The Harmel Report: full reports by the rapporteurs on the future tasks of the Alliance

The announcement by France of its withdrawal from the integrated military structure coupled with the questioning by certain elements of public opinion of the relevancy of NATO led to calls for an in-depth review of the Alliance's aims.

At the December 1966 Ministerial Meeting, on the proposal of the Belgian Foreign Minister Mr Pierre Harmel and recalling the initiative taken by Canada in December 1964, the "Council resolved to undertake a broad analysis of international developments since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Its purpose would be to determine the influence of such developments on the Alliance and to identify the tasks which lie before it, in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for a durable peace". [M3(66)3 of 16/12/66]

It was decided that a preliminary report would be examined at the Spring 1967 Ministerial Meeting and the Ministerial Council at its meeting in December 1967 would draw the appropriate conclusions that emerged from that enquiry.

A special group of Representatives was established under the Chairmanship of the Secretary General and sub-groups were set up each working on a broad subject of interest to the Alliance and each chaired by a Rapporteur of repute. [press communique (67)3]. Work started on 17th April 1967. It was decided that the four reports would be drafted under the responsibility of each Rapporteur but that efforts would be made to avoid any duplication.

The written reports went through several stages: they were reviewed and the findings compared during a last meeting of the rapporteurs at Ditchley Park (UK) in October. Based on the work of the four sub-groups a draft summary report was prepared by the International Staff Secretariat in November which was subsequently presented to Foreign Affairs Ministers in December 1967. After some last amendments the report was approved by Ministers on 14th December 1967 and issued as an annex to the final communique.

- **Report of Sub-Group I: EAST-WEST RELATIONS**
  
  Rapporteurs: Mr. J.H.A. Watson, Assistant Under Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs (UK) and Mr. K. Schutz, Secretary of State Foreign Affairs (Germany)
- **Report of Sub-Group II: LES RELATIONS INTERALLIEES**  
  Rapporteur: Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, Minister of State (Belgium)

- **Report of Sub-Group III: GENERAL DEFENCE POLICY**  
  Rapporteur: Mr. Foy Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary of State (US)

- **Report of Sub-Group IV: RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES**  
  Rapporteur: Dr.C.L. Patijn, Professor in International political relations, University of Utrecht (Netherlands)

Note: The full text of the four reports is presented in the language in which they were drafted.
The Future Tasks of the Alliance

Report of the Council

A year ago, on the initiative of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, the governments of the fifteen nations of the Alliance resolved to "study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace". The present report sets forth the general tenor and main principles emerging from this examination of the future tasks of the Alliance.

2. Studies were undertaken by Messrs. Schutz, Watson, Spaak, Kohler and Patijn. The Council wishes to express its appreciation and thanks to these eminent personalities for their efforts and for the analyses they produced.

3. The exercise has shown that the Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous organization which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions. It also has shown that its future tasks can be handled within the terms of the Treaty by building on the methods and procedures which have proved their value over many years.

4. Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 the international situation has changed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension. Amongst other developments, the Alliance has played a major part in stopping Communist expansion in Europe; the USSR has become one of the two world super powers but the Communist world is no longer monolithic; the Soviet doctrine of "peaceful co-existence" has changed the nature of the confrontation with the West but not the basic problems. Although the disparity between the power of the United States and that of the European states remains, Europe has recovered and is on its way towards unity. The process of decolonisation has transformed European relations with the rest of the world; at the same time, major problems have arisen in the relations between developed and developing countries.

5. The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this task. But the possibility of a crisis
cannot be excluded as long as the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German question, remain unsolved. Moreover, the situation of instability and uncertainty still precludes a balanced reduction of military forces. Under these conditions, the Allies will maintain as necessary, a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.

In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente. The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe.

6. From the beginning the Atlantic Alliance has been a co-operative grouping of states sharing the same ideals and with a high degree of common interest. Their cohesion and solidarity provide an element of stability within the Atlantic area.

7. As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus, each of the Allies can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the problems and objectives of the others. To this end the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved. Each Ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the Alliance. The chances of success will clearly be greatest if the Allies remain on parallel courses, especially in matters of close concern to them all; their actions will thus be all the more effective.

8. No peaceful order in Europe is possible without a major effort by all concerned. The evolution of Soviet and East European policies gives ground for hope that those governments may eventually come to recognize the advantages to them of collaborating in working towards a peaceful settlement. But no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany.

9. Accordingly the Allies are resolved to direct their energies to this purpose
by realistic measures designed to further a détente in East-West relations. The relaxation of tensions is not the final goal but is part of a long-term process to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

10. Currently, the development of contacts between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe is mainly on a bilateral basis. Certain subjects, of course, require by their very nature a multilateral solution.

11. The problem of German reunification and its relationship to a European settlement has normally been dealt with in exchanges between the Soviet Union and the three Western powers having special responsibilities in this field. In the preparation of such exchanges the Federal Republic of Germany has regularly joined the three Western powers in order to reach a common position. The other Allies will continue to have their views considered in timely discussions among the Allies about Western policy on this subject, without in any way impairing the special responsibilities in question.

12. The Allies will examine and review suitable policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of Germany and to foster European security. This will be part of a process of active and constant preparation for the time when fruitful discussions of these complex questions may be possible bilaterally or multilaterally between Eastern and Western nations.

13. The Allies are studying disarmament and practical arm control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reductions. These studies will be intensified. Their active pursuit reflects the will of the Allies to work for an effective détente with the East.

14. The Allies will examine with particular attention the defence problems of the exposed areas e.g. the South-Eastern flank. In this respect the present situation in the Mediterranean presents special problems, bearing in mind that the current crisis in the Middle East falls within the responsibilities of the United Nations.

15. The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied countries contribute individually within the United Nations and other international organizations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the solution of important international problems. In accordance with established usage the Allies or such of them as wish to do so will also continue to consult on such problems without commitment and as the case
may demand.

16. In the light of these findings, the Ministers directed the Council in permanent session to carry out, in the years ahead, the detailed follow-up resulting from this study. This will be done either by intensifying work already in hand or by activating highly specialized studies by more systematic use of experts and officials sent from capitals.

17. Ministers found that the study by the Special Group confirmed the importance of the role which the Alliance is called upon to play during the coming years in the promotion of détente and the strengthening of peace. Since significant problems have not yet been examined in all their aspects, and other problems of no less significance which have arisen from the latest political and strategic developments have still to be examined, the Ministers have directed the Permanent Representatives to put in hand the study of these problems without delay, following such procedures as shall be deemed most appropriate by the Council in permanent session, in order to enable further reports to be subsequently submitted to the Council in Ministerial Session.
I. East-West Relations Detente and a European Settlement

1. The essential function of the North Atlantic Alliance is the relationship between East and West in the North Atlantic area. The basic common aim of Allied policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe remains to provide effective protection for our own territorial integrity, political independence and security. The second purpose of the Allies is, without jeopardizing our freedom or weakening our security, to develop plans and methods for eliminating the present unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe (which are not of our choosing) including the division of Germany. The Allies wish to promote easier movement and intercourse between the countries of Europe, and develop peaceful cooperation among them; in order finally to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order which will provide adequate and durable security for all Europe.

2. Our final objective can hardly be attained at a time of tension and hostile confrontation of blocs, and requires to be pursued in a climate of détente. The core of the problem is to convince the East European states and the Soviet Union by means of a persuasive, patient and undramatic policy that there are greater advantages to both sides in collaboration between East and West. Relaxation of tension is not the final goal, but a step on the way towards cooperation between the states of Europe and a European settlement which in itself no longer gives rise to renewed tension.

3. Soviet objectives with respect to the future of Europe continue to differ from ours. The Soviets have in recent years come to see a certain relaxation of tensions as meeting their own national interests: but how far their ultimate aims in Europe have changed and how far they are prepared to move towards cooperation with the West is arguable.

4. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe communist dogma and the desire of the Communist Parties to maintain their present power operate against a relaxation of tension and the achievement of a European settlement. So do fears that it would be difficult to limit the consequences of a change in the structure of Europe, and that communist control of East European countries might be imperilled as a result. On the other hand, the worldwide responsibilities of the Soviet
Union including the tension with the People's Republic of China, and the differentiations within the communist world and especially the growing self-assertion of Eastern Europe, may incline these governments towards further exploring the possibilities of a European settlement. A relaxation of tensions in Europe and limited cooperation with the West would also make it possible for them to meet their own growing economic and technological requirements, as well as widespread desires for a higher standard of living and a somewhat more open society. The economic practices followed by the East, although effective in the early stages of industrialization, are showing themselves inadequate to meet the needs of a more complex and technological economy; and several East European states have begun to understand that the further development they seek requires them to specialize. Since on the whole the best markets, technology and sources of supply are not within the communist grouping, increased exchanges with the West are likely to result. The resulting contacts tend to engender near practices and fresh thinking, which could have significant political consequences in furthering the process of détente and closer ties in Europe.

5. Eastern governments have so far shown themselves able to control these forces; but they are increasingly aware of the problems raised. This gives ground for hope that the Eastern governments can gradually be persuaded of the advantages for them in helping to organise a Europe where states and communities with differing social systems cannot only co-exist in uneasy confrontation but can progress through détente to closer collaboration in a stable settlement for their mutual benefit.

6. These trends and influences have had varying results in different East European countries. Some Eastern governments now maintain less rigid attitudes than others towards various members of the Alliance. Although there is without doubt a genuine interest in a European détente, the Soviet Government still hopes, by relaxing tensions selectively, to weaken the cohesion of the Alliance and to drive wedges between the states of Western Europe and in particular to open up differences between Western Europe and the United States. Many Eastern European governments would be well suited by a limited improvement in bilateral relations based on the status quo that perpetuates the present situation in Eastern Europe. But the hopes of all those governments are probably tempered by what they think they can achieve; and they may come to realize that the more ambitious Soviet objectives are unattainable.

7. Thus the relaxation of tensions is a fluctuating process, and there are still objectives in the policy of some East European states that in a period of détente run counter to ours. It may take a long time to reach significant results; for a policy aimed at achieving a settlement through détente will ultimately succeed only if the other side too is willing to contribute to a just and peaceful order in Europe. In particular, if a
relaxation of tensions is to be effective and to lead to a European settlement, it will have to be comprehensive and must include everybody. Nevertheless it remains the task of the Allies to persist in our efforts to relax tensions, and to welcome such co-operation as the Eastern governments are willing to show. In fact, a period of relaxing tensions provides new and constructive opportunities for all the countries of Europe.

8. The North Atlantic Alliance and a policy of détente are not contradictory. Indeed, the Allies have already been able to initiate a policy of détente towards the countries of the East. This policy has been made possible by the general evolution of relations between East and West in Europe, and also by the balance of forces resulting from the continued cohesion of the Alliance and its readiness for defence. Meanwhile the Alliance has not discharged its military tasks; though it may prove possible to fulfil them at lower force levels and so accelerate a political settlement. The Atlantic Alliance remains an irreplaceable guarantor of security in Western Europe.

9. The European members of the Alliance are not in a position to maintain their freedom and independence alone in face of the presence and power of the Soviet Union in its present manifestations; and a corresponding North American presence thus remains as necessary as when the Alliance was founded, in order to preserve the freedom of its European members. This contribution must not be limited to defence and deterrence: active North American participation is equally necessary in the process of utilizing the détente for achieving a peaceful order in Europe. Moreover, any general European settlement and security system, once achieved, will require the continuing support and cooperation of the United States. Therefore the participation of the United States and of Canada is of vital importance, both in working towards a new peaceful order in Europe, and in maintaining it afterwards.

10. On the other hand it is clear that no substantial progress can be made towards a European settlement without Soviet agreement, though it would also appear that so far the Soviet Government has not been persuaded that it is in its interest to make a major change. The Soviet Government can effectively block any European settlement that it regards as opposed to its own interests. Moreover many East European regimes regard Soviet support as necessary for their national security and to keep them in power; and at their present stage of development close economic relations with the Soviet Union are also essential to them. In working towards a general European settlement our policy should therefore be not to set Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union but rather to involve both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in more constructive forms of cooperation which will be of greater advantage to both sides than the present confrontation.
11. Thus a just and stable European settlement, and a European security system designed to guarantee it, will have to provide for rights and duties of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a system may develop out of collaboration between the two existing groupings. A security system may be more effectively organised and involve less risks for individual countries, if it is based on an equilibrium between two groupings rather than exclusively on agreements between separate states.

12. Although it is still too early to forecast the shape of a future peaceful order in Europe, the Allies should already at this stage reach agreement among themselves on some of the basic elements to be considered in such a European settlement, e.g.

- The states united in the North Atlantic Alliance must be sure that a European settlement guarantees them (as is stated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty) "the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law";

- Any feasible European settlement will have to recognize that the states comprising it will have differing political, economic and social system, and to accept the domestic sovereignty of each government;

- Every nation must have the right to determine its own political, economic, social and cultural system;

- Renunciation of the use of force, the threat of force and all forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other states;

- Relations between states should be governed by the principles laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

The members of the North Atlantic Alliance should, moreover, try to ensure that the right of free movement of persons and of free flow of information are as widely respected as possible throughout Europe.

13. The North Atlantic Alliance was formed to deal with the problems caused for the Allies in the treaty area by the power and policies of the Soviet Government and the existence of communist governments in Eastern Europe. It is fulfilling successfully its first task, which circumstances still make necessary, to guarantee its members against the danger of aggression. By keeping the peace the Alliance contributes to the developing relaxation of tension. In the field of East-West relations it now has a threefold political task: to improve relations between the various countries of Europe; to help achieve a just and
lasting European settlement which will remove the barriers that now divide the continent; and to help with the construction of a balanced and viable system of European security to make this possible. The Allies must persuade the Eastern governments to accept an alternative to the present state of Europe which is politically and economically more attractive to both sides.

II. The German Problem

1. The present division of Europe is one of the main obstacles on the road to this goal. It manifests itself most clearly in the division of Germany. The two problems are indissolubly connected. The Soviet Union and their Allies claim that there exist two German states and that West Berlin is an autonomous political unit. The acceptance of this "reality" by the West cannot be a prerequisite for a détente.

