Politics and Proliferation:
Analysis and Summary of the Cox
Committee Report and the Allegations of
Chinese Nuclear Espionage
By Anjali Bhattacharjee
BASIC Research Associate
June 1999
Table of Contents:
I. Introduction
II. The Investigation and the Events leading up to it
III. Discuss fundamental findings:
IV. Comments, Criticisms, and Consequences
V. Recommendations
VI. Endnotes
1. Introduction
On 25th May 1999 the U.S.
House of Representatives' Select Committee on US National Security
and Military/Commercial Concerns with the Peoples Republic of China
released its long awaited report that exploded onto the political
scene, creating furor among the general public and media pundits alike.
The Select Committee's report (commonly referred to as the Cox Report)
concluded that, inter alia, China had deliberately used an
elaborate system of espionage and technology exchanges to modernize
its existing nuclear weapons capabilities. It accused the PRC of stealing
sensitive data on seven specific U.S. thermonuclear warheads and classified
information for an enhanced radiation weapon. The following report
summarizes events that lead up to the formation of the select committee,
its findings, and how these conclusions have affected policies and
safety measures at U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories.
II. The Investigation and the Events leading up to it
The Select Committee, consisting of nine
members--four democrats and five republicans, was led by Representative
Christopher Cox (R-Ca), was never really formed for the sole purpose
of exposing nuclear leaks from the national weapons laboratories.
In fact, its original task was to unearth probable offenses against
the Clinton Administration for easing export controls in its commercial
relations with China.1 However, while questioning Donald H. Rumsfeld,
a former Defense Secretary, the committee stumbled upon the topic
of the modernization of Chinese nuclear weapons program. Although
Mr. Rumsfeld did not answer the committee due to the high level of
classification surrounding the subject, the committee approached the
CIA looking for answers.2 In doing so, the committee apparently discovered
evidence implicating the Chinese in a comprehensive system of espionage
and found an appalling lack of security at U.S. weapons labs.
III. Fundamental findings of the Select Committee
Weapons leakage
(including warhead information, legacy codes, and neutron bomb)
According to an internal Department of
Energy review, security was especially found to be particularly below
par at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory.3 Among the official findings, the Cox committee
resolved that:4
- The People's Republic of China (PRC)
has stolen design information on the United States' most advanced
thermonuclear weapons.
- The PRC has stolen or otherwise illegally
obtained US missile and space technology that improves the PRC's
military and intelligence capabilities.
- United States and international and
domestic policies and practices have facilitated the PRC's efforts
to obtain militarily useful technology.
- The PRC seeks advanced U.S. military
technology to achieve its long-term goals.
Despite all the reports it is still not
clear how much information was accrued by the Chinese government and
what are the long-term consequences for the United States from a security
stand point. The Cox Committee believes that the 'thefts' are not
a recent occurrence and date as far back as the late 1970's when the
PRC acquired information on the W-70 warhead.5 It was not until 1995 that officials realized the
extent of the damage. According to the Cox Committee's report, a Chinese
individual approached the CIA and handed agents classified documents
from the PRC that outlined illegally acquired design information on
at least seven U.S. nuclear warheads including:
- W-88 Trident D-5 SLBM
- W-87 Peacekeeper ICBM
- W-78 Minuteman III ICBM
- W-76 Trident C-4 SLBM
- W-70 Lance SRBM
- W-62 Minuteman III ICBM
- W-56 Minuteman II ICBM
Apparently using certain elements derived
from the W-70 warhead one can create an enhanced radiation weapon
(known commonly as the neutron bomb). Such a weapon was tested by
the Chinese in the 1980's. Although that particular test proved unsuccessful,
the PRC national implied that his/her government had sent agents back
to the United States in order to steal further information that would
help resolve the problem. This time they were successful.6 The Cox Committee also stated that the stolen technology
is used in guidance systems of fighter jets such as the F-14, F-15,
and F-117. The guidance technology is particularly useful to the short
range CSS-6 missile that the Chinese test fired over the strait of
Taiwan in 1996.7 Interestingly, it must be noted that it was later
discovered in 1996 that this particular individual was still working
under the auspices of a Chinese intelligence agency. The message being
delivered (if in fact there was one) is yet to be deciphered.8
Eventually the investigators working
for the FBI and the DOE honed in on one particular individual who
appeared to be the chief suspect in both the W-88 and the other thefts.
The man was Wen Ho Lee, a Taiwanese born U.S. citizen who had worked
for the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) since 1978.9 Officials found out that Mr. Lee, who held a distinguished
position at LANL, had traveled to China on two separate occasions
for scientific conferences and had also attended a highly classified
meeting that reviewed and talked about the design flaws in the original
neutron bomb. At this point, the authorities are highly criticized
for not having taken immediate actions. Although officials were notified
about Mr. Lee in 1996 he was not fired until March 8, 1999. In fact,
not only did he maintain his top-security clearance but he was also
assigned to a new position at LANL that involved updating legacy codes
for five nuclear warheads.10
The 'legacy' (also referred to as the
Langrarian codes) codes are basically the blueprints of the warheads
in the existing defense arsenal. They are made up of data that is
used to design the weapons and appraise test results and safety features.
