# INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT
## US ARMY DOCTRINE

## Chapter 1. GENERAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Analysis of Internal Defense and Development Strategy</td>
<td>1-1-1-3</td>
<td>1-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 2. THE ENVIRONMENT OF DEVELOPING NATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Social, Economic, and Political Factors of Developing Nations and Their Potential for Internal Conflict</td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 3. INSURGENCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Insurgent Strategies</td>
<td>3-4-3-5</td>
<td>3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Development and Organization of Insurgency</td>
<td>3-6-3-10</td>
<td>3-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Legal Status of Insurgencies and Insurgents</td>
<td>3-11-3-12</td>
<td>3-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Analysis of Insurgency</td>
<td>3-13</td>
<td>3-8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 4. HOST COUNTRY INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>4-1-1-4</td>
<td>4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Internal Defense and Development Strategy</td>
<td>4-3-4-4</td>
<td>4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Planning Guidance</td>
<td>4-5-4-8</td>
<td>4-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Organization Guidance</td>
<td>4-9-4-13</td>
<td>4-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. IDAD Policy Guidelines</td>
<td>4-14-4-15</td>
<td>4-12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 5. HOST COUNTRY INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>5-1-1-5</td>
<td>5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Major Internal Defense and Development Operations</td>
<td>5-3-5-9</td>
<td>5-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Host Country Response During The Three Phases of Insurgency</td>
<td>5-10-5-11</td>
<td>5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Internal Defense and Development Campaigns</td>
<td>5-12-5-14</td>
<td>5-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Operations in Selected Areas</td>
<td>5-15-5-17</td>
<td>5-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Operational Guidelines</td>
<td>5-18-5-19</td>
<td>5-18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 6. UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>6-1-1-6</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Organization and Responsibilities for US Foreign Assistance</td>
<td>6-3-6-10</td>
<td>6-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Development and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>6-11-6-12</td>
<td>6-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. US Security Assistance Programs</td>
<td>6-13-6-15</td>
<td>6-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Organization and Responsibilities for US Security Assistance</td>
<td>6-16-6-22</td>
<td>6-11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 7. US ARMY ADVISOR IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>7-1</td>
<td>7-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
<td>7-2-7-5</td>
<td>7-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. US Army Advisor</td>
<td>7-6-7-8</td>
<td>7-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter 8. US ARMY FORCES IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>8-1-8-3</td>
<td>8-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. United States Army Forces</td>
<td>8-4-8-8</td>
<td>8-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Major IDAD Operations of the US Army</td>
<td>8-9-8-14</td>
<td>8-11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendix

| A. REFERENCES | A-1 |
| B. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY | B-1 |
| C. GLOSSARY | C-1 |
| D. TRAINING | D-1 |
| E. BRANCH AND FUNCTIONAL AREA PRECIS | E-1 |
| F. ARMY OPERATIONS ANNEX TO MILITARY IDAD PLAN | F-1 |

## Index

* This manual supersedes FM 31-23, 2 October 1972; and FM 100-20, 18 August 1972.
1-1. Purpose and Scope
   a. This manual provides US Army concepts and doctrine concerning the conduct of internal defense and development (IDAD) by host country security forces to prevent and defeat insurgency, and US Army IDAD advice and assistance to host country security forces. It includes a general perspective of the environment of developing nations and insurgent strategies, an overview of US security assistance, and a description of the roles and responsibilities of US Army advisors and US Army forces in IDAD.
   b. The doctrine in this manual is applicable to US Army advisors in providing IDAD advice and assistance to host country security forces and to US Army commanders and staff officers in planning and employing US Army Security Assistance Forces and other General Purpose Forces in support of host country IDAD operations. The doctrine provides fundamental principles that are designed to guide the actions of military forces in the conduct of IDAD operations. In applying the principles, one must be aware that the situation in each developing country faced with an insurgent threat is unique to that country. In addition, the situation may vary considerably in different areas of the same country. The IDAD principles, policies, and programs that are applied successfully in one nation (or in one area of a country) may not be applicable in exactly the same manner in another nation (or another area of the same country). Therefore, the principles in this manual only provide a general guide to the conduct of IDAD, and judgment must be used to adapt them to each situation.
   c. The manual should be used jointly with other official publications that provide guidance, processes, and techniques concerning the US security assistance programs and IDAD operations.

1-2. Recommended Changes
Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommendations for improving its contents. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to ensure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forwarded direct to the Commandant, US Army Institute for Military Assistance, ATTN: ATSU-CTD-IDAD, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307. Originators of proposed changes that significantly modify approved Army doctrine may send an information copy through command channels to Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA 23651, to facilitate review and followup.

1-3. Definitions
   a. Internal Defense. The full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.
   b. Internal Development. Actions taken by a nation to promote its balanced growth by building viable institutions—political, economic, and social—that respond to the needs of its society.
   c. Host Country. A nation in which representatives or organizations of another state are present because of government invitation and/or international agreement.
   d. Stability Operations. This term is no longer used.
CHAPTER 2
THE ENVIRONMENT OF DEVELOPING NATIONS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

2-1. General
a. This chapter outlines characteristics common to many developing nations. It identifies social, political, economic, and psychological factors that often contribute to political instability and which generally require consideration by a host country in planning and conducting programs to prevent and control internal conflict. It should be recognized that other governments, external to the developing nation, may attempt to exploit the weaknesses and volatile environment discussed in this chapter for their own purposes.

b. In society, change is the inevitable product of human interactions. Change may be violent or nonviolent, from the simple voicing of desires and protest to the conduct of revolution. Although man has always been faced with effectively harnessing these forces of sociopolitical change, this challenge is being accelerated and becoming more complex by developing nations seeking rapid economic and political modernity with limited or undeveloped human and material resources and very limited modern technological knowledge.

c. Although each nation is unique, there are certain apparent similarities among developing nations. In these nations, political, social, economic, and cultural pluralisms are common and may contribute to the development of internal conflicts. Various groups within these nations tend to be isolated and often perceive the government solely in local terms. Centuries of agrarian and tribal dominance have established definite patterns and societal values, and any changes in the economic and political situation impact upon these established patterns and values. A traditional elite unwilling to surrender power; a small, poorly developed middle class resentful of traditional social distinctions; a poorly trained, ill-equipped police force; and a poverty-stricken, disenfranchised mass populace can contribute to a volatile environment.

d. Within many developing nations, the military often plays a major role in modernization. The impact of the military on the modernization process is to a great extent dependent upon its capabilities, its influence within the government, its relations with various segments of the population, the government’s efficiency and effectiveness, as well as the extent of internal conflict and the presence or absence of an external threat.
Section II. SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL FACTORS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS AND THEIR POTENTIAL FOR INTERNAL CONFLICT

2-3. Social Factors

a. Modernization tends to disrupt the traditional way of life of the people in developing nations. This often includes lessenimg the loyalties and identity of the people with race, region, tribe, family, religion, language, and traditions. In the modernizing process, the people may give up much of their traditional values, and without modified or new cultural values they become more susceptible to manipulation by apparently credible and persuasive factions. The extent to which the traditional social structure and mores of a people change during modernization varies considerably among developing nations.

b. The breaking away from familiar customs and institutions is often accompanied by a high degree of expectation for improved conditions. Rural people without marketable skills move into metropolitan areas expecting to find easy affluence, only to be disillusioned by lack of employment and squalid living conditions. The resulting disappointment often contributes to growing frustration among the people and the conviction that they are totally disenfranchised. This situation provides the fertile breeding ground of dissidence sought by those individuals or groups who would overthrow the government.

c. The following are examples of social factors common to many developing nations:

1. Population growth and concentrations which are increasing at an accelerated rate exceed the economic growth necessary to meet the rising expectations of the population and cause profound psychological, social, economic, and political problems.

2. A rural population that is largely unintegrated into the nation's political life since governmental priority is often given to urban industrialization.

3. Elements of the population tend to identify with their local, regional, tribal, ethnic, or indigenous groups rather than the nation.

4. A high degree of illiteracy with the educational base inadequate to keep abreast of modernizing technological, political, and economic requirements.

5. Urbanization which has overtaxed available housing, public utilities, and social services, exceeding the ability of the government to meet growing needs.

6. Expanding communications such as radio and television which provide the masses with awareness of standards of living not attainable for most.

7. A comparatively small, dominant elite group whose status and power is being challenged by an emerging middle class and other groups.

8. A leadership which strives to preserve those institutions from which it derives its power and affluence.

9. A wide social, economic, and political disparity between the small power structure and the vast majority of the disenfranchised population.

10. Groups such as ethnic and tribal minorities which have not been assimilated into the general society and for which no mechanisms for assimilation exist.

11. A military with an officer corps composed mainly of members of the more privileged classes; with the much larger NCO and enlisted corps coming from the masses and, in some cases, minority factions.

12. A police organization which is generally untrained and ill-equipped.

2-4. Economic Factors

a. Some of the more serious problems facing the developing nations rise from rapid and uneven rates of economic development. A significant effect of rapid development is that changes in economic activities tend to contribute to internal instability and create social unrest and political strife. In time of crisis, important segments of the populace may become alienated from the government and turn to violent measures.

b. Uneven rates of economic development have also produced striking physical contrasts within developing countries. Cities and towns with higher standards of living and technology exist alongside regions with marginally subsistent economies. Poor transportation and communications facilities often hinder satisfactory economic and cultural relationships among proximate geographical regions.

c. The following economic factors are common to many developing nations:
(1) Lack of an industrial and technological base which results in dependence on foreign sources of manufacture and expertise.

(2) An economy dependent on one or two types of raw material exports—agriculture (e.g., coffee, rubber, cotton) or extractive (e.g., copper, oil, bauxite).

(3) A high proportion of foreign capital investment compared with domestic investment.

(4) Lack of an adequate economic and industrial infrastructure.

(5) Reliance on outside affluent countries to help subsidize development programs.

(6) A high proportion of jungle, desert, arid, or other land unfit for agriculture, coupled with the lack of technological means to improve production on arable land.

(7) Limited allocation of resources for development of agriculture due to the emphasis placed on industrialization.

(8) Primarily subsistence level agriculture.

(9) A low per capita income.

2-5. Political Factors

a. The governmental structure of new nations is often weak. In many developing nations, dictatorships and military regimes have emerged to replace weak governments. These authoritarian regimes, lacking an effective civil service, often face serious deficiencies which hinder governmental administration. Two major political problems facing many governments of developing nations are the lack of an effective administrative system and the lack of informed popular participation in the political process. In the older developing nations, the bureaucracy tends to favor one group over others. In rural or agrarian nations, local leadership, though well defined, tends to be traditionally oriented. The development of a stable and responsive civil service is difficult under these conditions.

b. In most developing nations there are powerful quasipolitical and social organizations which lie outside the formal structure of government. These groups usually reflect interests based on kinship, class, ethnic, religious, or regional factors, and perform functions similar to those of political parties. Formally constituted political parties also exist to exercise politically accepted roles within the governmental system. Their status and objectives frequently depend upon the will of the governing authority.

c. The leadership of developing nations is often authoritarian. This is the reason personal loyalties often transcend individual capabilities in the appointment of key government officials. It is also why many decisions of minor consequence are made at the highest level of government. Authoritarian decisions may conflict with, or even violate, the recognized law of the land. Each such decision, regardless of its wisdom and intent, creates the possibility of dissent which opposition elements may try to use against the government in power.

d. The following political factors are common to many developing nations:

(1) Physical geography of developing nations often does not favor political homogeneity but rather the opposite—fragmentation of the population into groupings with little contact among each other and lack of political and governmental authority in the rural areas.

(2) The stability of the political system is often dependent upon a single key political leader.

(3) There is reluctance to vest political power in, or relegate decisionmaking authority to the various departments and agencies of government.

(4) A distinct elite class or ethnic group often controls the government.

(5) Instability may result from class conflict, differences between ethnic groups, interest groups, economic groups, groups such as students or bureaucrats, or some combination of these and other more or less identifiable associations.

(6) The political institutions are characterized by an inadequate civil service and inadequate political organization.

(7) The military is often the most organized and viable institution in society and often dominates or strongly influences the political arena.

(8) The deprivations and resulting resentments created by rapid urbanization have decreased public acceptance of government.

(9) There is often a reluctance on the part of the government to acknowledge the presence of an insurgent threat until it reaches dangerous proportions.

(10) Existing political and economic institutions often restrain and inhibit independent growth of a free enterprise system.

2-6. Potential for Conflict

a. As a society changes economically, socially, and politically, the expectations of the people are often increased by exposure to what others have attained. Change produces new roles and new expectations for some individuals and groups while it erodes the position of and engenders reaction in others. Some will regard change as too
rapid; others, too slow. Some elements of the country will feel optimistic, others may become disillusioned, and still others will be left out entirely. Differences to the point of antagonism may arise over desirable goals, desirable means of change and the government's role and capability to control change. Alleviating many of the problems in a developing nation requires considerable time and resources. Most developing nations can respond only partially to these increased demands. In addition, nations need mechanisms within their political system to aggregate the many individual and group interests and refine them into acceptable policies and programs.

b. Members of a society who willingly participate in or support internal conflict are usually those whose expectations have been thwarted and who believe that their attainment is not possible under the incumbent government. It is mainly the attitudes of the people toward conditions, the intensity of their frustrations, and the extent of governmental control that determine the degree to which people will voluntarily participate in and support political violence. It should be noted that conditions within a society, regardless of their severity, do not necessarily cause dissension or violence. For example, the people of a particular society may be living under conditions that in most countries would be considered very severe and crude. Because these people have never experienced better conditions, or because they reject change, their attitudes toward existing conditions are generally favorable; therefore, the people do not feel deprived or frustrated, nor are they susceptible to exploitation concerning these conditions. The key point, however, is that discontented persons are vulnerable. They have a higher potential for social and political action than their more content fellow citizens and will therefore be more prone to becoming members of or supporting an organization whose means of accomplishing its objectives include a form of internal conflict.

HIGHLIGHTS

A DEVELOPING NATION
- HAS PROGRESSED BEYOND A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY.
- IS UNIQUE IN THAT EACH HAS ITS OWN HISTORY, CULTURE, AND GOALS.
- EXPERIENCES THE TURBULENT PROCESS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE.

CONDITIONS IN DEVELOPING NATIONS INCLUDE
- DISRUPTION OF TRADITIONAL CUSTOMS AND VALUES.
- RISING EXPECTATIONS.
- INADEQUATE INDUSTRIAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL BASE.
- RISING POPULATION GROWTH.
- RAPID URBANIZATION.
- DIVERSE ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND MINORITY GROUPS.
- RELATIVELY LOW PER CAPITA INCOME.
- UNSTABLE POLITICAL SYSTEMS.

Figure 2-1. Highlights.
CHAPTER 3
INSURGENCY

Section I. INTRODUCTION

3-1. Purpose
This chapter provides information concerning requirements for insurgency, the characteristics of insurgent strategies, the development and organization of insurgency, legal aspects, and factors to be considered when analyzing an insurgency. The Mass strategy insurgent model, which will be described, is used to explain the development and organization of insurgency because it has been employed successfully in the past and many aspects of the complex and comprehensive organizational structure and operations of the Mass model can be related to other insurgent strategies.

3-2. General
Insurgency is an attempt by a dissident element to organize and incite the population into forcibly overthrowing its existing government. Although this manual deals primarily with insurgency, those involved in preventing or defeating it must be alert to the possibility that other forms of internal conflict may be exploited by insurgents to achieve their objectives.

3-3. General Requirements for Insurgency
a. Vulnerable Population.
(1) There are numerous conditions, as identified in chapter 2, that can impact on the ability of developing nations to satisfy the demands of the populace. These conditions include a population expanding more rapidly than the growth in gross national product (GNP), drastically low educational levels, inadequate technical skills and technological know-how, primitive agriculture, the lack of investment capital, control of capital assets by foreign nations, lack of raw materials, a small or nonexistent industrial base, elites unwilling to give up or share power, and inefficient, sometimes corrupt, government. These conditions which limit the ability of developing nations to respond to the increased demands of their societies often result in frustration and dissatisfaction among the people. Whether the dissatisfaction will polarize into violent political dissent will depend upon many factors such as the attitudes of the people concerning the conditions, their expectations of success, the nation’s political and cultural traditions, its past experience with political violence, and the degree of political activity exercised by the populace.

(2) The problems brought about by modernization often become more serious because of the government’s inability or reluctance to bring about changes to enhance the society’s capability to meet demands. This failure, over a period of time, may result in an alienation of public feeling and affected groups developing antagonisms toward each other and toward the government. When these conditions are widespread, the result is often a populace that is vulnerable to insurgent exploitation.

b. Direction and Leadership. The existence of a vulnerable population is not enough to begin an insurgent movement. There also must be elements of direction and leadership that can exploit the situation and mobilize the discontented within the population. It is these elements that will address a vulnerable population and convince them that their grievances are caused by the government and resolution of their grievances will come only with a change in government. To accomplish this, it is necessary that the insurgent leadership element adopt and promulgate an ideology—a body of thought—that proposes solutions to overcoming the people’s grievances, promises ultimate success, provides guidance, promises a better future, and justifies violence.

c. Lack of Government Control. The national political climate also will affect insurgent success. If the government is well organized and effective, the insurgency will have fewer opportunities to expand its operations and support organizations than it would if the government were poorly organized and ineffective. Even though a vulnerable population and an insurgent leadership element exist in a nation, an insurgency is not likely to achieve even initial success if the government has effective control throughout the country. Therefore, how well a government is organized, its ability and willingness to suppress violence, the degree of its efficiency, and extent of its control significantly impact on the success or failure of insurgency.

3-1
Section II. INSURGENT STRATEGIES

3-4. General

a. There are many strategies and techniques that insurgents can use in their attempts to gain political control of a nation. Each insurgency can be expected to have individual characteristics and adopt methods of operations to fit its objectives, philosophies, the situation and the environment of the area. The following quote from Lenin illustrates the high degree of flexibility of Communist insurgent movements: "... the party does not tie its hands, it does not restrict its activities to some preconceived ... methods of political struggle; it recognizes all methods ... as long as they ... facilitate the achievement of the best possible results under the given conditions."

b. Insurgent strategies and techniques can range from the predominant employment of nonviolent means at one end of a spectrum to the almost exclusive use of violence at the opposite end. However, to facilitate addressing the subject in this manual, three generalized models, which can be considered as falling at different points along the spectrum, are presented below to depict the full range of insurgent strategies. The terms "Right" and "Left" used with insurgent strategies are not intended to convey the political philosophies of conservatism or liberalism which are frequently associated with the terms. The Right Strategy, with little emphasis on overt and attributable violence, applies to that form which appears to operate legally within the established political system. At the other end of the spectrum is the Left Strategy in which an effort is made to gain power almost exclusively through violence. Mass Strategy, which relies on both nonviolent and violent means, falls somewhere between the Right and Left Strategies. Insurgencies may seldom, if ever, fall precisely within one of these three categories. It is more likely that these strategies will be modified as circumstances dictate and possibly used in combination. The insurgents may follow one strategy, switch to a second, and finally to a third. Various aspects of each strategy may be pursued locally so that on a national scale the insurgents follow all three simultaneously.

3-5. Strategies

a. Left Strategy.

(1) The Left Strategy attempts to create a revolutionary situation primarily through acts of violence. This strategy envisions a spontaneous uprising, sparked by a suitable catalyst, of the masses against the government, and struggle of short duration. Organizationally, the insurgent stresses a capability to carry out violence. With the insurgent party and armed elements becoming one, the top leadership has dual roles as political leaders and leaders of armed elements. Little if any attention is given initially to the formal development of mass organizations or coalitions.

(2) The Che Guevara approach fell within the Left category with nearly total reliance on armed insurgents engaging government forces. In addition, the Tupamaro movement in Uruguay which utilized armed terrorists is considered an example of this strategy. Another version of the Left Strategy concedes the eventual necessity for mass organizations; but only after the guerrilla has demonstrated government vulnerability and gained sufficient strength to begin holding territory.

b. Right Strategy.

(1) The Right Strategy is a description for an often-employed political strategy which is characterized by infiltration of members of an insurgent organization into the society's political and social organizations; manipulation of these institutions to perpetuate unrest; and propaganda, sometimes accompanied by sabotage and terrorism, to discredit the government and influence the populace. This strategy places emphasis on the party, gaining control of mass organizations, and the use of coalitions. Little emphasis is placed on development of armed elements.

(2) In its simplest form this strategy entails the insurgent party's entry into a coalition with other political parties. A prerequisite of the Right Strategy is that the insurgent party appears to function within a legal framework. This strategy avoids blatant, overt violence utilized by the Left and Mass Strategies. Organizations publicly identifying with the insurgent party normally do not become involved in armed confrontations with forces of the incumbent government. By covertly placing members of the insurgent group in existing organizations and by selective recruiting of key personnel, the insurgent may be able to exercise strong influence within the organizations. By uniting a number of these organizations into coalitions, the insurgent party can wield more political power. Through their political organization, they attempt to gain
sufficient electoral support to permit participation in a coalition government with other parties.

(3) Once in a position to challenge the government, the insurgents begin to make impracticable demands, agitate against programs of the incumbent government, and may covertly instigate riots, strikes, terror and other violent measures to discredit opposition members in the government. These activities, coupled with effective propaganda, have as their objective the takeover of power through what appears to be legitimate procedures.


(1) The third insurgent strategy is termed the Mass Strategy. This strategy envisions a protracted conflict against the incumbent government. Organizationally the Mass Strategy emphasizes an intricate party structure which utilizes mass civil organizations and armed elements. The insurgent party operates from a secure base and establishes a parallel governmental structure that competes for legitimacy with the existing administrative structure of the incumbent government. Through a cellular organizational structure, and a system of interlocking directories, attempts are made to control all aspects of the movement. Control mechanisms whereby party dominance is assured will take various forms and may achieve a high degree of complexity. Figure 3-1 depicts the major organizational elements and control mechanisms of an illustrative Mass insurgent organization.

(2) The ultimate goal of the Mass Strategy is the establishment of a government controlled by the insurgent party. A military arm is considered essential for the ultimate success of this type insurgency. The relative importance of the armed element will vary with local conditions; e.g., the government’s military strength and the insurgent party’s evaluation of circumstances. If total military victory is not obtainable, the Mass Strategy entails a continued effort to transfer the people’s allegiance to the insurgent political structure while the established government’s administrative structure is being rendered ineffective. It should be noted that many of the tactics and techniques of the Mass Strategy can be applied to urban as well as rural insurgencies.

Section III. DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF INSURGENCY

3-6. General

US Army IDAD doctrine is primarily concerned with neutralizing insurgencies that use armed elements to carry out violence (e.g., Left and Mass type insurgencies) and which, therefore, require the employment of host country military forces. The doctrine in this manual is oriented toward the defeat of insurgencies using the Mass Strategy because these are the most complex and difficult to counter and most likely to cause a government to seek US assistance. An understanding of the development and organization of Mass type insurgencies will also facilitate understanding insurgencies that use other ideologies and strategies.

3-7. Phases of Insurgency

a. General Framework. The successful progression of insurgencies employing armed elements, especially the Mass type strategy, can usually be categorized into three general phases: Phase I, Latent and Incipient Insurgency; Phase II, Guerrilla Warfare; and Phase III, War of Movement. These three phases are used in US Army doctrine to provide a useful categorization of the intensity of insurgent activities. The phases provide a general framework within which to consider IDAD activities that may be employed to defeat or prevent the further escalation of insurgencies. In actuality, the actions that occur during the progression of insurgencies, especially those employing the Mass Strategy, are much more complex and detailed than can be portrayed in the general description of the phases in this manual.

b. Flexibility. The flexibility that applies to the employment of strategies by insurgents also characterizes the sequential phases (or stages) through which insurgencies develop. Since insurgent strategies depend on many variables in any given environment, any concept of phasing must be generalized. Phases are merely general descriptions of the overall development of insurgencies. When using phases to describe insurgencies, it should be recognized that there is no clear line between phases; phases overlap. In addition, the type and intensity of insurgent activity may vary from one region of a country to another. Also, it should be noted that insurgent leaders may choose to accelerate certain of the phases or may, when faced with successful host
country operations, revert from one phase of intensity to one of lesser intensity. A strategic decision for the insurgent will be to determine when to escalate or de-escalate operations. This will usually be based on an insurgent assessment of the relative insurgent strength versus the strength of the government. Likewise, a key decision for the government will be to determine what level of insurgency it is confronted with, so that correct choices and ranges of countermeasures may be instituted to depress the threat and prevent further escalation. What is described below is a logical progression of a successful Mass type insurgency which is categorized according to the three general phases.

c. Phases

(1) Phase I (Latent and Incipient Insurgency). This phase ranges from circumstances in which subversive activity is only a potential threat, latent or incipient, to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgency activity. The following relate to possible insurgent activities during Phase I.

(a) This is the period when the insurgents, starting from a relatively weak position, plan and organize their campaign and initial urban and/or rural target areas are selected. Basic ideological decisions are made as well as determination of fundamental leadership relationships.

(b) Overt and covert organizations are established. If the insurgent party is illegal, the organizations may be entirely covert. If the party is legal, overt mass organizations may be established. The covert party organization will always exist.

(c) Psychological operations are conducted to exploit popular grievances and expectations, to discredit government actions and policies, to influence the populace, and to increase the loyalty of insurgent members. Psychological activities are emphasized during all phases of the insurgency and all actions are considered in light of their psychological implications.

(d) The establishment of a shadow government is begun.

(e) Once the party has been established to a degree that gives it a capability to expend effort beyond its own organization, it concentrates on gaining influence over the population and infiltrating government, economic, and social organizations and challenging the government's administrative ability.

(f) Recruiting, organizing and training of armed forces are emphasized during the latter part of this phase.

(g) Initiation of attacks on police forces and minor military and terrorist activities are carried out, especially in preselected target areas, to gain additional influence over the population, provide arms for the movement, and to challenge the government's ability to maintain law and order.

(2) Phase II (Guerrilla Warfare). This phase is reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority. The following are examples of insurgent activities during Phase II:

(a) Continue and expand activities that were initiated in Phase I. Intensified insurgent control, both political and military, over targeted territory and populace characterizes the early stages of this phase.

(b) Employ guerrilla warfare on a larger scale and conduct limited defense of geographic areas.

(c) The establishment of an insurgent government in insurgent dominated areas is accomplished as the military situation permits. In areas not yet controlled, efforts are made to neutralize actual or potential opposition groups and increase infiltration into government agencies. Intimidation through terror and threat of guerrilla action takes on added significance because of increased frequency of occurrence.

(d) Militarily, the major goal is the control of additional areas while forcing the government to extend its resources trying to protect everything simultaneously. To accomplish these operations, insurgent forces attempt to tie down government troops in static defense tasks, interdict and destroy lines of communications, and capture or destroy supplies and other government resources.

(3) Phase III (War of Movement). The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority. Insurgent Phase III activities may include the following:

(a) Continuation and expansion of activities conducted in Phase I and Phase II.

(b) The employment of larger units to fight conventional battles with government forces and the capture of key geographical and political
objectives which will assist in defeating government forces.

(c) Should the insurgency result in the defeat of the military and the collapse of the government, the insurgents initiate consolidation activities. These activities may include removing potential enemies, establishing and improving additional control mechanisms, and restructuring the society.

3-8. Organization of Insurgency

Organization is critical to the insurgent. This is true whether the insurgent movement pursues its objectives primarily within the established political arena or whether violence against the established government is to be followed from the outset. Regardless of the strategy, some structure will generally exist which includes varying combinations of the following organizations.

a. A party or control element to perform the centralized policymaking and supervisory function. The party will normally be compartmentalized to provide security against penetration by intelligence agencies.

b. Mass organizations which serve to affiliate people with the party and through which the party is able to effect control and receive support of people without their necessarily being willing supporters of all of the party’s objectives.

c. Armed elements (overt or covert), depending on the insurgent’s analysis of the best means to their ends.

3-9. The Mass Model of Insurgency

a. General. At the heart of every Mass-oriented insurgency may be found a tightly disciplined party. The party eventually controls mass organization and “liberation” committees which parallel the country’s existing government at the local, subnational, and national levels. The overall organization is composed of three major elements: the party core, mass civil organization and front groups, and military forces. These elements are interlocked organizationally to insure that the party exercises complete control over their activities. Although the exact organizational relationship of its elements may vary from one insurgency to another, the interlocking arrangement with its high degree of centralized control will usually be used with every Mass Strategy. Figure 3-1 illustrates a type Mass insurgent organization.

b. The Party Core.

(1) The party cellular organization.

(a) The cell is the base of the Mass insurgent party structure. A party member normally belongs to two or more cells—the local party cell and one or more functional cells such as school, factory or trade organizations. Parallel chains of command exist between the party structure and the various functional organizations. These party cells and functional cells often overlap.

(b) Party groups are normally created to control and coordinate the activities of two or more party cells. Each party group, in turn, is responsible to a higher office known as the interparty committee. This committee is also responsible to its counterpart committee at the next higher echelon. The chain of command within the overall party structure is from the central committee at national level down through each interparty committee at national; subnational, and local level.

(2) The party committee system.

(a) Although all authority stems from the cellular party organization, functional committees composed of party members carry out the party’s daily activities. The primary organization used for this purpose is the party executive committee, often termed the party revolutionary committee. This committee normally exists at national, subnational, and local levels. At the local level, cells perform their functional tasks under the direction of local committees. At national level, control is exercised by the secretariat of the central committee.

(b) At each hierarchical level of operation, the party core cellular organization and its counterpart revolutionary committee exist in interlocking fashion. All party members in a given branch or section of the revolutionary committee are concurrently members of a cell in the party organization.

(3) The party youth organization. A party youth organization is the third parallel structure within the party core and is an indispensable affiliate of a party. Members may engage in most of the activities conducted in an insurgency and acquire experience in the multiple phases of party work. This will enable them to enter the core of the organizational apparatus when they are eligible.

c. Mass Organizations.

(1) The concept of the Mass Strategy is a small, mobile, disciplined, and dedicated party which directs the masses in a manner that permits the party to exercise power over the people. Therefore, the aim is to recruit into the service of the party a great many individuals some of whom are unaware they are serving the party cause. Mass organizations are one of the primary means
Figure 3-1. A type Mass insurgent organization.

used by the insurgents to achieve control and influence over the population. The insurgents exploit these organizations for intelligence, logistics and recruiting requirements. There are three types of organizations—popular organizations, special interest groups, and local militia.

(2) Popular organizations are the most important of the mass organizations in that they are organized on a nationwide scale. They have
committees at the national, subnational, and local level. These organizations seek to appeal to a broad segment of the population—for example, youth groups, farmer organizations, and labor unions.

(3) Special interest groups are narrower in scope than popular organizations and are oriented to special issues. Examples are medical associations, sporting clubs, and teachers groups—organizations expressly created to further the special interests of a group.

(4) The local militia also is considered an element of the mass civil organization although it often is regarded as a part-time and inferior arm of the military. The three distinct paramilitary elements in the local militia are the self-defense force, the combat guerrilla unit, and the secret guerrilla unit. The militia's task is to isolate the population from government control.

(a) The self-defense force normally is organized, trained, and employed for the defense of communities and other insurgent facilities, whereas the guerrilla force is the local instrument for inflicting damage on the government and gaining and maintaining population control.

(b) The combat guerrilla unit of the local militia is employed by the party in the support of regular military forces or is used independently to conduct small operations.

(c) The secret guerrilla unit is used primarily to enforce the will of the party in a given area. It is composed primarily of party members.

d. The Military Forces.

(1) The military forces are but one of several instruments through which the party seeks to achieve power. Mass insurgency provides for military reverses and the possible necessity for retrenching, restructuring, or even temporarily disbanding its military forces should enemy strength prove overwhelming. Party strategy is based realistically on the assumption that as long as the party core and the mass civil organization remain intact, the military arm of the insurgent movement can be reactivated or replenished. However, without the party nucleus and mass civil base, the movement cannot succeed.

(2) Mass insurgent military forces fall into two classes—main forces and regional forces. These elements are distinguished from the local militia which, although paramilitary, is not in the military chain of command. The main force is normally a body of well-trained soldiers and a highly motivated, elite, fighting group. Deployable where needed, the main force usually is controlled at the national level. The regional force is made up predominantly of indigenous personnel recruited directly from the mass civil organization or promoted from the ranks of the local militia. The regional forces normally confine their operations to a specific region or state (province).

3-10. Insurgency in an Urban Environment

a. The information presented in the preceding paragraphs concerning insurgent organization and strategies generally apply to both rural and urban areas. However, there are conditions in urban areas that require special consideration. This paragraph describes urban operations from an insurgent view.

b. The following factors tend to support insurgent operations in urban areas.

(1) The existence of a large number of people who are potential participants in insurgent sponsored activities such as protest demonstrations, riots, and logistical support.

(2) The existence of many services, supplies, facilities, and skilled personnel critical to the insurgent. The ease by which a system can be developed in urban areas to provide the armed insurgent with necessary logistical support—food, clothing, ammunition, and weapons.

(3) A large target audience for propaganda.

(4) Contact points for foreign support, international and national press, and for political maneuvering.

(5) Contacts with potentially friendly foreign powers.

(6) A degree of safety because of the anonymity inherent in a large city.

(7) Built-up areas that can serve as fortifications and convenient escape routes.

(8) A source for antigovernment intelligence.

(9) Targets for insurgent activity in the delicately interwoven and easily interrupted systems of communications, transportation, water, electricity, production, and distribution.

(10) A police force incapable of coping with insurgent activities.

c. The following factors tend to be disadvantageous to insurgent operations in urban areas:

(1) Urban areas are normally the points of greatest government strength and the insurgents are surrounded by masses of potential government informants.

(2) Insurgents are required to operate under the constraints and threats implicit in curfews, checkpoints, and other governmental populace and resources control measures.

