FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS
INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT (IDAD)

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Purpose and Scope ........................................ 1-1 1-1
General .................................................. 1-2 1-1

2. BACKGROUND
Insurgency and the World Situation ............... 2-1 2-1
US National Objectives ................................ 2-2 2-1
US Interests .............................................. 2-3 2-1

3. GROWTH OF INSURGENCY
General .................................................. 3-1 3-1
The Basic Cause of Insurgency ...................... 3-2 3-1
Development of Insurgent Movements .............. 3-3 3-1
Role of a Disciplined Revolutionary Party ....... 3-4 3-2
External Intervention .................................. 3-5 3-2
Phases of Insurgency .................................... 3-6 3-2

4. US POLICY FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT
The US Role in Countries Threatened by Insurgency .... 4-1 4-1
US Strategy ............................................. 4-2 4-1
Legal Aspects ............................................ 4-3 4-2

5. US ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT
General .................................................. 5-1 5-1
The Role of the Department of State .............. 5-2 5-1
The Role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) .... 5-3 5-2
The Role of the US Information Agency (USIA) .... 5-4 5-2
The Role of the Agency for International Development (AID) .... 5-5 5-2
The Role of the Department of Defense .......... 5-6 5-3

JCS Functions in Foreign Internal Defense ........ 5-7 5-3
Functions of Unified and Specified Commands in Foreign Internal Defense .... 5-8 5-3
Functions of Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG) in Foreign Internal Defense ... 5-9 5-4

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6. ROLE OF THE ARMY IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. General</td>
<td>The Army's Role</td>
<td>6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specific Responsibilities of the Army in Stability Operations</td>
<td>6-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support of Other US Agencies</td>
<td>6-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US Army Organization for Stability Operations</td>
<td>6-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal Defense and Internal Development Assistance</td>
<td>6-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stability Operations Roles</td>
<td>6-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advisory Assistance</td>
<td>6-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations</td>
<td>6-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intelligence Operations</td>
<td>6-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Populace and Resources Control</td>
<td>6-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tactical Operations</td>
<td>6-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Training</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>6-12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX A. REFERENCES

A-1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1-1. Purpose and Scope

a. Purpose. This manual outlines the roles of the US Government departments and agencies in assisting host countries in countering an insurgency and provides guidance for the execution of the Department of Defense portion of coordinated national strategy.

b. Scope. In outlining the roles of US departments and agencies in internal defense and development, the manual considers the nature of the threat and the relationships between US agencies concerned with US foreign internal defense and development.

c. Comments. Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes and comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons will be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be forwarded direct to the Commanding Officer, US Army Combat Developments Command, Special Operations Agency, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307. Originators of proposed changes which would constitute a significant modification of approved Army doctrine may send an information copy, through command channels, to the Commanding General, US Army Combat Developments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia 22060, to facilitate review and follow-up.

1-2. General

Within the Army the overall national program to prevent and defeat insurgency is called IDAD. The military role in IDAD is a principal Army mission that is generally referred to as stability operations (STABOPS). It encompasses those activities that are designed to promote stability and progress in the modernization process of developing nations. These activities include advisory assistance, civil-military operations, intelligence operations, populace and resources control, and tactical operations. Stability operations are specifically defined as—

That type of internal defense and internal development (IDAD) operations and assistance provided by the Armed Forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and without which progress cannot be achieved (AR 310-25).

The term “counterinsurgency” is used by the US Joint Staff and the unified commands in joint planning and operations. Within the Army, the term “internal defense and development (IDAD)” is preferred to “counterinsurgency.” The Army uses the term stability operations to indicate the military portion of IDAD. The Army's readiness for such activities commands a full share of its resources, professional military thought, and equal priority with readiness for conventional and nuclear war missions.
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

2-1. Insurgency and the World Situation

a. The broad background of insurgency and what US national interests are will be outlined in this chapter. Major insurgent movements have occurred in China, Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, Laos, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Iran, and Indonesia. Insurgencies of more limited size and duration have occurred in other areas. Some of these insurgencies have resulted in the overthrow of governments, and some have been defeated.

b. While not every insurgent movement has been Communist inspired, many have provided opportunities for Communist exploitation. In some cases e.g., Greece, Laos, South Vietnam, the insurgency has been supported by a neighboring Communist state, and the insurgents have enjoyed the advantage of a secure base for training, logistic support, and a safe haven from pursuit across an international border.

c. Communist and other movements use insurgency as a tool to achieve power by the use of military, political, economic, sociological, and psychological means in an integrated attack on existing governments. Insurgency must be properly recognized as a major Communist form of politico-military conflict.