2. Any solution of German problems contributing to a just and lasting European settlement:

   - must start from the principle that the German people in both parts of Germany have the right of free decision;

   - requires action of the Four Powers with special responsibility for Germany;

   - must satisfy the legitimate security needs of all the states concerned;

   - requires the cooperation not only of our Allies but of other states of Europe which also have a vital interest in establishing a lasting and peaceful order in Europe.

While, after the second World War, peace treaties and similar agreements were concluded with all former allies of the German Reich and with Austria, there has been no peace treaty for Germany. All efforts of the Three Western Powers with special responsibility for Germany to bring about a solution of the German question in direct negotiation with the Soviet Union have so far been unsuccessful, but it was thanks to their firmness, the solidarity of the Alliance and the courage of the Berliners that Soviet and Soviet-Zonal attempts against the freedom of West Berlin were thwarted.

3. Berlin still is a focal point of Soviet policy in Germany. A crisis might flare up here at any time with implications and repercussions that could be worldwide. Moscow and East Berlin are constantly perfecting their technique of creating and manipulating critical situations in this area.
4. It is therefore necessary that:
   - each member of the Alliance should, as part of its endeavour to overcome the division of Europe and achieve a relaxation of tension between East and West, strive for a just solution of the problems of Germany and Berlin;
   - the Federal Republic of Germany in its efforts to overcome the division of the German people should strive for a relaxation of tension in its relations vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as well as the countries of Eastern and South Eastern Europe.

5. As long as a part of the German people is denied the right of self-determination and has to live in a separated state-like entity ruled by a regime imposed upon them by a foreign power and kept by force, that regime must be denied international recognition. There are not two German states.

The relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the other part of Germany are of an internal nature; the relations of the other members of the Alliance to the Soviet Zone are governed by the understanding that it forms part of Germany. The German authorities in the Soviet Zone perform certain administrative functions. However, the members of the Alliance continue to consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs.

6. It is not possible at present to draw up a blueprint for a solution of the German problem; there does not exist a magic formula for overcoming the division of Germany. The solution of this question, as it seems today, will be a long process closely connected with progress in overcoming the present division of Europe.

In their efforts to solve the German problem within the framework of a policy of détente the Federal Republic of Germany, the Allies (especially the Three Powers) and the Alliances as such have their parts to play.

7. It is up to the Federal Republic of Germany, to include the other part of Germany in its policy of détente by retaining and strengthening the ties between the Germans in East and West. At the same time the Federal Government should make it clear that the more freedom is granted to the Germans in East Germany the more the division of Germany will be overcome.

Pursuant to this policy the Federal Government has made many
proposals to the Soviet Zone authorities destined to facilitate the relations between the people in both parts of Germany, to alleviate the life of the Germans in the Soviet Zone, to promote cooperation in inner German trade as well as communication and exchanges in the fields of culture, science and sport.

The Federal Government ought to continue this policy, because the Germans in the other part of the country should not be isolated but, on the contrary, this region should be included in a general process of détente. The 16 proposals contained in the declaration of the Federal Government of 12 April, 1967, and the letters written by Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger to Chairman Stoph in East Berlin are examples of this policy. A continuing increase of internal German trade which is a significant link between the two parts of Germany, and economic cooperation, would be an important instrument in this respect.

Furthermore, it is up to the Federal Republic of Germany, progressively to facilitate the participation of the population of the Soviet Zone in international life, in scientific cultural and sporting exchanges without thereby furthering the political objectives of the East Berlin regime.

8. On the other hand it is up to the Allies to assist the Federal Government's efforts for a relaxation of tension between the two parts of Germany and for improving conditions of life of the individuals in East Germany. They should in cooperation with the Federal Government open up and facilitate private contacts with the Germans of the other part of Germany, particularly in the sphere of science, culture and sports. The link with progress in internal German relations should be kept in mind. The Allies should assist the efforts of the Federal Republic of German, by counteracting attempts to interpret contacts between the authorities of the Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone of Germany as international relations between two German states. They should explain to their own populations as well as to the world (e.g. in international forums, like the UN);

- that the division of Germany is a main obstacle on the road towards a lasting just and peaceful order of Europe which also satisfies the legitimate security needs of the states concerned

- that they, including the Federal Republic of Germany, persistently try to overcome the division of Germany, but that so far their numerous proposals to this effect have been rejected;

- that they want the population in the other part of Germany to be free and allowed to determine their own political fate;

- that the East Berlin regime is not legitimate and that it does not
represent a sovereign state and that any action to enhance its international status would not only disregard the will of the people living under its power but would hamper internal German contacts and relaxation of tension between the two, parts of Germany.

9. The Alliance as such should be instrumental in harmonizing and coordinating the policies of the Federal Government and those of the other Allies in this context. It is also the task of the Alliance to help ensure the freedom and viability of Berlin, and to remain aware of the constant threat to Berlin even in times when the East is hoping for Western interest to wane and resistance gradually to flag.

III. Practical steps and procedures

1. The present chapter is designed to suggest ways in which the Allied objectives described above can be achieved. It is not possible at this stage to draw up a comprehensive solution for all the problems which divide Europe. From time to time various measures have been proposed which might contribute to a solution: further detailed study will be needed to show which are the most advantageous and so the ones to be pursued by the Allies.

Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations

2. Bilateral discussions between Eastern and Western states are an indispensable means of improving relations between East and West in a period of relaxation in tension. They can be of great value if they proceed within the framework of agreed objectives, and if the governments concerned continue to observe their responsibilities to each other as members of the Alliance. But they will be harmful if Eastern governments get the impression that they can play off one Western state against the other; because then they will continue to pursue their more ambitious and disruptive objectives.

3. A bilateral approach makes possible direct contacts with individual European governments. The East European countries are at different stages of national self-assertion, and the Allies should avoid treating them as a single bloc led by the Soviet Union. We should value cooperation with each of them; both for its own sake and also as a means of influencing the Soviet Union and other East European countries to accept mutually beneficial settlements.

4. There are practical limits to what can be achieved bilaterally. As relations develop, discussions with Eastern government will deal increasingly with problems of concern to several or all members of the Alliance. In order to shape a stable larger European structure, involving both the United States and the Soviet Union, it will be desirable
increasingly to work towards multilateral exchanges with Eastern governments in addition to bilateral ones.

5. Multilateral exchanges will probably develop more slowly. They too have their limits. Proposals with a specific NATO label are at this stage liable to be received with suspicion by many Eastern governments. An undue or premature emphasis by the Western Allies on multi-lateral negotiations could lead to an undesirable consolidation of the links which bind the East Europeans to each other and to the Soviet Union. We must also ensure that a multilateral approach to a European settlement does not perpetuate the existing division in Europe or allow it to crystallise on its present lines. In this context the question of an East-West conference needs to be particularly carefully studied.

6. There is agreement in principle on the importance of consultation between the Western Allies on the central questions of East-West relations. But in fact more detailed exchanges between the allies will be necessary if we are to use the present fluctuating relaxation of tensions to work in a coordinated fashion towards a general European settlement which will ultimately be formulated in multilateral agreements. The Allies will need to discuss fully among themselves how their common aims described in Chapter I can be translated into practice, so that each Ally can work effectively towards these aims in its dealings with the East.

7. The Atlantic Alliance offers an excellent forum for establishing this consultation on our side, and for maintaining the necessary degree of coordination both in our bilateral and multilateral dealings with the East. This is one of the ways in which the Alliance can make an essential contribution to the organisation of the collective arrangements described in Chapter I, designed to remove East-West antagonisms and ensure peace and unity in Europe.

Economic, Technological and Cultural Cooperation

8. For the reasons given in Chapter I, economic and technological exchanges for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe occupy an important place in breaking down communist rigidity and in furthering the process of détente. Moreover the development of such collaboration seems to be the aspect of the détente which most interests the governments of Eastern Europe and even perhaps the Soviet Government at this stage. It has the advantage to the West that it can be made beneficial to us as well: clearly, if such exchanges are to flourish, they must benefit both partners.

9. Cultural and personal contacts have a corresponding effect. They have a considerable impact on the artificially isolated societies of the East. We
must therefore expect the Soviet and East European governments to limit these contacts which potentially weaken their hold over their countries.

10. Thus the fields of economics, technology, cultural and personal contacts offer good prospects for significant steps towards the forging of mutually beneficial links between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe; though these contacts will not by themselves be sufficient to bring about a just and lasting settlement. We recommend that within the framework of the Alliance continuous study should be given to the ways in which agreements and opportunities in these fields can help to further our objectives.

**Other Forms of Cooperation**

11. In addition cooperation between East and West can take several forms which may prove valuable, depending on the circumstances and opportunity.

(a) cooperation in some aspects of existing Western multilateral institutions with those Communist states that have evolved sufficiently, thereby encouraging other to evolve in a similar fashion;

(b) cooperation in existing international organisations;

(c) regional East-West cooperation, involving a few states from each side, in special ventures inside or outside Europe, thereby cutting across political and ideological divisions;

(d) various semi-official or non-governmental activities in technical, scientific, cultural, athletic, etc., fields;

(e) utilisation of special East-West forums to develop additional means of dialogue and communication and, in time, to consider political and security issues.

**Political Arrangements and Security**

12. In this field we should make it clear that while we welcome such mutually beneficial minor arrangements as the Soviet Union and particularly some East European governments have so far been prepared to accept, we look beyond this to wider and deeper forms of cooperation designed to establish a durable settlement guaranteed by an adequate security system. In this way we may be able gradually to increase the readiness of Eastern governments to respond to our approaches.

13. Special consideration must be given to proposals for an East-West
conference on security matters, which has been proposed by some East European governments and has attracted public interest. An overall conference, such as the Soviet sponsored "European Security Conference" does not at present promise success. It seems to have been proposed largely as a tool for propaganda, for cementing the status quo, and for disrupting the Western alliance. But an East-West conference may be desirable, and indeed, necessary, at the right time, when we have already advanced a considerable distance along the road to a European settlement and a security system. For such a conference to succeed, it would have to be clear from exchanges with Eastern governments that the participation of our North American Allies was assured and that the Soviet Union and its allies were also prepared to contribute to a lasting and equitable settlement in Europe. Such a conference would also have to be properly prepared and have an agenda satisfactory to both sides. The Allies will need to reach agreement as far as possible both beforehand and during the conference about all the items on the agenda.

14. Such a conference is thus a long way off. What is required in the present phase of bilateral exploratory exchanges with the Eastern governments on political and security arrangements is for the Allies to make a close and urgent study of the European settlement which we aim to achieve, as set out in Chapter I, and of the elaboration of measures designed to further it and maintain it; and also of the ways in which the Allies should approach this settlement in their discussions with the East.

15. To promote consultations on these subjects among the Allies the Foreign Ministers may find it useful to constitute a special body, responsible to the North Atlantic Council, to study on a continuing basis all the substantive issues listed above which are related to a general settlement in Europe, European security, and procedural approaches to East-West negotiations in this field.
Les relations interalliées

Rapport du Rapporteur du Sous-Groupe 2
M. P. H. SPAAK
Le 4 octobre 1967

- Introduction

1. Qu'était l'Alliance Atlantique en 1949 ?
2. Qu'est devenue l'Alliance Atlantique depuis 1949 ?
3. La détente et ses conséquences sur le plan politique.
4. Que peut être l'Alliance de demain ?

Introduction

Les termes de référence du travail demandé au Sous-Groupe n° 2 impliquent en premier lieu « l'examen des relations interalliées ».

Des discussions qui ont eu lieu au sein du Sous-groupe et entre les rapporteurs, il apparaît que la question posée devrait être présentée dans les termes suivants : Qu'était l'Alliance atlantique en 1949 ? Qu'est-elle devenue ? Que pourrait-elle être ?

Un rappel des faits qui ont amené la conclusion de l'Alliance et un résumé de son évolution paraissent indispensables pour mesurer la divergence qui existe entre la volonté d'hier et la réalité d'aujourd'hui.

1. Qu'était l'Alliance Atlantique en 1949 ?

Pour bien comprendre ce qui s'est passé, il faut souligner qu'une Alliance
comme celle qui devait sortir du Traité de Washington n’était pas voulue par les dirigeants des pays occidentaux victorieux pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale et pendant les premières années qui ont immédiatement suivi la fin des combats.

L'espoir des hommes d'État responsables était de maintenir avec l'URSS la coopération qui avait permis de gagner la guerre.

Le Traité entre l'URSS et la Grande-Bretagne, celui entre l'URSS et la France, les décisions de Yalta, marquent les étapes de cette politique couronnée par la création des Nations Unies.

C'est à l'organisation que l'on souhaitait universelle et où les cinq plus grandes puissances s'étaient réservées des pouvoirs particuliers, que l'on désirait confier la responsabilité du maintien de la paix. Le droit de veto accordé aux cinq grands les « condamnait » à agir ensemble.

Cette conception des choses, théoriquement valable, ne résista pas longtemps aux réalités.

Il apparut bientôt que l'URSS sous la conduite de Staline n'était pas prête à collaborer au succès d'une pareille politique. L'URSS dissipa en quelques années le capital de confiance qu'elle s'était constitué. Sa politique dans les Balkans, en Europe centrale, en Allemagne, en Iran, en Turquie, l'usage abusif de son droit de veto, une incessante propagande dirigée contre ses alliés, ne permirent pas de conserver d'illusions à cet égard.

Les gouvernements occidentaux n'abandonnèrent qu'avec peine leur espoir et après s'y être longtemps accrochés.


A cette époque, les hommes d'État responsables en Occident (ils représentaient à cette époque toutes les nuances de la pensée politique), étaient convaincus qu'il fallait s'unir pour arrêter la politique d'expansion communiste en Europe. C'est de cette conviction qu'est né le Traité de Washington. Son but essentiel était de mettre les pays démocratiques de l'Europe à l'abri d'une agression et d'arrêter la poussée communiste.