(3) Insurgent terrorism may get out of hand and thereby cease to serve the overall strategy.
unless strictly controlled by the central leadership.

(4) High level insurgent leaders tend to be more vulnerable in urban areas.

Section IV. LEGAL STATUS OF INSURGENCIES AND INSURGENTS

3-11. General

a. Insurgency occurs within a particular state when revolutionaries who have banded together for political reasons attempt to displace the established government by force. An insurgency attains belligerent status under international law when it meets the requirements for civil war (see glossary).

b. It is permissible under international law for another country to assist an established government threatened by an insurgent movement; however, as a general rule, it is not considered permissible for another country to assist the insurgents.

3-12. Treatment of Prisoners

a. Under the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, guerrillas who meet the criteria for belligerent status and are accorded it must be accorded prisoner-of-war status.

b. Insurgents usually cannot meet the criteria for belligerents. Historically, insurgency has been accorded little international legal status because the condition had no status in international law before 1949. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 gave cognizance to an "armed conflict not of an international character"—essentially, insurgency. The Conventions furnish protection to captives of these conflicts by prohibiting—

(1) Violence to life and person; in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.

(2) Taking hostages.

(3) Outrages upon personal dignity; in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.

(4) Passing sentences and carrying out executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court that affords all the judicial guarantees considered indispensable by civilized peoples.

c. Basic United States policy for the treatment of insurgents held in United States Army custody during internal defense operations requires and directs that they be accorded humanitarian care and treatment from the moment they are detained until they are released or repatriated. The observance of this policy is fully and equally binding upon United States personnel whether they are the capturing troops, custodial personnel, or serve in some other capacity. This policy is equally applicable for the protection of all detained or interned personnel. It is applicable whether they are known to have committed, or are suspected of having committed, acts of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or other serious offenses of a war crimes nature. The punishment of such persons is adjudicated and administered only under due process of law and by legally constituted authority. Inhumane treatment, even under stress of combat and with deep provocation, is a serious and punishable violation under international law and the US Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Section V. ANALYSIS OF INSURGENCY

3-13. General

Although there may be commonalities among insurgencies in developing nations, each insurgency exhibits certain characteristics, methods of operation, and techniques that are unique to the country and area in which it is operating. The information presented in paragraphs 3-1 through 3-5 will assist in identifying general subject areas that should be considered during the analysis of insurgencies. An examination of the following factors, among others, will assist in providing insight into the existence of an insurgency, its level of activities, and its potential for success.

a. Vulnerable Population. Who are the vulnerable elements in the population? What issues concern them? Are they subject to insurgent exploitation? Are they organized? What is their size, density, distribution, and potential for influencing the political system? Are there established mechanisms for the consideration of political dissent?
b. Insurgent Leadership. Does an insurgency in fact exist? Is the leadership clearly defined or do competing factions exist? Is the insurgency affiliated with any political, labor, student, or social organizations? What is the philisophy of the leadership?

c. Strategy. What is the insurgent strategy? Is there an identifiable pattern of insurgent activities? Does the insurgent organization function primarily within the established political system or in open competition with it? What activities are being conducted by the insurgent movement?

d. Organization. Is the insurgency linked to a racial, religious, ethnic, or regional base? Does

HIGHLIGHTS

INSURGENCY REQUIRES THE FOLLOWING MAJOR ELEMENTS--

- Vulnerable Population.
- Direction and Leadership Element.
- Lack of Government Control.

INSURGENT STRATEGIES INCLUDE--

- The Left Strategy, known as the "Strategy of Violence."
- The Right Strategy, known as the "Legal" Approach.
- The Mass Strategy of Protracted Conflict.
- Varying Combinations of Above Strategies.

THREE PHASES OF INSURGENCY

- Phase I (Latent and Incipient) extends through periods when organized subversive incidents are frequent, but there are no major outbreaks of violence against the established authority.

- Phase II (Guerilla Warfare) is reached when the subversive movement has gained sufficient local or external support and can initiate organized guerilla warfare or related forms of violence against the establised authority.

- Phase III (War of Movement) develops when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.

INSURGENT ORGANIZATION

- Party
- Mass Civil Organizations
- Armed Elements

Figure 3-2. Highlights.
the insurgent organization function through predominantly legal means or clandestine operations? What and who constitute the organizational elements of the movement?

e. **Government Capability.** Is the government organized and does it operate with reasonable efficiency to engender popular support? Does it take effective steps to alleviate national problems and effectively combat the varying levels of insurgent activities? Does the nation possess an adequate police force, capable of maintaining the requisite degree of law and order for internal development efforts? Can law and order be maintained in the face of an organized insurgent threat? Can the armed forces adequately cope with an escalated insurgent threat?

f. **Extended Influence.** What degree of support has been offered by and accepted from foreign powers? Are there indications of future international alignment, assuming the insurgency is successful under the current leadership?
CHAPTER 4
HOST COUNTRY INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT
CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

4-1. Purpose
This chapter presents concepts and doctrine for host country internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy, planning, organization, and policy guidance. Although the concepts and doctrine are oriented primarily against the Mass Strategy, many of the principles will apply to countering other insurgent strategies.

4-2. General
The fundamental thrust of IDAD doctrine is toward preventing insurgencies from escalating to where they present a significant threat and require an inordinate amount of resources to combat. Prevention is accomplished through forestalling and defeating the threat posed by insurgent organizations and by recognizing and alleviating societal conditions that prompt violence. Should insurgency occur, emphasis is necessarily shifted to holding down the magnitude of violence. Together, internal defense and internal development constitute an overall strategy for host country prevention or defeat of insurgency.

a. Internal defense is the full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It is designed to provide an atmosphere of internal security and relative peace within which internal development can promote national growth. The emphasis on internal defense will necessarily vary with the magnitude of insurgent operations and the extent of the insurgent's influence and control over the population.

b. Internal development is those actions taken by a nation to promote its balanced growth by building viable institutions—political, economic, and social—that respond to the needs of its society. Internal development programs, carefully planned and implemented, and properly publicized, can serve to associate the government with the interests of population groups and deny exploitable issues to the insurgents.

Section II. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

4-3. Concepts
Internal defense and development strategy involves the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, psychological, and military powers of a government, including all police and internal security forces, to prevent or defeat insurgency. This strategy is invariably population-oriented, although approaches vary. The US concept is based on the strategy of simultaneous internal defense and development programs. The primary objective under this strategy normally will be the attainment of internal security which will permit economic, political, and social growth through balanced development programs. Like other strategies, it considers the political, economic, psychological, military, and police powers of the government and is directed toward both the populace and the insurgent.

a. The Population. Alleviating the conditions that insurgents exploit to foster an insurgency must be a part of the national strategy. The police and military can contribute materially to winning the confidence of the people by providing security, but their efforts must be accompanied by planned economic, social, political, and psychological actions to reduce the frustrations of discontented elements of the populace and to mobilize support for the government. It must be recognized, however, that economic, political, and social changes are inherently dynamic and may promote unrest. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.
(1) The populace can be mobilized only when it is secure from insurgent coercion. Unless the people know they will be protected from the insurgent, their response to government overtures will be minimal. Therefore, the basic strategy must provide for the establishment of a relatively secure and stable environment within which the government is able to organize and develop the active support of the populace and can administer its IDAD programs.

(2) The deep, underlying resentments and desires of both majority and minority groups must be analyzed objectively before strategic measures are decided upon. With the resources and capabilities typically available, it is virtually impossible to satisfy the desires of all; therefore, the designation of priorities, allocation of resources, and assignment of tasks require objective, realistic planning and conscientious implementation. Factors affecting resource allocation must be appraised realistically in the light of their availability, short- and long-range impact on the population, and the benefits which will accrue to the government.

(3) The process of integrating the populace of a country into a coherent society that enables people to work in concert to achieve their goals is known as institutional development. This kind of development is concerned with building organizations at the community level that will involve the local people. Through their participation in these organizations, cooperative patterns of behavior among the people (institutions) that favor national unity and community development are established.

(a) In a general sense, institutional development involves the establishment of new institutions where none exist to meet needs; the strengthening or modification of existing institutions; and elimination of certain institutions which are counterproductive from the standpoint of national unity. Of primary importance is the development at the community level of groups of people (organizations) oriented toward the goals of the nation. This task is accomplished by identifying the needs of the people, both perceived and real, insuring that institutions and organizations exist to meet these needs, and integrating the people into these organizations. The activities may often have to be inspired or directed by assistance from government agencies. With regard to the above tasks, it should be understood that the needs of people are frequently not easy to determine and creation or elimination of institutions must be acceptable to the local populace and based on decisions of local leaders.

(b) At the same time that the small group organizations are being developed at the community level, it is necessary to develop similar organizations and programs at each level of government to which the smaller organizations at community level can be linked. This linking together of organizations from lowest to highest levels provides the government with a basic structure through which it is able to exert influence over the population. Moreover, it binds small groups of people together in organizations through which they are able by cooperative effort to satisfy their needs.

b. The Insurgent. National strategy must provide for isolating the insurgents from the population, both physically and psychologically; thereby denying them personnel, materiel, and intelligence support. Psychological operations are a large part of this strategy and should be initiated to prevent as well as defeat an insurgency.

(1) Elimination or neutralization of the insurgent leadership and the insurgent organization is a major consideration of a national strategy. A small, hard-core leadership faction exists at the heart of every insurgent movement. Although this faction usually is well concealed, it must be sought out and destroyed or otherwise made ineffective. Since all component parts of the insurgent organization interlock, removal of party leadership elements normally results in elimination of centralized direction and control, fragmentation of the insurgent infrastructure, disunity, and the eventual destruction of the insurgent organization.

(2) The defeat of insurgent tactical forces may also be of prime importance in the formulation of a national strategy. Pressure on these forces is maintained through tactical and police operations to inflict casualties, destroy supplies and equipment, and lower morale. At the same time, the strategy must provide for positive programs urging the insurgent to voluntarily abandon the insurgent movement. Such programs offer the insurgents an alternative that permits them to surrender and tends to weaken their resolution to continue fighting under adverse circumstances.

(3) The inclusion of psychological operations (PSYOP) in the national strategy cannot be overemphasized. The national strategy to be effective and to insure success in the combating of insurgency must implement an effective PSYOP program and coordinate it with and into all other government IDAD effort. The insurgent organization must be thoroughly discredited with
the population, otherwise it will disappear underground to surface again when reorganized. PSYOP actions, themes, and messages must also be directed at the individual insurgent to weaken his resolution and to offer him honorable justification to surrender or to leave the insurgent movement.

4-4. IDAD Strategy

a. General. Internal defense and development, as discussed in conceptual terms in paragraph 4-2, may be placed in useful perspective by viewing IDAD strategy as being composed of three interdependent components: balanced development, mobilization, and neutralization.

(1) Balanced development. Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through balanced political, social, and economic development. It includes activities to alleviate frustration by providing opportunities to individuals and groups within the society.

(2) Mobilization. Mobilization includes all activities to motivate and organize the populace in support of the government through IDAD programs as well as activities to protect the populace from insurgent actions.

(3) Neutralization. Neutralization includes all activities to disrupt, disorganize, and defeat an insurgent organization.

b. Components of IDAD Strategy. In developing specific IDAD programs, it is useful to consider the above components—balanced development, mobilization, and neutralization—as bases for programs that are available in some degree to governments seeking to prevent or defeat an insurgency. Insurgency may be prevented or defeated by visible balanced development that provides individual and group opportunities to progress toward attainment of popular expectations; by adequate surveillance and subsequent neutralization of the insurgent organization; and by organizing and channelizing the populace and material resources into positive, constructive, government programs. All governments operate within constraints. There are certainly some governments, and perhaps many of them, that do not have the requisite resources, popular support, or administrative capability to effectively translate these components into programs. Such governments should pursue balanced development, mobilization and neutralization as distant goals and implement limited programs toward their attainment.

c. Balanced Development. Conditions that contribute to insurgency must be recognized and preventive measures initiated early. In support of this concept, internal development programs should promote advances in the economic, sociological, and political fields which tend to bring overall development in balance and provide opportunities for all groups to share in the benefits of these improvements. Early recognition and alleviation of the conditions which render a society vulnerable is the long-term solution to the problem of insurgency.

d. Mobilization. Effective mobilization provides organized manpower and the necessary material resources for internal defense and development programs. To the extent that mobilization is successful, it maximizes the availability of resources to the government and minimizes those available to the insurgent. Mobilization also provides an opportunity to the government to reinforce existing institutions and create new institutions to improve the cohesiveness of the society and enhance the legitimacy of the government. The ability of a particular government to mobilize populace and material resources is related to the administrative and management capabilities it possesses. Most developing nations do not have a government with a good administrative capability and must develop this as a systematic effort to improve efficiency.

e. Neutralization. Neutralization of insurgent organizations is the decisive task of internal security organizations. It includes all activities to discredit, disrupt, disorganize, and defeat an insurgent organization. The primary target of neutralization is the leadership and control element of the insurgent movement. Neutralization can take many forms and can vary from public exposure and discrediting of the leaders during a low level of insurgency when little political violence has taken place—to arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken—to combat action when the insurgency escalates. Internal development can contribute to neutralization of insurgent organization through programs that satisfy legitimate grievances exploited by the insurgents and tend to discredit the insurgent organization and its propaganda.

(1) The Mass Strategy relies on protracted conflict, flexibility, and complex and superior organization. When an insurgency using this strategy is well established in a developing nation, the host country government will probably be required to rely heavily on mobilization in order to neutralize the insurgency.

(2) The objective of the Left Strategy is to gain control in a relatively short period through the use of violence. The organization and ac-
tivities of this type insurgency are normally much less complex than that of an insurgency employing the Mass Strategy. Therefore, government internal defense may require little, if any, mobilization and would, instead, concentrate on neutralization of the armed element. Internal development efforts may, of necessity, decrease because a proportionately larger amount of government resources must be expended in internal defense actions.

Section III. PLANNING GUIDANCE

4-5. General.
National IDAD programs are based on national IDAD strategy. Planning for IDAD is facilitated in those developing nations which have adopted central planning to promote rapid modernization and economic development. IDAD planning should integrate all programs, to the extent possible, into an overall plan. Programs designed to correct those conditions contributing to an insurgency will thus complement operations to defeat insurgent organizations. Programs planned at the national level provide the basis for IDAD activities at subnational levels (region, state, local). The planning activities at the lower levels should contribute to national plans and the achievement of national objectives. Planning recognizes that IDAD depends on integrated, area-oriented execution by civil and military agencies.

(1) A national internal defense and development plan should be prepared by the government to set forth objectives and broad, general guidance concerning priorities of effort, budget limitations, and resource allocation. This plan should include both short- and long-range goals and should include sufficiently detailed and comprehensive guidance so that it can be used for additional national level planning and as a basis for planning at regional, state, and local levels. The national plan is supported by supplemental plans prepared by various government departments and agencies whose resources and capabilities can be used in implementing the master plan. These supplemental plans discuss specific programs and departmental responsibilities and resources and describe how these resources will be used to carry out the internal defense and development programs.

(2) The national plan is based on national objectives and an estimate of the internal defense and development situation which evaluates government and opposing force capabilities and develops courses of action. The estimate updates research and background studies by highlighting the most pertinent elements for internal defense and development planning and considers the insurgent threat, vulnerable elements of the population, and the national situation. A current estimate of the situation and a knowledge of the phases of insurgency are important to the IDAD planner. They will assist in preparing a proper response to varying levels of possible insurgent activity as well as developing measures to correct conditions which may foster an insurgency. National plans must be based on realistic assessments of local conditions, resources, plans, and the needs and desires of the people.

(3) IDAD plans should be developed at all political subdivisions of a nation based on national priorities, the conditions in each particular area, and the IDAD plans of the next higher levels. Representatives of governmental departments and agencies located at each level assist in preparing the political subdivision's IDAD plan by developing supporting programs and projects relative to their areas of responsibility.

(4) Campaigns may be developed at national or subnational levels to implement a series of IDAD operations based on the national and subnational IDAD plans. Campaigns are characterized by a given time frame, a specified area, and specific objectives. Campaigns may include operations to implement governmental development programs; to establish government control of populated areas; to defeat insurgent tactical forces and destroy insurgent base areas; or to establish government strength and authority in selected areas. A campaign may include one or more of these objectives.

b. Planning Tasks. An important requirement of national planning for insurgency situations is to ensure that internal defense and development activities are molded into unified strategy tailored to attain national objectives. Some of the more significant planning tasks include—

(1) Developing appropriate objectives and establishing priorities.

(2) Examining the structure of government and governmental agencies to determine existence of mechanisms which insure that in-
ternal defense and internal development plans are effectively implemented.

(3) Estimating necessary monetary appropriations for procurement and operations.

(4) Examining conscription laws and procedures to insure adequate numbers of personnel for operations.

(5) Examining existing laws to determine whether they are adequate to protect the populace and allow the controls necessary to neutralize and defeat an insurgency.

c. Planning Organization. The composition of the planning organization will vary with the degree of mobilization required. In latent insurgency situations, the existing government structure may be adequate to plan and coordinate IDAD activities. In advanced phases of insurgency, planning may overextend the capabilities of individual government agencies and therefore require the establishment of IDAD coordinating centers at national and subnational levels. Internal defense and development coordinating centers are not intended to replace government agencies or perform their functions but to provide focal points for planning and coordinating the IDAD effort. Paragraphs 4-9 through 4-13 provide a discussion of internal defense and development coordination organization.

4-6. Internal Development Planning

Internal development planning outlines specific programs to be undertaken by a government to improve economic, social, and political conditions and create favorable attitudes among the people concerning these conditions. It also outlines the objectives to be attained and the policies and strategies to be used in achieving them. The development of institutions which will assist in integrating the population into a coherent society is a major part of internal development.

a. Objectives. National objectives of internal development planning include—

(1) Identifying conditions that provide a potential for internal conflict.

(2) Defining internal development objectives, purposes, and tasks, and establishing priorities.

(3) Determining actual and potential economic, social, and political resources and their capabilities to support internal development objectives.

(4) Selecting means to mobilize the populace and resources for the attainment of objectives.

(5) Providing a basis for the allocation of limited resources.

(6) Training in public administration and developmental techniques at all levels of government.

(7) Insuring that the operations of different government departments and private groups are coordinated and consistent with each other.

(8) Providing adequate security to the populace and a secure environment within which developmental operations can be conducted.

b. Concepts. National internal development planning can be coordinated and supervised by a national level organization to assist in the attainment of political, sociological, and economic objectives through effective use of available resources.

(1) Fundamental characteristics of internal development planning include the clarification of a nation's objectives and an assessment of its willingness to make sacrifices for future growth. To be fully effective, planning should stimulate private contributions to the development process.

(2) Planning should provide for private business to receive an appropriately large share of limited resources so that it can further economic expansion.

c. Programs. The more highly organized the society the better it is able to achieve the objectives of internal development programs and prevent insurgent warfare. Through organizations and the institutions they promote, the people can become better unified in support of national programs to improve political, economic, and social conditions. In planning and executing a development program, governments may have to establish, supervise, and operate activities and organizations which mobilize the populace and contribute to the political, social, psychological, and economic development of the nation. These activities and organizations may include—

(1) Political.

(a) Discussion groups.

(b) Voting apparatus.

(c) Establishing political parties.

(d) Enacting laws that support national objectives.

(e) Broadening the bases of political power through education and health programs.

(2) Social.

(a) Public health programs.

(b) Public education programs and facilities.

(c) Specialized training programs.

(d) News media.

(e) Civil service system.
(f) Civic organizations.
(g) Crime prevention programs.
(h) Youth programs.
(i) Recreational programs.
(j) Community relations programs.

(3) Psychological.
(a) Training and indoctrination programs.
(b) Information programs.
(c) Pictorial campaigns.
(d) Motion picture service.
(e) Ceremonies and contests to assemble people for orientation.

(4) Economic.
(a) National development bank.
(b) Industrial development company.
(c) Housing authority.
(d) Water resources authority.
(e) Customs authority.
(f) Land development authority.
(g) Electric power corporation.
(h) Transportation authority.
(i) Food distribution authority.
(j) Medical authority.
(k) Vocational and technical training programs.

d. Other Internal Development Factors.
Measures important in host country internal development planning include—

(1) Recognizing the needs and aspirations of the people and the appropriate government response.
(2) Recognizing the proper relationship between official and private organizations.
(3) Planning for the participation of nongovernmental personnel, organizations, and groups.
(4) Ascertaining the impact of internal defense activities on internal development.
(5) Coordinating internal defense and internal development plans in an overall nation-building program.
(6) Phasing internal development to insure coordinated action and availability of personnel and materiel. For example, personnel must be recruited and trained before work can begin.

4-7. Internal Defense Planning
Internal defense planning is based on knowledge of the threat; operational environment; national objectives, organization, and requirements; and other plans. Planning at all levels involves a wider scope and closer coordination between the civil/military community than is normally required during limited and general war. Plans must provide for the employment of available support from the armed forces and other organizations. When assistance from Free World nations will be provided to assist internal defense forces, plans must permit efficient integration of this external assistance.

a. Objective. The objective of internal defense planning is to provide for the most efficient employment of defense resources to support both internal defense and internal development programs. The national plan provides guidance for long-range objectives, whereas lower level plans provide more detailed guidance concerning short-range objectives.

b. Concept. Before and during Phase I, internal defense planning accentuates the employment of military resources in support of internal development programs through military civic action and PSYOP. Standard operating procedures should be formulated for as many types of military activities as possible. During Phases II and III, internal defense planning is expanded to meet the insurgent tactical threat. Internal defense planning should—

(1) Be responsive to nationally established priorities of resource allocation and must be closely coordinated with internal development planning.
(2) Provide an organizational structure that will facilitate coordination and implementation of all plans.
(3) Estimate insurgent activities and prepare to meet them offensively and prevent their escalation.

c. Other Internal Defense Planning Factors.
The following planning aspects should be recognized—

(1) Planning for internal defense operations should be oriented on control of the national territory.
   (a) Planning should provide for clear division of responsibility and precise lines of authority.
   (b) Tasks should be assigned on the basis of unit capabilities and limitations.
   (c) When areas of responsibility are assigned to a unit, the extent of responsibility must be clearly defined.
   (d) Planning must include provisions for the training of all internal defense forces, to include coordinating staffs.
(2) Planning objectives are not limited to neutralization of enemy forces, but are also heavily oriented toward securing and gaining support of the population.
(3) Combat power must be applied in a manner that serves to reduce the overall scope, intensity, and duration of the insurgency. In
particular, combat power must be applied selectively in order to minimize noncombatant casualties. In many instances, commanders may have to choose between a course of action that will assure entrance into a given area with minimum troop losses and one that precludes harming the population. The commander must weigh the psychological impact of his military operations in order not to sacrifice important long-range political objectives for temporary tactical gains.

(4) In addition to tactical operations, internal defense planning provides guidance for conducting civil affairs, intelligence, PSYOP, and populace and resources control operations.

(5) Local, state, and regional plans are coordinated and implemented through the use of detailed comprehensive orders that provide commanders with adequate operational guidance about the requirements within their specific areas.

(6) Planning must give close attention to political, economic, social, psychological, and military factors. Estimates are based on an analysis of the areas of operations, the mission, and information previously outlined.

(7) All plans must be coordinated closely between military and civilian agencies. Planning staffs must anticipate difficulties in gaining approval for unit plans and allow enough time to process these plans at higher, lower, and adjacent levels.

(8) During latent and incipient insurgency, when few or no tactical operational requirements exist, host country combat support and combat service support forces (such as engineers, medical, signal, and intelligence) should be tasked early to carry out nontactical internal development missions.

(9) All plans for military operations should consider the roles and capabilities of police, internal security, and paramilitary forces.

(10) Plans for tactical operations are oriented on the enemy and his activities but they also must consider internal development operations.

(11) Supply procedures and other administrative and logistical support activities should be planned for both routine and emergency operations.

(12) Planning should provide for the contingency that subnational efforts may require military forces in excess of those locally available. To accomplish this, special units may be designated for attachment to subnational levels.

4-8. Military Plans

a. This paragraph is oriented toward host country army planning; however, the principles provided are generally applicable to all security forces. Information on the plans for police and other security forces should be included in the military plan. The military plan to the national internal defense and development plan should be prepared by the host country defense establishment. It should be a realistic and detailed blueprint of the missions, resources, capabilities, and employment of the military, paramilitary, and self-defense forces in support of the total internal defense and development effort. The Army's portion of the plan is referred to as the Army IDAD operations annex. The following discussion is based on figure 4-1, which depicts the components of an Army IDAD operations annex. The annex should include all the resources and effort to be expended. Logistic considerations should be integrated into each appendix. It is particularly important to coordinate all functional elements of the plan so that available personnel and materiel resources will be used properly. The annex should have appendixes on the following operations:

(1) Intelligence. This appendix contains the intelligence assets available and the guidance necessary to collect, process, and disseminate intelligence concerning the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population. It also provides guidance to those counterintelligence activities necessary to minimize insurgent espionage, subversions, and sabotage. The intelligence appendix should also include intelligence requirements and information pertinent to PSYOP, civil affairs, and communications security (COMSEC) monitoring and support.

(2) Psychological operations. This appendix prescribes the military PSYOP missions, objectives, roles, and the PSYOP resources required. It categorizes the target audience and prescribes the themes in consonance with the host country national PSYOP plan and objectives.

(3) Civil affairs. This appendix considers relationships between the military, civil authorities, and the people. It focuses on programs designed to organize and motivate the people to support the internal defense and internal development projects.

(4) Populace and resources control. This appendix prescribes proper employment of available resources and measures necessary to preserve or reestablish a state of law and order. It
Figure 4-1. Type Army IDAD operations annex.

4-8

includes detailed backup in support of IDAD operations on such activities as protecting lines of communication (LOC), severing relations between the insurgent and the population, amnesty and rehabilitation, law enforcement, and border operations.

(5) Tactical operations. This appendix considers all aspects of organizing, equipping, training, and directing armed and paramilitary forces in tactical operations. The objectives of tactical operations are to destroy insurgent tactical forces and their bases and establish a secure environment within which internal development is possible. Since both internal
defense and internal development are involved in mission accomplishment, this appendix also considers the impact of tactical operations on other military and civilian nontactical operations being conducted to achieve national objectives.

(6) Advisory assistance. This appendix describes the activities of the host country army in training and supporting self-defense forces and other paramilitary organizations which may be one basis of IDAD mobilization. It includes advice and assistance to other governmental agencies and local governmental officials.

Section IV. ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDANCE

4-9. General
This section provides doctrine concerning host country organization for coordinating, planning, and conducting IDAD activities. It presents examples of type national and subnational organizations to illustrate the principle of achieving a coordinated and unified IDAD effort at each level within a nation.

4-10. Organizational Concepts

a. The objective of creating a national-level organization is to provide centralized direction to the planning and conduct of internal defense and development operations. The organization should be so structured and chartered that it has the capability of coordinating and directing the IDAD efforts of existing governmental agencies, yet not interfere with those agencies' normal day-to-day functions.

b. IDAD should be characterized by the integration of all functions—security, social development, political development, and economic development—at all levels within a nation. The required organizational structure will vary from country to country in order to adapt to the particular conditions existing. The planning, organization, and control of IDAD should follow the established political organization of the nation. The organizational structure should provide a framework under which centralized direction and decentralized execution of IDAD activities can be established.

c. Populace and Resources Control Office. This office develops programs, concepts, and plans and provides general guidance on the operations of all forces in the security field. It is staffed mainly by representatives of branches of government concerned with law enforcement and justice.

d. Intelligence Office. This office develops concepts, directs programs, and plans and provides general guidance on intelligence related to national security. It also coordinates intelligence activities; correlates, evaluates, and interprets intelligence relating to national security; and disseminates intelligence. It is staffed mainly by representatives from intelligence agencies, police, and military intelligence.

e. Military Affairs Office. This office develops and coordinates broad, general plans for the mobilization and allocation of armed and paramilitary forces.
Figure 4-2. Type national-level IDA planning and coordination center.
4-12. Subnational-Level Organization

Area coordination centers may be established as combined civil-military headquarters at subnational, state, and local levels. These centers are responsible for planning, coordinating, and exercising operational control over all military forces and government civilian organizations within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The area coordination center does not replace unit tactical operations centers or the normal government administrative organization in the area of operations.

a. Mission. Area coordination centers perform a twofold mission: they provide integrated planning, coordination, and direction of all internal defense and internal development effort; and they insure, immediate, coordinated response to operational requirements.

b. Organization. The area coordination center is headed by the senior governmental official who supervises and coordinates the activities of the staffs responsible for formulating internal defense and development plans and operations within their separate areas of interest. These staffs normally are composed of selected representatives of major forces and agencies assigned to, or operating in, the center's area of responsibility. The area coordination center should include members from the—

1. Senior area military command.
2. Senior police agency.
3. Local and national intelligence organization.
4. Public information and PSYOP agencies.
5. Paramilitary forces.
6. Other local and national government offices involved in the economic, social, and political aspects of internal defense and development activities.

c. State (Provincial) Area Coordination Center. A nation's first political subdivision with a fully developed administrative apparatus usually is the state. Most of these governments are well established and have exercised governmental functions over their areas before the onset of insurgency. This is normally the lowest level of administration capable of administering the full range of internal defense and development programs. The economic, social, psychological, political, and military aspects of these programs are focused at this level, and area coordination centers should be established to exploit this potential.

d. Urban Area Coordination Center.
1. General. Urban areas require a more complex organization than rural areas to plan, coordinate, and direct internal defense and development efforts. An urban area may vary from a market town of 20,000 people to a commercial/industrial city with a population of more than a million. The dense population, multi-story buildings, subterranean construction, public utilities, and transportation systems all require special attention. Police public safety services, social organizations, political factors, economic aspects, and communications systems must be considered.

2. Organization. The urban area coordination center is organized very much like the area coordination centers previously described. Urban coordination centers are established to perform the same functions for urban areas that local coordination centers perform for rural areas. However, representatives from local police, fire fighting, medical, public works, public utilities, communications, and transportation authorities also are included. When necessary, an operation center capable of operating 24 hours a day is established. It must be able to receive and act upon information requiring immediate operational action and coordination. When there is a state or local area coordination center in an urban area, it may be necessary to include the urban resources in that center and to plan, coordinate, and direct urban operations from there. The decision to establish an urban center or use the state or local center for these purposes should be based on the authority of the official at the head of the urban area government, and resources available to him. If the urban area comprises several separate political subdivisions with no overall political control, the area coordination center provides the control to insure proper planning and coordination. Urban area coordination centers should be established in autonomous cities and in urban areas not having a higher level coordination center.

4-13. Civilian Advisory Committees

Committees composed of government officials and leading citizens should be formed to help the coordination centers at all levels to evaluate the success of their activities and to elicit population support. These committees evaluate the results of various actions affecting civilians and provide a communications link with the people, thus providing feedback on which to base future operations.

a. The organization of a civilian committee will likely vary with local requirements and must be flexible enough to meet changing situations. The
chairman should be a prominent figure, appointed by the government or elected by the membership. General membership of a civilian advisory committee assisting an area coordination center should include leaders of civilian organizations such as:

1. Local police chief.
2. Superintendent of schools or school principal.
3. Priests, ministers, or other leaders of religious faiths.
4. Health director.
5. Judge or other judiciary representatives.
7. Editors of local news media.
8. Business and commercial leaders.
9. Other influential persons.

b. Some representatives may hold positions in both the area coordination center and the civilian committee.

Section V. IDAD POLICY GUIDELINES

4-14. General
The IDAD doctrine and concepts provided in this chapter cannot always be applied precisely as outlined because each situation will be different. However, general guidelines have been derived which can be applied to most IDAD situations.

4-15. Policy Guidelines
The following IDAD policy guidelines are general in nature and are useful in a conceptual way. They must be applied with reason and logic in any specific situation to be of value.

a. IDAD strategy should be oriented toward preventing insurgency from escalating to a level where it would present a significant threat to the nation and require an inordinate amount of resources to combat.

b. IDAD should be characterized by the integration of all functions—security, social development, political development, and economic development—at all levels.

c. Planning, organization, and control of IDAD functions should follow the established political organization of the nation.

d. IDAD activities must be tailored to promote the achievement of specific, constructive IDAD goals.

e. Policies regarding suppression of insurgent violence should be formulated before violence occurs, be based on law, be publicized, and be enforceable.

f. A nationwide, population-oriented intelligence network utilizing the capabilities of the civil police enhances the probability of success.

g. The neutralization of the insurgent organization, rather than infliction of maximum casualties, is the goal of IDAD operations.

h. A program of development must include the creation or strengthening of a spirit of nationhood among the people.

i. Development programs must seek to create within the people both a desire and an ability for self-development.

j. The government must clearly demonstrate that it is a better choice than the insurgent organization.
HIGHLIGHTS

IDAD STRATEGY
- IS BASED ON SIMULTANEOUS INTERNAL DEFENSE AND INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT.
- IS DIRECTED TOWARD POPULACE AND INSURGENT ALIKE.
- IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF NEUTRALIZATION, MOBILIZATION, AND BALANCED DEVELOPMENT.

INTERNAL DEFENSE
- SEEKS TO ACHIEVE INTERNAL SECURITY AND A STATE OF LAW AND ORDER.

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT
- PROMOTES BALANCED GROWTH BY BUILDING VIABLE INSTITUTIONS.

IDAD PROGRAMS
- MUST BE CAPABLE OF ADJUSTING TO THE INTENSITY OF INSURGENT WARFARE.

IDAD PLANNING
- SHOULD MOLD INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES INTO A UNIFIED STRATEGY.

THE NATIONAL LEVEL IDAD ORGANIZATION
- IS CONCERNED WITH PLANNING AND COORDINATION.

SUBNATIONAL LEVEL IDAD ORGANIZATION
- IS CONCERNED WITH PLANNING, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL.