2-2. US National Objectives

Creation of a stable international environment, within which political, economic, and social development can occur, is a primary US objective. In order to achieve this objective, the US pursues a foreign policy that includes assistance to selected countries to maintain their freedom and independence and to deal effectively with their problems of political stability, economic development, and social justice. The US will continue to provide elements of military strength and economic resources when such appears to be within our interests. However, the defense and progress of other countries must be first, their responsibility and second, a regional responsibility. Without the foundations of self-help and regional help, US help will not succeed. The assistance provided is predicated upon the requirement that any country whose security is threatened and who requests assistance must assume primary responsibility for providing the manpower needed for its own defense.

2-3. US Interests

a. Broad US interests are—

(1) A political and ideological interest in assuring that nations contribute to a stable world conducive to international cooperation and the growth of free institutions.

(2) A military interest in assuring that areas of strategic value to the US do not fall under unfriendly control.

(3) An economic interest in assuring that resources and markets remain available to the United States.

(4) A humanitarian interest in assisting in achievement of social, economic, and educational aspirations.

b. The United States does not wish to assume an invariable stance against revolution as a means of change. The right of peoples to change their governments, economic systems, and social structures by revolution is recognized in international law. Each case of latent, incipient, or active insurgency must therefore be examined on its merits in the light of US interests.
CHAPTER 3
GROWTH OF INSURGENCY

3–1. General

Conditions that favor insurgency usually exist in nations which are breaking with a traditional order but have not yet developed a stable social and economic structure or a popularly accepted governmental apparatus. This chapter will concern itself with causes of insurgency and its development.

3–2. The Basic Cause of Insurgency

The basic cause of insurgency is the desire of the insurgent leadership to wrest power from one elite in order to control it themselves. The motive of this leadership may be either dissatisfaction with the status quo, ambition to achieve power, desire to act for external forces, or a combination of these. To achieve this goal, insurgent leaders will attempt to exploit grievances that are caused by the populations' lack of faith in the present government due to its failures.

a. Grievances. Grievances may arise from long standing or recent political, social, and economic conditions. In some cases, government actions to prevent insurgency may provide grievances which could be exploited by the insurgent leadership.

b. Loss of Faith in the Government. The population may lose faith in a governmental system when that system shows itself to be unwilling or unable to meet popular expectations. Thus a major governmental effort should be made to identify causes of popular discontent and take remedial action. Ideally, such action should be highly visible and positive in nature in order to demonstrate governmental interest and effectiveness in meeting popular demands.

c. Governmental Failures.

(1) The government may fail to recognize the magnitude of the grievances of its people. This failure may occur because the governmental structure does not extend down to the local levels or is insensitive to the needs of the people. These conditions deny the people an effective means for making their grievances known.

(2) On the other hand, the government may recognize the grievances but fail to provide solutions. This may occur as a result of strong factions seeking to maintain the status quo.

(3) The government may offer solutions the people consider too slow in bringing benefits. This failure is the most common and the most difficult to avoid. It necessarily takes time to establish the preconditions for economic advancement and to execute programs to alleviate grievances. The time required is even greater when the country is poor in means and skills. The population usually is not cognizant of the need for time to plan and organize the large-scale programs necessary to start the process of modernization. As a result, the people are unwilling to wait for long term benefits. Whether the government is deliberately slow or not, those impatient for change will suspect that it is. In an effort to permit the government to move faster, some faction may encourage it to seek more and more foreign aid. Concurrently, other factions may try to cause the government to refuse such aid in the belief that acceptance will be detrimental to the developing sense of nationalism.

(4) The government may fail to communicate to the people the magnitude and scope of its efforts to alleviate recognized grievances. Regardless of the speed with which the government attempts to achieve its nation building tasks, it must provide the people some hope for the future as well as some immediate, tangible benefits as evidence of its ability and determination. If a government initiates rapid and sound programs to remedy grievances, it usually will be anxious to make its efforts and progress known to the people.

3–3. Development of Insurgent Movements

a. Leadership. Grievances and a lack of faith in the programs or capabilities of the government may promote a smoldering resentment and fragmented, disjointed actions against the government on the part of individuals and small groups. However, an ingredient must be added to bring on an active insurgency. This indispensable ingredient is leadership. Leadership converts the discontent into a cause, the dissatisfied person into an insurgent, and the mob into an organization. The appeal of the cause is broadened to include ever larger segments of the population and to intensify the commitment of its members. An organization is established to coordinate their efforts and to use available means and skills for
maximum effect. Political opportunists or subversive parties seek to exploit the situation by capturing leadership of the movement for their own purposes.

b. Organization. Insurgent movements begin when disaffection occurs among strongly motivated individuals who will not or cannot further their cause by peaceful and legal means. Under appropriate conditions, the attitudes and beliefs of these individuals spread to family groups, neighbors, and entire communities. When legal recourse is denied, the government program is inept, or radical elements do not seek recourse through legal channels nor desire to accept the government proposals to alleviate grievances, disaffection can grow into insurgency. At this point, elements of the populace may be organized to participate in insurgent activities. Dissident groups living and working within the established order are formed into an underground organization to conduct coordinated clandestine insurgent activities. As resistance grows, armed insurgent bands may be formed in relatively secure areas. These activities may be initiated or supported by outside sources also seeking to disrupt or destroy a government.

