<DOC>
[105 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:46832.wais]

                                                        S. Hrg. 105-285


 
                     THE DEBATE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                       ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

             OCTOBER 7, 9, 22, 28, 30 AND NOVEMBER 5, 1997

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                 JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana            JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia              PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming                CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota                 RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri              DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee                PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
                     James W. Nance, Staff Director
                 Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director

                                  (ii)




                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                       Hearing of October 7, 1997

                                                                   Page

Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement.........................     1

Albright, Hon. Madeleine, Secretary of State.....................     6
     Prepared statement..........................................    12

                       Hearing of October 9, 1997

Pros and Cons of NATO Enlargement................................    41

Brzezinski, Hon. Zbigniew, Counselor, Center for Strategic and 
  International Studies, Washington, DC..........................    46
    Prepared statement...........................................    47
Dean, Hon. Jonathan, Senior Arms Control Advisor, Union of 
  Concerned Scientists, Washington, DC...........................    67
    Prepared statement...........................................    70
Kirkpatrick, Hon. Jeane J., Senior Fellow and Director, Foreign 
  Policy and Defense Studies, American Enterprise Institute, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    47
    Prepared statement...........................................    52
Mandelbaum, Dr. Michael, Professor and Director of American 
  Foreign Policy, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
  International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    72
Roth, Hon. William V. Jr., United States Senator from Delaware, 
  Chairman, Senate NATO Observer Group, and President, North 
  Atlantic Treaty Assembly.......................................    42
    Prepared statement...........................................    44

                      Hearing of October 22, 1997

Qualifications of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for NATO 
  Membership.....................................................    91

Prepared statement of:

    Cambone, Dr. Stephen A., Senior Fellow, Political-Military 
      Studies Program, Center for Strategic and International 
      Studies, Washington, DC....................................   108
    Grossman, Marc, Assistant Secretary of State, European and 
      Canadian Affairs...........................................    91
    Kramer, Franklin D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
      International Security Affairs.............................    94
    Larrabee, Dr. Stephen F., RAND, Washington, DC...............   115
    Micgiel, Dr. John S., Director, East Central European Center, 
      Columbia University........................................   119

                      Hearing of October 28, 1997

Costs, Benefits, Burdensharing and Military Implications of NATO 
  Enlargement....................................................   123

Eland, Dr. Ivan, Director of Defense Policy Studies, CATO 
  Institute, Washington, DC......................................   165
    Prepared statement...........................................   167
Hadley, Hon. Stephen, partner, Shea and Gardner, Washington, DC..   170
    Prepared statement...........................................   172
Kugler, Dr. Richard, Distinguished Research Professor, Institute 
  For National Strategic Studies, National Defense University....   152
    Prepared statement...........................................   154
Slocombe, The Hon. Walter, Undersecretary of Defense For Policy..   124
    Prepared statement...........................................   131

              Hearing of October 30, 1997, Morning Session

NATO-Russia Relationship--Part I.................................   183

Kissinger, Hon. Henry A., President, Kissinger and Associates, 
  New York, New York.............................................   183
    Prepared statement...........................................   186

             Hearing of October 30, 1997, Afternoon Session

NATO-Russia Relationship--Part II................................   207

Matlock, Ambassador Jack F. Jr., George F. Kennan Professor, 
  Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey............   230
    Prepared statement...........................................   236
Odom, William E., Lt. Gen., USA, retired, Director of National 
  Security Studies, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC.............   238
    Prepared statement...........................................   242
Pickering, Ambassador Thomas R., Undersecretary of State for 
  Political Affairs..............................................   207
    Prepared statement...........................................   214
Simes, Dimitri K., President, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, 
  Washington, DC.................................................   245
    Prepared statement...........................................   248

                      Hearing of November 5, 1997

Public Views on NATO Enlargement.................................   261

Acheson, David C., President, The Atlantic Council of the United 
  States, Washington, DC.........................................   294
    Prepared statement...........................................   296
Ciccolella, Charles S., Assistant Director, National Security and 
  Foreign Relations Division, American Legion, Washington, DC....   305
    Prepared statement...........................................   306
Doubek, Robert W., President, American Friends of the Czech 
  Republic, Washington, DC.......................................   277
    Prepared statement...........................................   279
Harmon, Col. Herbert N., USMCR, National President, Reserve 
  Officers Association of the United States, Washington, DC......   315
    Prepared statement...........................................   317
Harris, David A., Executive Director, American Jewish Committee, 
  New York, New York.............................................   310
    Prepared statement...........................................   312
Joyce, John T., President, International Union of Bricklayers and 
  Allied Craftworkers, Washington, DC............................   313
    Prepared statement...........................................   314
Karatnycky, Adrian, President, Freedom House, New York, New York.   297
    Prepared statement...........................................   298
Koiva, Mati, member, Board of Directors, Joint Baltic American 
  National Committee, Incorporated, and President, Estonian 
  American National Council, Rockville, Maryland.................   283
    Prepared statement...........................................   284
Koszorus, Frank, Jr., board member, Hungarian American Coalition, 
  Washington, DC.................................................   270
    Prepared statement...........................................   272
Moskal, Edward J., President, Polish American Congress, 
  Washington, DC.................................................   266
    Prepared statement...........................................   269
Nowak, Jan, Representative, Central and Eastern European 
  Coalition, Annandale, Virginia.................................   262
    Prepared statement...........................................   264
Plesch, Daniel T., Director, British American Security 
  Information Council, Washington, DC............................   290
    Prepared statement...........................................   292
Rubinstein, Dr. Alvin Z., Political Science Department, 
  University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.........   318
    Prepared statement...........................................   320
Shanahan, Adm. Jack, USN (Ret.), Director, Center for Defense 
  Information, Washington, DC....................................   303
    Prepared statement...........................................   304
Stern, Hon. Paula, President, The Stern Group, New York, New 
  York, on behalf of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO...........   286

                               APPENDICES
                               Appendix 1

Additional material received for the October 7 hearing record:
    ``Hearing on the Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement,'' 
      a staff memorandum to the members of the Foreign Relations 
      Committee..................................................   331
    ``Meeting the Challenges of a Post-Cold War World: NATO 
      Enlargement and U.S.-Russia Relations,'' A Report to the 
      Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted by Senator Joseph 
      R. Biden, Jr...............................................   338
    Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold............   404
    Letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary, Legislative 
      Affairs, Department of State, to Chairman Helms............   405
    Responses of Secretary Albright to Questions Asked by Senator 
      Helms......................................................   405
    Responses of Secretary Albright to Questions Asked by Senator 
      Feingold...................................................   413

                               Appendix 2

Additional material received for the October 9 hearing record:
    ``NATO Expansion; A Bridge to the Nineteenth Century,'' 
      submitted by Michael Mandelbaum............................   418

                               Appendix 3

Additional material received for the October 22 hearing record:
    ``Hearing on the Qualifications of Poland, Hungary, and the 
      Czech Republic for NATO Membership,'' a staff memorandum to 
      the members of the Foreign Relations Committee.............   439
    Excerpts from ``Nations in Transit: 1997--Civil Society, 
      Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly 
      Independent States:''

        Czech Republic: Freedom in the World Ratings, 1988-1997..   446
        Hungary: Freedom in the World Ratings, 1988-1997.........   463
        Poland: Freedom in the World Ratings, 1988-1997..........   475

                               Appendix 4

Additional material received for the October 28 hearing record:
    ``Hearing on the Costs, Benefits, Burdensharing, and Military 
      Implications of NATO Enlargement,'' a staff memorandum to 
      the members of the Foreign Relations Committee.............   488
    Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold............   499
    ``The High Cost of NATO Expansion,'' a policy analysis by 
      Ivan Eland.................................................   500
    Responses of Mr. Slocombe to Questions Asked by Senator Helms   519
    Responses of Mr. Eland to Question Asked by Senator Biden....   522
    Prepared statement of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, Senior Fellow, 
      Political-Military Studies Program, Center for Strategic 
      and International Studies, Washington, DC..................   523

                               Appendix 5

Additional material received for the October 30 hearing record:
    ``Hearings on NATO-Russian Relations,'' a staff memorandum to 
      the members of the Foreign Relations Committee.............   531

                               Appendix 6

Additional material received for the November 5 hearing record:
    Letter from Alexandr Vondra, Ambassador of the Czech 
      Republic; Gyorgy Banlaki, Ambassador of the Republic of 
      Hungary; and Jerzy Kozminski, Ambassador of the Republic of 
      Poland; to Chairman Helms..................................   537
    Paula Stern, U.S. Committee to Expand NATO, supplemental 
      submissions................................................   537
    Lithuanian-American Community, Inc., prepared statement......   546
    Armand Scala, President of the Congress of Romanian 
      Americans, prepared statement..............................   549
    U.S.-Baltic Foundation, prepared statement...................   549
    John E. Moon, Commander-in-Chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars of 
      the United States, letter and attachment...................   551



                STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR NATO ENLARGEMENT

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1997

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met at 10:14 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the 
committee), presiding.
    Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Smith, Thomas, 
Ashcroft, Grams, Frist, Biden, Sarbanes, Robb, Feingold, 
Feinstein, and Wellstone.
    Also Present: Senator Warner.
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    Madam Secretary, as you know, we welcome you. We appreciate 
your being our lead-off witness as the Foreign Relations 
Committee begins its consideration of NATO expansion.
    For nearly 50 years, NATO has defended democracy against 
communism and other forms of tyranny in Europe. Despite that 
success, many Americans will never forget the betrayal at Yalta 
which left millions of Europeans behind enemy lines.
    Today, with the expansion of the NATO alliance, we have an 
historic opportunity to right that wrong by accepting Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. All Americans should 
welcome these nations as they finally become equal partners in 
a community of democratic nations, thereby ensuring that their 
new democracies shall never again fall victim to tyranny.
    Now, if Europe and the United States are to enjoy a century 
of peace, upcoming, one that does not replicate the bloody wars 
of the past century, we must embrace these democracies and 
guide them and show them away from their tragic histories of 
ethnic division and war.
    That said, there's a right way and a wrong way to proceed 
with NATO expansion. We in the Senate recognize that this vital 
undertaking is not without cost to the United States, and I am 
convinced that the three new democracies are willing and eager 
to bear their fair share, but we must now make certain that our 
present NATO allies are likewise willing to fulfill their end 
of the bargain.
    Just last week our allies made clear to us that they expect 
the United States, meaning the American taxpayers, to pay the 
lion's share of the cost of expansion. Now, Madam Secretary, 
ratification of NATO expansion by the U.S. Senate may very well 
succeed or fail on the question of whether you can dissuade our 
allies of that notion.
    Further, we must resist any temptation by the leadership of 
our country to rush forward into an ill-considered NATO 
partnership with Russia. Now, while the United States is 
willing to take steps to demonstrate that NATO represents 
absolutely no threat to a democratic Russia, NATO's relations 
with Russia must be restrained by the reality that Russia's 
future commitment to peace and democracy, as of this date, is 
far from certain. In fact, I confess a fear that the United 
States' overture toward Russia may have already gone a bit far.
    I believe, Madam Secretary, that it's fair to expect the 
administration to outline a clear, strategic rationale for NATO 
expansion and to explain clearly to the U.S. Senate what 
potential threats NATO may face in the 21st century and why an 
expanded NATO alliance is necessary to counter such threats.
    To illustrate, it is self-evident I think that one such 
potential threat will manifest itself if and when Russia takes 
a turn for the worse. In your testimony today, Madam Secretary, 
I hope that you will address this and other possible threats to 
Europe's security.
    We live in a time when the United States finds few allies 
within NATO or elsewhere in the struggle for freedom. Too many 
expect the American taxpayers to pay the bills and to leave the 
driving force up to these other nations.
    For example, France boasts of investments to prop up the 
terrorist regime in Iran, a regime that has spilled the blood 
of American and French citizens alike. In fact, the European 
Union waits with baited breath for Iran to allow their 
Ambassadors to return to Tehran.
    Denmark and the Netherlands, both having courageously 
condemned China's human rights record in Geneva earlier this 
year, now find themselves in the incomprehensible position of 
being sanctioned by the Chinese while their opportunistic 
European Union partners rush to enrich themselves with new 
business opportunities.
    Somehow an understanding must be made clear that the United 
States did not create the NATO alliance and prepare for war and 
send our troops to fight and die in Europe and spend our 
country into debt for 50 years simply to defend European real 
estate or European economic interests. Our commitment was first 
and foremost to the defense of democracy and the preservation 
of human liberty and it must remain so.
    So many of our cold war allies have so quickly forgotten 
how close they came to losing their freedoms, but you, Madam 
Secretary, more than most, know that freedom cannot be taken 
for granted because your family personally suffered the peril 
of tyranny, ignored or tolerated by those entrusted with 
leadership at that time.
    NATO has yet to fight a war because NATO was thoroughly 
convinced and convincing all along that NATO has been prepared 
to fight a war, if necessary. But with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the American people have turned their attention 
to problems at home. There is no audible demand by the American 
people to play the role of international referee or world 
policeman.
    Together we must explain to the American people that NATO 
enlargement is vital precisely because it will secure peace and 
security into the next century and ensure, at the same time, 
that America will not be called upon once again to save Europe 
from the advance of tyranny.
    Now, Madam Secretary, as I conclude, I want to share with 
you and others here today a passage written by the man I 
consider the greatest statesman of the 20th century, Winston 
Churchill. In his 1929 book, The Aftermath, Mr. Churchill tried 
to warn the world about the slide down the slippery slope 
toward the next world war.
    At first his apprehensions fell on deaf ears, and in 
connection with that, Mr. Churchill years later wrote the 
following, with which I shall conclude.
    He said: ``To the faithful, toiled, burdened masses, the 
victory was so complete that no further efforts seemed 
required. Germany had fallen and with her the combination that 
had crushed her. Authority was disbursed. The world unshackled. 
The weak became the strong. The sheltered became the 
aggressive. The contrast between victors and vanquished tended 
continually to diminish. A vast fatigue,'' he said, ``dominated 
collective action and, through every subversive element, 
endeavored to insert itself. Revolutionary rage, like every 
other form of psychic energy, burnt low. Through all five acts, 
the drama had run its course,'' he said. ``The light of history 
is switched off. The world stage dims. The actors shrivel. The 
chorus sings. The war of the giants has ended. The quarrels of 
the pygmies has begun.''
    I think that just about says it all. Senator Biden?
    [Material submitted by Chairman Helms follows:]

            The Madrid Summit--New Members, Not New Missions

                            [By Jesse Helms]

    WASHINGTON, D.C.--As NATO leaders meet in Madrid today to discuss 
the enlargement of the Alliance, some words of caution are in order. 
The Clinton administration's egregious mishandling of NATO expansion is 
raising serious concerns in the U.S. Senate, which must approve any 
enlargement treaty.
    There is growing distress among supporters of enlargement (like 
myself) that the administration's plan for NATO expansion may be 
evolving into a dangerous and ill-considered plan for NATO 
transformation: that we are not inviting new nations into the NATO that 
won the Cold War, but rather into a new, diluted NATO, converted from a 
well-defined military alliance into a nebulous ``collective security'' 
arrangement.
No Rationale
    To date, the Clinton administration has failed to present the 
Senate with any credible strategic rationale for NATO expansion--that 
is, no explanation of the threat posed to the Atlantic Alliance, nor 
why an expanded NATO is needed to counter it. Instead, all sorts of 
misguided proposals are floating around for transforming NATO's mission 
and purpose, in an effort to justify Alliance expansion.
    Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the Clinton 
administration's pointman on NATO expansion, argues that while ``during 
the Cold War, military and geopolitical considerations mainly 
determined NATO's decisions . . . today, with the end of the Cold War, 
other non-military goals can and should help shape the new NATO.'' 
NATO's primary mission, Mr. Talbott is saying, should no longer be the 
defense of Europe, but rather ``promoting democracy within NATO states 
and good relations among them''--in other words, nation-building.
    Others see this ``new NATO'' serving as a stand-in peacekeeper for 
a United Nations discredited by its failures in Somalia and Bosnia. 
Indeed, the NATO-Russia ``Founding Act,'' largely negotiated by the 
Clinton administration, enshrines this new role for NATO, hailing 
NATO's ``historic transformation'' in making ``new missions of 
peacekeeping and crisis management in support of the U.N.'' primary 
Alliance functions.
    Advocates of NATO transformation make a better case for the 
Alliance to disband than expand. NATO's job is not to replace the U.N. 
as the world's peacekeeper, nor is it to build democracy and pan-
European harmony or promote better relations with Russia. NATO has 
proven the most successful military alliance in history precisely 
because it has rejected utopian temptations to remake the world.
    Rather, NATO's mission today must be the same clear-cut and limited 
mission it undertook at its inception: to protect the territorial 
integrity of its members, defend them from external aggression, and 
prevent the hegemony of any one state in Europe.
    The state that sought hegemony during the latter half of this 
century was Russia. The state most likely to seek hegemony in the 
beginning of the next century is also Russia. A central strategic 
rationale for expanding NATO must be to hedge against the possible 
return of a nationalist or imperialist Russia, with 20,000 nuclear 
missiles and ambitions of restoring its lost empire. NATO enlargement, 
as Henry Kissinger argues, must be undertaken to ``encourage Russian 
leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history . . . and 
discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of 
important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its 
borders.''
    Unfortunately, the Clinton administration does not see this as a 
legitimate strategic rationale for expansion. ``Fear of a new wave of 
Russian imperialism . . . should not be seen as the driving force 
behind NATO enlargement,'' says Mr. Talbott.
    Not surprisingly, those states seeking NATO membership seem to 
understand NATO's purpose better than the Alliance leader. Lithuania's 
former president, Vytautas Landsbergis, put it bluntly: ``We are an 
endangered country. We seek protection.'' Poland, which spent much of 
its history under one form or another of Russian occupation, makes 
clear it seeks NATO membership as a guarantee of its territorial 
integrity. And when Czech President Vaclav Havel warned of ``another 
Munich,'' he was calling on us not to leave Central Europe once again 
at the mercy of any great power, as Neville Chamberlain did in 1938.
    Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other potential candidate 
states don't need NATO to establish democracy. They need NATO to 
protect the democracies they have already established from external 
aggression.
    Sadly, Mr. Havel's admonishments not to appease ``chauvinistic, 
Great Russian, crypto-Communist and crypto-totalitarian forces'' have 
been largely ignored by the Clinton administration. Quite the opposite, 
the administration has turned NATO expansion into an exercise in the 
appeasement of Russia.
    After admitting East Germany in 1990 (and giving the Soviet Union 
neither a ``voice'' nor a ``veto'' in the process), the U.S. delayed 
NATO expansion for nearly seven years in a misguided effort to secure 
Russian approval. Russia, knowing an opportunity when it sees one, has 
used its opposition to NATO expansion to gain all sorts of concessions, 
ranging from arms-control capitulations to the NATO-Russia ``Founding 
Act.''
    That agreement concedes ``primary responsibility . . . for 
international peace and security'' to the U.N. Security Council, where 
Russia has a veto. It gives Russia (the very country NATO is 
constituted to deter) a voice at every level of the Alliance's 
deliberations. And it gives Russia a seat at the table before any new 
candidate members (those being brought in to protect them from 
aggression) get a seat at the table.
    It is my sincere hope that the U.S. Senate can approve NATO 
expansion. But if we are to do so, some dramatic changes must be made. 
As chairman of the Senate committee that must approve the resolution of 
ratification, I urge the administration to take the following steps 
before presenting NATO expansion to the Senate:
  <bullet> Outline a clear, complete strategic security rationale for 
        NATO expansion.
  <bullet> Agree that no limitations will be placed on the numbers of 
        NATO troops or types of weapons to be deployed on territory of 
        new member states (including tactical nuclear weapons)--there 
        must be no second-class citizens in NATO.
  <bullet> Explicitly reject Russian efforts to establish a ``nuclear 
        weapons-free zone'' in Central Europe.
  <bullet> Explicitly reject all efforts to tie NATO decisions to U.N. 
        Security Council approval.
  <bullet> Establish a clear delineation of NATO deliberations that are 
        off-limits to Russia (including, but not limited to, arms 
        control, further Alliance expansion, procurement and strategic 
        doctrine).
  <bullet> Provide an immediate seat at the NATO table for countries 
        invited to join the Alliance.
  <bullet> Reject Russian efforts to require NATO aid for Russian arms 
        sales to former Warsaw Pact militaries joining the Alliance, as 
        a quid pro quo for NATO expansion--NATO must not become a back 
        channel for new foreign aid to Russia.
  <bullet> Reject any further Russian efforts to link concessions in 
        arms control negotiations (including the antiquated ABM treaty 
        and the CFE Treaty) to NATO expansion.
  <bullet> Develop a plan for a NATO ballistic missile defense system 
        to defend Europe.
  <bullet> Get clear advance agreement on an equitable distribution of 
        the cost of expansion, to make certain American taxpayers don't 
        get stuck with the lion's share of the bill.
Strategic Threats
    Is renewed Russian aggression the only strategic threat NATO must 
consider? Of course not. There are many potential threats to Europe, 
including the possibility of rogue states like Libya and Iran one day 
threatening the continent with weapons of mass destruction. But the 
Clinton administration has failed to define NATO expansion in terms of 
any strategic threat.
    If the Clinton administration views NATO not as a tool to defend 
Europe, but as a laboratory for social work, then NATO should not only 
eschew expansion, it should declare victory and close shop. The costs 
of maintaining NATO, much less expanding it, cannot be justified if its 
mission is democracy-building and peacekeeping. There are other, less 
expensive and more appropriate forums for such ventures (such as the 
European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe). NATO is a military alliance--it must remain so or go out of 
business.

    Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, welcome. It is always a pleasure to have 
you here.
    Mr. Chairman, I have stated my support for NATO enlargement 
many times on the floor of the U.S. Senate and in private 
forums. So, today I will only summarize my rationale for this 
policy.
    Europe remains a vital interest for the United States. 
Other than North America, no other region can match Europe's 
combination of political, economic, military, and cultural 
power and significance to the United States. The European 
Union, for example, has a population one-third larger than ours 
and a combined GDP slightly greater than ours.
    A large percentage of the world's democracies are in 
Europe. By any geopolitical standard, it would be a catastrophe 
for American interests if instability were to alter the current 
situation in Europe.
    After the cold war, there are new threats to Europe: Ethnic 
and religious conflicts, one nation crossing the borders of 
another as Yugoslavia did in Bosnia, international crime and 
drugs; also I might note a possible future threat to Mideast 
oil supplies.
    For this reason, enlargement is being combined with a new 
strategic doctrine and a force posture that provides a more 
mobile and capable force projection capability in event of any 
of those crises.
    In the 20th century, Europeans have proven incapable, left 
to themselves, of settling their differences peacefully. The 
United States it seems to me must continue to lead the new 
security architecture for that continent, for if we do not, I 
do not know who will.
    In this context, admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary into NATO will extend the zone of security to central 
Europe in a way that, if left undone, will leave a gray zone 
and insecurity in that region.
    The question, I would emphasize, is not whether to enlarge 
NATO or remain the same. The status quo, Madam Secretary, in my 
view is not an option. If we were not to enlarge, the countries 
between Germany and Russia would inevitably seek other means to 
protect themselves, creating bilateral or multilateral 
alliances as they did in the 1930's with, I predict, similar 
results.
    There is also a powerful moral argument for enlargement: 
Redeeming our pledge to former captive nations to rejoin the 
west. I mean both NATO and the EU when I say the west because 
the Europeans will have to step up to that ball plate as well.
    When they are fully qualified to join both, their security 
will be fully secured. This fall's final accession talks 
between NATO and each of the three candidate countries, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary, will reveal whether each of 
them meets the alliance's demanding qualifications. Based on 
what I saw in my travels, I believe they do.
    Enlargement, Mr. Chairman, need not adversely affect our 
relations with Russia. We must redouble our political and 
economic engagement with that country in my view, and the NATO-
Russia Founding Act of May 1997 is a significant step in the 
right direction and the Partnership for Peace arrangement is 
equally as important.
    The NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council created by the 
founding act has begun functioning. I especially look forward 
to the fourth in our series of hearings on October 30th when we 
will examine the new NATO-Russian relationship.
    Mr. Chairman, in my view two big issues must be solved 
before the Senate considers ratification. One is directly 
related, one not as directly, but they're both important: 
Bosnia and cost sharing. If Bosnia is the prototypical European 
crisis of the 21st century, then in the coming weeks--and I 
mean weeks--the United States and its NATO allies had better 
come up with a workable post-SFOR scenario.
    Similarly, while the United States must continue to 
exercise its leadership role in NATO, our European and Canadian 
alliance partners must agree, as you indicated, to step up to 
the plate and bear their fair share of enlargement costs.
    The definitive NATO study on cost will come out in 
December. In anticipation of the report, this committee will 
hold its third hearing on NATO enlargement on October 22nd when 
we will examine the cost and burden sharing items. So, today I 
will not speak much to those items in my questioning.
    Mr. Chairman, I believe that admitting Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary to NATO, if they meet the qualifications, 
which they appear to meet, will be in the security interest of 
the United States of America. I believe to do otherwise would 
be to extend a zone of instability rather than one of 
stability.
    I look forward to the Secretary's testimony.
    Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for setting up an aggressive 
series of hearings prior to the requirement for us to decide 
whether or not to expand the Washington Treaty. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Now we will hear from you, 
Madam Secretary.

    STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE

    Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, members of the committee, it 
is with a sense of appreciation and anticipation that I come 
before you to urge support for the admission of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland to NATO.
    Each of us is playing our part today in the long unfolding 
story of America's modern partnership with Europe. That story 
began not at the Madrid summit, nor when the Berlin Wall fell, 
but half a century ago when your predecessors and mine 
dedicated our Nation to the goal of a secure, united Europe.
    It was then that we sealed a peacetime alliance open not 
only to the nations which shared our victory in World War II, 
but to our former adversaries. It was then that this committee 
unanimously recommended that the Senate approve the North 
Atlantic Treaty. On that day, the leaders of this body rose 
above partisanship and they rose to the challenge of a pivotal 
moment in history.
    Mr. Chairman, I believe you are continuing that tradition. 
I thank you for your decision to hold these hearings early, for 
the bipartisan manner in which you and Senator Biden are 
conducting them, and for the serious way in which you have 
framed our discussion.
    I am honored to be a part of what you have rightly called 
the beginning of the process of advice and consent.
    As I said, I am very conscious of history today. I hope we 
can take a moment to remember what was said half a century ago 
about the alliance we are striving to renew and expand today.
    Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman Helms' extraordinary 
predecessor, predicted that NATO would become the greatest war 
deterrent in history. He was right. American forces have never 
had to fire a shot to defend a NATO ally.
    This committee predicted that NATO would free the minds of 
men in many nations from a haunting sense of insecurity and 
enable them to work and plan with that confidence in the 
future, which is essential to economic recovery and progress. 
Your predecessors were also right.
    President Truman said that the NATO pact will be a 
positive, not a negative influence for peace, and its influence 
will be felt not only in the area it specifically covers but 
throughout the world. He was right too.
    Thanks in no small part to NATO, we live in a different 
world. Our Soviet adversary has vanished. Freedom's flag has 
been unfurled from the Baltics to Bulgaria. As I speak to you 
today, our immediate survival is not at risk.
    Indeed, you may ask if the principle of collective defense 
at NATO's heart is relevant to the challenges of a wider and 
freer Europe. You may ask why, in this time of relative peace, 
are we so focused on security.
    The answer is we want the peace to last. We want freedom to 
endure, and we believe there are still potential threats to our 
security emanating from European soil.
    You have asked me, Mr. Chairman, what these threats are. I 
want to answer as plainly as I can.
    First, there are the dangers of Europe's past. It is easy 
to forget this, but for centuries virtually every European 
nation treated virtually every other nation as a military 
threat. That pattern was broken only when NATO was born and 
only in the half of Europe NATO covered. With NATO, each 
member's security came to depend on cooperation with others, 
not competition.
    That is one reason why NATO remains essential. It is also 
one reason why we need a larger NATO which extends its positive 
influence to Europe's other half.
    A second set of dangers lies in Europe's present. Because 
of the conflict in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, 
Europe has already buried more victims of war since the Berlin 
Wall fell than in all the years of the cold war. It is sobering 
to recall that this violence has its roots in the same problems 
of shattered states and of ethnic hatreds that tyrants 
exploited to start this century's great wars.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must consider 
the dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean direct threats 
against the soil of NATO members that a collective defense pact 
is designed to meet. Some are visible on Europe's horizon, such 
as the threat posed by rogue states with dangerous weapons. 
Others may not seem apparent today, but they are not 
unthinkable.
    Within this category lie questions about the future of 
Russia. We want Russian democracy to endure. We are optimistic 
that it will, but one should not dismiss the possibility that 
Russia could return to the patterns of its past. By engaging 
Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to 
deepen its commitment to peaceful relations with neighbors, 
while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.
    We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20, or even 
50 years from now. We do know that whatever the future may 
hold, it will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger 
alliance with those European democracies that share our values 
and our determination to defend them.
    We recognize NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of 
American responsibilities in Europe. As Americans, we take our 
commitments seriously and we do not extend them lightly. Mr. 
Chairman, you and I certainly agree that any major extension of 
American commitments must serve America's strategic interests.
    Let me explain why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland into NATO meets that test.
    First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the 
area in Europe where wars simply do not happen. By making clear 
that we will fight if necessary to defend our allies, it makes 
it less likely our troops will ever be called upon to do so.
    Now you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate 
threat or armed attack today. That is true. The purpose of 
enlargement is to keep it that way. Senator Vandenberg said it 
in 1949: NATO is not built to stop a war after it starts, 
although its potentialities in this regard are infinite. It is 
built to stop wars before they start.
    It is also fair to ask if it is in our vital interest to 
prevent conflict in Central Europe. Some have implied it is 
not. I am sure you have even heard a few people trot out what I 
call the consonant cluster clause, the myth that in times of 
crisis Americans will make no sacrifice to defend a distant 
city with an unpronounceable name, that we will protect the 
freedom of Strasbourg but not Szczecin, Barcelona but not Brno.
    Let us not deceive ourselves. We are a European power. We 
have an interest in the fate of the 200 million people who live 
in the nations between the Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the 
cold war in part because these nations were held captive. We 
fought World War II in part because these nations had been 
invaded. If there were a major threat to the security of their 
region, we would want to act, enlargement or no enlargement. 
Our aim must be to prevent that kind of threat from arising.
    The second reason why enlargement passes the test of 
national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more 
cohesive. The Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs are passionately 
committed to NATO and its principles of shared responsibility. 
Their forces have already risked their lives alongside ours 
from the Gulf War to Bosnia.
    I know you have expressed concern that enlargement could 
dilute NATO by adding too many members and by involving the 
alliance in too many missions. Let me assure you that we 
invited only the strongest candidates to join and nothing about 
enlargement will change NATO's core mission which remains the 
collective defense of NATO soil.
    At the same time, it is important to remember that NATO has 
always served a political function too. It binds our allies to 
us just as it binds us to our allies. So, when you consider the 
candidacy of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, I ask you 
to consider this. On the issues that matter, from 
nonproliferation to human rights, to U.N. reform, here are 
three nations we have been able to count on and will continue 
to be able to count on.
    Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our 
interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of 
central and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own 
problems. To align themselves with NATO, aspiring countries 
have strengthened their democratic institutions, made sure 
soldiers serve civilians, signed 10 major accords that resolve 
virtually every old ethnic and border dispute in the region.
    I have been a student of central European history and I 
have lived some of it myself. When I see Romanians and 
Hungarians building a genuine friendship after centuries of 
enmity, when I see Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians forming 
joint military units after years of suspicion, when I see 
Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of mistrust, when I see 
central Europeans confident enough to improve their political 
and economic ties with Russia, I know something remarkable is 
happening.
    NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what this NATO 
predicted it would do for Europe's west after World War II. 
This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want 
our troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, 
and social unrest, are far more easily avoided with NATO 
enlargement than without it.
    In short, a larger NATO will make America safer, NATO 
stronger, and Europe more peaceful and united. That is the 
strategic rationale. But I would be disingenuous if I did not 
tell you I see a moral imperative too.
    NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations 
of North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted 
the cold war. Americans have long argued that the nations of 
central Europe belong to the same democratic family as our 
allies in western Europe. As Americans, we should be heartened 
so many of them wish to join the institutions we did so much to 
build.
    We should also think about what would happen if we were to 
turn them away. That would mean freezing NATO at its cold war 
membership and preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern 
frontier. It would mean locking out a whole group of otherwise 
qualified democracies simply because they were once, against 
their, will members of the Warsaw Pact.
    Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old 
democracies forever but its new democracies never? Were we to 
do that, confidence would crumble in central Europe leading to 
a search for security by other means, including costly arms 
buildups and competition among neighbors.
    We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the 
landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which 
of these nations that are so clearly important to our security 
are ready to contribute to our security? The answer to that 
question is before you today awaiting your affirmation.
    I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there are weighty 
voices on both sides of this debate. Let me address a few of 
the concerns I expect you will consider fully.
    First, we all want to make sure that the costs of a larger 
NATO are distributed fairly. Last February the administration 
made a preliminary estimate of America's share. Now we are 
working with our allies to produce a common estimate by the 
December meeting of the North Atlantic Council. At this point 
the numbers we agree upon as 16 allies are needed prior to any 
further calculations made in Washington.
    I know that you are holding separate hearings on this 
question, but I will say this. I am convinced that the cost of 
expansion is real but affordable. I am certain our prospective 
allies are willing and able to pay their share because in the 
long run it will be cheaper for them to upgrade their forces 
within the alliance than outside it. I will insist that our old 
allies share this burden fairly. That is what NATO is all 
about.
    I know there are serious people who estimate that a larger 
NATO will cost far more than we have anticipated. The key fact 
about our estimate is that it is premised on the current 
favorable security environment in Europe. Obviously, if a grave 
threat were to arise, the cost of enlargement would grow, but 
then so would the cost of our entire defense budget.
    In any case, there are budgetary constraints in all 16 NATO 
democracies that will prevent costs from ballooning. That is 
why the main focus of our discussion, Mr. Chairman, and our 
consultations with our allies needs to be on defining the level 
of military capability we want our old and new allies to have 
and then making sure that they commit to it. We should spend no 
more than we must but no less than we need to keep NATO strong.
    Another common concern about NATO enlargement is that it 
might damage our cooperation with a democratic Russia. Russian 
opposition to NATO enlargement is real. But we should see it 
for what it is, a product of old misperceptions about NATO and 
old ways of thinking about its former satellites in central 
Europe. Instead of changing our policies to accommodate 
Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage Russia's more 
modern aspirations.
    This means we should remain Russia's most steadfast 
champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining 
rule-based institutions, opening markets, and participating 
constructively in world affairs.
    But when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is 
a threat, we owe it candor to say that is false and to base our 
policies on what we know to be true. I believe our approach is 
producing results from our cooperation in Bosnia to agreements 
to pursue deeper arms cuts, to new signs that the new START II 
Treaty may be moving ahead in the Duma, to NATO's new 
relationship with Russia.
    I know that some are concerned that this relationship with 
Russia may actually go too far. You have asked me for an 
affirmation, Mr. Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council 
remains NATO's supreme decisionmaking body. Let me say it 
clearly: It does and it will. The NATO-Russia Founding Act 
gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay, or block NATO 
decisions.
    Another important concern is that enlargement may create a 
new dividing line in Europe between a larger NATO and the 
countries that will not join in the first round. We have taken 
a range of steps to ensure this does not happen, from NATO's 
commitment to an open-door policy, to a stronger Partnership 
for Peace, to the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.
    Among the countries that still aspire to membership, there 
is enthusiastic support for the process NATO has begun. They 
understand a simple fact: With enlargement, no new democracy is 
permanently excluded; without enlargement, every new democracy 
would be permanently excluded.
    The most important thing the Senate can do to reassure them 
now is to get the ball rolling by ratifying the admission of 
the first three candidates.
    A final concern I wish to address has to do with Bosnia. 
Some have suggested our debate on NATO enlargement simply 
cannot be separated from our actions and decisions in that 
troubled country. I agree with them. Both are aimed at building 
a stable, undivided Europe. It was our experience in Bosnia 
that proved a fundamental premise of our enlargement strategy: 
There are still threats to security in Europe that only NATO 
can meet.
    We cannot know today if our mission in Bosnia will achieve 
all its goals, but we can say that whatever may happen, our 
interest in a larger, stronger NATO will endure long after the 
last foreign soldier has left that country.
    We can also say that NATO will remain the most powerful 
instrument we have for building effective military coalitions 
such as SFOR. At the same time, Bosnia does not by itself 
define the future of a larger NATO. NATO's most important aim, 
if I can paraphrase Arthur Vandenberg, is to prevent wars 
before they start so it does not have to keep the peace after 
they stop.
    These are some of the principal concerns I wanted to 
address today. I know our discussion is just beginning. I am 
glad that it will also involve other committees of the Senate, 
the NATO Observers' Group, and the House of Representatives. 
Most important, I am glad it will involve the American people.
    When these three new democracies join NATO in 1999, as I 
trust they will, it will be a victory for us all, Mr. Chairman. 
On that day, we will be standing on the shoulders of many. We 
will be thankful to all those who waged the cold war on the 
side of freedom, to all those who champion the idea of a larger 
NATO, to all those Members of Congress from both parties who 
voted for resolutions urging the admission of these three 
nations, to all those Republican Members who made NATO 
enlargement part of their Contract with America.
    Now, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, all of our 
allies and future allies are watching you for one simple 
reason: The American Constitution is unique in the power it 
grants to the legislative branch over foreign policy, 
especially over treaties. In this matter, you and the American 
people you represent are truly in the driver's seat.
    That is as it should be. In fact, I enjoy going to Europe 
