Defining the Path to a Peaceful, Undivided, and Democratic Europe

Briefly...

- A peaceful and undivided Europe must include both the United States and Russia if it is to be stable and successful over time.
- The United States wants a Europe that is a reliable strategic partner in trade and security issues, both in the region and potentially elsewhere.
- There can be considerable flexibility of form in the way this “single security community” of Europe arranges itself.
- A new and affirmative trilateral U.S.-Russian-European agenda is required that addresses important issues and promotes cooperation.
- Together the United States and European countries must continue the process of NATO enlargement, recognizing that this presents a potential political problem that needs to be worked with Russia.
- A trilateral agenda targeted at building a stable and undivided Europe that includes Russia should not be pursued at the expense of separate bilateral relationships.

Introduction

In late January 2000, the Future of Europe Working Group met in Berlin as part of the United States Institute of Peace’s Future of Europe Project. The project is examining the future direction of Europe, the future of the transatlantic relationship, and prospects for Russia’s integration into greater Europe.

Discussion in Berlin took as its starting point the recent work of Ambassador James Goodby who adopted President Clinton’s terminology in analyzing prospects for a peace-
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Defining a Europe ‘Whole and Free’

How does one define a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe? Discussions in Berlin began with the vision of a single security community or geopolitical system in which the resort to military force is no longer an option for resolving disputes among states. The term “security community” is somewhat of a misnomer, however, for it refers to an environment in which issues of security have moved into the background in favor of increased emphasis on political and economic relations.

The discussions supported the general conclusion that a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe must include both the United States and Russia if it is to be stable and successful over time. This vision of Europe will not evolve in an international vacuum, but it is premature to argue that such a security community already does, or should, extend to all members of OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) or to Japan and other states in Asia.

This definition of Europe does not equate an “undivided” Europe with a “unified Europe”; nor does it require that Russia be a member of the European Union. But the United States and Western Europe must tell Russia explicitly that their vision for a future Europe is of a single security community of which Russia is a part. It is particularly important to make that vision of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe clear to Russia now during its difficult transition period. All recognize that there is a long way to go before this vision becomes reality, and that the United States and the European Union must develop a common strategy to implement this vision.

Attaining a Peaceful, Undivided, and Democratic Europe

This vision of Europe does not mean that every European state needs to be a member of every European institution. There can be considerable flexibility of form in the way this “single security community” arranges itself. The European Union, for example, is talking about differentiated structures and “variable speeds” of integration within itself. The vision for all of Europe would be no different. A peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe need not be a “unitary institution”; it can—and arguably should—be a loosely defined community.

Although numerous impediments to this vision of Europe are clear, discussion at the Berlin meeting provided a reasonable basis for cautious optimism about its prospects. This optimism rests largely on non-governmental factors—economic trends, the attrac-
tion of free markets, increased cultural diffusion, the still-vaguely-defined-process of “globalization”—all engines of an integration process that is increasing the prospects for a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe far more than formal governmental policies ever could. Governments can best further this process by not getting in the way.

The Role of Russia

The triangle of relationships between Western Europe, Russia, and the United States is extraordinarily complex. Each leg of the triangle has a unique perspective. While no state would disagree with the desirability of a stable peace in Europe, its exact definition varies with national perspective.

The U.S. perspective is decidedly global. It has an extensive agenda with both functional and regional components. The United States wants a Europe that is a reliable strategic partner in trade and security issues, both in the region and potentially elsewhere.

The perspectives of European nations are almost exclusively regional. They seek continued success in promotion of regional institutions and need concrete rewards for difficult domestic decisions along the way. The primary interest of Europe lies in building a regional system conducive to economic and political integration without compromising national sovereignty.

Russia is stuck in a 19th century realist calculus without the ability to influence outcomes. It feels threatened by American activity in Europe and its leaders can for the moment employ only rhetoric to make their desires known. It is fractured internally and currently lacks the ability to control events even within its own borders. Some Russians may long for the days of superpower authority, but in its current state Russia lacks the resources to wield much real power.