Il est quelquefois difficile pour une nouvelle génération de réaliser l'état d'esprit de celle qui l'a précédée. Des changements se sont produits, les éléments des problèmes politiques se sont modifiés. Il n'est pas possible de prouver que les événements qui ne sont pas arrivés, bien qu'ils fussent possibles et même probables, se seraient produits si certaines précautions n'avaient été prises. Ceux qui n'ont pas connu certaines craintes ne peuvent
réagir comme ceux qui les ont vécues. Tout cela est évident.

Ce qu'il est permis d'affirmer, c'est que l'objectif essentiel que se proposaient les auteurs du Pacte atlantique a été atteint. Depuis 1949, en Europe, les conquêtes du communisme ont été arrêtées. Il n'a plus fait aucun progrès. Aucun des pays de l'Alliance atlantique n'a connu le sort des pays qui, entre 1945 et 1948, sont passés, contre la volonté de la majorité de leurs habitants, sous un régime communiste.

L'Alliance atlantique a donc résolu le problème politique précis qui se posait en Europe en 1949. Elle a été une réponse adéquate à la menace que faisait peser sur elle l'impérialisme stalinien.

Sur cette volonté de se protéger contre une agression possible, il ne peut exister aucun doute. Le texte du Traité est formel. Lorsque celui-ci fut signé à Washington le 4 avril 1949, tous ceux qui prirent la parole insistèrent sur cet aspect des choses.

Cette volonté de résoudre un problème précis et urgent était cependant envisagée dans le cadre d'une politique plus générale.

A cette époque les pays de l'Europe occidentale, les États-Unis et le Canada étaient conscients de la menace que le communisme faisait peser sur l'ensemble du monde et de la nécessité de s'unir pour défendre les principes démocratiques.

On trouve des traces de cette conception dans les articles du Traité. Dans le préambule d'abord, où les parties contractantes affirment leur détermination de « sauvegarder la liberté de leurs peuples, leur héritage commun et leurs civilisations fondées sur les principes de la démocratie, les libertés individuelles et le régime du droit ».

L'article 2 est plus explicite encore. Les parties s'engagent à « contribuer au développement de relations internationales pacifiques et amicales, en renforçant leur libre institution, en assurant une meilleure compréhension des principes sur lesquels ces institutions sont fondées et en développant les conditions propres à assurer la stabilité et le bien-être ».

Un pareil but constitue l'esquisse d'une politique dépassant la solution à apporter au problème immédiat représenté par une menace d'agression.

Ce sont ces préoccupations générales et à long terme qui donnaient toute son ampleur et toute sa signification au Traité de Washington et qui faisaient de l'Alliance atlantique une alliance différente de celles conclues auparavant.

**II. Qu'est devenue l'Alliance Atlantique depuis 1949 ?**
Durant les premières années qui suivirent sa création, l'Alliance atlantique fut entièrement absorbée par la tâche immense et urgente de son organisation militaire.

Peu à peu cependant, la nécessité d'étendre l'Alliance à d'autres domaines se fit sentir. De plus en plus, il apparut qu'une défense commune n'avait un sens que s'il existait une politique étrangère commune. De plus en plus également, ceux qui avaient la responsabilité de diriger l'Alliance, comprirent combien il était difficile de se contenter d'être allié dans une partie du monde en acceptant de s'opposer dans d'autres. Le cadre géographique de l'Alliance se révélait trop étroit.

Dès 1956, les Ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays partenaires sentirent la nécessité de faire préciser, à la lumière d'une expérience qui durait depuis sept ans, les objectifs de l'Alliance et les moyens nécessaires pour les atteindre. Trois d'entre eux, MM. Pearson, Lange et Martino, furent chargés d'étudier le problème. Dans le langage de l'OTAN, leur rapport devint celui des Trois Sages. C'est un document essentiel qui permet de comprendre l'état d'esprit des dirigeants atlantiques à cette époque et dans quelle direction ils espéraient faire progresser l'Alliance.

L'introduction générale serait à citer toute entière. Sans trahir les idées qu'elle contient, on peut les résumer de la manière suivante :

(a) La politique de défense contre une agression éventuelle doit être maintenue quelque que soit l'interprétation que l'on donne aux événements qui sont intervenus depuis 1949. Il faut que chaque partenaire conserve la volonté et les moyens de remplir l'engagement politique qu'il a souscrit, c'est-à-dire celui de participer pleinement à une action collective contre l'agression.

(b) Cet objectif ne peut être atteint si les membres de l'Alliance n'ont pas entre eux des relations étroites et fondées sur la coopération dans les domaines politique et économique. « Une Alliance, dont les membres ignorent les intérêts de leurs partenaires, se laissent diviser par des conflits politiques ou économiques ou se méfient les uns des autres, ne peut être efficace, que ce soit pour décourager une agression ou pour la repousser ».

(c) Une telle politique n'est possible que « parce que si la crainte a été à l'origine de l'OTAN, nous avons compris, consciemment ou non, qu'en cette ère atomique, dans un monde où les distances comptent de moins en moins, le moment était venu de grouper en une association plus étroite les nations soeurs de l'Atlantique et de l'Europe occidentale à des fins autres que strictement défensives, et que la mise en commun d'une partie des souverainetés nationales pour notre protection mutuelle, contribuait aussi au progrès de la coopération en général. Les gouvernements et les peuples sentaient que cette plus grande unité était à la fois naturelle et souhaitable, que cette communauté de traditions...
culturelles de libre institution et de conceptions démocratiques qui était mise au
defi et vouee à la destruction, constituaient aussi une raison de s'unir
davantage, non seulement pour les defendre, mais pour les developper. En
realite, la conscience d'un danger immediat commun se doublait d'un sens de
communaute atlantique ».

(d) Une telle politique conduit « au developpement d'une communauté
atlantique reposant sur les fondations encore plus profondes que la necessite
d'une defense commune ». Le developpement d'une telle communauté
n'implique rien moins qu'une association permanente des peuples libres de
l'Atlantique Nord visant à renforcer leur unite, à defendre et à servir les interess
que ces pays, en tant que democraties libres, ont en commun.

(e) Une telle politique a pour but de resister à la menace politique du
communisme. « Cette menace resulte des doctrines revolutionnaires du
communisme qui, grace aux soins diligents des chefs communistes, ont, depuis
des annees, semé partout les germes du mensonge au sujet de notre mode de
vie et de notre democratie ».

(f) Pour réussir, une telle politique doit conduire ses participants « à ne pas
oublier que l'influence et les interess de ses membres ne se limitent pas à la
zone d'application du Traité et que les evenements exterieurs à cette zone
peuvent gravement affecter les interess collectifs de la Communauté Atlantique ».

Tout ceci est clair et cohérent. Les Trois Sages, approuves par leurs collegues,
avaient en vue en 1957, une alliance militaire, politique et economique contre
l'éventuelle agression communiste, des pays unis pour la defense des principes
de la civilisation occidentale. Cette alliance devait conduire, etape par etape, à
la constitution d'une Communauté atlantique.

Les moyens pratiques pour realiser cet objectif etaient longuement etudies dans
le rapport. Il est utile de rappeler qu'en ce qui concerne la consultation
politique, les Trois Sages en proposaient un renforcement considerable. Cette
consultation politique devait etre préalable à toute action, quels que soient les
problemes à résoudre, que ceux-ci se passent à l'intérieur de l'aire géographique
du Traité ou en dehors. Il est utile de rappeler aussi les mesures proposees pour
éviter et pour aplanir les conflits pouvant exister entre les membres de
l'Alliance. Elles etaient sages et restent toujours d'application.

Apres de tres serieuses discussions en decembre 1956, les conclusions des
Trois Sages furent adoptees à l'unanimité. On peut donc affirmer que leur
rapport traduisait exactement la volonté des quinze gouvernements de
l'Alliance.

Pendant plusieurs annees, une majorite parmi les partenaires de l'Alliance
s'efforça d'appliquer les directives adoptées. La consultation politique,
notamment en ce qui concerne les problèmes de l'unification allemande, ceux posés par le statut de Berlin, ceux relatifs au désarmement, et d'une manière plus générale l'ensemble de ceux concernant les relations avec l'URSS fut constante et sérieuse.

En dehors de la zone d'application du Traité, la consultation politique s'avéra moins fructueuse. La plupart des problèmes qui s'y posaient ne déculsquaient plus du défi communiste mais provenaient d'une multitude de causes.

Les tentatives d'intégration économique régionale, la décolonisation et la coopération avec les pays en voie de développement, en particulier, étaient autant de problèmes où les intérêts nationaux n'étaient pas nécessairement identiques et où les opinions publiques des différents pays membres de l'Alliance ne devaient pas nécessairement réagir de la même façon. Il s'ensuivit qu'un nombre de gouvernements décidèrent de poursuivre des voies autonomes sans avoir préalablement consulté leurs alliés. Ceci fut surtout le cas dans le processus de la décolonisation.

A la fin de 1958, le Gouvernement français proposa aux Gouvernements américain et britannique de prévoir un triumvirat qui réglerait les problèmes mondiaux au nom de l'Occident. Cette proposition fut repoussée par les Gouvernements américain et britannique.

Le Gouvernement français, depuis ce moment, modifia sa politique et poursuivit un retrait progressif de l'organisation militaire de l'Alliance (1), qu'il quitta complètement en 1966. Dès lors les conceptions énoncées par les Trois Sages se révélèrent irréalisables.

(1) Rect. du 02/7/92
EXS(92)150

III. La détente et les conséquences sur le plan politique

Personne ne songe à contester les modifications qui se sont produites dans la politique de l'URSS depuis la mort de Staline, ni l'importance que constitue le fait que les pays communistes d'Europe placent leur politique internationale dans le cadre de la coexistence pacifique.

On doit cependant se demander quelle part l'existence même de l'Alliance atlantique a jouée dans cette évolution et quelles pourraient être les conséquences de son affaiblissement ou de sa disparition.

Il faut aussi s'efforcer de bien comprendre ce que représente pour les
Les communistes se sont très clairement expliqués à cet égard. La coexistence pacifique n'est pas, pour eux, une conséquence découlant de leurs principes. C'est une politique qui leur est imposée par les faits. La coexistence pacifique est la dernière manifestation d'une « politique occasionnelle » qui a conduit les dirigeants de l'URSS à s'allier avec Hitler en 1939, avec les démocraties occidentales en 1941 et à pratiquer la guerre froide dès la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale.

Aucun doute ne peut exister à cet égard. Krouchtchev s'est expliqué avec une entière franchise et très clairement. Dans un discours prononcé au début de 1960, il a déclaré que l'URSS militairement plus puissante qu'elle ne l'avait jamais été, était pourtant décidée à ne pas faire la guerre car elle était dans l'impossibilité de mettre sa population à l'abri d'une attaque atomique.

Le fait atomique domine la situation et bouleverse les doctrines. Krouchtchev disait : « La bombe atomique ne règle pas la lutte des classes ».

Dès lors, le communisme ne peut espérer s'imposer par la guerre mais, abandonnant ce moyen, il espère toujours, ne renonçant à aucun de ses objectifs, vaincre ses adversaires sur tous les autres terrains : politique, économique, social et culturel. Le conflit qui oppose aujourd'hui la Chine à l'URSS, et certaines tendances à une plus grande indépendance qui se manifestent dans certains pays communistes de l'est européen, ont incité les successeurs de Krouchtchev à poursuivre la route indiquée par celui-ci.

Quelle que soit la conception communiste de la coexistence pacifique, elle doit être acceptée et pratiquée par les Occidentaux. C'est d'abord pour eux l'application d'un principe essentiel de leur civilisation, dans la mesure où celle-ci est une civilisation de dialogue ; et c'est en plus le moyen efficace d'assurer la paix.

De plus, l'Occident n'a aucune raison de la craindre. Il ne lui faut pas redouter la comparaison entre ses réalisations et les réalisations communistes. Dans le domaine matériel ses succès sont incontestablement plus grands et, dans l'ensemble, la vie à l'ouest est infiniment plus agréable qu'à l'est. Le mur de Berlin en est une preuve en même temps qu'il est un symbole.

Grâce à la coexistence pacifique, les échanges commerciaux et culturels entre l'est et l'ouest se sont heureusement développés mais il faut bien constater que des points de vue militaire et politique des résultats vraiment importants n'ont pu être atteints. Les forces militaires de l'URSS n'ont pas été réduites et les positions de l'URSS sur les problèmes allemands ne sont pas modifiées. Une atmosphère meilleure a été créée. Elle permet de tenter des rapprochements que la guerre froide rendait impossibles. Cette amélioration certaine en Europe ne
permit pas cependant de considérer que le danger communiste a disparu.

La politique de la Chine paraît au moins aussi dangereuse que celle de l'URSS il y a vingt ans, et une conférence comme celle de La Havane montre combien les forces subversives sont encore actives. Certes, le danger pour l'Europe s'est éloigné géographiquement et dans le temps, mais ce serait faire preuve d'un singulier optimisme que de croire qu'il n'existe plus. L'encerclement de l'Europe par des pays hostiles est toujours une hypothèse possible. Qu'il se réalise sous la direction de la Chine plutôt que sous celle de l'URSS ne change pas fondamentalement les choses.

**IV. Que peut être l'Alliance de demain ?**

Le grand changement qui s'est opéré étant ainsi précisé et ses limites actuelles ayant été mesurées, la constatation la plus importante est que tous les membres de l'Alliance estiment que celle-ci doit continuer. La plupart d'entre eux, sinon tous, affirment qu'elle doit continuer après 1969. Ce que les gouvernements recherchent, ce sont les raisons profondes de leurs décisions. Raisons qui doivent être comprises et acceptées par une opinion publique qui semble ne plus partager les craintes existant en 1949 et qui, dans son désir de rapprochement avec les pays communistes de l'est, ne veut pas que l'Alliance constitue un obstacle.

La raison essentielle de cette prise de position réside sans doute dans des préoccupations militaires et la constatation que chacun des pays de l'Alliance, exception faite pour les Etats-Unis, est incapable d'assurer sa défense s'il reste livré à ses propres forces. C'est très probablement à cette constatation qu'arriveront les Sous-Groupes 1 et 3. Mais il existe un désir profond de justifier l'Alliance par des considérations autres que militaires. Ce sont celles-là que le Sous-Groupe 2 doit énoncer.

