1. On 12 December 1967 the Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session adopted MC 14/3 as an overall strategic concept for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area, while noting that, as pointed out by the Military Committee, the concept had been intended to reflect the substance and intent of the Ministerial guidance of 9 May 1967 (DPC/D(67)23), but that the wording and emphasis of certain passages varied from those of the guidance, and that in the event of questions regarding the interpretation of the strategic concept the Ministerial guidance must prevail.

NOTE: This Final Decision sheet now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of MC 14/3. Page numbering of the complete document when this decision sheet is attached is as follows:

MC 14/3(Final) - Pages i, ii
MC 14/3(Mil Dec) - Pages 1-22
2. The attention of the Major NATO Commanders is drawn to this report, which now becomes operative.

3. This document supersedes MC 14/2(Revised).

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

EZIO PISTOTTI
Lieutenant General, Italian Army
Director International Military Staff

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NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L’ATLANTIQUE NORD

MC 14/3 (Military Decision)
22 September 1967

MILITARY DECISION ON MC 14/3
A REPORT BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
to the
DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE
on
OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AREA

1. At their Informal Meeting on 16 September 1967 in Oslo, the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session approved MC 14/3.

2. The attention of the Defense Planning Committee is invited to the recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of the report.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

EZIO PISTOTTI
Lieutenant General, Italian Army
Director, International Military Staff

1 ENCLOSURE
MC 14/3

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This document consists of 22 pages

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MC 14/3 (Military Decision)
A REPORT BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TO THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE ON OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION AREA

References: a. DPC/D(67)23, 11 May 67
b. MC 14/2(Rev.)(Decision), 6 Apr 57

INTRODUCTION

1. The decisions of the Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session on 9 May 1967 (reference a) invited the Military Committee to continue its work upon a possible revision of the overall strategic concept for NATO (reference b) and, inter alia, transmitted to the Military Committee guidance to be followed, (Annex II to reference a).

2. The paper at enclosure represents the first stage of the revision. The second stage will be the submission of a revised paper on "Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept" (MC 48/3).

3. These two papers together supersede the existing strategic guidance contained in MC 14/2(Revised) and MC 48/2.

4. The Military Committee intends that the strategy paper reflect the substance and intent of the Ministerial guidance even though the wording in the strategy paper varies in some respects from that in the Ministerial guidance (Annex II to DPC/D(67)23). The Ministerial guidance will control whenever any difference of wording between the two documents is raised. The Military Committee fully realises that the Defence Planning Committee may wish to comment further or to make suggestions for modification of this paper.

RECOMMENDATION

5. The Military Committee recommends that the Defence Planning Committee approve the document at enclosure.
ENVELOPE 1

OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENSE
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION AREA

ANNEX A - DEFINITIONS

OBJECTIVE

1. The overall defensive concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is to preserve peace and to provide for the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area primarily by a credible deterrence, effected by confronting any possible, threatened or actual aggression, ranging from covert operations to all-out nuclear war, with adequate NATO forces. They must be organised, disposed, trained and equipped so that the Warsaw Pact will conclude that if they launched an armed attack the chances of a favourable decision to them are too small to be acceptable, and that fatal risks could be involved. The Warsaw Pact must not be given any reason to think that they could gain their objectives by the threat or use of military force against any part of the North Atlantic Treaty area. To this end, the provision of military force in support of the purposes and principles of the Alliance requires close, positive and continuing collaboration among the nations concerned and integrated commands.

2. Should aggression occur, the military objective is to preserve or restore the integrity and security of the North Atlantic Treaty area by employing such forces as may be necessary within the concept of forward defence.

ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT

Nature of the Threat

3. The Soviet leaders have not renounced as an ultimate aim the extension of Soviet Communist influence throughout the world.
Even though the policies by which the Soviets seek to realise their ends show signs of evolving in response both to political changes in the world and to the continuing existence of a credible Western deterrent, the fundamental issues underlying the tension between East and West have not been resolved. In this context the Soviets will try to exploit any weaknesses to their own advantage, within as well as outside the NATO area, in order to strengthen their position as a world power. Soviet policy, which is supported to a greater or lesser extent by the Eastern European countries on a number of questions in which they share a community of interest, will continue to be based on:

a. Economic means;
b. Political means;
c. Propaganda;
d. Subversion — including spreading of the Communist ideology and the exportation of arms and material;
e. Military power.