and telling our allies this is what we want to do but 
ultimately it will be up to our Senate and our people to 
decide. I say that with pride because it tells them something 
about America's faith in a democratic process.
    But I have to tell you that I say it with confidence as 
well. I believe that when the time comes for the Senate to 
decide, Mr. Chairman, you and I and the American people will 
stand together, for I know that the policy we ask you to 
embrace is a policy that the administration and Congress shaped 
together, and I am certain that it advances the fundamental 
interests of the United States.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]
                Prepared Statement of Secretary Albright
    Chairman Helms, Senator Biden, members of the committee: it is with 
a sense of appreciation and anticipation that I come before you to urge 
support for the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to 
NATO.
    Each of us today is playing our part in the long unfolding story of 
America's modern partnership with Europe. That story began not in 
Madrid, when the President and his fellow NATO leaders invited these 
three new democracies to join our Alliance, nor eight years ago when 
the Berlin Wall fell, but half a century ago when your predecessors and 
mine dedicated our nation to the goal of a secure, united Europe.
    It was then that we broke with the American aversion to European 
entanglements, an aversion which served us well in our early days, but 
poorly when we became a global power. It was then that we sealed a 
peacetime alliance open not only to the nations which had shared our 
victory in World War II, but to our former adversaries. It was then 
that this committee unanimously recommended that the Senate approve the 
original NATO treaty.
    The history books will long record that day as among the Senate's 
finest. On that day, the leaders of this body rose above partisanship 
and they rose to the challenge of a pivotal moment in the history of 
the world.
    Mr. Chairman, I believe you are continuing that tradition today. I 
thank you for your decision to hold these hearings early, for the 
bipartisan manner in which you and Senator Biden are conducting them, 
and for the serious and substantive way in which you have framed our 
discussion.
    I am honored to be part of what you have rightly called the 
beginning of the process of advice and consent. And I am hopeful that 
with your support, and after the full national debate to which these 
hearings will contribute, the Senate will embrace the addition of new 
members to NATO. It would be fitting if this renewal of our commitment 
to security in Europe could come early next year, as Congress 
celebrates the 50th anniversary of its approval of the Marshall Plan.
    As I said, and as you can see, I am very conscious of history 
today. I hope that you and your colleagues will look back as I have on 
the deliberations of 1949, for they address so many of the questions I 
know you have now: How much will a new alliance cost and what are its 
benefits? Will it bind us to go to war? Will it entangle us in far away 
quarrels?
    We should take a moment to remember what was said then about the 
alliance we are striving to renew and expand today.
    Senator Vandenberg, Chairman Helms' extraordinary predecessor, 
predicted that NATO would become ``the greatest war deterrent in 
history.'' He was right. American forces have never had to fire a shot 
to defend a NATO ally.
    This Committee, in its report to the Senate on the NATO treaty, 
predicted that it would ``free the minds of men in many nations from a 
haunting sense of insecurity, and enable them to work and plan with 
that confidence in the future which is essential to economic recovery 
and progress.'' Your predecessors were right. NATO gave our allies time 
to rebuild their economies. It helped reconcile their ancient 
animosities. And it made possible an unprecedented era of unity in 
Western Europe.
    President Truman said that the NATO pact ``will be a positive, not 
a negative, influence for peace, and its influence will be felt not 
only in the area it specifically covers but throughout the world.'' And 
he was right, too. NATO gave hope to democratic forces in West Germany 
that their country would be welcome and secure in our community if they 
kept making the right choices. Ultimately, it helped bring the former 
fascist countries into a prosperous and democratic Europe. And it 
helped free the entire planet from the icy grip of the Cold War.
    Thanks in no small part to NATO, we live in a different world. Our 
Soviet adversary has vanished. Freedom's flag has been unfurled from 
the Baltics to Bulgaria. The threat of nuclear war has sharply 
diminished. As I speak to you today, our immediate survival is not at 
risk.
    Indeed, you may ask if the principle of collective defense at 
NATO's heart is relevant to the challenges of a wider and freer Europe. 
You may ask why, in this time of relative peace, are we so focused on 
security?
    The answer is, we want the peace to last. We want freedom to 
endure. And we believe there are still potential threats to our 
security emanating from European soil.
    You have asked me, Mr. Chairman, what these threats are. I want to 
answer as plainly as I can.
    First, there are the dangers of Europe's past. It is easy to forget 
this, but for centuries virtually every European nation treated 
virtually every other as a military threat. That pattern was broken 
only when NATO was born and only in the half of Europe NATO covered. 
With NATO, Europe's armies prepared to fight beside their neighbors, 
not against them; each member's security came to depend on cooperation 
with others, not competition.
    That is one reason why NATO remains essential, even though the Cold 
War is over. It is also one reason why we need a larger NATO, so that 
the other half of Europe is finally embedded in the same cooperative 
structure of military planning and preparation.
    A second set of dangers lies in Europe's present. Because of 
conflict in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, Europe has already 
buried more victims of war since the Berlin Wall fell than in all the 
years of the Cold war. It is sobering to recall that this violence has 
its roots in the same problems of shattered states and hatred among 
ethnic groups that tyrants exploited to start this century's great 
wars.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, and most important, we must consider the 
dangers of Europe's future. By this I mean direct threats against the 
soil of NATO members that a collective defense pact is designed to 
meet. Some are visible on Europe's horizon, such as the threat posed by 
rogue states with dangerous weapons that might have Europe within their 
range and in their sights. Others may not seem apparent today, in part 
because the existence of NATO has helped to deter them. But they are 
not unthinkable.
    Within this category lie questions about the future of Russia. We 
have an interest in seeing Russian democracy endure. We are doing all 
we can with our Russian partners to see that it does. And we have many 
reasons to be optimistic. At the same time, one should not dismiss the 
possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of its past. By 
engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to 
deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with 
neighbors, while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.
    We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20, or even 50 
years from now. We do know enough from history and human experience to 
believe that a grave threat, if allowed to arise, would arise. We know 
that whatever the future may hold, it will be in our interest to have a 
vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share 
our values and our determination to defend them.
    We recognize NATO expansion involves a solemn expansion of American 
responsibilities in Europe. It does not bind us to respond to every 
violent incident by going to war. But it does oblige us to consider an 
armed attack against one ally an attack against all and to respond with 
such action as we deem necessary, including the use of force, to 
restore the security of the North Atlantic area.
    As Americans, we take our commitments seriously and we do not 
extend them lightly. Mr. Chairman, you and I do not agree on 
everything, but we certainly agree that any major extension of American 
commitments must serve America's strategic interests.
    Let me explain why welcoming the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
into NATO meets that test.
    First, a larger NATO will make us safer by expanding the area in 
Europe where wars simply do not happen. This is the productive paradox 
at NATO's heart: By imposing a price on aggression, it deters 
aggression. By making clear that we will fight, if necessary, to defend 
our allies, it makes it less likely our troops will ever be called upon 
to do so.
    Now, you may say that no part of Europe faces any immediate threat 
of armed attack today. That is true. And I would say that the purpose 
of NATO enlargement is to keep it that way. Senator Vandenberg said it 
in 1949: ``[NATO] is not built to stop a war after it starts, although 
its potentialities in this regard are infinite. It is built to stop 
wars before they start.''
    It is also fair to ask if it is in our vital interest to prevent 
conflict in central Europe. There are those who imply it is not. I'm 
sure you have even heard a few people trot out what I call the 
``consonant cluster clause,'' the myth that in times of crisis 
Americans will make no sacrifice to defend a distant city with an 
unpronounceable name, that we will protect the freedom of Strasbourg 
but not Szczecin, Barcelona, but not Brno.
    Let us not deceive ourselves. The United States is a European 
power. We have an interest not only in the lands west of the Oder 
river, but in the fate of the 200 million people who live in the 
nations between the Baltic and Black Seas. We waged the Cold War in 
part because these nations were held captive. We fought World War II in 
part because these nations had been invaded.
    Now that these nations are free, we want them to succeed And we 
want them to be safe, whether they are large or small. For if there 
were a major threat to the security of their region, if we were to wake 
up one morning to the sight of cities being shelled .and borders being 
overrun, I am certain that we would choose to act, enlargement or no 
enlargement. Expanding NATO now is simply the surest way to prevent 
that kind of threat from arising, and thus the need to make that kind 
of choice.
    Mr. Chairman, the second reason why enlargement passes the test of 
national interest is that it will make NATO stronger and more cohesive. 
The Poles, Hungarians and Czechs are passionately committed to NATO and 
its principles of shared responsibility. Experience has taught them to 
believe in a strong American leadership role in Europe. Their forces 
have risked their lives alongside ours from the Gulf War to Bosnia. 
Just last month, Czech soldiers joined our British allies in securing a 
police station from heavily armed Bosnian Serb extremists.
    Mr. Chairman, I know you have expressed concern that enlargement 
could dilute NATO by adding too many members and by involving the 
alliance in too many missions. Let me assure you that we invited only 
the strongest candidates to join the Alliance. And nothing about 
enlargement will change NATO's core mission, which is and will remain 
the collective defense of NATO soil.
    At the same time, it is important to remember that NATO has always 
served a political function as well. It binds our allies to us just as 
it binds us to our allies. So when you consider the candidacy of the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Mr. Chairman, I ask you to consider 
this:
    When peace is threatened somewhere in the world and we decide it is 
in our interest to act, here are three nations we have been able to 
count on to be with us. In the fight against terror and nuclear 
proliferation, here are three nations we have been able to count on. In 
our effort to reform the UN, here are three nations we have been able 
to count on. When we speak out for human rights around the world, here 
are three nations we will always be able to count on.
    Here are three nations that know what it means to lose their 
freedom and who will do what it takes to defend it. Here are three 
democracies that are ready to do their dependable part in the common 
enterprise of our alliance of democracies.
    Mr. Chairman, the third reason why a larger NATO serves our 
interests is that the very promise of it gives the nations of central 
and eastern Europe an incentive to solve their own problems. To align 
themselves with NATO, aspiring countries have strengthened their 
democratic institutions. They have made sure that soldiers serve 
civilians, not the other way around. They have signed 10 major accords 
that taken together resolve virtually every old ethnic and border 
dispute in the region, exactly the kind of disputes that might have led 
to future Bosnias. In fact, the three states we have invited to join 
NATO have resolved every outstanding dispute of this type.
    I have been a student of central European history and I have lived 
some of it myself. When I see Romanians and Hungarians building a 
genuine friendship after centuries of enmity, when I see Poles, 
Ukrainians and Lithuanians forming joint military units after years of 
suspicion, when I see Czechs and Germans overcoming decades of 
mistrust, when I see central Europeans confident enough to improve 
their political and economic ties with Russia, I know something 
remarkable is happening.
    NATO is doing for Europe's east precisely what it did--precisely 
what this Committee predicted it would do--for Europe's west after 
World War II. It is helping to vanquish old hatreds, to promote 
integration and to create a secure environment for economic prosperity. 
This is another reminder that the contingencies we do not want our 
troops to face, such as ethnic conflict, border skirmishes, and social 
unrest are far more easily avoided with NATO enlargement than without 
it.
    In short, a larger NATO will prevent conflict, strengthen NATO, and 
protect the gains of stability and freedom in central and eastern 
Europe. That is the strategic rationale. But I would be disingenuous if 
I did not tell you that I see a moral imperative as well. For this is a 
policy that should appeal to our hearts as well as to our heads, to our 
sense of what is right as well as to our sense of what is smart.
    NATO defines a community of interest among the free nations of 
North America and Europe that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War. 
America has long stood for the proposition that this Atlantic community 
should not be artificially divided and that its nations should be free 
to shape their destiny. We have long argued that the nations of central 
and eastern Europe belong to the same democratic family as our allies 
in western Europe.
    We often call them ``former communist countries,'' and that is true 
in the same sense that America is a ``former British colony.'' Yes, the 
Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians were on the other side of the Iron 
Curtain during the Cold War. But we were surely on the same side in the 
ways that truly count.
    As Americans, we should be heartened today that so many of Europe's 
new democracies wish to join the institutions Americans did so much to 
build. They are our friends and we should be proud to welcome them 
home.
    We should also think about what would happen if we were to turn 
them away. That would mean freezing NATO at its Cold War membership and 
preserving the old Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier. It would mean 
locking out a whole group of otherwise qualified democracies simply 
because they were once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact.
    Why would America choose to be allied with Europe's old democracies 
forever, but its new democracies never? There is no acceptable, 
objective answer to that question. Instead, it would probably be said 
that we blocked the aspirations of our would-be allies because Russia 
objected. And that, in turn, could cause confidence to crumble in 
central Europe, leading to a search for security by other means, 
including costly arms buildups and competition among neighbors.
    We have chosen a better way. We have chosen to look at the 
landscape of the new Europe and to ask a simple question: Which of 
these nations that are so clearly important to our security are ready 
and able to contribute to our security? The answer to that question is 
before you today, awaiting your affirmation.
    I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that there are weighty voices 
on both sides of this debate. There are legitimate concerns with which 
we have grappled along the way, and that I expect you to consider fully 
as well. Let me address a few.
    First, we all want to make sure that the costs of expansion are 
distributed fairly. Last February, at the behest of Congress and before 
the Alliance had decided which nations to invite to membership, the 
Administration made a preliminary estimate of America's share. Now that 
we have settled on three candidates, we are working with our allies to 