Another feature of the codes is their use in the creation of a nuclear
weapons design via the process of computer simulation. However, when
allied with particular information regarding performance data of nuclear
tests, the legacy codes can help assemble the design of a U.S. warhead.11 "These codes embody a lot of knowledge gleaned
from testing," said Matthew McKinzie of the National Resources
Defense Council, "The US has conducted over 1000 tests; the Chinese
have only conducted 45. There's knowledge there. The US weapons program
is much larger in scale."12
It has been determined by experts that
due to a lack of extensive testing and a declared moratorium on future
testing of nuclear weapons China would be especially interested in
gaining information about the upkeep of nuclear weapons, commonly
known as 'stockpile stewardship.' Upon the course of their investigation,
the FBI determined that around 1994-95 Wen Ho Lee had (using his high
security clearances) downloaded the legacy codes along with data for
certain warheads from the restricted computer system at the national
laboratory. The information was then concealed under different file
names on an open and easily accessed network.13 It could be possible to simply attach these files
to e-mails and transmit them among the thousands that are sent daily
from LANL. Officials have either yet to determine if this was the
case or the conclusion was not published in the Cox Committee report
due to national security concerns.
Controversy over HPC and Hughes-Loral dilemma
According to the Select Committee's final
report, this particular incident at the Los Alamos National Laboratory
in New Mexico was not the only time U.S. security was jeopardized
resulting in an information leak that helped the PRC modernize its
nuclear program. The fact that PRC is a known proliferator of weapons
and weapon systems to states such as Iran, Pakistan, North Korea,
Syria and Libya is of particular concern as well.14 The report also denounces China for having illegally
acquired information regarding satellite technology from U.S. based
firms and believes it uses U.S. exported High Performance Computers
(HPC's) to process operations involving nuclear weapons.15
Upon the failure of several satellites'
launches in the early and mid 1990's, satellite manufacturers Hughes
Space and Communications International Inc. and Loral Space &
Communications Ltd. knowingly ceded information to the PRC without
procuring licenses required under the law.16 Over the years, since its missile program began,
the PRC has benefited greatly from several foreign countries that
have provided technology as well as certain information. However,
when the Long March rockets experienced launch failures, their manufacturers
Hughes and Loral organized reviews and provided recommendations (on
data pertaining to missile design, testing procedures, design analysis,
etc.) without obtaining export licenses from the State Department.17 The Cox Committee further published in its report
that these Long March rockets serve both commercial as well as military
uses. It's military uses are listed as:
IV. Comments, Criticisms, and Consequences
Although the incident involves a serious breach of national security,
experts warn against unnecessary panic. It still remains equivocal
just how much the Chinese know and to what extent that information
compromises the U.S. defenses. Monte Bullard, a former military attaché
to the US embassy in Beijing was quoted in the Philadelphia Inquirer
as saying, "I assume they've been able to close the gap (with
the U.S.) a little bit but we haven't exactly been standing still."18
The country still remains way behind the United States in its nuclear
weapons capability. A report released by the CIA stated that "to
date aggressive Chinese collection effort has not resulted in any
apparent modernization of their deployed strategic force or any new
nuclear weapons deployment."19 The fact that Sino-American relations have
improved considerably over the past twenty years and the likelihood
of a nuclear war is extremely remote. Moreover, the Chinese nuclear
arsenal consists of merely 400 weapons compared to nearly 12,000 nuclear
weapons located in the U.S. stockpile.20
However, not everyone is so relaxed.
The security, or rather lack of security, at the national laboratories
is ridiculed and calls to strengthen it are being echoed widely. Those
supporting the current administration, while calling for reforms,
have steadfastly stated that the espionage started way before President
Clinton took office. However, critics state that strong enough measures
were not placed until it was too late; some have even gone as far
as to call for the resignation of Bill Richardson, Secretary of the
Energy Department and Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General.