3-4. Role of a Disciplined Revolutionary Party

The conditions described in the preceding paragraphs thus create fertile soil for a disciplined revolutionary party, such as the Communists. A local party, if existent, may be relatively small in numbers, but it invariably constitutes a disciplined cadre of highly motivated individuals—many trained abroad in the techniques of seizing power. Party members may be among the original leaders of dissident groups, or they may attempt to infiltrate such groups in the early stages and assume key positions in order to control the leaders. They attempt to identify themselves with nationalism or other popular causes while concealing or denying their real political identity and purpose. Party members use every opportunity to aggravate conditions which cause popular discontent. They foster discontent by skillful agitation and propaganda, and they channel it into directions favorable to their goals.

3-5. External Intervention

Infiltration of professional revolutionaries to all parts of the world has increased since the end of World War II. External revolutionaries have been able to intervene directly in newly independent and less developed nations in a variety of guises, e.g., trade, economic aid, technical assistance, and military advice. Moreover, they have trained large numbers of Africans, Latin Americans, and Asians for subversion in their homelands. Given the relative ease with which a trained subversive can foment difficulty for a government already struggling with the stresses of modernization, little additional external support from outside countries is needed.

3-6. Phases of Insurgency

Insurgency may be divided into three general phases based on the level of intensity. These phases facilitate discussion of the requirements necessary to defeat a subversive insurgency. However, the flexibility of strategy open to the insurgent movement requires a continuing analysis of insurgent activities and capabilities. The phases described below permit only general planning and preparations.

a. Phase I. This phase includes latent and incipient insurgency. There are no major outbreaks of violence against the established authority. However, there are outbreaks of subversive incidents which may initially be mistakenly identified with simple banditry or other forms of lawlessness.

b. Phase II. This phase is reached when a subversive movement has gained sufficient local or external support and can initiate organized urban or rural guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.

c. Phase III. The situation moves from Phase II or Phase III when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.
CHAPTER 4
US POLICY FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

4-1. The US Role in Countries Threatened by Insurgency

US foreign policy provides for security assistance when it is in our national interest and requested by a nation threatened by subversive insurgency. The Nixon Doctrine calls for a country whose security is threatened to assume primary responsibility for providing the manpower needed for its own defense. Such reliance on local initiative encourages local assumption of responsibility and thereby serves both the needs of other countries and US national interest. To this end, the US role is to—

a. Assist countries to devise effective internal defense and internal development programs sufficiently in advance to make unnecessary the future need for employment of US combat troops.

b. Assist in establishing or strengthening host country internal defense organizations so that they are capable of defeating subversive insurgency in its earliest stage.

c. Minimize direct US military involvement in insurgent wars by drawing on the assistance of international organizations and third countries.

d. Assist in the defeat of insurgency in threatened countries by assisting the host government with appropriate security assistance programs.

e. Minimize the probability of subversive insurgency escalating to conventional or nuclear war.

4-2. US Strategy

a. The introduction of technology in the developing areas of the world promotes instability and uncertainty. Thus to maintain a contented population, the government must balance the rate of technological advancement with the ability of the people to absorb it. Further, it must develop an administrative structure to insure that the legitimate needs of the people are heard and if possible met within the resources of the nation. In this overall environment the local government must also maintain internal security. In the past, prevention of insurgency has been viewed primarily as a military or police problem. However, it is now recognized to be a problem which must be met with a full range of measures—political, economic, social, psychological, and military. Consequently, the strategy for a selected country may require multiple channels for US assistance towards development of an independent and sovereign state free of outside influence, capable of defending its own interests in its own territory, and to move by its own will toward its own objectives. The desirability of defeating an insurgency at the earliest possible stage is fundamental to this strategy because the political, economic, and human costs of preventive measures are small compared to the costs of winning a full scale insurgent war. Each US mission must continually assess its host country’s potentialities for constructive development, and its vulnerability to insurgency. Such assessments permit the US Government to develop an appropriate policy toward that country which can contribute to the prevention of insurgency.

b. Elimination of Insurgency.

