

European Security : a Common Concept of the 27 WEU Countries

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INTRODUCTION

1. Over the last decade, many changes have taken place in Europe. A new security architecture is under construction, made possible by the end of the Cold War. In developing the architecture, European States have acknowledged that their security is indivisible, that a comprehensive approach should underlie the concept of security and that cooperative mechanisms should be applied in order to promote security and stability in the whole of the continent. These are being strengthened through international agreements, through declarations aimed at the implementation of the principles, enshrined in the UN Charter, of the sovereign equality and inviolability of internationally recognized borders and through the establishment of international organizations based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. WEU, EU, NATO, and the OSCE each take these general principles into account when playing their respective roles in the newly emerging security architecture.
2. All European States are committed to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, the OSCE documents and the Stability Pact, and all the States taking part in this common reflection are members of the Council of Europe. No other region of the world has gone so far towards building an international order based on legal instruments.
3. However, with the end of the period of global confrontation embodied in the Cold War, new kinds of security concerns, tension and conflict have emerged, to which Europe and its North American partners must find new answers.
4. WEU countries have decided to examine together the new conditions of their security. The aim of this collective endeavour, itself a contribution to the process of integration - one of the cornerstones of peace in Europe - is to identify the common interests of Europeans, the risks and potential threats, but also Europe's new responsibilities in a strategic environment in which Europe's security is not confined to security in Europe, and in which Europe has acquired the capability to make its own contribution to the building of a just and peaceful world order.
5. To fulfil that aim, Chapter I analyses the wide range of security challenges that confront Europe. Many of these challenges will be addressed collectively through international cooperation and the process of European integration. As the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU is in a position to respond to many of the challenges identified in the politico-military field.
6. Chapter II identifies some of the ways in which WEU countries, in the framework of the emerging European security architecture, can contribute to security and stability in Europe, in neighbouring areas and in the wider world. Special emphasis has been given to the responses WEU can bring to enhancing European capabilities in the field of crisis-prevention and management.

Finally, in this exercise for the first time all WEU countries have worked together in such an important matter as their common security. It has proved to be a singular opportunity for a better mutual understanding and provided all participants with the possibility of harmonizing their views on WEU's contribution to the emerging security architecture for Europe.

Chapter I

The new European security conditions: challenges and risks

I. THE COMMON SECURITY INTERESTS OF EUROPE

A. The Foundations of European security

8. Europe is witnessing the emergence of a new framework of global security to promote greater stability throughout the continent. Europe and its neighbouring regions have a shared interest in this respect.
9. This new security framework is based on a broad concept of security. The process of European integration has made a major contribution to the security of Europe. This process has created the basis for the development of peaceful relations between European states. A landmark of major importance is the Treaty on European Union. The European Union has become a model of prosperity, stability and peace. It is striving for the economic development and stability of its members and of its partners. As a complement to its economic and commercial weight and commensurate with its wider responsibilities, it is establishing a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might, in time, lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance (1). In this, it will rely in particular on WEU, an integral part of the development of the European Union.
10. The development of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as all the earlier, recent and future enlargements of the EU, enhance stability and security on the Continent. The Europe Agreements, with their clear perspective of membership, mark the need that is felt for developing the involvement of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the EU's foreign and security policy. Reinforced political dialogue has been established covering in particular meetings with CFSP bodies from expert to Ministerial level and association with EU joint actions, declarations or démarches.
11. In the Treaty on European Union, WEU, which is an integral part of the development of the European Union, was requested to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the EU which have defence implications. In June 1992 WEU Ministers agreed that, apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units made available to WEU could be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and other tasks of combat forces in crisis management. In May 1994 WEU Ministers agreed the arrangements for Associate Partnership, thus involving the countries of Central Europe in WEU's activities. In November that year the Noordwijk Ministerial meeting endorsed preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a Common European Defence Policy.
12. Under their status of association, WEU's Associate Partners can participate in sessions of the WEU Council and working groups and may take part in WEU operations in the framework of the Petersberg Declaration. WEU, as the defence component of the EU and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, is being further de-

- veloped in full complementarity with the transatlantic nature of the Alliance, and should not duplicate existing structures.
13. NATO continues to play an essential role in reinforcing stability and security in Europe. It has always been a political community of nations committed to promoting shared values and defending common interests. The transatlantic link, embodied by NATO and the substantial North American military presence in Europe, continues to make a crucial contribution to the security of Europe. In November 1991, NATO approved a new strategic concept. This reaffirmed the Alliance's core functions and the importance of the transatlantic link and decided that the creation of a European identity in defence and security issues would underline the preparedness of European nations to take a greater share of responsibility and help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. At the Brussels summit in January 1994, NATO leaders agreed that the emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) would strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link. They authorised the further adaptation of the Alliance's political and military structures to reflect its new roles and missions and the development of the emerging ESDI, including the development of separable but not separate capabilities that could be used by NATO or WEU.
 14. The democratic revolutions and other historic transformations towards democracy at the end of the 1980's and the early 1990's and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact brought the Cold War to an end. These developments greatly reduced the risk of massive confrontation and gave a new impetus to the process of European integration. The common historical and cultural heritage of Europe and the new political situation on the continent should be reflected in the new European security framework.
 15. The successful transformation of the political, legal and economic systems of the Central and Eastern European countries and the process of their integration into European and transatlantic institutions are of fundamental importance for the security and stability of Europe. The enlargement of these institutions should go hand in hand with the strengthening of cooperation with all those European countries that wish it, including Russia and Ukraine.
 16. Without prejudice to the efforts and responsibilities of the European Union, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, the OSCE is performing an important role in promoting stability and cooperation throughout Europe, and with its North American partners, in particular in the field of conflict prevention. The OSCE is currently undertaking a discussion for a common and comprehensive security model for Europe in the 21st century. Bearing in mind the vast array of OSCE activities, the discussion on a Security Model can be expected to reaffirm OSCE's central position in the European security architecture, but without any mandate to control other institutions. The OSCE is, inter alia, an important venue for dialogue with those countries that do not wish or are not likely to become full members of the Western security organizations. The OSCE, as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, should be further developed into a primary instrument of early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management.
 17. The CFE Treaty to which most WEU nations are parties marked a turning point in the arms control and disarmament process in Europe. It remains a cornerstone for European security and stability. The Treaty's full and timely implementation and the preservation of its integrity is of crucial importance.
 18. In addition, the agreed confidence and security-building measures enhancing transparency and predictability need to be applied faithfully and, where appropriate, to be developed further.

B. Common values and interests

1. *Democratic values and human rights, the defence of peace, international order and the rule of law*

19. All European states have an interest in the maintenance of international peace and order and the widest possible observance of generally recognised norms of conduct between states. This is not just because of the need to minimize the risk of conflicts and instability affecting Europe itself, but also because Europe's prosperity and its position in world affairs depend on free and orderly conditions for international economic intercourse and on the widest possible international cooperation in tasks such as arms control and disarmament, non-proliferation, combating terrorism, crime and the protection of the environment.
20. Experience both within and outside Europe shows that democratic institutions, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law are among the best guarantees of peaceful, predictable and cooperative behaviour between states as well. They ensure that national armed forces, and the machinery of government as a whole, are properly answerable to public opinion and democratic institutions and cannot be used as an instrument of oppression either inside or beyond the state. These principles are enshrined in the documents of the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe and hold the key to the successful handling of problems involving national ethnic as well as religious minorities, and the prevention and the peaceful and enduring settlement of conflicts. However, neither the UN nor other multilateral institutions are yet in a position to meet all the new challenges they face. There is a greater need than ever for international regulating instruments. Further efforts must be based on the effective implementation of the existing principles and commitments established within the framework of the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe. The UN faces constant demands but still lacks the means to meet all its responsibilities.
21. European states have committed themselves both to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and - on the basis of shared values - support efforts to pre-empt and correct breaches of those principles by others. All WEU nations belong to the Council of Europe which has legally binding obligations and acts as a monitor and supporter of democratic practices, rule of law and human rights throughout its membership². They also belong to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which enshrines detailed norms of democratic behaviour and human rights among its political commitments and possesses a range of instruments for preventing and correcting shortcomings in these areas (vide especially the Paris Charter and the Copenhagen Document of 1990).

2. *Europe's worldwide economic interests*

22. Growing European economic integration, for which the European Union is the driving force, has created and reinforced interdependence and solidarity among Europeans. The political initiatives taken by the European Union towards its Central and Eastern European partners are a logical extension of the same process. European association agreements are designed to reinforce economic and political stability and to increase the interdependence and solidarity of European countries. For its part, the Pact on Stability also has an economic dimension.

23. The European Union has reached economic agreements with a number of European countries. Partnership agreements with Russia and Ukraine, for example, and those concluded under the forms of cooperation now being set up with countries south of the Mediterranean, will help prevent economic imbalances from becoming threats to the security of our continent.
24. The maintenance of communications links within its territory is a prerequisite for the efficient functioning of the modern state. Threats to communications systems could turn out, depending on their scope, to be threats to the economy and security of the state. The improvement of cross-border communications is an important factor in promoting trade and the free exchange of ideas, thus enhancing interdependence between states and increasing the stake each has in the security of its neighbours. By creating the conditions necessary to attract inward capital investment, market-oriented economic reforms will play an important role in upgrading these communication links. The European Union has also expressed its determination to promote the development of trans-European networks. The European Council at Essen in December 1994 also stated that the integration of associate countries into trans-European networks is a key factor in European economic and political integration.
25. Access to technology is a factor vital to the security of Europe. The development of the industrial and technological capacity of Europe is vital both to its economic prosperity and to its security.
26. Most European countries are largely dependent for their supplies of energy and raw materials on countries whose political and economic stability over the medium term cannot be taken for granted. Gas and oil are conveyed, at least in part, through pipelines crossing countries of uncertain stability. In the event of a major crisis, the disruption of those supplies is a distinct probability and maritime transport routes could be vulnerable. The flow of gas and oil to European markets through reliable pipeline and maritime routes hold great political and strategic significance. The diversification of European energy supplies may help reduce these potential risks.
27. The European Energy Charter has as its aim to help make available to countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the countries of the CIS the technologies, expertise and capital they need for prospection, and to contribute to the security of European countries' energy supplies. The International Energy Agency has agreed on an emergency oil-sharing system and other emergency response measures for use in major oil supply disruptions and other situations.

3. *The security of European citizens in the world*

28. There are large numbers of European citizens living and working abroad, many in unstable or dangerous areas. Many more travel abroad on a short-term basis. Their security over and above that provided by the countries where they are present, is the responsibility of national authorities. This applies to citizens present on European territory as well as to those outside national and European borders and who might find themselves in situations where their security is endangered. Their protection is undertaken through consulates and embassies. Many governments have negotiated agreements with other countries to extend the protection that can be provided.

29. For example, the Treaty on European Union makes provision for European consular protection to any European Union citizen abroad not having a local consulate of his own country. Similar arrangements have been made among other European states.
30. This system of cooperation has recently been successfully put to the test in various situations: Zaire, Angola, the Yemen and Rwanda are just a few examples of cooperation among WEU States in this field. Practical experience in these cases has underlined the usefulness of current work in WEU on evacuation planning and of coordination between WEU and the EU.

C. The new risks

1. *Potential armed conflicts*

31. The end of the Cold War has brought to a close a period of division in Europe and made massive military confrontation a remote prospect. But dangers remain, and new security risks and uncertainties are emerging in the Continent and its neighbouring regions.
32. Europe faces a broad spectrum of security problems, some of which may lead to armed conflict.
33. Recent events have demonstrated the need to settle border disputes peacefully in accordance with international law. Crises may also arise from severe neglect of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities in violation of internationally agreed norms.
34. Particular dangers arise when armed groups operate outside the law or without proper democratic control. The larger and better armed these groups, the greater the risk of conflict is likely to be. Security risks can also be associated with excessive concentrations of military forces.
35. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia is a source of major concern and a threat to European security: the risk of its potential expansion, the level of armaments involved, the forces mobilized, the extent of human suffering and the degree of international political involvement, all underline the seriousness of this crisis.

2. *The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means*

36. The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means continues to constitute a threat to international and European peace and security. A European priority in this field has been to pursue universal participation in, and compliance with, multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation conventions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and, at the same time, to continue to strengthen export control regimes such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Australia Group. On the other hand, European countries and defence organisations have relied on deterrence and other means in countering the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. In addition, there may be a need to develop other aspects of defence posture to meet the specific threats from WMD proliferation.
37. When assessing the proliferation of these weapons, a distinction should be made between nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as the risk they pose can be of a substantially different nature.

Nuclear Weapons

38. The entire international community faces potential risks in the field of nuclear proliferation. On the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, European states faced a potentially serious problem arising from uncertainties over the control of Soviet nuclear forces. The accession of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan as non-nuclear-weapon states to the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, has done much to reduce this threat. The process of removal of nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine is well underway with the assistance of Western countries; and Russia, who also benefits from such assistance, is continuing with the difficult task of the safe and secure dismantlement of these weapons.
39. One proliferation risk is the possibility that scientists previously involved with the Soviet nuclear weapons programme, but now unemployed, will offer their services to potential proliferators outside the region. The contributions of a number of countries to the creation of the International Science and Technology Centre in Moscow and the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine, in Kiev, are specifically intended to avert this risk.
40. The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguard system remains an essential feature of the non-proliferation regime. Following the experience in Iraq, a timely adoption of the 93 + 2 program (3) will strengthen the system, in particular the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities.
41. Nuclear export controls through the introduction of supply conditions regarding physical protection, re-transfer, technology control and, most importantly, the addition of IAEA full-scope safeguards in recipient non-nuclear weapon states as a condition of supply and the establishment of a regime to control the export of nuclear-related dual-use material have made valuable contributions to nuclear non-proliferation.
42. A universal, internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which is currently being negotiated in Geneva with the active participation of many members of the WEU, should be concluded no later than 1996 with a true zero-yield option. Another important priority which would address nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation will be the immediate commencement and early conclusion in Geneva of negotiations for a Convention to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
43. The Review and Extension Conference in New York decided on 11 May 1995 to extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely. This decision together with the strengthening of the review process and the reaffirmation of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament will lead to a strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. This outcome was reached without a vote and represents a significant expression of confidence by the international community for the Treaty.
44. The reaffirmation by the nuclear weapons states of their commitment under Article VI of the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control is an important contribution to international security.
45. Although the incidents of nuclear smuggling have so far been few, and the amounts of fissile material involved in nearly all cases small, the European states are taking the problem seriously. There is now a wide range of assistance

being given both multilaterally and bilaterally to improve standards of nuclear materials accountancy and control, and physical protection of sites. In addition, the IAEA is developing a database of incidents and there has been closer cooperation throughout Europe in customs and law enforcement.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

46. Security conditions in Europe are also affected by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW), which may be easier to develop than nuclear weapons. There is also a risk that those weapons could fall into the hands of, or be developed by, terrorist organizations.
47. The Chemical Weapons Convention is the first multilateral disarmament treaty combined with a verification regime banning a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. It is also a means of countering the development of clandestine chemical weapon programmes by means of a new verification regime entailing intrusive inspections. European states are convinced of the importance of bringing the CWC into force as soon as possible.
48. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. Although the BTWC currently lacks an effective verification system, efforts are under way to add such a system to the Convention.
49. Another key tool is that of export controls. National restrictions on the export of technology, and of chemical and microbiological material, as harmonised, inter alia, in the Australia Group, make the development of CBW programmes by potential proliferators much more difficult. There have been strong pressures from some countries for such controls to be removed on entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and on establishment of a BTWC verification regime. The members of the Australia Group have undertaken to review, in the light of the implementation of the Convention, the measures that they take to prevent the spread of chemical substances and equipment for purposes contrary to the objectives of the Convention, with the aim of removing such measures for the benefit of States Parties to the Convention acting in full compliance with their obligations under the Convention.
50. Some WEU Associate Partners have joined the Australia Group, and a number of them have applied for membership. They have established national legislation which implements the Group's guidelines, and strictly abide by them.