There was a general reluctance by the European participants at the meeting to assume a leadership role in dealing with Russia on the issues associated with a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. Nevertheless, some suggested that Europe ought to take the lead in working with Russia in coordination with the United States. What does this mean in practice? If it means that the United States must bear the burden associated with dealing with Russia on difficult issues such as nuclear weapons, Iran, and Iraq, while Europe deals with the affirmative aspects of the Russian agenda, this would be an unequal division of labor, to say the least.

Leadership issues aside, discussants in Berlin agreed that any coordinated approach to Russia must include the following elements:

- A vision of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe of which Russia is a part;
- Expanded consultation with Russia on its new national security strategy, in order to seek to keep the emerging anti-Western character of this strategy from becoming the reality of Russian policy;
- An agenda for active engagement among the United States, the European Union, and Russia;
- “Rules of the road” for ordering relations with Russia in the post-Kosovo world.

This targeted trilateral agenda should not exclude the separate bilateral relationships between members of the triangular relationship. It simply recognizes that the United States, the European Union, and Russia can be more effective on certain issues by working together. Such interaction could take place at many levels and in a variety of fora, but emphasis should be on patterns of interaction that make practical sense—bringing the right people together to address an issue with approval from senior political levels.

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The Path Ahead: Policy Recommendations

Discussion in Berlin identified a number of policies that the United States and the European states should pursue in order to encourage a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe.

Europe should pursue the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), but focus on developing real military capability, while avoiding an abstract fight with the United States over the U.S. role in Europe and the ESDP’s relationship to NATO. Such a fight would only alienate the United States from Europe and ultimately reduce European security, especially if Europe does not enhance its real military capability as part of the ESDP.

The United States should support Europe in its effort to develop real military capability and give the Europeans some breathing space to do what is necessary to build political support for this effort in Europe. The United States should recognize that Europe is trying to do what the United States has asked Europe to do for decades—namely, to accept more of the common defense burden. Our European allies have given us grounds for confidence that they will develop the ESDP in a way that balances the relationship to NATO and a continuing U.S. role in Europe.

Europe must also continue its effort to expand the European Union to embrace new members. The problems are hard and the pace may be slow. But the prospect of membership in the European Union is a key incentive to the economic and political evolution of the rest of Europe and could ultimately provide a critical element of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. Simply imagine the impact if the European Union were to announce tomorrow that it would remain at its current size indefinitely.

The United States for its part must be less overbearing in its approach to Europe— with less lecturing, less unilateralism, and more consultation, coupled with a real willingness to change the U.S. view as a result of consultations.

Together the United States and European states must continue the process of NATO enlargement, recognizing that this presents a potential political problem that needs to be worked with Russia. A parallel process of transforming NATO and redefining its role to fit the new security environment must accompany this process of enlargement.

All the foregoing must be part of a broader effort by the United States, the European Union, and Russia to develop trilateral cooperation on issues of common concern. A new and affirmative trilateral agenda is required that addresses issues such as nuclear safety, the environment, public health, and rule of law. Dialogue between Europe, Russia, and the United States must begin in earnest. The rules of the road must be developed. The Europe-Russia-U.S. agenda should not displace current discussions, but should seek to promote cooperation where cooperation is now lacking.

Conclusions

It is important that American and EU leadership not take for granted the commitment of their publics to democracy—much less a commitment to a vision of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. A new generation of voters is coming of age in Europe whose political outlook is formed by the post-Cold War world. This new generation needs to be convinced of the virtues of democracy and the prospects for and advantages of a Europe whole and free.

Political leaders must turn their attention to developing policies that encourage a civic culture supporting democracy and a Europe whole and free. New policy approaches must include tools for coping with ethnic and other conflicts within societies—tools other than military force. This is the focus of much of the work of the United States Institute of Peace.