produce a common estimate by the December meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council. At this point, the numbers we agree upon as 16 allies are 
needed prior to any further calculations made in Washington.
    I know you are holding separate hearings in which my Pentagon 
colleagues will go into this question in detail. But I will say this: I 
am convinced that the cost of expansion is real but affordable. I am 
certain our prospective allies are willing and able to pay their share, 
because in the long run it will be cheaper for them to upgrade their 
forces within the alliance than outside it. As Secretary of State, I 
will insist that our old allies share this burden fairly. That is what 
NATO is all about.
    I know there are serious people who estimate that a larger NATO 
will cost far more than we have anticipated. The key fact about our 
estimate is that it is premised on the current, favorable security 
environment in Europe. Obviously, if a grave threat were to arise, the 
cost of enlargement would rise. But then so would the cost of our 
entire defense budget.
    In any case, there are budgetary constraints in all 16 NATO 
democracies that will prevent costs from ballooning. That is why the 
main focus of our discussion, Mr. Chairman, and in our consultations 
with our allies, needs to be on defining the level of military 
capability we want our old and new allies to have in this favorable 
environment, and then making sure that they commit to that level. We 
must spend no more than we must, but no less than we need to keep NATO 
strong.
    Another common concern about NATO enlargement is that it might 
damage our cooperation with a democratic Russia. Russian opposition to 
NATO enlargement is real. But we should see it for what it is: a 
product of old misperceptions about NATO and old ways of thinking about 
its former satellites in central Europe. Instead of changing our 
policies to accommodate Russia's outdated fears, we need to encourage 
Russia's more modern aspirations.
    This means that we should remain Russia's most steadfast champion 
whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining international 
institutions, opening its markets and participating constructively in 
world affairs. It means we should welcome Russia's decision to build a 
close partnership with NATO, as we did in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
    But when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is a 
threat, we owe it candor to say that is false--and to base our policies 
on what we know to be true. When they imply that central Europe is 
special, that its nations still are not free to choose their security 
arrangements, we owe it to candor to say that times have changed, and 
that no nation can assert its greatness at the expense of its 
neighbors. We do no favor to Russian democrats and modernizers to 
suggest otherwise.
    I believe our approach is sound and producing results. over the 
past year, against the backdrop of NATO enlargement, reformers have 
made remarkable gains in the Russian government. We have agreed to 
pursue deeper arms reductions. Our troops have built a solid working 
relationship on the ground in Bosnia. Russia was our full partner at 
the Summit of the Eight in Denver and it has joined the Paris Club of 
major international lenders.
    What is more, last week in New York we signed documents that should 
pave the way for the Russian Duma to ratify the START II treaty. While 
this prospect is still by no means certain, it would become far less so 
if we gave the Duma any reason to think it could hold up NATO 
enlargement by holding up START II.
    As you know Mr. Chairman, last week, NATO and Russia held the first 
ministerial meeting of their Permanent Joint Council. This council 
gives us an invaluable mechanism for building trust between NATO and 
Russia through dialogue and transparency.
    I know that some are concerned NATO's new relationship with Russia 
will actually go too far. You have asked me for an affirmation, Mr. 
Chairman, that the North Atlantic Council remains NATO's supreme 
decision making body. Let me say it clearly: It does and it will. The 
NATO-Russia Founding Act gives Russia no opportunity to dilute, delay 
or block NATO decisions. NATO's allies will always meet to agree on 
every item on their agenda before meeting with Russia. And the 
relationship between NATO and Russia will grow in importance only to 
the extent Russia uses it constructively.
    The Founding Act also does not limit NATO's ultimate authority to 
deploy troops or nuclear weapons in order to meet its commitments to 
new and old members. All it does is to restate unilaterally existing 
NATO policy: that in the current and foreseeable security environment, 
we have no plan, no need, and no intention to station nuclear weapons 
in the new member countries, nor do we contemplate permanently 
stationing substantial combat forces. The only binding limits on 
conventional forces in Europe will be set as we adapt the CFE treaty, 
with central European countries and all the other signatories at the 
table, and we will proceed on the principle of reciprocity.
    Another important concern is that enlargement may create a new 
dividing line in Europe between a larger NATO and the countries that 
will not join in the first round. We have taken a range of steps to 
ensure this does not happen.
    President Clinton has pledged that the first new members will not 
be the last. NATO leaders will consider the next steps in the process 
of enlargement before the end of the decade. We have strengthened 
NATO's Partnership for Peace program. We have created a new Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council, through which NATO and its democratic 
partners throughout Europe will shape the missions we undertake 
together. We have made it clear that the distinction between the 
nations NATO invited to join in Madrid and those it did not is based 
purely on objective factors--unlike the arbitrary line that would 
divide Europe if NATO stood still.
    Among the countries that still aspire to membership, there is 
enthusiastic support for the process NATO has begun. Had you seen the 
crowds that cheered the President in Romania in July, had you been with 
me when I spoke to the leaders of Lithuania and Slovenia, you would 
have sensed how eager these nations are to redouble their efforts.
    They understand a simple fact: With enlargement, no new democracy 
is permanently excluded; without enlargement, every new democracy would 
be permanently excluded. The most important thing the Senate can do to 
reassure them now is to get the ball rolling by ratifying the admission 
of the first three candidates.
    Mr. Chairman, a final concern I wish to address has to do with 
Bosnia.
    Some have suggested that our debate on NATO enlargement simply 
cannot be separated from our actions and decisions in that troubled 
country. I agree with them. Both enlargement and our mission in Bosnia 
are aimed at building a stable undivided Europe. Both involve NATO and 
its new partners to the east.
    It was our experience in Bosnia that proved the fundamental premise 
of our enlargement strategy: there are still threats to peace and 
security in Europe that only NATO can meet. It was in Bosnia that our 
prospective allies proved they are ready to take responsibility for the 
security of others. It was in Bosnia that we proved NATO and Russian 
troops can work together.
    We cannot know today if our mission in Bosnia will achieve all its 
goals, for that ultimately depends on the choices the Bosnian people 
will make. But we can say that whatever may happen, NATO's part in 
achieving the military goals of our mission has been a resounding 
success. Whatever may happen, our interest in a larger, stronger NATO 
will endure long after the last foreign soldier has left Bosnia.
    We can also say that NATO will remain the most powerful instrument 
we have for building effective military coalitions such as SFOR. At the 
same time, Bosnia does not by itself define the future of a larger 
NATO. NATO's fundamental purpose is collective defense against 
aggression. Its most important aim, if I can paraphrase Arthur 
Vandenberg, is to prevent wars before they start so it does not have to 
keep the peace after they stop.
    These are some of the principal concerns I wanted to address today; 
I know you have many more questions and I look forward to answering 
them all.
    This discussion is just beginning. I am glad that it will also 
involve other committees of the Senate, the NATO Observers' Group and 
the House of Representatives. Most important, I am glad it will involve 
the people of the United States. For the commitment a larger NATO 
entails will only be meaningful if the American people understand and 
accept it.
    When these three new democracies join NATO in 1999, as I trust they 
will, it will be a victory for us all, Mr. Chairman. And on that day, 
we will be standing on the shoulders of many.
    We will be thankful to all those who prosecuted the Cold War, to 
all those on both sides of the Iron Curtain who believed that the goal 
of containment was to bring about the day when the enlargement of our 
democratic community would be possible.
    We will be grateful to all those who championed the idea of a 
larger NATO--not just President Clinton, or President Havel, or 
President Walesa, but members of Congress from both parties who voted 
for resolutions urging the admission of these three nations. we will 
owe a debt to the Republican members who made NATO enlargement part of 
their Contract with America.
    Today, all of our allies and future allies are watching you for one 
simple reason. The American Constitution is unique in the power it 
grants to the legislative branch over foreign policy, especially over 
treaties. In this matter, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, you 
and the American people you represent are truly in the driver's seat.
    That is as it should be. In fact, I enjoy going to Europe and 
telling our allies: ``This is what we want to do, but ultimately, it 
will be up to our Senate and our people to decide.'' I say that with 
pride because it tells them something about America's faith in the 
democratic process.
    But I have to tell you that I say it with confidence as well. I 
believe we will stand together, Mr. Chairman, when the time comes for 
the Senate to decide, because I know that the policy we ask you to 
embrace is a policy that the Administration and Congress shaped 
together, and because I am certain that it advances the fundamental 
interests of the United States.
    Thank you very much.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for a very 
eloquent statement. It will be written about and talked about 
for some time because this is an important subject. It is an 
important milestone in not only the history of this country, 
but the world.
    We are going to have a round of 6-minute questions by each 
Senator, and I hope that they will not be taken up by 
statements up until 10 seconds before the red light comes on 
and therefore give you a chance to answer.
    Reports that NATO intends to consult with Russia on such 
fundamental matters as the military strategy and nuclear 
doctrine of the alliance have caused a great concern among a 
great many leaders of our country, past and present. They, you 
better believe, are contacting me with suggestions.
    Now, how can NATO consult with Russia on these and other 
matters without compromising the security or decisionmaking 
process of NATO?
    I guess that leads to a second question. Will you establish 
fire walls in NATO's relations with Russia and assure that 
Russia has neither a voice nor a veto in NATO discussions of 
issues such as arms control, strategic doctrine, and further 
alliance expansion? A pretty hefty question but I know you can 
handle it.
    Secretary Albright. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, we are pleased with the development of the 
NATO-Russia relationship to date. We believe that the NATO-
Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council it created 
offers real opportunities to develop a partnership between NATO 
and Russia through regular consultations and activities to 
build practical cooperation.
    I have been very pleased with the early work of that 
council, including its first ministerial meeting in New York on 
September 26th, and I think that in many ways that was quite a 
remarkable meeting in starting this process out. I believe that 
these elements of the NATO-Russia relationship, together with 
our bilateral efforts to integrate Russia more fully into the 
rest of the West, are beginning to bear fruit.
    At the same time, let me be very clear about your concern. 
The Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council created as a 
result do not provide Russia any role in decisions the alliance 
takes on internal matters, the way NATO organizes itself, 
conducts its business, or plans, prepares for and conducts 
those missions which affect only its members, such as 
collective defense, as stated under Article 5.
    The Permanent Joint Council will not be a forum in which 
NATO's basic strategy doctrine and readiness are negotiated 
with Russia, nor will NATO use the Permanent Joint Council as a 
substitute for formal arms control negotiations such as the 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.
    Consistent with our past approach to relations with Russia, 
NATO will continue to explain to Russia its general policy on a 
full range of issues, including its basic military doctrine and 
defense policies. Such explanation will not extend to a level 
of detail that could in any way compromise the effectiveness of 
NATO's military forces. Such explanations will only be 
offered--and I state this very emphatically--after NATO has 
first set its policies on issues affecting internal matters. 
NATO has not and will not discuss these issues with Russia 
prior to making decisions within the North Atlantic Council.
    Now, further, the Permanent Joint Council operates by 
mutual agreement, which means both NATO and Russia must agree 
to discuss an issue in the first place. NATO's policy always 
will first be established by consensus requiring all allies' 
agreement. Moreover, NATO is not required to discuss any issue. 
The Founding Act is a political commitment, not a legal 
document. The U.S., thus, will always retain the ability to 
prevent the Permanent Joint Council from discussing any issue 
which it does not want addressed for whatever reason within 
that forum.
    So, let me just reemphasize. I can assure you that the 
Permanent Joint Council will never be used to make decisions on 
NATO doctrine, strategy, or readiness. The North Atlantic 
Council is NATO's supreme decisionmaking body, and it is 
sacrosanct. Russia will not play a part in the NAC or NATO 
decisionmaking and it will never have a veto over NATO policy. 
Any discussion with Russia of NATO doctrine will be for 
explanatory, not decisionmaking, purposes.
    But I also would like to state, Mr. Chairman, that I think 
we will find the Permanent Joint Council a very useful 
mechanism for having discussions with Russia on issues of 
mutual interest. If the first meeting that we just held in New 
York is an example of it, I look forward to seeing that as a 
very useful mechanism as we develop our relationship with a 
democratic Russia.
    The Chairman. Very quickly because the yellow light is on. 
That is a good answer to my questions and I appreciate it.
    Have our allies met the current defense obligations to 
which they have committed themselves as members of NATO?
    Secretary Albright. Yes, they have. We are all part of how 
we burden-share in terms of allotments for NATO. As you know, 
there are really two parts to the NATO budget. There are common 
budgets for which there are assessments, and then each country 
provides within its defense budget to live up to its 
obligations under NATO. I believe that they are doing so and I 
also believe that they will do so as we go through developing 
the processes for the payment of the enlargement.
    The Chairman. Very well.
    Our distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Biden.
    Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, I have had the occasion now--it seems a 
little premature--to debate this subject in different fora with 
several of my colleagues who oppose the expansion of NATO, most 
recently before a group of chief executive officers and opinion 
leaders from one of our States who were here in town.
    There have also been closed meetings that Senator Roth and 
I have set up in the Senate's NATO Observer Group where our 
colleagues come in and state their support, opposition, or 
concern.
    It seems to be coming down to a pretty basic thing. It is 
kind of ironic. The only thing that seems to be carrying the 
momentum right now in the minds of many of my colleagues and 
the American people is the moral imperative, and that is that 
Poland and particularly Hungary and the Czech Republic were 
left behind the curtain. the curtain is up. Now is the time to 
let them come to the west from the east.
    But there's very little knowledge--I should not say 
knowledge--there is very little consensus about why this is in 
the vital interest of the United States. Very few people 
believe that adding, as brave and as valiant as they may be, 
the Polish army and the Czech army and the Hungarian army to 