Means of delivery

51. Security conditions in Europe are also influenced by the development, or acquisition, by states in its vicinity, of missile systems capable of delivering WMD. Many European states participate in arrangements intended to prevent the proliferation of such delivery systems, the most important arrangement being the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Europe has great interest in strengthening this regime and enlarging its membership to cover all relevant supplier states. Missile activities in certain states on Europe's periphery lend added importance to the efforts of the MTCR to halt the spread of technology enabling the production of delivery systems capable of carrying WMD.
52. Although not yet parties to the MTCR, a number of WEU Associate Partners abide by the guidelines of this non-proliferation regime and have established national systems of export controls of missile technology products. MTCR

partners have also been concerned, not only to seek the prudent enlargement of the regime, but also, to keep the equipment and technology covered by MTCR under continuous review to deflect any new developments in the production of missile technology.

3. ***International terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and uncontrolled and illegal immigration***

International terrorism

53. International terrorism continues to pose a threat to European security interests. Acts of international terrorism threaten fundamental freedoms and the stability, security and economic and social development of States. They thus constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. Innocent individuals may be the unwitting victims of indiscriminate, politically motivated acts.
54. Numerous resolutions and declarations in international fora underline that terrorism cannot be justified under any circumstances, and all acts, methods and practices of terrorism, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whom committed, are deplored as acts of aggression, violating fundamental human values and democracy. These acts threaten the security of States and can destabilize legitimately constituted governments.
55. As such, international terrorism is an important security challenge on the post-Cold War European scene, calling for coordinated and cooperative responses. Adherence by States to the international conventions relating to various aspects of terrorism is an important step to combat terrorism.

Organized crime and the illegal traffic in drugs

56. Given modern means of communication and the greater openness of frontiers in Europe, organized crime is not only a national problem but has international ramifications with the potential to provoke both internal instability and to affect relations between countries. This is particularly the case in certain successor states of the Soviet Union where the collapse of authority has created vast new opportunities for criminal activity. Lack of effective supervision and criminal complicity have made the large stocks of weapons left over from the Cold War years as well as nuclear materials relatively easy to obtain. Equally, organized crime has, in many instances, close links with the financially lucrative production and trafficking of narcotics. There are possible links between organized crime and terrorist organizations.
57. As an earnest of their determination to intensify international cooperation on organized crime, the EU and Associated Countries issued a Joint Declaration in Berlin in 1994.

Problems associated with uncontrolled or illegal migration

58. Major causes of uncontrolled and illegal migration, both within Europe and between Europe and other parts of the world, are:
- differences in employment prospects and levels of earnings within Europe and between Europe and other regions;

- large-scale social unrest, political repression and massive violations of human rights, internal conflicts or civil war;
 - porous borders and weak control mechanisms in many countries contributing to the growth of illegal migration towards Europe.
59. Problems associated with uncontrolled or illegal migration have grown considerably in recent years. As such, it has become an issue relevant to European stability and security. It may, in different ways, pose substantial security concerns for the countries affected both as "final destination" and as "transit" countries. These concerns are:
- massive displacements of persons in particular as a consequence of internal upheavals or armed conflicts in areas adjacent to our countries (4)
 - illegal migration can pose a threat to internal security and affect law and order in our societies (links with organized crime, "importation" of political conflicts elsewhere)
60. Other problems associated with migration may relate to the cost to host countries of dealing with large influxes of immigrants both financially and in social terms.

4. *Environmental risks*

61. The potential impact of large-scale environmental damage on human health, economic activities and the ecosystem could affect well-being and stability in sub-regions or larger parts of Europe, and thus stability and security in Europe as a whole.
62. Main sources of potential large-scale environmental damage include radioactive material, dangerous chemical substances, in particular chemical weapons and their components, gaseous, liquid and solid industrial releases, the transport of dangerous substances and the risk of major oil-spills, affecting in particular sea and coastal areas. Of particular concern are the unsafe design, construction or operation of some nuclear reactors and other nuclear facilities, the management, transport and storage of spent fuel, radioactive waste and other nuclear materials in ways that fall short of internationally accepted standards and any past poor practice in the production, testing, storage and destruction of nuclear weapons.
63. The end of the Cold War has shed light on a legacy of large-scale military-related environmental damage. This includes radioactive contamination, the pollution of large land areas, and the dumping or unsafe disposal of chemical weapons and components, explosives and fuels. Unsafe storage and handling of arms-related nuclear and chemical substances pose the continued risk of release and large scale damage.

Large-scale environmental risks are inherently of a cross-border character, thus easily affecting entire regions. Risks are more acute in some regions of Europe than others, reflecting unequal concentrations of industry or military installations handling dangerous materials, and unequal attention to safety standards and environmental concerns. The concentration of environmental destruction and risk of further damage is largest in the countries of the CIS. The Kola region of North-Western Russia displays the largest single concentration of military and civilian nuclear facilities in Europe, presenting significant risks linked to unsafe operation and unacceptable waste management. The Mediterranean, the Baltic and other European sea areas suffer from the impact of environmentally unsustainable economic activities. There are also major problems in other parts of the continent for instance in Central and Eastern Europe. Many of these problems are being addressed. The overall risks will, to some extent, be mitiga-

ted by the provisions of the Basle Convention, the London Convention, the Convention on Nuclear Safety (not yet entered into force) and the UNCED follow-up activities on maritime protection. European countries played an active role in the Rio Conference. However much remains to be done.

II. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A. The transatlantic relationship

65. Europe, the US and Canada share a common heritage and are bound by close historical, political, economic and cultural ties. The European descent of many citizens of those two countries strengthens those links. Europeans and North Americans are guided by their faith in the values of human dignity, intellectual freedom and civil liberties and in the democratic institutions which have evolved on both sides of the Atlantic over the centuries.
66. Transatlantic solidarity is essential for the preservation of peace and freedom and for the strengthening of an undivided, free and democratic Europe. The shared principle of free trade, broad economic interchange and an ever growing flow of goods, services, technologies as well as ideas makes the transatlantic relationship an effective framework for cooperation and the development of free economies. A broad network of bilateral relations as well as daily cooperation in international organizations and other international gatherings are an indication of the global nature of those links.
67. The maintenance of European security requires a continued effort by both European and transatlantic partners. These efforts are complementary and interlinked. Both the US and Canada support Europe's efforts towards further integration.
68. The Declaration on EC-US relations agreed by the two sides on 23 November 1990 is a major expression of the transatlantic relationship in a broad area that extends beyond security and defence. It solemnly reaffirmed the determination of the two sides further to strengthen their partnership in pursuing the values and objectives they share. It also established an institutional framework for regular, intensive and high-level consultations, which have become a common practice ever since. Both sides resolved to develop and deepen those procedures so as to reflect the evolution of what was then the European Community and its relations with the United States. A similar declaration was also made with Canada. In addition, work is under way to sign at the beginning of December 1995 a US-EU Action Plan for expanding and deepening the EU-US relations.
69. The Atlantic Alliance is at the heart of the transatlantic relationship and embodies the permanent bond between North America and Europe. It is a central element of the European security architecture. Its essential purpose remains unchanged: to safeguard the freedom and security of its member States by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. Its military posture, including an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear forces, deters and defends against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member State.
70. Since the end of the Cold War, new causes of instability, tension and conflict have emerged, to which Europe and North America must respond. At the London and Brussels Summits, NATO decided that the Alliance should adapt its political and military structures to reflect the full spectrum of its new roles and missions and the development of the European security and defence identity, to which it gave its full support.

71. The further development of the CJTF concept and the readiness of the Alliance to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the NAC, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies including in pursuit of the EU common foreign and security policy, reflect these objectives. They will enable the Alliance to conduct its operations more efficiently and flexibly, including with the participation of Nations outside the Alliance, provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or WEU, and illustrate the full backing given by the Alliance to the development of the European security and defence identity which, as called for in the WEU Maastricht Declaration annexed to the Treaty on European Union, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the Union, might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.
72. NATO has also offered to support on a case-by-case basis peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UNSC or under the responsibility of the OSCE, in order to make its contribution to furthering collective security.
73. These developments confirm the enduring validity and indispensability of the Alliance. NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty.
74. NATO has an important role to play in the further development of a network of mutually reinforcing institutions. Allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The new democracies of the East see in the transatlantic link an irreplaceable pledge of security and stability for Europe as a whole and are in favour of direct involvement by the United States and Canada. The fuller integration of all European countries into a continent whole and free cannot be successful without the strong and active participation of all Allies on both sides of the Atlantic.
75. It is therefore important for security and stability in all of Europe that NATO increases its cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as with CIS countries, through NACC and PFP which are very important features of European security cooperation. The objective is to enhance security and stability eastward for instance through practical cooperation such as joint peacekeeping exercises and through ensuring democratic control of armed forces. The efforts of European partners within the PFP framework are an expression of European solidarity. NATO will consult with any of its active partners in the Partnership for Peace if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security.
76. Furthermore NATO has completed a study on enlargement which addresses how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership and how the PFP can contribute concretely to this process. NATO's enlargement is part of an evolutionary process that takes into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe and maintains an undivided continent. It will threaten no-one and be part of a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout Europe. It will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, and complement the enlargement of the EU, a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and stability.
77. Bearing in mind the radically altered security environment, the further development of European cooperation in the field of security and defence and the broader definition of what constitutes a security challenge, proposals have been made for a further strengthening of transatlantic ties and a broader framework to express the solidarity and commonality of values and interests that constitute the link between the European and North American partners.

B. Russia, the newly independent states and the development of the Commonwealth of Independent States

Russia

78. Russia has embarked on a process of profound political and economic reform. The outcome of this process, which is of vital importance for European stability, is not yet clear. The keys to success are the establishment of a credible, stable democratic structure as well as economic and social progress.
79. However, there are risks. Serious violations of human rights have occurred during the Chechen crisis. The crisis illustrates the dangers of internal instability and the possible threat to regional security. The sheer size of Russia's conventional forces and its extensive nuclear arsenal makes democratic control over its armed forces and full compliance with its arms control and disarmament obligations all the more indispensable. Europe has a vital interest in the fulfilment by Russia and other CIS states of their obligations in the nuclear, chemical and conventional fields and supports further development of disarmament measures. A lack of effective controls over civil and military fissile material adds to the danger of proliferation.
80. The constructive participation of Russia in preventive diplomacy, international crisis management and settlement in accordance with international obligations and commitments is of crucial importance for Europe and the international community.
81. Russia has significant potential as a partner for European economies which is reflected in the many agreements with European states and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed with the EU. Furthermore, Russian energy supplies are critical for Europe.

Ukraine

82. Besides Russia, Ukraine is the most significant partner in the region for WEU nations. It retains significant military capability and has important potential as a trading partner. The increasing relations between our countries and Ukraine illustrate this fact. WEU has recently agreed on contacts with this country to allow for the development of the existing dialogue. For its part, the EU has signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Ukraine. Europe has a strong interest in the internal stability of Ukraine, as well as in supporting its continued territorial integrity, independence and economic development. Ukraine has made significant progress on economic reform and has agreed to take steps to improve its nuclear safety.

Belarus and Moldova

83. An effective political and economic transformation of these countries is also an important element for European security. A continuation of the reform process is dependent upon stable political conditions which will help bolster their independence. The agreed withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army from the territory of Moldova will be an important contribution to security and stability in the region. Cooperation with these two countries is important for WEU countries.

Caucasus and Central Asia

84. Europe has an interest in developing fruitful cooperation in the political, economic and cultural fields with Caucasus and Central Asian countries. These countries are participating States of OSCE and almost all have joined Partnership for Peace; many are po-

tentially important trading partners and suppliers of energy for Europe. Any conflicts in the region should be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the UN Charter and OSCE principles, for the resolution of which European countries are showing active support. OSCE missions are present in various places in the region and the setting up of a peacekeeping force for Nagorno-Karabakh under OSCE auspices is being prepared.

The Commonwealth of Independent States

85. The attachment of the twelve newly independent states to the CIS framework varies, and some have publicly distanced themselves from certain areas of CIS cooperation. Within the CIS Russia continues to have a predominant position. Although there are now hundreds of CIS agreements, many have not been implemented. It remains unclear how far the CIS will develop institutionally in the future. To the extent that the CIS framework is based on voluntary relations and a genuine pursuit of mutual interests, a further development of the CIS in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the OSCE, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, could contribute to the stability of the area. It is important for Europe to continue to support the sovereignty and independence of individual CIS member States.
86. There are many existing or potential sources of conflicts in the CIS area often of an ethnic nature. The continuing conflicts in this area do not in their present form directly affect Europe's security, but the perpetuation of conflicts, with no political solution, cannot be ruled out (extension of ceasefires, lack of genuine negotiations on a settlement).

Russia and the Western security organizations

87. Western security organizations have reaffirmed their commitment to developing a far-reaching relationship with Russia corresponding with its size, capabilities and strategic importance. The intensity of the relationship will be determined by Russian political, military and social reality and its observance of international commitments and standards. Those relations and the substantive dialogue should be transparent and of a cooperative character.
88. WEU has recently agreed on contacts with Russia to allow for the development of the existing dialogue and for the development of exchanges of information on issues of common interest. These contacts, while not duplicating dialogue in other fora, will complement other efforts to enhance stability in Europe.
89. The enlargement of the EU is a process which will have benefits for stability and prosperity right across the European continent. In June 1994 the EU and Russia signed a partnership and cooperation agreement which will, when ratified by all member States, help maximize these benefits by establishing a framework for the development of a substantial relationship between the two parties, including political dialogue. A step forward within this framework was the signature, in July 1995, of an Interim Agreement to develop the commercial aspects of the relationship between the EU and Russia.
90. The adoption by Russia, in May 1995, of its Individual Partnership Program with NATO and the Document on relations beyond PFP, was an important step to develop a cooperative relationship and therefore a valuable contribution to European stability.

Russia and the OSCE

91. Russia has on several occasions shown interest in strengthening the OSCE as a pan-European security forum. It is the only forum where wider and regional aspects of security in Europe are being discussed with the equal participation of Russia. The Russian proposal to hold a discussion on a common and comprehensive Security Model for Europe in the framework of the OSCE, agreed at the Budapest Summit, offers an additional opportunity for WEU countries to work constructively to influence the development of the European security architecture.

C. Southeastern Europe: political, military and economic challenges and risks

92. The end of the bipolar world order has led to developments in several countries in Southeastern Europe similar to those witnessed in the other parts of Central and Eastern Europe: their striving for the establishment of democratic systems and market economies as well as the reorientation of their societies as a whole towards European values, all of which have a stabilizing effect. The heritage of communist regimes, the destruction of traditional economic links and other factors are nevertheless hampering the process of reform and stabilisation.
93. Meanwhile in other countries of this area, specific developments have taken place where ethnic intolerance, policies of aggression and a combination of other internal and external factors have led to the upsurge of armed conflict. Military force has again become an instrument for the pursuit of expansionist political goals with war replacing the principle of political settlement of conflicts.
94. Since the early stages of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the international community has tried to tackle the problem. Its efforts have contributed to containing the conflict and securing the provision of humanitarian aid. Sanctions have been imposed by the UN on Serbia and Montenegro and have been enforced despite heavy economic losses suffered by the neighbouring states.
95. WEU is actively involved in the efforts of the international community to find a political solution to this conflict. In this respect, WEU is engaged in the enforcement of the sanctions regime imposed by the United Nations both in the mission on the Danube as well as through its participation, together with NATO, in Operation SHARP GUARD in the Adriatic. WEU is also committed to the EU Administration of Mostar, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where at the request of the EU it has deployed a police element with the objective of establishing a "Unified Police Force of Mostar".
96. Problems in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina have not so far developed into military conflicts. The basic question of how to reconcile ethnic disputes with the need for respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of states and the satisfactory functioning of multiethnic societies is still to be answered. The return of OSCE missions, which proved to be useful, would facilitate the search for a modus vivendi there. Conflicts between ethnic groups in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia⁵ are being discussed in trilateral negotiations between the government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, representatives of minorities and representatives of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, thus serving so far as a positive example of constructive conflict management in the region. In this case, preventive deployment of peacekeeping forces has proved successful; so have the activities of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.