Figure 4-3. Highlights.
CHAPTER 5
HOST COUNTRY INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT
OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

Section I. INTRODUCTION

5-1. Purpose
This chapter provides US Army doctrine concerning major internal defense and development (IDAD) operations and campaigns in which host country security forces participate when executing IDAD plans. Security forces are primarily the civil police, paramilitary, and military forces.

5-2. General
The degree to which the various security forces of a nation participate in internal defense and development will vary with the level of insurgent activities. The actions of police forces are critical in the prevention of insurgency and continue to be important during all phases of insurgency.

a. Maintenance of law and order, a facet of security, is one of the fundamental responsibilities of government. During the various stages of insurgency, the insurgent may be considered a criminal. He seeks to achieve his objective by illegal means and employs the full range of criminal tactics in order to overthrow the incumbent government. Therefore, these actions of the insurgent come under the purview of the police. The police are the initial security force defending against all those elements which seek to destroy free societies through the erosion of public order. The most effective and economical method of dealing with an insurgency is to prevent it. The earlier the police can meet threats against the nation, the less it will cost in money and manpower and the less interruption will occur in the vital process of development. Historically, those nations which have been crippled by insurgency reflect the fact that their police forces, even though paramilitary in nature, have been unable to cope with the insurgent movement in its early stages. In many respects, law enforcement officials are a real first line of defense whereby the fate of government and nation may hang in the balance.

b. The police are a sensitive point of contact between government and people, close to the focal points of unrest, and generally more acceptable than the military as keepers of order over long periods of time. The police are frequently better trained, organized, and equipped than the military to deal with minor forms of violence, conspiracy, and subversion. Also, the legal restraints imposed by government which suppress normal freedom may be more readily accepted by the populace if enforced by local police rather than by combat elements of the armed forces.

c. In an insurgency environment, a small rural police force will seldom be capable of performing its duties without assistance from military, paramilitary forces, or some type of auxiliary organization composed of citizens from the area. In the initial phase of insurgency, an auxiliary force in support of the rural police organization may be adequate to provide security for the population. However, if the insurgency escalates, paramilitary or military police forces will often be required to augment local police. Large groups of organized insurgents operating in an area will normally require the commitment of the military forces of the nation to neutralize these elements.

d. IDAD normally includes establishment of local paramilitary forces. Depending on the strategy developed at the national level and local conditions, these forces may be limited to police auxiliary units. On the other hand, the IDAD strategy may incorporate a much more extensive mobilization that would provide for the organization of the civilian population into an extensive intelligence system, forums for PSYOP, and self defense programs for the population.
Section II. MAJOR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS

5-3. General
This section discusses the major IDAD operations of host country security forces and explains the objectives, concepts and methods employed in these operations. Military forces accomplish IDAD chiefly through the conduct of intelligence, PSYOP, civil affairs, populace and resources control, tactical operations, and advisory assistance. These operations are normally conducted in coordination with other government agencies in support of internal defense and development programs.

5-4. Intelligence
The direction, collection, processing, and dissemination of available information concerning all aspects of a nation susceptible to insurgency are essential to successful internal defense and development operations. Military intelligence actions, in coordination with other host country government agencies, must be started as early as possible during an expected or actual insurgency. Of particular importance are intelligence operations devoted to neutralizing or destroying the effectiveness of the insurgent infrastructure and establishing a data base in preparation for whatever roles the military is required to play in defeating the insurgent movement. See FM 19-50, FM 30-17, FM 30-17A, FM 30-18, and FM 30-31 for detailed guidance on internal defense and development intelligence operations.

a. Intelligence operations must support internal defense and development planning and operations by providing general and specific knowledge of the area of operations and the insurgent forces. In broad terms, intelligence objectives are to—

(1) Determine the indicators of impending insurgency (app E, FM 30-31).
(2) Obtain information about the insurgent, weather, terrain, and population (FM 30-5).
(3) Reduce to a minimum insurgent espionage, subversion, and sabotage (FM 30-17A).

b. Before and during Phase I, subversion is used extensively to lay the groundwork for the more advanced stages of insurgency. Subversion precedes other insurgent activity and continues throughout the entire process, just as guerrilla warfare, once introduced, continues during the war of movement. This subversion is designed to alienate the population from the government and win the support of the people for the insurgency movement.

c. When insurgent groups become organized, civil and military intelligence agencies should be in a position to establish their identities and make recommendations for future surveillance or neutralization operations. This involves operations against the political infrastructure which may consist of the hard core cellular party apparatus, its revolutionary committees, party youth organizations, farmers' associations, and workers' and women's organizations. Also considered part of the insurgency are those ostensibly legitimate civilian organizations which are insurgent-penetrated and insurgent-controlled, popular front organizations, and covert local militia (guerrilla forces). Counterintelligence operations include formulating and conducting security training programs and carrying out security measures necessary to protect host country information, personnel, facilities, and materiel against insurgent intelligence operations. These intelligence and counterintelligence measures continue throughout all phases if the insurgency escalates.

d. A unified, centralized intelligence system is essential to the effective conduct of internal defense and internal development operations.

(1) At national level, the intelligence system should—
(a) Operate freely throughout the nation.
(b) Maintain a central registry of intelligence information.
(c) Maintain a centralized system of source control.
(d) Coordinate all intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
(e) Direct, collect, process, and disseminate intelligence and counterintelligence information for the benefit of all authorized users.
(f) Prepare national intelligence and counterintelligence plans and estimates.
(g) Conduct special operations as directed.

(2) Below national level, coordination points should be established at each level of government where the intelligence efforts can be coordinated.

e. A thorough understanding of the internal and external forces supporting or subverting a society is essential to effective intelligence operations. Basic intelligence on a specific area and situation is derived from strategic intelligence reports and studies augmented by
available intelligence information of the area. These are the bases for the estimate of the situation and subsequent plans. The essential elements for processing this information are contained in FM 30-5 and FM 30-31.

(1) Planning for production of intelligence is a continuous process at all levels, since the attack of specific targets can be initiated by any level. There are three significant areas involving intelligence collection planning. The first is strategic intelligence, which may expose actual or potential insurgency problems and usually is derived from political, economic, and sociocultural developments. The second encompasses exploiting the weakness inherent in the logistical support system of the insurgent armed elements. The establishment of insurgent facilities to provide services and support involves people and a great deal of activity to gather, store, and distribute supplies. Targeting on this system during planning can lead to early detection and identification of significant elements of the insurgent network, such as members of the political infrastructure. The third area encompasses such functions as combat intelligence and security.

(2) Initial intelligence functions that must be accomplished to support current activities and prepare for possible future operations are—

   a) Preparation of detailed studies regarding the terrain, weather, and population groups (including ethnic, religious, and tribal minorities).
   
   b) Preparation of strength and vulnerability analysis of the host country and the insurgent.
   
   c) Preparation, production, and distribution of nation-wide terrain maps and aerial photographs.

(3) The objective of intelligence production is to provide accurate and timely intelligence that satisfies military and civil requirements at each operational echelon. There must be a steady flow of intelligence information to and from higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters and agencies. This necessitates constant interdepartmental coordination between military and civil police and intelligence organizations. Intelligence requirements vary according to echelon, user, and mission. No single format is adequate for all users; therefore, production programs must be flexible and must provide several degrees of detail. Determination of production objectives and priorities requires careful analysis.

(4) Timely dissemination of intelligence is a vital aspect of the intelligence process. The frequent need for immediate reaction on essential intelligence information dictates the establishment of systems for quick processing and transmission of this data to military and police units at all levels. Primary, alternate, and special intelligence channels of communication should be established when facilities and resources permit.

(5) Military security applies to military information, personnel, facilities, and materiel. Classified information must be protected by all available means and entrusted only to appropriately cleared personnel who require such knowledge. Even after individuals have been investigated and cleared, commanders and intelligence personnel should continue to exercise close supervision and observation over the activities and behavior of individuals who, for one reason or another, may be subjected to insurgent coercion, influence, or pressure.

5-5. Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
Since both government forces and insurgent forces need the support of the people to accomplish their programs, a major struggle between the government and the insurgent for the people's support often results. PSYOP as used in this paragraph are not limited to enemy or foreign groups but also includes operations directed toward host country armed forces and civilian populations. PSYOP are an integral part of all internal defense and internal development activities and are tailored to meet specific requirements of each area and operation. Military and nonmilitary courses of action must be considered in terms of their potential psychological impact. This often requires that short-range tactical advantages be sacrificed to preserve long-range psychological objectives. FM 33-1, FM 33-5, and FM 100-5 contain further guidance on PSYOP.

a. PSYOP are designed to support the achievement of national objectives and are directed toward specific target groups. PSYOP objectives for the main target groups are—

   1) Insurgents. To create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces. Host country national programs designed to win insurgents over to the government's side are needed.

   2) Civilian population. To gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the host country government and its internal defense and internal development program.

   3) Host country and allied forces. Essentially the same as for civilians, with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of these
forces. The loyalty and motivation of these forces are critical factors in combating an insurgency.

(4) *Neutral elements.* To gain the support of uncommitted foreign groups inside and outside of the host country by revealing the subversive activities and bringing international pressure to bear on any external hostile power sponsoring the insurgency.

(5) *External hostile powers.* To convince the external hostile power supporting the insurgents that the insurgency will fail.

b. The national PSYOP program, containing national objectives, guidance, and desired approaches, is prepared and coordinated at the national level. Military organizations and civilian agencies at all levels develop PSYOP within the parameters established by the national PSYOP plan. The plan is interpreted at the various military and political levels in terms of local requirements and should be coordinated through appropriate area coordination centers. To achieve maximum effectiveness, all psychological activities are executed within clearly established channels, and PSYOP planners develop a number of appropriate themes that can be disseminated by available means. PSYOP themes and messages should be tested prior to dissemination. These themes and messages, using words familiar to the target audiences, should be clear, easily understood, and repeated frequently.

c. Units are organized and trained to emphasize psychological activities at all levels.

(1) *National level.* Both military and civilian PSYOP organizations may exist at national level. They are responsible for—

(a) Planning the national PSYOP program.

(b) Organizing, training, and allocating host country PSYOP units and resources.

(c) Conducting strategic PSYOP.

(d) Developing criteria of program effectiveness.

(e) Monitoring the PSYOP program.

(f) Producing, analyzing, and disseminating PSYOP intelligence and target analysis of specific target groups.

(2) *Subnational and local level.* The subnational area coordination center translates national PSYOP programs and directives into implementing guidance for subordinate area coordination centers, military commanders, and civilian agencies. The local center provides direction to paramilitary forces, military forces, civilian agencies, and PSYOP teams. Since paramilitary organizations normally do not have organic PSYOP teams, PSYOP support is provided by civilian or armed forces organizations.

(3) *Military.* Civil-military or psychological operations staff elements and PSYOP military units plan and conduct PSYOP in consonance with national programs and directives. They may be supported by military PSYOP units whose operations range from strategic PSYOP to local tactical PSYOP and consolidation PSYOP. PSYOP units are tailored to meet mission requirements. Their operations involve all means and media of communications including: face-to-face communications (the most effective of all means), television, radio, loudspeaker, printing, audiovisual, and photographic equipment.

d. At the national level, PSYOP exploit the broad aspects of internal defense and internal development programs. They are general in scope and deal primarily with national policy and programs. Tactical and consolidation PSYOP are responsive to local intelligence and address more specific target audiences. In nations with large minority groups, PSYOP should employ appropriate languages, dialects, and symbols that can be readily understood by these groups. Military PSYOP and civilian information services planning must be closely coordinated and supervised at all levels to insure effectiveness and credibility.

(1) *Command responsibility.* Military forces are representatives of the government and, in many cases, a major factor in the formation of attitudes and behavior toward the government. For this reason, commanders must constantly be aware of the psychological effect of operations conducted in their areas of responsibility as well as the effect of the behavior of their troops. Military operations often have a psychological impact on the population, and the success of an operation often may depend on the commander’s awareness of the psychological and political implications of military actions.

(2) *Planning.* The basic requisites for an effective PSYOP plan include—

(a) An intimate knowledge of the history, background, current environment, and attitudes of potential target groups.

(b) An intimate knowledge of the insurgent’s organizations, motivation, sources of resources (men and materiel), and how they are obtained.

(c) A knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of ideological and political opponents.

(d) An assurance that PSYOP plans
support national objectives.

(e) A knowledge of all means of communication available to carry out PSYOP.

(f) The ability to classify the population by audience type so that themes can be tailored to influence specific groups.

(g) The availability of continuous, timely, accurate, and detailed intelligence (including effect of current PSYOP programs, i.e., post-testing).

3) Supported operations. PSYOP themes must be tailored to support the type of operations and campaigns being conducted. Section IV of this chapter discusses campaigns. The authority to approve specific PSYOP messages, based on approved themes, may have to be delegated to local level PSYOP personnel because of variance in susceptibilities, vulnerabilities, and attitudes of local target groups. This delegation of authority should improve the effectiveness and credibility of the PSYOP program.

(a) PSYOP themes in support of consolidation campaigns should stress the degree of security that is afforded the population and the benefits that have been and can be gained with popular support.

(b) PSYOP themes supporting strike campaigns should explain the purpose of the operations and stress efforts being made to provide for the safety of the civilian population. PSYOP themes directed against the insurgent forces should explain and stress the futility of fighting, importance of family ties, and the acceptability of amnesty programs. The decision to employ PSYOP before the actual conduct of military operations is weighed carefully against compromising surprise and security.

(c) PSYOP themes supporting remote area operations are tailored to maintain the morale of government forces and to solicit the support of the population.

(d) PSYOP themes supporting populace and resources control operations should stress the need and benefits of more stringent law enforcement. Themes should also explain that the insurgents are causing populace and resources control operations such as curfews and identification requirements.

5-6. Civil Affairs

This paragraph is oriented toward host country military forces; however, it should be noted that the principles provided are also generally applicable to civil affairs activities conducted by other host country security forces.

a. Civil affairs operations are a responsibility of military commanders at every echelon. They include any activity of command concerned with relationships between the military forces and the civil authorities and people in the area. In civil affairs operations, military forces perform specified functions or may exercise certain authority that normally is the responsibility of the local government.

b. The scope of civil affairs operations will vary with the type of local government and degree of authority accorded, and will be influenced by the economic, social, and political background of the country and people. The major civil affairs actions are—

1. Prevention of civilian interference with military operations.
2. Support of government functions.
3. Community relations.
5. Populace and resources control.
6. Civil defense.

c. The overall objective of civil affairs operations is to organize and motivate civilians to assist the government and military forces. The operations are directed at eliminating or reducing political, economic, and sociological problems.

d. All military units have a capability to conduct civil affairs, particularly military civic action. Since this capability may be great or minimal, each military organization must assess its capabilities and be prepared to make civil affairs contributions part of its overall mission. Some combat support and combat service support units, such as engineer and medical, may be assigned a primary role of military civic action and be organized specifically for this mission.

1) Civil affairs organizations can be established within major commands. Units as small as a battalion task force may be assigned civil affairs elements to assist in carrying out plans for which a civil-military operations staff officer has responsibility.

2) Civil affairs liaison and coordination should be established between all host country military forces and government agencies. This can be accomplished through organizations specifically designed for this purpose or through the civil affairs staff elements of existing units or advisory teams.

e. Civil affairs operations range from the informal, day-to-day, community relations activities of individuals to the planned and organized operations of units. Civil affairs operations should be based on the establishment of good relationships with the population. Those conducted to compensate for lack of troop
discipline, discourtesy, or dishonesty in dealings with the people will attain minimal results. On the other hand, where sound rapport has been established between host country forces and the population, properly administered civil affairs operations can be expected to contribute materially to the attainment of internal defense and internal development objectives.

(1) Planning for civil affairs operations is as important as planning for other internal defense and development operations. Policies and objectives should be clearly defined to provide adequate guidelines for persons responsible for developing overall internal defense and development plans. Civil affairs planning must consider political, economic, social, psychological, and military aspects and provide for possible future modifications. Planning for civil affairs should consider the following—

   (a) The national development plan.
   (b) Military civic action operations to be conducted by military forces. Figure 5-1 shows a military civic action worksheet.
   (c) Civil affairs mobile training team requirements and resources.
   (d) Civil affairs personnel and units required to support host country agencies at subnational levels.
   (e) Civil affairs training program requirements for host country and allied forces.
   (f) The host country civil affairs requirements to provide government administration in areas of country where needed.

(2) Civil affairs responsibilities assigned to a tactical force commander may include functions beyond his capability and will require the employment of specialized civil affairs personnel or units. Host country CA plans should include provisions for civil affairs support to tactical force commanders. See FM 41-10 for details about civil affairs organization and capabilities.

(3) Emphasis on military civic action varies with the intensity of insurgency. In prevention of insurgency or during Phase I, military civic action concentrates on the development of the socioeconomic environment. In the absence of tactical operations, a significant allocation of military resources may be devoted to military civic action projects providing both long-range and short-range benefits. An example is the training of conscripts in skills with both military and civilian application so that these personnel can make useful contributions to their communities after release from military service. During Phases II and III, military civic action will be concentrated on projects designed to prevent intensification of the insurgency. These projects should produce noticeable improvements in a relatively short time frame. Examples of such projects are farm-to-market roads, bridges, short-range educational programs, basic hygiene, medical immunization programs, and simple irrigation projects. In the advanced stages of insurgency, priorities on defense programs may reduce military civic action to such immediate tasks as providing medical aid to the sick and wounded civilians and procuring and distributing food and shelter for displaced persons. Throughout all levels of IDAD, military civic action is planned and conducted, to the extent possible, to support the development programs at national and subnational levels.

5-7. Populace and Resources Control

Populace and resources control operations are police-type operations directed primarily against the insurgent apparatus by controlling the populace and resources of a nation. When feasible, military units employed in these type operations should be in support of the police forces and not replace them. If regular units are used, special training must be considered. This section provides general guidance on various populace and resources control activities and establishes a basis upon which to develop tactics and techniques.

   a. A populace and resources control program is designed to complement and support the other internal defense and development programs. Its objectives, in concert with civil affairs operations, are to—
      (1) Mobilize the materiel and human resources on behalf of the government.
      (2) Detect and neutralize the insurgent organizations and activities.
      (3) Provide a secure physical and psychological environment for the population.
      (4) Sever the supporting relationship between the population and the insurgent.

   b. Police, intelligence, and other security agencies normally are established to maintain law and order in a peacetime environment. Their organizations are tailored to protect the populace from common criminals and lawbreakers and enforce the established system of control necessary to maintain reasonable order. In an active insurgency, peacetime security organizations have far more to contend with. They are confronted with a well-organized insurgent movement that is adept at the disruption of a society through subversion, espionage, and sabotage. Coping with this problem often is beyond their normal peacetime capabilities, and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION</th>
<th>AGROCLIMATIC</th>
<th>PUBLIC HEALTH</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FARM TO MARKET ROAD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPROVE FARMING METHODS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRIGATION PROJECTS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTABLISH VILLAGE HOSPITALS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMMUNIZATION PROGRAMS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVIDE TEACHING MATERIALS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAIN TEACHERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUILD SCHOOLS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CRITERIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>DESIRABILITY</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WILL THE POPULATION SUPPORT IT?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL THE MILITARY SUPPORT IT?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL OTHER AGENCIES SUPPORT IT?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL THE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT IT?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN IT BE STARTED IMMEDIATELY?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL IT HAVE IMMEDIATE IMPACT?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL IT BENEFIT A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL IT HAVE A FAVORABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS IT AMENABLE TO PUBLICITY EXPLOITATION?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL IT IMPROVE THE GOVERNMENT IMAGE?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL IT IMPROVE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL IT LEND ITSELF TO SELF-HELP?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL IT CONTRIBUTE TO THE STABILIZATION OF SOCIETY?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>FEASIBILITY</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOES IT CONFORM TO LOCAL CUSTOMS?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARE ALL NECESSARY SKILLS AVAILABLE?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARE LABOR, MATERIALS, AND EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN IT BE SUPPORTED BY CURRENT PROGRAMMED FUNDS?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>JUSTIFICATION</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOES IT SUPPORT OVERALL IODAD PLANS AND PROGRAMS?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL IT AVOID SERIOUS IMPAIRMENT OF PRIMARY MILITARY MISSION?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILL IT PROVIDE MAXIMUM RETURN ON INVESTMENT AND EFFORT?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOES IT AVOID DUPLICATION WITH EFFORTS OF OTHER AGENCIES?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Complete by indicating yes or no response with detailed explanatory notes attached!)

* Other functional areas as required.

Figure 5-1. Type military civic action worksheet.
expansion and reinforcement by military and paramilitary forces are required.

(1) During Phase I, insurgents seek to gain control of the populace through a combination of persuasion, terror, and civil disturbance. In many cases, the government of a developing nation learns too late that it actually does not control its more remote areas. For this reason, insurgent activities and influence in these areas can expand rapidly, creating political vacuums that insurgents attempt to fill. Security forces should be deployed to remote areas identified during the planning process to establish or reestablish a climate of law and order in which government administration and other development activities can be conducted. Urban populace and resources control plans should be implemented early to deny insurgents materiel support from these areas. This is the phase where general surveillance measures and block warden systems are initiated. Intelligence is intensified to continue seeking out and eliminating the infrastructure.

(2) In Phases II and III, populace and resources control operations must be expanded to cope with increased societal disruption and the deterioration of law and order. Inadequate early control measures probably contribute to an increase in conflict intensity. When the need for populace and resources control is first determined, a complete and adequate program should be applied immediately. It is best to avoid piecemeal operations that escalate slowly. A carefully designed psychological operations program should be implemented simultaneously with the controls so that the two programs complement each other in attaining their objectives.

c. Indigenous police organizations, if adequately staffed, trained, equipped, and motivated, are ideally suited to supervise the implementation of populace and resources programs because they provide an organized control force that is—

(1) Knowledgeable about local conditions.
(2) Accepted by the populace as a government organization with enforcement prerogatives.
(3) Capable of security operations.
(4) Able to gain access to and use recorded factual data.
(5) Capable of controlling transportation arteries.

(d) Immediate augmentation of the existing police force should be obtained from other organizations whose duties call for contact with the populace. This may include revenue agents, conservation officials, and customs officials. Paramilitary forces are another source of manpower for these programs. The regular military is normally used as a backup force and as a source of personnel for administrative, intelligence, and psychological operations and other specialties. National agencies determine those populace and resources control requirements within their respective areas of responsibility and present them to the national-level coordination center. The national-level coordination center, assisted by these national agencies, prepares the overall national plan to insure coordination of operations. Subnational area coordination centers prepare their populace and resources control plans according to instructions and guidance from the national coordination center.

e. Essential populace and resources control measures that conform to legal codes must be established and enforced—justly and firmly. In addition to laws prescribing possession of certain items, requiring permits for possession or movement of others, and regulating populace movements, laws must also clearly specify authorized methods of disposing of contraband. Since populace and resources control operations lend themselves readily to graft and extortion, they must be closely supervised and enforced in a way that does not alienate the people. Emphasis should be placed on both in-country controls and controls of imports. Populace and resources control operations include, but are not limited to—

(1) Employing population surveillance (overt and covert) based on area coverage.
(2) Controlling movement of both personnel and materiel.
(3) Establishing checkpoints and roadblocks.
(4) Establishing curfews and blackouts.
(5) Screening and documenting the population.
(6) Conducting cordon and search operations.
(7) Establishing rationing and price controls.
(8) Controlling refugees and displaced persons.
(9) Protecting resource storage areas from insurgent attack. See FM 19-50 and FM 31-73 for a detailed discussion of the activities involved in these operations.

f. Law enforcement is primarily a police operation to protect the persons and property of the populace against criminal acts, including those perpetrated by insurgent elements. En-
enforcement laws should be enacted temporarily authorizing government security and defense forces extraordinary powers. Procedural protections, such as search, seizure, and detention laws, often must be diminished to permit law enforcement operations against insurgents. PSYOP measures should inform the people of such changes in the law and turn their resentment against the insurgents. Emphasis should be placed on the strictly temporary nature of such legislation and its basic purpose, which is to protect the populace against the insurgents. Additional legal machinery, such as courts of limited jurisdiction to try particular classes of offenses, may be required to process the increased flow of prosecutions. In any case, early attention must be given to the capability of the court system to process cases quickly and fairly. Long periods of pretrial confinement tend to turn even the most loyal citizens against the government. Military forces will assist civil law enforcement agencies in accordance with host country legal procedures.

**g. Armed forces** may be charged with the overall mission of border security, or they may reinforce other security forces chartered with this mission. Border operations are discussed in paragraphs 5-15 through 5-17. For guidance on border security and anti-infiltration operations see FM 31-55.

5-8. **Tactical Operations**

Tactical operations are the most violent and extreme of all those employed in internal defense. They are the principal activities in strike campaigns and they are integrated into and support consolidation campaigns. This paragraph provides guidance on tactical operations, objectives, organization, and doctrine. For further guidance, see FM 31-16 and FM 100-5.

**a. The objective of tactical operations is to destroy or neutralize insurgent tactical forces and bases** and establish a relatively secure environment within which the insurgent infrastructure can be exposed and neutralized and internal development is possible. Tactical operations are coordinated with civilian agencies through area coordination centers.

**b. Tactical operations rarely are conducted as independent sporadic actions aimed solely at the elimination of insurgent tactical forces and bases.** They usually are part of a campaign and coordinated with other internal defense and development operations toward the attainment of broader objectives. Military personnel must be aware of the impact their actions have on the population and IDAD programs.

c. **Armed and paramilitary forces** are organized primarily to conduct tactical operations; however, civil security forces, such as the police, also may be assigned certain limited combat missions. Tactical operations should be coordinated by area coordination centers, which integrate intelligence, PSYOP, and other activities required to support tactical operations. Organizational emphasis for tactical operations is placed on firepower and mobility. Organization should stress tactical self-sufficiency and provide adequate combat support and combat service support elements to conduct semi-independent or independent operations. Moreover, consideration should be given to providing the tactical force with capabilities for dealing with the civilian population by attaching or assigning civil affairs and PSYOP personnel or units.

d. **Tactical operations against guerrillas are primarily offensive operations, characterized by mobility, to find, fix, destroy, or capture the guerrillas.** They generally include such offensive tactics as raids, reconnaissance in force, and coordinated attacks, plus harassing, elimination, and reaction-type operations.

e. Tactics outlined above must be modified greatly to meet a mobile warfare threat. Mobile warfare cannot be considered as positional or guerrilla warfare. Although it seeks the same objectives, larger reserves are maintained, the size of operating units is increased, artillery fires are massed, and larger security and defense detachments are required. In mobile warfare, utilization of terrain, organization of fires, and maneuver are used to seize and hold the initiative, not terrain. Therefore, commanders must not expect envelopments, penetrations, or turning movements to produce the same effects on insurgent forces as they would if terrain were the key consideration. Caches, safe areas, and population support can be dispersed so strategically that insurgent tactical units are not dependent on a single critical logistical base that they must protect, and they can maneuver in any direction in reaction to an offensive maneuver.

**f. Continuous pressure against insurgent forces should be maintained and commanders must be particularly cautious not to consider them destroyed merely because opposition has ceased.** If contact with insurgent force is lost, aggressive pursuit efforts should be made to reestablish contact and destroy the force. Long periods of inactivity permit insurgent forces to rest, reorganize, and resume offensive operations.

g. **Defensive operations normally are conducted as coordinated military and civilian**
programs. Defensive operations are employed to—

1. Protect the population.
2. Reduce the insurgent capacity for offensive action.
3. Deny the insurgent entry into an area.
4. Destroy or trap the insurgent force.
5. Develop more favorable conditions for offensive action.
6. Economize on forces in one area so that decisive force can be applied elsewhere.

h. Retrograde operations are conducted to preserve the integrity of a force and for one or more of the following reasons—

1. To harass, exhaust, resist, delay, and inflict punishment on the enemy.
2. To draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.
3. To permit the use of the force elsewhere.
4. To avoid combat under undesirable conditions.
5. To gain time without fighting a decisive engagement.
6. To disengage from combat.
7. To relocate forces in relation to other friendly forces.
8. To shorten lines of communication.

i. Bases of operation are localities from which operations are projected and supported. They may be permanent or semipermanent installations containing essential command control, communications, combat support and combat service support elements. FM 31-16 and FM 31-81 (Test) contain details of base establishment and defense.

j. Combat support and combat service support units are integral to all tactical operations. These units provide the operational assistance, combat service support, or administrative support to the tactical forces. They are organic to, attached to, or are placed in support of the tactical forces. Sound combat support and combat service support planning is required for all tactical operations.

5-9. Advice and Assistance
Host country regular military forces may provide assistance to other internal security forces, paramilitary forces, self-defense forces, and other government agencies participating in IDAD. National or subnational centers may be established to assist in organizing, equipping, and training newly activated units. Mobile training teams may be utilized to provide onsite training, advice, and assistance to self-defense or other territorial security forces.

Section III. HOST COUNTRY RESPONSE DURING THE THREE PHASES OF INSURGENCY

5-10. Integrated Response
The governmental process normally includes measures to maintain law and order and to improve conditions that meet the needs of the people and enhance their support to the government. These measures, properly implemented, should contribute to the prevention of insurgency. In countries where insurgency is incipient, host governments normally should intensify such measures. This section outlines selected host country IDAD activities that illustrate in general terms the application of doctrine in an integrated response to a Mass Strategy during its three phases. Host country strategy should be flexible and capable of adjusting to insurgent strategies, the intensity of insurgent activities, and existing conditions within the country. The government's strategy should be designed to prevent insurgent activities from escalating to higher levels and, ultimately, to eliminate the insurgent threat. It must be understood that there is no exact point at which insurgency passes into a higher or lower phase. In addition, the host country activities described below must be modified to fit the particular situation being confronted. A more complete discussion of host country IDAD activities is provided in paragraphs 5-4 through 5-9 and the remainder of this chapter.

a. Phase I Insurgency (includes latent and incipient insurgency during which subversive incidents may occur; however, there are no major outbreaks of violence). Certain host country activities appear particularly important during Phase I. These normally include intelligence and counterintelligence operations, selected PSYOP, upgrading security forces, civic action, and actions to alleviate political, economic or social vulnerabilities. Also included are measures to strengthen the psychological and organizational links between government and populace. Depending on the situation certain populace and resources control measures may be appropriate.

b. Phase II Insurgency (includes organized guerrilla warfare and related forms of violence).
Increasing conflict normally requires changes in emphasis and the introduction of added measures by the host country. These normally include strengthening territorial security forces, increased populace and resources control measures, and tactical operations in an effort to defeat insurgent armed elements, consolidate support, and physically isolate insurgents from the populace.

5-11. Continuing Operations

The government may achieve success in combating an insurgency in any of the phases. Those operations which will contribute to the consolidation of government successes should be continued. Programs which contribute to the alleviation of conditions fostering the insurgency should be continued or initiated to prevent its recurrence.

Section IV. INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT CAMPAIGNS

5-12. General

This section provides guidance for campaigns in which military forces may participate when executing IDAD plans. Campaigns to execute IDAD plans are categorized based upon operational objectives. They are titled consolidation and strike campaigns. In planning these campaigns, all of the major IDAD operations discussed in paragraphs 5-3 through 5-9 must be considered and, as appropriate, integrated into the campaign.

5-13. Consolidation Campaigns

Consolidation campaigns are organized in priority areas as an interdepartmental civil-military effort. These campaigns integrate internal defense and internal development activities designed to restore host country governmental control of the population and the area and to provide an environment within which the economic, political, and social conditions can be improved.

a. Consolidation campaigns may be conducted in all phases of insurgency, although the probability of success is greater if the campaigns are mounted during Phases I or II. The concepts described below are based on a relatively major insurgent threat, including the presence of insurgent tactical forces, and must be adjusted to lesser threat situations.

(1) Consolidation campaigns normally are a state-level (provincial) function supported by national, subnational, state, and other resources.

(2) Consolidation campaigns will normally include all the operations discussed in section II of this chapter. Although a consolidation campaign may be primarily oriented toward priority areas that have relatively large populations, it should be understood that the campaign may also require operations in remote and border areas which support the overall consolidation effort.

(3) Consolidation campaigns should expand outwardly from areas over which the government has control. The government must have a secure base and place first priority on the denial of this base to the insurgent. Extension of operations into contested and insurgent-dominated areas—particularly population centers, resource locations, installation sites, and along routes of communication—is required to expand government control into surrounding areas. Authorities should extend consolidated areas only to the limits of combined civil/military capabilities. Once an area has been cleared of insurgent tactical forces, sufficient tactical defense capabilities and internal security must be established and maintained to defend and secure the area. Police and paramilitary forces should be assigned the major role in this. Every effort should be made to prevent controlled areas from reverting to insurgent domination.

(4) Consolidation campaigns have four overlapping stages: preparation, offensive, development, and completion.

b. Preparation Stage. The preparation stage is a planning, training, organizing, and equipping period during which all participating civil and military forces prepare for operations. During this stage, integration of effort is required between civilian and military planners.

(1) Consolidation campaign plans are developed based on priority areas designated in national plans, civilian and military resources.
available, and estimated capability to achieve the objectives. Internal defense planning insures that adequate personnel and materiel for tactical, psychological, civil affairs, populace and resources control, and intelligence operations are available at the beginning of the consolidation campaign. Forces allocated should be superior to the insurgent threat in the operational area. Internal development planning insures that sufficient personnel and materiel resources are available or are programmed to provide adequate support during each stage of the consolidation campaign. Plans should establish effective command and control measures to insure that all resources are applied effectively and all operations are coordinated through the area coordination center.

(2) Organizations participating in consolidation campaigns are combined into a task force (TF) which, in turn, may be subdivided into local task forces. All task forces are interdepartmental and include civilian and military operational elements. When possible, boundaries and phase lines are established to include entire political subdivisions. Consolidation campaigns are normally controlled by the chief governmental official within whose area the campaigns will be conducted. Communications are planned to provide parallel, interlocking, and integrated networks used by police, armed forces, paramilitary, intelligence, and internal development organizations.