(1) General. The major effort in combatting insurgency must come from the host country since insurgency is a problem involving the aspirations and allegiances of the people. The host government must remove the causes, win the support of the people, strengthen the society’s cohesiveness, and neutralize the insurgents. The United States must remain in the background, lest it prejudice the local government’s actions and expose itself unnecessarily to charges of intervention and colonialism. US representatives should conduct themselves in such a manner as to assure that maximum credit is accrued by the local government.

(2) Military Response. Military action by indigenous armed forces will be required. US programs and operational assistance should be designed to make the indigenous military response as effective and decisive as possible.

(3) Multilateral Action. Multilateral action to prevent or defeat insurgency is preferable to unilateral US action. The policy of the United States is to—

(a) Take action in and through the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of American States (OAS), South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), etc.
TO), and other multilateral and regional organizations.

(b) Encourage other nations to give diplomatic, political, economic, and military aid to threatened countries.

(c) Encourage maintenance of effective border security in countries contiguous to those threatened to prevent use of their territory as safe havens.

c. Strategic Intelligence. Agencies having action responsibilities for US foreign internal defense and internal development contribute to the US strategic intelligence effort in accordance with applicable directives.

4–3. Legal Aspects

US forces and their members engaged in stability operations are subject to international law, agreements between the US and host country government, US law and regulations, and except as otherwise specifically agreed, local law. For a detailed discussion of the legal aspects of conducting stability operations, see FM 27–10 and FM 31–23.
5-1. General

a. Many United States resources are drawn on in providing assistance to less-developed countries to prevent or defeat insurgency. Effective use of these resources, however, requires development of integrated plans and programs under a unified concept of operations. This chapter deals with the roles of the various departments and agencies of the US Government engaged in foreign internal defense and internal development. It provides in broad outline the organization for the coordination of US activities. Chapter 6 will consider the role of the Department of the Army in these operations.

b. Internal defense and internal development operations are major instruments of US foreign policy. To meet his overall responsibility for the formulation and direction of the foreign policy of the United States, the President may find it necessary to call upon the executive departments and agencies of the national government, members of the legislative or judicial branches of government, or upon private citizens and institutions for advice, consultation, or conduct of various foreign policy activities. Uppermost in advisory activities will be the National Security Council (NSC) which was established as a advisory and coordinating system to assist the President in making those key decisions involving national security and foreign policy matters. The National Security Council system ensures the integration and coordination of all decisions into the overall governmental effort. Many of these decisions will pertain to internal defense and internal development activities of the United States and how they best support US security and interests abroad. In the normal course of events the NSC system will coordinate the functions of the governmental departments participating in internal defense and internal development operations through area oriented regional bureaus called Interdepartmental Groups (IG’s).

c. The departments and agencies which have major roles in foreign internal defense and internal development are the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Agency for International Development (AID), the United States Information Agency (USIA), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

5-2. The Role of the Department of State

The President has assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the US government overseas. This includes continuous supervision and direction of the entire foreign aid program which includes development assistance, security assistance, and humanitarian assistance programs. In the implementation of his responsibilities for the execution of foreign policy and for the direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities overseas, the Secretary of State uses the Under Secretaries’ Committee and the Interdepartmental Groups.

a. The Under Secretaries’ Committee, chaired by the Under Secretary of State who reports directly to the Secretary of State, considers those more sensitive policy matters which pertain to the activities of the US Government overseas and are beyond the authority of the Interdepartmental Groups but do not require the consideration of the National Security Council or the President. The Committee, or where deemed necessary, the NSC, will identify and establish priorities for countries in which an internal security situation represents a significant threat to US interest and where US internal defense and internal development assistance would be desirable and feasible.

b. In general, the Interdepartmental Groups are chaired by an Assistant Secretary of State and are responsible for—

(1) Identification and recommendation of priorities for countries in which an internal security situation represents a significant threat to US interests and where US internal defense and internal development assistance would be desirable and feasible.