NATO is any more likely to make them sleep more safely in 
Peoria than they sleep today.
    I am going to recite the arguments I hear very briefly, and 
then stop and ask you to comment because they are the essence 
of what we are going to have to answer in order to prevail.
    You indicate that the American people will eventually agree 
with NATO expansion. I think there is only one lesson I take 
away from the Vietnam War and that is that a foreign policy, no 
matter how well or poorly constructed, cannot be maintained 
without the informed consent of the American people. Right now 
there is not informed consent.
    Right now, if you ask the American people if they think 
there is a need for NATO, if they like spending $120 billion a 
year, or whatever allocation we would conclude is warranted by 
our NATO membership, I suspect you would find them saying the 
same thing I hear from my colleagues. Why cannot Europe do 
this? Why not leave well enough alone?
    If we expand, the alliance will lose its vitality. As one 
of my senior colleagues on the Armed Services Committee said in 
a debate I recently had with him ``if it ain't broke, don't fix 
it.''
    If you expand it, you are going to diminish consensus. We 
have a hard enough time getting 16 nations to agree now. Expand 
it by three or more nations and it is going to even be more 
difficult to obtain consensus. You are going to do what was 
done 300 years ago in Poland when the princes got together and 
each had a veto. You are going to allow the basic structure to 
crumble.
    These are the arguments that I keep hearing, but the root 
argument is as follows. Look at Europe. As one of our 
colleagues says, of the six largest armies in the world, five 
are in Asia. Our economic future lies in Asia. We have a 
disproportionate allocation of our resources in Europe. Why are 
we doing this?
    It comes down, in my view, to the need to answer the 
following question, and then I will cease when I ask it,--why 
cannot the Europeans take care of themselves? Their GDP is 
larger than ours. Their population is larger than ours. As my 
father said in a different context to me, not since the Roman 
army invaded Europe and quelled the pagans has there been an 
occupying army that stayed in place as long as we have been 
required to stay in place in Europe. Why?
    I believe you and the President in particular are going to 
have to carry that argument to the people, an answer to that 
question. Why can Europe not do this themselves? Why do we have 
to be involved?
    I think I am like that old joke about the Texan who says he 
does not know much about art, but he knows what he likes. I 
feel firmly I know the answer to why we have to be involved, 
but I think until it is explained to the American people, we 
are going to have this shadow debate about a lot of things 
other than why the Europeans cannot do this by themselves. Why 
do we need to be in Europe?
    Secretary Albright. Senator Biden, I think that that is a 
key question that we have to answer. Let me just say here that 
one has to really hark to history.
    First of all, as both you and the chairman said, our 
history is tied to the history of Europe, even before, 
obviously, the 20th century. Our values and a great deal of our 
history comes from Europe and strategically Europe is key to 
the United States in terms of its population, its economy, its 
geostrategic structure.
    But let me also say that what is evident because of those 
aspects, we have found that when we have not paid attention to 
Europe ultimately because those elements are so strong, we are 
drawn into dealing with Europe's problems, always at a much 
greater cost than would have been the case in the first place.
    I believe very strongly that this is a very smart 
additional preventive measure because history has shown us that 
we will go into Europe when we see massive wars that involve 
people that we are very closely related to, and when it 
involves our economic and strategic interests.
    Now, we are not an occupying power in Europe. We are a 
partner, and the point of this is that NATO does in fact bind 
us to Europe in a way that keeps us there as an invited partner 
and not as an occupying power. I believe that if we do not stay 
there now, and say ``let the Europeans do it,'' history will 
show us that we will be back and we will be back at much 
greater cost than if we were to do it now at a lesser cost as a 
partner rather than as someone that has to go dig them out of a 
mess.
    Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
    Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Albright, in my judgment the NATO enlargement 
debate has thus far largely ignored the central question of 
NATO's basic purpose. The Senate's ratification debate over new 
alliance members should start with that question, and I commend 
Chairman Helms for focusing on that theme in this committee's 
initial hearing.
    Many of us within the Congress and the administration have 
been working hard to ensure ratification of the admission of 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, perhaps too busy to 
define NATO's purpose. But issues associated with purpose and 
burden sharing will come up in the ratification proceedings. 
The answers will be key to the ratification, but also for the 
future of NATO.
    First, the absence of a clearly defined and understood 
purpose can complicate the implementation of enlargement by 
making it appear as if the alliance's exclusive mission is to 
defend its members against some future, yet ill-defined threat 
from the east.
    While not insignificant, such a preoccupation could in turn 
focus allied militaries on the wrong problem, particularly if 
major strategic threats to the United States and its allies are 
elsewhere.
    Second, the act of enlargement is becoming confused with 
the alliance's reason for existence, and the issue of future 
additional members could either cause further delay in 
addressing NATO's core purpose or be delayed by inadequate 
definition of the alliance's core missions.
    Third, the alliance force planning goals and programs must 
be based on a military strategy which must, in turn, be shaped 
by strategic purpose. Adequate defense spending in the 
modernization and restructuring of outdated forces will not 
occur in the absence of strategic purpose.
    Fourth, the United States' strategy and technology are 
driven by global priorities, while European forces are focused 
on territorial defense and thus are largely irrelevant to U.S. 
priorities. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review does not 
substantially take account of NATO, Europe, or the allies in 
U.S. global strategy and requirements. In short, adjudged by 
the QDR, America's main alliance is not confronting the main 
security problems of the United States.
    Despite alliance emphasis on defense of its members' 
territory under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and peace 
operations and crisis management under Article 4, NATO is in 
need of strategic direction. This should be accomplished before 
or in parallel with further decisions about forces, command 
structure, and membership.
    To oversimplify, I believe there are at least two strategic 
alternatives that could drive the alliance's core purpose.
    The first is for NATO to be the guarantor of European 
security, and thus NATO's mission is identified with a European 
mission and should dovetail with Europe's danger.
    The second is for NATO to serve as the vehicle by which 
Americans and Europeans protect their common interests wherever 
challenged. While it subsumes the first, it also suggests that 
the Atlantic Alliance can and should confront the rising 
threats to the interest of members beyond Europe. Geography is 
the chief criteria of the first strategy. Interests are what 
matter in the second.
    These two strategic alternatives point toward quite 
different futures and may suggest different approaches to 
future enlargement to further encourage other engagement of PFP 
partners to burden sharing, to structuring forces and commands.
    Secretary Albright, where does the administration stand on 
the definition of our strategic alternatives and what strategic 
direction or rationale will it promote within the alliance?
    Secretary Albright. Senator Lugar, let me say that there 
are two parts to the answer to this question.
    First of all, clearly the basic original objective of NATO, 
which was a collective defense treaty to deal with Europe, 
continues to be in place and in fact is adapted in order to 
deal with the changing security environment and obviously the 
change that has taken place with the end of the cold war. There 
have been studies that have been undertaken internally in order 
to adapt the strategic concept of NATO to the more current 
threats that it faces.
    If I might say, to dovetail on a point that Senator Biden 
made, that those who say it ain't broke, don't fix it, the 
truth is it ain't suitable for what we are doing now. So, it 
needs to be fixed. Europe looks very different, and I would ask 
you to review what I said in my opening statement: What would 
happen if we did not adapt NATO and enlarge it? Because 
otherwise, we would be dealing with the past instead of dealing 
with the future.
    At the same time, Senator, I do think that there has been 
an incredible amount of creativity in terms of developing 
institutional structures such as the EAPC or the Partnership 
for Peace that allows us to look at how to use an enlarged NATO 
or a NATO along with subsidiary organs to deal with 
peacekeeping, and to deal with the potential threats from some 
of the rogue states. I find what is going on is a very good 
exercise in creativity with substantial backing from strategic 
thinkers in terms of how to use what is the best military 
alliance in the history of the world to deal with the new 
threats, both geographically and the ones that you mentioned. 
That process is going on. These are not two mutually exclusive 
goals.
    Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
    Senator Sarbanes. Madam Secretary, I want to join with my 
colleagues in welcoming you before the committee. As everyone 
has indicated, this is the beginning of an extended process to 
examine carefully this issue.
    I want to get some sense at the outset about the path that 
we will be placed upon and where it will lead and what the 
timing is, as we move forward. So, I would like first to just 
get a sense of the parameters of the timing. How do you see 
that unfolding?
    Secretary Albright. Well, Senator, as of right now, we are 
dealing both with our allies and the invitees to develop what 
would be their defense plans and the budget that goes with it. 
We would hope that by December there would be the NAC 
ministerial at which the accession protocols would be signed. 
Then our plan would be to submit the treaty to you formally and 
have, in fact, the official debate going on. At the same time, 
there would be a ratification debate going on in the 
parliaments of the other NATO members. Then we would be able 
to, in fact, have the new NATO, the enlarged NATO, at the 50th 
anniversary in 1999.
    Senator Sarbanes. Now, is the December meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council the meeting at which you expect approval of 
the entry of the three countries into NATO?
    Secretary Albright. From the perspective that they have the 
power to do that, the accession protocols would be signed. 
Obviously, it is not final until this is ratified and goes 
through the constitutional processes of each individual 
country.
    Senator Sarbanes. Now, at that point, will the burden of 
the cost be outlined, or will that be something to be developed 
later?
    Secretary Albright. No. The plan is that the comprehensive 
NATO and cost report would be approved by the NATO ministers in 
December.
    Now, I have to stress again, as I stressed in my statement, 
those are to do with the costs in the current environment. They 
would have been worked out as a result of very careful work 
among the allies, as well as what is going on now, Senator 
Sarbanes, in terms of our people going around talking with the 
three invitees about developing their specific defense plans.
    Senator Sarbanes. I am having some difficulty in 
understanding why the 50th anniversary of either the Congress' 
approval of the Marshall Plan or the entry into force of the 
Marshall Plan is relevant as a date by which this process ought 
to move. I wonder if you could enlighten me on that.
    Secretary Albright. Well, we have been celebrating the 50th 
anniversary of everything.
    Senator Sarbanes. Well, I understand that.
    Secretary Albright. Are you suggesting, Senator----
    Senator Sarbanes. I take it that is about the only 
rationale for it.
    Secretary Albright. We believe, Senator, that the debates 
will be going on in the various parliaments. We want to give 
the publics a chance to really be a part of the debate. We 
would like to be early on in the ratification process because 
we are the United States and provide the leadership. We thought 
it would be a nice time, but it could be earlier if everyone 
were ready to go.
    Senator Sarbanes. I take it once that process is completed, 
then the immediate issue before us, as we are moving down this 
path, would be the accession to NATO of other countries which 
are seeking to become members. Would that be correct?
    Secretary Albright. We have said that it is an ongoing 
process. We have not specifically set a date for the next 
tranche, and we will be considering new members. We had said 
hypothetically that it could take place after these members 
were full members, which is where we had put it in 1999.
    Senator Sarbanes. Well, is it not reasonable to assume that 
once these members are dealt with, that that issue will then be 
immediately before us?
    Secretary Albright. It is reasonable to assume that. I 
think that there are countries that wish to be considered in 
the next tranche. There are those that we would like to be 
looking at that are, as part of the Partnership for Peace 
process, already very much involved with what we are doing. We 
are setting up relationships with those countries. So, this is 
an ongoing process, Senator.
    Senator Sarbanes. Well, that would encompass not only, say, 
the two that were considered at Madrid, Romania and Slovenia, 
but I take it other eastern European countries, would it not?
    Secretary Albright. We have said that all those countries 
that met the criteria and the guidelines, are eligible. NATO is 
open to all democracies and market systems which can show a 
real dedication to the development of democratic institutions 
which include civilian control over the military, and which can 
add to the security of NATO. We would not even consider other 
countries that could not contribute generally to the 
enhancement of NATO. That is the basis on which these three 
were invited, and that would be the basis on which others would 
be considered.
    The Chairman. The able Senator from Nebraska.
    Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Secretary Albright, thank you for taking time this morning 
and for your testimony.
    As you mentioned in your statement--and I think your 
statement, Secretary Albright, is a good beginning to this 
debate, but you mentioned clearly that NATO expansion is 
interconnected. It is connected to many variables, many 
interests, economic, trade, national security, Bosnia, Middle 
East, Caspian Sea, and others.
    Is the President of the United States going to set out a 
clear visionary comprehensive foreign policy so that this 
Congress, the American people, the world can understand what it 
is that he thinks is important as we move into the next 
century, including NATO expansion? How does that fit together? 
Will that be forthcoming?
    Secretary Albright. Well, Senator, I believe that all along 
we are giving speeches, as is the President, about the 
direction of our foreign policy. He has made a number of 
statements already. He obviously will continue to do so as will 
the rest of us.
    We are in a period, I think, that is more exciting than any 
that I have witnessed in terms of the possibility of putting 
all those pieces together and explaining to the American public 
what our national interests are and what the stake of each 
American is in all those issues that you have raised. Yes, the 
President will be speaking out, as will the rest of us.
    Senator Hagel. On Bosnia, which you alluded to and did 
mention that obviously Bosnia has in effect, will continue to 
have in effect, as we debate NATO expansion, could you give us 
an update at this point? Where are we in Bosnia? What is our 
course of action? When do we look at pulling some troops out, 
leaving some behind? Where might they be left? Where? Whatever 
you can give us in regard to Bosnia.
    Secretary Albright. Yes. Senator, I think it is very 
interesting. Bosnia has obviously been very much on our minds 
in the last couple of years, and often we focus too much on the 
negative aspect of the fact that the situation has not been 
totally resolved.
    I would prefer to focus on the positive, which is that if 
we go back 3 or 4 years, there were hundreds of thousands of 
people dying. It was impossible for any of us to feel that we 
were doing the right thing in terms of ethnic cleansing. There 
were refugees not only throughout the Balkans, but throughout 
Europe, and there was a question about the survival of the 