4. Within Europe the Soviet leaders appear in recent years to have followed a more cautious line. Outside Europe, wherever they can do so without military risk to the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders actively exploit every opportunity to build up positions from which to threaten NATO in the event of hostilities; this is especially true in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.

5. The military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact constitute a formidable element in the threat. Although the Warsaw Pact leaders probably believe that they now possess sufficient military power to deter NATO from resorting to all-out nuclear war except under extreme threat to its vital interests, they continue to spend large sums on improving their capabilities; in particular:
a. The Soviets will continue to seek by every possible means, including research, development and production, to acquire a clear military advantage over NATO. They can be expected to exploit, to the maximum, any significant success possibly by adopting more aggressive policies.

b. The Soviets will continue to support their objectives from a position of impressive military strength based on nuclear, massive conventional, chemical and possibly biological capabilities. They will continue to increase their nuclear capability and may build up their anti-ballistic missile capability. The Soviet Union, as a major and still growing world sea power, will deploy its maritime forces world-wide on an increasing scale. The Soviets will also continue to maintain and increase the Warsaw Pact forces’ capability for a wide range of military operations.

**Warsaw Pact Capabilities**

6. The Warsaw Pact is capable of initiating and conducting a wide range of actions against NATO. The principal possible options open to the Pact are:

a. Major nuclear aggression with the aim of destroying to as large an extent as possible NATO’s military potential and, in particular, Allied world-wide nuclear retaliatory capabilities together with attacks on industrial and population centres.

b. Major aggression, possibly supported by tactical nuclear and chemical weapons, delivered simultaneously against the Northern, Central and Southern Regions of ACE and extended into the sea areas.

c. Major aggression against one or two land regions of NATO with or without tactical nuclear and chemical weapons.
d. Nuclear or non-nuclear operations, restricted to the sea areas of NATO, and directed against NATO forces, shipping and sealines of communications.

e. A limited aggression determined by a particular situation, against an individual NATO country. Such an attack could be confined to a particular area.

f. A renewed harassment or blockade of West Berlin, or an attack on West Berlin.

g. Covert actions, incursions or infiltrations (for definitions see Annex "A") anywhere in the NATO area.

h. Politico-military pressures and threats against one or more members of the Alliance involving ultimatums, military demonstrations, deployment of forces, mobilisation and other related incidents.

Other Contingencies

7. Other contingencies could arise which would not immediately and directly threaten the territories and populations of NATO but which would be of special importance and urgent concern to NATO, e.g.: -

a. Soviet actions in the peripheral areas outside the NATO area, e.g., Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, or on the high seas, or in such states as Sweden, Finland, Austria or Yugoslavia.

b. Incidents, outside the NATO area, either on land or at sea, over which neither side could exercise immediate and full control.

Possible Forms of Action Against NATO

8. General. The Warsaw Pact leaders will continue to exploit every opportunity to undermine Alliance solidarity and, in general, to weaken NATO and secure the withdrawal and dispersion of its military forces, including those deployed for forward defence. The means that they may choose in order to realize their aims are likely to be
influenced both by NATO’s military capabilities (particularly in terms of forces immediately available) and by their conclusions regarding the cohesion of NATO and its determination to use its military power if necessary. The more probable actions appear to be those at the lower end of the spectrum, such as creating tension by harassment or blockading Berlin or other political military pressures, as mentioned in sub-paragraphs 6f and 6h above. Other forms of action are examined in more detail in the following paragraphs.

9. **Covert Actions** - Covert action ranging from subversion to outright insurgency is most likely to be effective in countries characterised by political, economic and social instability. For this reason, the Soviets are less likely to meet with any major success in the NATO area than in areas outside it. However, it is conceivable that in the NATO area, the Soviets might engage in covert action to forment unrest, insecurity and subversion in an attempt to create favourable conditions for subsequent exploitation. However, they would be wary of employing any measures which would involve a direct confrontation with Allied forces and a consequent widening of hostilities.

