evacuation means.

c. In planning the hospital system, it is necessary to establish the theater evacuation policy; this is the period a patient is retained for treatment in the theater hospital system before being returned to duty or evacuated from the theater. An evacuation policy may be applied to a hospital, a series of hospitals, a command, or any level of medical treatment and may fluctuate, particularly in subordinate commands within the theater. The evacuation policy of the area of operations is the shortest consistent with economical use of military means. Evacuation policy at the echelon concerned may be reduced to create reserve bed capacity.

d. The use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons may affect medical evacuation and hospitalization by—

(1) Greatly increasing the number of patients in a single area in a very brief period of time. Increased numbers, as such, are not of great significance to the medical service, but the rate at which they are produced is of importance. The rate affects medical capabilities for immediate treatment, generates peak requirements for evacuation, and increases the need for hospitals. The rate of casualty production may frequently rise to levels which exceed the capacity of available medical evacuation and treatment facilities. This may necessitate holding considerable numbers of casualties in tactical unit aid stations. Consequently, troop units must be trained in the care and treatment of nuclear casualties with minimal professional medical assistance. Logistics plans should provide for rapid distribution of extra medical supplies to units faced with the situation.

(2) Producing a different pattern of casualties. There will be many more burns, secondary missile injuries, casualties
from ionizing radiation, and diseases caused by biological agents and chemical casualties.

(3) Increasing numbers of casualties in rear areas. The collecting and evacuation system must be expanded to provide combat zone type medical service throughout the theater.

(4) Increasing destruction of medical facilities. Medical installations throughout the theater are vulnerable to destruction or neutralization by mass casualty weapons. This vulnerability imposes a need for great flexibility and reserve capacity. These problems are overcome by more rapid evacuation, by exploiting improved transportation and communication means and by greater use of civilian resources.

355. Labor

a. Labor normally is available from military service units, allied civilians, U.S. civilians, prisoners of war, enemy civilians, refugees and displaced persons. Labor is both static and mobile and includes professional, skilled, and unskilled personnel.

b. Plans provide for maximum practicable use of all sources of labor, to reduce requirements for military personnel.

356. Personnel Replacement and Services

a. Personnel functions include furnishing individual and unit replacements and providing personnel services within the areas of operations.

b. The purpose of the personnel replacement system is to maintain theater army units at authorized strengths and to contribute to the efficient use of military manpower in the theater. The replacement system must be capable of furnishing complete units, battalion and smaller, as replacements, in addition to individual replacements.

c. In nuclear warfare the rate of casualty production may frequently exceed the available replacement rate. Commanders will be forced to rely on reorganization and consolidation of units to reconstitute combat effectiveness.

d. Personnel services must meet the requirements of the operational environment consistent with austerity, conservation of manpower, and morale.

357. Civil Affairs

a. Civil affairs includes the authority exercised, responsibilities assumed, and actions taken by the military commander in an occupied or liberated area with respect to the lands, properties, and inhabitants thereof. Military government is the form of control
which may be established and maintained for the government of occupied areas. Such control is limited by international law and national policy. Civil affairs is that form of control established in friendly territory whereby a foreign government, pursuant to an agreement with the local government of the area concerned, may exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government.

b. The basic objectives of the civil affairs function are to support military operations, to fulfill national obligations, to support and implement national policies, and to provide for the transfer of responsibility from the military commander to a designated civil agency of government. Civil affairs functions are of great importance in modern war.

c. When tactical considerations are primary, civil affairs activities are normally directed by major subordinate commanders using the operational chain of command. A civil affairs chain of command is employed in areas where the situation is stabilized.