97. The pillars of the various peace plans presented by the European Community, the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, the European Union and the Contact Group are inviolability by force of international borders, respect for territorial integrity, international guarantees and control for human and minority rights, appropriate autonomy provisions, the prospects for post-crisis security and reconstruction arrangements. They form the nucleus of the balanced and equitable approach on which is founded the current Peace Conference.
98. The level of armaments involved in the conflict in Former Yugoslavia, which reflects major differences and imbalances in terms of military potential not restrained by the agreements by which neighbouring countries abide, constitutes a particular threat to European security which could remain even after the resolution of the conflict in Former Yugoslavia. This development as well as the existence in the region of countries enjoying different security status and guarantees underlines the need for enhanced security in the area. The OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation was mandated by Heads of State and Government at the Budapest Summit in December 1994 to address specific regional security problems, with special emphasis on longer term stability in Southeastern Europe.
99. There is a clearly visible common European security interest in:
- o making efforts for the peaceful settlement of conflicts in former Yugoslavia including the respect for internationally recognised borders;
 - o avoiding any spillover of the existing conflicts and preventing a possible escalation of the Yugoslav crisis into a wider regional crisis;
 - o continuing to work for a security architecture which reaches beyond the military aspects and includes common values such as good neighbourly relations, respect for human rights and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and a common political culture aiming at the spirit of solidarity on common security.

This, together with regional cooperation, would enhance the prospects of the integration of countries in Southeastern Europe into the broader European framework.

D. The Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East: an area of strategic interest for Europe, military and non-military risks for European security

100. The Mediterranean Basin is a high priority for European security. This area merits particular attention from WEU, which has initiated a dialogue on security issues with certain non-WEU mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia).
101. The EU is working on a renewed and expanded policy towards the region as a whole. It includes setting out guidelines for cooperation between countries in the area into the next century, intensified economic and financial cooperation between the EU and these countries as well as a permanent dialogue on all questions of common interest. That is the aim of the Euro-Mediterranean conference to be held at the end of November 1995 in Barcelona. Furthermore, the EU plays a significant role in the Middle East peace process, which has a profound impact on the political situation in the Mediterranean basin as a whole.
102. NATO is also in the course of developing its dialogue with countries in the area (initially with Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia).
103. The maintenance of political, economic and military stability in the region as well as a free flow of traffic through and into the Mediterranean remain priority objectives.

104. Although there does not appear to be an immediate danger of disruption of oil supplies, European states remain vulnerable to a possible interruption of their fuel supplies from North Africa, the Gulf or the Middle East, due to the existing and potential instability there.
105. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery means, in certain countries of this region, is also a cause for concern for regional stability and European security.
106. The uncertainties over the control and capabilities of the Black Sea fleet remain a source of concern.
107. Increased instability and the weakness of democratic institutions in parts of North Africa are today sources of great concern for Europe as a whole. Disputes with some countries on specific issues are not to be ruled out. However, the nature of the security risk is mainly connected with the challenge represented by extremist movements, the asymmetry between Europe and North Africa in economic wealth and in population growth. Extremist forces have engaged in violent activities against their own governments and countrymen as well as foreign citizens and assets. These activities not only seriously threaten stability in the area but may also spill over into Europe.
108. The unsolved question of Cyprus is also a source of concern. (6)
109. The progress made within the framework of the Arab-Israeli peace process has reduced security risks in the area. The countries involved do not present a direct military threat to Europe. A resumption of confrontation could, however have highly destabilizing effects on the whole area and on Europe. In addition, because of the regional policies adopted by Iran and Iraq, the political and military situation in the Gulf area is a cause for preoccupation.
110. The recent rise of certain extremist movements in the Middle East has led to an increase in the number of terrorist acts which have seriously affected stability in the region and European citizens and interests in certain countries.

E. Africa: an area of interest for Europe, security and stability challenges and risks, the role of European States in African crisis management

111. The African continent has ceased to be a stage for East-West confrontation. Africa's serious economic problems deserve due political attention. A further deterioration of the social, economic and political situation on the African continent would aggravate the risk of permanent instability and increase migratory pressure from the Africans. Further instability is generated by a lack of adherence to democratic principles, widespread, unchecked corruption and violations of human rights.
112. Armed conflict on the African continent is now predominantly intra-state in character. The international community has been faced with the implosion of states and the major humanitarian tragedies which ensue.
113. Confronted with this new eruption of conflicts, the Organization for African Unity has set up a mechanism for conflict prevention. This mechanism has been put to the test in the case of Congo, Gabon and Burundi. Sub-regional organizations are also acting in this direction in their respective fields of intervention.
114. European countries are currently examining, bilaterally and in the frameworks of the UN, the EU and WEU, possibilities to support Africans' own efforts, including through regional and sub-regional institutions and structures, to promote the preservation of peace, the search for reconciliation and the achievement of sustainable and socially balanced development through good governance.

F. Asia and Pacific: the nature of the security interests of Europe in this area.

115. Europe has a number of interlocking security interests in the Asia/Pacific region. This region already contains half the world's population. It is also becoming increasingly prosperous. Economically, Europe and the Asia/Pacific region are rapidly becoming interdependent. Europe now does more trade with East Asia alone than with North America. Europe therefore has a fundamental security interest in promoting conditions in the Asia/Pacific region in which commercial investment and free trade can prosper. Europe also has an interest in fostering democratic political stability, regional security and sustainable development.
116. In politico-strategic terms, Europe's interest centres on the balance of power between China, Russia and Japan. The continued presence of the United States in this region will help to preserve stability. Key countries in the region are developing more assertive foreign policies and are increasing their defence expenditure significantly. It is in Europe's interests to establish and maintain a close dialogue - and work for mutual understanding and respect - on security issues with the key countries in the region.
117. Individual European states also have historical associations with particular countries which in some cases convey security responsibilities.
118. Efforts are being made within the region to establish effective mechanisms for defining and controlling disputes. The relevance of such local initiatives has increased with the reduction of the US military presence in the region. Some progress has already been made. The Group of ASEAN countries, established in 1967 to address local inter-state relations, agreed in 1993 to set up a wider ASEAN Regional Forum to address regional security issues. The EU is an active contributor and has offered to share European experience in the field of confidence- and security-building measures. APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) brings the leaders of Asia-Pacific countries together regularly to address economic business and this acts as a general factor of stability in the region. The European Council in Essen (December 1994) confirmed the European Union's willingness to intensify its cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region.
119. In addition to the EU/ASEAN dialogue, the EU/Japan dialogue, the proposed dialogue with Korea, the NATO/Japan security dialogue and Japanese and Korean interest in OSCE offer particularly useful opportunities to engage the countries of the region. Several European countries are working to try to limit the dangers of proliferation and to advance arms control agreements, in particular with China, on the Indian sub-continent and the Korean Peninsula.

G. Latin America: the nature of the security interests of Europe in this area.

120. Europe and Latin America have a common cultural heritage which is reflected in the shared values and interests and close relations on the human level. This, together with problems of a political, social and economic order faced by certain Latin American countries, call for a European contribution to their progress and stability.
121. In the specific field of European security interests in Latin America, there are three priorities: the consolidation and institutionalisation of democracy, the respect for human rights and regional stability; the achievement of sustained development and economic integration of the region; and the fight against drug trafficking.
122. Individual European states have particular security interests in this region.
123. While much remains to be done, during the last decade, the Latin American countries have accomplished a great effort towards democracy. In this effort, they have had the firm support of Europe, which is reflected in the political contribution to

the solution of conflicts existing in several countries as well as in Europe's assistance in applying peace plans through its contribution to peacekeeping operations.

124. Recent years have witnessed the consolidation of Latin American integration. This is clearly reflected particularly in the establishment of MERCOSUR. Regional stability and security have substantially improved. In this process, the Organization of American States has played and continues to play a leading role.
125. Latterly, there have been important advances in the relations between the EU and Latin America. European economic aid to, and political dialogue with Latin America have found concrete expression in the document "Europe and Latin America: A Partnership for Action", approved by the Council of the EU in October 1994. Environmental problems have also received European attention with economic contributions.

The EU supports Latin American countries in their fight against drugs, through a variety of programmes aimed both at preventing drug production and trafficking and the laundering of money obtained from the illicit drug trade.

Chapter II

Contributions of WEU countries to European security: enhancing capabilities in the field of crisis prevention and management.

I. THE PROMOTION OF SECURITY AND STABILITY

A. The institutional framework

127. European states have acknowledged that their security is indivisible, that a comprehensive approach should underlie the concept of security and that cooperative mechanisms should be applied in order to promote security and stability in the whole of the continent. The responses to the new security challenges should be based on the existing European and transatlantic institutions and cooperative arrangements, on the better utilization of their capacities, including the possibility of their enlargement, and closer coordination between them.
128. The EU is contributing to stability and prosperity in Central and Eastern Europe through the conclusion of different sorts of agreements. Some of these, the Europe Agreements, contain the perspective of EU membership which provides further incentives for the completion and stabilisation of political and economic reform in Central Europe. The enlargement of the EU will contribute to peace, security and stability in and around Europe.
129. Enhanced cooperation within the CFSP has contributed to a number of far-reaching initiatives of the EU geared to bringing about more security and stability, such as the Stability Pact which is a major contribution to good neighbourly relations including the situation of national minorities. However, discussions are taking place on the possibilities for making decision-making more effective and improving capacities for analysis, planning and implementation.
130. The Treaty on European Union has established a CFSP, which shall include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence. In Europe's changing security environment, WEU should continue its development as the defence component of the EU and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the

Alliance. In addition to their other functions, both the EU and WEU have a role to play in pursuance of Article J.4 of the TEU and in the area defined by the Petersberg Declaration. In this context, WEU should coordinate more closely with the EU and at the same time continue to reinforce its operational capabilities.

131. The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference will be an important opportunity, inter alia, to prepare the institutional ground for the future accession of associated European countries to the EU, to examine how to enhance the effectiveness of the CFSP and to review the EU-WEU relationship. Different options for future institutional relations between WEU and the EU have been developed by the WEU member States in a separate document which will be transmitted to the EU as WEU's contribution to the 1996 IGC.
132. NATO, the transatlantic relationship and the commitment of the North American allies to the defence of Europe are vital and remain essential to the continued stability and security of the continent. In order to promote European security and stability, NATO is considering enlargement of its membership as a gradual, open and transparent process not excluding a priori any European nation. NATO has made it clear that its enlargement will be part of a much broader security policy including the following elements:
 - o the building up of existing cooperative arrangements such as NACC, PFP;
 - o the development of healthy and solid relationships both with Russia and Ukraine;
 - o the strengthening of interlocking pan-European structures such as the OSCE and Council of Europe;
 - o the promotion of regional cooperation.
133. NACC and PFP are both important instruments for promoting security in a wider setting. While NACC is principally a multilateral forum for political consultation, PFP is NATO's instrument for practical cooperation with individual partner countries (through peace-keeping exercises, military-to-military contacts, etc.) and promoting civilian and democratic control of the military. PFP will play an important role both to help prepare possible new members, through their participation in PFP activities, for the benefits and responsibilities of eventual membership and as a means to strengthen relations with partner countries which may be unlikely to join the Alliance early or at all. The activities of NACC and PFP, by their nature and participation, are important for WEU countries. WEU's status of association agreed at Kirchberg in 1994 for the nine countries of Central Europe which have concluded Europe Agreements with the European Union complements the closer cooperation of these states with the European Union and comes within the same security perspectives as the NATO initiatives.
134. The OSCE, thanks to its inclusive membership, its comprehensive approach to security and the scope of its competences based, in particular, on the Helsinki Final Act (1975), Paris Charter (1990), Helsinki (1992) and Budapest (1994) Documents, plays a fundamental role in creating an enduring cooperative security space in Europe. An example of the useful role the OSCE is playing in the field of conflict management is the process of negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh within the OSCE Minsk Group. The planning for the first ever OSCE peacekeeping operation has been finalised awaiting the conclusion of the negotiations. WEU has offered to support, on a case by case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, conflict prevention and crisis management measures undertaken under OSCE aegis. WEU should now envisage what expertise, or logistic and personnel contributions could be made available for OSCE activities in this field.
135. The discussion on the Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the 21st century currently under way in the OSCE framework may help define the shape

of the new European security architecture. In this context, WEU is substantially contributing to this discussion not only through its direct involvement but also through the expression in this Common Reflection of the common security views and concerns of the 27 WEU countries.

136. The pan-European approach of the OSCE could now be complemented by a greater emphasis on regional cooperation, including pursuing the concept of regional tables, in particular in fields such as CSBMs, environmental protection and economy. In the light of experience gained with the Pact on Stability, the work of regional tables is considered a useful method of addressing regional issues and of promoting good neighbourly relations. The structures of regional or sub-regional cooperation will also continue to form an important element in strengthening security and stability in Europe.
137. The network of bilateral treaties has helped create a positive environment for good neighbourly relations by confirming respect of internationally agreed principles concerning the inviolability of frontiers and respect of human rights including those of persons belonging to national minorities.
138. The United Nations is the global institution responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. As WEU continues to develop its operational capabilities, it will support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, conflict prevention and crisis management measures under UN aegis. WEU should now envisage what expertise, or logistic and personnel contributions could be made available for UN activities in this field.

B. Security and stability in WEU's neighbouring regions and the wider world

139. Arms control and measures aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are important means of enhancing international and European peace and security. The WEU countries have many common interests in this area and much cooperation already takes place between them, either informally or within the framework of groupings to which some or all of them belong.
140. START I and START II are achievements of historical significance. WEU countries will benefit from the implementation of their provisions no less than the parties to these Treaties, and therefore they share a strong wish to secure the implementation of START I and ratification and full implementation of START II. They firmly support efforts to provide assistance for countries which have to tackle a huge nuclear legacy eg. in the fields of control, accountability and disposal of fissile nuclear materials.
141. Following the successful outcome of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, every effort should be made to achieve universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference highlighted the programme of action necessary for the full realization and effective implementation of Article VI of the NPT by stating that:
- the completion by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996; pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint.
 - the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in

accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

- the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

This programme of action constitutes an essential reference framework and WEU countries attach importance to its active implementation.

In addition the enhancement of the NPT review procedure achieved as a result of the NPT Review and Extension Conference will significantly strengthen the non-proliferation régime and its potential should be used to the full.

142. The strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, in particular in order to detect undeclared nuclear activities, should be pursued as a complement to the indefinite extension of the NPT.
143. In the field of chemical and biological weapons, the WEU countries should undertake all possible efforts to ensure the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention at the earliest possible date as well as universal participation in it and to elaborate an effective verification system for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
144. In the conventional field, the CFE Treaty remains a cornerstone for European security and stability. Its full and timely implementation and the preservation of its integrity are of crucial importance. The WEU countries will continue to contribute to the further enhancement and full implementation by all participating states of the system of measures on arms control, disarmament and confidence and security building developed in the OSCE framework.
145. WEU countries are engaged in practical cooperation in the framework of the Open Skies Treaty. In addition, they must persist in their efforts to secure the ratification of the Treaty by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus so it can enter into force.
146. With respect to land-mine clearance and the current EU joint action on anti-personnel land-mines, the WEU should consider how best to contribute to the definition and implementation of specific actions of the EU.
147. WEU countries will explore ways in which a contribution could be made to the strengthening of the UN Register on Conventional Arms and to giving practical effect to the OSCE's principles governing Conventional Arms Transfers.
148. The prudent extension of the membership of export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime would also contribute to stability and security.
149. With respect to security challenges such as international terrorism and organized crime, the European States should have coordinated and cooperative responses. Adherence by States to International Conventions relating to various aspects of these challenges and their full implementation is an important step to combat international terrorism and organized crime.
150. The formation of a politically stable and economically developing Russia in which democracy, the rule of law and human rights are irreversibly established is a vital security interest of the WEU countries. A Russian foreign policy, based on cooperativeness, partnership and good-neighbourliness, will strengthen European stability and security. The success of the ongoing political, economic and social reform process in Russia is one of the WEU nations' major interests. WEU countries will continue to

contribute to the development of a market economy in Russia. In this context, they support and encourage the efforts made in particular by the European Union with its TACIS programme, by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In addition to these wider efforts, the stability and the social and economic development of the areas of Russia adjacent to the WEU countries are of particular interest. WEU countries believe that regional cooperation can enhance the development and stability of those areas thus contributing to European security.