10. **Limited Aggression** - It is believed that the Warsaw Pact leaders are convinced that limited aggression initiated by them in the NATO area would engage vital Western interests and commitments as in no other area of the world, and that even a small-scale military engagement contains the inherent risk of escalation to general nuclear war. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will deliberately initiate a limited war in the NATO area provided that the risk of escalation to nuclear war continues to be made clear to it, and as long as they remain convinced of NATO’s determination, military strength and political cohesion.
a. Nevertheless, if NATO fails to maintain a credible capability to deal with the whole spectrum of aggression, the Warsaw Pact might conclude that they could engage in limited aggression under the umbrella of Soviet strategic nuclear capability. In so doing, the Soviets would attempt to exploit NATO vulnerabilities without escalation to nuclear war. Such action would be aimed at achieving a quick success with limited objectives, followed by a prompt call for negotiations to exploit a fait accompli and avoid military confrontation with NATO.

b. The Soviets might engage in such limited aggressions with Soviet forces, but more probably with other forces or with Communist-supported local revolutionary groups. In keeping with the limited political objectives of such operations, they would seek to limit the engagement of NATO forces, to restrict the geographic area of engagement and to prevent, or at least restrict, the use of nuclear weapons.

11. Major Aggression - So long as the forces committed to NATO and the external nuclear forces supporting the Alliance are able to inflict catastrophic damage on Soviet society even after a surprise nuclear attack, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will deliberately initiate a general war or any other aggression in the NATO area that involves a clear risk of escalation to nuclear war.

12. Deliberate Attack - The risk of deliberate attack, which may vary between regions, cannot be discounted; for example, if the potential enemy, either from political evidence or by deduction from the state of our military preparedness, doubts our cohesion, our determination or our capability to resist. The military weaknesses of the flanks make them particularly vulnerable.

13. Accident or Miscalculation - The possibility of hostilities arising by accident, or from miscalculation, which could escalate to greater intensity, cannot be ruled out.
Probability of Receiving Warning of Attack

14. The potential enemy has the capability to mount a surprise attack on a considerable scale, and the concept of surprise remains a fundamental principle of war; one of the bases for NATO’s military planning should therefore be the hypothesis of an attack with little or no strategic warning by some or all of the forces immediately available to the Warsaw Pact. For an attack directed exclusively or initially against a flank region, NATO’s local military weaknesses would be particularly likely to influence an aggressor’s choice of action in favour of surprise.

15. If the Warsaw Pact was prepared to forego strategic surprise in order to increase the weight of its attack some military indications of the build-up should be expected. Although there can be no certainty that the Soviet Union or one of its Allies would not undertake a sudden onslaught, it is probable in the present political climate that a period of increasing political tension (possibly of weeks, if not months) would precede aggression. The early stages of such a period of increasing tension might be marked by indications (e.g. changes in Soviet policy) which, if interpreted correctly and in time, would give NATO a measure of forewarning. While reliance on this probability as a basis for military force planning for the Alliance as a whole would involve considerable risk, it should also be taken into account in the planning of political measures and military actions, such as making ready and deploying reinforcements, thus enabling the maximum use to be made of any period of forewarning to demonstrate the cohesion and determination of the Alliance and enhance the credibility of its deterrent posture.

STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS

Defence Principles

16. The deterrent concept of the Alliance is based on:
a. **A manifest determination** to act jointly and defend the North Atlantic Treaty area against all forms of aggression;

b. **A recognisable capability** of the Alliance to respond effectively, regardless of the level of aggression;

c. **A flexibility** which will prevent the potential aggressor from predicting with confidence NATO’s specific response to aggression, and which will lead him to conclude that an unacceptable degree of risk would be involved regardless of the nature of his attack.