(3) All internal defense and development forces required to conduct consolidation campaigns should be trained before actual operations begin. Training and indoctrination of armed, paramilitary, police, intelligence, political, economic, civil administration, and PSYOP personnel should be conducted on a team basis.

c. Offensive Stage. The initial requirement is to clear the area of insurgent tactical units. Once this is accomplished, adequate government forces, to include police and paramilitary if available, must remain in the area to protect the population.

(1) The offensive stage entails moving the TF into the operational area; destroying, dispersing, and clearing insurgent tactical forces from the area; locating and destroying elements of the insurgent's supporting base area system; and identifying and neutralizing the members of the insurgent's political infrastructure. Combat power must be selectively applied to preclude unnecessary harm to the population.

(2) TF are structured to conduct offensive tactical operations with command and control exercised through the military chain of command. Offensive combat patrolling, saturation patrolling, and small-unit actions are used to disrupt insurgent operations and to gain information. If insurgent units are large and well trained, tactical operations conducted by large forces may be required to destroy them. Ambushes, raids, and other techniques are employed in conjunction with saturation patrolling and large scale tactical operations.

(3) Curfews, spot checks, searches, a system of information reporting, and other similar measures are initiated. The police and other security organizations institute surveillance and populace and resources control measures to deprive the insurgent of support and assist in neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure. PSYOP assist in making populace and resources control measures more acceptable to the population by explaining the necessity for them. When appropriate, the blame for unpopular programs is directed toward the insurgents.

(4) An intelligence program is established by intelligence agencies and police forces. Interrogation, loyalty screening, and cataloging of information are undertaken to assist in identifying and neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure.

d. Development Stage. The development stage is characterized by actions to eliminate remaining insurgent elements, establish firm government control in the area preventing the return of insurgents, and establish internal security and development organizations and operations.

(1) In the development stage, emphasis shifts from military internal defense to civilian internal development. In essence, the armed and paramilitary forces adopt an aggressive defensive posture to protect the secured areas established during the offensive stage. This permits other TF elements—primarily the political, economic, social, and psychological action cadres—to conduct their activities effectively. Psychological/information activities are continued to motivate and condition the population to support both internal defense and internal development efforts. Internal development activities and supporting military civic action demonstrate government concern for the population and are used to solicit its participation in development programs and in defense against insurgent attack.

(2) Internal defense activities include training local self-defense forces or other paramilitary forces to participate in territorial security and internal development programs.
Offensive tactical operations are continued to eliminate insurgent tactical forces and their supporting base area; however, defense of population centers, tactical base, logistical installations, and LOC also is required.

(3) Saturation patrolling, extended in range and scope, is conducted over the entire area to be controlled. Efforts are made to seek out the insurgent and block approaches into the controlled area. Military forces normally conduct offensive tactical operations in adjacent areas to relieve pressure on areas being secured.

(4) Police organize, plan, and operate forces to maintain an adequate, effective state of law and order. They also establish controls over the movement of personnel and supplies and secure critical food supplies and materiel during production and storage.

e. Completion Stage. The completion stage entails acceleration of internal development programs and is marked by the capability of the local authorities to provide defense against insurgent attack. Concentrated efforts are made to return all responsibility for local government to the local people. TFs gradually lose armed forces and certain internal development cadre elements. These elements are then prepared for employment in other areas.

(1) As local administrators gain experience, outside cadres with the TF that have performed administrative functions can be released for other assignments. As the local police and local paramilitary force become more effective and assume more of the security responsibilities, TF security elements can be withdrawn and reassigned. However, before security forces are reduced or transferred from a given area, government control must be insured.

(2) Redeployment must not take place until local paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces are capable of maintaining tactical defense and security. A local reserve force should be established and state reserves prepared to assist if they are needed. Regional territorial security forces, if available, provide an additional reserve capability that can be used in responding to insurgent attacks.

(3) The government must also insure that it has adequate resources to carry out ongoing programs before extending its control. Requests for full-time protection and assistance received from local officials outside the area should not be honored until the government is fully prepared to mount a consolidation campaign into these new areas. In the meantime tactical operations can be mounted to relieve the pressure on these populated areas by destroying nearby insurgent forces and base areas.

5-14. Strike Campaigns

Strike campaigns consist of a series of major combat operations targeted against insurgent tactical forces and bases in contested or insurgent-controlled zones. Other internal defense activities may support tactical forces during an actual strike. FM 31-16 contains additional guidance on tactical operations.

a. Concepts. Strike campaigns are conducted in remote or contested areas by armed forces and are coordinated through appropriate area coordination centers. Since the main objective of a strike is destruction of insurgent forces and base areas, strike forces normally do not remain in the area of operations after mission accomplishment.

b. Organization. Forces assigned strike campaign missions should be relieved of routine area defense responsibilities well in advance of the operation. Strike forces are controlled at the national, regional, or state level and are assigned no permanent area responsibilities. Strike forces are organized as self-sufficient TF capable of operating for extended periods of time in areas remote from home bases. A strike force normally is assigned a specific target area in which it conducts operations. In addition to combat forces, TF may contain intelligence, PSYOP, police, and paramilitary elements.

c. Operations. Once insurgent forces or bases have been located, strike forces maneuver to destroy them. The insurgent’s ability to hide weapons and to assume noncombatant guises in attempting to avoid capture may require thorough reconnaissance and search of the area. Suspects must be managed firmly but treated fairly and with respect to avoid turning innocent suspects into insurgent sympathizers. When small units conducting reconnaissance operations sight relatively large insurgent tactical forces, surveillance should be maintained until reaction forces can be deployed to destroy them. Due to the necessity to react quickly to intelligence about insurgent forces, a thorough analysis of all factors affecting the situation is rare in these operations. When an area is suspected of harboring insurgent forces or installations, reconnaissance and surveillance should be conducted and followed by an immediate attack or raid by reaction forces when sufficient information has been developed on the target.

(1) Tactical operations include reconnaissance in force, encirclement, pursuit, raid, sweep, and coordinated attack. Combat support
and combat service support operations are planned to insure responsiveness to operational requirements. Operations outside the support range of fixed combat service support installations may require that these elements be attached or assigned directly from field depots and tactical bases. The coordination of these activities is accomplished between the TF commander and the appropriate headquarters.

(2) Reconnaissance to locate and test insurgent dispositions and strengths or to develop additional intelligence can be followed immediately by a coordinated attack or raid. Reconnaissance should emphasize thorough reconnoitering of an area and is characterized by continuous, decentralized, small-unit operations. If a sizeable insurgent force is located, friendly units maintain contact until reaction forces can be deployed to assist in the destruction of the insurgent force.

(3) Since strike campaigns are conducted in insecure areas, plans must provide for force withdrawal after mission accomplishment.

Section V. OPERATIONS IN SELECTED AREAS

5-15. Remote Area Operations
Remote area operations are undertaken in contested or insurgent controlled areas to establish government strongholds. These areas may be populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups; however, remote area operations may be conducted in areas devoid of civilian population in which insurgent forces have established staging areas, training areas, rest areas, logistical facilities, or command posts. The remote area may be in interior regions of the country or near border areas where major infiltration routes exist. Remote area operations normally are conducted by specially trained and selected units. The material in this paragraph should be used in conjunction with FM 30-31, FM 31-16, FM 31-20, FM 31-21, FM 31-73, and FM 41-10.

a. Concepts. Remote area operations are conducted to establish islands of strength in order to provide operational bases to support tactical operations or consolidation campaigns. Success of a given remote area operation is more assured if a segment of the local population is willing to support its programs. Operations can best be undertaken in contested or insurgent controlled areas if the government force contains personnel indigenous to the area who can influence the local population. Initially, additional combat and combat support forces may be required to assist the tactical force in establishing secure operational bases. A remote area operation may be conducted in areas nearly devoid of any people when the primary objective is the interdiction of infiltration routes. Maximum use should be made of special equipment to provide continuous coverage of suspected areas and routes. Firepower and combat forces, with an airmobile capability if available, operating from secure bases, should be employed to attack located and identified targets.

b. Organization. To the extent possible, the tactical force should be composed of personnel indigenous to the operational area. The type of tactical force employed (armed or paramilitary) will depend on the objectives, characteristics of the area, attitude of the local population, political climate, and the equipment and logistical support available. The size and composition of the force depends on the degree of area control exercised by the insurgents and the government’s potential for recruiting and developing an adequate local force. When the tactical force is recruited from local inhabitants, local leaders should be used even though their military capabilities may be limited. By using local leaders, assisted as necessary by advisors, more positive control is assured and training, indoctrination, and incorporation of the local force into the governmental structure is enhanced.

c. Operations. Remote area operations of long duration may include advisory assistance, tactical, civil affairs, PSYOP, intelligence, and populace and resources control operations.

(1) Planning. Consideration must be given to geography, sociology, economy, politics, and other factors that can enhance or hinder operations.

(2) Stages. Remote area operations include a preparation stage followed by the operational stages of offense, development, and completion. Most operations are long term and continuous. They are directed at disrupting the insurgents’ operations, neutralizing the insurgent infrastructure, and destroying insurgent tactical organizations.

(a) Preparation stage. This preparation stage entails delineation of the area of operations;
collection and assessment of data and information pertaining to the operational area; an estimate of resource requirements; training of personnel; and, finally, preparation of operations plans.

(b) Offensive stage. The offensive stage entails moving the remote area force into the operational area; establishing a secure base from which to launch operations; destroying, dispersing, or clearing insurgent tactical forces from the area; neutralizing or destroying the insurgent base area; neutralizing the insurgent political infrastructure; and establishing or reestablishing government control.

(c) Development stage. The development stage entails the conduct of aggressive defense operations, primarily by saturation patrolling. Short-term military civic action programs are implemented and may serve as the medium through which long-term internal development programs are initiated. Training of paramilitary or self-defense forces for populace and resources control, intelligence, and PSYOP is initiated. Internal development activities may be required in such areas as health, welfare, and education.

(d) Completion stage. This entails continuing development stage activities, transferring operational control to appropriate civil agencies, and expanding operations to adjacent areas.

5-16. Urban Area Operations
Operations in an urban environment require different emphasis and different techniques than those in rural areas. The presence of large numbers of people and the characteristics of the area will influence both insurgent and government operations. Armed forces may be required to reinforce police in combating riots and disorders provoked by the insurgents. Tactical operations may be necessary if the insurgents take direct action to seize urban areas or critical installations within them. FM 31-16 and FM 31-50 address tactical operations in urban areas.

a. The population density requires emphasis on the use of nonlethal weapons and the careful use of weapons of destruction when the application of force is necessary. The limitations placed on the use of firepower to minimize the loss of life and destruction to property require detailed planning, coordination, and control.

b. Covert insurgent activity is extensive in urban areas. The government must emphasize intelligence and police operations to counter clandestine organizational, intelligence, logistical, and terrorist activities.

c. Internal defense and development operations in urban areas may be part of a consolidation campaign.

d. Urban areas are critical and require a continuing internal defense and internal development effort whether they are part of a specific campaign or not. Military forces should participate in internal defense and development operations and planning in urban areas during all phases of insurgency to be prepared to assist when other national security/law enforcement agencies are inadequate to cope with the situation.

(e) Operational Environment.
(1) Characteristics. An urban area normally includes—

(a) A large, concentrated population.
(b) Government facilities.
(c) Industrial complexes.
(d) Communications facilities.
(e) Transportation terminals.
(f) Storage facilities.
(g) Food markets.
(h) Medical facilities.
(i) Public utilities.
(j) Education centers.
(k) Ethnic, religious, and economic groups.
(l) Manmade features (multistory buildings and subterranean facilities).
(m) Police forces; paramilitary forces, and other law enforcement agencies.

(2) Government activity. The requirements for government functions and services are much greater in urban areas than in rural areas. This necessitates more and possibly larger elements of government organizations for operations. The activities and capabilities of all government agencies should be considered in the planning and execution of internal defense and development operations in urban areas.

(3) Subversive activities. The introduction of a subversive element intent on destroying the government may strain the capabilities of local authorities in urban areas. Police, internal security, and other government organizations will be high priority targets of the insurgents. The insurgent will attempt to exploit local civilian organizations by subverting their goals and objectives to serve the insurgent cause. The insurgents will attempt to exploit local civilian organizations by subverting their goals and objectives to serve the insurgent cause or try to place them in opposition to the government. Terrorist activities and psychological operations will accompany covert insurgent organizational, intelligence, and logistical operations.

f. Operations.
(1) General. Careful planning and coordination are required for operations in urban areas, particularly for operations involving the application of force. Military forces must be able to communicate with police and other agencies
involved in the operations. Detailed information should be available for area characteristics and critical installations.

(2) Intelligence. Intelligence data on a specific area of operations should include detailed information about the urban centers within it. Information needed in all aspects of internal defense and development operations is drawn from this database. Military forces, which may be responsible for tactical operations in an urban area, prepare plans and prepare to implement them should the need arise. Information needed for planning should be gathered if it is not available in the area intelligence files. This information includes detailed city plans, subterranean construction, and location and description of all critical installations. Information on all internal defense and development activities and the insurgent situation must be kept current for operational plans.

(3) Populace and resources control. Populace and resources control activities in urban areas are extremely critical to the overall effort to defeat an insurgency before the insurgent can develop a significant capability for armed conflict. Police intelligence operations contribute to populace and resources control and may link criminal acts such as robberies, kidnappings, terrorism, and extortion to insurgent psychological or money-gathering activities. Careful surveillance should be maintained over government and civilian sources of weapons and ammunition. Intelligence operations are targeted on production, collection, and storage activities which may form part of the insurgent’s logistical base area system. Psychological operations should support and justify restrictive measures such as rationing, curfews, searches, and setting up checkpoints and restricted areas when these measures are necessary. Military support may be required for populace and resources control operations if insurgent activity surpasses the capability of other security forces for countering it.

(4) Tactical operations. Tactical operations may be required inside or near an urban area to defeat an insurgent attack. It is likely that any insurgent attempt to seize and hold the area will involve operations in both areas. When the police and other internal defense forces can cope with the attack inside the urban area, military forces can best participate by establishing security around the urban area and by denying the insurgent reinforcement or support. When military forces are required to reinforce police or defeat insurgent forces inside the urban area, operations are closely controlled and coordinated. Military forces should be withdrawn as soon as local forces can handle the situation.

(5) Psychological operations. Psychological operations in urban areas take on added significance because of the mass media available and the size and composition of the target audience. The government must solicit and win the support of the major opinionmakers in the areas. These include news editors, radio and television personalities, religious leaders, educators, and leaders of organizations whose support of the nation-building effort is essential to success. Emphasis should be placed on programs to improve or maintain the image of government forces when they are operating in urban areas. Security forces themselves receive continuing indoctrination on their role and the impact of individual actions on the success of their mission.

(a) A major activity of PSYOP in urban areas is the support of populace and resources control programs.

(b) All PSYOP resources available in the urban area should be considered in planning support of tactical operations. If there is an insurgent attack, PSYOP resources can be used to prevent panic, direct the movement of civilians, and assist in control and care for refugees.

(6) Civil affairs. Civil affairs operations in urban areas require added emphasis because of the large civilian population. Military participation in populace and resources control programs and military support of civil defense may be major activities. Planning and preparation to assist civilians if insurgents launch an armed attack are essential. This assistance may include—

(a) Rescue, evacuation, and hospitalization.

(b) Recovery and disposition of the dead.

(c) Handling of refugees, evacuees, and displaced persons.

(d) Emergency provision of prepared food and facilities for food preparation.

(e) Issue of food, water, and essential supplies and material.

(f) Restoration of utilities.

(g) Emergency clearance of debris and rubble from streets, highways, airports, docks, rail systems, and shelters.

(h) Damage assessment.

5-17. Border Operations

In an IDAD environment, armed forces may be charged with the overall mission of border
security or they may reinforce other security forces charged with immigration, customs, or internal security operations.

a. Objective. The objective of border operations in an IDAD environment is to deny infiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries. Tasks which may be performed in attaining this objective include—

(1) Security of populated areas.
(2) Intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
(3) Operation of authorized points of entry.
(4) Refugee control.
(5) Enforcement of movement and travel restrictions.
(6) Psychological operations.
(7) Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
(8) Attacks against insurgent forces.
(9) Destruction of insurgent base areas.
(10) Barrier and denial operations.

b. Concept. In phase I insurgency, operations in border areas are normally a function of police, customs, and other government organizations. Armed and paramilitary forces may assist these organizations, particularly in remote areas. In phases II and III, increased external support for the insurgency may require combat operations in border areas. Close coordination and cooperation are required between the armed forces, paramilitary forces, and all government agencies involved in these operations.

(1) The physical sealing of the border may not be possible since such an operation could require the commitment of more government forces and materiel than overall national requirements permit.

(2) Since it may not be possible to place forces and barriers at all possible crossings or entry sites, priorities should be established. Natural barriers must be used wherever possible. The use of patrols, sensors, and obstacles in selected areas will increase the effectiveness of natural barriers. Herbicides, if approved for the area of operation, may be used to enhance the visibility in vegetated areas.

(3) Barrier and denial operations are established after careful consideration of the threat, the environment, and the location of the infiltrators' probable targets and methods of operation.

c. Organization. National border forces may be composed of border police and guards and may include paramilitary forces and regular armed forces with supporting or direct responsibility for portions of the international border.

(1) Command and control. Border operations are planned, directed, and supervised from the national level. Authority to conduct these operations may be delegated to subnational and other area commanders.

(2) Structuring. Border task forces are tailored units designed to meet requirements in the area to which they are assigned. They should contain sufficient combat support and combat service support units to permit independent operations for extended periods.

d. Operations. Restricted zones or friendly population buffer zones can be established if needed. Either of these operations could require the relocation of many persons and must be carefully planned. Although armed forces may assist, civil authorities normally are responsible for planning and carrying out a relocation program. Forced relocation should be held to a minimum.

(1) Surveillance. Continuous and detailed surveillance is required to determine infiltration and exfiltration routes and support sites, frequency and volume of traffic, type of transportation, number and type of personnel, amount and type of material, terrain and traffic conditions, and the probable location of base areas and sanctuaries. Aerial reconnaissance, unattended ground sensors, and ground reconnaissance patrols may be employed to insure adequate reconnaissance and surveillance of remote areas. Surveillance and control of extensive coastal areas normally require the use of coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline, coordinated offshore patrols, aerial surveillance, strategic observation posts along the shoreline, and an effective system of licensing and identifying friendly military and civilian watercraft.

(2) Military operations. Border units establish operational bases at brigade, battalion, and company levels to direct operations. Aviation, signal, engineer, and fire support augmentation usually is required.

(3) Restricted zone. A carefully selected area, varied in width and contiguous to the border, is declared a restricted zone. Persons living in this zone are relocated. Announcements state that all unauthorized individuals or groups encountered in the restricted zone after completion of the relocation program will be considered infiltrators or insurgents.

(4) Friendly population buffer zone. Civilians living within the area of operations are
limited to those believed to be loyal to the government. Persons of doubtful loyalty are relocated. This concept offers a good potential for establishing informant nets and using loyal citizens in self defense border units. It denies insurgents potential civilian contacts and base areas for border-crossing activities. A continuing PSYOP effort should be directed toward maintaining the morale and loyalty of the population.

Section VI. OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

5-18. General
The doctrine provided in this chapter cannot always be applied precisely as outlined because situations will differ. However, general operational guidelines have been derived which can be used in planning and conducting IDAD.

5-19. Guidelines
a. Insure Unity of Effort. Internal defense and development require well-coordinated action and centralized control at all levels. The organizational basis for coordinating and controlling IDAD activities, including activities conducted by security forces, is described in paragraphs 4-9 through 4-13.

b. Maximize Intelligence. Intelligence must be the basis for all IDAD activities. Internal defense requires an alert organization with special police functions that is capable of assessing the insurgent threat, warning the government, taking action to penetrate the insurgent organization, and assisting in neutralizing it. The government must develop and improve the intelligence capabilities of security forces.

c. Minimize Violence. Although insurgent organizations may act violently, it does not follow that a host government must respond in the same manner. Instead, it should use its resources to minimize violence and maintain law and order. Depending on the situation, governments may act decisively to shorten the duration of violence, or they may proceed with caution, extending the duration, but limiting the intensity or scope of violence. The following are some factors that a government considers to minimize violence:

(1) Government campaigns and operations are conducted in a manner that enhances popular support and promotes compliance with its laws and directives.

(2) The government acts to develop and support organizations which provide opportunities for individual and group development, nonviolent expressions of discontent, and the means to implement IDAD programs.

(3) The government minimizes the opportunities for insurgent groups to coordinate and practice violence.

(4) The effective employment of loyal, disciplined security forces inhibits the insurgent from utilizing violence.

(5) When a host government employs security forces to suppress insurgency, controls and punishments should be applied with fairness and consistency in a manner that enhances the government’s legitimacy and insures compliance with its laws and directives.

(6) Security forces are necessarily in the public eye while maintaining normal law and order which varies from country to country. Forces above those required to maintain “normal” law and order are best employed where they can actively assist the populace, as in military civic action, or where they provide a psychologically insignificant target.

d. Improve Administration. The effectiveness of governmental policies, planning, and projects is influenced by the competency of governmental administration. In many developing countries it will be necessary that the government provide additional training supervision, followup, and controls to insure that subordinate personnel and organizations follow national policies and properly implement and administer programs. An important element in administering IDAD programs is the loyalty, discipline, and morale of security forces.
THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND ECONOMICAL WAY OF DEALING WITH AN INSURGENCY IS TO PREVENT IT.

MILITARY FORCES ACCOMPLISH IDAD OPERATIONS THROUGH THE CONDUCT OF

- INTELLIGENCE
- PSYOP
- CIVIL AFFAIRS
- POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL
- TACTICAL OPERATIONS
- ADVISORY ASSISTANCE

IDAD CAMPAIGNS MAY BE CATEGORIZED AS

- CONSOLIDATION CAMPAIGNS
- STRIKE CAMPAIGNS

OPERATIONS IN SELECTED AREAS INCLUDE

- REMOTE AREA OPERATIONS
- URBAN OPERATIONS
- BORDER OPERATIONS

Figure 5-2. Highlights.
CHAPTER 6
UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

6-1. Purpose and Scope

a. This chapter provides information concerning United States security assistance as an element of United States foreign assistance. It includes US Government organization and responsibilities for foreign assistance, an outline of humanitarian and development assistance, and a description of US security assistance programs.

b. US military support of host country internal defense and development (IDAD) is carried out within the parameters of US foreign policy and as part of US security assistance. An understanding of US foreign assistance, particularly US security assistance programs, will assist US military advisors, commanders, and staff officers to better plan, coordinate, and conduct IDAD activities in support of US and host country national interests and objectives.

c. There are numerous service, joint, and other governmental publications that provide guidance concerning the planning and implementation of US security assistance programs. Brief descriptions of the more important publications relative to security assistance are provided in appendix B. In addition, chapter 7 briefly discusses a few related publications that apply to the advisor.

6-2. US Foreign Assistance

a. US foreign policy is primarily based on US national interests. Broad US interests include a political and ideological interest in helping friendly nations contribute to a stable world conducive to international cooperation; a security interest in ensuring that strategic areas do not fall under unfriendly control and that free nations remain able to preserve their independence; an economic interest in assuring that resources and markets remain available to the United States and to other free-world countries; and a humanitarian interest in assisting to achieve social and economic aspirations and relieve suffering. US foreign policy includes a national commitment to encourage and support a peaceful world environment in which the security and continued development of the United States is assured and in which the peoples of other nations have the opportunity to pursue their own aspirations. Three basic tenets of this foreign policy are that the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments, provide a shield for selected nations against threats by nuclear powers, and furnish economic and military assistance towards increasing the economic and military self-sufficiency of selected allies in accordance with US national interests.

b. The United States provides foreign assistance through a wide variety of programs. Assistance under these programs may range from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and manmade disasters. The various US assistance programs may be categorized in terms of three major functions.

   (1) Development assistance—economic and technical assistance designed to promote development and modernization.

   (2) Humanitarian assistance—basically welfare and emergency relief designed to alleviate human suffering.

   (3) Security assistance—military and economic assistance designed to improve national security.

c. By viewing US foreign assistance programs in terms of development, humanitarian, and security assistance, they can be seen as related means of furthering US interests rather than as a mass of unrelated programs, each with its own end.

d. US foreign assistance programs have a basis in law. This legal basis consists of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended; treaties and executive agreements; annual congressional authorization and appropriation acts; and other enabling legislation.
6-3. Department of State
   a. The President has assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility for overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas. This includes continuous supervision and direction of the entire foreign assistance program. The major elements of the State Department through which the Secretary of State exercises this responsibility are shown in figure 6-1.

   b. The Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance is charged with the responsibility for coordinating the plans and programs of all US Government departments and agencies involved in security assistance activities. Additional information concerning the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance is provided in paragraph 6-16.

   c. The Inspector General of Foreign Assistance is responsible to the Secretary for matters relating to the effectiveness of US foreign assistance programs, Peace Corps programs, and Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) activities. The Inspector General's office conducts inspections of these programs, makes recommendations to the head of the agency concerned, and follows up to determine the action taken.

   d. The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs is a major element of the State Department in the formulation of national security policy. The Bureau advises the Secretary of State on issues and policy problems arising in areas where defense and foreign policy intersect. Additional information concerning this bureau is provided in paragraph 6-16.

   e. Five assistant secretaries direct the activities of the regional or geographic bureaus which are responsible for US foreign affairs activities in the major regions of the world. These assistant secretaries are responsible for advising the Secretary of State in the formulation of US policies toward the countries within their regional jurisdiction. They also direct, coordinate, and supervise interdepartmental and interagency matters involving these regions.

   f. The assistant secretaries are assisted in their duties by country directors within each of the bureaus. The country directors are responsible for overall guidance and interdepartmental coordination with respect to their assigned countries.

6-4. National Security Council System (fig 6-2)
   a. The National Security Council (NSC), established by the National Security Act of 1947, is the principal forum for the consideration of policy issues which require Presidential decision. Its function is to advise the President on the integration of foreign, domestic, and military matters relating to national security.

   b. The NSC system is an interdepartmental and interagency advisory and coordinating system used by the decisionmakers in the executive branch to formulate foreign policy and national security recommendations and to integrate and coordinate governmental efforts in the execution of approved foreign assistance policies. In effect, the NSC system provides for centralized planning, coordination and policy formulation, and decentralized execution of approved plans and policies by the various departments and agencies concerned with overseas activities. The organization of the NSC supports policy coordination between Department of State and the NSC since Department of State personnel either chair or are represented on all committees of the NSC system and the Under Secretaries Committee.

   c. The five regional interdepartmental groups of the NSC system correspond to the five regional bureaus of the State Department. Each regional interdepartmental group is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State that heads the corresponding State Department regional bureau. In addition to the five NSC regional groups, there is a functional NSC interdepartmental group titled The Political-Military Group. Membership of each group includes representatives from Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the NSC staff, and others at the discretion of the chairman. The interdepartmental groups—

   1. Discuss and decide interdepartmental issues that can be settled at the assistant secretary level, including issues arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions.

   2. Prepare policy studies and papers for review by the NSC Senior Review Group.
Figure 6-1. State Department organization for foreign assistance.

*Chair corresponding interdepartmental groups of NSC system
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL *

THE PRESIDENT

• THE VICE PRESIDENT • THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
• THE SECRETARY OF STATE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF

NSSM **

NSC

SENIOR REVIEW GROUP 2

POLICY FORMULATION

NSC

SENIOR REVIEW GROUP

DECISION

UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE 3

NSC

UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUPS

POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS

AFRICAN AFFAIRS

MIDEAST AFFAIRS

EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

AFRICAN COUNTRY TEAMS

MIDEAST COUNTRY TEAMS

EAST ASIAN COUNTRY TEAMS

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY TEAMS

EUROPEAN COUNTRY TEAMS

1 PROVIDES STAFF SUPPORT TO THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (SANSA) AND THE COUNCIL

2 SANSA IS CHAIRMAN

3 DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE IS CHAIRMAN

* ORGANIZATION EXCLUDES AD HOC GROUPS AND DEFENSE PROGRAM REVIEW COMMITTEE

** NSSM - NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY MEMORANDUM

*** NSDM - NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MEMORANDUM

Figure 6-2. National Security Council organization.
(3) Prepare contingency papers on potential crisis areas for NSC review.

d. The NSC Senior Review Group examines papers such as those coming out of the interdepartmental groups, NSC ad hoc groups, or departments prior to their submission to the NSC. The NSC Senior Review Group, chaired by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (SANSA), includes representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the JCS, and other agencies at the discretion of the chair, depending on the issue under consideration. The NSC senior Review Group reviews papers to insure that—
   (1) Contentious issues are resolved, if possible.
   (2) The issue under consideration is worthy of NSC attention.
   (3) All realistic alternatives are presented.
   (4) All facts, including cost implications and all departments' and agencies' views, are fairly and adequately set forth.

e. The NSC Under Secretaries Committee functions under the chairmanship of the Deputy Secretary of State. Membership of this committee includes the chairman; the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who acts as the alternate chairman; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Chairman of the JCS; and other agency representatives at the discretion of the chair. The Under Secretaries Committee is subordinate to the National Security Council; however, the committee reports directly to the Secretary of State. This committee contains the high-level leadership and authority necessary to implement policies established by Presidential decisions. The committee—
   (1) Considers issues referred to it by the NSC Senior Review Group.
   (2) Considers operational matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas.
   (3) Considers matters that are referred to it by the Secretary of State.
   (4) Executes the policies established by Presidential decisions as reflected in the National Security Decision Memorandums (NSDM).
   (5) Considers other operational matters referred to it jointly by the Deputy Secretary of State and the SANSA.

6-5. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

The CIA coordinates intelligence activities of other US departments and agencies in the interest of national security. It is responsible for—

a. Advising the NSC in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as relate to national security.

b. Recommending policy to the NSC for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the government as they relate to national security.

c. Correlating and evaluating intelligence relating to national security and providing for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government.

d. Performing such additional services of common concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

6-6. The United States Information Agency (USIA)

Note. USIA is referred to as United States Information Service (USIS) in host countries.

USIA helps to achieve US foreign policy objectives by influencing public attitudes in other nations and by advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated US policies, programs, and official statements. This is carried out by using personal contact, radio broadcasting, libraries, book publication and distribution, press, motion pictures, television, exhibits, English-language instruction, and other means of communication to encourage constructive public support abroad for US policy objectives and to unmask and counter hostile attempts to distort or frustrate US policies. US responsibility for interdepartmental coordination of psychological operations has been assigned to the USIA.

6-7. The Agency for International Development (AID)

a. AID is an autonomous agency under the policy direction of the State Department. It is responsible for supervision and general direction of all development assistance programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 480, and similar legislation. AID plans and implements programs overseas having as their long-term goal the creation of economic and social conditions of sufficient viability to eliminate causes of discontent and to sustain responsive, representative governments and institutions.

b. Although AID is primarily concerned with humanitarian and development assistance, some of its programs such as Supporting Assistance and selected provisions of Public Law 480 are security related. In these instances, these
security related programs are administered by AID, and the Director of USAID in the host country insures that they are fully coordinated with the Department of Defense representative.

6-8. The Department of Defense (DOD)
Information on the responsibilities of DOD and its subordinate organizations is provided in paragraphs 6-16 through 6-22.

6-9. Other US Government Agencies

a. The Department of Treasury. The Department of Treasury has primary responsibility for formulating and recommending domestic and international financial policy. The Secretary of the Treasury, as chief financial officer of the United States Government, serves as the United States Governor of the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. The Secretary is also chairman of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, which is authorized to coordinate the policies and operations of all agencies of the government which make, or participate in making, foreign loans and exchange or monetary transactions. Within the Department of Treasury, the Customs Bureau, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, is active in suppressing the traffic in illegal narcotics.

b. The Department of Commerce. The mission of the Department of Commerce is to promote the healthy growth of the American economy through programs of assistance to US domestic and international business activities. Foreign trade and investment rank high on the list of priorities of the department due to the importance to the United States of a strong balance-of-payments position. In support of United States efforts to advance the economic growth of the developing countries, the Bureau of International Commerce of this department provides a wide range of background and specific information relative to potential US investments in the developing countries. The Bureau of International Business Assistance Service provides government assistance to businessmen with specific international trade problems and informs US firms of projects overseas with significant export potential.

c. The Department of Agriculture (USDA). USDA, in cooperation with the US embassies worldwide, develops programs for the sale of agricultural commodities to individual host countries under the provisions of Public Law 480, as amended. These programs specify the use of currency to be generated by the proposed agreement. USDA submits these programs to the Interagency Staff Committee on Public Law 480. This committee includes representatives of the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, State/ AID, Defense, Commerce, and the Office of Management and Budget. They consider the country's need for the commodity, foreign exchange position and overall economic status, and the relationship of the proposed program to the foreign aid program and the foreign policy of the United States. Once approved, negotiations are carried on by the ambassador or his designees with officials of the host government. Foreign currencies generated through Public Law 480 may be devoted to services for common defense, usually as grants to the host country for the procurement of materials, facilities, and services.

