Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 39   March 18, 1996

A Wasteful and Dangerous Illusion


Rich Kelly is an independent defence analyist based in Washington, D.C.

Executive Summary

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in late 1991,
Soviet nuclear weapons were in the hands of four sud-
denly independent republics--Russia, Ukraine, Kazakh-
stan, and Belarus--whose leadership appeared confused
and wobbly. In response to that threatening turn of
events, Sens. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar
(R-Ind.) persuaded Congress to pass the Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) program to provide assistance
for dismantling or safely storing the weapons in the
Soviet nuclear arsenal.

That program, which began in response to a press-
ing national security challenge, has evolved into a
Pentagon bureaucracy. The urgent need for aid has
waned, and its central purpose--to destroy nuclear
weapons--remains unfulfilled. To date, the CTR program
has done relatively little. The few projects it has
funded--ranging from defense conversion to providing
housing for former Soviet military officers--do little,
if anything, to advance Washington's key objective of
curbing nuclear proliferation.

In fact, the evidence suggests that CTR may in the
long run threaten, rather than enhance, American secu-
rity. CTR funds have eased the Russian military's
budgetary woes, freeing resources for such initiatives
as the war in Chechnya and defense modernization.
Congress should eliminate CTR funding so that it does
not finance additional, perhaps more threatening,
programs in the former Soviet Union.


After the breakup of the Soviet Union in late 1991,
four suddenly independent republics (Russia, Ukraine, Ka-
zakhstan, and Belarus) inherited thousands of Soviet nuclear
weapons. The abrupt decentralization of control over the
Soviet nuclear arsenal, together with well-founded concerns
about the leadership and stability of the newly independent
states, greatly alarmed Washington. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
said of the situation, "I know of no more urgent national
security challenge confronting our nation, nor do I know of
any greater opportunity . . . to reduce the dangers con-
fronting us."[1] Led by Nunn and Sen. Richard Lugar
(R-Ind.), Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduc-
tion Act of 1991.[2] The Senate voted 86 to 8 in favor of
the legislation--which came to be known as the Nunn-Lugar
Act--because even the most stalwart opponents of U.S. for-
eign aid saw the value of the emergency effort to help the
former Soviet republics secure and destroy their excess
weapons of mass destruction.

The act, which was funded by a congressionally author-
ized transfer of $400 million from Department of Defense
(DOD) operations and maintenance accounts to Nunn-Lugar
projects in fiscal year 1992, focused on weapon destruction
and security, specifically,

ˇ destroying nuclear, chemical, and other weapons;

ˇ transporting, storing, disabling, and safeguarding
weapons to be destroyed; and

ˇ establishing verifiable proliferation safeguards.

In January 1992 Harvard University's Ashton Carter, a
prominent academic involved in the creation of the Nunn-
Lugar program, detailed its requirements. [3] He wrote that,
in response to the congressional authorization to spend $400
million, the administration should develop a plan for as-
sisting in moving, storing, and destroying the former Soviet
Union's nuclear weapons. The plan--to be "worked out with"
authorities from the new republics, experts from the inter-
national community, and the former Soviet nuclear weapons
complex--would proceed in five stages: (1) inventorying,
tagging, and securing weapons; (2) relocating weapons to
perhaps 25 storage sites; (3) dismantling the weapons; (4)
placing materials in long-term storage; and (5) cleaning up
nuclear facilities.

With the advent of the Clinton administration in Janu-
ary 1993, Carter became assistant secretary of defense for
nuclear security and counter proliferation, one of two
assistant defense secretaries with responsibility for the
CTR program.[4] The Defense Nuclear Agency was in charge of
selecting and paying the U.S. contractors that would perform
the work and consume the funding.[5]

A mismatch has developed between the CTR programs
lofty aims--reducing the former Soviet Union's nuclear
threat to the United States--and what it has done--to date,
very little. The lack of accomplishment may be a blessing,
however, because the CTR program has not had the opportunity
to waste much money or implement projects that could produce
dangerous results. The path to understanding what has gone
wrong leads in two directions: to the former Soviet Union
and to the Pentagon.