(2) Development of a comprehensive plan to provide US internal defense and internal development assistance to each country under the above criteria. These plans should be applicable to specific situations and be developed by the appropriate country teams according to format, timing, and other guidelines established by the Under Secretaries’ Committee.

c. The State Department organization includes five area oriented geographic bureaus correspond—
ing to the area oriented IG's of the NSC. An assistant
secretary of state chairs both the State Department
regional bureau and the corresponding NSC IG. A
country director is appointed within each regional
bureau of the Department of State to serve as a focal
and contact point for coordination of department and
interdepartment activities concerning his country or
countries of assignment. He is responsive to the chiefs
of mission in the respective countries within his geographic
area (hereafter referred to as ambassador), the
appropriate assistant secretary of state which directs
the geographical bureau, and other government
agencies as required.

d. The ambassador represents the President of
the US, functions within the organization of the
State Department and is in charge of the entire
US diplomatic mission in the host country. The
mission includes the representatives of all US
departments and agencies in the country of assign-
ment.

e. In order to coordinate interdepartmental
matters, ambassadors are encouraged to organize
country teams composed of the ambassador, the
deputy chief of mission, the chiefs of the political,
economic, and consular sections of the embassy,
and the leaders of the in-country elements of DOD,
CIA, AID, USIA, and other representatives of the
US Government as may be appropriate. However,
he normally organizes and operates the country
team to fit his own particular style of decision
making and supervision. The President has given
full responsibility to the ambassador to direct and
coordinate the activities and operations of all ele-
ments of the United States diplomatic mission.
The President has charged him to exercise this
mandate not only by providing policy, leadership,
and guidance, but also by assuring positive pro-
gram direction to the end that all United States
activities in the host country are relevant to cur-
rent realities, are efficiently and economically ad-
ministered, and are effectively interrelated so that
they will make a maximum contribution to United
States interests in that country as well as to re-

go
dional and international objectives.

5-3. The Role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

a. The CIA coordinates intelligence activities of
other US departments and agencies in the in-
terest of national security. It is responsible for—

(1) Advising the NSC in matters concerning
such intelligence activities of the government de-
partments and agencies as relate to national se-
curity.

(2) Recommending policy to the NSC for the
coordination of such intelligence activities of the
departments and agencies of the government as
they relate to the national security.

(3) Correlating and evaluating intelligence
relating to national security and providing for the
appropriate dissemination of such intelligence
within the government.

(4) Performing such additional services of
common concern as the NSC determines can be
more efficiently accomplished centrally.

5-4. The Role of the United States Information
Agency (USIA)

Note. USIA is referred to as United States Information Service
(USIS) in the host countries.

a. USIA helps to achieve US foreign policy ob-
jectives by influencing public attitudes in other
nations and by advising the President, his repre-
sentatives abroad, and the various departments
and agencies on the implications of foreign opin-
ion for present and contemplated US policies, pro-
grams, and official statements. This is carried out
by using personal contact, radio broadcasting,
libraries, book publications and distribution,
press, motion pictures, television, exhibits, Eng-
lish-language instruction, and other means of com-
unication to encourage constructive public sup-
port abroad for US policy objectives, and to un-
mask and counter hostile attempts to distort or
frustrate US policies. Except for certain aspects
applying to the United Nations Command, all psy-
chological operations abroad during cold war, in-
cluding those carried out by DOD, are a function
of USIA with support rendered by DOD and other
applicable agencies.

b. US responsibility for interdepartmental co-
ordination of psychological operations has been
assigned to the USIA. The coordination of the
United States and host country psychological op-
erations is achieved through the establishment of
joint US/host country area coordination centers
at various political/military levels. The success or
failure of an internal defense and internal de-
velopment operation or program can hinge on how
well it is received and understood by the popula-
tion. Thus, psychological operations become a
major facet of security assistance. Thorough co-
ordination is required at all levels in order to in-
sure that military and civilian elements put forth
an integrated and unified effort.

5-5. The Role of the Agency for International
Development (AID)

a. AID functions as an agency within the De-
partment of State. It is responsible for continuous
supervision and general direction of all development assistance programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 480, and similar legislation. AID also coordinates military and economic assistance programs to ensure consonance with US foreign policy objectives.

b. AID plans and implements programs overseas having as their long term aim the creation of economic and social conditions of sufficient vitality to eliminate causes of discontent and to sustain responsive, representative governments and institutions. It also assists host governments in developing or improving their civil police capability.

c. Although AID is primarily concerned with economic, humanitarian, and developmental assistance, some of its programs such as Economic Supporting Assistance, Public Safety, selected provisions of Public Law 480, etc., are security related. In these instances, these security related programs are administered by AID but the Chief, USAID in the host country ensures that they are fully coordinated with the DOD representative and integrated into the internal defense and internal development objectives of the United States.