6-10. US Country Team (fig 6-3)

a. The US diplomatic mission to a host nation includes the representatives of all in-country US Government departments and agencies. The chief of the diplomatic mission, normally an ambassador, represents the President of the United States and functions within the organization of the State Department. The President has given full responsibility to the ambassador to direct and coordinate the activities and operations of all elements of the US diplomatic mission. However, the ambassador's authority does not include US military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a US area military command. In fulfilling his responsibilities, the ambassador promotes positive program direction by assuring that all US activities in the host country are relevant to current realities, are efficiently and economically administered, and are effectively interrelated so that they will make a maximum contribution to US interests in that country as well as to regional and international objectives.

b. The term "country team" is an informal title that has evolved to describe in-country interdepartmental coordination among key members of the US diplomatic mission. In practice, the composition of the country team varies widely, depending on the desires of the chief of the diplomatic mission, the situation in-country, the US departments and agencies represented in-country, and the problems to be considered by the team. The country team, normally headed by an ambassador, is used to coordinate US activities in order to achieve a unified US program for the host nation. Although a US area military commander is not a member of the diplomatic mission, he usually participates as a member of the country team.
Figure 6-3. The country team concept.
6-11. Development Assistance

a. Development assistance is provided to assist the economic and social development in selected countries. In addition, the provision of development assistance may result in increased security or direct and immediate relief of human suffering, even though these are not its main purposes. Similarly, humanitarian assistance and security assistance often contribute to development.

b. Development assistance is designed to support economic and social progress, to increase agricultural and industrial production, to educate and train people, to help prevent population growth from outrunning economic growth, to build lasting institutions, to reduce economic disparities, and to promote wider distribution of the benefits of economic progress. The aims of development assistance are fundamentally long term; its goals can seldom be achieved quickly.

c. In development assistance, several techniques are employed, separately and in combination, to assist nations in their development process. These techniques may be categorized as development loans and technical assistance.

(1) Development loans finance a wide range of commodities and related technical services which developing countries need for such facilities as schools, clinics, irrigation works, and roads. Development loans are repaid to the United States with interest. Interest rates charged to the borrowing country are lower than commercial rates, and maturities are longer. There are three basic types of development loans—project loans, program loans, and sector loans.

(a) Project loans finance US-produced goods and US services for specific undertakings such as irrigation projects, fertilizer plants, roads, sewage systems, electric power plants, or credit programs. These loans are conditioned upon matching measures of self-help by the recipient country to further its own development.

(b) Program loans finance the import of US commodities such as machinery, raw materials, and spare parts, which are needed to sustain the overall development process. They are often associated with fiscal or monetary reforms or other self-help steps affecting the entire economy of the borrowing country.

(c) Sector loans provide resources needed to help a country carry out an integrated program in one particular sector such as agriculture or education. Technical assistance is frequently integrated with sector loans.

(2) Technical assistance is primarily concerned with people—their skills, their productivity, and the institutions they build and administer. Technical assistance is the principal means of assisting the people of the developing countries to acquire, adapt, and generate the knowledge, skills, and institutions they require for economic and social growth and modernization. Self-sustaining growth depends on the effective use of natural resources, capital facilities, and labor. Technical assistance is designed to accelerate the process by which people are educated, skills transferred, and attitudes changed so that people can more effectively help themselves. Technical assistance is of several types—

(a) Research in both the social and physical sciences is directed toward the solution of development problems, primarily to build institutional capacity for research within the developing countries and to be directly applied to their problems.

(b) Institution building is the most lasting and far-reaching function of technical assistance. US civil and military advisors, overseas training for foreign nationals, organizational and program planning insight, imagination, and time have helped developing countries to establish institutions or further develop existing ones. When the effort is successful, the institutions develop momentum and a capacity to evolve and renew themselves; they become able to respond to new problems.

(c) Training is a direct investment in people. It includes formal education, training in skills from crop spraying to accounting, and accumulation of all kinds of experience in modern methods. Technical assistance is most effective if it enhances the capacity not only of people who receive direct training, but also of others to whom they pass on their new abilities. The training of foreign nationals in the United States and third countries makes them effective agents of change. When they return to their own countries, they contribute to modernization by using their new knowledge and skills and transmitting them to others. Certain military training serves developmental purposes.

(d) Developing countries may require assistance in formulating development policies and programs, in defining investment and
planning priorities, and in improving the operations of government ministries and enterprises. They may also need technical assistance for the private sector in the fields of research and institution building. In some cases the United States is the best source of the relevant skills, and may respond to such needs through advisory technical services when there are significant opportunities to assist a country's development program.

6-12. Humanitarian Assistance

a. Humanitarian assistance is basically welfare and emergency relief. The largest part of this assistance is for maternal and child feeding and school food programs aimed at raising nutrition levels. Disaster and emergency relief and refugee assistance comprise the second major category under this type of assistance. These programs have helped in emergency situations resulting from war and natural disasters such as drought, floods, and earthquakes. They also have helped in resettling and feeding refugees.

b. Humanitarian assistance programs are administered by AID and the Department of State in conjunction with the Department of Agriculture. Most of the food programs are conducted by US affiliates of international voluntary agencies under arrangements made with AID. The disaster relief and emergency programs are also the responsibility of AID. The refugee program is administered by the Department of State, largely through international organizations.

Section IV. US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

6-13. General

a. US security assistance brings together those major programs used by the United States to enhance the self-defense capabilities of allied and friendly countries in support of US national interests. US security assistance encompasses those programs which enhance, as necessary, those host country forces that, in conjunction with the United States and allied forces, will constitute a balanced force capable of providing adequate resistance to aggression in accordance with regional defense plans. Security assistance serves as a major instrument in attaining US objectives in consonance with US foreign policy.

b. Security assistance provides eligible allied military forces with the end items, spare parts, peculiar supporting materiel, equipment, services, and training that enable the supported military forces to conduct effective resistance against external aggression and to maintain internal security. Training assistance is also furnished so that foreign security forces can attain maximum effectiveness. Training is designed to add technical competence, insure proper usage and maintenance of equipment, establish a sound base for training activities, and create friendship and goodwill toward the United States.

6-14. Programs

a. There are three major military security assistance programs: Military Assistance Program, Foreign Military Sales Program, and Excess Defense Articles Program. Collectively, these three programs are referred to as "military assistance."

1. Military Assistance Program (MAP) refers to transfers of defense articles, services, and training to foreign governments-and international organizations as grant aid and loans, under authority of the FAA or successor legislation. This aid fulfills military needs of friendly countries and international organizations who, under normal conditions, could not meet these requirements from their own resources. The US Government retains residual title to grant aid materials. Foreign military training includes formal and informal instruction of foreign students in the United States; the use of contract technicians and contractors; training at civilian institutions; correspondence courses; technical, educational, and information publications; and military advice to foreign military units and forces. It is designed to improve the ability of friendly foreign countries to use their own resources and equipment and systems of US origin with maximum effectiveness for the maintenance of their defensive strength and internal security; encourage effective and mutually beneficial relationships and enhance understanding between the United States and friendly foreign countries; and promote increased understanding by friendly foreign countries of the policies and objectives of the United States in pursuit of the goals of world peace and security.

2. Foreign military sales (FMS) provide defense articles, services, and training to allied nations and international organizations through
purchases by the recipient nations and organizations. Sales may be on a cash or credit basis. The US policy concerning FMS is to sell for cash to developed nations but provide credit, if necessary, to less developed countries in order to permit them to use their economic resources for development. The United States also encourages allied governments to deal directly with US manufacturers, where possible. Foreign military sales are a means of supplementing, augmenting, and eventually replacing military assistance grant aid.

(3) Excess defense articles offer US Government-owned defense articles, in excess of the US mobilization reserve requirements, to friendly countries and international organizations on either a nonreimbursable (grant aid materiel recipients only) or a cash basis. The principal source of excess defense articles is items excess to US inventories. A second source is redistributable military assistance grant aid that has become excess to the recipient's needs.

b. In addition to the three major military security assistance programs, US security assistance includes the Supporting Assistance Program. Supporting assistance provides economic assistance to foreign governments facing major political or military threats. This assistance is designed to free other resources (local currency, foreign exchange, etc.) for security purposes, to assist in maintaining political and economic stability, and to promote development. Supporting assistance may be provided in the form of a loan or grant to finance capital programs, commodities and services for emergency or refugee relief projects, and police and internal security activities. Supporting assistance is administered by AID. When recipient nations gain a reasonable degree of political and economic stability, the United States shifts from supporting assistance to normal development assistance programs.

c. Two additional programs, which are authorized by other than security assistance legislation, impact on security assistance planning and programs: Ship loans and Public Law 480 (Food for Peace).

   (1) Ship loans is a program by which surplus US Navy vessels are loaned to other nations. Each ship loan must be approved by Congress. These vessels, which may be needed by the United States in the event of full-scale war, are above current United States requirements. Selected nations are given the opportunity to use these vessels while maintaining them at their expense. In time of crisis, all vessels loaned through this program will be returned to the United States if required.

   (2) Public Law 480 is officially known as the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. In addition to supporting the economic development of a nation, it provides grants to support the country's defense budget; however, this program is not included in security assistance legislation. Specifically, the act states in title I, referred to as the common defense "provision," that Public Law 480 may be used to "procure equipment, materials, facilities, and services for the common defense including internal security." Congress has provided a system that permits common defense funds to be used for certain approved, military-related projects.

6-15. US Security Assistance Concepts

US Security assistance is based on the following concepts:

a. Provision of US assistance is predicated upon nations directly threatened assuming the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for their own defense, devoting a fair share of their other resources to their defense effort, and making the best possible use of their resources.

b. US grant aid is to be terminated as rapidly as possible, consistent with reasonable economic stability and growth, and transition to aid on a sales basis is to be facilitated by judicious use of foreign military sales credit.

c. US grant aid and credit resources are concentrated in the provision of investment (capital) needs, with the receiving country assuming responsibility for the major share of operating and maintenance costs.

d. In defense planning, the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence (app C) emphasizes the need for the United States to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of free-world security. These free-world military forces which are a part of the total force "concept" include both active and reserve components of the United States, those of US allies, and the additional military capabilities of US allies that will be made available through local efforts or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs.

e. US assistance and advice to major recipient countries include the combined development of assistance and self-help goals that reflect balanced considerations of such factors as threats, risks, costs, resource constraints, and manpower limitations. These factors and their interrelation assist in providing a realistic
planning basis for the allocation of resources for security purposes.

f. The United States devotes increased attention to the economic consequences of force modernization planned by other nations, lest unanticipated growth of security expenditures undo the gains already registered in economic development.

g. The United States seeks to encourage recipient countries to recognize the total costs of their forces and to make informed choices in allocations of limited resources.

h. The recipient nation is expected to assume progressively greater responsibility for its own defense, for the fundamental decisions related to it, and for providing the necessary resources.

Section V. ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR US SECURITY ASSISTANCE

6-16. State Department (fig 6-4)

a. The Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance is charged with responsibility for the coordination of policy, plans, and programs of all departments and agencies of the US Government involved in security assistance activities. The Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, although subordinate to the Deputy Secretary of State, has direct access to the Secretary of State for security assistance matters.

b. The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs has four principal functions: to advise the Secretary of State on issues and policy problems arising in areas where defense and foreign policy intersect; to serve as the principal channel of liaison and contact between the Department of State and the Department of Defense; to participate in developing the views and positions of the Department of State and the Department of Defense on politico-military problems that are under consideration within the National Security Council System; and to exercise, on behalf of the Secretary of State, the responsibility for supervision of the military assistance and sales programs and control of the commercial export of arms. The Bureau receives direction from the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance only for security assistance purposes.

c. The Bureau for Supporting Assistance in USAID administers security supporting assistance. Supporting assistance is economic aid provided to help a country faced with a serious and immediate security threat to maintain economic and political stability. For purposes of security assistance only, it comes under the direction of the Department of State’s Under Secretary for Security Assistance.

d. The Security Assistance Program Review Committee (SAPRC) is chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance and is composed of representatives from the executive branch departments, such as DOD, State, AID, Office of Management and Budget, and Treasury, that might be involved in security assistance matters. With a minimum of paperwork these representatives are able to bring an issue concerning security assistance to the surface at a level where decisions can be made. Through the SAPRC, a closer tie is made between military assistance and military-related supporting assistance. This encourages mutually supporting programs, allows for trade-offs, and thus decreases the total costs and increases the efficiency of the US Security Assistance Program.

6-17. Department of Defense (fig 6-5)

a. DOD has a major responsibility to assist selected countries to maintain internal security. In discharging this responsibility, DOD assists these nations in achieving a proper balance of their military capabilities to meet external and internal threats.

b. The purpose of the Defense Security Assistance Council, which consists of key personnel from within DOD, is to advise the Secretary of Defense on security assistance matters and insure full coordination of them within DOD.

c. Within DOD the Secretary of Defense has delegated his authority to act on all DOD related security assistance matters to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA). The ASD/ISA is the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense in the fundamental field of international security as prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. His functions include—

(1) Formulating comprehensive DOD security assistance programs, including plans, policies, and priorities for approval by the Secretary of Defense.

(2) Insuring, through coordination with the
Figure 6-4. State Department coordination of security assistance.
DASD/SA IS ENGAGED IN LONG-RANGE PLANNING

2 DASAA IS ENGAGED IN DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS

3 DSA COUNCIL ADVISES SECRETARY DEFENSE

4 ROUTINE COORDINATION BETWEEN SERVICE DEPARTMENTS, UNIFIED COMMANDS, MAAGS, AND DSAA
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), that the Security Assistance Program is integrated within the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

(3) Serving as the principal DOD point of contact and policy spokesman relating to security assistance.

The first is that of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for Security Assistance (DASD/ISA(SA)), who is responsible to the ASD/ISA for DOD security assistance policy, planning, and program formulation for current and future years. The second position is the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), who is responsible for the execution of approved security assistance plans. The positions of DASD/ISA(SA) and Director, DSAA, are in actuality held by a single general or flag rank officer with two distinct staffs. This organization insures coordination and unity of purpose while separating planning and programming from day-to-day management.

e. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) is especially designed to place increased emphasis on the management control, and implementation of approved and funded military security assistance programs. The Director, DSAA, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense on administration of security assistance matters, thereby making his office more responsive in the day-to-day management of all DOD-approved security assistance programs.

6-18. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

a. The JCS play a key role in the US security assistance effort. The JCS assist the Secretary of Defense by means of joint plans such as the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP). A brief explanation of these plans is provided in appendix B. In addition, the JCS continually review current and on-going programs for specific countries and geographic areas to insure compatibility with US global security interests, and to determine that military assistance resources are being utilized in a manner that promotes US strategic concepts.

b. All military related security assistance guidance, plans, and programs promulgated at the national level are referred to the JCS for review and concurrence. Directives and communications pertaining to military assistance affairs are coordinated initially with the JCS to ensure that force objectives, strategic concepts, and military plans are not being inadvertently circumvented or ignored. Program recommendations emanating from the MAAG's and unified commands are also fully coordinated through JCS to insure consonance with US global security plans.

6-19. Military Departments

The military departments participate in the development, negotiation, and execution of agreements pertaining to military security assistance programs. They provide advice on such matters as costs, availability, and lead time on military equipment to insure delivery of material and services to recipient countries in accordance with approved programs and established security assistance programs by providing the resources and the administrative support necessary to move assets to recipient countries.

6-20. Department of the Army (fig 6-6)

a. Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of the Army is responsible for executing approved and funded programs and for providing Army support activities and personnel required to support security assistance programs. The Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs is responsible for integrating security assistance into the total spectrum of US Army international affairs commitments. In addition, the Secretary of the Army has delegated his military assistance logistic responsibilities to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics (ASA(I&L)). Similarly, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management (ASA/FM) is responsible for discharging financial responsibilities. The Secretary of the Army has specific responsibilities which are accomplished through appropriate Army staff agencies and commands. They are listed in the following paragraphs.

b. Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS).

(1) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations is the principal advisor to the Army Chief of Staff for security assistance matters and political military aspects of international affairs and is responsible for the formulation of the Department of the Army position on military assistance policy and planning, to include missions, tasks, priorities, strategic force objectives, requirements for force development, and general courses of action. The Directorate for International Affairs (ODCOPS/1A) has
primary responsibility for the accomplishment of these DCSOPS functions.

(2) The Director of International Affairs has the following security assistance responsibilities:
(a) Supports DCSOPS in his role as principal advisor to the Army Chief of Staff in security assistance matters and political military aspects of international affairs.
(b) Formulates Army policy and provides guidance to the Army Staff and subordinate Army agencies concerning training support of Grant Aid and Foreign Military Sales Programs.
(c) Directs the development and coordination of Army views on policy pertaining to security assistance matters and represents the Army Staff in influencing DOD policies and directives.
(d) Promulgates Department of Army general policy and direction of Army Security Assistance Programs.
(e) Develops and coordinates Army Staff positions concerning the overall security assistance program within guidance and policies promulgated by OSD and the JCS.
(f) Monitors foreign assistance legislation and coordinates Army views concerning its impact on Security Assistance Programs.
(g) Directs the inclusion of Army's general policies in regulations and other directives which are initiated by Army elements and/or other defense staff agencies which pertain to the policy aspects of security assistance.

b. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.
(1) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) exercises overall supervision of Army logistics that are related to security assistance programs. This responsibility has been further delegated to the Director of International Logistics, ODCSLOG. However, as in the case of US Army logistics programs, implementation of military security assistance logistics involves the participation and full support of all agencies within the Department of the Army. US Army logistical support of military security assistance programs is called international logistics.
(2) The Director of International Logistics discharges the following military assistance responsibilities for the ODCSLOG—
(a) Directs and coordinates the Army participation in, and is the Army staff point of contact for, all logistics aspects of international matters except for matters of a financial management nature.
(b) Initiates and fosters acceptance of international logistics plans, policies, and concepts which will further United States national and allied national readiness in accordance with overall DA and DOD policy.
(c) Provides for ODCSLOG assistance to the DOD, NSC, unified commands, MAAG's, and Army attaches in the development of logistics plans, policies, and programs pertaining to the military aspects of international logistics to include grant aid; sales of military equipment, materiel, and services; and agreements for combined cooperative logistics systems.
(d) Plans for and encourages United States industry participation in international logistics activities.
(e) Exercises staff supervision over the Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Grant Aid Divisions, ODCSLOG.
(f) Initiates, prepares, and publishes Department of the Army logistical policies necessary to the accomplishment of military assistance programs.

d. Army Materiel Command (AMC).
(1) The Army Materiel Command supervises the execution of the logistical portions of military security assistance programs for the Department of the Army. This execution encompasses both the materiel and services portion of the program, and involves the provision of supply and fiscal data as well as the performance of liaison functions that insure adherence to Army directives on the condition of materiel to be delivered to recipients.
(2) International Logistics Center (ILC), New Cumberland Army Depot, functions as the Army's focal point in CONUS for international logistics activities and maintains master status files on such activities. In addition, the Center prepares DA extract orders and processes changes to the Military Articles and Service List (MASL). The ILC, under the supervision of the AMC, controls the supply flow from the commodity command, overseas commanders' stocks, off-shore procurement, Defense Supply Agency (DSA), and General Services Administration (GSA). In performing this mission, the Center prepares and maintains requisitions for materiel contained in approved military security assistance programs, including grant aid and supply support arrangements and requisition control for foreign military sales. The Center also acts as a National Inventory Control Point (NICP) for DSA and GSA items. The Center monitors requisitions for cooperative logistics supply support arrangements for countries being supported directly from CONUS. Aggressive follow-up is maintained to assure that every effort is made to reduce delay or any other negative
Figure 6-6. Army organization for management of military security assistance programs.
supply action. Inquiries concerning any item on a
requisition are directed to the ILC.

e. Chief, Research and Development (Chief, R&D). The Chief, R&D, is responsible to the
Secretary of the Army for providing recommendations and technical assistance for proposed
coproduction programs, and providing technical assistance and facilities and furnishing advice and
recommendations with respect to the Mutual Weapons Development Program.

f. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Under policy guidance of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), procedures have been established to insure the assignment of
experienced and qualified Army personnel to the MAAG's and missions.

g. The Surgeon General. The Surgeon General, in coordination with the US Army Materiel
Command, supervises and executes the medical elements of military cooperative logistics. The
Surgeon General is assisted in the supply aspects of military assistance programs by the
International Logistics Center, Army Materiel Command, through which requisitions pass to the
US Army Medical Materiel Agency, the Army Class Management Activity for Medical Materiel.
The Office of the Surgeon General is the Department of the Army contact point for foreign
military sales and supply support arrangements involving medical materiel or training. The Office
of the Surgeon General researches, prepares, and tenders letters of offer for medical materiel,
training of foreign personnel, and supply support arrangements.

h. The Comptroller of the Army. The Comptroller of the Army is responsible to the ASA/FM
for developing and presenting to the OASD/ISA the Army portion of the military assistance
budget data that ASD/ISA is required to present to the Office of Management and Budget. In
addition, after the military assistance programs are approved, the Comptroller of the Army must
provide certain additional justification for the funds required to implement the Army's portion of
military assistance.

6-21. Unified Commands

a. The unified commands are vitally concerned with military security assistance activities and
serve as the center around which the whole process revolves. Serving as an intermediate level
for policy guidance and review between DOD and the MAAG's within the host countries, the
unified command commander is responsible for

insuring that all military security assistance plans and activities are coordinated, integrated,
and in consonance with regional US defense plans.

b. The Department of the Army's major overseas commands (component commands of the
unified commands) participate, as may be directed by the commander of the unified command concerned, in the execution of the military assistance programs for countries within their respective areas of responsibility. This participation may include assistance in the development and execution of long-range plans and programs of military assistance, including foreign military sales and cooperative logistics. It may also include the provision, as appropriate, of technical advice pertaining to weapons systems, tactics and doctrine, and information relative to logistics support; the provision of training and technical assistance by such means as mobile training teams and technical assistance teams; and the provision of any other assistance in the overall administration and implementation of the military assistance programs, as may be requested by proper authority. Major overseas commands are not in the chain of command established for military assistance matters.

c. Unified commands supervise the activities of MAAG's within their geographical area of
responsibility to include the provision of guidance for the MAAG's use in preparing the military
assistance grant aid and foreign military sales portions of security assistance programs. The
unified command must insure that US security assistance programs are correlated with military
plans.

d. The channel of communication on approved security assistance programs is between the
DSAA and the unified command. However, the DSAA is also authorized to communicate directly
with the MAAG's. The normal flow of military security assistance planning matters is from the field through the unified commands to the ASD/ISA(SA) where the planning is coordinated and finalized. Upon approval, the programs are implemented through the DSAA.

6-22. Military Assistance Advisory Groups
(MAAG's)
The MAAG within a host country is responsible for administering DOD-related security
assistance programs. Chapter 7 provides information concerning the functions and responsibilities of MAAG's.
HIGHLIGHTS

US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE INCLUDES

- DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE—ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DESIGNED TO PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION.
- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE—BASICALLY WELFARE AND EMERGENCY RELIEF DESIGNED TO ALLEVIATE HUMAN SUFFERING.
- SECURITY ASSISTANCE—MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE DESIGNED TO IMPROVE NATIONAL SECURITY.

THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS HAVE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE RESPONSIBILITIES

- DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
- NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
- UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
- AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
- DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
- DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
- US DIPLOMATIC MISSION

US SECURITY ASSISTANCE INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMS

- MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM [GRANT AID]
- FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
- EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES
- SECURITY SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE

TWO ADDITIONAL PROGRAMS, AUTHORIZED BY OTHER THAN SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION, THAT IMPACT ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE PLANNING AND PROGRAMS

- SHIP LOANS
- PUBLIC LAW 480

Figure 6-7. Highlights.
CHAPTER 7
US ARMY ADVISOR IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

Section I. INTRODUCTION

7-1. Purpose and Scope

a. This chapter provides information concerning the responsibilities and activities of military assistance advisory groups (MAAG), with particular emphasis on the joint and interdepartmental aspects of their operations. It presents guidance relative to the role and requirements of advisors in developing countries. In addition, significant documents which amplify the contents of this chapter are referenced in appendix A.

b. The participation of the US Army advisor in internal defense and development (IDAD) is considered within the context of his functions as a member of a MAAG and a key implementor of US military security assistance programs in developing countries. The advisor is viewed as operating primarily with the host country military at the host country national level. Guidance and doctrine for the US Army advisor at lower levels of host country military structure are contained in FM 31-73.

Section II. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS

7-2. General

a. Definition of a MAAG. The term "Military Assistance Advisory Group" encompasses joint US military advisory groups, joint US military groups, US military missions, US military advisory groups, US military groups, and US military representatives or other military organizations exercising responsibility for security assistance and other related Department of Defense matters with the host government to which they are accredited. Defense Attaché personnel are included when assigned to carry out security assistance responsibilities.

b. The MAAG as a Joint Organization. The MAAG is a joint group normally under the military command of the unified commander. The Chief, MAAG, is a member of the US country team (USCT) and represents the Secretary of Defense. He is responsible for keeping the ambassador informed, providing him advice on military security assistance matters and the military aspects of internal defense and development. The Chief, MAAG, is also responsible for insuring that military security assistance matters are coordinated with other US departmental representatives in the host country.

c. A Type MAAG Organization Structure. A MAAG is normally divided into Army, Navy, and Air Force sections, each of which is responsible for the accomplishment of its service portion of MAAG activities. In a large MAAG, there may be joint, general, and special staffs. If the MAAG has an operational or training mission, it will have advisors who advise host country counterparts on operational and training matters. Each MAAG must be tailored to the host country to which it is assigned. For this reason there is no standard MAAG organization. For purposes of illustration, the organization shown in figure 7-1 is representative of a MAAG organization.

7-3. MAAG Functions

a. General. The primary mission of the MAAG is to administer US military security assistance programs in the host country and, in an IDAD situation, to assist the host country armed forces with their IDAD programs and operations. In IDAD situations, chapters 4 and 5 provide doctrine for the US Army MAAG advisor on the US concept for host country IDAD planning, organization, operations, and campaigns.
Although MAAG missions vary according to existing host country requirements and US interests, they generally consist of advice and assistance concerning one or more of the following—

1. Resource management.
2. IDAD organization, plans, operations, and training.
3. Military educational programs.
4. Grant aid equipment, supplies, services, and training (including programming and monitoring responsibilities).
5. Planning and acquisition of US foreign military sales (FMS) materiel, services, and training to include assistance in actual negotiation as required.

b. Military Assistance Command. When US military security assistance includes sizeable US combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, a joint military assistance command may be established to assume the missions of the MAAG as well as the overall direction of US military operations.

c. Specific MAAG Functions. The chiefs of the MAAG's—

1. Serve as representatives of the Secretary of Defense for security assistance matters with the military officials of the host country to which the MAAG is accredited.
2. Establish and maintain liaison between the US Defense Establishment and that of the host country.
(3) Establish and maintain a relationship of mutual trust and confidence with the host country's military establishment.

(4) Under the supervision of the commander of the unified command, and consistent with the Total Force Concept, DOD policies, and country objectives and financial guidelines, develop security assistance plans and programs in coordination with the chief of the US diplomatic mission and other elements of the country team for submission to the unified command.

(5) Keep the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)), Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), JCS, unified commands, and military departments, as appropriate, informed of security assistance activities in country.

(6) Report on the utilization by the host country of defense articles and services provided as grant aid.

(7) Assist the host government in arranging for purchase of defense articles and services to meet valid country requirements through foreign military sales and commercial sales.

(8) Assist the DSAA and the military departments, as requested, in carrying out FMS negotiations with foreign governments.

(9) Cooperate with and assist representatives of US firms in the sale of US defense articles and services to meet valid country requirements.

(10) Assist US military departments and their subordinate elements in arranging for the receipt, transfer, and acceptance of security assistance materiel, training, and other services for recipient countries.

(11) Assist the host government in the identification, administration, and proper disposition of security assistance materiel that is excess to current needs, including the reporting of any dispositions made which are not in accordance with applicable understandings, agreements, and authorizations, and the unauthorized transfer of defense articles of US origin to third countries.

(12) Provide appropriate advisory services and technological assistance to the host country on security assistance matters. In developing nations, provide advisory services, technical assistance, and training to develop a realistic capability to plan, program, budget, and manage the military resources of the host country.

(13) When requested by appropriate authority, act as channel of communications for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) (ASD(I&L)) regarding production and other logistical matters between the United States and the government to which accredited.

(14) When requested by appropriate authority, act as channel of communications for the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DR&E), regarding research and development matters between the United States and the government to which accredited.

(15) Perform such other functions as may be set forth in the MAAG's particular terms of reference or otherwise directed by competent authority.

d. Documents Describing MAAG Responsibilities and Functions.

(1) DOD Directive 5132.3. This directive, titled Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance, provides broad DOD guidance as to the functions and responsibilities of the MAAG. It serves as the basic document from which the terms of reference and the joint manpower program are derived.

(2) Terms of reference. The chief of the MAAG receives minimum essential guidance governing the organization and operation of the MAAG in a document referred to as the terms of reference. The terms of reference are developed by the unified command, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Department of Defense (DOD), and include mission, command relationships, organization, administration, logistical support responsibilities, and functions of the MAAG. As roles and requirements change, additions or deletions are made to the terms of reference.

(3) Joint manpower program (JMP). The JMP includes MAAG missions, functions, organization, current and projected manpower needs, and, when applicable, required MAAG mobilization for a 5-year period. The JMP is prepared by the individual MAAG and, with DOD and JCS approval, represents the MAAG's evaluation of what functions must be performed and the manpower and military occupational specialties required to accomplish these functions. The joint table of distribution (JTD) for each MAAG reflects the current fiscal year of the JMP.

7-4. Integrated US Country Team Effort

a. Under the US National Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, the MAAG is given added emphasis as the principal agency through which the US military contributes to the capabilities and efficiency of the host country military forces for
participation in internal defense and development. The MAAG’s must seek and support integrated country team efforts to insure effective foreign internal defense forces. Only through this means can the number of diverse security assistance resources be fully coordinated for the benefit of the host country and US national interests.

b. Trends in US security assistance policy and guidance support the perspective of advisory assistance discussed above. These trends include an increasing emphasis on: US security interests and needs, indigenous initiative and self-help, integrated US Government departmental planning, more efficient use of US defense resources, and international and regional security arrangements. In addition, trends in US security assistance require MAAG’s to give added emphasis to assessing host country internal defense requirements and coordinating and integrating MAAG plans with those of other US Government agencies in support of unified US country team efforts. The need for the MAAG to have strategic planning and management capabilities is indicated by an emphasis on cost effective assistance, a shift from grant aid to FMS, short-range security assistance programs that clearly support specific US long-term objectives and strategies, and more efficient host country management of total defense resources.

7-5. Planning Requirements at the MAAG Level

a. Security Assistance Programs.

(1) Security assistance planning by the MAAG’s must be a continuous systematic process. The security assistance Program Objective Memorandum (POM), prepared annually by the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA) and approved by the Secretary of Defense in a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM), is the basic document for planning and programming military assistance grant aid, FMS credit, and excess defense articles.

(2) The planning period for security assistance encompasses a 5-year time span. A new POM submitted to the Secretary of Defense in June of each year addresses a 5-year planning period beginning 13 months later.

(3) The planning cycle for security assistance is an approximate 24-month period of time necessary to develop guidance, to plan responsive programs for the current planning period, and to obtain authorization and appropriations for the first year of a planning period (normally called budget year). Since a planning cycle extends beyond 12 months, key events of two or more cycles will be occurring at the same time. The planning cycle includes a number of key events involving the Congress, the Executive Branch, Department of State, Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified commands, and the MAAG’s. Only those events involving the unified commands and the MAAG’s are discussed below (fig 7-2). See chapter D, part I, Military Assistance and Sales Manual (MASM), for a more complete discussion.

(a) During September, the commanders of the unified commands provide recommendations for the Joint Strategic Objectives Plans (JSOP) (Volume II, Book VII, Free World Forces) on military security assistance programs and Free World objective levels within the criteria of reasonable attainability and prudent risk. The JSOP is strictly a US prepared document without specific host country consultation. However, this part of the JSOP is based on a continuing dialogue between country teams and host countries to develop plans and programs for types of assistance and mutual courses of action. When completed by JCS, this document serves as the basis for the US military position on security assistance.

(b) From January through March, the unified commands and MAAG’s develop the necessary input to JCS and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Security Assistance) for the Joint Force Memorandum (Support to Other Nations Annex) (JFM) and the POM. This input is based on the latest policy, planning, and programming guidance and is reflected in a recommended update to the POM. Current, detailed program data supporting the budget year are provided to the Director, DSAA. Issues which require presentation and/or resolution at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/JCS level are identified.

(c) In June the unified commands and MAAG’s receive the decisions of the Secretary of Defense on security assistance. These decisions reflected in the security assistance POM are provided to allow detailed program data to be adjusted for an up-to-date data base for interagency program review.

(d) In December the unified commands and MAAG’s receive the Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) baseline guidance. This document is prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Security Assistance) (OASD/ISA(SA)) and is based on the
UNIFIED COMMANDS/MAAGS

(1) SEPTEMBER
JSOP VOL II, BOOK VII, RECOMMENDATION

(2) JANUARY-MARCH
POM UPDATE

(3) SEPTEMBER
REVISE DETAILED PROGRAM DATA

(4) DECEMBER
REVISE DETAILED PROGRAM DATA

(5) JULY
FINAL PROGRAM REVISION IAW ADJUSTED DOLLAR CEILINGS

Figure 7-2. Security assistance planning cycle.

Presidential Budget Decision. Unified commands and MAAG's adjust data to reflect the Congressional Presentation Document baseline guidance and submit changes in accordance with chapter F, part II, MASM, to the Director, DSAA, in early January.

(e) The following July the programs, if approved and enacted, are available for funding allocations and implementation. At this time the MAAG's make a final revision of the programs to accommodate the country dollar ceilings as adjusted by DOD and DOS. When final congressional action has been long delayed, interim dollar ceilings may be established to assure that funding under Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) does not unduly prejudice final decisions later.

b. Support of other USCT agencies. The MAAG's should participate actively in joint planning with the other members of the country team as comments of the chief of the US diplomatic mission accompany all program recommendations forwarded by the MAAG. Their primary assistance to the country team comes in the preparation of the military portion of the country paper, an annual document which identifies interests and objectives and establishes priorities. Courses of action designed to achieve the objectives are spelled out, and issues are identified and discussed. Preparation of the country paper is the first step in the production of national policy papers referred to by several different titles. This executive paper provides the general policy framework for activities of all US Government agencies with respect to the country in question.