Considérant donc comme acquis que, malgré la détente, l'Alliance atlantique reste la seule réponse valable aujourd'hui aux problèmes que pose le rapport des forces militaires en Europe, il faudrait essayer de préciser ce que cette alliance exige du point de vue politique et comment elle peut servir à la consolidation de la paix.

Il n'est peut-être pas inutile à cet égard de faire une distinction entre ce qui justifierait l'Alliance à court et à moyen terme, et ce que l'Alliance pourrait devenir à long terme.

A. Le maintien de l'Alliance exige une politique commune et pas seulement concertée sur les problèmes que posent la réunification de l'Allemagne et le statut de Berlin.
Il serait très utile que les Allemands définissent eux-mêmes sur quels terrains ils entendent poursuivre leurs efforts en vue de leur réunification et que les partenaires de l'Alliance confirment leur volonté de leur apporter leur appui et essayent de les aider dans la voie choisie de commun accord.

Des divergences de vues sur la politique allemande conduiraient rapidement à la fin de l'Alliance alantique.

B. Les pays de l'Alliance doivent mettre au point une politique commune en matière de désarmement et sur les problèmes qui concernent la sécurité et la défense.

Il semble utile à cet égard de mettre en avant des formules qui tiennent compte de la situation telle qu'elle se présente aujourd'hui. Il est acquis que cette politique doit être poursuivie avec la collaboration active des Etats-Unis et du Canada.

Un effort d'imagination devrait permettre de présenter des idées neuves qui pourraient constituer des étapes dans la voie du désarmement. Le plus modeste progrès en cette matière serait bien accueilli par l'opinion publique.

Ce qui importe, c'est de maintenir la cohésion la plus complète entre les partenaires de l'Alliance. Les polémiques auxquelles le Traité de non prolifération a donné lieu, montrent toute l'importance qu'il y a de conserver une politique concertée.

C. C'est au sein de l'Alliance atlantique que les règles générales des rapports avec l'URSS et les pays communistes d'Europe devraient être fixées.

Dans l'application, une certaine liberté doit certainement être laissée à chacun des pays, mais ils devraient constamment tenir leurs partenaires au courant de leurs initiatives. Le Conseil atlantique devrait être en cette matière une sorte de « Clearing House », de telle façon que l'examen et la discussion des idées nouvelles soient toujours possibles.

D. Il faut insister sur le fait que les relations coordonnées entre deux groupes de puissances sont beaucoup plus efficaces que celles que pourraient avoir entre eux une vingtaine de pays agissant en ordre dispersé. L'ordre européen ne se créera pas par une addition de relations bilatérales. Il sera beaucoup mieux assuré par une politique faite par des groupes de pays agissant ensemble. C'est par cette voie qu'un équilibre réel pourra être établi au bénéfice de tous. C'est aussi le moyen le plus sûr d'assurer la participation des Etats-Unis et du Canada.

E. C'est au sein de l'Alliance atlantique que les pays d'Europe peuvent espérer influencer la politique des Etats-Unis.

La situation idéale serait évidemment que l'Europe, au sein de l'Alliance, puisse
s'exprimer comme une unité. Nous examinerons plus loin ce que ceci implique. En attendant, il serait sans doute possible de tenir compte dans une certaine mesure du « fait européen », en donnant aux pays européens de l'Alliance une responsabilité commune plus grande dans le domaine de la défense et plus spécialement en ce qui concerne leur défense atomique.

F. Le Sous-groupe n° 4 aura à se prononcer sur la difficile et pourtant si importante question de savoir dans quelle mesure la consultation politique des partenaires de l'OTAN doit déborder l'aire géographique fixée par le Traité de Washington. Il n'est pas possible, lorsque l'on tâche de déterminer ce que devrait être l'Alliance à court ou à moyen terme, d'ignorer ce problème. Il est évident que l'on ne peut pas réclamer le même degré de collaboration pour les problèmes qui se posent à l'intérieur de l'aire géographique du Traité et ceux qui se posent à l'extérieur.

*****

Il reste à examiner maintenant ce que l'Alliance pourrait être à long terme.


Une partie de l'opinion européenne souffre d'un complexe d'infériorité ou de frustration vis-à-vis des États-Unis. Elle leur reproche de jouer au sein de l'Alliance un rôle trop important. Elle paraît trouver que la liberté d'action et l'indépendance politique des pays d'Europe sont entravées par la trop grande puissance du partenaire américain.

Personnellement, tout en constatant le phénomène et même son ampleur, je ne puis partager ces sentiments.

Dans l'aire géographique du Traité, je cherche en vain quelles seraient les solutions qui auraient été imposées par les États-Unis à ses partenaires, politiquement ou militairement et, notamment, quelle initiative de rapprochement avec l'URSS ils auraient empêchée.

A l'intérieur de l'aire géographique de l'Alliance, la politique internationale a toujours été poursuivie, tous les intéressés agissant en parfait accord.

Lorsque l'on songe à la politique qui se fait en dehors de l'aire géographique du Traité, il en est autrement. Dans plusieurs questions importantes, les États-Unis ont agi seuls et quelquefois en opposition avec leurs alliés occidentaux. C'est incontestable et c'est dangereux pour la cohésion de l'Alliance. Mais en dénonçant cet état de choses, il faut reconnaître que les pays européens font le procès de leur propre faiblesse. C'est dans la mesure où, à l'échelle mondiale, ils ne sont plus des partenaires valables, qu'une telle situation peut se créer.
Le seul remède à cette situation c'est, pour les pays de l'Europe, de s'unir afin de pouvoir parler avec autorité.

L'avenir à long terme de l'Alliance atlantique est dépendant du progrès qui sera accompli vers l'union de l'Europe. C'est pourquoi la question de savoir si la Grande-Bretagne rejoindra ou non le Marché commun est capitale.

La logique commande à ceux qui désirent voir l'Europe jouer demain un rôle plus important que celui d'aujourd'hui, de réaliser d'abord une Europe aussi large que possible, ensuite pour cette Europe d'accepter de prendre, comme le font les Etats-Unis et l'URSS, des responsabilités au niveau mondial.

L'Europe des Six, élément économique important, ne peut être une force politique avec laquelle il faudrait compter, entre l'URSS et le monde anglo-saxon.

L'Europe des Six, plus la Grande-Bretagne et l'un ou l'autre pays qui rejoindraient le Marché commun, dépassant l'union économique et réalisent des objectifs politiques implicitement contenus dans le Traité de Rome, deviendrait au contraire, au sein de l'Alliance atlantique, un partenaire valable pour les Etats-Unis, une des grandes forces capables d'influencer la politique mondiale.

Une telle réalisation en Europe modifierait profondément le fonctionnement de l'Alliance. Dans l'état actuel des choses, elle paraît difficile, non pas tant à cause des problèmes techniques qui se posent, qui tous peuvent être résolus si la volonté politique existe, mais parce que certains, au lieu d'envisager l'Europe unie comme un élément de l'Alliance atlantique, l'envisagent comme une troisième force.
The future security policy of the Alliance

Report of the Rapporteur
Sub-Group 3
Mr. Foy D. Kohler, USA

- **INTRODUCTION**

I. **NATO AND THE CHANGING SOVIET CHALLENGE**

II. **FUTURE SECURITY POLICIES**

A. **Defense Issues**
   1. Force Levels
   2. Nuclear Planning
      a. Tactical Nuclear Weapons
      b. The Strategic Balance
   3. Crisis Consultation

B. **The Alliance and Arms Control**
   1. Introduction
   2. Mutual Force Adjustments
   3. Complementary Arms Control
   4. Strengthening NATO’s Arms Control Machinery

C. **Trends in Technology and Their Impact on the Alliance**
   1. The Relation of Technology to Security
   2. Trends and Their Impact
   3. Problem Areas

D. **The Relationship Between NATO Security Policies and Worldwide Developments**
   1. The Impact of External Developments on NATO Security
   2. Implications for NATO Security Policies
   3. NATO and the UN
E. **Conclusions - The Future Security Tasks of the Alliance**

- **Introduction**

This report is concerned with the future security policies of the North Atlantic Alliance. These policies seek to ensure freedom and security for the members of the Alliance in the face of a continuing threat from the East, so that our peoples can develop to the fullest their spiritual and material resources.

Security for the members of NATO rests on two pillars. First, the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of the NATO countries if aggression should occur. Second, realistic measures to reduce tensions and the risk of conflict, including arms control and disarmament measures.

The purpose of this report is to develop a broad perspective of NATO's current security position, outline future directions and suggest the security policies required for the years ahead.

A more detailed assessment of the military threat facing NATO, and of NATO's strategic concepts and force requirements, is contained in the guidance transmitted by the DPC Ministers to the Military Committee in May 1967. *(Annex II to DPC/D(67)23, May 11, 1967)*

**I. NATO AND THE CHANGING SOVIET CHALLENGE**

If the Soviet Union has today abandoned the objective of changing the status quo in Europe by force and is engaging in diplomatic approaches toward détente with some NATO countries, this is due in large measure to the cohesion, the determination and the effective military strength of NATO over the years. As recently as 1961-1962 NATO faced and met a Soviet challenge to the Western position in Berlin which included the use of limited force and the threat of unlimited force. When the Soviet leadership was then faced down in the air corridors and on the Autobahn, it sought yet another means to affect a change in the general balance of power by secretly installing medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, targeted against the US. If this move had been successful, we could have expected renewed pressures on Berlin.

Since the Cuban crisis, the Soviets seem to have accepted the fact that they are unable to alter substantially the situation of mutual deterrence on the European Continent and globally.
At the same time, throughout the entire period, they have maintained undiminished their military deployments on the Continent and their MRBM/IRBM threat to Western Europe. They have also undertaken an urgent program to improve their nuclear capability against the West by dispersing, hardening and enlarging their deployments of ICBMs and by installing an initial ABM capability. They have also in recent years moved toward improving their strategic posture by deploying increasing naval strength, particularly in the Mediterranean area. They have built up their political-military influence in the Arab states of North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. These actions pose a growing threat to NATO's southern flank.

Moscow recognises the military strength of our deterrent. It recalls the demonstrated firmness and preparedness of the Alliance under challenge in 1962.

At the same time the Soviet leaders are preoccupied with their conflict with Peking and the concurrent upsurge of nationalism in the Socialist camp. They are also confronted with serious internal problems, notably the erosion of Communist ideology and a declining economic growth rate. All these factors make it unlikely that the Soviet Union will in the immediately foreseeable future initiate, or even wittingly risks major hostilities.

They will, however, expect the very existence of their military power to convey political influence in Western Europe, particularly if serious strains develop in the Alliance. Berlin remains a hostage, and the situation in Eastern Germany remains inherently unstable. The record in the recent Middle East crisis can hardly increase our confidence in Soviet capability to avoid miscalculation. Finally, in considering the future of East-West relationships, we would do well to bear in mind the Soviet leadership's views as to the nature of détente. Speaking at last year's 23rd Congress of the CPSU, Mr. Podgorny put it this way:

"The principle of peaceful coexistence is the principle of relations among states with different social systems. It is absolutely inapplicable in the class struggle between exploiters and those exploited, in the struggle between colonialists and the oppressed peoples, in the struggle between the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. Under present conditions the implementation of this principle facilitates victories by socialism in economic competition with capitalism and favors the successful struggle of all detachments of the world workers and national liberation movements."

In recent practice, Soviet objectives in pursuing détente have included a drive for the acquisition of advanced Western technology. The Soviets have also sought to exploit centrifugal and divisive tendencies, to isolate the FRG from its Allies, to reduce or eliminate the US and Canada as power factors in Europe and to propagate the theme that the Atlantic Alliance will reach a natural end in 1969.
Just as we should have no illusions about Soviet purposes, so should we be clear about our own. For the fact is that Soviet willingness to seek certain accommodations with the West, even on a selective basis and for whatever motive, does provide opportunities for the Alliance to foster a favorable evolution of policy. This includes the development of a public opinion in Eastern Europe and inside the Soviet Union itself which will exercise restraints on their leaders. Soviet policy may also open new possibilities for finding arrangements in the field of arms control and disarmament which would favor the emergence of a new political environment, without jeopardizing our security.

As we move in this direction, we must keep in mind that the present Soviet posture was brought about in large part by our own unity, strength and determination. We must also remember that the maintenance of this unity, strength and determination is the essential foundation for effective exploitation of this new situation. A sound NATO defense policy and military structure, combined with close political consultation, can avert the following potential dangers:

1. giving Moscow the option of again stressing the availability of their military power in Europe in the context of Soviet pressure for Western political concessions;

2. permitting Moscow to play one NATO member off against another, thus dividing and weakening the Alliance.

In fact, despite some hesitations and setbacks, the Fourteen members of NATO who continue to plan their defense on an integrated basis have remained aware of the political importance of maintaining their defense posture and adapting their policies and structures to changing circumstances and new problems in cooperation with their French ally wherever possible. Examples include:

1. revised and improved force planning procedures that are designed to correlate strategy, force requirements and resources,

2. new political guidance to the military authorities that has provided the basis for a review of NATO strategy,

3. an enhanced role for the non-nuclear powers in nuclear planning through the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee (NDAC) and the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG),

4. recognition of the need to improve procedures and facilities for exchange of intelligence and other data resulting from the work of the Special Committee of Defense Ministers,
(5) readjustment of the Military Committee and the NATO command structure to adapt to the withdrawal of the French from integrated military commands, while at the same time simplifying the command structure and providing for continued cooperation in specific areas between France and the other NATO countries,

(6) recognition of the need to improve NATO's decision-making process in times of crisis,

(7) a substantial improvement of NATO's communication capabilities,

(8) recognition that the military weaknesses of the flanks make them particularly vulnerable; adoption of certain plans for strengthening the defense of these regions, including the improvement of local forces, continuance of work in this field, including ways of providing external reinforcements in defense emergencies; and agreement to common NATO funding for the exercises of the ACE Mobile Force,

(9) continued attention to the special need for assistance in the economic development of Greece and Turkey and for defense support to enable these two countries to provide the local forces necessary, within the framework of NATO's overall military capability, for deterrence and defense on the south-eastern flank,

(10) stressing arms control as an important element of NATO business through regular meetings of disarmament experts who have engaged in extensive discussion of arms control proposals and their relation to the security interests of the Alliance.