5-6. The Role of the Department of Defense (DOD)

a. The provision of US military advice and assistance to a host country is dependent upon US national policy, the desires of the host country, the insurgent threat, and the directions of the President. When directed by the President, the Department of Defense has a major responsibility to assist selected countries to maintain internal security. In discharging this responsibility, DOD seeks to achieve a proper balance in each country of the capabilities to meet external and internal threats. When insurgency is incipient in countries not confronted with a credible external threat, DOD will support development of an adequate internal defense capability, assist USIS, and support the internal development programs of AID. In this case, the military assistance functions of DOD assets are primarily in the fields of advisory and training assistance. If the insurgent movement gains momentum and progresses to higher levels of intensity, the President may direct further US military participation. This could take the form of increased advisory and training assistance or the commitment of US military combat support and combat service support units. During critical situations of grave interest to the US, the US Government may direct the commitment of US combat forces.

b. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for International Security Affairs (ISA) assists the Secretary of Defense in foreign internal defense and internal development. He is charged with responsibilities for all security assistance activities of DOD. The ASD (ISA) responsibilities include the following functions:

1. Direction, administration, and supervision of the Security Assistance Programs.
2. Coordination and supervision of relations of DOD organizations with other governmental agencies in the field of military assistance.
3. Coordination with other agencies in order to formulate guidance for the preparation of long-range military assistance plans and programs.

5-7. JCS Functions in Foreign Internal Defense

The Joint Chiefs of Staff—

a. Serve as principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

b. Maintain continuing surveys of military resources available to the Department of Defense, verify their readiness, report on their adequacy, and make appropriate recommendations for their employment.

c. Present the military viewpoint in government councils to insure that military factors are understood before decisions are reached and to assist in arriving at unified and effective plans for execution.

d. Insure the training of military officers in the background, tactics, techniques, and program planning for stability operations.

e. Provide for development of strategy and preparation of military contingency plans, in accordance with US national objectives.

f. When directed, provide operational assistance to friendly countries faced with a credible threat of internal and/or external aggression.

g. In consonance with policies promulgated by the Secretary of Defense, provide guidance for the supervision of stability operations through the commander of unified and specified commands.

5-8. Functions of Unified and Specified Commands in Foreign Internal Defense

Each commander—

a. Directs and supervises the activities of the MAAGs in his command to include provision for technical assistance and administrative support.

b. Reviews the military portions of host country internal defense plans and forwards them with his recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Supports, through the Security Assistance
Program, appropriate requirements of the country team for internal defense and internal development activities.

d. Plans appropriate command structures to be activated when military conditions dictate and upon approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. Exercises complete responsibility for military operations and operational command of assigned military units within his area in accordance with JCS Pub. 2.

5–9. Functions of Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Foreign Internal Defense

Note. The term MAAG as used in this manual includes MAAG/Mission/MILGP and similar organizations.
The Commander/Chief of each MAAG—

a. Represents the Secretary of Defense in the country to which he is accredited, as specified in each case by Executive Order or other pertinent instruction.

b. Develops the military section of country team internal defense plans and assures that provision is made for MAP support.

c. Provides advice and assistance to host countries on the military aspect of internal defense and internal development, whenever such assistance is sought by the host country and approved by the United States Government. When appropriate, this includes the development of a US foreign intelligence assistance program to help establish an effective indigenous military intelligence organization.

d. In countries where no MAAG is assigned the senior US military officer will perform the responsibilities listed above.

e. When the internal threat to a host country increases to the point where military assistance requirements exceed the administrative and supervisory capabilities of a MAAG, a military assistance command may be established. Additionally, a US support command may be established if the situation so dictates.

f. Supervises use and maintenance of end items provided to host country through Security Assistance Programs.
CHAPTER 6
ROLE OF THE ARMY IN INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT

Section I. GENERAL

6-1. The Army's Role

The Army has been assigned a major role in providing military assistance to those nations willing to assume responsibility for their own security. Initially the help provided will consist of training, advice, and material assistance. When required and deemed appropriate, the help may be the provision of backup logistical support and sea and air combat support. In some special cases, it can include ground combat support as well. However, the degree of participation by US Army units will be determined by the President based upon his analysis of the insurgent threat and the desires of the host country government.

6-2. Specific Responsibilities of the Army in Stability Operations

a. Provide military assistance in conjunction with the Navy and Air Force to designated friendly countries under the MAP.

b. Develop language trained and area oriented Army forces and personnel as necessary to train, advise, or assist indigenous forces.

c. Act as the executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for civil affairs planning.

d. Conduct research and development activities in support of foreign internal defense and internal development to include psychological operations and civil affairs within its area of responsibility.

e. Conduct intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

f. Develop, in coordination with the other services, the doctrine, tactics, procedures, techniques, and equipment to be used by Army and Marine Corps ground forces, except for those used in amphibious operations.

g. Participate with the other services in joint internal defense training and exercises as mutually agreed by the services concerned.

h. Be prepared to provide tactical units.