151. Russia is an important element within the emerging European security architecture. A growing network of cooperative ties is being developed which aims at fully fledged partnership and intensifying cooperation. The development of dialogue and cooperation with Russia through and beyond its participation in NACC and PFP will be part of a broad approach to promoting a cooperative security architecture in Europe. For its part, WEU is fully implementing its decision on contacts with Russia. In this context, WEU has recently agreed a number of proposals to give substance to this decision. In addition, WEU countries support the gradual inclusion of Russia into discussions in the G7 and the accession of Russia to the Council of Europe at the earliest possible moment.
152. Since independence, Ukraine has continuously shown strong interest in increasing political and economic cooperation with the West, with the highest possible degree of integration in European organisations as a medium to long-term goal. WEU countries welcome the intensified political dialogue and other forms of cooperation which have already been established. Enhancement of the relationship between Ukraine and NATO beyond PFP's parameters is a positive development. WEU countries welcome the accession of Ukraine to the Council of Europe. WEU's own contacts with Ukraine should be fully exploited and ways of developing WEU's relations with Ukraine will be examined.
153. WEU countries also have an interest in the security and stability of Belarus and will continue to promote economic reform and democratic development in that country. Development of partnership of Belarus with the European Union and the Council of Europe, active participation in PFP and active contribution to regional cooperation corresponds with the interests of WEU nations. WEU is open to the possibility of initiating appropriate contacts with Belarus in the future.
154. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and Moldova, admission to the Council of Europe and participation in the NATO/PFP programme provide the ground for a future enhanced relationship between Moldova and WEU. In this context, WEU could examine practical modalities for establishing appropriate relations with Moldova in view of enhancing security and stability in the region.
155. The 27 WEU countries also have an interest in the independence, territorial integrity, security and stability of the other newly independent states to their East as well as in the strengthening of their ties with Europe and consequently fully support the conflict prevention and crisis management roles of the OSCE in this area.
156. WEU has established a dialogue with Mediterranean countries on defence and security matters. It should further develop this dialogue and identify ways and means to give such a dialogue an increasingly significant content. The aim is to contribute in an effective way to the stability of a region which is fundamental for European security. This would complement the efforts of other organisations (EU, NATO, OSCE), all of which underline the importance of that area.
157. The promotion of security and stability in Africa has been identified as an important concern of the WEU countries. European countries are currently examining the possibilities of supporting the efforts of Africa itself to promote the preservation of

peace, the search for reconciliation and the achievement of sustainable and socially balanced development through good governance. WEU itself is considering the role it might play in support of peacekeeping and conflict prevention by African states.

C. Role of nuclear forces in deterrence

158. France and the United Kingdom, member countries of WEU who are also members of the EU and NATO, are nuclear weapon states within the meaning of the NPT.

In the language of para. 55 of the Alliance's Strategic Concept, the fundamental purpose of nuclear forces is political; it is "to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war [...] by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression" and by demonstrating "that an attack of any kind is not a rational option". The Hague Platform states that "To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk."

The Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy (WEU Council of Ministers, Noordwijk, 1994), which take up the language of the The Hague Platform and the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance, which were agreed respectively by WEU in 1987 and NATO in 1991, underline that "Europeans have a major responsibility with regard to defence in both the conventional and nuclear field". (7) The independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

II. CRISIS PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT

A. Capabilities available to WEU

159. WEU, as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, is playing a growing role in the field of crisis prevention and management activities. WEU has the capacity to act on its own initiative in response to a crisis and, at the request of the EU, will elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the EU which have defence implications. It should coordinate as appropriate with other institutions notably NATO, the OSCE and the UN.

160. At the Petersberg Ministerial meeting in 1992, WEU member States defined the crisis prevention and management missions that could be conducted through WEU by their forces as follows:

"military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."

It should be borne in mind that as well as mounting military operations in support of crisis management tasks, WEU may, on a case-by-case basis, also coordinate non-military resources as it has done in Mostar and on the Danube.

The flexibility that WEU enjoys through the statuses of its various forms of participation enables Associate Members, Observers and Associate Partners to make their own important contribution to the achievement of these missions.

161. Besides the institutional questions being discussed in the preparations for IGC 1996, the resources and capabilities effectively available to WEU for the performance of these missions are being evaluated. Considerable progress has been made over the past few years in strengthening the ability of WEU nations to respond to crises but it is undeniable that the achievements do not as yet match up to the objectives that have been set.

National assets for action

162. While it is possible that an individual nation may respond to a particular crisis without assistance from other nations, for an increasing number of operations, it is more likely in practice that nations will join together in some form of "coalition of the willing" to undertake the kind of operations listed in para. 160. In some cases, it may be that multinational forces are declared as available to contribute to an operation.
163. National contributions to these missions continue to be based on the declaration of military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces as being available for Petersberg operations. The organization of these national resources for such operations needs common procedures. Since many WEU nations already use or are adapting to procedures developed by NATO, and WEU operations will rely in a certain number of cases on NATO assets and capabilities, there is a need to keep WEU procedures compatible with NATO's.
164. In addition to an individual nation's response to a crisis, there is also the possibility that a cooperative response could be mounted by several nations acting under the direction of a "lead nation" which would be responsible for the command arrangements for the operation, as well as other aspects such as transport and common logistics. In this case, political support could be provided by WEU, which could also help to coordinate national contributions to the operation. Such an operation would remain however under the full responsibility of the individual nation or group of nations.

Means of collective action

165. Crises or potential crises may call for a wide range of responses. For crisis prevention or management, the EU may use political, economic and financial measures. While it does not have its own military assets, under Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union, the Union requests WEU "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications."
166. WEU's capabilities for collective action, either in response to the EU or on its own initiative, have been significantly enhanced in recent years so that it could conduct the crisis prevention and management operations set out in the Petersberg Declaration. The Planning Cell was established in 1992 to plan for eventual WEU operations. It maintains and updates a list of national and multinational forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU).

Through the decisions taken at Rome in November 1992 and at Kirchberg in May 1994, the WEU Associate Members, by committing forces to WEU military operations, will participate on the same basis as full members in these operations, as well as in relevant exercises and planning. They also have full rights to nominate FAWEU and may nominate officers to the Planning Cell.

WEU Observers may participate in WEU operations on agreement of all WEU full members. The contributions of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the WEU police element within the European Union Administration of Mostar mark a beginning of WEU Observers' participation in WEU operations.

WEU's Associate Partners, following the Kirchberg Declaration, may associate themselves with decisions taken by member States covering the Petersberg tasks and participate in their implementation and planning as well as in relevant exercises.

They provide details of forces which they consider suitable for such operations, which are held by the Planning Cell alongside the FAWEU lists. The liaison arrangement which Associate Partners have with the Planning Cell, that has a prospect for further development, is facilitating their participation in WEU activities. There was a discussion of the proposals from the Associate Partners concerning practical arrangements between them and the Planning Cell.

Further refinement of the lists of forces answerable and available to WEU will remain a high priority.

167. WEU supports endeavours that enhance crisis prevention and management capabilities of WEU countries, for example, the joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, BALTBAT, and the Austrian-Hungarian peacekeeping forces, created as a result of successful international cooperation.
168. The decisions taken at Lisbon in May 1995 to establish a Politico-Military Group, to set up a Situation Centre, and an Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell as well as the adoption of preliminary conclusions and transitional arrangements for the financing of WEU operations, are designed to facilitate and expedite WEU's decision-making and its ability to plan and conduct Petersberg operations. In this context, Ministers also decided to establish the Satellite Centre for the interpretation of imagery as a permanent WEU body. Proposals for developing capabilities for using satellites for security purposes are being examined.
169. Multinational forces and headquarters are important and valuable instruments for the management of crises, alongside national contributions. The broad spectrum of risks, the multitude of possible missions, and the diversity of potential areas of action require different models of cooperation and a flexible mix of operational capabilities.
170. Member States and Associate members have responded well in terms of declaring resources answerable to WEU, which can also be employed in the NATO context. Besides national forces, multinational FAWEU include:
 - o the European Corps, which will become fully operational by 30 November this year and in which five countries are represented: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain;
 - o the Multinational Division Central (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and UK) and UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force;
 - o EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR: France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

Designation of appropriate parts of the 1st German/Netherlands Army Corps as FAWEU is under active consideration by Germany and the Netherlands.

Such formations provide a pre-packaged capability with associated headquarters and are an important element of the overall set of forces from which WEU will select force packages designed to meet specific contingencies.

These operational structures, together with other important endeavours such as the Franco-UK European air group, constitute a set of assets whose rules of employment reflect the dual vocation of WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

171. Cooperation between WEU and NATO will help considerably to reinforce European efforts in peacekeeping and other contingency missions. In this context, there is an urgent need to finalize work on the CJTF concept, as agreed at the Alliance Summit in January 1994, to make a vital contribution to providing WEU with an operational multinational command capability. The readiness of the Alliance to make collective assets and capabilities available for WEU operations is fundamental to ensuring that WEU has access to a sufficiently wide range of capabilities, whilst avoiding costly and unnecessary duplication. WEU has contributed to the development of the CJTF concept and has an important interest in the completion of the work by NATO on CJTFs and in the implementation of Summit decisions on the use by WEU under its command of NATO's collective assets and capabilities.

B. The gaps and deficiencies in European capabilities

172. Despite the progress already achieved, a lot of work remains to be done in enhancing WEU's operational capabilities and thus WEU is not yet able to undertake large-scale operations either in response to the EU or on its own initiative.

There are several areas, to be addressed in later sections, where gaps and deficiencies can clearly be identified:

- crisis management mechanisms, including procedures for force generation and assembly, and command and control procedures;
- reconnaissance and intelligence;
- strategic and in-theatre transport capabilities;
- standardisation and interoperability;
- the European defence industrial base.

C. Experience drawn from the conflict in former Yugoslavia

173. The conflict in former Yugoslavia is taking place at a time when European security organizations are adapting or setting up structures that would contribute further to crisis prevention and management on the continent. European countries have committed themselves on the ground as part of the peacekeeping operation under UN auspices. WEU has made a valuable contribution to certain aspects of the crisis, particularly in the field of sanctions enforcement and its assistance to the EU administration of Mostar. The conflict has demonstrated the ability of WEU to respond to a request of the EU, as envisaged under Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, as well as the continued essential role of NATO, especially its importance in non-Article 5 missions.

174. On the political front, experiences in former Yugoslavia can be useful for future WEU operations:
- The political aims of the mission must be set out clearly from the start; the mission should be reviewed continually to ensure that tasks are not gradually taken on in theatre which deviate from the overall political aim.
 - Adequate capabilities and an effective decision-making structure to undertake the Petersberg tasks must be available to WEU.
 - The need for closer relations between the EU and WEU. Besides the institutional questions being discussed in preparation of the IGC, WEU needs to develop mechanisms for close consultation between the two bodies on both political and operational matters. This will be particularly important for WEU missions of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction which, like Mostar, are likely to involve overall political guidance by the EU, if not actual participation by civilian agencies coordinated by the EU.
 - The need for closer working relations between WEU and NATO.
 - The need for a clear understanding of the respective roles of other Organizations involved (for instance, UN or OSCE), in response to a crisis and for closer coordination of their responses.
175. In operational terms, WEU countries need to build on this experience to enhance capabilities in the following fields:
- There must be a clear channel of communication between the WEU Council and WEU forces. Experience indicates that, besides the role of liaison played thus far by the WEU Presidency, there needs to be a proper channel of communication linking WEU elements involved in an operation and the WEU Council.
 - For each WEU operation, there must be a single chain of command for all WEU military forces involved, in order to avoid confusion and delay in carrying out tasks.
 - Arrangements need to be devised for ensuring efficient coordination in the theatre of operations between the military and civilian elements of an operation, in particular where the civilian elements are provided by another organization such as the UN.
 - The need for WEU to establish or to have access to an adequate observation capability and to develop an intelligence processing capability which are decisive for the conduct of operations in complex, shifting politico-military environments.
 - The need to have transport capabilities available permitting the rapid projection of forces and their deployment to the theatre of operation as required. In this field, Europeans currently call upon other countries or the international market for heavy airlift.

D. Responses: enhancing European capabilities

176. In defining its responses to the deficiencies described above, WEU must identify and implement policies and new concrete organizational steps to increase its capability to fulfil the Petersberg tasks and to enhance its contribution to European stability and security.

Adapt national defence forces while maintaining their effectiveness

177. National defence assets are essential for the security and defence of European countries, underpin collective security and constitute the basis of collective efforts in this field. Nations are undertaking programmes to restructure their armed forces better to meet the new security challenges in crisis prevention and management fields, including peacekeeping. Modernisation of armed forces must include efforts towards greater mobility and interoperability, in order, inter alia, to enable WEU countries to cooperate together in international conflict prevention and management operations.
178. Cooperative efforts including participation in PfP present opportunities of working towards this goal.
179. National defence priorities, at a time when financial resources are necessarily limited, must take account of the obligations entered into vis-a-vis the security organizations (NATO, WEU).

Strengthen WEU's politico-military structures

180. An important task for WEU in the coming years is to continue to develop its politico-military structures in order to be able to conduct the full range of Petersberg tasks. This includes:
- Developing closer relations with the EU at the political and working levels in respect of actions undertaken at the EU's request in the framework of Article J4 of the Treaty on European Union;
 - Improving further the close cooperation with NATO;
 - Establishing and improving effective liaison and consultation arrangements with other relevant organisations, notably the UN and the OSCE. This will enable the most effective coordination of all the international resources devoted to a particular crisis, including non-military elements. WEU countries could also establish appropriate coordination, when they are involved on a national basis in UN or OSCE peace operations and inform as necessary the WEU Council.

Reinforce European assets and capabilities.

181. In parallel, it is important to examine and reinforce common means for action by developing WEU capabilities that are both effective and credible on a basis of transparency and complementary with NATO, avoiding unnecessary duplication, and capable of undertaking the full range of Petersberg tasks, including the following:
- The implementation of the CJTF concept and the definition of separable but not separate capabilities so as to ensure effective use of CJTF where appropriate by WEU and, in that case, under its command;
 - Continuing the process of developing national and multinational FAWEU, developing effective operational links between them and WEU and fully integrating them into WEU planning.
 - Examination of the requirements for, and means of generating, strategic lift for the various types of operations envisaged. Thought should be given to the question of military transport aircraft.
 - Development of other means for rapid generation of force packages in response to an urgent crisis. The decision on the WEU humanitarian task force will be of use in this area, and provides valuable guidelines for the coordination of military and non-military resources.