17. Should deterrence fail and aggression take place there are three types of military response open to NATO, one or more of which should be used in any specific contingency:

a. **Direct Defence.** Direct defence seeks to defeat the aggression on the level at which the enemy chooses to fight. It rests upon physically preventing the enemy from taking what he wants. A capability for direct defence in any contingency is a deterrent to that contingency; successful direct defence either defeats the aggression or places upon the aggressor the burden of escalation. Full options for direct defence exist when NATO can successfully counter any aggression, at whatever place, time, level and duration it occurs. The direct defence concept includes the use of such available nuclear weapons as may be authorised, either on a pre-planned or case-by-case basis. The requirement for direct defence is effective forces-in-being which, on land, must have a capability to defend forward and, at sea, must have a capability to defend wherever aggression occurs.

b. **Deliberate Escalation.** Deliberate escalation seeks to defend aggression by deliberately raising but where possible controlling, the scope and intensity of combat, making the
cost and the risk disproportionate to the aggressor’s objectives and the threat of nuclear response progressively more imminent. It does not solely depend on the ability to defeat the enemy’s aggression as such; rather, it weakens his will to continue the conflict. Depending on the level at which the aggression starts, the time needed for each escalatory action and reaction and the rate of success, escalatory steps might be selected from among the following examples provided they have not previously been used as part of a direct defensive system:

(1) broadening or intensifying a non-nuclear engagement, possibly by opening another front or initiating action at sea in response to low intensity aggression;

(2) use of nuclear defence and denial weapons;

(3) demonstrative use of nuclear weapons;

(4) selective nuclear strikes on interdiction targets;

(5) selective nuclear strikes against other suitable military targets.

c. General Nuclear Response. General nuclear response contemplates massive nuclear strikes against the total nuclear threat, other military targets, and urban-industrial targets as required. It can be forced upon NATO by a major Soviet nuclear attack. It is both the ultimate deterrent and, if used, the ultimate military response.

Elements of Strategy

18. Defence Concept - To safeguard NATO territories and populations and to preserve the free use of sea and airspace, the NATO defence concept should fulfil the following basic objectives:

a. To maintain a strategic nuclear deterrent posture, with a secure retaliatory strike capability, and overall readiness for war.
b. To make it credible to a potential aggressor that he will have to contend with an immediate and effective response by NATO the forward defence concept should be maintained. Sufficient combat ready and balanced land, air and naval forces should be maintained and stationed as far forward as is necessary and possible.

c. To identify the scale of any aggression on land or at sea as quickly as possible.

d. To prevent the aggressor from seizing and holding NATO territory or interfering with the free use of sea and air space and to counter limited aggression without necessarily resorting to nuclear warfare; or, if the aggressor remains intent on his purpose, to confront him with such resistance that he will be compelled to withdraw or risk further escalation which, if necessary, would include the controlled use of nuclear weapons.

e. To cope with a major aggression by bringing to bear such conventional and nuclear capabilities as may be necessary to achieve NATO’s objectives.

19. **NATO Committed Forces** - The forward defence concept requires sufficient ground, sea and air forces in a high state of readiness, committed to NATO for prompt, integrated action in times of tension or against any limited or major aggression. Forces-in-being, with conventional and nuclear capabilities, must be committed to NATO in peacetime to present a credible deterrent to any level of aggression ranging from incursion to major aggression. In order to be fully effective against an attack with little or no strategic warning forces should be provided with adequate combat and logistic support, possess the necessary tactical mobility, and be deployed forward with appropriate echeloning in depth in suitable tactical locations.
To take account of the probability of a period of political tension preceding a possible aggression or to take advantage of forewarning provided by any other indications, NATO requires a capability for rapid augmentation of its forward posture. This calls for:

a. The timely deployment of any active forces not located near their emergency defence positions.

b. Supplementing effective local forces-in-being on the flanks through an improved NATO capability for rapid reinforcement without impairment of M-Day defensive capabilities elsewhere.

c. The provision of trained, equipped, and readily mobilisable reserve forces which might be committed to NATO.

d. The availability of adequate stocks of conventional and nuclear supplies.

The requirement at c. above, which should take full account of the mobilisation and force expansion capabilities of NATO countries, should provide a base for longer term force increases in a prolonged test of political determination.