The current study is, itself, part of the broad effort to adapt the Alliance to a changing environment.

### II. FUTURE SECURITY POLICIES

While much progress has been made in modernising the policies and machinery of the Alliance, this is a continuing process. Several current issues have important implications for the future political and security policies of the Alliance as a whole and its individual members. These are discussed below.

#### A. Defense Issues

**1. Force Levels** - One of the major defense issues we face in the Alliance is the size and type of forces we shall need to maintain in the years ahead and how the burden of maintaining forces for the common defense will be distributed.
This is not a new issue. However, it has been given new urgency by the growing pressures in all of our countries to reduce defense burdens at a time when the immediate threat of conflict in Europe appears to have diminished. Balanced and gradual revision of force levels on both sides could, together with other steps, help to shape a new political environment. However, uncoordinated force reductions could weaken our defences, create political dissension in the Alliance and actually impede development of a stable détente with the East. We cannot permit this to happen.

There continue to be differences among us on the specific forces required and how the burdens will be shared. It now is both urgent and timely that we attempt once again to resolve these differences.

The general postulates for the development of a modernised strategic concept for NATO on which rational force plans can be based were outlined in the recent guidance by the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) Defense Ministers. (Annex II to DPC/D(67)23, May 11, 1967.) This has laid the basis for a fundamental revision of the NATO strategic concepts. This guidance stresses the continuing need for the Alliance to maintain a full spectrum of military capabilities in order to deter and, if necessary, counter aggression. It notes that certain deficiencies in NATO forces remain to be corrected.

In addition the military staffs have recently developed imaginative new strategic concepts and plans, notably SACEUR's recent study of force postures based on alternative strategic concepts and SACLANT's plan for a standing naval force in the Atlantic. These ideas must now be translated into forces which the members of the Alliance are willing to support for an agreed period. We should use the consultatives means at our disposal and the force planning procedures to assure that any force adjustments are coordinated and assure the continued security of the NATO area.

2. Nuclear Planning - Another issue of continuing concern in NATO has been how to involve the non-nuclear members of the Alliance more fully in the critical decisions relating to the nuclear forces of the Alliance. Significant progress has been made in this area over the past two years, particularly with the establishment of the NDAC and the NPG. These bodies have undertaken studies which are intended to develop new guidelines for policy on several critical issues.

(a) Tactical Nuclear Weapons - Probably the most important nuclear planning task is the development of improved policies and procedures for the control and possible use of the large and varied arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons available to the Alliance. The NPG discussions with respect to tactical nuclear forces reached the conclusion that the tactical nuclear weapons available to major NATO commanders appear to be sufficient in quantity. However, the mix of weapons and the circumstances in which they might be used require further detailed study. The main questions in this area relate to the selective use
of nuclear weapons. This includes the means of ensuring adequate political control and consultation in the decision-making process, which might have to be undertaken in a very short time. Another question is the great uncertainty as to what would occur once the use of tactical nuclear weapons was initiated. It is difficult to predict when it would be of net advantage to NATO to initiate the use of tactical nuclear weapons in response to aggression less than general war. Further studies are now under way in the NPG to help to clarify this question.

(b) The Strategic Balance - While there are many ways of measuring the relative strategic capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (e.g. megatons, number of missile launchers, number of warheads), by most indices the West has clear numerical superiority over the East. In this connection, the NPG has concluded "... that the existing and programmed strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance remain adequate for deterrence of large-scale attack by the Soviet Union." But at the same time the Soviet Union also has a deterrent by virtue of having created a protected second-strike missile force which it continues to expand and improve. Thus, mutual deterrence at the strategic level exists and is likely to be maintained for the foreseeable future. In this situation, the numerical superiority of the Alliance in strategic forces, while still most important, has a limited utility as a deterrent unless it is linked with tactical nuclear capabilities and strong non-nuclear forces.

Under these conditions of mutual deterrence, the Soviets probably will continue to observe caution and avoid direct conflict with the US or its major allies. They could, however, come to believe that they had new opportunities to generate political pressures on the Alliance or conceivably even to deploy low levels of violence if the capabilities of NATO to meet lesser contingencies were permitted to atrophy.

While a situation of mutual deterrence exists and seems likely to persist, this does not mean that deterrence is static. In strategic nuclear matters the US and the Soviet Union mutually influence each other's plans. In recent years the Soviets have substantially increased their offensive forces. Clearly the Soviet build-up is in part a reaction to the US build-up since the beginning of this decade. While neither side is able to achieve a credible first-strike capability and neither seems trying to do so, it is difficult to assess intentions accurately. There is a tendency to plan one's assured destruction capability on very conservative assumptions. The result has been that both sides have built up forces to a point that far exceeds a credible second-strike capability against the forces each started with.

NATO cannot permit the Soviets to outdistance us, because to do so would be to jeopardize the very viability of the nations of the Alliance. Nevertheless, we do not want a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union. This would be extremely wasteful and in the end would buy neither side greater security. We would, therefore, much prefer to come to a realistic and reasonably riskless agreement with the Soviet Union which would effectively prevent such an arms race. If, however, the only way to prevent the Soviet Union from
obtaining a first-strike capability over us is to engage in such a race, the NATO countries possess in ample abundance the resources, the technology and the will to run faster in that race for whatever distance is required.

Another factor in the strategic equation is the emerging nuclear capability of Communist China. There is evidence that the Chinese are devoting very substantial resources to the development of both nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems. It seems likely that China's basic motivations in developing a strategic nuclear capability are to provide a basis for threatening her neighbors and to clothe herself with the dubious prestige that the world pays to nuclear weaponry. While it would be insane and suicidal for China to utilize this nuclear capability one can conceive conditions under which China might miscalculate. It is only prudent, therefore, to reduce such possibilities to a minimum. It is primarily for this reason that the US had decided to go forward with a Chinese-oriented ABM deployment.

The development and deployment of ABMs by both the USSR and the USA could have far-reaching strategic and arms control implications affecting the Alliance. While the presently planned deployment by the US is limited in scope, as is that of the Soviet Union, a major expansion of ABM deployments by either side could lead to a new and expensive arms race with serious consequences in the disarmament field. The deployment of ABMs by the two major powers, particularly if the present limited deployments are expanded, also raises for the European members of NATO the question of whether they should seek a similar form of defense. This has important military, economic and political implications which are now being studied in the NPG.

3. Crisis Consultation - The Special Committee of Defense Ministers, which preceded the NDAC/NPG, developed a number of recommendations related to improving the arrangements and procedures for information exchange, many of which are being implemented. However, each member state will have to improve its methods of handling and analysing data and provide more information to NATO before there can be a truly effective system of information exchange.

Improved procedures for exchange of information in peacetime are a vital prerequisite to improving crisis consultation; but the procedures that would be used in time of crisis also need to be reexamined. The International Staff has initiated action on this front and expects that the conduct of the forthcoming high-level exercises will permit further examination of procedures and related problems. This work should proceed expeditiously.

The Council has a modern situation center to serve as the focal point for receiving, analyzing and presenting all kinds of intelligence. The new Center at Evere should provide a substantially improved capability for crisis consultation through its situation and consultation rooms, data handling and modern communications facilities. The Center's staff should develop a well-trained
cadre for keeping pace with developing situations.

For its regular work, above all in time of crisis, the NATO military and civil authorities need to be linked by the most modern kinds of communications systems. The Alliance in the past year or so has made substantial progress in this field. An advanced system is being established that will make NATO operations more independent of land lines or short-range links. Looking ahead, the Alliance is also working on a satellite system to provide more reliable communications in the future.

B. The Alliance and Arm Control

1. Introduction - Future European security arrangements could involve mutual reductions of East-West force and armament levels, joint arms control measures and concrete progress toward the solution of the German question. It is difficult to establish priorities or a time schedule that would lead to these goals. It will depend on the willingness of the East to enter into arms control arrangements and to seek security in this way rather than by maintaining a massive military confrontation.

The first stage probably would have to rest largely on tacit understandings and mutual example. Thereafter, progress toward normalisation would in many cases require formal political and arms control agreements. Measures which might constitute elements of a future European security arrangement are:

(a) establishment of special military liaison missions on both sides with maximum freedom of movement, or a few regional and mobile observation posts. Such exchanges could make some contribution over time to breaking down the barriers to adequate verification which still stand in the way of progress on arms control. Even if no early multilateral agreement can be reached about military missions and/or observation posts, the several allies should continue to seek increased bilateral exchanges in the military field, including observation of manoeuvres on a reciprocal basis with individual members of the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union;

(b) agreements between parties on both sides renouncing the use of force;

(c) balanced reductions or redeployments of armed forces on both sides, in particular of foreign troops, or equivalent measures affecting local forces;

(d) reduction of Soviet MRBM/IRBMs targeted on Western Europe. Progress in this area may be possible only in the larger framework of limitations on US-Soviet strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and may well involve reductions in tactical nuclear weapons;

(e) East-West non-aggression pacts, undertaken in the context of concrete progress toward a European settlement, might result from progress on some of
the above measures.

There should, of course, be full consultation in NATO on all such arrangements.

2. Mutual Force Adjustments - At the present time, certain changes are taking place in Alliance military dispositions. These are partly based on economic and technological reasons. Another factor is a widely shared judgment that changes in the political posture of the other side have reduced the immediate military threat to NATO. The several allies undertaking or contemplating these measures, and the Alliance as a whole, must, however, assure that such adjustments are related to a feasible strategy and that our military options are not dangerously narrowed.

If, however, we can induce reciprocal reductions or redeployments (We distinguish between reductions and redeployments. A reduction is a cut in the existing active forces available to the Alliance. A sizeable reduction can be reversed only over a period of time and if it is, would very likely induce responses on the other side, even though it had been in the first place stimulated by some perceived change in the security situation. A redeployment moves troops back from the front but clearly keeps them in being. These units may be earmarked for return under circumstances to be agreed within the Alliance.) from the East, even without a formal agreement, force adjustments which maintained an adequate balance might serve NATO's security interests by revising the Alliance's military posture to conform to current perceptions of the threat from the East. This should be done in a manner which fosters the development of favorable political tendencies in the East and between East and West, thereby contributing to a further easing of the rivalry and ultimately to a political settlement.

NATO's security interests would have been served by the necessary preparations for such mutual force adjustments. They must lead to a NATO-agreed framework for possible reductions in the manner most likely to elicit reciprocity by the other side. This in turn will help to prevent the unraveling of the Alliance's military posture which could result from inadequately coordinated decisions and actions regarding national force levels motivated by budgetary, balance of payments and political pressures.

We have previously noted that NATO and Soviet objectives with respect to détente are not necessarily identical. However, the Russians have shown interest in the past in a mutual thinning of forces, thus there is prospect of eventual Soviet interest in patching moves. Recently, however, they have been inhibited from pursuing the matter by political considerations. They are not likely to associate themselves with a formal agreement which may appear to their allies to permit the US to redeploy men and equipment from Europe to Vietnam. Additionally, they may believe that NATO countries will reduce armed forces strength irrespective of any compensating Soviet action.
Since formal agreement on force adjustments is probably not achievable in the immediate future, any adjustment would have to be made on the basis of a general tacit understanding at best.

Existing intelligence capabilities may suffice for determining the general magnitude and authenticity of withdrawal activity. However, if agreements, whether tacit or formal, involved specific types of weapons or forces, the question of verification would be more difficult. In the last analysis, the success or failure of the measure must rest on the extent of fundamental mutuality of interest in lessening the confrontation.

Even if significant adjustments by mutual example were implemented, NATO forces in Europe would still have to be of sufficient strength to contribute to the deterrence of aggression and be capable of dealing with local clashes, harassments and border incidents. Forces in Europe would also have to be large enough to make NATO's tactical nuclear capabilities credible as a deterrent both to largescale or nuclear attack. A significant visible US presence, which could be rapidly reinforced, if necessary, would be required to provide a continuing credible US commitment in Europe's security and to maintain the pattern of the Alliance's deterrent posture.

There are, of course, risks in making adjustments even if they are mutual. It might be politically difficult to restore or strengthen NATO military capabilities on a timely basis unless adequate advance preparations are made and strongly supported and the political firmness of the NATO governments matches the technical preparations. Although a developing crisis might be sensitive to, and exacerbated by, crash Western efforts to build up our strength, rapid redeployment could be used in a period of tension to provide evidence of determination.

In sum, mutual adjustments would involve both risks and advantages. Political as well as military issues are involved. Furthermore, there are many possible kinds and degrees of adjustments that could be envisioned. What constitutes a "balanced" reduction on the other side is a complex problem that requires careful analysis. What seems indicated is a careful study of the military and political consequences of alternative schemes for mutual force adjustments. Such a study has recently been envisaged in NATO and should be pursued. It should provide a good test of NATO's ability to work out common policies and plans in the arms control field.

3. Complementary Arms control Measures - An arms control measure which might accompany substantial force adjustments would be the establishment of a direct communications link between local military headquarters in Western and Eastern Europe as has been done in Norway. This could serve to reduce the risk of accidental conflict resulting from an unintended incident such as aircraft unintentionally crossing a border. This measure might be supplemented by increased exchanges of military missions. These measures would require
formal agreements, but their political sensitivity is low enough that such agreements might be possible.

Broader arms control and disarmament issues also affect the Alliance. Examples are the proposed nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the limited test ban treaty. The recent intensive discussions in the Council on the non-proliferation treaty demonstrate both the need for and the usefulness of full consultation on arms control measures affecting the Alliance members. The non-nuclear members of the Alliance have, quite correctly, wanted assurance that the signature of a non-proliferation treaty would not adversely affect their security interests, and the discussions in the NAC have helped to alleviate these concerns. NATO will need to give continuing attention to the effect of this treaty and other arms control measures on the strategy and force posture of the Alliance.