CTR Aid Has Failed Fundamental Tests

When one government proposes to aid another government,
the donor should consider fundamental questions, including
whether aid is needed and whether it is likely to produce
the desired behavior. The answers to those questions show
how the CTR program lost its way in the former Soviet Union.

Is Aid Needed?

In 1991 the leadership of the republics that inherited
the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons appeared confused and
wobbly. Washington, alarmed at the prospect of instability,
concluded that the republics needed emergency aid. The need
for aid dissipated as the urgency waned, however.

The urgency waned for three reasons. First, tactical
weapons were quickly removed to Russia from Ukraine, Kazakh-
stan, and Belarus. A top CTR official in the Bush adminis-
tration told Congress,

It has been generally agreed here and abroad that
the major danger from nuclear weapons in the dis-
solution of the former Soviet Union comes from the
wide dispersion of the smaller, easily transport-
able tactical warheads. . . . Authorities in the
newly independent states are doing what we and
others urged them last fall [1991] to do and have
developed a plan and schedule to [disable, with-
draw, and consolidate tactical weapons] for dis-
mantling. [6]

In addition, the republics quickly established command and
control arrangements for nuclear weapons. As early as
February 1992, Assistant Secretary of Defense Stephen Hadley
confirmed that "we are quite satisfied that an appropriate
command and control arrangement has been achieved." [7]

Finally, the successor republics acknowledged their
obligations to reduce the Soviet arsenal, as mandated by the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and agreed to schedules for returning all nuclear
weapons to Russia. [8] Even before the CTR program got under
way, the Bush administration told Congress that the three
non-Russian republics "repeatedly have proclaimed their
intention to rid their territories of nuclear weapons." [9]
Carter himself had written in January 1992 that the three
republics had "expressed the desire to be nuclear-weapon
free" and had agreed in 1991 to schedules for removing all
tactical weapons by mid-1992 and most strategic weapons by
the end of 1994. [10] U.S. experts conceded that Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus had the resources to destroy weapons
without U.S. help but argued that CTR aid would increase
speed and safety.[1l]

The United States was also concerned about personnel
from the former Soviet weapons complex migrating to un-
friendly countries. In an effort to reduce such migration,
CTR programs have provided housing for former Soviet mili-
tary officers and jobs for scientists.[12] It is unclear,
however, that such aid will do much to further the long-term
objective of containing nuclear proliferation. Patriotic
former Soviet weapons specialists will not work for the
likes of Saddam Hussein in any event, but mercenary special-
ists may work for Saddam or some other dictator whether or
not they are given a free house or a laboratory sinecure in

Will the Proposed Aid Encourage Good Behavior?

The core purpose of the Nunn-Lugar legislation was to
help the former Soviet Union destroy its nuclear warheads.
Destruction made good sense: a warhead that no longer exists
cannot be sold on a black market or stolen by terrorists.
Nuclear warheads (containing plutonium or weapons-grade
uranium) are essential to strategic weapons and nuclear
proliferation; missiles without nuclear warheads, on the
other hand, pose a minimal threat to the United States.[13]

Originally, Carter envisioned using U.S. aid to account
for all former Soviet warheads before they were destroyed or
stored. Step one of Carter's plan called for "immediately
inventorying and tagging all the nuclear weapons covered by
the program and placing them under secure (and in some cases
possibly international) safeguards."[l4] But Moscow did not
allow the United States to earmark CTR aid for tagging,
inventorying, and destroying weapons. In fact, the Russians
refused even to give the United States access to their
nuclear weapons, so U.S. inventorying and tagging were

Instead, Russia claimed that it could meet its time-
table for warhead destruction only if the United States
built a modern storage facility in Russia. U.S. officials
were skeptical. Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholo-
mew testified that "our experts . . . have some real ques-
tions about the solution the Russians are proposing, which
is a new and very expensive facility."[15] Nonetheless, CTR
funds are today slated to pay for a storage facility of
dubious merit.

The fundamental issue is that Russia wants to remain a
great power. A Harvard University panel concluded that the
Russian "'nuclear complex' is one of Russia's last legiti-
mate claims to a great power status and [officials] are
understandably reluctant to admit a humiliating inferiority
to the west." [l6] Russia has been unwilling to accept aid
that would diminish its great-power status by reducing its
nuclear weapons arsenal. Instead of abandoning the program
once it became clear that CTR funds would do little to
destroy former Soviet nuclear weapons, however, U.S. negoti-
ators concluded agreements that were peripheral or even
irrelevant to the original aims of Nunn-Lugar.