Section V. REAR AREA SECURITY AND AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

358. Purpose and Scope

a. Overall area security is the responsibility of the senior commander in the area, but rear area security presents problems which are different from those which exist in the forward area. The primary mission performed in rear areas is administrative support. The purpose of rear area security and area damage control is to prevent interruptions by the enemy of administrative support. In modern warfare the threat of such interruption is much greater than in the past. Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, airborne troops, guerrillas, infiltrators, and saboteurs are major components of this threat. Installations which were formerly protected by distance from the front are now within range of mass destruction weapons. Extended frontages and wide gaps between combat forces increase the vulnerability of rear areas to attack and require greater emphasis on rear area security (including counterintelligence measures) and damage control.

b. Rear area security measures include all actions taken to prevent, neutralize or destroy enemy attacks on units, activities, and installations in rear areas. These measures do not include active air defense operations. Attacks of such magnitude as to endanger the command as a whole are part of the main battle and beyond the scope of rear area security.

c. Area damage control includes those measures taken prior to,
during, and after attack by nuclear or other weapons including fallout, or by a natural disaster, to avoid and minimize the effects thereof, and to aid in the continuation or reestablishment of administrative support. Area damage control by definition does not include measures taken by commanders to fully restore the effectiveness of combat or combat support units which may have suffered heavy damage from enemy attack. In forward areas avoidance and control of damage to a significant extent is automatically included as a normal part of tactical planning and operations; for example, tactical warning and information nets and boundaries are used to delineate and control dispersion areas.

359. Command Arrangements

a. Within the rear area all commanders are responsible for local security and damage control for their own units and installations. Overall responsibility for rear area security/area damage control within a specific area is the responsibility of a designated commander. He is responsible for the integration of local security and damage control plans into the overall area plan. When necessary for operational controls and coordination, subareas are formed within the rear area. All units physically within the subarea including TOE unit replacements awaiting assignment, are integrated into the rear area security/area damage control plans for that subarea. These plans are coordinated between adjacent units and with higher headquarters.

b. Rear area security, area damage control, and administrative support activities are performed in the same geographic area and involve the same forces. Since the use of technical and administrative service units on rear area security/area damage control is a diversion of these units from their primary mission of administrative support to combat forces, the manner and extent to which these service units are diverted must be decided by a commander responsible for all these interrelated activities. Thus an effective system for rear area security and area damage control must possess the following characteristics:

1. A single commander responsible for all three functions in the same geographic area with the necessary staff and communications. These arrangements must not be temporary or improvised, or be established only after attack.
2. A definite fixing of geographic responsibility.
3. A control structure which prevents conflict and competition among agencies responsible for rear area security, rear area damage control, and administrative support.

360. Composition of Forces

a. Rear area security and area damage control forces consist of:
(1) Service units or elements thereof.
(2) Combat or combat support units specifically assigned rear area security/area damage control missions.
(3) Friendly national military, paramilitary, and police forces.
(4) TOE unit replacements awaiting assignments.

b. Service units or predesignated security detachments and damage control teams from these units are used for rear area security/area damage control functions in their own installations. They may be used in an emergency to reinforce other installations. When required, specific combat units are assigned the mission of assisting in overall security and damage control throughout the rear area. In an emergency they may be used to reinforce the capabilities of subareas.

Section VI. JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

361. Policy

a. The Secretary of Defense establishes basic policy for the conduct of administrative support. Administrative support of Service components of a joint force is primarily the responsibility of the parent Service. The degree of administrative support rendered one Service component by another is directed by the Secretary of Defense, a unified or specified commander, or as mutually agreed among the component Services concerned. A component commander may provide all, or part, of the common administrative support for all theater components.

b. The administrative support of national forces is a responsibility of the nation concerned. Within the provisions of U.S. national policy and international agreements, allied forces within an area of operations may be provided administrative support. Within these agreements and policy, the theater commander specifies the degree of support to be rendered and the procedures to be followed.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

G. H. DECKER,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
J. C. LAMBERT,
Major General, United States Army,
The Adjutant General.

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NG: State AG (3); Units—Same as Active Army except allowance is one copy to each unit.

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For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR 320-50.

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