4. Strengthening NATO's Arms Control Machinery - It seems clear that the Alliance should give increasing concern to arms control issues. Problems of arms control and possible security arrangement should be examined with as much continuing care and attention as NATO devotes to force planning, strategy and nuclear questions.

The Council has often discussed questions of arms control. Disarmament experts are considering these problems at the technical level during regularly scheduled meetings. These efforts, although valuable, have not proven adequate. The Alliance should establish regular and continuing machinery to examine and evaluate all aspects of proposals or suggestions in this field.

This could be accomplished by establishing, under the authority of the Council, a separate, permanent committee, called the Arms Control and Disarmament Committee. This committee would be supported by an expert staff section established within the International Staff under the Secretary General.

Establishment of this committee with International Staff support would institutionalize the consideration of arms control measures as an element of NATO security policy.

It would develop firms control concepts and proposals for consideration by NATO governments. It would serve as a point through which member governments could get initial NATO reactions to unilaterally formulated disarmament proposals.

The committee would seek the advice of NATO military planners in formulating its recommendations. The existing force planning machinery, adapted as necessary, would be utilised to evaluate the military implications of arms control proposals. This would ensure that the Council and member governments have available the carefully considered military, as well as political, views necessary for decisions on these sensitive matters.

1. The Relation of Technology to Security - Among the changes fast transforming our society, none has had greater impact than the scientific-technological revolution. Nowhere has the impact been more striking than in the field of military technology. Increasingly an essential component of an effective military establishment is the qualitative excellence and quantitative sufficiency of the arms and equipment borne by the armed forces. Advances in technology in the next ten to fifteen years are likely to have profound effects on the forces and strategy of the Alliance.

Examples of the way in which technology influences strategy include the development of satellite reconnaissance to provide timely intelligence and of the Polaris Weapon system to give a strike second capability. Both of these have served to reduce the likelihood of surprise attack. The advent of large transport aircraft has enabled greater flexibility in the deployment of ready forces.

2. Trends and Their Impact - It is characteristic of the rapidly changing technology that specific developments are difficult to predict. However, three characteristics in the trend of military hardware are particularly evident. First, the rate of innovation in advanced systems is extra-ordinarily high. It took only a decade to go from subsonic to supersonic fighter aircraft; the entire cycle of the heavy jet bomber development was completed in less than two decades. The requirement for timely decisions is equally important. With development times equalling or even exceeding the expected useful life of the weapon, the effectiveness of the decision-making process becomes central to the problem.

Second, as the effectiveness of weapons has grown, so also has their complexity requiring higher levels of education and training in design, production and operation of weapons systems.

Third, costs continue to rise, either because technology allows more to be done by a system of a given weight, size or volume or because more must be done and a new system developed to do it. A fighter plane, which cost $50,000 in 1944, would cost $2 million today to perform the same function. These costs are buried in all phases of the weapons life cycle: research, development, production, maintenance and operations. The net effect is to price some weapons almost beyond the means of even the most advanced industrial states, which find it most difficult to buy or even to operate them. On the other hand a single missile today costing $1.3 million carries more explosive power than 200,000 WW II B-17 aircraft, armed with conventional bombs, which would have cost over $37 billion.

3. Problem Areas - NATO continues to profit from the extraordinary
technological resources of all its members. However, we must continue to seek efficient and equitable ways to share the costs and the benefits of defense technology.

As the effectiveness and complexity of modern weapons grows, the quantities required decline. For many weapons, small national markets no longer provide a base for economic production. Without such a base and the hope of an efficient production run, there is less incentive to engage in expensive research. Without research, able talent disperses to new fields, and an entire industry may founder and disappear. Thus, the technological gap widens.

Efforts to enlarge markets and share costs by joint development or production projects have had only limited success. The cooperative production projects attempted, although highly useful, have encountered problems in management, funding, division of production and agreement on specifications. The basic problem is the extent to which national considerations must be sacrificed in the interest of a common effort to produce modern hardware at a reasonable cost. In our experience so far, national considerations have taken precedence over the laws of comparative advantage. As the costs of maintaining a modern military establishment increase, it may become increasingly difficult for the smaller members of the Alliance to maintain a full spectrum of military capabilities on a national basis. Increasing specialization and thus greater military integration may be required.

There is no simple solution to these difficult problems. All members of the Alliance must play a role in seeking solutions, and some sacrifice of purely national interests will be required. On the one hand, efficient use of limited resources clearly seems to suggest that the technological tasks should be performed largely by those best qualified to do so at the least cost. On the other hand, this approach, carried to a logical conclusion, only widens the gap between those who contribute and those who do not.

Much of the difficulty of achieving successful cooperation lies in the need to reconcile national operational requirements both in terms of military characteristics and of timescale. Experience has shown the need for greater flexibility in reconciling these requirements at an early stage if joint development projects are to be achieved.

In the search for healthy long-term solutions, the size of markets and industry, management techniques, availability of risk capital, government-industry relationships and investment in education all play a major role. All must be considered.

As far as the Alliance is concerned, a two-fold approach seems indicated:

First, there is an urgent need to increase intra-European cooperation if the European members of the Alliance are to cope with the problems of
maintaining high-technology industries on the scale necessitated by their complexity and cost. Europe has already demonstrated its capacity to handle comparable issues in its civilian industrial sector. Defense deserves a similar effort.

Second, is the need to continue and develop the interallies cooperation already in existence in such forms as the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the bilateral and multilateral production programs, the SHAPE Technical Center, AGARD, the SACLANT ASW Center and the activities of the NATO Science Committee.

D. The Relationship Between NATO Security Policies and Worldwide Developments

1. The Impact of External Developments on NATO Security

Clearly our interests and responsibilities outside the NATO area differ in kind and degree, but to some extent we will be affected by conflicts that erupt elsewhere in the world. There is always the risk that a conflagration that starts in a distant part of the world - especially one in some way involving the USSR - can spread to affect the NATO countries.

The recent Arab-Israeli conflict has emphasized how the interests of the NATO members can be threatened by conflict in the Middle East area. The military map of the Mediterranean is changing as a result of the Soviet decision to maintain substantial naval forces in the area indefinitely, their large-scale arms resupply operation and the possibility of deeper Soviet penetration into the Arab armed forces, including Algeria. Dispatch of Soviet naval units to Arab ports while tensions still ran high suggests the future possibility of greater risks than heretofore of direct Soviet military involvement should large-scale incidents occur along the Suez Canal. This effort by the Soviets to extend their influence, particularly in the Mediterranean Basin, directly involved the interests of all NATO countries.

Recent developments in the Middle East have stimulated consultations in the NAC with a view to co-ordinating arms supply policies in the Middle East. These should be continued. In addition, in considering the question of balanced force reductions we should take into account the growing Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern area. We would not wish to reduce our defences unduly in one sector of the NATO area while the Soviets were increasing their capabilities in another particularly as forces on the Central front are, at present, a substantial source of military strength for rapid reinforcement of the flanks.

2. Implications for NATO Security Policies - Conflicts outside the NATO area will have different implications for different members of the Alliance. However, we should use the NATO machinery to exchange views and to
harmonise, to the fullest extent possible, plans and approaches on threats to peace which could directly affect the security interests of all NATO members. With respect to global developments of general interest to the Alliance, we should continue to exchange views and consult together in the Council and in the regional experts groups.

The question arises as to when a particular conflict or threat to the peace is of sufficient concern to the Alliance as a whole to warrant more intensive consultation or joint action. It is not possible to specify in advance whether, and if so how, NATO should react to a particular crisis. However, we should be able to improve the machinery for identifying, at an early stage, developing situations that are of concern to Alliance members, and measures for dealing with them. The new situation center at Evere should help us to accomplish this. In addition, it is suggested that the review of crisis consultation procedures, which has recently been proposed by the Secretary General, should include the consideration of machinery for identifying crises that are of interest and concern to the Alliance as a whole. The review should also develop specific consultative procedures for dealing with these crises.

3. NATO and the UN - NATO security policies also could contribute to world stability by encouraging members to participate in and support UN peacekeeping activities.

The Alliance might explicitly endorse the concept that participation by individual members in UN peacekeeping and earmarking forces for UN service is desirable. There should be no great difficulty in reconciling NATO and UN commitments. In practice, national troop contingents and facilities engage in UN operations only on the express decision by the contributing country case by case. In the event of overriding national interests, the contributing country is at liberty to withdraw its contingent.

Earmarking and commitment of forces and other resources to UN operations can be undertaken in a manner that does not impair the ability of national forces committed to NATO to fulfil NATO requirements if called upon. Planning for participation in UN activities should even enhance military capabilities. While budget implications need to be carefully considered, the advantage of added military strength consequent on training an additional contingent for peace-keeping would generally tend to outweigh possible budget problems.

Another advantage of participation by NATO countries in UN peacekeeping is that it makes manifest the political acceptability of troops from certain NATO countries as impartial peacekeepers in the third world. Thus, the presence in the Middle East, Cyprus and the Congo of troops from Canada, Denmark and Norway serves to demonstrate the desire of NATO members to contribute to the maintenance of global peace.
In any event, NATO in the future will have to take into consideration the outlook of certain members which see their national defense role as encompassing world peace-keeping responsibilities as well as responsibilities for collective self-defence in the NATO framework.

E. Conclusion - The Future Security Tasks of the Alliance

1. Sustain and modernise the Alliance's military strength in order to maintain deterrence and create the political climate indispensable to security and progress toward a permanent political settlement in Europe. To this end, continue using and improving the force planning process to relate strategy, forces and resource capabilities.

2. Use effectively the machinery recently created for nuclear planning. Also strengthen national nuclear planning staffs so that the non-nuclear members can participate more effectively in this planning.

3. Carry through the steps already initiated to improve military consultation through the regular exchange of intelligence and related information in the Situation Center. This can provide the desired basis for more effective crisis consultation, particularly if the Center provides early warning of worldwide events that may affect NATO security.

4. Increase cooperation in military research and production between the members of the Alliance on an urgent basis. This is the only way in which members, particularly the small ones, can cope with the problems of maintaining high-technology industries on the scale necessitated by their complexity and cost. To this end operational requirements should be reconciled at an early stage so that joint development projects can be achieved.

5. While maintaining effective means of deterrence, formulate concrete disarmament propositions which will afford renewed evidence of the political will of the Alliance to realize an effective détente with the countries of the East. In particular, in preparation for the time when balanced force reductions may become feasible, possibilities in this field should be studied now. To achieve this objective, a permanent Arms Control and Disarmament Committee of NATO and a unit of the International Staff to support this committee are proposed.
Developments in regions outside the NATO area

Report of Subgroup 4

The role of NATO in world affairs

Introduction (Par. 1 - 14)

Categories of problems which could affect the interests of the Alliance (par. 15)

I. Political events directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area (par. 16 - 24)

II. Political events not directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area, but in which NATO members are involved (par. 25 - 27)

III. International problems of a universal character towards which Western nations have to take a position (par. 23 - 34)

Proposals for improving political consultation (par. 35 - 41)

Conclusion (par. 42)

Introduction

1. Although the main purpose of the Atlantic Alliance is to ensure the collective defence of its members within the area covered by the Treaty, it is evident that their security and wellbeing can be seriously affected by developments outside that area. Accordingly, in the Report of the Committee of Three of 1956 on Non-military Cooperation in NATO it was stated that the members: "Should also be concerned with harmonizing their policies in relation to other areas, taking into account the broader interests of the whole international community; particularly in working through the United Nations and elsewhere for the maintenance of international peace and security and for
the solution of the problems that now divide the world (par 32).

In following this course, NATO can show that it is more than a defence organization ... It can prove its desire to cooperate fully with other members of the international community in bringing to reality the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It can show that it is not merely concerned with preventing the cold war from deteriorating into a shooting one; or with defending itself if such a tragedy should take place, but that it is even more concerned with seizing the political and moral initiative to enable all countries to develop in freedom and to bring about a secure peace for all nations." (par. 33)

2. On 13th December, 1956, the NATO Council took note of the Report and approved its recommendations. The intention to harmonize the policies of the members in relation to other areas, and especially the appeal to the Alliance to bring about peace and security for other nations, has not, however, materialized. Public opinion today is even less convinced than it was in 1956 that NATO as an international organization has a function outside the Treaty area. The harmonization of policies of the NATO members in their relations to other areas has proved indeed to be a stubborn assignment. The Alliance was not designed to meet threats to peace coming from outside Europe; most of its members, moreover, are not prepared to accept any additional commitments beyond the domain of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nevertheless, the threats to the security of the North Atlantic nations now seem to rise more often from outside the area. The problem of communist expansion has shifted to other parts of the world while political instability is on the increase everywhere.

3. The member States are all the more reluctant to face developments outside the NATO area since the commitments of individual Allied Governments in those parts of the world and discordant situations around the globe (de-colonization, Suez 1956, Vietnam, etc.) have often been a source of friction and irritation between them. A common policy for problems falling outside the competence of the Atlantic Alliance was never anticipated, but coordination of national policies of the members, in the interest of the cohesion of the Alliance, was one of the assumptions upon which NATO was built. The present conspicuous lack of harmony in the foreign policy of NATO members in international crises outside the NATO area reflects an ingrained disbelief in the possibility of Western collective diplomacy in the world arena. In this respect, the hopes of 1956 have not been fulfilled.

4. In the absence of effective international institutions for the maintenance of a decent world order, individual members of NATO have repeatedly taken military action in international situations in the interest of peace and stability. The great differences of degree of international responsibility between the members has not facilitated NATO consultation and mutual understanding with regard to such interventions. This disagreement has lately taken the form of a public discussion between individual spokesmen in the United States and Europe with regard to their respective roles in the preservation of peace and
order throughout the world. This debate between the United States and its Allies - although largely unofficial - is significant for the present interpretation of the function of the Alliance with regard to events outside the NATO area.

5. From the American side the desire has been expressed to see their NATO allies take a greater share in the maintenance of international order, while many Europeans and Canadians show considerable hesitation to accept for themselves or for the Alliance a larger political role in world affairs. American spokesmen assume that there are real common interests outside the Atlantic area and the refusal, especially of some European NATO partners, to share the responsibility and the costs is sometimes interpreted in the United States as a reprehensible lack of solidarity. At the same time, in Europe large sectors of public opinion are apprehensive of being drawn by their American partners into conflicts outside the Atlantic area, while European understanding of the implications of "containment" or "wars of national liberation" in those regions is often different from that of the United States.