Section III. US ARMY ADVISOR

7-6. General
The advisor is first and foremost a representative of the United States in a foreign country. As a military representative, the advisor performs important security assistance functions in the execution of established US policies. US Army advisor functions are being oriented toward higher level joint and service host country staffs with the objectives of assisting and advising in the management of defense resources and the development and operation of a total national force. His functions and duty requirements often are quite different from those customarily performed by US military officers. Intercultural
communications are involved in the advisor-counterpart relationship, and US military advisors frequently find themselves dealing with counterparts of quite different cultural, educational, and military backgrounds. Problems and situations in any host country require resolution by means appropriate to the specific country. To enhance his effectiveness as an advisor and the consequent success of US military security assistance programs, he should be adaptable and competent in working with dynamically changing variables. The succeeding paragraphs will be devoted to a discussion of the advisor's relationship with the MAAG, the USCIT, and the host country military.

7-7. Relationships and Functions of the US Army Advisor

a. US Tri-Service Orientation. The US Army advisor will normally operate in a joint organization either as a member of the Army element or as a joint staff officer. As such, he requires an appreciation of the security assistance responsibilities and functions of the other services. He must be knowledgeable of the total scope of the MAAG operations in order to effectively present his service position and to integrate it with those of other services. This requirement becomes critical in the event a compromise tradeoff is necessary when planning for host country military development.

b. Relationships with US Country Team (USCIT). The US Army advisor will also find himself working and coordinating with civilian members of other USCIT agencies. It is especially important that the US Army advisor be knowledgeable of the functions, responsibilities, and capabilities of the other agencies of the USCIT as many of the host country activities cross the jurisdictional boundaries or responsibilities of the various USCIT members. At the same time, many of the activities of USCIT agencies (including the MAAG) often overlap and project into areas for which another USCIT agency has charter responsibility. The exact relationship between USCIT members will depend on the desires of the chief of the diplomatic mission. Integrated US country team planning requires the US Army advisor to coordinate his portion of the military assistance plan with other agencies of the USCIT. At times the advisor will have to act on his own initiative to seek out the other members of the USCIT for coordination. Whatever the situation, the chief of the MAAG normally obtains concurrence of the chief of the US diplomatic mission prior to MAAG personnel holding discussions with host country military authorities on substantive military security assistance issues. The MAAG maintains direct access to host country military officials on nonpolicy issues. Unresolved differences between the MAAG chief and the chief of the US diplomatic mission are referred through their separate channels to the commander of the unified command to the Secretary of Defense and to the Secretary of State. Some issues may go to the National Security Council (NSC) for resolution.

c. Relationship with Host Country Military.

1. The primary prerequisite for effectively advising a counterpart is an understanding of his sociological, psychological, and political makeup. Accomplishment of the MAAG mission is often more dependent upon positive personal relationships between US advisors and host country counterparts than upon formal agreements. Advice may be the least desired assistance offered by the MAAG's and only tolerated to obtain material and training assistance. Even when accepted, host country military leaders may not immediately act upon advice given by their US advisors. In times of crisis, regardless of how valid and logical the recommendations of US military advisors may be, the military leadership of most developing countries will act within the framework of its own sociopolitical culture and experience. Often, what may appear logical to the advisor may not appear logical or practical for political, cultural, or economic reasons to those he advises. Also, it may be that host country military leaders, while outwardly agreeing with the advisor on needed changes, may actually be undermining the accomplishment of reforms and attempting to preserve those traditions and practices from which they derive their power and influence.

2. US Army advisors may have limited influence in host country internal security matters. This may not be solely the result of the relationships with the host country counterparts, because the US Army's role in internal defense in a particular host country may be relatively minor in view of the overall US security assistance effort. There are some identifiable factors which are attributable to the peculiarities of the host country military. The military activities in developing nations are often determined more by political consideration than by military logic; and political objectives and constraints, rather than military operational capabilities and effectiveness, often dictate the roles, missions, and organizational strength and composition of host
country military and other security forces. A second point for consideration is threat perception. Many developing nations perceive the major threat to their national security as being external and, therefore, may tend to underestimate the seriousness of the internal insurgent threat. Consequently, many host country military forces may be primarily organized, trained, and equipped to meet an external threat. (3) The capability of the host country to plan for and manage their total defense resources is of primary concern to the advisor. The military of developing nations may not develop a capability to fully manage their defense establishments and resources if they continue to request US advisory assistance in areas where they have already achieved efficiency. Overreliance on US advisors tends to delay the self-sufficiency process. The attainment of self-sufficiency can be best accomplished through the training of key military personnel in resource management principles. While the scope of defense resource management differs according to size and sophistication of a country’s military establishment, certain basic principles are applicable to all and define the primary areas for providing training assistance.

HIGHLIGHTS

THE PRIMARY MISSIONS OF THE MAAGS ARE TO

- ADMINISTER US MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN THE HOST COUNTRY.
- ASSIST THE HOST COUNTRY ARMED FORCES IN THE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS.

DOCUMENTS DESCRIBING MAAG RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS

- DOD DIRECTIVE 5132.3 ON POLICY AND RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE
- TERMS OF REFERENCE
- JOINT MANPOWER PROGRAM
- JOINT TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION

THE US ARMY ADVISOR

- THE US ARMY ADVISOR WILL NORMALLY OPERATE IN A JOINT ORGANIZATION EITHER AS A MEMBER OF THE ARMY ELEMENT OR AS A JOINT STAFF OFFICER.
- THE FUNCTIONS AND DUTY REQUIREMENTS OF THE US ARMY ADVISOR ARE OFTEN QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE CUSTOMARILY PERFORMED BY US MILITARY OFFICERS.
- THE US ARMY ADVISOR MUST BE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE FUNCTIONS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND CAPABILITIES OF OTHER AGENCIES OF THE USCT.
- THE PRIMARY PREREQUISITE FOR EFFECTIVELY ADVISING A COUNTERPART IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF HIS SOCIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL MAKEUP.
- US ARMY ADVISORS MAY HAVE LIMITED INFLUENCE IN HOST COUNTRY INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS.
- THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOST COUNTRY MILITARY TO PLAN FOR AND MANAGE THEIR TOTAL DEFENSE RESOURCES IS OF PRIMARY CONCERN TO THE ADVISOR.

Figure 7-3. Highlights.
These areas are defined as those methods and procedures used in the host country's defense establishment that deal with resources (manpower, money, property, weapons, equipment, services, and materials) and the actions involved in management of such resources (planning, budgeting, acquisition, use, consumption, storage, and disposition). A definitive discussion of these functional areas is contained in chapter E, part II, MASM.

7-8. Advisor Requirements

a. General. The military advisor needs a wide array of skills in view of the diversity of activities encompassed in security assistance operations and the requirements of coping with different cultures. He must have a broad educational foundation that will permit him to fully understand his own social system as a means to a better appreciation of the social systems of developing nations. Geographic and cultural area study programs can contribute to an understanding of the particular society in which the advisor will be working. Language training is of major importance when face-to-face contact is a significant part of the advisor's assignment. The DOD system for training of advisors is designed to provide the specialized education necessary for assignment to developing nations.

b. Selection and Training. The selection and training of security assistance personnel is specifically delineated in DOD Directive 2000.10, Selection and Training of Security Assistance Personnel. Two Army career specialty programs, the Foreign Area Officer Program (FAOP) and the Logistical Officer Program (LOP), provide a means for procuring and training specially qualified personnel for worldwide security assistance positions. US Army advisors although normally coming from one of these specialty programs may be selected from other fully qualified individuals. Phased training is provided for the advisor. It consists of preparatory and MAAG-related training under the control of the furnishing service, orientation in Washington sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for selected key MAAG personnel, and regional and country orientation as deemed necessary by the unified commander.
CHAPTER 8
US ARMY FORCES IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

Section I. INTRODUCTION

8-1. Purpose and Scope
This chapter provides information and doctrine concerning the employment of US Army forces in internal defense and development (IDAD). It includes the legal aspects of US Army forces participation; the overall responsibilities of the US Army in IDAD; the three tiers of US Army forces upon which unified commands and Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) can draw to support host country IDAD; and considerations for US commanders and staff officers when planning the employment of US Army forces in IDAD activities.

8-2. Legal Aspects

a. General. US commanders, senior advisors, and their subordinates should be familiar with the legal basis for their presence in a foreign country for the purpose of assisting its government and armed forces. At the very least, the basic rules of international law and domestic law that authorize these operations and the major restrictions imposed upon them by law should be understood. Three bodies of law are relevant to the conduct of US Army operations in IDAD: international law, consisting of customs, international agreements, and general principles recognized by civilized nations; United States law; and the law of the host country. Collectively, these laws regulate the status and activities of the armed forces engaged in such operations. Should questions arise concerning law, the Staff Judge Advocate or other official legal advisor should be consulted.

b. International Law. The rules of international law applicable to US, Allied, and host country forces can be found in the writings of experts, international agreements, and judicial decisions. International agreements are the most important source. These prescribe most of the reciprocal rights, powers, duties, privileges, and immunities of the US Armed Forces stationed abroad and of the governments of the host and allied countries and their respective armed forces. They also regulate, to some extent, the relationship between the opposing parties in internal conflicts. In this realm, the international agreements that regulate the status or activities of US forces offer the best guidance. These agreements are of three general types: MAAG agreements, mission agreements, and status of forces agreements. The US Army is committed to conduct internal security operations in accordance with the applicable provisions of international law of war, including those of the Geneva Convention of 1949 and others set forth in FM 27-10, and DA Pam 27-1.

c. United States Law. United States law—as expressed in statutes, executive orders, Department of Defense directives and instructions, Army regulations, directives and regulations issued by the unified command and by the Army component command—is applicable to US forces in the host country. Areas such as military justice, the control of public funds, the procurement of supplies, and the disposition of property continue to be regulated by US domestic law. Copies of publications containing applicable US laws should be on file at the headquarters of the military assistance organization in the host country.

d. Host Country Law. The law of the host country establishes the rules under which IDAD is to be conducted. This body of law emanates from the various levels of government and from the agencies functioning at each echelon. The host country laws governing the employment of labor, currency, foreign exchange transactions, the separation of powers, local purchases, judicial procedures, control of the populace and resources, and emergency legislation in general are of major importance and must be understood by US advisors, commanders, and staff officers. Detailed guidance in this area normally is obtainable through the local US consul, a legal advisor or local attorney employed by the US diplomatic mission, or a judge advocate.

e. Claims Administration. Activities of US Army personnel serving in allied countries will

8-1
occasionally result in personal injuries, deaths, and property losses to other individuals and entities. Also, US armed forces personnel may be injured and their property, or that of the US Government, may be damaged under such circumstances. Claims against the United States which arise in foreign countries are settled under a variety of statutes implemented by AR 27-20. These claims statutes are the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees Claims Act of 1964, the Foreign Claims Act, the Military Claims Act, and the Non-Scope of Employment Claims Act. Also, many claims which arise in foreign countries are settled under a Status of Forces Agreement. Article VIII of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement, for example, provides for the settlement of claims arising out of NATO operations. Claims in favor of the United States are settled under either the Federal Claims Collection Act of 1966 or the Medical Care Recovery Act, both of which are implemented by AR 27-40.

8-3. The Army's Role in IDAD

a. The Army has been assigned a major role in providing military assistance to selected allied nations in support of US national interests. Initially the assistance provided may consist of training, advice, and materiel assistance. When required and deemed appropriate, the assistance may include provision of backup logistical support and sea and air combat support. In some special cases, it may include ground combat support as well. The degree of participation by US Army units will be determined by US policy, US interests, and analysis of the insurgent threat, and the capabilities and desires of the host country government.

b. Responsibilities of the US Army in IDAD include—

(1) Providing military assistance in conjunction with the Navy and Air Force to designated friendly countries.
(2) Developing language-trained and area-oriented Army forces and personnel as necessary to train, advise, or assist indigenous forces.
(3) Acting as the executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for civil affairs planning.
(4) Conducting research and development activities in support of internal defense and internal development to include psychological operations and civil affairs within its area of responsibility.
(5) Conducting intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
(6) Developing, in coordination with other services, the doctrine, tactics, procedures, techniques, and equipment to be used by Army and Marine Corps ground forces, except for those used in amphibious operations.
(7) Participating with the other services in joint internal defense training and exercises as mutually agreed by the services concerned.
(8) Being prepared to provide mobile training teams, combat service support, combat support, and combat units.

c. The Army provides support to the internal defense and development effort of other US governmental agencies by—

(1) Administering Army aspects of security assistance.
(2) Participating in the development of joint plans.
(3) Supporting the State Department Cultural Exchange Program by exchange of US and foreign military personnel for visits, training, and education.
(4) Supporting the United States Information Agency (USIA) through direct liaison at national and field levels. The Army provides timely information to USIA on Army matters which will have an impact on foreign nationals. Army psychological operations personnel may operate with USIA posts at regional level and, in certain cases, assist in the development and conduct of psychological operations.
(5) Maintaining facilities to conduct instruction and professional training in civil-military operations, psychological operations, medical support, engineering, communications, and civil affairs.
(6) Supporting the Agency for International Development (AID) through direct liaison at national and field level. Army personnel support AID operations by administering Army aspects of security assistance that impact on military/civil action and military and paramilitary activities.
(7) Supporting other US agencies when directed.

Section II. UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES

8-4. Tiers of Forces

In addition to the members of the MAAG in a host country, the US Army has three tiers of forces upon which the commanders of unified
commands and the chiefs of military assistance advisory groups (MAAG's) can draw to support IDAD. In most cases, the US elements described below will be employed to advise and train host country forces, although elements can also provide combat support and assistance to these forces.

a. The first tier consists of US Army Security Assistance Forces (SAF) organized by the Army to support commanders of unified commands. The SAF is a specially trained, area-oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force that is available to the commander of a unified command for the support of operations in situations short of open hostilities and in limited and general war. SAF organizations may vary in size and capabilities according to theater requirements. This force may be strategically located and can provide skilled and readily available mobile training teams to assist a MAAG in its training requirements. Paragraph 8-6 contains additional information on the SAF.

b. The second tier is drawn from overseas-based general purpose TOE units that are designated as brigade-size backup forces. These may include forces consisting of infantry, armor, armored cavalry, artillery, engineer, psychological operations, signal, civil affairs, intelligence, military police, aviation, Army Security Agency, medical, and other essential support units, designated as backup forces for the SAF. These backup forces should be partially language qualified, area oriented, and trained in IDAD. These backup forces can provide mobile training teams and operational units of sizes and capabilities consistent with mission requirements. Generally, their elements are committed when requested by the MAAG and the capabilities of the SAF have been exceeded by the requirements of the country concerned. Paragraph 8-8 provides additional information on backup forces.

c. The third tier consists of CONUS-based general purpose forces. In consonance with contingency planning, area-oriented brigade-size backup forces that are trained for IDAD are designated for employment in specific areas of the world. The third tier satisfies requirements that exceed those of the first and second tiers.

8-5. Mobile Training Teams (MTT)
Mobile training teams are provided to fill training requirements beyond the capability of the in-country military assistance organization, and for which, under the circumstances, it is more expeditious, practical, and economic to bring the

instruction to the country. AR 550-50 contains detailed information on MTT's.

a. The purpose of MTT's is to provide the host country a self-training capability in a particular skill. This is accomplished by training selected personnel of the host country which will then in turn constitute an instructional base for continuing the training.

b. MTT's are not programmed for periods in excess of six months.

c. The MTT will be tailored to provide it with the specific capabilities required for its mission. Under most circumstances, the MTT will operate directly under the operational control of a MAAG. A specific command and control element can be included in the MTT when required by the mission.

d. The MTT mission is a normal function of a SAF when it is assigned to a unified command. When requirements are beyond the SAF's capabilities an MTT would be constituted from general purpose forces within the unified command.

8-6. Security Assistance Forces (SAF)
The SAF is a composite organization of units organized under a Special Forces group headquarters. Each SAF is structured to meet the requirements of the command to which it is assigned. The organizational structure is based on the concept of employing MTT's and small detachments to fulfill specific mission requests in a specified time period. The flexibility of organization and the wide range of skills available in the SAF provide the Army with forces to temporarily expand the capability of the MAAG whose mission is the provision of military assistance for IDAD. Detailed information about the SAF elements is provided in the appropriate TOE.

a. The SAF normally consists of a Special Forces group as the nucleus and is usually augmented with civil affairs, psychological operations, engineer, medical, intelligence, military police, and Army Security Agency units. Elements of the SAF can provide, on a small scale, a wide range of advice and assistance on IDAD activities and techniques (fig 8-1).

b. The mission of the SAF in IDAD is to assist MAAG's by providing training, operational advice, and assistance to host country forces.

c. As early as possible, the SAF commander should be requested to assist in preparing for the employment of the SAF or elements of the force. Visits to the host country by SAF representatives
before deployment will be beneficial and should be requested whenever possible. The MAAG requesting the unified command to employ elements of the SAF must consider the anticipated mission, organization, concept of operations, control, and logistical support, including personal services available in the host country, in order to adequately prepare the force and insure its success upon arrival in-country. In most cases, the resources available to the MAAG will be adequate to support small elements of the SAF in requirements for medical, dental, legal, postal, finance, exchange, commissary, and other services normally available through US military or civilian agencies. Transportation and maintenance requirements must be considered. Host country transportation resources may be available and adequate. The use of in-country resources is preferable to establishing additional US support activities for short-term operations.

**d. Within the SAF**, the organization of the Special Forces group provides a command and control system that facilitates administration, logistical support, and operational control of deployed elements. In addition to the group headquarters staff, the Special Forces battalions and companies have unit staffs that can be deployed to serve as command and control elements. When augmented, these unit staffs can provide limited administrative and logistical support for deployed operational detachments.

**8-7. Elements of the SAF**
The commander and the staff of the Special Forces group functions as the commander and the staff of the SAF. The Special Forces group staff includes a civil-military operations (CMO) officer, who has staff responsibility for civil affairs and psychological operations. Special staff elements include a surgeon, staff judge advocate, communications-electronics officer, engineer, controller, and a chaplain. Military police and other organizations also provide special staff officers when assigned or attached to the SAF.

**a. Airborne Special Forces Group** (fig 8-2).

(1) The airborne Special Forces group is organized under TOE 31-101. Major elements are a headquarters and headquarters company, a signal company, a service company, and three Special Forces battalions. The Special Forces battalions consist of a headquarters and headquarters detachment and three Special Forces companies, each company composed of a company headquarters and six operational detachments. The service company consists of a headquarters section, an aviation platoon, medical platoon, administrative services platoon, and a logistics platoon. The signal company has a company headquarters, two base operations platoons, a communications support platoon, an electronic maintenance section, and a photo section (fig 8-2).

(2) The Special Forces group provides the following capabilities for IDAD—

(a) Mobile training teams and operational detachments, which may be deployed to meet the requirements of a MAAG or a military assistance command.

(b) A system of command and control of deployed elements of the SAF when required.

(c) Limited administrative and logistical support for deployed elements of the SAF when required.

(d) A Special Forces operational base (SFOB) and advanced alternate or separate operational bases when major elements of the SAF are deployed.

(3) Outside the United States, the Special Forces group is assigned to the major US Army
Figure 8-2. Airborne Special Forces group.
command and is under the operational control of
the overseas unified command. CONUS-based
Special Forces groups are assigned to US
FORSCOM and when required will be under the
operational command of a US-based unified
command. Whether operating as a separate
organization or as the major element of a
designated SAF, the group trains its detach-
ments to meet area requirements for MTT's.
Detachments, mobile training teams, and
command and control elements are placed un-
der the operational control of the Chief, MAAG,
when deployed to the host country. Mission
requirements vary from assistance by individual
advisors to the support and assistance from an
entire Special Forces group. See FM 31-21 for
document for Special Forces operations.

b. Civil Affairs. The civil affairs unit of the
SAF provides professional and technical
assistance and advice to US and indigenous
officials, agencies, and military forces to
strengthen the host country's social, economic,
and political posture.

(1) The civil affairs unit is structured ac-
cording to the requirements of the SAF. It can
range in size from a platoon to a battalion with
appropriate headquarters and staff elements and
functional teams drawn from TOE 41-500. As an
example, a civil affairs company can be organized
with a company headquarters, one to ten platoon
headquarters, and the required number of
language and functional teams to operate in the
four broad functional categories of government,
economics, public facilities, and special functions.
A civil affairs company may be structured to
provide any of the following skills:

(a) Economics.
(b) Agriculture.
(c) Public health.
(d) Public welfare.
(e) Public education.
(f) Labor.
(g) Public communications.
(h) Public works and utilities.
(i) Public transportation.
(j) Public finance.
(k) Public safety.
(l) Public administration.
(m) Civil information.
(n) Property control.
(o) Civilian supply.
(p) Civil defense.
(q) Legal.
(r) Religious relations.
(s) Displaced persons, evacuees, and
refugees.

(t) Arts, monuments, and archives.
(2) The civil affairs unit can—
(a) Provide mobile training teams, in-
dividuals, or functional teams to support the
activities of other SAF elements or MAAG's.
(b) Provide assistance in preparing area
studies and surveys.
(c) Analyze conditions to determine the
basic causes of insurgency and recommend action
to reduce or eliminate these causes.
(3) The civil affairs unit supports the
missions of the SAF. Its platoons, functional
teams, and individuals can be attached to other
elements of the SAF, MAAG's, or other US
headquarters to support indigenous military
forces in IDAD. See FM 41-10 for doctrine for
civil affairs operations.

c. Psychological Operations. The
psychological operations unit provides training,
advice, and operational assistance to other SAF
elements and indigenous military forces to
strengthen the host country's psychological
operations (PSYOP) programs. It can also assist
a MAAG or US civil agency in the host country.

(1) Specific organizations and numbers of
teams are determined by the requirement of the
area of operations. As an example, a company
may include functional teams drawn from TOE
33-500 and consist of elements for command and
control, operations, supply, liaison, and a number
of control and operational teams suitable for
mobile training team employment. Mobile
training and operational teams are tailored to
meet the specific SAF mission requirements.
(2) The psychological operations unit can
provide mobile training teams, individuals, or
operational teams to support the PSYOP ac-
tivities of other SAF elements or MAAG's. It
also can provide training, advice, assistance, and
support to indigenous forces and civil agencies
engaged in PSYOP programs.
(3) The psychological operations unit sup-
ports SAF missions. Its platoons, operational
teams, and individuals can be attached to SAF
elements, MAAG's, or other US headquarters.
Support to indigenous military forces engaged in
IDAD may include training, assistance, and
advice in all aspects of PSYOP. See FM 33-1 and
chapter 11, FM 33-5, for PSYOP doctrine,
techniques, and procedures.

d. Medical Detachment. The medical detac-
hemt of the SAF is a composite unit which
provides mobile medical advisory support teams
to advise, train, and assist indigenous military
forces of a host country with medical programs.
Particular emphasis is placed on the development
of military civic action projects. The detachment provides unit-level medical support for US personnel deployed with other elements of the SAF.

(1) The detachment may contain appropriate functional teams drawn from TOE 8-600 and 8-620. One type of detachment has three medical control teams (team AL) consisting of one Medical Corps officer each and up to 27 medical advisory support teams (team OL) with a chief medical NCO, a medical operations and training NCO, a preventive medicine NCO, and an X-ray specialist. The senior officer of the medical control teams commands the provisional detachment when the SAF is deployed as an entity or in garrison before deployment.

2) The detachment can—
   (a) Provide mobile medical advisory teams to advise, train, and assist indigenous military, paramilitary forces, and local civilians in medical treatment and preventive medicine procedures.
   (b) Establish health service clinics to provide limited medical treatment to indigenous civilians as part of the coordinated civil affairs program and train civilian or paramilitary personnel to maintain and staff clinics.
   (c) Provide unit-level medical support to other deployed elements of the SAF.

3) The medical detachment, with its flexible organization, supports the missions of the SAF. Its command and control teams, medical advisory support teams, or individuals can be attached to SAF and MAAG elements or to other US headquarters. Support to indigenous military forces, paramilitary forces, or civilian medical programs consists of training, advice, assistance, and support of military civic action projects. See FM 8-10 for medical support doctrine.

e. Engineer Detachment. The engineer detachment provides planning, coordination, advisory assistance, and operational support for engineer aspects of SAF missions. It provides advice, assistance, and operational support to indigenous forces and other SAF elements.

(1) The detachment consists of engineer civic action teams drawn from TOE 5-560. Team KA, Engineer Civic Action Headquarters; Teams KB, Engineer Civic Action Control; and Teams KC, Engineer Civic Action Advisory, are assigned on the basis of area of operations requirements. Mobile training teams and command, control, and support elements are tailored to meet the specific requirements of SAF missions.

(2) The engineer detachment can—
   (a) Provide engineer staff personnel for the
on police intelligence and populace and resources control operations. FM 19-50 contains IDAD doctrine for military police.

g. Military Intelligence Detachment. The military intelligence detachment provides planning, coordination, advisory assistance, and operational support for intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of SAF missions. It also supports the psychological operations and civil affairs aspects of SAF missions. The detachment can assist a MAAG in coordinating activities with host country intelligence agencies.

(1) The military intelligence detachment consists of a headquarters and teams drawn from TOE 30-600. In addition to its headquarters, a detachment could include order of battle, collection, counterintelligence, imagery interpretation, and interrogation teams. Mobile training teams and operational teams are tailored to meet specific mission and operational requirements of the SAF.

(2) The military intelligence detachment can—

(a) Provide staff planning, advice, and assistance to the SAF and to deployed elements of the SAF.

(b) Provide training, advice, and assistance to indigenous military intelligence and counterintelligence units.

(c) Provide coordination and liaison for intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

(3) The military intelligence detachment supports the SAF missions. Its teams or individual personnel are attached to SAF or MAAG elements or to other US headquarters. Elements of the detachment can be deployed to provide staff planning, coordination, or training, advice, and assistance to indigenous forces engaged in intelligence operations. FM 30-31 and FM 30-18 contain doctrine for intelligence aspects of IDAD operations.

h. US Army Security Agency (USASA) Special Operations Detachment (SOD) (Abn). The USASA SOD supports the missions of the SAF by providing assistance in those areas of primary interest to USASA. It will support the activities of other deployed elements of the SAF, MAAG's, or other US headquarters. It provides, when specifically approved by DA or DOD, training, advice, and operational assistance to specific military forces.

(1) The USASA SOD (Abn) consists of a headquarters and control team, two Teams B, and four operational Teams A. The SOD's, as organized, represent a basic element that may require augmentation to meet specific operational requirements of the area of operations.

(2) The USASA SOD can—

(a) Conduct USASA operations in support of the SAF, deployed elements of the SAF, or MAAG's.

(b) Conduct specific USASA functions, when approved by DA or DOD, as part of the DOD authorized program of security assistance.

(c) Maintain limited communications with other USASA units, facilities, and capabilities external to the SAF, to facilitate mutual support, as required.

(3) Operational control of USASA SOD detachments is through the commander of the SAF. The stringent security regulations which govern the conduct of USASA security assistance activities also govern all planning for these activities. Use of the SAF SOD in security assistance programming must be approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. The detachment commander or other designated ASA officer can serve as the USASA staff officer for the SAF, MAAG, or other US headquarters. Teams are best suited for employment on most missions by combining one B team and two A teams. In some circumstances, a single team or individual personnel may be deployed. FM 32-10 provides doctrine for USASA employment.

8-8. Brigade-Size Backup Forces (fig 8-3)

In IDAD, the infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, and airborne brigades can be employed as operational elements in conjunction with the SAF. With appropriate reinforcing combat, combat support, and combat service support units, they can be employed as an independent or semi-independent force or in an advisory and training role. When designated as a backup force, these brigades should become area oriented and partially language qualified. A brigade organization is shown in figure 8-3. Within each brigade organization there should be specially trained units which can provide MTT's as a provisional SAF backup force. The organizational structure of mobile training teams in this provisional backup force, when augmented, closely parallels that of the SAF.

a. Command and Control of Elements.

(1) General. Brigade-size backup forces can be committed to an operational area when the capabilities of the SAF or MAAG have been exceeded. Under certain circumstances, the entire provisional brigade backup force can be com-
Figure 8-3. Type brigade-size backup force.
mitted and operated as a SAF task force. In most cases, however, the brigade will provide units and mobile training teams for attachment to the MAAG or the SAF elements operating within a host country.

(2) Communications. Communications support for the brigade backup force employed in an advisory and training role can be provided by either a signal support company (TOE 11-117) or by a combination of cellular teams from TOE 11-500.


(1) Infantry mobile training teams.
   (a) The infantry MTT can provide training, advice, and assistance in infantry tactics and the use of infantry weapons for host country small units up through battalion level. Training, advice, and assistance, emphasize counterguerrilla tactical operations. The team may be placed under the operational control of a MAAG advisory detachment if appropriate. The team can provide limited advice and assistance on military civic actions.
   (b) The combat support company can organize weapons training teams similar to rifle company teams. The composition of the teams will depend on the type of weapons available in the host country.

(2) Field artillery mobile training teams. The field artillery MTT’s are constituted from the 105mm direct support field artillery battalion. These teams can provide training, advice, and operational assistance in the tactics and techniques of employment of light artillery and associated functions such as survey and target acquisition, and limited advice on military civic action. They are under the operational control of a MAAG advisory detachment training indigenous forces.

(3) Armored cavalry mobile training teams. The armored cavalry MTT provides training, advice, and operational assistance to indigenous troop-size units in the tactics and techniques of the employment of tanks and scout vehicles against guerrillas. Training and advice emphasize employment in both offensive and security roles. The team provides limited advice on military civic action projects.

(4) Aviation component. The brigade’s aviation component provides the backup force with necessary airlift to support its activities when deployed as an entity. The organization should include sufficient specialized personnel and equipment to sustain an organizational aircraft maintenance capability. The primary mission of the aviation component is to provide administrative and logistical support to the widely dispersed mobile training teams. On a limited basis, personnel, aircraft, and equipment are employed to train indigenous units and to support psychological operations and military civic action projects.

(5) Engineer component. The engineer company, division engineer battalion, provides the capabilities required to support a SAF or provisional brigade backup force. It can provide training and operational assistance to indigenous military and paramilitary forces. The company also can provide combat support to indigenous military and paramilitary forces. The company may also be engaged in IDAD. It can also support military civic action programs involving the construction of projects. When supporting the country’s civic action program, its efforts will be closely coordinated with USAID and host country personnel.

(6) Military police component. A military police element from the MP company is tailored to meet the requirements of the provisional backup force. With the same special training, personnel of this element can be organized into MTT’s to train and advise indigenous military and paramilitary police in riot control, area control, and police public relations including civic action, police intelligence, physical security, and general investigation.

(7) Medical component. A medical element from the division medical battalion is tailored to meet the requirements of the provisional backup force. With some special training, this element can be organized into MTT’s to provide training and advice to indigenous military forces and assist with military civic action programs.

(8) Signal component. The brigade’s communications resources (organic signal platoon plus TOE 11-117 or TOE 11-500 augmentation) can provide, on a limited basis, training assistance and operational support to indigenous military and paramilitary forces. Additional signal advisory support can be provided by cellular teams from TOE 11-500 (teams UA through UF).

c. Augmentation Units. Overseas unified commands and USFORSCOM provide military intelligence, civil affairs, and psychological operations elements as required. The CG, USASA, provides Army Security Agency resources to augment the capabilities of the provisional brigade-size backup force as required. Skills required in these units are not available in the infantry or airborne division. Such units should have capabilities corresponding to like units in the SAF.
8-9. General

a. The primary purpose of US Army assistance in IDAD is to increase the capabilities and efficiency of host country armed forces in IDAD operations. This purpose is normally achieved through the use of US Army advisors who are members of a MAAG (the responsibilities and functions of US Army MAAG advisors are provided in chapter 7). However, overall US assistance can be viewed as a system wherein the extent of US involvement will be commensurate with the magnitude and form of the threat to our allies while simultaneously being wholly consistent with the level of US interest. US Army assistance may consist of providing equipment, training, and advice; mobile training teams; combat service support; combat support; and finally intervention with ground combat forces. US policy places emphasis on host countries providing the manpower necessary for their own defense. However, if US combat forces are employed in IDAD, the missions assigned the forces should be oriented toward security and tactical operations. Indigenous combat forces should be utilized in support of consolidation campaigns and urban operations which are highly politicized and involve direct contact with the populace.

b. US Army forces accomplish their IDAD missions through the employment of six major IDAD operations: advisory assistance, intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, populace and resources control, and tactical operations. These operations are similar to those listed for host country armed forces in chapter 5. For the US Army, the term "civil-military operations" includes psychological operations and civil affairs activities of US Army units. The information and doctrine provided in chapter 5 on host country armed forces IDAD operations are generally applicable to US Army forces. However, since the security of a nation is primarily the responsibility of its own armed forces, the scope of US Army operations may not be as broad as that of the host-nation's armed forces. Because US Army IDAD operations take place in a foreign environment and in support of a host nation and its armed forces, there are certain factors (peculiar to US forces activities) that need to be considered and emphasized by US commanders and staff officers when planning IDAD operations. This section outlines planning and coordinating considerations applicable to IDAD operations conducted by US Army forces.

8-10. Advisory Assistance

Within the Department of Defense, the principal element charged with providing advisory assistance is the MAAG. When US Army combat, combat support, and combat service support units are employed in an IDAD situation, certain elements of these units may also have the mission of providing advice and assistance to host country security forces. The responsibilities and functions of the US Army advisor are provided in chapter 7 and FM 31-73.