The Cox Report itself has not come out
of the whole process untarnished. Many doubt its credibility and warn
against drawing hasty conclusions that would damage Sino-American
alliances. Experts believe it is quite unwise to focus exclusively
on China and, in doing so, isolate the state with which it has taken
so long to develop amicable relations. Tensions that developed in
the aftermath of the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade have further complicated relations. Former CIA director Stansfield
Turner said, "I think it's becoming too much of a political football
with very important relationships at stake
Unfortunately people
can gain political advantage in our political process by doing so."21 An ABC news report listed several errors that occur in the
report. Background information on Mr. Qian Xuesen (cited in the report
for having stolen classified information before fleeing to China)
and the work he did proved inconsistent in reference to the Titan
missile program. Certain figures about payload information and dates
of Chinese satellite launches have also been shown listed incorrectly
on the Cox Report. Although no significant damage or error was deduced,
it was mentioned whether such mistakes affected some of the Committee's
conclusions.22
The Chinese official reaction was one
of outrage as well, but this one was being directed towards the Cox
committee and its findings. It stated that references made to the
PRC's elaborate intelligence gathering network. It found the notion
that all Chinese that came to the United States are under orders to
gather data to be absolutely unfounded and "absurd."23 Mr. Yu Shuning, Minister Counselor (Press) also
remarked in his official statement that China was a "peace-loving"
country sought to develop its nuclear program in adherence to existing
nonproliferation regimes in order to enhance the livelihood of its
populace. It by no means poses a threat to another state.24
"This is a great slander against
the Chinese nation and is typical racial prejudice," said Zhao
Qizheng, the State Council spokesman.25 On May 31 1999, professional Web surfer Fan Nan downloaded
technical nuclear weapons information from the Internet. This demonstration
was an effort to prove that the Chinese government did not really
need to resort to espionage in order to gain sophisticated information
about American warheads.26 Mr. Fang's main source of information was the web
page of the Federation of American Scientists, an American organization
that deals with issues such as nuclear proliferation. However, Charles
Ferguson, a senior research analyst for FAS claimed that there is
plenty of difference between what is published on their Website and
what the U.S. government classifies as top secret.27
The Cox Committee, meanwhile, concluded
its report by making thirty-eight recommendations that, it believes,
need to be enforced in order to ensure security for American nuclear
weapons program. On June 9th 1999, the House unanimously
voted 428-0 for the adoption of a measure that would implement these
thirty-eight recommendations.
In February 1998, President Bill Clinton
issued Presidential Decision Directive 61 (PDD-61) which addressed
the problem that has been existing at the national nuclear weapons
labs. Under the auspices of the Department of Energy, the PDD-1 calls
for:28
- hiring counterintelligence professionals
to be based at weapons labs
- doubling the budget for counterintelligence
- changing the screening and the approval
process for foreign visits
- instituting more extensive security
reviews (including the use of polygraphs) for DOE scientists working
in sensitive programs.
On May 25th 1999 the administration
responded to the Cox Committee findings through a Press Release. Among
other things, the statement agreed for the need for heightened security
and assured that steps were being taken to prevent such incidents
from reoccurring. The White House requested a bipartisan Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board lead by Senator Warren Rudman to appraise security
at U.S. national weapons laboratories. However, the White House disagreed
with the Select Committee's recommendation to revive COCOM; instead
it believes proper measures to strengthen the Waasenaar Agreement
should be undertaken.
V. Recommendations
Although the allegations of espionage
and investigations into such allegations started many years ago, public
information is still very limited. Many parts of the Cox Committee
Report were censored due to national security concerns and it appears
that there is a lot more to be learnt.
The real danger revealed by the Cox report,
although ignored by its author, is that of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The United
States and other nuclear weapon states have a special responsibility
to safeguard the information concerning these matters under their
control, and to prevent proliferation of such information. The US
has conspicuously failed to do so over a long period of time. China
is a known proliferator of nuclear weapons technology, and of missile
technologies. The US has unwittingly contributed to China's technological
base, and to the technology it is able to sell on to others. The world
is, in some unknown measure, a less safe place because of American
carelessness.
However, while the US and other nuclear
weapon states continue to refuse to live up to their obligation to
dismantle their nuclear arsenals under the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and while they place a high political and strategic value on
nuclear weapons, attempts at espionage and proliferation will continue.
Other states will continue to seek these technologies. Inevitably,
some information will leak out.
In the short term, the only solution
is the strengthening of non-proliferation regimes under the NPT, IAEA
safeguards, the Wassenaar Arrangement and others. In the long term,
the only possible solution is for nuclear weapons states to take their
obligations to Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
seriously and to conclude complete nuclear disarmament.
Unfortunately, there has been little
attempt by critics of the current administration to seriously react
to the Cox report. Many have taken this particular incident and purposely
turned it into a political opportunity to gain the upper hand while
the issue remains at large. Without thorough examination of the allegations
and the review itself, political opportunists are blindly calling
for resignations and demanding immediate responses to actions that
are still undermined. Yet another fact worth remarking upon is the
fact that even if the United States is facing the worst case scenario,
i.e. actual nuclear warhead design information in Chinese hands, as
it is already noted it outnumbers the PRC's nuclear arsenal by a vast
aggregate. The US strategic arsenal contains some 6000 warheads, the
Chinese one somewhere around 20. Those who have sought to use the
report to justify spending trillions of dollars on deploying the National
Missile Defense (based on unproven, indeed possibly unprovable technologies)
are simply looking for domestic political advantage in the run-up
to a Presidential election year.