The marginal programs that have resulted from such
agreements have failed to reduce the risks associated with
the former Soviet arsenal. The Harvard panel of experts
concluded that, because of inadequate controls over the
former Soviet nuclear weapons establishment, the threat of a
nuclear catastrophe is now greater than at any time since
the height of the Cold War and is the gravest national
security threat facing the United States today. [17] The
experts, led by former assistant secretary of defense Graham
Allison, issued that gloomy assessment in a report put out
by Harvard University's Center for Science and International
ffairs and cited inadequate U.S. assistance as one of the
primary causes.

It is difficult to see how either increased CTR funding
or some other form of U.S. aid would rectify the specific
problems they cite. They warn of "huge uninventoried quan-
tities of weapons-usable material . . . stored and trans-
ported under conditions of extreme insecurity," for exam-
ple.[18] But as long as Moscow will not allow U.S. assis-
tance to be used for inventorying nuclear weapons, no amount
of aid from Washington will have an impact on that problem.
Another problem the report cites is the potential for brib-
ery of nuclear workers and security guards. Again, it is
difficult to see how U.S. aid would deter unscrupulous
employees--or, for that matter, high-level officials--from
making deals with radical states or terrorist groups.

The report may well be correct in its assessment of the
magnitude of the threat posed by the insecurity of the
former Soviet nuclear establishment. In light of the histo-
ry of CTR efforts, though, the report's prescription is
precisely backwards. Instead of continuing to throw money
at the problem in a vain attempt to solve it, Washington
should recognize the need for an alternative approach.
Additional financial assistance will not solve the problem
and may, in the long run, have an adverse impact on American

The Problem of Perverse Incentives

U.S. officials have stated that "every [former Soviet]
missile and every warhead deactivated . . . since December
1991 can be attributed to the CTR program."[l9] But any
claim that CTR has encouraged good behavior in the former
Soviet Union is an overstatement, if not an irony. In fact,
the program has created a series of perverse incentives that
may have hindered, rather than advanced, the stabilization
of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. DOD offi-
cials hypothesized that U.S. aid would lead the newly inde-
pendent republics to take certain actions, but in practice,
DOD's hypothesis has worked in reverse--that is, the evi-
dence suggests that the republics took certain actions
specifically aimed at securing U.S. assistance.

In March 1994, for instance, Assistant Secretary Carter
boasted to Congress of CTR's success in convincing the three
republics to become nuclear free:

As a result of our diplomacy, in which the CTR
program has provided critical leverage and rein-
forcement, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have
agreed to denuclearize completely, removing all
nuclear weapons from their territories in a short
period of time. [20]

What Carter omitted saying was that the republics had
pledged in 1991, before the CTR program existed, to become
nuclear free but that they became stubborn in CTR negotia-
tions in 1992. Their obduracy brought them a payoff from
U.S. negotiators. Ukraine's parliament, for example, bla-
tantly demanded and received U.S. aid as a precondition for
ratification of START I. [21] (Belarus may be playing the
same game with Russia. Belarus has refused to return SS-25
strategic missiles to Russia, which Belarus had agreed to do
under START I, unless Russia cancels $400 million of Bela-
rus's natural gas debts.) [22]

Carter's claim that CTR aid prompted the republics'
decision to relinquish nuclear weapons notwithstanding, the
fact is that the republics demanded and received payment for
political decisions that had already been made. That prece-
dent is unsettling. In the future, other signatories to
treaties that are important to the United States may also
attempt to gain access to the U.S. treasury by claiming that
they cannot fulfill their treaty obligations unless the
United States agrees to provide aid.