6-3. Support of Other US Agencies

The Army provides support to the foreign internal defense and internal development effort of other US governmental agencies by:

a. Administering Army aspects of MAP.

b. Participating in the development of joint plans.

c. Supporting the State Department cultural exchange program by exchange of US and foreign military personnel for visits, training, and education.

d. Supporting the USIA through direct liaison at national and field levels. The Army provides timely information to USIA on Army matters which will have an impact of foreign nationals. Army psychological operations personnel operate with USIS posts at regional level and, in certain cases, conduct radio broadcasts to target countries.

e. Maintaining facilities to conduct instruction and professional training in psychological operations, medical services, engineering, communications, police techniques and operations, and civil affairs.

f. Supporting AID through direct liaison at national and field level. Army personnel support AID operations by administering the aspects of the MAP program that bear on military/civic action and military and paramilitary police activities. When directed, the Army will reinforce AID assets when AID personnel are not available.

g. Supporting other US agencies when directed.

6-4. US Army Organization for Stability Operations

a. Army elements, through participation in MAAGs, play a key role in improving the internal defense and internal development capability of indigenous military and when directed, paramilitary and police forces by providing advice, training, materiel, and operational assistance. Official and personal relationships established by US Army advisors with local military and civilian leaders provide opportunities to increase mutual understanding.

b. All Army units are capable of participating in stability operations. They conduct operations and/or assist host country forces during operations to defeat insurgencies. Combat support and combat service support units may be employed to provide internal defense assistance in early stages of insurgency. Combat units are not likely to be
committed during early stages of unrest or insurgency, but they may participate in show of force operations as a deterrent during early stages of unrest or insurgency.

c. The Army provides mobile training teams (MTT’s) in fields such as signal, psychological operations, civil affairs, medical, engineering, intelligence, tactical operations, and police operations. These teams may be dispatched from theater back up forces, or from CONUS on temporary duty for specific training missions.

d. Certain specialized organizations, such as Special Action Forces (SAF), Special Forces, the US Army Security Agency, psychological operations units, intelligence and counterintelligence units, and civil affairs units, conduct stability operations in both the advisory and operational roles.

e. Resources deployed by the unified commander are normally placed under the operational command of the MAAG in the host country.

f. Personnel designated by the unified commander for stability operations should be linguistically, culturally, and professionally qualified to perform assigned missions effectively.

g. Approved requests for in-country assistance that cannot be filled from available unified command resources will be forwarded to the Department of Defense for levy against CONUS resources.

h. Units in the CONUS base may be designated as backup forces for specific unified commands. These units can be oriented toward the probable geographic area of employment and develop rudimentary linguistic qualifications.

6-5. Internal Defense and Internal Development Assistance

a. The Need for a Tailored Effort. Each insurgency develops a character of its own. This character is determined by factors peculiar to that country such as: geography, population, government structure, quality of insurgent leadership, and type of external support, if any. The nature of the response by the host country and its allies will also be structured by these factors. Careful assessment of these factors and their impact on the overall situation must be made in order to properly tailor US assistance and the host country response. Once committed, US assistance may include that support which is keyed to the phases discussed in b through d, below.

b. Phase I. During this phase, US support will consist primarily of financial and material aid; economic, political, sociological, and military advice; and provisions for education both in and out of the host country. Most US efforts will be provided at the host country national level, i.e., at the national capital or in areas where centralized training centers have been established. However, some US mobile training teams and some advisors may be sent throughout the nation.

c. Phase II. In a Phase II insurgency, US Army personnel and combat service and combat service support units may be sent to advise, train, or otherwise support the efforts of the host country.

d. Phase III. US assistance in a Phase III insurgency may require relatively large US logistical units or combat support units, and US combat forces may be committed to maintain, establish or regain control of threatened land areas.

6-6. Stability Operations Roles

Military forces accomplish stability operations missions through the conduct of advisory assistance, civil-military operations, intelligence operations, populace and resource control, and tactical operations. These operations may be conducted by the military alone or in coordination with other governmental agencies in support of US military assistance programs (MAP). The MAP is fundamental to the furtherance of US military objectives in countries combatting insurgency. The Department of the Army, in conjunction with the Navy and Air Force, provides military assistance to designated friendly nations under the direction of DOD.

6-7. Advisory Assistance

Within DOD, the principal element charged with providing advisory assistance is the MAAG. US/HC and allied advisory assistance includes furnishing advice on military organization, training, operations, doctrine, and materiel in order to increase the capabilities and efficiency of the host country for participation in internal defense and internal development. See FM 31–23 for a more detailed discussion.