- Consideration of how to enhance interoperability between national forces. Given the multinational nature of WEU operations, greater interoperability is an essential objective, and extends to all 27 nations which may potentially take part in operations. There is a need to adopt standard operating procedures compatible with NATO and in accordance with UN principles. The Partnership for Peace programme provides a valuable means of improving interoperability. In this respect greater transparency between PFP and WEU activities would be desirable.
- Consideration of how WEU might benefit more fully from enhanced participation both of Observers and Associate Partners within WEU's activities and Petersberg operations.
- Further development of a WEU exercise and training programme which should be implemented in harmony with that elaborated within NATO. This is essential for interoperability, and to gain practical experience of decision-making procedures at all levels of the organisation.
- The setting up of an Intelligence Section in WEU, which will work on the basis of inputs to be provided by WEU nations, the Satellite Centre, NATO and other relevant sources, and which will be capable of supporting WEU in crisis situations.
- The development of WEU's capacity to use satellite imagery for security purposes by defining the basic conditions for possible WEU participation in a developing multilateral European programme.
- Consideration of the extension of access to a WEU telecommunication system to all WEU nations.

Progress in the above-mentioned areas could be improved by exploring opportunities for burden-sharing and pooling of resources.

182. The various forms of participation in WEU contribute substantially to the ability of WEU to undertake Petersberg tasks. The contribution to these tasks by the Associate Partners should be seen as the manifestation of their intention to contribute to European security and of their aspirations to accede in due course to the modified Brussels Treaty.
183. Restructuring of NATO forces is also being undertaken in the light of the Strategic Concept, with smaller and more mobile forces being an important element. WEU will need to monitor these developments and adapt its planning to cater for the new type of force structures.

Enhancing the European defence industrial base

184. The demand for defence equipment has changed drastically in the past few years. The defence industrial base in all WEU countries is therefore undergoing major changes. European efforts in the field of crisis prevention and management have to rely on new and different kinds of defence equipment, interoperability being an important feature. The European defence industry is restructuring to adapt to changes in demand. Supplying forces with militarily effective weapons and other equipment requires reliable long-term access to leading-edge technology and efficient and responsive suppliers who can respond to common needs. In this respect, the European defence industry should be capable, competitive and commercially sound. WEU countries recognize the need for European armaments cooperation. It was agreed in the WEU Maastricht Declaration to examine further proposals for enhanced cooperation in the

field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency. Such proposals are being examined in the WEAG framework.

Attached is the document on the "European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries".

WEU Council of Ministers

WEU Contribution to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference of 1996

Madrid, 14 November 1995

INTRODUCTION

1. In the "Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance" of 10 December 1991, WEU Member States agreed "on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters". The Declaration likewise indicates that "this identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases".
2. Consistent with the principle of gradual development, the WEU Declaration, in paragraph 8, refers to the possibility of reviewing in 1996, in accordance with Article J.4(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty's provisions on the CFSP, and at the same time establishes that "WEU will re-examine the present provisions in 1996".
3. The procedure defined in Article N(2) of the TEU for the examination of those provisions of the Treaty for which revision is provided, includes convening an Intergovernmental Conference in 1996. Consequently, it falls to the said Conference to also review the CFSP provisions of Art. J.4 with a view to furthering the objectives set out in Article B of the TEU and, in particular, "the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence".
4. WEU has decided to make its own contribution to the work of the 1996 Conference in aspects that affect the Organization. Paragraph 16 of the Declaration of the Noordwijk Council of Ministers of 14 November 1994 states that, "In the light of the review of Article J.4 of the Treaty on European Union that will take place during the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996, Ministers decide that WEU should make a timely contribution to the work of the Conference on the basis of its own review of the provisions of the Declaration on the role of WEU and its relations with the EU and with the Atlantic Alliance of December 1991".
5. The Declaration of the Lisbon Council of Ministers of 15 May 1995, after recalling this decision, indicates in paragraph 26 that "Ministers tasked the Permanent Council to present a report at their next meeting in November in Madrid. In this respect, they welcomed the intention of the incoming Spanish Presidency to present a reflection document on the WEU contribution to the IGC to serve as the basis of the Permanent Council's report". The Spanish Presidency presented a first version of the present document to the Permanent Council at the beginning of July 1995.

6. Paragraph 8 of the WEU Maastricht Declaration of December 1991 states that the re-examination of its provisions "will take account of the progress and experience acquired and will extend to relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance". This specific reference to the Alliance is consistent with the definition of the role of WEU as "the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance".
7. As WEU is an integral part of the process of the development of the Union, it is natural that the WEU contribution to the IGC should take account of the EU's wider security interests as defined within the Common Foreign and Security Policy. These interests include the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link, the extension of security and stability to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the consolidation of the reform process in Russia. These interests will therefore have to be fully taken into account when the IGC considers the institutional arrangements for European defence cooperation. The preamble to the Treaty on European Union also gives an indication of the considerations that should inform this review. It makes clear that the aim of the implementation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the eventual framing of the common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence, is "to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and
8. ~~In the view of~~ the institutional arrangements for defence cooperation in the next phase of European development should be consonant with the form such cooperation is likely to take in future and with an appreciation of what European countries will do together in this field. In this context, account will need to be taken of the prospects for WEU's operational development and the relationship with NATO.
9. Against this background, the present document includes both an evaluation of progress made regarding the three aspects of the Declaration: WEU's relations with the EU, WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance and the operational role of WEU, and an analysis in the form of options of the future framework of European security and defence. While the examination of these three elements is done in separate sections of this paper, obviously all the aspects of the Declaration are closely connected with each other. In particular, WEU/EU and WEU/NATO relations are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and their interrelationship will be fundamental for the decisions to be taken at the IGC.
10. Stemming from this assumption, the first part of the contribution is devoted to an assessment of the progress achieved to date in implementing the provisions of the Declaration. To this end, the development of relations between the EU and WEU, since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, is analysed firstly, assessing the results achieved and identifying the shortcomings encountered. Secondly, WEU's relations with NATO are reviewed, with a similar assessment. And, thirdly, the progress achieved and the problems encountered in developing the operational role of WEU are examined.
11. In the light of this critical analysis, the second part of the WEU contribution describes and analyses some proposals for the future development of the European Security and Defence Identity with a view to furthering the objectives of the Treaty on European Union, consistent with the Union's security interests and taking into account other defence-related considerations outlined above. Since this exercise is a contribution to the IGC's review process contemplated in the Maastricht Treaty, these proposals address the question of the institutional relationship between the European Union and WEU, while taking due account of the Atlantic dimension and the operational aspects.
12. Any option selected by WEU for reviewing the institutional framework of WEU-EU relations would naturally have consequences on WEU's other dimensions, both regard-

ding its relations with the Atlantic Alliance and its operational role. These consequences are taken into account as each option is examined.

As a suitable way of approaching the internal debate on WEU's contribution to the IGC, the present document contains a number of options. WEU is prepared fully to contribute to the IGC as required with regard to the security and defence aspects and has agreed to continue to follow this matter closely.

I.- EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE IDENTITY SINCE MAASTRICHT.

A. WEU'S RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION.

14. As stated in the WEU Declaration of 10 December 1991, the objective of these relations is "to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union". The Treaty on European Union, after declaring that the CFSP "shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence" (Article J.4(1)), states in Article J.4(2) that WEU "is an integral part of the development of the Union" and that the Union requests WEU "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications". To this end, this article also establishes that "the Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements".
15. Recalling these provisions of the TEU and with the same objective, the December 1991 Declaration states in paragraph 3 that "WEU is prepared, at the request of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications".
16. In order to carry out this task, the WEU Declaration proposes to develop "a close working relationship with the Union" and, to this end, announces that it will take the following practical measures, in agreement with the competent EU bodies:
 - o as appropriate, synchronization of the dates and venues of meetings and harmonization of working methods;
 - o establishment of close co-operation between the Council and the Secretariat-General of WEU on the one hand, and the Council of the Union and General Secretariat of the Council on the other;
 - o consideration of the harmonization of the sequence and duration of the respective Presidencies;
 - o arranging for appropriate modalities so as to ensure that the Commission of the European Communities is regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities in accordance with the role of the Commission in the common foreign and security policy as defined in the Treaty on European Union;
 - o encouragement of closer co-operation between the Parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament."
17. Furthermore, WEU Member States adopted also at Maastricht an additional declaration (second part of Declaration 30 annexed to the Final Act) in which:

"States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU".

18. An evaluation of the implementation of the Maastricht provisions to date reveals important advances as well as some shortcomings:
 - Following decisions adopted by the European Council on 29 October 1993 and by the WEU Council of Ministers on 22 November of the same year, it may be affirmed that, in general terms, the implementation of the provisions for the establishment of a co-operation between WEU and EU Councils and Secretariats, which began in Autumn 1994, is making progress. The same applies to the establishment of modalities for information and consultation between the EC Commission and WEU and to the harmonization of the duration of the respective Presidencies as of 1 July 1994.
 - The invitation to participate in WEU has been accepted by all the countries of the Union which were not yet WEU members. However, only Greece has acceded as full member. Denmark and Ireland (1992) and the new Union members Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995), have become observers. The flexibility allowed by these different status of participation (together with those of WEU associate members and associate partners) enhances WEU's ability to bring together the ideas, efforts and resources of European States for the sake of stability and security in Europe. On the other hand, differences regarding status increase the asymmetry between both organizations, thereby making the full development of WEU as the defence component of the Union more complex, as two partially different groups of countries participate in the decision-making process regarding EU decisions and actions to be elaborated and implemented by WEU.
 - Agreement has not yet been reached on synchronization of the dates of meetings and harmonization of working methods, nor has the issue of harmonization of the sequence of respective Presidencies been settled. Furthermore, closer cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament has not been promoted.
19. Nevertheless, development of the measures specified in Maastricht is still under way. Possible solutions to the above-mentioned shortcomings have been under discussion also in the EU on the basis of the document on "Relations between the European Union and WEU" agreed in May 1995 by the CFSP Security Working Group and noted thereafter by the Political Committee. This document, which has been forwarded to WEU, contains some proposals:
 - to promote WEU's role in the elaboration of a common European security and defence policy, acting as a forum for analysis of security issues which have defence implications (or of security issues which imply the use of military means) and as forum for consultations on security issues between members of the Union and other WEU participants (especially in crisis situations);
 - to give an impetus to WEU's role in elaborating and implementing EU decisions and actions related to humanitarian or crisis management missions by convening of coordinated sessions of the respective bodies, cross participation of experts and the definition of modalities for the financing of operations which may be carried out by WEU at the Union's request.

- to attain greater EU-WEU interaction through practical measures like harmonization of the respective presidencies (making them coincide in the same country as far as permitted by the asymmetric membership), harmonization of meeting-schedules, coordination of the respective working programmes, mutual information, strengthening of cooperation between the respective Secretariats, etc.
20. However, despite the progress that the implementation of these measures would entail, it seems clear that there is scope for the development of the mechanism contemplated in Maastricht. The arrangements required to facilitate WEU's compliance with the task "to elaborate, and implement decisions and action of the Union which have defence implications" imply in particular the existence of an EU-WEU crisis management mechanism, which has yet to be developed, since this is an essential element of the WEU-EU framework of relations. In this sense:
- It is necessary to develop modalities for the elaboration and implementation of EU decisions and actions which have defence implications, and to provide for a follow-up evaluation of their effectiveness.
 - Crisis-management exercises are needed to facilitate the definition of flexible procedures which would allow for a truly operational WEU response; the simulated exercise scenarios would provide the opportunity for the study of command and control problems in accordance with the respective fields of competence.
 - It is necessary to establish the most unrestricted exchange of information between the two Organizations as possible.
 - The conclusion of a security agreement between WEU and EU is required as well as the adjustment of the security standards in both Organizations.
21. Closer cooperation between the WEU Parliamentary Assembly and the European Parliament is to be encouraged.

B. WEU'S RELATIONS WITH THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

22. Paragraph 4 of the WEU Declaration of 10 December 1991 establishes that the objective of these relations is "to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance".
23. In this context, the already mentioned second part of Declaration 30 annexed to the Maastricht Final Act also invited the other European members of the Alliance to become associate members of the Organization in order to thus facilitate WEU's role as a means to strengthen the European pillar.
24. To bring forward this objective, paragraph 4 of the WEU Declaration indicates two courses of action, to be followed in parallel and "on the basis of the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defence identity and the Alliance". One is intended "to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU Member States in the Alliance", which is, obviously, consistent with WEU's role in the reinforcement of the European pillar and with the principle of complementarity between the two Organizations. This will be discussed in more detail when considering WEU's operational development.
25. The other course of action is "to develop further the close working links between WEU and the Alliance". This is a more immediate task, which aims at facilitating the attainment of the previous one. To this end, the Declaration specifies three concrete measures to advance in the direction proposed:
- WEU Member States will intensify their co-ordination on Alliance issues which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing

- joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance (...).
- Where necessary, dates and venues of meetings will be synchronized and working methods harmonized.
 - Close co-operation will be established between the Secretariats-General of WEU and NATO.
26. The Summit meeting of Allied Heads of State and Government held in January 1994 formalises NATO's recognition of and full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity, the strengthening of the European pillar of the Alliance through WEU and NATO's willingness to facilitate the use of its collective assets and capabilities, as well as the structures to be developed under the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept for WEU operations.
27. To date, an evaluation of the implementation of decisions taken at Maastricht reveals some still pending issues, but also significant advances, in particular since the previously mentioned 1994 NATO Summit. Indeed, on that occasion the Alliance agreed that NATO and WEU would consult in future contingencies, including as necessary through joint meetings of the respective Councils to discuss how to address such contingencies; likewise, the Alliance's commitment to adapt its political and military structures and to adjust its organization and resources will facilitate the achievement of, among others, the above-mentioned aims; and, lastly, the Summit's endorsement of the CJTF concept will provide an important means also for operations conducted by WEU.
28. The incorporation of Iceland, Norway and Turkey, in response to the invitation formulated in Maastricht to become associate members of WEU with the possibility to participate fully in the activities of WEU, has been specially important. Thus, all European members of the Alliance participate in the development of a European Security and Defence Identity within the WEU framework, according to their status. In this way, the "European pillar" of the Alliance has acquired, since Maastricht, a more solid and rational configuration.
29. Regarding the three concrete measures cited above, the implementation of the first measure, which refers to the coordination between WEU Member States on Alliance issues, has been reflected in the following aspects:
- The possibility to introduce joint positions into the Alliance consultation process, according to the Maastricht dispositions, has been used, namely, on the subject of WEU's employment of NATO assets and capabilities, including CJTFs. Possibilities for a more frequent use of such joint positions should be considered, bearing in mind the principle of transparency and the maintenance of the spirit of consultations in the Alliance, which will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of the Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty.
 - As regards WEU-NATO consultations on how to address future contingencies, there has not yet been an occasion to implement this arrangement, although a precedent prior to the Summit does exist: the agreement between WEU and NATO on coordination of naval operations for embargo surveillance in the Adriatic.
 - Following the agreements on WEU-NATO cooperation of 1993 and 1995, practical cooperation has been improved including through the holding of regular joint Council meetings, whose frequency has been steadily increased. Other procedures used for coordinating matters of common interest have been: forwarding of documents agreed in WEU to concerned NATO bodies or com-

mittees, and vice-versa; cross participation on a case-by-case basis in some meetings, joint experts meetings, liaison meetings between both Secretariats, etc. These are flexible and simple procedures for the introduction of the points of view of each organization into the working mechanisms of the other, and they will have to be further developed in the future.

30. The development of this cooperation has a bearing also on the possible distribution of tasks between WEU and NATO.
- In operations for the defence of the territory against armed attack (Articles V and 5 of the modified Brussels Treaty and the Washington Treaty, respectively), WEU Member States will act within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.
 - The WEU Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 describes a number of new missions, especially peacekeeping operations in the broadest sense. Following the Ministerial Decisions of 1992, NATO has also extended its field of responsibility to crisis management operations.

For the distribution of tasks in these kinds of missions, an informal view is emerging according to which entrusting an operation to NATO or to WEU will often depend on whether the North American Allies participate or not.