The CTR Program Has Lost Its Way in the Pentagon

In addition to the problems CTR encountered in the
former Soviet Union, the program got off track in the Penta-
gon. Nunn stated that the original legislation put the DOD
in charge of CTR activities because the Pentagon was accus-
tomed to taking action--in contrast to the State Department,
which was accustomed to lengthy negotiation--and had exper-
tise with weapons of mass destruction. [23] Despite that
expertise and DOD's usually activist style, the CTR program
went adrift. [24]

The FY95 defense authorization act ordered DOD to
submit a long-range assessment of CTR requirements and a
multiyear budget for meeting those requirements. DOD in
turn promised Congress it would create a CTR program office
to develop project selection and long-range planning proc-
esses. [25] Congress took such action because, even though
the White House had spent three years negotiating with the
former Soviet republics and was authorized to spend $1.2
billion, the CTR program had nether a written plan nor a
multiyear budget.

That omission was especially odd because the program's
architects had said that a program plan was the first order
of business. Carter had said that the program should begin
operation by writing a five-step plan, but once he had
authority to write the plan, he did not follow his own
advice. In a larger sense, it was curious that the Penta-
gon, a highly structured bureaucracy with a zeal for plan-
ning, would be given a pot of money without a plan or budget
and then fail to write a plan or budget until ordered to do
so by Conquers.

Why, then, did the Pentagon request and Congress au-
thorize $400 million each year for four years? That figure
appears to have been chosen arbitrarily without an assess-
ment of need. According to Nunn, $400 million was the
amount Congress would tolerate in the FY91 budget negotia-
tions. [26] Thereafter, DOD became accustomed to requesting
$400 million regardless of the changed circumstances each
year. Carter admitted to Congress that, although DOD re-
quested $400 million for FY95, the request was not based on
specific requirements.[27] Such comments suggest that U.S.
officials do not know if the funding level is too low, too
high, or about right.

Without a plan and a budget, the CTR program has become
little more than a list of more than 35 "bright ideas" for
spending U.S. funds in the former Soviet Union--none of
which directly addresses the core U.S. objective of destroy-
ing nuclear warheads. [28] The largest budget item, which
accounts for about 40 percent of funding, is the effort to
help destroy missiles. Other projects include chemical
weapons studies, arctic waste cleanup, environmental resto-
ration, communications links, armored blankets (covers to
protect weapons in transport), containers for fissile mate-
rial, nuclear reactor safety, military-to-military contacts,
export controls, and housing for out-of-work officers of the
defunct Soviet Rocket Forces. [29] About 20 percent of pro-
posed CTR funding would, under the title of "demilitariza-
tion," make work for former Soviet weapons-industry employ-
ees by converting defense-industry facilities to science
centers. [30]

The United States has signed agreements with all four
republics to invest in former defense industries. Carter
called those projects "a critical tool of the CTR pro-
gram."[31] Their purpose is to privatize the industries and
convert their output from defense items to civilian prod-
ucts. The United States also created a Defense Demilitar-
ization Enterprise Fund in May 1994 to continue defense
conversion in the former Soviet Union. In 1992 the United
States, the European Community, and Japan signed an agree-
ment to establish a science and technology center in Moscow
to help aid Russian weapons scientists make the transition
to civilian life. The following year the United States,
Canada, and Sweden agreed to set up a similar center in

Budget snafus have entangled many projects. Nunn had
complained as early as February 1992 that not one penny had
been spent, but by 1994 the Pentagon had still spent only
$50 million. By May 1995, more than three years after Nunn
first complained, the CTR program had spent $177 million, or
little more than one-tenth of the $1.6 billion Congress had
originally authorized.[33] So slow was the pace of spending
that authority to spend CTR money expired for a substantial
portion of funding authorized in 1992 and 1993.[34] DOD had
to seek congressional permission to take money from other
DOD accounts and use it to replace expired CTR program

The CTR Program May Produce Dangerous
Unintended Results

Given the importance of reducing the former Soviet
arsenal, U.S. taxpayers may believe that any program is
better than none. But in this case, the program is likely
to have dangerous unintended consequences, both in the
former Soviet Union and in the United States.

It is a truism that money is fungible. Dollars spent
in Russia enhance Russia's ability to act in ways unfriendly
to U.S. interests, if that is the Russian leadership's
intent. Although CTR projects avoid giving cash to Russia,
they provide skills, equipment, and labor that Russia would
otherwise have to purchase to meet its international commit-
ments to reduce its nuclear and chemical weapons arsenal.