20. **External Strategic Nuclear Forces** - There must be at all times full planning coordination between the nuclear strategic forces under national control and the nuclear forces of NATO to ensure the most effective use of the total nuclear capability.

21. **Other National Forces for NATO** - Available national forces that are not committed to NATO should contribute to the defence of the NATO area by providing one or more of the following:

a. Intelligence gathering and dissemination.

b. Security forces to counter covert operations directed against NATO countries.

c. Reinforcement forces in support of the Forward Defence Concept in limited aggression.

d. A defence in depth in support of the Forward Defence Concept in major aggression.

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e. Rapidly intervening external reinforcement forces, for the
defence of the flanks in combination with resolute local
forces.

f. A threat to open another front.

g. Forces for logistic support to NATO or national forces and
for safeguarding the lines of communication.

22. The Threat of Escalation

a. The main deterrence to aggression short of full nuclear
attack is the threat of escalation which would lead the
Warsaw Pact to conclude that the risks involved are not
commensurate with their objectives. Should an aggression be
initiated, short of a major nuclear attack, NATO should
respond immediately with a direct defence. (See para. 17a,
above). The first objective would be to counter the
aggression without escalation and preserve or restore the
integrity and security of the North Atlantic area. However,
NATO must be manifestly prepared at all times to escalate the
conflict, using nuclear weapons if necessary. It is
emphasised that NATO’s capabilities to resist conventional
aggression without resorting to nuclear warfare will depend
on the enemy’s actions, on the actions taken by NATO nations
as a result of available warning, on the effectiveness of the
military forces-in-being and reinforcements, and their
conventional capability to defend forward. These factors
will dictate the level of aggression at which NATO will have
to commit itself to initiate the use of nuclear weapons.

b. In peace and war nuclear power in being will weigh heavily in
the scales of negotiation and the keystone of NATO security
and integrity must continue to be based on an adequate
overall nuclear posture. The effects of nuclear war would be

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so grave that the Alliance should engage in such action only after the possibilities of preserving or restoring the integrity of the NATO area through political, economic and conventional military actions had been tried and found insufficient.

c. NATO should retain the initiative to use nuclear weapons under conditions where it is militarily or politically required. The use of nuclear weapons to oppose an aggression, limited in scope and area, though it should not be excluded, might involve an increased risk of escalation.

23. **Decision-Making Machinery** - In view of the speed with which the Warsaw Pact could develop military operations, the political and military control arrangements of the Alliance must allow for:

a. A continuous assessment of the enemy capabilities and indications of attack.

b. Decision-making machinery, capable of rapid decisions especially with regard to:

   (1) The declaration of alert measures, including the assignment of forces to the Major NATO Commanders.

   (2) The need for conventional military action while decisions are being made about mobilisation and deployment of reinforcements.

   (3) The release of nuclear weapons.

24. Effect of NATO Force Build-Up - NATO’s committed forces with a capability to respond rapidly to strategic warning would enhance the credibility of NATO to deter any scale of aggression. National forces would significantly contribute to the deterrent effect of NATO if they were maintained at an effective readiness status and if they could reinforce the NATO committed forces at an early stage, even before actual hostilities.

**THE MILITARY POSTURE OF THE ALLIANCE**

**General**

25. In order to deter, and if necessary counter, aggression, the basic military posture of the Alliance requires land, sea and
air forces with a full spectrum of capabilities, including:

a. The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance. These should be adequate to inflict catastrophic damage on Soviet society even after a surprise nuclear attack and constitute the backbone of NATO’s military capabilities. Although there appears to be no way to prevent similar damage to the West from an all-out nuclear attack, risks are a necessary corollary of a policy founded on deterrence.

b. The tactical nuclear forces available to the Major NATO Commanders. These constitute an essential component of the deterrent. Their primary purposes are to add to the deterrence of conventional attacks of any magnitude, and counter them if necessary, by confronting the enemy with the prospect of consequent escalation of the conflict; and to deter, and if necessary respond to, the use of tactical nuclear weapons by posing the threat of escalation to all-out nuclear war.

c. The conventional forces of the Alliance, land, sea and air, many of which are organically supported by tactical nuclear weapons, are a further essential component of the deterrent. They should be designed to deter and successfully counter to the greatest extent possible a limited non-nuclear attack and to deter any larger non-nuclear attack by confronting the aggressor with the prospect of non-nuclear hostilities on a scale that could involve a grave risk of escalation to nuclear war.