8-11. Intelligence

The principles outlined in paragraph 5-4 concerning host country intelligence activities generally apply to US forces employed in support of host country IDAD. Intelligence provides the basis upon which US and host country forces plan all IDAD operations. The nature and extent of US Army participation in an IDAD intelligence system is dependent upon the level of support being provided by US military forces.

a. When the intelligence effort in a host nation has sufficient US participation to be considered a combined activity (i.e., US elements have an operational mission), the management of the activity can also be handled on a combined basis with objectives and procedures developed by common agreement. Combined military intelligence operations facilitate the quick establishment of effective collection and production capabilities. Whereas the host country contributions are detailed area and language knowledge and accessibility to all levels of society, US Army intelligence can provide professional and technical expertise as well as managerial talent and advice.

b. There are usually some unilateral intelligence requirements imposed on both US and host country intelligence personnel. When time and subject matter permit, the combined intelligence resources should be drawn upon in meeting these requirements; however, there may be times when mutual effort will be impossible, as in the case of independent estimates or when contingency planning is required by the respective national authorities. In such cases, independent US or host country action will be required.

c. The US and host country intelligence operations should be coordinated in detail to determine mutual long-range objectives and basic organizational and operational procedures and policies required. Combined US/host country
planning is the key to progress in the development of in-country capabilities. Care must be taken to see that the intelligence and security resources of both the United States and the host country are employed effectively and efficiently. There should be no unnecessary competition or duplication of effort between the various echelons and agencies involved. US participation in national and subnational coordination centers assists in developing coordinated and combined host country/US intelligence programs.

d. US Army tactical units introduced into a country where a combined host country/US intelligence system is already developed work with the area intelligence elements on a mutual support basis. Where US tactical forces are deployed in such a manner that they are subject to frequent and sudden change of locations, they should not be given responsibility for long-term area oriented intelligence programs. However, they may contribute significantly to short-term collection and production efforts in support of area coordination center intelligence programs.

8-12. Civil-Military Operations

Civil-military operations are the complex of activities (political, economic, social, and psychological) in support of military operations embracing the relationship between US military forces and civilian authorities and population; and the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile foreign groups. The primary purpose of civil-military operations is to support the military commander during both conflict and nonconflict situations. Two major activities comprising civil-military operations are psychological operations and civil affairs. When US combat, combat support, and combat service support units are employed in an IDAD situation, civil affairs and psychological operations units are normally employed to support the operations of the US forces. US commanders and staff officers must recognize that the activities, combat or noncombat, of all US military personnel and units have civil-military operations implications. Staff responsibility for civil-military operations in US Army units is assigned to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Civil-Military Operations, or to the S5, Civil-Military Operations Staff Officer. Paragraph 4-9, FM 101-5, provides a detailed description of G5 responsibilities.


(1) Although the doctrine outlined in paragraph 5-5 is oriented toward host country PSYOP, it is generally applicable to the planning and conduct of PSYOP by US forces in IDAD. Chapter 8, FM 33-1, also provides PSYOP doctrine for US Army advisors and units employed in IDAD situations.

(2) The overall PSYOP policy and program in a host country is established and coordinated at national level. This program provides the general guidelines within which lower military and civilian echelons plan and conduct PSYOP. US Army units should insure that their PSYOP is in consonance with, and supports, US national objectives, the host country national PSYOP program, and the programs of the political subdivisions within which they are operating. Coordination of PSYOP—both US and host country—is made through appropriate area coordination centers.

(3) Host country PSYOP objectives, target audiences, and priorities may not be totally appropriate for US PSYOP. For example, a host country may list its own armed forces as the primary target audience, while US military PSYOP may consider the civilian population or the enemy forces as the principal audience. In general, however, US PSYOP should be in line with the host country PSYOP program.

(4) US units usually rely on host country personnel to assist in the development of PSYOP intelligence, themes, message content, and illustrations because US Army personnel normally do not have the required in-depth knowledge of the target audiences and the language. At the same time, host country PSYOP personnel often rely on the planning and technical expertise of US Army personnel.

(5) US commanders and staff officers should realize that any military action may have psychological implications—may influence the attitudes and behavior of target audiences. During the planning of IDAD activities of US forces, the PSYOP staff officer should be included in all planning so he can advise the commander and other staff officers as to the psychological effects of the operations and how PSYOP can be integrated to increase the effectiveness of the operations.

b. Civil Affairs. The applicability of the civil affairs doctrine, as expressed in paragraph 5-6 for host country forces, to the IDAD operations of US Army forces depends on the extent of US participation in these activities. The scope of host country military civil affairs will normally be much broader than the civil affairs activities of US forces.

(1) The responsibility of US commanders in
regard to maintenance of civil affairs capabilities in their units is outlined in Army Regulation 350-25. This regulation surfaces three capabilities which US commanders must develop and maintain: a favorable relationship between the individual soldiers and all civilians, an efficient civil affairs staff element to supervise command civil affairs, and the capability of subordinate units to carry out the commander’s responsibilities in regard to civilians.

(2) In IDAD situations, US civil-military operations staff officers are required at all levels from battalion upward. The CMO or G5/S5 staff officer is charged with coordinating all civil affairs and PSYOP activities. If a commander is not provided with specialist civil affairs elements, he must discharge his responsibilities within the resources available.

(3) Normally, civil affairs operations at the US tactical command level will, by operational necessity, be interim and minimal in nature to meet only the commander’s moral and legal responsibilities to civilians. Activities involving greater permanency should be exercised by host country organizations or by US civil affairs units outside the US tactical command. In determining civil affairs functional requirements of the US tactical commander, his operational mission must be weighed against his actual responsibilities to the civilians.

(4) Military civic action projects sponsored by US Army units should support national and subnational development programs and objectives and assist in gaining active support of the population for host country and US military operations. All US-sponsored civic action projects should be coordinated with the area coordination centers of the political subdivisions in which the projects will be carried out.

(5) Participation of US forces in civic action should place emphasis on assisting and working through host country organizations to convey the impression that the host country government is mainly responsible for the projects. This approach also improves the government’s capabilities to plan and carry out these type activities.

8-13. Populace and Resources Control
Paragraph 5-7 provides information and doctrine concerning host country populace and resources control operations. The doctrine also applies to US forces when they participate in these type operations. However, the enforcement of control measures on a nation’s population should be performed, to the extent possible, by host country agencies; therefore, the populace and resources control activities of US forces will normally be limited to a narrow scope.

a. Population and resources control operations are primarily a host country police responsibility. These operations involve the enforcement of control measures on the population. Since the civilian communities usually have some form of law and order, a logical approach is to build on the law enforcement system already available—the civil police. In some developing countries, paramilitary forces may be used to assist civil police in populace and resources control operations. The use of paramilitary forces provides for participation by the local population, thereby making these type operations more of a local affair than one of interference by outsiders.

b. When insurgent activities exceed the capabilities of the police and their supporting paramilitary forces, host country regular military forces may be required to augment the police. Because control measures are usually more acceptable to a population when enforced by host country personnel rather than the forces of an outside nation, US forces will normally participate in populace and resources control operations only when the situation is clearly beyond the capabilities of the nation’s security forces and US assistance is requested.

c. In those cases when US forces are required to participate in populace and resources control, their activities may range from minor support in the countryside to complete control in US bases and their immediate vicinity. When assistance by US forces is required, it should be oriented toward providing tactical and area security for the populace and resources control activities of host country security forces.

d. During the execution of populace and resources control operations, US forces should be accompanied by host country police or military personnel. These personnel can provide US forces with language capabilities, detailed knowledge of the people and area, and advice as to the legal aspects of implementing control measures. In addition, the presence of indigenous police or military personnel will assist in conveying to the people that US forces are only supporting the host country program rather than enforcing a unilateral US program.

8-14. Tactical Operations
The doctrine in paragraph 5-8 concerning tactical operations is applicable to US Army forces employed in support of host country IDAD. In addition, FM 31-16 provides detailed information
about brigade-size tactical operations in IDAD. Other references which provide further guidance on tactical operations include FM 6-20, FM 6-140, FM 7-30, FM 31-50, FM 61-100, and FM 100-5.

HIGHLIGHTS

THREE BODIES OF LAWS ARE RELEVANT TO THE CONDUCT OF INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT--

- INTERNATIONAL LAW
- UNITED STATES LAW
- LAW OF THE HOST COUNTRY

THE US ARMY HAS THREE TIERS OF FORCES FROM WHICH THE COMMANDER OF A UNIFIED COMMAND CAN REQUEST ADDITIONAL SUPPORT--

- SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCES (SAF)
- OVERSEAS GENERAL PURPOSE TOE UNITS (BACKUP FORCES)
- CONUS BASED FORCES

THE SAF INCLUDES ELEMENTS OF THE FOLLOWING--

- AIRBORNE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
- CIVIL AFFAIRS UNIT
- PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNIT
- MEDICAL DETACHMENT
- ENGINEER DETACHMENT
- MILITARY POLICE DETACHMENT
- MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT
- US ARMY SECURITY AGENCY SPECIAL OPERATIONS DETACHMENT

Figure 8-4. Highlights.
BRIGADE-SIZE BACKUP FORCES CAN BE EMPLOYED AS OPERATIONAL ELEMENTS.

BACKUP FORCES INCLUDE ELEMENTS OF THE FOLLOWING--

- INFANTRY MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS
- FIELD ARTILLERY MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS
- ARMORED CAVALRY MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS
- AVIATION COMPONENT
- ENGINEER COMPONENT
- MILITARY POLICE COMPONENT
- MEDICAL COMPONENT
- SIGNAL COMPONENT

US ARMY FORCES ACCOMPLISH IDAD MISSIONS THROUGH THE EMPLOYMENT OF SIX MAJOR OPERATIONS--

- ADVISORY ASSISTANCE
- INTELLIGENCE
- CIVIL AFFAIRS
- PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
- POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL
- TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Figure 8-4—Continued.
APPENDIX A
REFERENCES

A-1. Army Regulations (AR)

1-75 Administrative Support of MAAG, JUSMAG, and Similar Activities (FOUO)
1-78 Internal Coordination Among US Army Agencies Overseas
10-6 Branches of the Army
(C) 10-122 United States Army Security Agency (U)
27-20 Claims
310-25 Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Short Title: AD)
310-50 Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes
350-30 Code of Conduct
350-216 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Conventions No. IV of 1907
550-50 Foreign Countries and Nationals, Training of Foreign Personnel by the US Army
614-132 Logistics Officer Program
614-142 Foreign Area Officer Program
795-204 General Policies and Principles for Furnishing Defense Articles and Services on a Sale or Loan Basis

A-2. Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA Pam)

27-1 Treaties Governing Land Warfare
310-Series Military Publications Indexes
550-104 Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies

A-3. Department of the Army Training Circulars (TC)

3-16 Employment of Riot Control Agents, Flame, Smoke, Antiplant Agents and Personnel Detectors in Counterguerrilla Operations

A-4. Department of the Army Field Manuals (FM)

1-15 Aviation Company, Battalion, Group, and Brigade
1-100 Army Aviation Utilization
1-105 Aviator's Handbook
3-1 Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Support
3-2 Tactical Employment of Riot Control Agent CS
3-12 Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense
3-50 Chemical Smoke Generator Units and Smoke Operations
5-1 Engineer Troop Organizations and Operations
5-135 Engineer Battalion, Armored, Infantry, and Infantry (Mechanized) Divisions
5-136 Engineer Battalions, Airborne and Airmobile Divisions
5-142 Nondivisional Engineer Combat Units
5-162 Engineer Construction and Construction-Support Units
6-20 Field Artillery Tactics and Operations
6-140 Field Artillery Cannon Battalions and Batteries
7-10 The Rifle Company, Platoons, and Squads
7-20 The Infantry Battalions
7-30 The Infantry Brigades
8-10 Medical Support, Theater of Operations
8-15 Medical Support in Divisions, Separate Brigades, and the Armored Cavalry Regiment
8-21 The Field Medical Support Guide
8-55 Army Medical Service Planning Guide
9-6 Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations
10-8 Airdrop of Supplies and Equipment in the Theater of Operations
11-23 Theater Army Communications Command
11-50 Communications in Armored Infantry and Infantry (Mechanized) Division
11-57 Signal Battalion, Airmobile Division
12-2 Personnel and Administrative Support in Theaters of Operation
14-3 Comptroller Support in Theaters of Operation
16-5 The Chaplain
17-1 Armor Operations
17-36 Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units
17-95 The Armored Cavalry Regiment
19-1 Military Police Support, Army Division and Separate Brigades
19-4 Military Police Support, Theater of Operations
19-50 Military Police in Stability Operations
20-32 Landmine Warfare
20-33 Combat Flame Operations
21-40 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense
21-50 Ranger Training and Ranger Operations
21-76 Survival, Evasion and Escape
24-1 Tactical Communications Doctrine
27-10 The Law of Land Warfare
30-5 Combat Intelligence
30-17 Counterintelligence Operations
(C) 30-17A Counterintelligence Special Operations (U)
(S) 30-18 Intelligence Collection Operations, Intelligence Corps US Army (U)
30-31 Stability Operations-Intelligence
31-1 (Test) Employment of Unattended Ground Sensors
31-16 Counterguerrilla Operations
31-21 Special Forces Operations—US Army Doctrine
(S) 31-21A Special Forces Operations—US Army Doctrine (U)
31-50 Combat in Fortified and Built-up Areas
31-55 Border Security/Anti-Infiltration Operations
31-75 Riverine Operations
31-81 (Test) Base Defense
31-100 (Test) Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Night Observation (STANO)
(C) 32-5 Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U)
(S) 32-10 USASA in Support of Tactical Operations (U)
(C) 32-20 Electronic Warfare (U)
33-1 Psychological Operations—US Army Doctrine
33-5 Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures
38-8 International Logistics Management
41-5 Joint Manual for Civil Affairs
41-10 Civil Affairs Operation
44-1 US Army Air Defense Artillery Employment
44-1-1 US Army Air Defense Artillery Operations
44-3 US Army Air Defense Artillery Employment, Chaparral/Vulcan
54-1 The Logistical Command
54-2 The Division Support Command and Separate Brigade Support Battalion
54-4 The Support Brigade
55-1 Army Transportation Services in a Theater of Operations
55-10 Army Transportation Movements Management
55-15 Transportation Reference Data
55-40 Army Combat Service Support Air Transport Operations
55-51 Army Water Transport Units
57-35 Airmobile Operations
61-100 The Division
100-5 Operations of Army Forces in the Field
100-10 Combat Service Support
100-15 (Test) Larger Unit Operations
101-5 Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedure
101-10-1 Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical

A-5 Department of the Army Technical Manuals (TM)

38-750 The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS)

A-6 Other References

DOD Directive 2000.10, Selection and Training of Security Assistance Personnel
DOD Directive 5132.3, Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Assistance
DOD, DSAA, Military Assistance and Sales Manual (MASM), 5105.38-M
(S) DOD Program Objective Memorandum Military Security Assistance FY 1975-1979 (U)
JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of US Military Terms for Joint Usage (Short Title: JD)
(fouo) JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces UNAAF
Public Law 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act
Public Law 90-629, Foreign Military Sales Act
APPENDIX B
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

B-1. Department of State Publications
CASP. The Country Analysis and Strategy Paper is a document prepared annually by the US country team in each Latin American country providing the general policy framework for activities of all US Government agencies with respect to the country in question.

B-2. Department of Defense Publications
a. CPD. There are four Congressional Presentation Documents prepared annually: the first is concerned with the military grant aid program and is classified secret, the second with military sales and is classified confidential, the third with security supporting assistance and is unclassified; the fourth is a summary of the first three and is classified confidential.
b. DOD Directive 2000.10. This directive contains DOD policy and guidelines for the selection and training of security assistance personnel.
c. DOD Directive 5132.3. This directive contains DOD policy and guidance on the responsibilities of DOD agencies for security assistance down to and including the MAAG.
d. MASM. Military Assistance and Sales Manual, part I contains general information to include policy and planning. Part II contains procedures pertaining to military assistance grant aid planning, programming, approval, funding, execution, program reporting, and the evaluation of program performance. Part III contains procedures pertaining to foreign military sales for cash, credit, or credit guaranties—describing sales authorizations and limitations, credit planning and programming concepts, forms of funding, and reporting requirements.
e. PDM. The Program Decision Memorandum is a document which provides Secretary of Defense decisions on the Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
f. POM. The Program Objective Memorandum is prepared by OSD/ISA and covers 4 fiscal years. It contains the final guidelines and other dollar levels for the US security assistance programs and gives objectives and guidance.

B-3. Joint Publications
a. JFM. The Joint Force Memorandum is an annual document prepared by the Secretary of Defense recommending a joint force program which takes into account US forces and security assistance to other nations.
b. JIEP. The Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning is a worldwide series of strategic estimates prepared annually by Defense Intelligence Agency for the JCS to be used as a base for development of intelligence annexes for JCS plans.
c. JSCP. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan is a short range, current capabilities plan which translates US national objectives and policies for the next fiscal year into terms of military objectives and strategic concepts and defines military tasks for cold, limited, and general war which are in consonance with actual United States military capabilities.
d. JSOP. The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan is an annual publication of the JCS containing a mid-range plan projected 2 to 10 years in the future, determining and providing the military strategy and force structure requirements for attaining the security objectives of the United States.
e. TOR. The Terms of Reference is a document prepared by a unified command delineating the duties and responsibilities of the chiefs of US MAAG's and their deputies.

B-4. Army Regulations
a. AR 614-132. This regulation spells out the prerequisites for entry into the Logistics Officer Program (LOP), the proper format for application, and general guidelines for the career development of program members.
b. AR 614-142. This regulation spells out the prerequisites for entry into the Foreign Area Officer Program (FAOP), the proper format for application, and general guidelines for the career development of program members.
Border operations. Border operations are designed to deny infiltration or exfiltration of insurgent personnel and materiel across international boundaries. 

Campaign. In IDAD, a series of related government operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space.

Civil-military operations. That complex of activities (political, economic, social, and psychological) in support of military operations embracing the relationship between US military forces and civilian authorities and population, and the development of favorable emotions, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile foreign groups.

Civil war is an internal conflict which meets the following criteria:

- The insurgents occupy and control territory.
- The insurgents have a functioning government.
- Other states offer some type of recognition to the insurgent government and define their attitude toward the conflict.
- The insurgents have armed forces which are commanded by a person responsible for their actions, carry their arms openly, wear a distinctive emblem, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws of war.
- A state of general hostilities accompanied by a military confrontation of major proportions is taking place.

Consolidation campaign. A campaign organized in priority areas as an interdepartmental civil-military effort. Normally conducted at the state level, this operation integrates IDAD programs designed to establish, maintain, or restore host country governmental control of the population and the area and to provide an environment within which the economic, political, and social activities of the population can be pursued and improved.

Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP). A document prepared annually by the US country team in each Latin American country. It provides the general policy framework for activities of all US government agencies with respect to the country in question.

Developing nation. One which is progressing beyond a traditional society and is experiencing the turbulent process of economic, social, military, political, and psychological change.

Foreign assistance. Ranges from the sale of military equipment to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters. US assistance may be categorized in terms of three major functions—development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.

Host country. A country in which representatives or organizations of another state are present because of government invitation or international agreement.

Institutional development. Developing patterns of cooperation among people. The process of integrating the citizens of a nation into a cohesive social fabric that enables people to work in concert to achieve social, economic, psychological, and political goals.

Insurgency. A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily Communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

Insurgent war. A struggle between a constituted government and organized insurgents frequently supported from without, but acting violently from within, against the political, social, economic, military and civil vulnerabilities of the
regime to bring about its internal destruction or overthrow. Such wars are
distinguished from lesser insurgencies by the gravity of the threat to govern-
ment and the insurgent object of eventual regional or national control.

Internal defense. The full range of measures taken by a government and its allies
to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

Internal development. Actions taken by a nation to promote its balanced growth
by building viable institutions—political, economic, and social—that respond to
the needs of its society.

Military assistance. Refers collectively to three major military security assistance
programs—Military Assistance Grant Aid Program, Foreign Military Sales
Program, and Excess Defense Articles Program.

Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). As used in this manual, en-
compases joint US military advisory groups, military missions, military ad-
visory groups, US military groups and US military representatives exercising
responsibility at the government level for security assistance and other related
DOD matters with the host countries to which they are accredited. Defense
attaches are included when specifically designated.

Military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on
projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education,
training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health,
sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which
would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the
population.

Mobilization. The act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assem-
bling and organizing national resources. Mobilization includes all activities to
motivate and organize the populace in support of the government through
IDAD programs as well as activities to protect the populace from insurgent
actions.

National coordination center (area coordination center). A composite organization
to include representatives of local military, paramilitary, and other govern-
mental agencies responsible for planning and coordinating internal defense and
development operations.

Paramilitary forces. Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed
forces of any country but resembling them in organization, equipment, training,
or mission.

Remote area operations. Government operations undertaken in contested areas to
establish host country strongholds. These areas may be populated by ethnic,
religious, or other isolated minority groups; however, remote area operations
may be conducted in areas devoid of civilian population in which insurgent
forces have established training areas, rest areas, logistical facilities, or com-
mand posts. The remote area tactical force should be composed mainly of
personnel indigenous to the operational area.

Resource management. Those methods and procedures that deal with resources
(manpower, real property, weapons, equipment, services, materials, and
supplies), and are intended to assist in the management of such resources
(planning, organizing, coordinating, monitoring, and evaluating men, money,
and material facilities) to accomplish missions and tasks.

Security assistance. All activities of the United States Government carried out
under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act or Foreign Military Sales Act
or related appropriation acts and other related authorities.

Security assistance force (SAF). A specially trained, area-oriented, partially
language-qualified, ready force available to the commander of a unified com-
mand for the support of operations in situations short of open hostilities and in
limited and general war. SAF organizations may vary in size and capabilities
according to theater requirements.
Security supporting assistance. Funds used to finance imports of commodities, capital, or technical assistance, provided either on a grant or loan in accordance with terms of a bilateral agreement; counterpart funds thereby generated may be used as budgeting support. Most such funds are used to enable a recipient to devote more of its own resources to defense and security purposes than it otherwise could without serious economic or political consequences.

Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. The current US national strategy with the basic purpose of providing, through strength and partnership, for the security of the United States and its Free World allies and friends. Its aim is to discourage—and eventually to eliminate—the use of military force as a means by which one nation seeks to impose its will upon another. It seeks to deter war, but insures adequate capabilities to protect the United States and its interests should deterrence fail.

Strike campaign. Combat operations in zones under insurgent control or in contested zones. They are targeted against insurgent tactical forces and bases outside areas of government control. Other internal defense activities may support tactical forces during combat operations. Strike forces normally do not remain in the area of operations after mission accomplishment.

Total force concept. A concept for the use of all appropriate resources for deterrence—United States and Free World—to capitalize on the potential of available assets, which include both active and reserve components of the United States, those of US Allies, and the additional military capabilities of US Allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs.

Urban area operations. IDAD operations in an urban environment characterized by close coordination between the armed forces, police forces, paramilitary forces, and other security forces for the protection of critical installations and control of subversive activities. IDAD operations in an urban area also may be part of a consolidation campaign or a continuing IDAD effort not specifically designated as a campaign.
D-1. Introduction

This appendix contains information on internal defense and development (IDAD) training for US Army and host country army personnel. It provides general guidance concerning training requirements for US security assistance forces and brigade backup forces that advise or participate in IDAD operations, and guidance on training of host country military forces both in-country and out-of-country.

D-2. Training of US Army Forces

a. General. The nature of IDAD operations requires a personal orientation and motivation toward assisting the host country and accomplishing US objectives. US and individual responsibility to a host country government must be understood. Training and educational programs should stress the importance of the individual's actions in influencing indigenous support of US and host country objectives. Tolerance of political, economic, social, religious, and cultural differences is required to insure a proper relationship between indigenous and US personnel. Host country goals, status of forces agreements, and rules of engagement must be included in a continuing orientation program.

b. Individual Training. Individual training for US personnel should include development of proficiency in basic MOS skills, area orientation, varying degrees of language skill, and physical conditioning. When feasible, maximum cross-training should be given to members of mobile training teams (MTT) and advisors. Training should emphasize instructor skills to include techniques for teaching by demonstration with minimum use of language (voice) and proper techniques for use of interpreters.

c. Unit Training.

(1) Security Assistance Forces training. The commander of the Security Assistance Forces (SAF) is responsible for the training of all assigned and attached units. Normally, personnel in the various augmentation detachments requiring professional skills are MOS-qualified before detachments are assigned to a SAF. However, the commander must make provisions for service school training of selected personnel in specialized courses such as civil affairs, engineer, medical, military police, psychological operations, and intelligence. Area orientation and language training requirements for each SAF differ. Training missions within the SAF are assigned consistent with the availability of instructors, training facilities, and the type training required. Training supervision is centralized and accomplished through the normal chain of command.

(2) Special Forces training. The highly developed capability of Special Forces to organize, equip, train, and direct indigenous forces plus their knowledge of guerilla warfare tactics and techniques make these forces particularly effective in IDAD operations. Special Forces predeployment training should also include, as a minimum, area studies, language, IDAD operations, MOS cross-training, and general subject skills. The additional training presumsthat Army training program requirements have already been satisfied.

(3) Augmentation units training. Training for augmentation detachments of the SAF should be integrated into the Special Forces training program for area orientation, language training, common subjects, and field training exercises. Physical conditioning should be stressed in order to develop an ability to function under adverse conditions. Positions requiring professional skills should be filled by personnel who are already professionally qualified.

(4) Brigade-size backup forces training.

(a) General. Backup forces, like the SAF's, are specifically oriented for deployment to particular areas of the world. Accordingly, each US Army division designated is required to develop training programs for the brigade and its subordinate elements. Appendix B, FM 31-16, provides information and guidance for training the brigade and its subordinate elements in tactical operations.

(b) Training objectives. The backup forces training objectives should include—

1. Proficiency in MOS skills.
2. Proficiency in IDAD operations.
3. An understanding of the role of backup forces in Army IDAD missions.
4. Familiarity with the designated area.
5. Maintenance of language skill levels through refresher training.

D-3. Training of Host Country Forces

a. In-Country Training. In general, those skills, concepts, and procedures for IDAD which are taught to US forces are also applicable to host country forces. Training emphasis on what and how to teach indigenous forces varies according to the host country's requirements, force composition, and US programs for the country. The principles outlined in appendix B, FM 31-16, for training US forces generally apply to IDAD training programs for host country military forces. In addition, appendix C, FM 31-73, provides a type training program for host country paramilitary forces.

b. Out-of-Country Training. The US Army provides training to military personnel of selected developing countries. Objectives and areas of emphasis for providing training to foreign military personnel are set forth in Chapter E, Part II, Military Assistance and Sales Manual. AR 550-50 provides guidance on the training of foreign personnel by the US Army.
E-1. Introduction

This appendix summarizes branch and functional area doctrine for IDAD operations. References indicate the sources of detailed information in each area.

a. The US Army has designated its basic and special branches as arms and services to provide a basis for identifying functions and duties associated with the branches. Foreign military forces differ somewhat from the US Army system; however, the functions and duties ascribed to each of the US Army branches must generally be accommodated in every military system. AR 10-6 provides detailed coverage of the functions of each US Army branch.

b. Combat arms are those branches whose personnel are primarily concerned with fighting. They are Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, and Air Defense Artillery.

c. Combat support arms are those branches whose personnel provide operational assistance to the combat arms. They are Corps of Engineers, Signal Corps, Military Police Corps, and Military Intelligence.

d. The services are those branches whose personnel are primarily concerned with providing combat service support or administrative support to the Army. The services are Adjutant General’s Corps, Corps of Engineers, Finance Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Army Medical Department, Chaplains, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Ordnance Corps, Signal Corps, Military Police Corps, Women’s Army Corps, and Transportation Corps.

e. Some US Army functions—aviation, psychological operations, and civil affairs activities, for example—are performed by several branches. This manual addresses these as functional areas, and special units—Special Forces and the Army Security Agency (ASA)—are addressed as special functional units.

E-2. Combat Arms

In IDAD operations, Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery are mainly concerned with tactical operations. These branches are charged with seeking out and destroying insurgent armed forces and their base areas and with defending populated areas and critical installations. FM 31-16 provides guidance on tactical operations.

da. Infantry. The Infantry requires increased mobility support for its tactical operations. It is normally assigned responsibility for a tactical area of operations in which it conducts aggressive offensive and defensive operations. Added emphasis is placed on its reconnaissance and security roles. See FM 7-10, 7-20, and 7-30 for detailed doctrine.

db. Armor. The mobility, firepower, shock effect, and staying power of armored, air cavalry, and armored cavalry units are employed in strike operations against enemy forces and base areas. Air cavalry firepower and mobility are used in reconnaissance and security operations, providing a quick strike capability against moving enemy forces. See FM 17-1, FM 17-15, FM 17-36, FM 17-37, and FM 17-95 for detailed doctrine.

dc. Field Artillery. The Field Artillery can be called upon to dispose units to provide for greater area coverage in the defense of populated areas and forward operational bases. Its target acquisition functions must receive added emphasis and its firepower must be applied in a manner that will reduce the possibility of unnecessary harm and destruction in populated areas. FM 6-20 and FM 6-140 provide detailed doctrine for Field Artillery Branch.

dd. Air Defense Artillery. The Air Defense Artillery provides air defense protection for maneuver units and key targets such as bridges, cities, installations and convoys. In addition, Vulcan units can provide ground fire for base defense, convoy securities, and support of maneuver units. See FM 44-1, FM 44-1-1, and FM 44-3 for detailed doctrine and employment procedures.

E-3. Combat Support Arms

In IDAD operations, the roles of the Corps of Engineers, Military Intelligence, Military Police Corps, and Signal Corps differ significantly from their primary function of providing assistance to US Army combat areas. They may be called upon to provide assistance to host country forces engaged in tactical operations or to participate in other internal defense and development activities.

da. Corps of Engineers. The Corps of Engineers is capable of performing a great many IDAD operations, missions, and tasks in addition to
providing combat support assistance. Units can be called on to construct military facilities. They are especially well suited to provide advice and assistance for a wide range of military civic action projects and to participate in major internal development projects such as road construction or water resources. See FM 5-1, FM 5-135, FM 5-136, FM 5-142, and FM 5-162 for detailed doctrine.

b. Military Intelligence. Military Intelligence units participate in a wide range of intelligence and counterintelligence activities with host country intelligence agencies. Early identification and neutralization of the insurgent leadership are emphasized. A Military Intelligence effort should precede support assistance by other US Army units to provide an intelligence base for their operations. See FM 30-17, (C) FM 30-17A, (S) FM 30-18, FM 30-31, and (S) FM 32-10 for detailed guidance.

c. Military Police Corps. Military police participate in joint and combined IDAD operations. They provide assistance to host country military police, paramilitary police, or civilian police agencies. Populace and resources control and police intelligence are emphasized. FM 19-50 contains detailed guidance.

d. Signal Corps. Signal Corps units can provide communications support to host country military forces and to US advisory organizations. They can also assist in establishing civil communications facilities as part of the internal development effort. See FM 11-23, FM 11-50, and FM 11-57 for detailed doctrine.

E-4. Combat Service Support Arms

The services provide combat service support and administration in IDAD operations. Their assigned functions and tasks are adapted to the operational environment. The requirement for security is greatly emphasized and the requirement for mobility and communications is increased significantly. The Corps of Engineers, Military Police Corps, and the Signal Corps have been covered under their combat support role in the preceding paragraph. See FM 100-10 for combat service support doctrine.

a. Adjutant General’s Corps. The Adjutant General’s Corps role in IDAD operations is essentially the same as in other types of conflict. Adjustments must be made to provide services for units and small detachments in many locations. See FM 12-2 for doctrine.

b. Chaplains. The chaplain acts as advisor and consultant to the commander and staff on all matters of religion and morals, and morale as affected by religion. He fosters understanding of the customs, practices, and people in the host country as affected by religion. He exercises coordinating responsibility and maintains liaison with local churches, indigenous religious bodies, and civil groups throughout the command area of responsibility. He is responsible for providing religious coverage for assigned IDAD personnel. See FM 16-5 for detailed guidance.

c. Finance Corps. The Finance Corps functions in IDAD operations include measures to reduce the disruption of the host country economy by US Army payroll funds. See FM 14-3 for guidance.

d. Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Judge Advocate General’s Corps personnel become greatly involved in host country law and procedures in IDAD operations. Their legal services are required in a great many matters relating to the US military relationships with the host country. Claims services must be emphasized in the IDAD operations environment. See FM 27-10 and AR 27-20 for guidance.

e. Army Medical Department. Medical support in IDAD operations requires increased emphasis on air evacuation of patients. It may be provided to host country military forces. Medical assistance to the civilian population is provided through military civic action projects and internal development public health programs. See FM 8-10, FM 8-15, FM 8-21, and FM 8-55 for guidance.

f. Ordnance Corps. Ordnance units can provide ammunition, weapons, and fire control equipment maintenance, and ground mobility materiel maintenance support for host country military forces. Advice on the employment of, and defense against, chemical agents is also available through ordnance channels. See FM 9-6, FM 29-20, and FM 29-24 for guidance.

g. Quartermaster Corps. Quartermaster units can provide logistical support and services for host country military forces. See FM 29-3, FM 29-10, FM 54-1, FM 54-2, and FM 54-3 for guidance.

h. Transportation Corps. The Transportation Corps can provide mobility to host country military forces. Transportation units have an excellent capability to support military civic action projects and internal development programs. A great many manuals in the 55-series provide guidance for transportation support. See FM 55-15, FM 55-30, and FM 55-40 for general guidance on air and motor vehicle operations.

i. Women’s Army Corps. Women’s Army Corps personnel can provide advisory assistance to host country women’s service organizations.
AR 600-3 contains information on the mission and composition of the Women's Army Corps.