Money Russia does not spend on such activities (thanks
to CTR aid) can be spent instead attacking breakaway repub-
lics or, more ominously, modernizing weapons of mass de-
struction.[36] The Nunn-Lugar legislation requires DOD to
report on offensive biological or chemical weapons activi-
ties in the former Soviet Union.[37] The administration
admitted to Congress in late 1994 that it had concerns about
Russia's chemical and biological weapons activities.[38] By
mid-1995 indications of Russia's continuing biological
warfare programs led the House to threaten to slash CTR
funding, although in the final FY96 appropriations bill
funding was decreased only from $400 million to $300 mil-

CTR projects are giving Russia tools to use to store
and deploy new strategic weapons, including railcars, con-
tainers for fissile material, and assorted heavy machin-
ery.[40] CTR aid will help build an advanced nuclear storage
facility, which will enhance Russia's ability to store and
process warheads. Defense conversion projects under the CTR
program have often been impractical (such as teaching Rus-
sian arms makers to make Double Cola) and, at times, have
caused resentment.[41]

Essentially, CTR-funded projects are a U.S. subsidy for
the Russian arms industry--weapons makers may continue to
manufacture weapons (some of which are destined for the
international arms market) while using CTR aid to "convert"
other parts of their companies to civilian activities.[42]
Similarly, Russian scientists employed at the Science and
Technology Center may be moonlighting at weapons-development
jobs and collecting two paychecks: one from the U.S. govern-
ment for working on civilian projects and one from the
Russian weapons industry for working at their former

Every dollar that the CTR program spends subsidizing
the former Soviet defense establishment is a dollar taken
from the U.S. military. From a legislative standpoint, the
CTR program is not a foreign aid program but a military
program funded and operated by DOD. That distinction is
important. Congressional committees that oversee Pentagon
spending (e.g., defense appropriations subcommittees) ap-
prove the CTR budget, and CTR funds come not from the for-
eign aid budget but from other Pentagon accounts.[44] CTR,
therefore, competes directly with other U.S. military pro-
grams for available financial resources.[45]

The CTR Program Should Be Terminated

The urgency--and opportunity--that Nunn and his col-
leagues saw in the nervous summer of 1991 has passed. The
program that began as a response to our most urgent national
security challenge has simply become another Pentagon bu-
reaucracy and foreign aid boondoggle.

The Pentagon's difficulties in spending CTR funds
present Congress with an opportunity. Since the Pentagon
has actually spent only a fraction of the appropriated
funds, Congress can, by killing the program now, limit U.S.
losses and the CTR program's potential for incurring fright-
ening, unintended consequences.

Proponents of CTR may argue that termination of the
program would teach former Soviet republics that the United
States fails to meet international commitments. That argu-
ment is short-sighted. The longer view recognizes that CTR
termination will teach the republics that, although the
United States sometimes makes mistakes, it has the wisdom to
recognize and rectify them.


1. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Assisting the
Build-Down of the Former Soviet Military Establishment:
Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 101st
Cong., 1st sess., February 5-6, 1992 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1992), pp. 1-2.

2. The legislation created the Cooperative Nuclear Threat
Reduction (CTR) program. The original authorizing legisla-
tion was Title II of the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty Implementation Act of 1991, P.L. 102-228, December
12, 1991. At the same time, Congress passed the Dire Emer-
gency Supplemental Appropriations Act, P.L. 102-229 (section
108), which required the secretary of defense to give Con-
gress prior notification of funding obligations and make
periodic reports. In 1992 Congress passed the National
Defense Authorization Act, and Title XIV became the Former
Soviet Union Demilitarization Act of 1992. It extended and
amended the 1991 legislation. In 1993 and 1994 Congress
continued to authorize the CTR program at $400 million a
year and, through earmarks in the legislation, added spend-
ing and reporting requirements. See Theodor Galdi, The
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction Program for
Soviet Weapons Dismantlement, Congressional Research Ser-
vice, 94-985-F (Washington: Government Printing Office,
December 6, 1994), pp. 1-6.