6. In this controversy a few points require additional clarification. While the Americans are anxious to re-engage the interest of Europe in the problems of world security, they have never clearly indicated in what form and to what extent their NATO Allies could participate in the political control and administration of a power which is largely in American hands. At the same time, many Europeans protest their reluctance to accept such political cooperation on the world level as long as they do not enjoy full equality in the sharing of decisions; but there is reasonable doubt as to their real desire to face new responsibilities outside the NATO area. The most fundamental problem is, however, that most Europeans when asked about their world role must confess that they have no common view and even more no clear conception of a role for Europe outside the Atlantic area.

7. The interest of European nations in these problems has not disappeared (the Scandinavian countries and also Canada are more willing than before to accept United Nations tasks while several European countries are making impressive efforts in the new endeavour of development aid), but the loss by the former colonial powers of their imperial position and the traumatic experience of decolonization have greatly reduced European means and the will to assume global responsibilities. European contacts with regions outside the Atlantic area are still maintained largely through the old and tried channels of communication. European commitments exist in different forms; surviving colonial responsibilities, institutional links through the British Commonwealth, aid to former colonial territories, a sense of responsibility for new nations sometimes in the form of treaty obligations, etc. The economic and cultural opportunities which the old relations with former colonial territories offer are welcomed in Europe and of great value for the newly independent States. But those contacts are historical in origin and mainly national in significance. They do not fully counter-balance the lack of an up-to-date conception of Europe's role in world affairs in terms of the future and the interests of world order.
8. Nothing short of a foreign policy conceived in global terms and planned over a long period will safeguard the stability of the Atlantic nations. For the Alliance the relevance of events outside the Atlantic area is a new experience. Since it is possible to think in terms of "détente" in Europe, the importance of the prevention of conflicts elsewhere has increased. For "détente" is basically indivisible and a viable European settlement implies a more general understanding with the Soviet Union extending to all areas of the world. Events outside NATO in which the Soviet Union and the United States are involved can therefore deeply affect the relationships within the Alliance and the security of Europe. Many conflicts of a local character elsewhere have an inbuilt tendency to escalate or to bring about a confrontation of the two great powers. The real issue today is the establishment of world stability, for which the American presence is required in Europe, and European influence will be needed in the regions outside the NATO area. War can erupt and spread both in Europe and elsewhere. A European refusal to admit such a possibility, or to accept corresponding responsibility, could be as disastrous as the American indifference to the maintenance of the European balance of power after the First World War.

9. While the NATO Alliance is the suitable framework for the preservation of the security of its members in the Atlantic area, it is less obvious that NATO would be the right instrument for cooperation outside the area. The objections against utilizing NATO processes for extra-curricular purposes are wellknown. It is not possible to make NATO omnicompetent since the non-aligned nations refuse to be involved in the cold war. Nor is it advisable for NATO to intervene in conflict situations elsewhere in substitution for an ineffective United Nations organization; indeed, NATO action might well provoke Soviet intervention and accordingly spread the danger. The legal objections against the extension of NATO responsibilities outside the NATO area are well founded. The Treaty contains no provisions for operational activities of the Alliance in other regions.

10. Members of an Alliance, however, who together produce more than one half of the world's total wealth, who share an even larger part of the world's reservoir of technical skill and facilities, who control the terms of trade and credit in most parts of the world, and who have made it a habit to deliver armaments to many new countries, cannot be indifferent to events outside their own defence perimeter. If they desire to contribute to the peace of the Third world - as it would be in their own interest to do - they must seek to coordinate their policies in order to create an impact of western standards of law and order upon a world in which situations of peril and injustice will be endemic.

11. It is probably an illusion for members of NATO to hope to obtain a certificate of "United Nations' virginity" by refraining from taking sides in conflicts elsewhere. Although the members of NATO proclaimed a policy of strict non-intervention in the latest Middle Eastern crisis they could neither prevent the outbreak of the conflict itself nor escape the charge of imperialism. The fear of committing NATO, or even of formulating any NATO position with regard to the Israel-Arab conflict, did not prevent commitment from the
Soviet side. Nor did European impartiality safeguard any European interests. The main result has been, as Raymond Aron stated in the Figaro of 28th June, 1967, a demonstration of the political absence of Europe: "Au Moyen Orient il y a, d'une part, les acteurs locaux - Israël et les pays Arabes - d'autre part les deux Grands... L'Europe des Six s'occupait de betteraves pendant ces jours historiques".

12. The question must be faced whether the Western world can afford much longer the luxury of uncoordinated national approaches to problems of this kind. Many of the issues which confront us in regions outside the Atlantic area are of global dimensions and require multinational remedies. A failure to harmonize policies will in the end alienate the Allies one from another. In that case, the European partners should not be surprised if they are faced with a revival of American isolationism. Among the smaller nations, moreover, such a lack of unity of purpose will provoke a rapid spread of neutralism. It seems justified, therefore, to ask the members of NATO to reconsider their objections against fresh efforts to extend coordination of policy, contingency planning and common diplomatic action in the NATO context to developments in regions outside the NATO area.

13. NATO's task beyond the Treaty area is not to operate outside it, but to devise common policies for its members. The new relevance of events outside the NATO area requires Western European and North American cooperation in those parts of the world; the structure of the Alliance and our sovereign equality oblige us, however, to follow a process of mutual persuasion before common policies can be adopted. In political affairs the Alliance has no supranational pretentions. Nor can it serve as an instrument for hegemonic leadership by the United States. We cannot ignore the renewed awareness of their national identity amongst European nations, nor can we anticipate at this juncture a European political federation to serve as the European pillar in an Atlantic partnership. A new effort in political consultation must be based on contemporary realities; improvements in the mechanics of consultation can only be grafted upon the unsatisfactory political structure of the present world.

14. For simultaneous and parallel action on both sides of the Atlantic strong and clear indications of common interests are required, demanding a common approach and served through common means. The function of NATO in this field is to serve as a clearing house for mutual information and as a braintrust for the identification and formulation of the common interest. If the interests of members of the Alliance are not identical - as they sometimes will not be - a distinction can be made in responsibility. Between the poles of a complete common policy for the Alliance (which cannot be expected outside the Treaty area) and no common policy at all (unavoidable consequence of an Alliance in which it would be forbidden to give advice concerning matters outside the Treaty area) there lies a wide field for study and contingency planning for those members who are prepared to coordinate their efforts, who possess the capability to raise the means and are prepared to apply them.
Categories of problems which could affect the interests of the Alliance

15. Events outside the NATO area which could affect the security or the cohesion of the Alliance and for which - coordination of the policies of the members is required, can be distinguished into different categories:

I. Political events directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area

II. Political events not directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area, but in which NATO members are involved

III. International problems of a universal character towards which Western nations have to take a position

I. Political events directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area

16. Problems which will always be of major importance for the Alliance are the following:

a. Developments on the borders of the NATO defence perimeter which could directly affect the security of the area; or conflicts elsewhere which could escalate and provoke a confrontation of the great powers.

b. Nuclear developments which could affect the world nuclear equilibrium.

c. The problem of China.

17. It is not possible to review in any detail the crises which can arise in the Third World and which the NATO Council eventually will have to face. The period of decolonisation in Asia and Africa is coming to an end, and in many of the new nations the struggle for independence and the unifying impulse of militant nationalism has been followed by a crisis of consolidation. The new states - and the same applies to large sectors of Latin America - are faced with terrific problems of external vulnerability, domestic instability, and human poverty. The United Nations Charter provided them with the legal guarantee of their independence and the basis for a policy of non-alignment, but in many cases their weakness and lack of cohesion engender conflict and the need for support from outside. It will be unavoidable for members of NATO - especially for the United States in its world role and its system of alliances - to intervene from time to time in attempts to consolidate the status quo. It will be equally unavoidable that there will be interference from the side of communist powers, aware of a fertile field of expansion. The instability of the new configuration of
power in the world is a potential source of local conflict, regional escalation and confrontation of the great powers.

18. The Alliance will need adequate diplomatic responses especially to dangerous developments in regions on the border of the NATO defence perimeter. In emergencies it will be necessary to make distinctions between categories of danger. The Council should know what developments would not be acceptable in view of the security of the members. The persistent Soviet penetration in a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa requires close attention. The NATO Council will need a study in depth to decide what forms and what level of Soviet influence would seem unavoidable and acceptable in those parts of the world, and what forms of Soviet influence (e.g. arms deliveries, military bases, etc.) would create problems of security for the Alliance. If the Soviet Union is prepared to use its position in co-operation with other great powers to stabilize a situation of local conflict or dangerous fluidity, Soviet influence could be beneficial. If on the contrary the purpose is to weaken NATO, to stir up difficulties for the Western world and to continue the cold war outside Europe, the situation requires an active policy of containment and close cooperation at the Western side. The same applies to local conflicts elsewhere of such importance that they could threaten the peace in a wider area and involve the great powers. In such cases the Council will have to decide what level of turbulence can be tolerated and what should be done to localize the danger, together with the Soviet Union if possible, in opposition to the Soviet Union (mutatis mutandis: China) if necessary.

19. Remedial action in dangerous situations outside the NATO area will have to be taken in an environment and under a responsibility different from those of the NATO Council. In most cases the framework for diplomatic action in conflicts of this kind will be the United Nations. For the members of NATO it is essential that, whatever the international forum, a just and fitting response be given to the challenge of the danger, in the context of the relevant legal framework and the actual constellation of power. The main NATO interest and the purpose of all diplomatic activity will be that the dangerous fires outside the NATO area be quenched, and threats to the peace dealt with on their own merits, in order to prevent their spread and escalation. This implies that it would be a mistake for NATO members to approach situations of this kind from the angle of their national interests only, and even more to take advantage of the situation by damaging the interest of Allies.

20. It may be unavoidable for NATO members to take individual action, in the United Nations, in the countries concerned, or elsewhere. Where common action is not possible the NATO approach should always be (to use a slightly too dramatic military metaphor) "getrennt zu marschieren aber vereint zu schlagen" (to proceed separately, but to strike together). The NATO interest requires that the freedom of the members in such matters will be a freedom according to plan, subordinate to the concern for the right response to the problem itself. No such harmonized freedom will be possible without careful preparation, both in the analysis of the situation and the presentation of policy
implications for the members.

21. When it comes to political action the responsibilities for the members of NATO will differ widely. In situations outside the NATO area one or more of the great powers - permanent members of the Security Council and heavily committed elsewhere - will in most cases be directly involved. Other NATO members (e.g. Scandinavian countries and Canada) have repeatedly accepted special responsibilities for participation in peacekeeping activities of the United Nations, and can in this way effectively contribute to the settlement of conflict. There are advantages in this pluriformity of international conduct on one condition: that the members of NATO will be guided by the same views on the merits of the case and its solution. For this purpose NATO will need a policy and constant consultation, both in the NATO Council and in those international institutions where the members are confronted with the debate and the policy formulation for conflicts of this kind. It is, for the member countries to consult within the NATO Council on the right approach to the conflict. Their representatives in other international bodies will have the task to transpose the NATO-view in e.g. United Nations' policy in order to be able to respond adequately to the challenge of the occasion and environment. Danger can arise if the NATO Council does not give guidance and the Permanent Representatives of the NATO countries in New York are reluctant to consult effectively.

22. Problems in regions outside the NATO area requiring a long-term political strategy, policy planning and a system of crisis management from the side of the members of the Alliance will be the following:

a. The evaluation of communist expansion in specific regions. The kind and the lever of Soviet influence which would create dangers for peace, the stability of the area concerned, or the interests of NATO members. The policies to be adopted in order to neutralize the disruptive effects of Soviet pressure or communist subversive activity.

b. The necessity of a regional equilibrium of power in Asia and in the Middle East. The question where new lines of power and influence should be drawn in Asia, and the ways and means to assist in creating the necessary stability. The consequences of a British withdrawal from commitments East of Suez. The problem of military guarantees for non-aligned nations.

c. The need of an international control of arms deliveries in order to prevent local or regional disturbances of the peace.

d. The evaluation of local or regional political controversies and their significance for the future of the area concerned. (e.g. the conflicts within the Arab world, in Nigeria, and elsewhere).
e. The meaning of "wars of national liberation" in Asia and Africa and the question whether local conflicts of this kind should be ignored, or would justify international interference.

f. The evaluation of revolutionary developments in Latin America. The problem where to draw the line between creative social processes and disruptive subversive activities.

g. The problem of peace keeping activities of the United Nations and other international organisations, their function, possibilities and limitations. The support to be given to such activities by members of the Alliance.

h. Vital economic interests of the Western world in parts of Asia and Africa and how to safeguard them (e.g. oil, the Suez Canal, etc.).

23. Nuclear developments outside the NATO area which could affect the world's nuclear equilibrium will always be among the most important points of deliberation in the NATO Council. In the context of this section of the Report the political aspects of the spread or the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be mentioned. A world policy of non-proliferation will meet resistance, also of Asia, in countries desiring to develop a nuclear capacity in the military field. It may be that the Alliance will have to choose between general considerations of world nuclear control, and the more specific political question whether it would be in the interest of world stability to prevent countries like Japan and India from developing nuclear striking forces. If the general consideration prevails, the question what nuclear guarantee can be given to such countries is not only a technical matter, but a political one of great consequence. The nuclear situation puts a constant pressure upon the political structures of the future. What these structures should be is a problem of an order which requires not only technical or strategic answers, but political study in depth. This kind of long-term political thinking is not necessarily a task for the NATO staff only, but sooner or later the NATO Council should be presented with the result of studies enabling it to understand fully the political implications of the matter under consideration.