- It seems likely that, in the future, responsibility for new missions will be decided on a case by case basis between the two organizations in a manner that takes full advantage of their mutually complementary roles.
31. The implementation of the second of the concrete measures specified in paragraph 4 of the WEU Maastricht Declaration has also made some advances:
- The synchronisation of dates and venues of meetings has taken the form of an understanding that ordinary meetings of the Permanent Councils be held on different days of the week and that WEU Ministerial Councils be held before those of the Alliance. Nevertheless, their varying compositions and venues make absolute synchronisation of ministerial meetings a difficult matter to resolve.
 - On harmonisation of working methods, it should be noted that NATO and WEU have different structures. These include the lack of a Presidency in NATO; the differing responsibilities of the two Secretaries-General; and the different civil and military decision-making procedures (especially in Pol-Mil and operational aspects). These differences will always impose methods which are different in the detail, but very similar in the key aspects. It is worth noting that the planning and conduct of operations in the Former Yugoslavia has led to some changes in working methods in NATO. In any case, it is probable that the process of adaptation of NATO structures to the new missions will enhance cooperation with WEU.
32. The cooperation between the Secretariats of WEU and NATO, contemplated in the third of the concrete measures foreseen in paragraph 4 of the Maastricht Declaration, has also registered some advances, although much more could still be done. Once concluded, the Security Agreement between both organizations will allow for a deeper cooperation (exchange of information, joint use of the communications system, contacts between the respective military bodies, cooperation in the implementation of the CJTF concept, etc).
33. Therefore, the progress achieved in the WEU-NATO relationship can be positively evaluated. Nevertheless, there still remain some important questions to be settled in order to achieve a more effective and flexible cooperation between both organizations.

C. OPERATIONAL ROLE OF WEU:

34. Paragraph 2 of the WEU Declaration of 10 December 1991, states that: "WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role".
35. This operational development will enable WEU better to accomplish the role entrusted to it in Art J.4(2) of the TEU, according to which the EU requests WEU "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications"; and will make possible a more effective contribution by WEU to the strengthening of the European pillar of the Alliance.
36. To this end, the December 1991 Declaration also states that "WEU's operational role will be strengthened by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means, covering in particular:
 - o WEU planning cell;
 - o closer military co-operation complementary to the Alliance in particular in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance;
 - o meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff;
 - o military units answerable to WEU.

Other proposals will be examined further, including:

- o enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency;
 - o development of the WEU Institute into a European Security and Defence Academy".
37. An assessment of the implementation of what was agreed at Maastricht regarding the strengthening of the operational role of WEU should refer, in the first place, to the general purpose, contemplated in the 10 December 1991 Declaration, of examining and defining the missions, structures and means to this end:
 - o As regards WEU missions, on a general level, the definition of the missions which more specifically concern WEU, oriented basically to crisis management, took place in the already cited Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. In the last years, WEU has successfully carried out several missions that fit in, in general lines, with the missions defined at Petersberg (combined WEU-NATO operation in the Adriatic, WEU embargo enforcement on the Danube, and WEU police operation in Mostar).
 - o As regards WEU structures and means, significant concrete steps have been taken since Maastricht, as specified in the next paragraph. On a general level, the "Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy" (CEDP), approved by the WEU Council of Ministers at Noordwijk in November 1994, provided an important impetus to further work in key areas of WEU's operational development. The decisions adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers at Lisbon on 15 May 1995 represent a significant new step in this development, in particular regarding the establishment of new politico-military and support structures that will allow for an appropriate monitoring of crisis situations and of missions that could be undertaken by WEU.
 38. Most of the concrete measures proposed in the 1991 Declaration for strengthening the operational role of WEU have been implemented:
 - o The Planning Cell has been established in October 1992:

- The Cell is already doing important work in the preparation of generic plans and studies.
 - The CEDP document foresees that the Cell should give priority to the development of appropriate plans and procedures for humanitarian and rescue operations, including evacuation operations, and prepare for the possibility of undertaking military analysis for use by the EU.
 - Following agreement in Lisbon, an Intelligence Section is being established within the Planning Cell.
- A Situation Centre (SitCen) is being established which will, on the basis of information to be provided by WEU nations, the Satellite Centre, the WEU Operation HQ, the European Union, NATO and other relevant sources, work under the authority of the Secretary-General through the Director of the Planning Cell and as directed by the Council and/or Pol-Mil Group.
- Progress has been made towards closer military cooperation through:
 - The transfer to WEU of several former Eurogroup1 bodies which deal with logistic matters (Eurolog), communications (Eurocom) and long-term studies of operational requirements (Eurolongterm).
 - Preliminary studies on strategic transport.
 - The development of an exercise policy.
- Meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff are held twice a year. In addition, a Military Delegates Group (MDG), composed of Military Delegates representing their respective Chiefs of Defence Staff, has been established: to prepare for CHODs meetings and to execute their mandates; to support the Council and to execute its mandates; to formulate and provide collective evaluation and advice on the military aspects of every plan, including operational plans, or subsequent modifications of already approved plans, submitted to the Council; to exercise responsibilities with regard to the Planning Cell's work and to provide national military views, harmonised where appropriate, to the Planning Cell.
- The concept of military forces answerable to WEU (FAWEUs) has been defined and is being implemented.
 - Following the designation of national units as FAWEUs, the fact that multinational forces have also been made available (Eurocorps, UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, ARRC's Multinational Division, EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR) is of great significance.
 - Associate Members of WEU have full rights to nominate FAWEU, while Associate Partners have been invited to provide information on forces and to offer forces for specific operations.
 - The Lisbon Council of Ministers has adopted some improvements in the procedures for the designation of FAWEUs. At that meeting, Ministers agreed on a mandate to the Planning Cell which identifies the various elements to be taken into account by the Planning Cell in refining its work on the identification of FAWEUs and tasked it to update the list of FAWEU by the end of October each year.
- In Lisbon, Ministers also endorsed a document on "Emergency Responses to Humanitarian Crises: a Role for a WEU Humanitarian Task Force", which is fully consistent with their Decision on the operational development of WEU. As mandated by Ministers, the Permanent Council has completed work on this subject as a matter of priority and the Planning Cell taking forward as a matter of urgency its generic planning in this area.
- There is increased cooperation in the field of armaments. This cooperation has led to a rationalisation of structures, with the creation of the Western European

Armaments Group (WEAG) within the framework of WEU following the transfer of functions formerly carried out by the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG). Similarly, the analyses on a future European Armaments Policy (informal group of government experts of WEU/WEAG and EU Member States) and on a future European Armaments Agency are well advanced.

- In addition, the following measures have been decided by Ministers in Lisbon:
 - The reinforcement of WEU's politico-military structures and decision-making, in particular the establishment of a new Politico-Military Group to support the Council, which will ensure politico-military interface functions between the Council and the Operation Commander and monitor WEU operations.
 - Development of Intelligence capabilities in the space field, with the decision to establish the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejon as a permanent body of WEU; three approaches to developing WEU's capability to use satellite imagery for security purposes are currently under study, namely the establishment of a WEU satellite system, participation in a developing multinational programme or procurement of imagery.
 - The financing arrangements for WEU operations, adopting a transitional formula for a two year period, based on the contribution to the ordinary budget of the Organization, which will make possible the implementation of its other operational decisions.
 - The WEU Institute for Security Studies is being consolidated and its important activity is visibly reflected in seminars, studies and advice for activities of the Organization. Its transformation into a European Security and Defence Academy is being approached gradually, the first step having been approved at the beginning of this year.
39. Many of the still pending issues are being debated at present on the basis of the recommendations on the Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common European Defence Policy, agreed by Ministers at Noordwijk, and of the Lisbon Ministerial Council decisions. In this sense, the programme of the Spanish Presidency for the second half of 1995 has emphasised the objective of putting in place the new politico-military structures agreed upon in Lisbon and testing them through crisis-management exercises that will serve to evaluate the effectiveness of procedures and to further refine the FAWEU concept.
40. While there has been significant progress in the implementation of measures to strengthen WEU's operational role, much remains to be done.
- Regarding WEU operations, the political will of all members will continue to be essential for the development of appropriate European participation in this field. Similarly, greater coordination through WEU of the contributions that European countries make or will make on an individual basis to UN missions could also ensure a higher political visibility for the Organization. It would be appropriate for WEU to reflect on this question too.
 - At the present stage, WEU should aim to be able to plan and control a Petersberg operation at up to Corps level, taking into account factors such as complexity, intensity and duration. To reach such a level of capability will require inter alia the development of a WEU exercise programme aimed at the coordination of forces and political/military control during operations as well as the use of the Alliance's assets and capabilities in particular the successful implementation of the CJTF concept.

- Regarding the appropriate means for carrying out its missions, undoubtedly WEU has made some advances but much remains to be done to endow itself with the necessary capabilities to fulfil its tasks. In this respect, in addition to Allied assets and capabilities, including the CJTF concept, WEU must keep reflecting on the operational assets that it may require for its operations.
- The adoption of permanent financing arrangements in the light of experiences gained with the present transitional arrangements will be of special importance for WEU's operational development and the efficiency of its decision-making procedures. Appropriate financing arrangements for operations carried out on request of the EU must be developed.
- There is increasing downward pressure on defence budgets throughout Europe. This pressure is likely to continue. It will be even more important to avoid unnecessary duplication of resources and structures already available in NATO.
- The FAWEU concept has still not been put into practice in a way that would confirm the existence of a WEU capability effectively to generate force packages. The approval of the document "Creation and assembly of forces" is an important step forward for the FAWEU concept, including national and multinational FAWEUs, and for the concept of force packaging. These could be refined further in the light of experience gained on exercises and operations.
- Significant results with regard to a possible future pooling of resources or a sharing of tasks between armed forces of European nations may be expected as a result of the studies which EUROLONGTERM will conduct in this field as mandated by the Permanent Council.
- The development of the WEU-NATO relationship will have a significant relevance because of its impact on WEU's use of Alliance assets.

D. OTHER MEASURES

41. The WEU Declaration of 10 December 1991 also established two complementary measures of an organizational nature:
 - "The seat of the WEU Council and Secretariat will be transferred to Brussels" (paragraph 6).
 - "Representation on the WEU Council must be such that the Council is able to exercise its functions continuously in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty" (paragraph 7).
42. These measures have been implemented as foreseen:
 - The seat of the WEU Council and Secretariat was transferred from London to Brussels at the beginning of 1993, which has facilitated the desired closer links of both bodies (as well as of the Planning Cell established in the same headquarters) with the EU and NATO. At present, the implications of the decision in principle to increase the human resources of the Secretariat to enable it to cope with its growing tasks are also being examined.

The objective of organizing the WEU Permanent Council in such a way as to enable it to exercise its functions as the central, high-level, policy-making body of WEU, capable of dealing continuously with the main political, security and defence issues on the WEU agenda has been fully achieved. The presence in WEU Councils of an increasing number of countries with varying status (10 full members, 3 associate members, 5 observers and 9 associate partners) has enriched the work of the Council but has also underlined the need to improve further its working methods. The capacity of the Council to monitor operations is in the process of being considerably reinforced.

II. THE FUTURE FRAMEWORK OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE

43. There is an agreement, formally declared at Maastricht and also reflected in the Alliance Summit Declaration of 1994, on the need to develop a genuine European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). In this context, in the Maastricht Declaration WEU Member States agreed that "this identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases" and agreed "to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance".
44. Preparations for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference offer the opportunity to reflect on the next phase of this development. In effect, and as already indicated, it will fall to the said Conference to review the CFSP provisions of the Treaty on European Union and, consequently, also the present ESDI institutional framework, which is based on WEU's development as the defence component of the Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Obviously, this reflection should be conducted in the light of present military realities and the current security situation in Europe. Furthermore, as the Maastricht Treaty itself indicates, this review should take place having in view the date of 1998, in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, after which the possibility of denouncing WEU's modified Brussels Treaty will exist.
45. In any case, the need to review the present ESDI institutional framework is not only due to the time limits established in the treaties. The review of the present framework must also consider the fundamental objectives which institutional arrangements in the defence and security field are designed to serve, and the existing constraints. Public opinion in the Member States demands defence arrangements that are credible and can be relied upon to work in practice. For many European nations, the maintenance of a healthy and effective Atlantic Alliance is fundamental to the defence of their territory and to their national security policy. Others have chosen to remain outside or are not participating in collective defence arrangements. In the post Cold War environment all of them are confronted by new security challenges, some of which may require military responses under EU/WEU auspices in the form of peacekeeping, humanitarian or other crisis management operations. Given that these new missions have to be carried out in a climate characterised by defence budget constraints, unnecessary duplication of structures should continue to be avoided.
46. These new challenges provide the context in which the EU is developing a CFSP that includes all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. Examples of these new challenges, such as the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, where the EU and its member countries play an important crisis management role at all levels, lead to public expectations which are not easy to reconcile within the existing institutional framework. These challenges confirm the need to develop a "greater European responsibility on defence matters", on which WEU Member States agreed in Maastricht, and which demands from the Union "the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies" called for in Article C of the TEU. Achieving greater cohesion bet-

ween the different political, economic, humanitarian and military instruments of crisis management seems an obvious prerequisite for the effectiveness and continuity of European actions in this field.

47. The IGC will need to harness to the best effect the diverse contributions to security and defence that European nations are able to make. In this context, whatever course the institutional development of the EU and WEU may follow, the possibilities for participation by WEU Associate Members, Observers and Associate Partners in the ESDI must be maintained and further developed. As already mentioned, enlargement has increased both the asymmetry of membership in both organizations and the number of countries contributing via the EU and WEU to regional and global security, including in particular the Petersberg missions:
- The recent accession to the EU of Austria, Finland and Sweden, also Observers in WEU, has reinforced the role of both Organizations as a force for stability in Central Europe and the Baltic region. The fact that these States do not share collective defence commitments with other States of the Union, will need to be taken into account in devising appropriate mechanisms for future action in the context of the further development of the ESDI.
 - While introducing a new set of asymmetries into the EU-WEU institutional relationship, the incorporation as WEU associate members of European NATO members not members of the Union has made possible their participation in WEU's development as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and thus provide a positive contribution to European security and stability.
 - Furthermore, the creation of the Associate Partners' Status for Central and Eastern European countries, while increasing the structural complexity of WEU, has been an important factor of stability in Europe. It is also an element in the web of relations these countries enjoy with Western institutions they aspire to join, helping to reinforce their security and stability in the interim.
 - Finally, the enlargement process also taking shape in NATO (which will not necessarily proceed at the same pace and with the same countries as in the EU) will have a bearing on the EU/WEU institutional link and on the relations of both organizations with NATO.

Parallel processes of enlargement of EU, WEU and NATO are desirable and would alleviate the complexities connected with differing memberships of these Organizations.

48. The Atlantic security is indivisible and is a fundamental tenet of the development of ESDI. By providing collective defence for its members and undertaking its new missions, the Atlantic Alliance will continue to be a core element of European security. From this perspective, it is clear that decisions on the future development of the WEU/EU relationship cannot be taken in isolation from their effect on WEU/NATO relations, and on the Alliance itself. Irrespective of the institutional form that the ESDI might adopt in the future, the European institution responsible for defence must continue to act as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. At the same time, decisions at the IGC must also aim at reinforcing the common defence and cooperation in the new field of crisis management within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.
49. There are several theoretically possible options for the future institutional development of the ESDI. Three broad options have been identified. Logically, each of them allows for possible variations and has specific repercussions on matters relating to the

juridical form, members, functioning of bodies, decision-making procedures, relations with EU and NATO, operational development, financing, etc.