The broad requirements for these forces are outlined below.*

Covert Actions

26. The National armed forces and internal security forces of each NATO country normally should be sufficient to meet covert actions

* Detailed requirements are contained in the revision of "Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept".
in their respective countries. Certain covert actions could directly involve the forces of the Warsaw Pact. These potential sources of conflict, especially including the Soviet attitude to Berlin, should be considered as a special feature of NATO strategy.

**Limited Aggression**

27. The ground, sea and air forces of the Alliance should be capable of rapid, flexible and effective reaction against the various forms of limited aggression. To provide the necessary flexibility and to meet the need for direct defence these forces require adequate mobility, fire-power, communications and logistics, and the capability to conduct a wide range of defensive and offensive operations, including the selective and discriminatory use of nuclear weapons. Inasmuch as NATO forces may have to contend with superior conventional Warsaw Pact forces, there is a requirement for rapid reinforcement tailored to the threat. In order to enhance NATO’s capability to react instantly to a threat of limited aggression, especially on the flanks, the following factors are important:

a. The provision of adequate local forces capable of implementing the forward defence.

b. The provision of supporting reinforcement forces, land, naval and air, planned to intervene rapidly.

**Major Aggression**

28. To deal with major aggression NATO requires within the Alliance:

a. As the ultimate response, strategic nuclear forces with a secure retaliatory capability.

b. Ground, sea and air forces capable of conducting a conventional and nuclear defence against any form of aggression or subversion.

c. Maritime forces for the protection of shipping, to conduct offensive operations against submarines and surface
forces, to counter amphibious operations, for support of the land
battle, to assist in the safe evacuation and dispersal of Allied
shipping and in the essential supply of NATO nations.

Operations After a Major Nuclear Exchange

29. Since the scale and nature of any nuclear exchange cannot be
calculated with any assurance, the situation after a nuclear exchange
is difficult to foresee and to define. NATO should not plan to
reserve forces for hostilities following a general nuclear exchange.
However, NATO requires a survival capability to accomplish as a
minimum:

a. The implementation of survival measures.
b. The maintenance of law and order.
c. The control of land and sea areas.

Bacteriological and Chemical Warfare

30. It is not evident to what extent BW or CW capabilities might
affect deterrence. However, there is a danger that the Soviet leaders
might come to believe that their capabilities in these fields would
give them a significant military advantage. NATO should rely
principally upon its conventional and nuclear forces for deterrence,
but should also possess the capability to employ effectively:

a. Lethal CW agents in retaliations, on a limited scale.
b. Passive defensive measures against CW.
c. Passive defensive measures against BW.

Operations Outside the NATO Area

31. The forces of certain NATO nations may need to retain the
flexibility required to permit action to meet limited military
situations outside the NATO area especially in peripheral areas. This
flexibility should be harmonised with the requirement to protect NATO.

THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

32. The overall military objective of the Alliance is to
prevent war by creating an effective deterrent to all forms of
aggression. For this purpose the Alliance needs a full spectrum
of military capabilities ranging from conventional forces through
tactical nuclear weapons to strategic nuclear forces.

33. To provide the minimum requirements for this deterrent
strategy the Alliance must act jointly and maintain at least:

a. A credible capability for direct defence to deter the lesser
aggressions such as covert actions, incursions,
infiltrations, hostile local actions and limited aggressions.

b. A credible capability for deliberate escalation to deter more
ambitious aggressions.

c. A credible capability to conduct a general nuclear response
as the ultimate deterrent.