6-8. Civil-Military Operations

Civil-military operations embrace the political, economic, social, and psychological aspects of military operations. They specifically include those civil affairs and PSYOP actions embracing the relationship between the military forces, civil authorities, and people in the operations. These actions include internal development assistance activities and those actions in which PSYOP techniques are used to support the achievement of
command objectives. For further guidance see FM 31-23, FM 33-1, FM 41-5, and FM 101-5.

6-9. Intelligence Operations

a. Intelligence operations are concerned with all aspects of a nation's actual or potential involvement with insurgency and are vital to successful internal defense and internal development operations. Military intelligence operations, in coordination with other US governmental agencies, must be initiated as early as possible. Of particular importance are intelligence activities which are devoted to neutralizing or destroying the effectiveness of the insurgent infrastructure. It is also necessary to establish a data base in preparation for whatever roles the military may be required to play in defeating the insurgency. See FM 30-31 and FM 30-31A for detailed guidance on IDAD Intelligence operations.

b. Hard intelligence on insurgent activities and organization may be sparse and difficult to obtain. Military operations can be launched for the purpose of gathering information as well as in response to intelligence. The lack of concrete information should not be used as a rationale for deferring action. Rather commanders should recognize that in order to successfully inhibit insurgent movement and disrupt his organization it may become necessary to adopt a modus operandi whereby tactical operations are initiated based on largely unconfirmed information.

6-10. Populace and Resources Control

Populace and resources control comprises all those government initiated actions—socio-economic, political, and military—by which the population and its resources are maintained in a protected and secure status, for the purpose of (a) breaking any support link between the population and the insurgents and (b) forging a link of support between the population and the government. These activities are primarily a police responsibility; however, in an active insurgency they may require reinforcement by military or paramilitary forces. See FM 31-23 and FM 41-5 for a more detailed discussion.

6-11. Tactical Operations

Tactical operations are the most violent and extreme of all operations employed in stability operations. For detailed guidance see FM 31-23.

Section II. TRAINING

6-12. Training

a. General. Individual and unit training is required for Army forces to be committed to stability operations. Training programs must stress an attitude of urgency, dedication to the job, and the politico-military aspects of stability operations. This section discusses broad individual training objectives and programs. Unit training, as well as more detailed individual training requirements, is discussed in FM 31-23.

b. General Training Objectives for US Army Personnel. All personnel assigned, or to be assigned, foreign affairs responsibilities should receive general instruction on US policy and strategies, and on the resources and techniques available to the United States in assisting developing countries to cope with the problems of internal defense and internal development. In addition to general instruction, the following are desirable objectives for the training of personnel being assigned to countries with IDAD problems or to headquarters assignments which involve the monitoring or direction of IDAD programs in host countries.

(1) A basic knowledge of the US foreign policy, and how it applies to the host country.

(2) An understanding of the problems of modernization and its inherent instabilities.

(3) A basic knowledge of foreign internal defense responsibilities and capabilities within the military services.

(4) Knowledge of doctrine and organizational techniques employed in supporting insurgency from abroad, including those employed by the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba.

c. Foreign Affairs Executive Seminar. Advanced special instruction on problems of policy formulation and application in the developing countries is given at the interdepartmental Foreign Affairs Executive Seminar. This special training is available for officers who are selected to fill key positions in embassies or related assignments.

d. The Military School. Instruction in the fields of military assistance, internal defense and internal development is given to members of the
Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP) and to advisors at the Military Advisory School, US Army Institute for Military Assistance.

*Training of Allies.* The United States also provides training to civilian and military personnel of selected developing countries. While primary emphasis is placed on training the officials from those countries facing a subversive threat, an effort is made throughout training institutions to explain and gain support for US foreign internal defense policies and programs throughout the developing world.
APPENDIX A
REFERENCES

A-1. Army Regulations (AR)
310-25 Dictionary of United States Army Terms.

A-2. Department of the Army Pamphlets (DAPam)
27-1 Treaties Governing Land Warfare.
27-5 Staff Judge Advocate Handbook.
310-Series Military Publications Indexes.

A-3. Field Manuals (FM)
27-10 The Law of Land Warfare.
30-31 Stability Operations—Intelligence.
(S)30-31A Stability Operations, Intelligence Collection.
41-5 Joint Manual for Civil Affairs.
100-5 Operations of Army Forces in the Field.
100-10 Combat Service Support.
100-15 Larger Units Theater Army-Corps.

A-4. Other References
NATO Standardization of Certain Aspects of Logistics and Operation (SOLOG).
Public Law 480.
Foreign Internal Defense Policy (FIDP) (U).
Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Circular No. 521.
Department of Defense Directive No. 5132.3.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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The Adjutant General

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