A. REINFORCED PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN AN AUTONOMOUS WEU AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:

50. If this Option were to be retained, the institutional relationship between the EU and WEU would remain as set out in the Maastricht Treaty, supplemented by the provisions of the reinforced partnership described below. WEU would be preserved as an autonomous organization with its own separate Treaty base. The principle of national sovereignty would continue to govern relations between European countries on defence matters. The intergovernmental nature of decision-making on these issues would be preserved and be conducted on the basis of consensus. Therefore, the modified Brussels Treaty would remain in force and unaltered, without making use of the possibility of denunciation after 1998 established in Article XII of the Treaty.
51. Under this Option priority would be given to further increasing WEU's capability to carry out the tasks set out in the Petersberg Declaration rather than to further changes to the legal and institutional framework. To this end the operational relationship between EU and WEU would be developed in respect of military actions undertaken at the Union's request. The aim would be to achieve greater coherence than at present of European action in the security and defence fields, and to develop a faster and more effective operational/military elaboration of decisions and actions than at present.
52. The flexible nature of the present relationship would be exploited to provide a framework within which to encourage the contributions of a wide range of European countries. Differing memberships will need to be taken in account in devising the links between both Organizations. Associate Members, Observers and Associate Partners of WEU would continue to be able to participate in WEU operations in accordance with their status. In a reinforced partnership the provisions of Observer status would be interpreted so as to allow these countries to make the fullest possible contribution to WEU's work. The provisions of Observer status should accordingly be reviewed both with this aim in mind and to consolidate the relevant documents on Observer status.
53. As regards the procedure for decision-making on matters with defence implications, the basic rule should be consensus both in the CFSP and in the WEU framework. There would be no participation of the European Commission and Parliament in defence-related decision-making. The possibility of WEU independently deciding on action, besides acting at the EU's request in accordance with Article J.4(2) of the TEU, would be preserved.
54. This option would also imply the preservation of the WEU bodies existing today, fully independent with respect to those of the EU. In particular, the Council of Ministers, the Permanent Council and the Parliamentary Assembly would keep their roles. However, the reinforced partnership would find its expression at the highest political level by the creation of a "WEU Summit" which could meet as necessary back-to-back with the European Council. The European Council, to which the WEU Secretary-General might be invited when it discusses issues affecting the CFSP, could make proposals to the new WEU body. On its part, the WEU Summit would have responsibility for formulating general guidelines on collective European military action, in line with the role of WEU as the defence component of the EU. Countries would have the same rights and responsibilities in the WEU Summit as at present in the remainder of the Organization.
55. In developing this option, agreement would also be needed between the EU and WEU on the coordination of policy objectives for individual operations, the formulation

where relevant of joint assessments once WEU has accepted a request from the EU, agreement on the competences of the respective bodies, including those in the field, and cooperation between the CFSP Secretariat and WEU bodies on the monitoring of relevant operations.

56. These requirements suggest the need for closer working links between the EU and WEU at levels below the Summit, as required for individual operations:
- The WEU Ministerial Council could meet when necessary back-to-back with the EU's General Affairs Council, which could formulate a request for action by WEU in support of the EU's CFSP.
 - Meetings at senior official level to discuss issues related to an operation could take place e.g. between the EU's Political Committee and the WEU Permanent Council reinforced by diplomatic and military experts from capitals.
 - EU/WEU Task Forces could be established for the duration of individual operations. Together with systematic cross-representation between EU and WEU working bodies, this would ensure continuous politico-military coordination for operations carried out at EU request.
 - Mechanisms for crisis monitoring, analysis and planning in the WEU Secretariat and Planning Cell on the one hand and the CFSP Unit of the EU Council Secretariat on the other, should be created in close coordination between both organizations with a view to the establishment of joint EU/WEU mechanisms.
57. WEU should be further strengthened in the operational field by building WEU capabilities that are both effective and credible, and that are compatible rather than in competition with NATO, avoiding unnecessary duplication and meeting a proven requirement. In this context, the following issues would need to be considered:
- Further to improve mechanisms for decision-making and management of WEU operations.
 - To increase human and financial resources of the Secretariat, the Planning Cell and the Satellite Centre, in accordance with established budgetary procedures.
 - Decisions on the proposals regarding the development of WEU's capability to use satellite imagery, and on the creation of a future European Armaments Agency and a European Security and Defence Academy.
 - A decision to increase lacking resources of the ESDI in fields such as intelligence or strategic mobility.
 - Implementation of the CJTF concept, defined in terms broad enough to increase WEU's ability for carrying out the Petersberg missions and to favour ESDI's specific contribution to the collective defence, within the Atlantic Alliance, while safeguarding the strength of the transatlantic relationship.
58. A reinforced partnership would underline the need for further consideration of the procedures for financing WEU operations. This could include arrangements for the EU to contribute to the common costs of operations arising from its requests to WEU.

B. INTERMEDIATE OPTIONS TOWARDS AN EU-WEU INSTITUTIONAL CONVERGENCE:

59. Between the strict preservation of WEU's institutional autonomy and its merger with the European Union several intermediate options are possible which, while respecting the present separation and the Brussels Treaty, would provide for even closer EU-WEU links and continuity of action through convergence between the two Organizations, in the perspective of the future integration of WEU into the EU. Commitments of a political and/or juridical nature would be assumed between WEU and the EU, thus providing the ESDI with a more structured framework, as those commitments would

assign to one of the two organizations on which ESDI is based a certain directing role over the other for some activities. The EU-WEU convergence could be reflected in the wording of the revised TEU, in order to give a clearer perspective for organizational changes.

60. An important consideration would be to retain the flexibility required to make the most of the differing contributions which the enlarged memberships of EU and WEU can bring to European security. Differing memberships will need to be taken into account in devising the links between both Organizations. Associate Members, Observers and Associate Partners of WEU would continue to be able to participate in WEU operations in accordance with their status. The provisions of Observer status would be interpreted so as to allow these countries to make the fullest possible contribution to WEU's work. The provisions on Observer status should accordingly be reviewed both with this aim in mind and to consolidate the relevant documents on Observer status. The possible unfavourable implications for the situation and status of Associate Members of the implementation of Option B would have to be addressed both in the EU and WEU. In this sense, ways of developing closer links with CFSP for Associate Members when dealing with issues related to security and defence matters may need to be considered by the IGC.
61. Under this Option, the possibility of WEU deciding autonomously its own actions would be maintained as at present, without prejudice to its having henceforth to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union. As regards the decision-making procedures, many countries strongly feel that the principle of national sovereignty should continue to govern relations between European countries on defence matters and that the intergovernmental nature of decision-making on these issues should be preserved and be conducted on the basis of consensus, while not questioning that a final decision will have to be taken in the IGC framework, where all possible options, including majority-voting, are to be considered. In any case, it would be necessary to improve the procedures for the adoption of EU decisions addressed to WEU, in order to make the EU-WEU link more effective and operational.

In case present EU decision-making procedures would be preserved, they would have to be consistent with the establishment of a firm political or juridical commitment of WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union. This objective could be met through a flexible and juridically non-binding formula that would make the blocking of decisions politically more difficult:

- This kind of political commitment already exists within the CFSP framework, in the form of Declaration 27, annexed to the Maastricht Final Act, on voting in the CFSP field ("The Conference agrees that, with regard to Council decisions requiring unanimity, Member States will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a unanimous decision when a qualified majority exists in favour of that decision.") As a minimum, the TEU's review should be an occasion to recall that Declaration (which is of course applicable to EU decisions concerning requests to WEU) and to stress the will to apply it in practice.
- An additional step in the same direction would be the adoption, in the framework of the TEU's review, of a specific political commitment inspired in the mentioned Declaration 27, whereby all EU countries would declare their intention not to block, to the extent possible, the adoption of decisions having defence implications (and therefore addressed to WEU) for which a qualified majority exists.

- Similarly, a non-binding principle could be established to the effect that countries which do not participate in an operation requested by the EU and implemented by a "coalition of the willing" within the WEU framework voluntarily abstain from blocking a consensus on eventual follow-up operational decisions, taken in the context of an ongoing operation.
- 62. Participation in military action implementing a decision of the EU would remain a matter for national decision in accordance with countries' status in WEU.
- 63. If these intermediate options were to be retained, they would maintain the present structure of WEU bodies. The closest possible harmonisation and coordination between all EU and WEU bodies would be required in this context, given the increased relevance of EU decisions for WEU's functioning. Among other measures, the following could be envisaged:
 - Back to back and/or joint meetings of WEU and EU working groups.
 - Joint meetings of the Political Committee and the WEU Permanent Council on an ad-hoc basis to prepare for European and General Affairs Council as far as they will discuss crisis management issues.
 - Attendance at parts of the General Affairs Council on crisis management by the WEU Secretary-General and the Ministers of Defence.
 - Mechanisms for crisis monitoring, analysis and planning in the WEU Secretariat and Planning Cell on the one hand and the CFSP Unit of the EU Council Secretariat on the other, should be created in close coordination between both organizations with a view to the establishment of joint EU/WEU mechanisms.
 - Harmonization of the sequence of WEU and EU presidencies, taking account of the differing memberships and of the need to treat Member States on an equal footing.
 - Continuous liaison between the respective Secretariats.
- 64. These options would underline the need for further consideration of the procedures for financing WEU operations, including the possibilities for the EU to contribute to operations it entrusts to WEU. With regard to the implementation of decisions with defence implications taken within the EU framework of CFSP, a participation of supranational bodies should not be excluded a priori.
- 65. Relations with NATO would be maintained and further strengthened. Flexible arrangements for the use of NATO assets and capabilities and, as soon as developed, the CJTF concept, will facilitate WEU missions entrusted by the EU.
- 66. The reinforcement of institutional links between WEU and the EU implies the parallel reinforcement of WEU's operational capabilities so that WEU in fact becomes the defence arm of the EU. The building of capabilities that are both effective and credible must be compatible with NATO avoiding unnecessary duplication. In this context, the following aspects would need to be examined:
 - Further to improve mechanisms for decision-making and management of WEU operations.
 - To increase human and financial resources of the Secretariat, the Planning Cell and the Satellite Centre.
 - Decisions on the proposals regarding the development of WEU's capability to use satellite imagery, and on the creation of a future European Armaments Agency and a European Security and Defence Academy.
 - A decision to increase lacking resources of the ESDI in fields such as intelligence or strategic mobility.
 - Implementation of the CJTF concept, defined in terms broad enough to increase WEU's ability for carrying out the Petersberg missions and to favour ESDI's

specific contribution to the collective defence, within the Atlantic Alliance, while safeguarding the strength of the transatlantic relationship.

67. The possibility of WEU independently deciding an action, besides acting at the EU's request, in accordance with Art. J.4.2. would be preserved. The main difference between these intermediate options and the one that would maintain the full institutional autonomy of WEU lies, of course, in the establishment of firm juridical and/or political commitments between both organizations. Depending on the form adopted by such commitments, the following three options or modalities could be identified:

B.1 GENERAL EUROPEAN COUNCIL GUIDELINES.

68. Under this modality, the review of the TEU would confer to the Union a bigger political role in defence matters, enabling it to set the framework for military action by WEU, especially in crisis situations. To this end, the European Council would have responsibility for formulating general guidelines also on questions having defence implications. Therefore, such guidelines would be addressed also to WEU, as the organization requested to implement through the appropriate military actions the follow-up decisions adopted by the EU at Ministerial level. This would be a clear demonstration of the political resolution of European governments to meet the new challenges to European security using the entire range of crisis reaction instruments available, including the use of military means.
69. As long as WEU does not assume any treaty obligations in this respect, these general guidelines would not be juridically binding for the Organization. However, a political commitment reflecting the revised TEU provisions could be undertaken by WEU in the framework of the review of its Declaration of 10 December 1991, stressing the readiness of WEU to follow European Council guidelines on defence matters in order to ensure consistent European action in crisis management.

B.2 EU INSTRUCTIONS TO WEU:

70. As a further step towards WEU-EU convergence at the IGC, Article J.4(2) of the TEU could be reformulated to make it clear that WEU is both politically and operationally subordinate to the EU, with the former having the task of implementing decisions taken by the latter. To this end, the word "requests" in the first sentence of that Article could be replaced by "instructs".
71. Similarly, the second sentence of paragraph 3 of the WEU December 1991 Declaration would be amended or supplemented to indicate WEU's willingness to take action when so instructed by the Union and following its general guidelines. Thereby, WEU would make it clearer - although without juridical commitment - that it regards itself as the EU's implementing body.
72. Consistent with this approach, the review of the TEU may wish to envisage the possibility for the EU to take decisions concerning joint actions with defence implications. Their implementation - once formally accepted by WEU - might be left to coalitions of the willing.

B.3 LEGALLY BINDING LINK BETWEEN THE EU AND WEU:

73. A further intermediate option would be the conclusion of a legally binding agreement between the EU and WEU committing the latter organization to the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions with defence implications which may be entrusted to it by the Union. This option would still maintain the EU-WEU separation

and, consequently, the validity of the Modified Brussels Treaty. However, it would alter the juridical form of the EU-WEU institutional framework to the extent that it would establish legally binding commitments between EU and WEU (probably but not necessarily in addition to the TEU amendments referred above) in order to reinforce WEU's role as the implementing body of the EU.

74. The agreement would close a juridical gap between WEU and the EU, as the modified Brussels Treaty does not contemplate the latter's existence. It would define, inter alia, the following aspects:
- Conditions for a EU decision to be binding on WEU and for the termination of this obligation. This is the most important point, as it would establish a certain condition of subordination in WEU's relation with the EU. Under the conditions to be determined in the EU-WEU agreement, WEU would be legally committed to implement decisions and actions of the Union having defence implications.
 - Types of missions (those defined in the Petersberg Declaration) and conditions under which WEU would implement them.
 - Voluntary character of national contributions to those operations, as the Agreement would be legally binding on WEU as an organization, but it could never individually commit Member States to contribute with forces should they not desire to do so.
 - Financial aspects (see para. 64).

It would also be necessary to make arrangements with NATO in order to allow WEU to carry out decisions or actions requested by the Union.

75. Under these models, military expertise would already be required for the EU decision-making process. To this end, appropriate mechanisms for the timely introduction of military expertise at working group, senior official and General Affairs Council level, possibly through liaison arrangements with the corresponding WEU bodies, would have to be developed.

C. INTEGRATION OF WEU INTO THE EU:

76. The "eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence" is inscribed among the objectives of the Treaty on European Union. In this perspective, WEU Member States agreed in their Maastricht Declaration that a European Security and Defence Identity needs to be developed "through a gradual process involving successive phases", that the role of WEU should be strengthened in this context and that WEU "will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union". Maastricht does not set any time-table for this gradual development, nor does it prescribe any specific model as last outcome. At the same time, however, the concepts of a common defence policy and of a common defence within the EU clearly suggest the possibility that some day the Union takes over all the functions presently being carried out by WEU in matters of security and defence. In this context, the Intergovernmental Conference should contemplate the option of integrating WEU into the Union (in some of the ways described below), overcoming thus the institutional situation maintained in Maastricht and setting in its place a single institutional framework for European security and defence. The aim would be to achieve greater coherence than at present of European action in the foreign, security and defence policy fields and to develop a faster and more effective operational/military elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions.

77. In the juridical sphere, the first consequence of this option would be the disappearance of the modified Brussels Treaty. To this end, the signatory States would avail themselves of the denunciation possibility, after 1998, provided for in Article XII of the Treaty. With this Western European Union as an international organization would also disappear.
78. The second juridical consequence of this option would be the establishment, within the European Union, of a juridical framework for defence issues, thus providing the functions and capabilities transferred from WEU with a legal basis. The corresponding provisions -in any of the possible modalities identified below - would be introduced in the course of the review of the Treaty on European Union to be undertaken by the Intergovernmental Conference. The IGC would have to decide on the appropriate decision-making mechanisms for the modality adopted.
79. The institutional conclusion drawn in this option from the continuity and interwovenness that exists between foreign, security and defence policy is to integrate WEU into the EU.

Based on this premise, under this option, the participation of Associate members in the further development of the ESDI would have to be maintained and even improved vis-à-vis their present status, through appropriate arrangements to ensure their involvement and association with the CFSP.

Similarly, the present status of Associate Partners within the ESDI would be reflected in new links they would establish with the EU in order to facilitate their cooperation in defence issues with the Union, along the lines of the cooperation they maintain today in this field with WEU.