At the same time these allegations of
nuclear espionage have in one way or another seriously hindered the--already
strained--U.S. relations with China and it would take some serious
diplomatic undertakings from both sides to undo the damage. From a
domestic standpoint, efforts need to be taken that such incidents
don't prove any anti-Chinese sentiments. Such xenophobic tendencies
may well escalate into questioning allegiances of patriotic U.S. citizens
who happen to have an ethnic Chinese background. In a speech before
the Asian Pacific American group, Secretary Bill Richardson addressed
this problem while saying, "Chinese scientists have made important
contributions to U.S. programs
and those who have questioned
the patriotism of Asian Pacific Americans are also sowing seeds of
a darker xenophobia."29 He continued by stating that the U.S. government
by no means plans to single out ethnic Chinese during the course of
their investigations. "The individual in question was an American
citizen and an employee of the Lab."30 Eventually, a lot depends upon the foreign policy
the United States chooses to adopt toward the People's Republic of
China. Based on its decision the U.S. could either engage this Eastern
super power into a serious alliance based on commerce and technology
or it could choose to cool relations and force the PRC withdraw into
slow and reincarnate the vestiges of the Cold War.
Acknowledgements: Thanks to Martin
Butcher for his comments on drafts of this paper and all his help.
Endnotes
1 Jeff Gerth
and Tim Weiner, "Tracking The Suspicions Of China's Nuclear Spying,"
New York Times, 23 May 1999, pg.1.
.2 Ibid.
3 James Risen,
"Computer Work Is Halted At Nuclear Weapons Labs," New
York Times, 7 April 1999, pg.1.
4 Official
Report of the United States House of Representatives Select Committee
on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the
People's Republic of China. Released 25 May 1999. Available on the
Internet at http://hillsource.house.gov/CoxReport/
5 Ibid.
6 Jeff Gerth
and James Risen, "Intelligence Report Points To Second China
Nuclear Leak," New York Times, 8 April 1999, pg. 1.
7 Juliet Eilperin
and Vernon Loeb, "Panel Says Chinese Arms Used U.S. Data,"
Washington Post, 25 May 1999 pg.1
8 Tim Weiner,
"Nuclear Thriller With Ending As Yet Unwritten," New
York Times, 25 May 1999.
9 James Risen
and Jeff Gerth, "U.S. Says Suspect Put Data On Bombs In Unsecure
Files," New York Times, 28 April 1999, pg.1.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Linda
Feldman, "What Cost Theft OF US Secrets?" Christian Science
Monitor, 3 May 1999, pg.1.
13 James
Risen and Jeff Gerth, "U.S. Says Suspect Put Data On Bombs In
Unsecure Files," New York Times, 28 April 1999, pg.1
14 Official
Report of the United States House of Representatives Select Committee
on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the
People's Republic of China. Released 25 May 1999. Available on the
Internet at http://hillsource.house.gov/CoxReport/
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Steve
Goldstein, "Experts Say China's Gain Are Political, Not Military,"
Philadelphia Inquirer, 26 May 1999, pg.1.
19 CIA Press
Release, "Key Findings: The Intelligence Community Damage Assessment
on the Implications of China's Acquisition of US Nuclear Weapons Information
on the Development of Future Chinese Weapons," Available on the
Internet at http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/0421kf.html
20 "Report:
Taking Stock, Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998," Natural Resources
Defense Council, Available on the Internet at http://www.nrdc.org/nrdc/nrdcpro/tkstock/tssum.html
21 James
N. Thurman, "Spying On America: It's a Growth Industry,"
Christian Science Monitor, 23 March 1999, pg. 1.
22 James
Oberg, "Errors Mark the Cox Report," ABCNEWS.com, 3 June
1999, available on the internet at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/science/DailyNews/oberg990602.html
23 Yu Shuning,
Minister-Counselor (Press), The Embassy of the People's Republic of
China, Washington, "The Chinese Embassy Responds," Washington
Post, 30 May 1999, pg.B6.
24 Ibid.
25 Matt Forney,
"China Blasts Cox Report As 'Prejudice,' Suggests Data Are Available
On Internet," Wall Street Journal, 1 June 1999.
26 Michael
Laris, "Chinese Surfer Downloads U.S. Nuclear Data," Washington
Post, 1 June 1999, pg.10.
27 Ibid.
28 Presidential
Decision Directives and Executive Orders, PDD/NSC 61 Energy Department
Counterintelligence, February 1998, available on the Internet at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdos/pdd-tscm.htm
29 "Secretary
addresses espionage allegations, ethnic concerns," DOE This
Month, May 1999.
30 Ibid
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