3. Ashton B. Carter, "Reducing the Nuclear Dangers from the
Former Soviet Union," Arms Control Today, January-February
1992, pp. 10-14. A biographical note explains that Carter
was an author of a report on dangers posed by the former
Soviet Union. The report "was released by Senators Richard
Lugar (R-IN) and Sam Nunn (D-GA) in association with their
proposal to devote $400 million of the defense budget to
reducing nuclear danger in the former Soviet Union. This
article was adapted from that report and subsequent testimo-
ny by the author."

4. Carter was responsible for policy, and Harold Smith was
responsible for implementation of the CTR program.

5. Galdi, pp. 6-10; and Ashton B. Carter, "Testimony of
Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter on the
Former Soviet Union Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction
Program," before the Subcommittee on Defense of the House
Appropriations Committee, March 9, 1994 (photocopy), p. 2.

6. Undersecretary of State Reginald Bartholomew, testimony,
in U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, p. 10. Carter
later told Congress that 4,000 tactical warheads were moved
from the three republics to Russia "in early 1992." Ashton
B. Carter, "Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense
Ashton B. Carter on the Former Soviet Union Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program," before the House Armed Services
Committee, April 28, 1994 (photocopy), p. 7.

7. Stephen J. Hadley, in U.S. Senate Committee on Armed
Services, p. 23.

8. Galdi, pp. 6-10.

9. Bartholomew, p. 61.

10. Carter, "Reducing the Nuclear Dangers from the Former
Soviet Union," p. 11.

11. "I think in terms of technical know how and the like,
they have what is needed. In terms of resources, the ques-
tion is not so much could they get the job done without us,
the question is could they get it done without us, Senator,
as quickly--particularly as quickly--but also as safely."
Bartholomew, p. 40.

12. Carter, testimony of March 9, 1994, pp. 9-10.

13. Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, August 1993), pp. 45-68; and R. Jeffrey
Smith, "Anti-Smuggling Effort Largely in Disarray," Washing-
ton Post, August 28, 1994, p. A1.

14. Carter, "Reducing the Nuclear Dangers from the Former
Soviet Union," p. 11.

15. Bartholomew, p. 11. Some issues are addressed in Assis-
tant Comptroller General Frank C. Conahan, testimony, in
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Russian Nuclear
Weapons: U.S. Implementation of the Soviet Nuclear Threat
Reduction Act of 1991, GAO/T-NSIAD-92-47 (Washington: Gov-
ernment Printing Office, July 27, 1992), pp. 3-5.

16. Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard
University, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, forthcoming, quoted in
"Skeptical Bear Ill-Disposed to Having Its Claws Clipped,"
Financial Times, January 15, 1996, p. 4.

17. John Lloyd, "Nuclear Disaster Threat 'Greatest since
Cold War,'" Financial Times, January 15, 1996, p. 1.

18. Center for Science and International Affairs, quoted in
"Skeptical Bear Ill-Disposed to Having Its Claws Clipped,"
P- 4.

19. General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Reducing the Nuclear Threat from the Former Soviet Union: An
Update, GAO/NSIAD-95-165 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, June 1995), p. 4. The chief CTR negotiator made the
extravagant claim that "Nunn-Lugar funds played a vital role
in getting Ukraine's adherence to START I, the Lisbon Proto-
col, and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty." James E. Good-
by, "Dismantling the Nuclear Weapons Legacy of the Cold
War," Strategic Forum, February 1995, p. 2.

20. Carter, testimony of March 9, 1994, p. 5. In March 1995
the secretary of defense made a similar claim: "The [CTR]
program . . has been vital to the effort to help Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine make the transition to non-nuclear
status." William J. Perry, "Statement for the Record on the
START II Treaty by the Secretary of Defense for the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee," March 1, 1995.

21. Goodby, p. 2.

22. "Belarus Holds Russian Nukes," Defense News, August 21-

27, 1995, p. 1.

23. "We put DOD in as executive agent there, for this not to
get bogged down in negotiations." Sam Nunn, in U.S. Senate
Committee on Armed Services, pp. 29-27; and "Congress As-
sured on Pentagon Role in Disarmament," Defense Week, Febru-
ary 10, 1992, p. 5.