E-5. Functional Areas

This paragraph summarizes doctrine on selected functional areas as it applies to IDAD operations and references sources of detailed information. The functional areas included here require emphasis in IDAD operations but are not considered under branch functions.

a. Advisory Assistance. US advisory assistance, furnished under various circumstances and operational conditions, varies from provisions of US representatives at the national level only to advisors with armed forces units and political subdivisions. See AR 1-75, AR 550-50, AR 795-204 and FM 31-73 for guidance on advisory assistance.

b. Aviation. Aviation units provide reconnaissance, surveillance, mobility, and firepower in IDAD. Units may be called on to support indigenous forces engaged in counterguerrilla operations. See FM 1-100 for general guidance.

c. Base Defense. The threat in the IDAD operations environment requires preparation of base defense measures against surprise attack. Measures must include defense against infiltrators, armed assault, and attack by long-range weapons. See FM 31-81 (test) for guidance on base defense.

d. Border Security/Anti-Infiltration. Border security operations are conducted to deny the insurgent external support and base areas across international boundaries. They are normally the responsibility of civil police, paramilitary border security forces, or customs police. These agencies may be supported when necessary by military combat, combat support and combat service support units. Techniques used in operations of this nature may include outposts, patrols, ambushes, barriers, mobile forces, and sensor devices. See FM 31-55 for guidance.

e. Civil Affairs. Civil affairs personnel and units are engaged in a wide variety of activities in IDAD operations. Civil-military relations, military civic action, populace and resources control, and care of refugees are important areas for civil affairs. Officers trained in a foreign area officer program fill key positions and have staff responsibility for civil affairs operations. See FM 41-10 and FM 101-5 for guidance.

f. Populace and Resources Control. Populace and resources control measures are necessary to provide security for the population and to deny resources to the insurgent. Host country police normally are responsible for enforcing these measures. Military and paramilitary forces can support police operations. See FM 19-50 and FM 41-10 for guidance.

g. Psychological Operations (PSYOP). PSYOP are an important component of a broad range of political, economic, social, and military activities in internal defense and internal development. PSYOP personnel and units support all aspects of nation-building programs. Military PSYOP provide the commander with methods he can use to accomplish his mission. All military operations should be evaluated in terms of their impact on national PSYOP objectives to identify PSYOP tasks that will contribute to mission accomplishment. FM 33-1 and FM 33-5 provide guidance for psychological operations.

h. Riverine Operations. Riverine operations are necessary in operational environments where there are water lines of communication. A major consideration is the type of watercraft necessary to provide adequate mobility. Aviation can be used extensively in conjunction with watercraft. See FM 31-75 for guidance on riverine operations.

i. Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Night Observation (STANO). STANO equipment is used both day and night to locate and identify enemy activity and to improve firepower, mobility, and command and control effectiveness. See FM 31-1 (test) and FM 31-100 (test) for guidance.

j. Tactical Operations. The principal function of tactical operations is the destruction of enemy forces and base areas. Guidance for tactical operations is found in branch field manuals of each of the combat arms and combat support arms. Additional guidance is found in FM 31-16.

E-6. Special Functional Units

This paragraph summarizes doctrine on special functional units as it applies to IDAD operations and references sources of detailed information.

a. Army Security Agency. The United States Army Security Agency (USASA) provides support for signal intelligence, jamming, and deception operations and for advice and assistance in signal security practices and electronic counter-countermeasures. Stringent security measures are part of these operations. AR 10-122, FM 32-5, and FM 32-10 provide guidance for USASA operations.

b. Special Forces. The organization, mission, capabilities, and methods of operations of Special Forces are ideally suited for IDAD operations. To some extent, most of the US Army's IDAD operations are found in the Special Forces group and related units in the Security Assistance
Force. These units are especially well suited to deploy MTT and operational elements to provide advisory assistance and support to indigenous forces. See FM 31-20 and FM 31-21 for additional guidance.
APPENDIX F

ARMY OPERATIONS ANNEX TO MILITARY IDAD PLAN

(Approved for Public Release)

COPY _______OF _______ COPIES

ISSUING HEADQUARTERS

PLACE

DATE TIME GROUP

MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER

Annex _______ (Army Operations) to Military IDAD Plan. References: List plans, maps, charts, policy regulations, concepts, decrees relating to the plan.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Plan: ________________

Task Organization: This information must be given either here; in paragraph 3, "EXECUTION"; or in an appendix. Under this heading, as appropriate, give the subdivision of the force.

1. SITUATION

a. Insurgent Forces. Include information about insurgent military forces, infrastructures, and support organizations that may directly affect IDAD operations planning. Such information as unit identification, organizational concepts, major activities, outside support, leadership, morale, and political ideologies should be included. This paragraph will normally reference appropriate intelligence plans, annexes, appendices, and estimates rather than provide details on insurgent forces and activities.

b. Friendly Forces.

(1) Military. Include information and references about other forces (paramilitary, air force, navy, and allied) which may directly affect the missions and tasks of army forces.

(2) Civil. Include references and information about missions and roles of civil agencies that may directly impact on army operations and requirements. Such information as agency designations, mission and responsibilities, and interrelationship with army forces should be included.

c. Attachments and Detachments. List here, or in an appendix, units attached to or detached from the Army, purpose, and effective times.

d. Assumptions. State assumptions used as a basis for this annex.

2. MISSION

Make a clear concise statement of the tasks to be accomplished to include who, what, where, and why.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation. State the broad concept for the employment of army forces in support of IDAD. Concept should be comprehensive to include overall objectives, priorities and orientation of forces. IDAD plans at national level and for specific political subdivision are often phased. As a result, army annexes in support of these plans are phased when appropriate. The concept of operations may be prepared in subparagraphs for each phase.
b. Tasks. In subsequent separate lettered subparagraphs, the missions and tasks of each major element are provided.

c. Coordinating Instructions. This is the last subparagraph of paragraph 3 and contains details of coordination and control applicable to more than one element.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
This paragraph contains a statement of the combat service support instructions and arrangement.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL
a. Command. Provide instructions about command arrangements relating to army forces. Include, when appropriate, command relationships between army forces and other service organizations, chiefs of political subdivisions, and area coordination centers.

b. Signal. Signal instructions may make reference to an appendix. Information should be provided on the integration of military, paramilitary police and civil communications.

Acknowledgement Instructions.

Signature Commander

Authentication

Appendixes
1—Advisory Assistance (omitted)
2—Intelligence (omitted)
3—Psychological Operations (omitted)
4—Civil Affairs (omitted)
5—Populace and Resources Control (omitted)
6—Tactical Operations (omitted)

DISTRIBUTION:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adjutant General’s Corps</td>
<td>E-4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>5-19d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative capability</td>
<td>4-4b, 4-4d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative system</td>
<td>2-5a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advice and assistance</td>
<td>5-9, 8-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisor</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advisory assistance</td>
<td>4-8e (6), 5-3, 4-7-5-2, 5-15c, 8-9b, 5-14-8-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency for International Development</td>
<td>6-7, 6-12b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Artillery</td>
<td>E-2d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador</td>
<td>6-10a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty and rehabilitation</td>
<td>4-8a (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annotated bibliography</td>
<td>B-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Coordination Center:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian advisory committee</td>
<td>4-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>4-12, 4-12b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populace and resources control</td>
<td>5-7d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP programs</td>
<td>5-5c (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State (Provincial)</td>
<td>4-12c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical operations</td>
<td>5-8c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>4-12d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Areas of responsibility</td>
<td>4-7c (11c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armor</td>
<td>E-2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Cavalry mobile training teams</td>
<td>8-8b (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army IDAD operations annex</td>
<td>4-8, 4-8b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Materiel Command (AMC)</td>
<td>6-20d (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Medical Department</td>
<td>E-4e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army operations annex to military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAD plan</td>
<td>app F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Security Agency</td>
<td>E-6a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA)</td>
<td>6-17c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management (ASA/FM)</td>
<td>6-20a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics (ASA (I&amp;L))</td>
<td>6-20a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>E-5b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backup Forces:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augmentation units</td>
<td>8-8c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>8-8a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition</td>
<td>8-4b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>8-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>8-8b, D-2c (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training elements</td>
<td>8-8b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced development</td>
<td>4-3, 4-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base defense</td>
<td>E-5c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bases of operation</td>
<td>5-8f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belligerent status</td>
<td>3-11a, 3-12a, b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces mission</td>
<td>5-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer zone</td>
<td>5-17d (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>5-17c (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>5-17b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>5-17a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>5-17d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>5-17c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted zone</td>
<td>5-17d (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self defense border units</td>
<td>5-17d (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structuring</td>
<td>5-17c (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border security</td>
<td>5-7g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border security/anti-infiltration</td>
<td>E-5d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade and functional area precis</td>
<td>E-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade-size backup forces</td>
<td>8-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer zones</td>
<td>5-17d, 5-17d (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau for Supporting Assistance</td>
<td>6-16c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs</td>
<td>6-3, 6-16b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigns (see Consolidation campaign, Strike campaign):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>4-5a (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>5-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and coordination</td>
<td>4-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)</td>
<td>6-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically</td>
<td>2-6a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonviolent</td>
<td>2-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically</td>
<td>2-6a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socially</td>
<td>2-6a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>2-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplains</td>
<td>E-4b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of developing nations</td>
<td>3-5a (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Che Guevara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Action (see also military civic action)</td>
<td>5-10a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>4-8a (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment to tactical force</td>
<td>5-8c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>5-6d (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Area</td>
<td>E-5e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government administration</td>
<td>5-6f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison</td>
<td>5-6d (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>5-3, 5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations</td>
<td>5-6d (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>5-6e (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Action Force</td>
<td>8-7b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>8-7b (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Operations</td>
<td>8-7b, 8-12, 8-11, 8-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military Operations (CMO):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>8-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>8-9b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
<td>8-12b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological operations</td>
<td>8-12a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Officer</td>
<td>5-5c (3), 5-6d (1), 5-4-5-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>3-11a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Index-1
Civilian advisory committee .................. 4-13 4-11
Civilian information services ............... 5-5d 5-4
Claims administration ....................... 8-2e 8-1
Combat arms ................................ E-1b, E-2 E-1
Combat guerrilla unit (local militia) ........ 3-9c (4)(b) 7-3
Combat power ................................ 4-7c (3) 4-6
Combat service support (see also specific type) 5-6d, 5-8i,j, 5-5,5-10, 5-14c (1),5-13, E-3
Combat support (see also specific type) .... 5-6d, 5-8i,j, 5-5,5-10, 5-14c (1),E-3
Community level development ............... 4-3a (3)(a),(b) 4-2
Comptroller of the Army .................... 6-20A 6-17
Congressional Presentation ................. 7-5a (3)(d) 7-4
Documents (CPD) .......................... B-2a B-1
Consolidation Campaigns:
  Completion stage .......................... 5-13e 5-13
  Development stage ......................... 5-13d 5-12
  General ................................ 5-12 5-11
  Interdepartmental effort .................. 5-13 5-11
  Offensive stage ........................... 5-13c 5-12
  Plans ................................ 5-13d (1) 5-11
  Preparation stage ........................ 5-13b 5-11
  Tactical operations ...................... 5-8 5-9
  Task forces ................................ 5-13d (2) 5-12
  Training ................................ 5-13b (3) 5-12
  Urban areas ................................ 5-16c 5-15
Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) .... 7-5a (3)(e) 7-5
Coordination:
  Area coordination centers .................. 4-5c, 4-12 4-5-4-11
  Interdepartmental intelligence ............ 5-4e (3) 5-3
  National level ............................ 4-11 4-9
  Corps of Engineers ......................... E-3a E-1
  Counterintelligence (see also intelligence):
    Border Operations ...................... 5-17a 5-17
    Phase I Activities ........................ 5-10a
  Country Analysis and Strategy:
    Paper (CASP) .......................... B-1 B-1
  Country Team (see US Country Team) .... B-1 B-1
DCSOPS (see Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations)
  Defense attaché personnel .................. 7-2a 7-1
Defense Security Assistance Agency
  (DSAA) ................................ 6-17e 6-14
Defense Security Assistance Council ........ 6-17b 6-11
Defensive operations ....................... 5-8g 5-9
Department of Agriculture (USDA) ......... 6-9c, 6-12b 6-6,6-9
Department of Commerce ..................... 6-9b 6-6
Department of Defense (DOD) ............... 6-8,6-17 6-6,6-11
Department of State ........................ 6-3,6-16 6-2,6-11
Department of Army ........................ 6-20 6-14
Department of Treasury ..................... 6-9a 6-6
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for Security Assistance (DASD/ISA(SA)) ........ 6-17d 6-14
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) .................. 6-20c (1) 6-15
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (DCSOPS) ........ 6-20b 6-14
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs ........ 6-20a 6-14
Developing nations:
  Characteristics ................................ 2-2 2-1
  Threat perception ........................ 7-7c (2) 7-6
Development:
  Economic ................................ 4-4a (1),4-6c (4) 4-3,4-6
  Political ................................ 4-4a (1),4-6c (1) 4-3,4-5
  Social ................................ 4-4a (1),4-6c (2) 4-3,4-5
Development Assistance:
  Function ................................ 6-2b (1) 6-1
  Purpose ................................ 6-11 6-8
  US Government ........................... 6-1a 6-1
Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) .................. 6-17d 6-14
Director of International Logistics, ODCSLOG .......................... 6-20c (1),2 6-15
Directorate for International Affairs (ODCSOP/IA) .................. 6-20b (1),2 6-15
DOD Directive 2000.10 .......................... B-2b B-1
DOD Directive 5132.3 .......................... 7-3d (1) 7-3
  ... B-2c B-1
Economic:
  Changes ................................. 2-2a 2-1
  Conditions ............................... 5-13 5-11
  Development .............................. 2-4b 4-10a, 2-3-4-9
  Factors in developing nations .......... 2-1a 2-4 2-1-2-2
  Institutions ............................. 2-5d (10) 2-3
  Office ................................ 4-11b 4-9
  Programs ................................ 4-6c (4) 4-6
  Vulnerability ............................ 5-10a 5-10
  Engine detachment ........................ 8-7e 8-7
  Espionage ................................ 4-3a (1) 4-7
  Excess Defense Articles Program .... 6-14a 6-9
  External hostile powers ................. 5-5a (5) 5-3
Factors:
  Economic ................................ 4-8b (4) 4-9
  Internal development ...................... 4-6d 4-6
  Military ................................ 4-8b (4) 4-9
  Political ................................ 4-8b (4) 4-9
  Social ................................ 4-8b (4) 4-9
  Field Artillery ......................... E-2c E-1
  Finance Corps ............................ E-4c E-2
  FMS (see Foreign Military Sales) ........ B-4b B-1
  Foreign Area Officer Program (FAOP) .... B-4b B-1
Foreign Assistance:
  Organization ............................. 6-1a, 6-3 6-1,6-2
  Programs ................................. 6-2b 6-1
  Responsibilies ........................... 6-1a, 6-3 6-1,6-3
  US interests .............................. 6-2c 6-1
  US policy ................................. 6-2,6-4b 6-1,6-2
  Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) .......... 6-2d 6-7a 6-1,6-5,
  Foreign Military Sales (FMS) ........ 6-14a (1) 6-9
  Foreign Military Sales Act (FMS) ........ B-2d B-1
  Foreign Military Sales Program ....... 6-14a 6-9
  Foreign policy ........................... 6-4b 6-2
  Foreign powers ............................ 3-13/ 3-10
  Foreign support ........................... 3-10b (4) 3-7
  Free World nations ...................... 4-7 4-6
  Front groups ............................. 3-9a 3-5
  General Purpose Forces ................. 1-1b, 8-4b,c 1-1,8-3
  Geneva Convention (1949) ............. 3-12a 3-12b 3-8
  Glossary ................................. app C C-1
  Government capability ................. 3-13e 3-10
  Grant Aid ................................. 6-14a (1),6-15b 6-9,6-10
  ... 6-20b (2)(b) 6-15
Guerrilla Force (Para 3-9c) 5-4c
Host country (Para 5-15c) 5-13
Host country forces training (Para 5-7b) 5-10
Host Country Internal Defense and Development (IDAD):
Organization (Para 4-1,4-9) 4-1,4-9
Planning (Para 4-1,4-5) 4-1,4-4
Policy guidance (Para 4-1,14-15) 4-1,12
Strategy (Para 4-1,4-4) 4-1,4-3
Host country law (Para 6-12) 6-11,
6-2b (2), 6-1a 6-12 6-8,6,9
IDAD (see Internal Defense and Development)
Insurgency:
Analysis (Para 3-13) 3-8
Consolidation activities (Para 3-7b) 3-3
Introduction (Para 3-1,3-2) 3-1
Mass (Para 3-7b) 3-3
Organization (Para 3-8) 3-5
Phases (Para 3-7) 3-3
Requirements (Para 3-3) 3-1
Urban (Para 3-10) 3-7
Insurgent:
Armed elements (Para 3-8e) 3-5
Base Areas (Para 5-14a, 5-17a) 5-13,5-17
Direction and leadership (Para 5-3b) 3-1
Forces (Para 5-12a) 3-7,5-6a
Government (Para 5-13c) 3-4
Groups (Para 5-4c) 5-2
Guerrilla forces (Para 5-4c) 5-2
Indicators (Para 5-4a) 5-2
Infrastructure (Para 5-4,5-8a) 5-2,5-9
Intelligence operations (Para 5-16e) 5-15
Isolation (Para 4-3b) 4-2
Leadership (Para 3-3b, 5-10c) 3-1,4,7,3-12b
Logistical operations (Para 5-4e, 5-16e) 5-2,5-15
Mass organizations (Para 3-9c) 3-5
Military forces (Para 3-3d) 3-7
Neutralization (Para 5-4c) 5-2
Organizational operations (Para 5-16e) 5-15
Party core (Para 3-9b) 3-5
Psychological operations (Para 5-16e) 5-15
Strategies (Para 3-1-3-4) 3-1,2
Tactical forces (Para 4-3b, 4-13c) 4-2
Terrorist activities (Para 5-16e) 5-15
Threat (Para 8-3a) 8-2
Intelligence:
Appendix (Para 5-4a) 5-7f
Border operations (Para 5-17a) 5-17
Civilian population (Para 5-2d) 5-1
Combined operations (Para 8-11a) 8-11
Consolidation campaign (Para 5-13b) 5-11,5-12
Functions (Para 5-4e) 5-2
Guidelines (Para 5-15f, 5-19b) 4-12,5-18
Objectives (Para 4-11d) 4-9
Office (Para 5-4-5-10a) 5-2,5-10
Operations (Para 5-13b) 5-11,5-15
Planning (Para 5-4e) 5-2
Production (Para 5-4e) 5-3
Remote Area operations (Para 5-15c) 5-14,5-15
Strike campaign (Para 5-14b) 5-13
System (Para 5-4d) 5-2
Tactical operations (Para 5-8c) 5-9
Urban area operations (Para 5-16b, 5-16f) 5-15,5-16
US Army operations (Para 8-9b, 8-11) 8-11
Interdepartmental Groups (Para 6-4c) 6-2
Internal Defense:
Defined (Para 1-3a) 1-1,4-1
Planning (Para 4-7,5-13b) 4-6,5-11
Training (Para D-1) D-1
Internal Defense and Development:
Campaigns (Para 5-1,5-12) 5-1,5-11
Concepts (Para 4-5,4-14) 4-1,4-12
Coordination organization (Para 4-5c) 4-11,5-4-9
Functional areas (Para E-5) E-3
Introduction (Para 1-1,4-1) 1-1,4-1
Operations (Para 1-1,4-5) 1-4,4-7
Planning (Para 4-5) 4-4
Planning organization (Para 4-5c) 4-11,5-4-9
Strategy (Para 4-4,4-4b) 4-3
5-4,5-15a 4-5,4-12
5-2d 5-1
Internal Development:
Defined (Para 1-3b, 4-2b) 1-1,4-1
Planning (Para 4-5,5-13b) 4-5,5-11
Programs (Para 4-5c) 4-3
International Law (Para 3-11b, 8-2a, 8-1) 3-8,5-11
International Logistics Center (ILC) (Para 6-20d) 6-15
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (Para 6-15) 6-14
Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) (Para B-3a) B-1
Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP) (Para 6-15a) 6-14,5-1
Joint Staff (Para 7-3d) 7-3
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) (Para 6-15a) 6-14,5-1
Joint Strategic Objectives (Para 6-18a) 6-14,7-4
Joint Multinational Plan (JMP) (Para 5-4a) 5-5,5-12
Joint US Military Advisory Group (Para 7-2a) 7-1
Joint US Military Group (Para 7-2a) 7-1
Judge Advocate General's Corps (Para 6-4d) E-2
Lack of government control (Para 3-3c) 3-1
Law enforcement (Para 4-4a) 4-7,5-1,5-7f
Leadership:
Developing nations (Para 2-5c) 2-3
Insurgent (Para 4-3b) 4-2,4-3
Local (Para 4-3a) 4-2
Left Strategy (Para 5-4a, 5-5a) 5-4
Legal aspects (Para 3-1,3-11,8-2) 3-1,3-8,8-1
Legal status insurances (Para 3-11) 3-8
Local leaders (Para 5-15b) 5-14
Local militia (Para 3-9c, 3-5-37) 3-9d (2) 3-7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logistical:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>5-16b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>4-7e (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Officer Program</td>
<td>B-4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG (see Military Assistance Group)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG agreements</td>
<td>8-2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main forces</td>
<td>3-9d (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major overseas commands</td>
<td>6-21b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass civil organization</td>
<td>3-9c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass insurgency</td>
<td>3-1,3,7b, 3-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass organization</td>
<td>3-6b, 3-9a, 3-9c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Strategy</td>
<td>3-1,3-4b, 3-6c, 3-1-3,2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6,3,7a, 3-9</td>
<td>3-3,3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-4e (1),(2),5-10</td>
<td>4-3,5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Detachment</td>
<td>8-7d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Affairs Office</td>
<td>4-11e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Articles and Service List (MASL)</td>
<td>6-20d (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined</td>
<td>7-2a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functions</td>
<td>7-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>7-1a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint organization</td>
<td>7-2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization structure</td>
<td>7-2c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel assignment</td>
<td>6-20f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program recommendations</td>
<td>6-18b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibilities</td>
<td>6-22,7-3d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance and Sales Manual (MASM)</td>
<td>B-2d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance Command</td>
<td>7-3b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance Program (MAP) 6-14a 6-14a (1)</td>
<td>6-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Civic Action:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil affairs operations</td>
<td>5-6b (4),5-6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation campaign</td>
<td>5-13d (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis</td>
<td>5-6e (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal development</td>
<td>4-7e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army</td>
<td>8-12b (4),(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worksheet</td>
<td>5-6e (11b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Departments</td>
<td>6-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Forces:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host Country</td>
<td>3-6,5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent</td>
<td>3-9a, 3-9d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army</td>
<td>8-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence</td>
<td>E-3b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Intelligence Detachment</td>
<td>8-7g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military plans</td>
<td>4-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police Corps</td>
<td>E-3c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police Detachment</td>
<td>8-7f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military security</td>
<td>5-4e (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission agreement</td>
<td>8-2c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile training teams (MTT)</td>
<td>5-9,8-5,5,2b 5-10,8-3,3-D,2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile warfare</td>
<td>5-8e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>4-3a (1),4-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-8a (6),5-2d</td>
<td>4-7,5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Inventory Control Point (NICP)</td>
<td>6-20d (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National-level coordination center</td>
<td>5-7d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National-level organization</td>
<td>4-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Council (NSC)</td>
<td>6-4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)</td>
<td>6-4e (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutralization</td>
<td>4-3b (1),4-4a,b,c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-15g, 5-4c (4)</td>
<td>4-15,5-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC Senior Review Group</td>
<td>6-4d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC Under Secretaries Committee</td>
<td>6-4e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational guidelines</td>
<td>5-15,5-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance Corps</td>
<td>E-4f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community level</td>
<td>4-3a (3)(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>4-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>4-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency</td>
<td>4-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>5-15c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subnational</td>
<td>4-9,4-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban area</td>
<td>4-11d (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramilitary Forces:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>5-1,5-2d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>5-15c (2)(e), 5-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compartmentation</td>
<td>3-8a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent</td>
<td>3-5c (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>4-3c (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core</td>
<td>3-9b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>3-9c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Corps</td>
<td>6-3c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase I (Latent and Incipient Insurgency)</td>
<td>3-7c (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II (Guerrilla Warfare)</td>
<td>3-7c (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III (War of Movement)</td>
<td>3-7c (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phases of Insurgency:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined</td>
<td>3-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host Country response</td>
<td>5-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>4-5a (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>4-5a (3),4-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concepts</td>
<td>4-5a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency forces</td>
<td>4-7c (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>4-7c (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidelines</td>
<td>4-15c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Defense</td>
<td>4-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal development</td>
<td>4-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>4-6a, 4-7a, 4-5,4-6,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-7c (2)</td>
<td>4-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office</td>
<td>4-11a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>4-5c, 4-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II and III</td>
<td>4-7b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security assistance</td>
<td>7-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasks</td>
<td>4-5b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augmentation</td>
<td>5-7d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary force</td>
<td>5-2c,d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border operations</td>
<td>5-17b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>5-13b (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>4-7c (9),5-2a,b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-13c,4-2,5-13,19</td>
<td>5-13c (4), (e), (1),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-8c, 5-16</td>
<td>5-9,5-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent targets</td>
<td>5-16e (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>5-13c (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>4-3b (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populace and resources control</td>
<td>5-7,5-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-13a</td>
<td>5-13a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of insurgency</td>
<td>5-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres</td>
<td>5-13d (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Index-4
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>7-5a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Review Committee (SAPRC)</td>
<td>6-16d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs</td>
<td>6-13a,b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Secretary of State</td>
<td>6-3b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Assistance Forces (SAF):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil affairs</td>
<td>8-7b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements</td>
<td>8-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer detachment</td>
<td>8-7e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>8-4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical detachment</td>
<td>8-7d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military intelligence detachment</td>
<td>8-7g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military police detachment</td>
<td>8-7f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>8-6b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>8-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological operations</td>
<td>8-7c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces</td>
<td>8-7a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>D-2c (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Security Agency (USASA) (SOD)</td>
<td>8-7h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Assistance Program Review Committee (SAPRC)</td>
<td>6-16d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Forces</td>
<td>5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-defense forces</td>
<td>3-9c (4a), 5-2d, 3-7,5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9,5-13d (2), 5-10,5-12, 5-15c (2) (c), 5-15, 5-17d (4)</td>
<td>5-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-sufficiency</td>
<td>7-7c (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensors</td>
<td>5-17b (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shadow government</td>
<td>3-7c (1) (d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship Loans</td>
<td>6-14c (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Corps</td>
<td>E-3d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadres</td>
<td>5-13d (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>2-2a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions</td>
<td>5-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors</td>
<td>2-1a, 2-3,2-3c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office</td>
<td>4-11b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs</td>
<td>4-6c (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerabilities</td>
<td>5-10a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social development</td>
<td>4-10b, 4-15b, 4-9,4-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-11a</td>
<td>6-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>8-7a (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>8-6d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>8-7a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>8-7a (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAF nucleus</td>
<td>8-6a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special functional unit</td>
<td>E-6b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>D-2c (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special functional units</td>
<td>E-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special interest groups</td>
<td>3-9c (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability operations</td>
<td>1-3d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>6-3,6-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of forces agreement</td>
<td>8-2b, 8-2e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic intelligence</td>
<td>5-4e, 5-4e (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAD</td>
<td>4-2-4-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent</td>
<td>3-13-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Strategy</td>
<td>3-7b, 3-13c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Strategy</td>
<td>3-5c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>4-3a,b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Strategy</td>
<td>3-5b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified</td>
<td>4-5b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike Campaign:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concepts</td>
<td>5-14,5-14a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force withdrawal</td>
<td>5-14c (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>5-14a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>5-14c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>5-14b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP themes</td>
<td>5-5d (3) (b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction forces</td>
<td>5-14c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical operations</td>
<td>5-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subversions</td>
<td>4-8a (1), 5-4b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subversive activities</td>
<td>5-16e (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply procedures</td>
<td>8-7c (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Assistance Program</td>
<td>6-7b, 6-14b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgeon General</td>
<td>6-20g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation (STANO)</td>
<td>E-5i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Operations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td>4-8c (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidation campaign</td>
<td>5-13b (1), 5-13c (2), 5-11,5-12, 5-13d (2), 5-13d (3), 5-12,5-13, 5-13e (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated attacks</td>
<td>5-8d, 5-14c (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>5-8b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elimination operations</td>
<td>5-8d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encirclement</td>
<td>5-14c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional area</td>
<td>E-5j</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla warfare</td>
<td>5-10b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harassing operation</td>
<td>5-8d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major IDAD operation</td>
<td>5-3,5-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>5-8a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>5-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>4-7c (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>5-14c (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raids</td>
<td>5-8d, 5-14c (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction-type operations</td>
<td>5-8d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance in force</td>
<td>5-8d, 5-14c (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote area operations</td>
<td>5-15a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike campaign</td>
<td>5-14,5-14c (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweep</td>
<td>5-14c (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban area operations</td>
<td>5-16,5-16 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army forces</td>
<td>8-9b, 8-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance</td>
<td>6-11c (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms of reference</td>
<td>7-3d (2), 3-3e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial security forces</td>
<td>5-9,5-10b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror</td>
<td>5-13d (2), 5-13c (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist activities</td>
<td>3-7c (11g), 5-16b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiers of forces</td>
<td>8-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>6-11c (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Corps</td>
<td>E-4a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment of prisoners</td>
<td>3-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tupamaro movement</td>
<td>8-5a (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance</td>
<td>6-3b, 6-16a,b, 6-2,6-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified commands</td>
<td>5-16c,d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Information Agency (USIA)</td>
<td>6-21,5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States law</td>
<td>8-2c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity of effort</td>
<td>5-19a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area coordination center</td>
<td>4-12d (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>5-16e (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency</td>
<td>3-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Area Operations:</td>
<td>Paragraph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application of force</td>
<td>5-16a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil affairs</td>
<td>5-16f (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence operations</td>
<td>5-16b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal defense and internal</td>
<td>5-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>5-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police operations</td>
<td>5-16b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populace and resources control 5-7b (1),5-16f (3)</td>
<td>5-8-5-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological operations</td>
<td>5-16f (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical operations 5-16,5-16f (2),</td>
<td>5-15,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>2-3c (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Agency for International Development (USAID) (see also Agency for International Development (AID))</td>
<td>6-7b, 6-16c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibilities in IDAD</td>
<td>8-3b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major IDAD operations</td>
<td>8-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Advisor (see also Advisor):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functions</td>
<td>7-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>7-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDAD</td>
<td>7-1b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships</td>
<td>7-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirements</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Assistance:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat forces</td>
<td>8-9a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat service support</td>
<td>8-9a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat support</td>
<td>8-9a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment, training and advice</td>
<td>8-9a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile training teams</td>
<td>8-9a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary purpose</td>
<td>8-9a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army Forces:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backup forces</td>
<td>8-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in IDAD</td>
<td>8-1-8-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major IDAD operations</td>
<td>8-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile training teams</td>
<td>8-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and coordinating</td>
<td>8-9b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Assistance Forces</td>
<td>8-6,8-7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Tactical operations                                                                  | 8-14      | 8-13 |
| Tiers of forces                                                                       | 8-1-8-4   | 8-1-8-2 |
| Training                                                                              | D-2       | D-1  |
| US Army Security Agency (USASA)                                                       |           |      |
| Special Operations Detachment                                                         | 8-7a, E-6a | 8-8,E-3 |
| US Army Security Assistance Forces                                                     | 1-1a, 8-4a, 1-1a,8-3, | 8-6,8-7 | 8-3-8-4 |
| US foreign policy                                                                     | 6-1b, 6-2a, 6-13a | 6-9  |
| US combat forces                                                                       | 8-9a      | 8-11 |
| US country team (USCT)                                                                 | 6-3f, 6-10, 6-2-6-6, | 7-2b, 7-4, 7-1-7-3, | 7-5b | 7-4 |
| US foreign policy                                                                      | 6-1b, 6-2a, 6-13a | 6-9  |
| US interests                                                                          | 8-3a      | 8-2  |
| US military advisory groups                                                            | 7-2a      | 7-1  |
| US military groups                                                                     | 7-2a      | 7-1  |
| US military missions                                                                   | 7-2a      | 7-1  |
| US military representatives                                                             | 7-2a      | 7-1  |
| US objectives                                                                         | 6-13b     | 6-9  |
| US policy                                                                             | 3-12c, 8-3a | 3-8-8-2 |
| US Security Assistance:                                                                |           |      |
| Concepts                                                                              | 6-15      | 6-10 |
| Department of Defense                                                                  | 6-17      | 6-11 |
| Department of the Army                                                                 | 6-20      | 6-14 |
| General                                                                               | 6-13      | 6-9  |
| Introduction                                                                          | 6-1-6-2   | 6-1  |
| Joint Chiefs of Staff                                                                  | 6-18      | 6-14 |
| Military departments                                                                   | 6-19      | 6-14 |
| Programs                                                                              | 6-14      | 6-9  |
| State Department                                                                       | 6-3,6-16  | 6-2-6-11 |
| Unified commands                                                                       | 6-21      | 6-17 |
| Violence                                                                              | 3-6,5-19c | 3-3-5-18 |
| Vulnerable population                                                                  | 3-3a, 3-13a | 3-1-3-8 |
| Women's Army Corps (WAC)                                                               | E-4f      | E-2  |
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

FRED C. WEYAND
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

Distribution:

Active Army, ARNG, USAR: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11B requirements for Stability Operations, US Army Doctrine (Qty rqr block no. 305) and Field Service Regulations, Internal Defense and Development (Qty rqr block no. 408).