Under this option, it would not be necessary to have discussions on the status of the present WEU Observers.

Furthermore, it would not be necessary to devise mechanisms and procedures for coordination and cooperation between WEU and the EU, such as back-to-back meetings, synchronization of dates, harmonization of Presidencies, cross representation at meetings, etc.

80. In the operational sphere, an integration of WEU into the EU would eliminate duplications in decision making which can delay action when different organizations are concerned. Joint actions with defence implications (including crisis management and peacekeeping) would be more feasible and would have the advantages of joint financing, either from the Community budget or through particular arrangements. While troop contributions would remain subject to national decision, participation by all EU Member States in other aspects of the joint action and in its common funding and other forms of support would reinforce the effectiveness of European crisis-management operations. For this integration to provide further added value, the operational capabilities necessary for these kinds of action should be made available, both through arrangements for the use of NATO assets and capabilities, including CJTF, and through the development of complementary EU capabilities.
81. WEU, including its military expertise and its subsidiary bodies, would become part of appropriate EU structures. The WEAG and the groups transferred from the Eurogroup, should they not have been previously merged with WEU/EU, could maintain within the EU the same position they have today in the WEU framework. While administrati-

ve costs would have Community financing, specific formulae would be arranged for operational expenditures.

82. With this option, present WEU relations with NATO would be replaced with a direct relationship between EU and the Alliance that would build on the present WEU-NATO relationship, taking into account the change in the institutional configuration of the European pillar. Furthermore, a Declaration addressing relations with NATO could be envisaged and, in parallel to WEU's Maastricht Declaration, be annexed to the result of the IGC.
83. The new ESDI juridical framework envisaged under this option could adopt several modalities, depending on the EU area in which the collective defence commitment would be placed. Logically, the adoption of one or the other would also depend on the national positions and on the decisions taken by the Intergovernmental Conference regarding other aspects of the European construction. In this context, the following two modalities could be taken into consideration, if this option were to be retained:

C.1 EUROPEAN DEFENCE WITHIN THE CFSP:

84. This modality would imply incorporating the relevant provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty into the main body of the new Treaty on the Union, basically Article V (collective defence commitment) and perhaps also Articles IV (relations with NATO), VI (United Nations) and VII (not to enter alliances directed against another Contracting Party), as well as provisions covering the Petersberg tasks.
85. This could be done in the framework of the review of Article J.4 of the present TEU by defining in the common defence policy that these defence questions will also come under the CFSP, as well as by removing references to WEU (paragraphs J.4.2 and J.4.6). On the other hand, the present paragraph J.4.3, which excludes the application to these questions of the procedures defined for Joint Actions, would be maintained.
86. This defence dimension would be open to all EU Member States. However, a drifting apart of the defence commitments in the EU and NATO, which would weaken the transatlantic security link, must be avoided. Those members who could not or would not desire to participate in a collective defence commitment could be exempted from that particular arrangement. This would amount to an "opting out" from part of the defence dimension, similar to the one already applied by some countries for monetary policy.
87. The organs would be basically those presently existing for CFSP. Nevertheless, when dealing with defence issues, the dual format used in WEU could usefully be applied; for instance, this could be the case for the Council of Ministers, which would include both Foreign and Defence Ministers as well as for the other organs of the CFSP. The Permanent Council and its working groups would be dissolved and their functions taken over by the corresponding structures and working groups of the Second Pillar. The Parliamentary Assembly's functions would be assumed by the European Parliament in accordance with the provisions governing the CFSP. The Commission would be associated to such matters as it is at present to work in the CFSP field (Articles J.8.3 and J.9 of the TEU), thereby making available its expertise in other aspects of external relations as well as in financial and budgetary issues.

C.2 ADOPTION OF A DEFENCE PROTOCOL ANNEXED TO THE TEU:

88. Under this modality, defence would be placed within the EU framework in such a way that no country is compelled to either assume a collective defence commitment or re-

sort expressly to an "opting-out" from this commitment. A dual mechanism would be employed:

- to include into the main body of the revised Treaty on the Union provisions for a common European defence policy, in which all members would participate;
- to incorporate, as an annex to the Treaty, a Protocol for collective defence, open to all EU Member States. However, a drifting apart of the defence commitments in the EU and NATO, which would weaken the transatlantic security link, must be avoided.

89. In this sense, questions of security with military implications (excepting those related to the collective defence) would be dealt with within the CFSP, as in the previous modality. Therefore, the present Article J.4 of the Treaty would have to be modified as described above and would basically contain the following elements:

- A definition of common defence policy. This would include distinction between the crisis management missions defined in Petersberg (in which in principle all EU members would participate on an equal basis) and the collective defence.
- Consequently, the organs would be the same as for the previous modality of this option, but obviously they would not have, in this format, any responsibilities for questions related to the collective defence.
- As in the previous modality, the appropriate operational capabilities and bodies required to elaborate and implement decisions or actions with military implications for Petersberg missions would be incorporated or developed in the EU.
- In order to facilitate the elaboration and implementation of EU operations, it would be equally necessary to provide for the establishment of suitable arrangements for the EU-NATO relations and to allow for the use of Alliance assets and capabilities, including CJTFs, for European-led operations.

90. At the same time, a Protocol annexed to the Treaty on European Union would take over the key provisions on mutual assistance for the collective defence contained in the present modified Brussels Treaty and its annexed Protocols (mainly the already mentioned Articles IV-VII). It would specially include the definition, with a view to collective defence, of the "European pillar" of the Alliance, as well as the relations between the two organizations in this field.

91. Logically, the Protocol should be acceded to by the States which are Parties to the modified Brussels Treaty, i.e., the present WEU full members (as this organization would disappear when the Treaty is denounced after 1998). It would thus not be an "opting-out" arrangement as in the previous modality, but rather an "opting-in" for the countries which may so desire.

92. Under this modality there would be, on the one hand, a direct link between the CFSP and its implementation in the military field, in particular for crisis management operations (in which participation with forces would continue to be on a voluntary basis, as presently in WEU). At the same time, the present security and defence policies of all Union members would be respected (including those that today do not share collective defence commitments), since the mutual defence guarantee would be an optional commitment, of a voluntary nature, apart from the fact that its application would take place in the NATO framework.

CONCLUSIONS

93. The present document evaluates the experience acquired in the implementation of the provisions and practical measures adopted at Maastricht in matters of defence and identifies a number of possible options for the future development of the EU-WEU institutional relationship, towards the agreed objective of the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. This analysis leads to some conclusions on the further steps that could be taken to this end, both in the operational and in the institutional field.

A. OPERATIONAL STRENGTHENING OF THE ESDI:

94. Irrespective of the outcome of the institutional debate on European defence at the IGC, there is a broad consensus on the need to make available the operational capabilities necessary for European military action, particularly in the field of the new tasks defined at Petersberg. The mostly organizational measures agreed to this end at Maastricht have still to be fully implemented and additional efforts are needed to deliver appropriate military assets and capabilities that are both effective and credible. Recent work in WEU, especially regarding the politico-military structures, intelligence capabilities (including the use of satellite imagery) and the concept of Forces Answerable to WEU (both national and multinational), points in the right direction.
95. At the same time, appropriate arrangements for the use of NATO assets and capabilities - including CJTF - are needed. Relations with NATO and the transatlantic link should be reinforced, as a strong Atlantic Alliance is a condition for the operational strengthening of the ESDI.
96. Such operational steps are necessary to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Otherwise, both the establishment of closer EU-WEU links and the ongoing adaptation of the Alliance's structures would not have the desired results. In this sense, the present reflection should also be used as an opportunity for stressing the need to reinforce WEU as an effective military instrument in such a way that it can be used at the request of the EU, in particular to supply the means for the new missions defined in the Petersberg Declaration.
97. To this end, particular attention should be devoted to continuing the process of developing national and multinational FAWEUs and to the development of cooperation in space, armaments, air defence, as well as to other valuable initiatives. At the same time, WEU should continue to develop adequate politico-military structures, capabilities in the field of military intelligence, crisis monitoring, operational planning, etc in order to be able to effectively use the national and multinational means available to it.

B. STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

98. There is consensus among WEU Member States on the following principles and guidelines to assist the IGC on European defence arrangements:
- The aim should be to develop an outward-looking European Union which is able and willing to contribute to building regional and global security, by

means of a greater European contribution on defence matters leading to an improved European defence capability which strengthens the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and therefore the Alliance itself.

- The European security and defence identity should be developed in line with security realities and in conformity with the objectives agreed in the Treaty on European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.
- Whatever form European defence arrangements take in the future, the collective security guarantee currently embodied in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty must be preserved. In operations for the collective defence of their territory, WEU Member States will act within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.
- As Ministers agreed at Petersberg, the task on which WEU should focus should be to allow, in particular through an increasing operational capability, a more effective European military contribution to the new missions defined in their Declaration.
- As agreed in Maastricht, WEU Member States will intensify their coordination on Alliance issues which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultations in the Alliance, on the basis of the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defence identity and the Alliance.
- The Alliance will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty. NATO can be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defence of its members.
- Relations with NATO and the transatlantic link should be reinforced, since greater European responsibility on defence matters and a strong Atlantic Alliance are mutually supportive factors of European security. Therefore the WEU Member States support the ongoing efforts of the EU to develop its future transatlantic agenda by complementing the transatlantic security link with a new programme of political and economic cooperation.
- WEU's operational capabilities (and the mechanisms for making NATO assets and capabilities, including CJTFs, available for WEU operations) should be further developed to allow it to undertake effectively its tasks, as indicated in the previous section on operational conclusions. Existing European multinational forces available to WEU are also available to NATO. The practice of availability of multinational European forces both to WEU and NATO should continue to be followed.
- At present, decision-making on defence matters is intergovernmental and is conducted on the basis of consensus. Whatever the outcome of the IGC, participation in the new tasks defined at Petersberg will remain a matter for national decision. Implementation of such actions could be undertaken by coalitions of the willing.
- European defence arrangements must not constrain freedom to act in fulfilment of national defence commitments.
- The sovereign decisions of WEU observers regarding their defence arrangements will be respected. The IGC should promote European arrangements that enable all WEU and EU countries to contribute to the fulfilment of Petersberg

tasks. European defence arrangements should encourage equitable burden-sharing between nations.

99. Notwithstanding the common elements outlined above, there are two different views among WEU Member States as to the way ahead regarding the future development of European defence arrangements and structures, in particular the future relationship between WEU and the EU.

- I. One view favours the preservation of WEU as an autonomous organization. This view is reflected in "Option A" (reinforced partnership between an autonomous WEU and the EU). This option is based on the belief that the principle of national sovereignty must continue to govern relations between European countries on defence matters, and that the intergovernmental nature of decision-making on defence matters must be preserved and this decision-making will be conducted on the basis of consensus. This option gives priority to further increasing WEU's capability to carry out the tasks set out in the Petersberg Declaration rather than to further changes to the legal and institutional framework. At the same time, the EU and WEU would exploit the scope within the existing treaty provisions to build a closer relationship at all levels, including at the highest political level, by the creation of a WEU Summit, which could meet as necessary back-to-back with the European Council. According to this view, the maintenance of the present relationship between WEU and EU provides the right framework within which to develop WEU's operational capabilities, including a faster and more effective operational-military elaboration of decisions and actions than at present, and to encourage the contributions of a wide range of European countries. The IGC could encourage the further development of EU/WEU working relations as well as WEU's efforts to develop its operational capabilities in order to improve its effectiveness as an instrument for European crisis management, with the purpose of achieving greater coherence than at present of European action in the security and defence field. At the same time it could encourage the forging of closer operational links with NATO in order to allow European countries to act together using capabilities and assets available within the Atlantic Alliance.

This option would leave open the future development of European defence arrangements. It could be implemented under arrangements maintaining WEU as an autonomous organization but is also compatible with a longer term perspective of a more integrated approach.

- II. The majority view equally shares the desire to make maximum use of the existing Treaty provisions for operational reinforcement of the ESDI and strengthening of cooperation between EU, WEU and NATO but, in addition to this, advocates the gradual integration of WEU into the EU, with the purpose of achieving greater coherence than at present of European action in the security and defence field.

In this context, two different approaches have been suggested when defining the steps to achieve this goal:

- either an IGC agreement on measures to promote EU-WEU convergence, with full integration as the final goal ("Option B")
- or an IGC agreement on the objective and timetable for integrating WEU into the EU in the short/medium-term ("Option C").

The different modalities identified under this view could be seen as complementary measures and could be considered either separately or as successive phases of a sequential approach.

- "Option B" (intermediate options towards a EU-WEU institutional convergence), while maintaining the possibility of WEU deciding autonomously its own actions, would introduce some changes with respect to that present institutional autonomy. As regards the decision-making procedures, many countries strongly feel that the principle of national sovereignty should continue to govern relations between European countries on defence matters and that the intergovernmental nature of decision-making on these issues should be preserved and be conducted on the basis of consensus, while not questioning that a final decision will have to be taken in the IGC framework, where all possible options, including majority-voting, are to be considered. The declared purpose of this Option would be to facilitate a faster and more effective operational-military elaboration and implementation of EU decisions and actions than at present, stress the role of WEU as implementing body of the EU and give a clear aim to the development of the EU/WEU link.

Under this Option, the IGC could lead to one or more of the following measures:

- (B.1) Provisions enabling the European Council to issue general guidelines on WEU actions.
- (B.2) Provisions enabling the EU to give instructions to WEU.
- (B.3) Establishment of a legally binding link between the EU and WEU, through an agreement which would commit the latter to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union.
- "Option C" would mean the integration of WEU into the EU, thereby removing the institutional diversity still remaining under the previous options. According to this view, this would be the right consequence of the provision in the TEU on the development of a CFSP including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. This view also considers that WEU-EU integration would increase the coherence and effectiveness of European decision-making in the field of foreign, security and defence policy compared to the present situation. Furthermore, under this option, the development of operational capabilities would also be pursued vigorously. At the same time, close working links between NATO and the EU would be forged and other European allies would be associated with the CFSP. When examining the decision-making procedures for the CFSP, (including by allowing for majority voting), the question of an exception for defence issues will have to be addressed by the IGC. This option could be implemented in one of the following ways:
 - (C.2) Incorporation of the crisis management aspects of defence into the CFSP (thereby providing for a direct link between the CFSP and its implementation in the military field), together with the adoption of a Defence Protocol annexed to the TEU incorporating the collective defence commitment, to which Member States would opt in on conditions to be agreed.

- (C.1) Incorporation of all aspects of defence into the CFSP and the main body of the TEU, allowing countries unable to enter into the collective defence commitment to opt out of this commitment.

100. Whatever the options envisaged, and without prejudging the IGC, all WEU Member States reaffirm their agreement to proceed without delay with the strengthening of the relationship, both operational and institutional, between the European Union and WEU. The aim is to achieve greater coherence than at present of European action in the security and defence field, including through an effective and expeditious implementation of EU decisions with defence implications. The principle of reinforced partnership (Option A) is designed to further this closer relationship. Most Member States would prefer to go beyond than this option at the IGC, either by promoting increased EU/WEU convergence (Option B) or by writing into an amended Treaty the objective and timetable for EU/WEU full integration (Option C).

101. On the occasion of the Intergovernmental Conference, there needs to be fresh impetus for the development of the European security and defence identity and in this context, all WEU Member States reaffirm their will to develop "a greater European responsibility on defence matters". The objective is to provide a more effective and coherent response to the security risks and challenges which the European countries are facing today.

In this connection, as evidenced by the different options discussed above, all the Member States state their agreement as to the need to strengthen WEU's operational capabilities in order to contribute effectively to the development of the European security and defence identity.

Regarding the institutional aspects, all WEU Member States conclude by reaffirming their agreement to the advisability of strengthening the links between the European Union and WEU.

The aim is to enable WEU to contribute to the gradual construction of the European security and defence identity referred to in the WEU Maastricht Declaration in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and the world.