24. One knowledgeable observer saw friction between Carter
and his colleagues as hampering the CTR program. "Ash
Carter and his policy team had neglected to establish close
relations with other members of the executive branch and the
defense committees of Congress. As a result, quiet opposi-
tion from other members of the defense establishment fre-
quently delayed the effort." Charles Flickner, "The Russian
Aid Mess," National Interest (Winter 1994-95): 17.

25. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1995, P. L. 103-337. Title XII, Cooperative Threat Reduction
with States of Former Soviet Union (Washington: Government
Printing Office, October 5, 1994); and House Armed Services
Committee, "Dellums Releases GAO Report on Weapons Disman-
tlement and Nuclear Threat Reduction in the Former Soviet
Union," News Release, October 6, 1994, p. 1.

26. Nunn, p. 2.

27. Carter, testimony of April 28, 1994, p. 12.

28. Goodby, p. 2.

29. Ibid., pp. 2-4.

30. General Accounting Office, p. 35.

31. Carter, testimony of April 28, 1994, p. 9.

32. Galdi, p. 12.

33. General Accounting Office, p. 10.

34. A Senate Budget Committee staff member wrote, "Harassed
and over-worked mid-level officials in the executive branch
. . . soon found out that they were unable to get prompt,
effective guidance from their own senior managers. Then,
when congressional appropriations committees reviewed the
results, they often balked at the proposed projects."
Flickner, p. 16.

35. House Armed Services Committee, p. 2; and Carter, testi-
mony of April 28, 1994, p. 15.

36. Lee Hockstader, "Chechnya Draining Russian Economy,"
Washington Post, January 9, 1995, p. A1; and Suzanne Crow,
"Yeltsin's Chechnya," Perspective, January-February 1995,
pp. 1, 9-10.

37. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995,
Title XII, section 1207.

38. Thomas W. Lippman, "Administration Voices Concern on
Russian Treaty Compliance," Washington Post, December 11,
1994, p. A36.

39. John Mintz and Bradley Graham, "House Sustains B-2
Funds, Blocks Aid to Destroy Soviet Nuclear Arms," Wash-
ington Post, June 14, 1995, p. A9; and S. Mirzayanov, "Chem-
ical Weapons: An Expose," Perspective, April-May 1994,
pp. 1-4.

40. Carter, testimony of April 28, 1994, p. 8.

41. Adi Ignastius, "U.S. Stirs Russian Resentment with Plans
for Defense Conversion," Wall Street Journal, September 19,
1994, p. A10.

42. Russia intends to earn hard currency exporting conven-
tional arms (also an important U.S. export). See "Russia,
France Hike Arms Sales to Developing Nations," Defense News,
August 21-27, 1995, p. 10; and "Beneath the Smiles," The
Economist, September 3, 1994, p. 39.

43. General Accounting Office, p. 28.

44. Budget cuts may affect traditional foreign aid to Rus-
sia. See Carla Anne Robbins, "Kentucky Senator, Handed Keys
to Foreign Aid, to Be Most Potent Foe of Clinton's Russia
Policy," Wall Street Journal, December 13, 1994, p. A20.
However, the cuts will not affect CTR because it is not
technically a foreign aid program.

45. Dana Priest, "'Non-Defense' Projects Targeted," Washing-
ton Post, February 10, 1995, p. Al. U.S. military actions
in Haiti, Somalia, and elsewhere are directly hurting the
Pentagon's readiness accounts. John F. Harris, "Military
Leaders Stress Funding Needs," Washington Post, February 2,
1995, p. A15; and Bradley Graham, "Pentagon Seeks $2.6
Billion Emergency Funding to Preserve Force Readiness,"
Washington Post, January 20, 1995, p. A12.

Published by the Cato Institute, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing
is a regular series evaluating government policies and offering
proposals for reform. Nothing in Cato Foreign Policy Briefing
should be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the
Cato Institute or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of
any bill before Congress.
Contact the Cato Institute for reprint permission. Printed
copies of Cato Foreign Policy Briefing are $2.00 each ($1.00 each
for five or more). To order, or for a complete listing of available
studies, write the Cato Institute, 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW,
Washington, DC 20001-5403. (202) 842-0200 FAX (202) 842-3490
E-mail World Wide Web

| Hot Topics | Foreign Policy Briefs | Cato Home Page |