34. Should aggression occur the military objective must be to
preserve or restore the integrity and security of the North Atlantic
Treaty Area by employing such force as may be necessary within the
concept of forward defence. Should aggression occur the Alliance
should:

a. Meet initially any aggression short of a major nuclear attack
with the available direct defence.

b. Conduct a deliberate escalation of the conflict if the
aggression could not be held and the situation restored by
direct defence.

c. Initiate the appropriate major nuclear response if the
aggression were a major nuclear attack.

35. The political and military control arrangements of the
Alliance should permit timely political consultation required by
indicators of attack, and consultation required for the use of nuclear
weapons. The use of nuclear weapons should be consistent with the
following guidelines:

a. In the event of an unmistakable attack with nuclear weapons
in the NATO area, the forces of the Alliance should
respond with nuclear weapons on the scale appropriate to the circumstances. The possibilities for consultation in this context are extremely limited.

b. In the event of a full-scale conventional aggression, indicating the opening of general hostilities on any sector of the NATO area, the forces of the Alliance should, if necessary, respond with nuclear weapons on the scale appropriate to the circumstances. It is anticipated that time will in this case permit consultation.

c. In the event of an attack not fulfilling the conditions described in a and b, above, but which threatened the integrity of the forces and the territory attacked and which could not be successfully held with conventional forces, the decision to use nuclear weapons would be subject to prior consultation in the Council.
ANNEX A
DEFINITIONS

1. The definitions in the following paragraphs are intended only to define the spectrum of enemy aggression. They do not dictate or pre-judge the nature or scale of NATO response.

2. **Covert Actions** - are defined as any non-nuclear operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, or permit denial by, the sponsor. Such actions may be used to cause unrest and insecurity in an attempt to create favourable conditions for subsequent limited aggression against NATO forces or territory and interference with free use of sea and air space by NATO nations, and are considered to include certain incursions and infiltrations as defined in paragraphs 3 and 4 below.

3. **Incursions** (Adapted from MC 78) - Small-scale raids, frontier violations, or other harassments on land, at sea and in the air carried out by Soviet, Satellite or other aggressive military or para-military units with the apparent intention to generate disorder, tension, confusions, or to reconnoitre.

4. **Infiltrations** (Adapted from MC 78) - Covert penetrations by individuals or small groups of Soviet, or Satellite personnel or other hostile groups for the purpose of executing various harassments. Such occurrences are usually political in nature. However, to the extent that they are military or para-military activities such as sabotage, ambushes, traffic disruption, reconnaissance of NATO bases, the establishment of hidden depots, or activation and support of Communist Fifth Columns, some infiltrations may have a direct bearing on the military situation and cannot be ignored by the military authorities.

5. **Hostile Local Actions** (Adapted from MC 78) - Military actions conducted in an atmosphere suggesting conscious restriction by the adversary on the objectives, nature and duration of operations and on the manpower and weapons he employs. In initiation of these hostile local actions, it is considered that reliance would be
placed on the quick thrust and, if objectives were quickly realised, on the assumed reluctance of NATO to restore the situation by force and thereby risk broadening the scope of the incident.

6. **Limited Aggression** - is defined as any armed attack against NATO forces or territory, or actions at sea or in the air, under conditions of self-imposed military restraint, in which it appears that an armed attack imperils neither the survival of nation(s) nor the integrity of military forces as indicated in paragraph 7a and b, below. Restraints include voluntary restriction on the objective sought, the areas involved and on the weapons and forces used by the enemy. Limited aggression is considered to include overt incursions and hostile local actions, as defined in paragraphs 3 and 5, above.

7. **Major Aggression** - is defined as any nuclear or non-nuclear armed attack against NATO forces or territory, or actions at sea or in the air, in which it has been clearly determined that the aim and scope of an armed attack are such as to imperil, directly, either:

   a. One or more NATO countries, to the extent that survival as free and independent nation(s) is immediately at stake, or

   b. The integrity of military forces, to the extent that capabilities essential to the effective accomplishment of NATO strategic objectives are imminently subject to unacceptable deterioration.

8. **Conventional Forces** - are defined as those forces employable in a non-nuclear role, although they may have a nuclear capability.