24. Finally, one of the major problems of the next few years will be how to relate China to the rest of the world. This is not a matter for one or more nations, not even for the NATO Council, but clearly a problem in which members of the Alliance should consult with other Asian states and the Soviet Union. The world interest, to see China participate through normal channels of communication and in normal diplomatic fashion in every major international activity, is also the NATO interest. The members of the Alliance will need from the side of the NATO Council the best possible information and interpretation of Chinese events and motives. In view of the importance of the subject a common NATO approach would be advisable in every major policy decision with regard to China, and in emergencies on the Chinese border.
II. Political events not directly affecting the security of the Atlantic area, but in which NATO members are involved.

25. For events of a local character and minor significance, and for special obligations or interests of individual members of the Alliance, a harmonization and coordination of the policies of the members is not required. No one expects a clearly defined NATO position with regard to United States' commitments in Latin America and East Asia, British positions east of Suez, or Portuguese colonial obligations, as long as those commitments do not give rise to major trouble or threats to the peace. The interests of the members are not identical everywhere and it must be possible to agree to a permissible range of divergence and freedom of action for problems in this category. It cannot be denied, however, that such commitments of individual members can have a disruptive effect on the cohesion of the Alliance. The reserved domains of international action have often been a source of trouble both for the Alliance and the individual member.

26. The members have full freedom of decision with regard to their commitment outside the NATO area; prior consultation in the NATO Council is not obligatory, nor can it in all circumstances be expected. A world power cannot consult at every turn its numerous allies. There may come moments in which e.g. the United States has to act alone quickly and vigorously in order to face a confrontation of strategic power. The Cuban missile crisis was such a moment and none of the NATO allies expected at that time prior consultation or common contingency planning. Nevertheless, if this unavoidable freedom is not used with the utmost care and consideration - and this applies to all members - the consequences for the Alliance could be serious. A complete freedom of action for the individual members would undermine the belief in the Alliance. World order is a common responsibility, and no member can expect policies to be shared which have not first been made object of discussion. The cost of non-consultation must be measured before any unilateral action is taken, since the harm in international confidence can be serious. Prior consultation, therefore, should be the rule, at least with those allies which are able and willing to participate in consultation. The Council, or special groups appointed by the Council, must have the right to be informed, to encourage and to warn.

27. Colonial obligations of members of the Alliance have been a source of difficulty from the beginning. Today only Portugal is still deeply involved in a process of decolonization, and it will not be easy for the NATO Council to adopt a common policy with regard to this problem. The Portuguese delegation takes the view that the Alliance should accept the following line of conduct: "The vital interests of any one of the members of the Alliance should never be unnecessarily undermined or, a fortiori, openly attacked by other members for reasons which are not in the same degree vital to those other members; an ally should be recognised in right to pursue, in a field which does not affect vital
interests of others, a special policy dictated by interests vital to that ally; such a policy, particularly when it serves useful purposes in terms of the social and economic welfare of the less developed peoples affected by it, should receive from the other allies at least as much public tolerance as is shown, for the purposes of détente, towards communist regimes and Soviet domination in eastern Europe."

While the Portuguese desire commands full respect and should be followed as far as possible, it is not to be expected that the other members of the Alliance will always be able to adhere to the Portuguese request in debates of the United Nations and other international organisations.

III. International problems of a universal character towards which Western nations have to take a position.

28. In the Third World we are faced with the challenge of a few problems of a general character and global significance. It may well be that the future prestige of the Western world is less dependent upon its power and wealth than upon its response to problems of human rights, racial relations and economic development. In our contacts with the peoples of Asia and Africa a new paradox is building up: a sharp resentment from the side of the Third World against any interference in its affairs, and at the same time the desire that the Western powers shall proclaim and enforce respect for human rights, racial non-discrimination, freedom and economic development throughout the world. In view of the national over-sensitivity of the new nations the Western powers have in many instances followed a scrupulous policy of non-intervention. There is a wide-spread impression, however, that they will be prepared to set aside their objections to intervention as soon as communist influence raises its head. The diplomacy of the Western world must try to avoid the appearance of being more interested in checking the progress of communism than in helping to establish conditions of human dignity. In their relations with the Third World the NATO members should clearly strive for more than anti-communism; they need a political strategy which will command respect and sympathy. Here again study in depth, consultation and co-ordination of policy are required, especially in two fields: racial relations and economic development.

29. In the next few years it will be of the utmost importance what will be the attitude of the Western nations with respect to tensions and conflicts emanating from racial discrimination, especially in Rhodesia and South Africa. Although Europe and the United States cannot be blamed for policies and events in those countries, there is in the eyes of the coloured peoples no escape from the collective responsibility of the white race. In the highly explosive atmosphere of the southern parts of Africa we are expected to throw our political weight into the scale of the human interests of the coloured population. It would certainly be welcomed in the Western world, if racial discrimination could be
30. Protest and condemnation, the easy indignation of United Nations' meetings, is both irrelevant and infra dignitatem for those who hold world power. Can NATO develop a foreign policy for its members which could influence the course of events? Only if we should be able to engage the interest and cooperation of the white population of the countries concerned. One example of possible action may suffice. The question could be studied, whether it would be possible for Western nations to give a guarantee of non-intervention to the countries concerned, on one condition: that they gradually change their racial legislation, and establish in due time conditions of legal and social equality for the whole of the population.

31. The problems of economic development are of no direct concern of NATO. For the members of the Alliance the best framework for the harmonization of their development assistance policies will be the O.E.C.D., and especially its Development Assistance Committee. In their report on non-military cooperation in NATO the Committee of Three of 1956 rightly concluded that economic cooperation must remain wider than NATO. And according to a later study on the competence and objectives of NATO in the economic field (Doc. C.M.(61)30, Part.II, Par.17) the function of NATO with regard to the less developed countries outside NATO is strictly limited:

"NATO provides a forum for a frank exchange of views, where necessary, on policies for countering the Sino-Soviet economic offensive in the less developed countries. For example, if it were felt that these policies are not developed with sufficient sense of urgency in the Development Assistance Group or other international organizations, there could be an exchange of views on this point in NATO. Any remedial action that might be considered necessary should be promoted by the NATO member countries in the Development Assistance Group or other international organizations concerned.....When carrying out any measures recommended in NATO, member countries should continue to act in their individual capacity; for any attempt to make NATO into an operating "agency for countering Sino-Soviet economic penetration would have grave psychological "repercussions in the less developed countries."

32. It may be time to reconsider the assumption, that an exchange of views in NATO should be limited to occasional failures of other organizations in developing policies for countering communist economic offensive. The problem of aid to the less developed nations should not be approached only from the angle of the containment of communist expansion. It should be solved on its own merits, and a NATO discussion would seem indicated if the dangers of economic stagnation in developing countries would require a special effort and a high priority in the policies of the Western world. The O.E.C.D. and
other international organizations provide the members with analysis, theory and advice on the general scope of the action which would be needed to meet the most urgent problems. The role of the NATO Council should be to underline the urgency and importance of recommendations made by such organizations in view of the general world situation.

33. The latest data of the Development Assistant Committee of the O.E.C.D. are not very encouraging and indicate a decline in the net flow of development aid in percentages of the national income of the members of the O.E.C.D.. At the same time political disturbances in several underdeveloped countries are beginning to slow down the process of development. In view of the real danger of a serious deterioration in the development situation the recommendations in the 1967 Review of the D.A.C. are of special importance.

34. Attention should be drawn to the following points (1):

- The failure of the overall development assistance effort to expand more rapidly reflects the longer priority given to aid as against other claims on national resources.

- The net official flow of assistance from D.A.C. members to less developed countries has been slowly increasing in 1966, but

  a. the disbursements for assistance have not kept up with the growth in national income of the last six years.
  b. the increase in the net official flow in 1966 was more than offset by a drop in private foreign investment.
  c. much higher levers of support will be necessary if the multilateral agencies are merely to maintain their present levels of commitment.

- The terms of aid financing are very unsatisfactory. It will not be possible to maintain the present net flow of assistance in the face of growing interest and amortization payments, and the growing weight of external debt in the borrowing countries.

- It will, therefore, be necessary to soften the terms of lending and to anticipate debt crises before they develop.

- These problems cannot be dealt with by the members individually and separately, but require common action.

- The members should consider the possibility of multi-year aid programmes in each donor country.

(1) cf. the introductory statement by Willard C. Thorp, Chairman of the D.A.C. at its meeting of 19th and 20th July 1967
Proposals for improving political consultation.

35. In view of the changes in the international situation since 1949 (especially the fact that the main threats to the security of the North Atlantic nations have shifted from Europe to other parts of the world) we need a better alliance system for consultation in crisis situations outside the Atlantic area. This purpose can be attained on two conditions: our Governments must demonstrate the political will to make NATO an active centre for the coordination of the policies of the Western world, and the NATO machinery must be adapted to the new tasks. The fundamental point, of course, is the strength of the resolution of the members to make use of the Alliance as an instrument for the coordination of their policy. If they believe to have better means for the tasks described in this Report, NATO has no function. Since this is probably not the case it seems not to be entirely superfluous to suggest a few adaptations in the processes of consultation.

36. NATO is in need of a greater variety of forms of consultation in order to mobilize the potential for study in depth and to present the Council with proposals for coordinated action. This would require gradations in the consultation process, both with regard to the participants and the issues singled out for study. The best procedure for questions outside the NATO area would be discussion in groups performing a narrow function, restricted to closely defined subjects. Not all members are equally interested in the study of specific areas or specific issues outside the NATO area. Special responsibility rests on those members who are directly involved or have a special experience of the problem or the regions concerned. A different degree of response can be expected from members with world responsibility and those without it; from those who are ready and capable to engage in contingency planning for action and those who do not want to be involved through their NATO membership in matters which are not of direct concern to NATO. There should be no objection to the use of the organisation for this purpose. While there are clearly no military obligations for members outside the NATO defence perimeter, the Treaty nowhere implies that there are subjects which fall outside the consultation processes of the Alliance.

37. Present NATO procedures for developing adequate policies are not satisfactory. NATO has at its disposal a wealth of information and political analyses from expert working groups, the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group and other bodies with regard to specific international problems. What seems to be lacking is a more deliberate effort to present the Council with policy implications for the members of the Alliance. This hesitation is not the fault of the NATO Secretariat. The Council's dislike to draw conclusions for action results in atrophying the intermediate processes in the NATO machinery to work out policy proposals. The implied wish to avoid embarrassment and dissension prevents the development of a political strategy in terms of the challenges which confront the Western world outside the NATO area. For the
future of the Alliance it is essential to make the tasks, that is the things that
should be done in the interest of peace and stability, the starting point of all
deliberations, followed by attempts to cooperate by as many members in as
many issues as will be possible.

38. The NATO Council should, therefore, create a number of specialized
groups working on specific regions or subjects outside the Atlantic area. The
groups should preferably be limited to member countries possessing special
knowledge of the subject, or acknowledging a genuine stake and interest in it.
Their main task would be contingency planning for the prevention of conflict:
the study of situations before they present acute danger, and advice about the
political measures to be applied in order to prevent a deterioration of the
situation. Such groups should meet without publicity or press releases, with a
minimum of paper work, and should be served by a small secretariat. Their
main task would be to produce adequate proposals for remedial action, to be
reported to the Council or committees of the Council constituted on the
principle of open-endedness (accessible to all members). The main purpose of
this proposal is to facilitate collective brain work in bringing together the
countries which are able and willing to produce proposals for policy and
eventually to apply them, without excluding any member from taking
cognizance of them in the normal NATO framework where all members have
full liberty to accept or reject them.

39. The NATO Council should consider also how to make better use of the
Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG), which has the task to provide the
Council with studies on long-term policy problems and suggestions for future
action. The task of all policy planning is to turn latent common interests into
active common policy, and accordingly APAG was meant to be composed of
the chiefs of the planning staffs of the foreign offices of the member countries.
Meeting of APAG have proved to be very useful for informal consultation and
mutual information; it has all the characteristics of a potential long-term
planning machinery. The difficulty, however, for bodies of this kind is the
practical impossibility for the most responsible policy making people to attend
many committee meetings. The object of APAG will be defeated if the
meetings have to take place without the presence, the authority and the
freedom of intellectual initiative of the real policy makers. If they have to be
replaced by alternates without such powers and necessarily limited in their
effectiveness by instructions, the process of consultation will produce
information and understanding, but no policy. The same applies to the regular
meetings of the Committee of Political Advisors (POLADS), staff members of
the Permanent Representatives, overburdened with work and constantly at the
receiving end of the cables from fifteen sovereign governments. No policy can
easily spring from consultations under such frustrating conditions. For the
initiation of new policies the level of the policy makers must be very high.

40. One more requirement for long-term policy planning should be
considered. The intermediate machinery for policy planning should contain a
centre of initiative for highly qualified independent study, advice and policy
suggestion, without instruction or interference of governments. NATO cannot change its intergovernmental character: it is not possible to think in terms of the powers of initiative and stimulation of the European Commission of the EEC. Therefore the two conditions for effective policy planning cannot easily be met.

41. Ideal solutions do not exist in our loosely knitted Alliance, but if an indispensable function cannot be suitably fulfilled for legal or structural reasons, attempts should be made to remedy the weakness in the NATO structure by other means. A purely pragmatic use of outside advice could have a stimulating effect. Independent advisors or working parties of experienced politicians and scholars could from time to time be invited to present the NATO Council with confidential proposals for policy and diplomatic action. They should have full liberty of advice and the Council should be entirely free to make use of recommendations of this kind, or not. A similar task of study and advice could be entrusted to one or more international institutes. It may well be in the interest of NATO to mobilize the knowledge and the resources of outsiders in order to revitalize the consultation processes of our governments.

---

**Conclusion**

42. In order to improve the effective functioning of NATO with regard to developments outside the Atlantic area, the following next steps are recommended:

1. The council should create special groups to carry forward active consultation on the implications for NATO of specific security situations. Two groups should be established as soon as possible:

   a. on the security situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East;

   b. on the Chinese problem.

2. The Council should improve the NATO capacity for long-term policy planning. The following points are recommended:

   a. The Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG) and other advisory bodies should be instructed to present the Council with more specific advice regarding policy implications;

   b. arrangements should be made for the occasional assistance of independent advisers.

3. NATO consultation between the members' Permanent Missions to the
United Nations should be strengthened.