whole region.
    Thanks to the resolute action of the United States, led by 
President Clinton, we have in fact been able to reverse the 
tide and not only reverse the tide but take some very positive 
actions.
    First of all, there is a development of the centralized 
institutions within the federation where they are moving more 
and more to those central institutions. We have had municipal 
elections. New elections have now been scheduled in Republika 
Srpska for November. We have managed to see the return of 
refugees. There has been a real change in terms of the economic 
reconstruction. War criminals are going to the Hague. As we 
know, we had 10 of them that the Croats have turned over, and 
we see a genuine change.
    The President has stated, as have I and Sandy Berger, that 
we see the SFOR mission ending in June 1998. But clearly there 
will be a need for continued international presence in Bosnia, 
and that is evident in terms of an economic and political 
presence. We will have to see what kind of a security presence 
will be needed after that time, and that discussion has not 
taken place either in NATO or for us specifically. That is what 
we are turning our attention to now.
    But after a large review of our Bosnia policy last year, I 
do believe that we have new momentum and that we have done a 
great deal to improve the situation for the Bosnian people and 
ultimately, therefore, for the United States because it is in 
our national interest that there not be instability in the 
Balkans.
    Senator Hagel. One additional comment and I would be very 
interested in your thoughts on this, Madam Secretary.
    It seems to me, although I was barely around 50 years ago, 
that one of the reasons that NATO has been such a great success 
is because the leaders at the time had very clear vision that 
called upon the best of our people worldwide, certainly in 
America, and they were able to articulate that and express that 
in not just a grand vision but a realistic vision that called 
upon the best that we as a people, as a Nation, had and as a 
community of nations.
    I would hope that the President will be very engaged in 
this debate because it is very clear that his personal 
commitment and leadership is going to be critical to whatever 
happens here. He, as you suggest, has a tremendous opportunity, 
one of the few opportunities in history, to really put a print 
on the future for the world.
    Secretary Albright. I was 10 years old, but I was on the 
other side of this. I have to tell you, if I might, Mr. 
Chairman, take a minute. I was living in Czechoslovakia at the 
time and it was left out of NATO because there was a communist 
coup and the Soviets had liberated Czechoslovakia and it was 
not allowed to be in this great Western alliance that was there 
to save the West. It did take the leadership of a lot of people 
in the United States to finally realize that in order to stop 
the slide toward communism, it was essential for the American 
people, with our European allies, to draw the line. It took a 
great deal of work by President Truman and by your predecessors 
and by my predecessors.
    I hope very much that that same kind of dedication takes 
place now, and I can assure you that President Clinton and the 
administration is fully with this. I know from listening to all 
of you--and the fact that we have started this now--that we do 
have that kind of commitment and partnership in examining the 
questions in 1997 as they were examined in 1948.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I am obliged to acknowledged that I was not 
barely around 50 years ago.
    Senator Robb.
    Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I was here but I was not concentrating on these particular 
matters at that precise moment in history.
    I join you and other members of this committee in thanking 
the Secretary for coming and being with us this morning and 
thank her for her leadership.
    I might observe, if I may, that a distinguished colleague 
and my senior Senator from Virginia, who is the Ranking 
Republican Member on the Armed Services Committee, has joined 
us this morning. I do not recall recently having had the 
privilege of his visit on this particular committee before, 
although we both serve on the other committee. I do not know 
whether he is going to join the questioning or not, but I am 
delighted that he could join us.
    Madam Secretary, let me just ask a couple of process 
questions or timing questions that are follow up on questions 
that have already been asked in part this morning.
    One of the questions has to do with the basic criteria. You 
indicated in your statement that no new democracy would be 
permanently excluded from NATO membership, but we are not, 
understandably, precise as to exactly how long that whole 
process might be open and inclusive.
    I wonder if you could indicate what your thinking is, at 
least at the moment, with respect to additional accessions. 
Will it be based strictly on the criteria that have been 
established?
    Will it be based on concerns about collective security?
    Will it be based on concerns about threat assessments or 
circumstances as they exist at that particular time?
    Will it be based in part on the success both politically 
and as a matter of creating a more stable relationship of the 
first three accessions or the invitees that presumably will be 
formally accepted sometime in the near future?
    Secretary Albright. Senator, I think that what we have 
based ourselves on as a guiding principle here is that in 
enlarging NATO, we do not wish to diminish its effectiveness. 
As we look at new members, we have to keep in mind that what is 
prime for us is to maintain the cohesiveness of NATO and have 
those that join it be contributors to its strength rather than 
to draw on it and to detract from it. So, that is a guiding 
principle.
    At the same time, we have made very clear that enlargement 
is not a one-time event, that this is a process and that we 
have to have a robust open-door policy in principle, but 
maintain a certain amount of flexibility and nonspecificity as 
we move forward on this.
    I think, as I stated to Senator Sarbanes, we agreed that 
NATO will review the process in 1999. We have made no decisions 
or formal commitments regarding future members. We are going to 
be using the same guidelines as we did for the invitations to 
these three current members.
    Now, obviously the circumstances at the time will be part 
of what we are looking at, but it is our belief that what needs 
to be the guiding principle is to maintain the cohesiveness and 
strength of NATO and have the new members be additions to that 
central goal.
    Senator Robb. Given the criteria that you have suggested 
and the ultimate ability for any democratic state, if they meet 
the criteria and whatever other matters will be considered by 
the member nations in NATO at the time, what would you assess 
is the prospect for the ultimate accession of, say, the Baltic 
states?
    Secretary Albright. Well, I think that again we will have 
to look at it as we move forward and make an assessment as to 
how the situation is evolving and what the first round has 
brought us. But let me specifically address myself to the 
Baltic states.
    We are taking a number of steps in order to ensure that the 
Baltic states are more and more enveloped in European 
institutions and that they are a part of an evolution that 
makes them a part of what we are doing in knitting them in. So, 
for instance, we have done more in terms of knitting them into 
Baltic organizations in northeastern Europe. We are founding 
members of a new group called the BALTSEA which does better 
coordinated donor military assistance. We are also promoting 
closer ties with Nordic states, as well as coordinating efforts 
to promote cooperation between northern Europe and northern 
Russia. We are encouraging the Baltic states in terms of EU 
membership. We are working very hard, I think, to make sure 
that they are very much a part of what we are doing.
    But the major statement, Senator, is that NATO is open to 
all democracies that meet those guidelines that we have been 
talking about. It is not closed to anyone and there is a 
process in train, but I am not going to predict specifically 
what the next group of countries will be.
    Senator Robb. I can understand about not wanting to address 
the question of timing, but clearly for those who have some 
hopes and aspirations for those states, that is precisely not 
ruled out.
    Secretary Albright. Absolutely.
    Senator Robb. Thank you.
    I had another question. My time is expired, however. Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
    I think all of us welcome the distinguished chairman of the 
Rules Committee.
    Senator Warner.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I enjoy sitting, where else? To his right on 
the Rules Committee.
    Senator Ashcroft.
    Senator Ashcroft. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, I thank you for appearing before us.
    You have stated today that there are no parts of Europe 
that face immediate threat and you indicate that one of the 
things we need to do is to enlarge NATO and to adapt NATO. 
Obviously, the NATO enlargement is the subject of the 
discussion.
    Will the adaptation of NATO require us to restate the 
purposes of the organizing documents in some way or is the 
adaptation somehow within the limits of the purposes as stated 
in the document?
    Secretary Albright. We believe that it is within the 
purposes of the document, a collective defense agreement.
    Senator Ashcroft. In terms of collective defense, I'm 
interested in what Senator Lugar mentioned. Defense seems to be 
geographic, at least to defend the soil of those nations that 
are members. Senator Lugar talked about pursuing the interests 
of the member nations.
    Do you see the adapted NATO and the enlarged NATO as 
pursuing the interests of member states, as well as defending 
the soil of those countries?
    Secretary Albright. I do because I think that as I 
mentioned to him, I think that there are increasing interests 
out of area that the NATO countries themselves agree to pursue. 
They are looking at ways to pursue the interests in a way that 
is commensurate with the way that they define them. So, it is 
not overreaching. On the other hand, there are threats that are 
different from the original founding that in fact can be 
subsumed in the way that the treaty is currently outlined.
    Senator Ashcroft. Your use of the phrase ``out of area'' in 
your response is instructive to me. I believe we see an out-of-
area deployment in Bosnia. How wide-ranging would you 
anticipate out-of-area deployments might become under an 
enlarged NATO? For instance, would you see them extending as 
far as the Pacific Rim in the event our interests were 
challenged there? Or would you define it as maybe extending to 
the subcontinent of Asia? Or would you see us as having 
potential out-of-area deployments in Africa, for example?
    I guess then the thrust of my question is, if NATO becomes 
an organization which addresses the interests of NATO nations 
wherever they might take place, is it to be a sort of limited 
U.N. that doesn't require quite as much consensus, or could you 
comment about the potential limits? What would be beyond the 
limit of a NATO which is to respond to the interests of members 
sates rather than NATO's historical purpose of defending the 
European democracies? Is there anyplace in the world to which 
NATO troops might not be assigned?
    Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, while I have said 
it is the prime military alliance of our time, it is not the 
only military arrangement that exists. The NATO Council 
operates by consensus and we are obviously not just one but I 
think people see us as a senior partner within the North 
Atlantic Council. I think that the definition of how far it 
would go is obviously based on that kind of a discussion.
    But let me say what I have been particularly impressed by, 
Senator, in the last couple of years is the creativity of the 
international community in terms of dealing with nonspecific 
threats that we had not heard about before. So, there are a 
variety of ways that issues can be dealt with.
    In the Pacific, we have just published new guidelines in 
our dealings with Japan. We have a whole different way of 
dealing with issues.
    Without making any kind of a statement that rules anybody 
in or out that might cause us problems later on, I would like 
to underline the fact that what is interesting about this era 
is the variety of ways that coalitions of the willing can be 
formed where there is a core group and then there are ways to 
deal with the problem where others join. The Partnership for 
Peace is now viewed as a very creative way of dealing with 
issues.
    Senator Ashcroft. I think I am hearing you say that the 
NATO Council's willingness to agree would be the only limit in 
terms of our ability to enlist the aid of individuals pursuing 
our interests somewhere else in the world.
    Secretary Albright. Not only that, but obviously 
constitutional processes of each of the countries is also 
involved. While we always talk about NATO as triggering this 
Article 5 where an attack on one is an attack on all, there are 
different ways to grade whatever the threat has been and the 
way that a country responds to it in which our constitutional 
processes are the determinative factor.
    Senator Ashcroft. I would like to raise one other issue. I 
see the yellow light is on.
    I am a little bit concerned about our relationships with 
Russia. I think to allow enlargement, without understanding our 
relationship to Russia in the context of it, would be in error, 
and I am sure you are doing that.
    But in one sense it seems like we are isolating a potential 
ally in Russia. We are telling them that you are not a part of 
the European or western oriented group of nations, and that 
troubles me, particularly when it appears to me that the 
administration is beginning to, while isolating a potential 
ally, embrace a new threat--the People's Republic of China--
particularly the administration's consideration of allowing 
nuclear cooperation with China.
    I suppose the other hearings will afford opportunities to 
address these issues, but I think we need to be careful, having 
won the cold war against the Russians, not to turn them from 
Europe and an orientation to the west.
    Secretary Albright. If I might.
    The Chairman. Sure.
    Secretary Albright. On the contrary. I believe that what we 
have managed here is to do a very important balance by, on the 
one hand, asking Russia to join us in the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act which allows them, as I mentioned in my remarks and also in 
answer to Chairman Helms, a way to be part of a discussion 
about issues of mutual interest. At the same time, this will 
leave the door open to them and make it very clear that the new 
NATO is not directed against them.
    So, I feel very strongly that while we need to maintain 
NATO as a guard against any potential resurgence, at the same 
time we have walked this line very carefully in terms of not 
isolating a new Russia from a new Europe and a new NATO.
    The question about China, sir, is that we are very careful 
in our dealings with China, in terms of having a multi-faceted 
relationship with them, and making sure that they are part of 
what we are trying to accomplish, which is a regime that does 
not allow proliferation of any weapons of mass destruction. It 
is important for us to engage with China also in a way that 
does not isolate them as a huge power as we move into the 21st 
century.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, it is good to see you again. You look 
wonderful, none the worse for wear.
    Secretary Albright. Love my job.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, that helps.
    Let me follow up on Senator Ashcroft's questions. My 
concern about NATO is twofold. One is Russia and the second is 
the cost item. Let me talk just for a moment about Russia.
    I for one see a kind of growing instability there. I see an 
increasing problem with proliferation, certainly a dramatic 
impact in Iran and Iraq with that proliferation. Some have said 
that there might be a response by Russia to NATO, by Russia's 
trying to develop an alliance down south with those countries. 
I do not know whether that is correct or not.
    But when you see Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's comments too 
on the subject that developments in Russia could take an 
ominous turn. He says, I am not afraid that Poland or Hungary 
or anyone else will be within NATO. It is not so dangerous for 
Russia. The thing I am worried about is Russia and what might 
happen in Russia and nothing else. End quote.
    I think as we watch some of these events, I for one see his 
point. I also recognize that START II is pending before the 
Russian Duma. It would be hopeful for its ratification soon. I 
would like your comment on that, and then whether promise 
negotiations for a START III might be able to ease some of 
this. But I think politically what happens in Russia as a 
product of this is a potentially very dangerous thing. I would 
like you to explore that a little further, if you would.
    Secretary Albright. Senator, clearly one of the major 
assignments that we have is managing the devolution of the 
Soviet empire and creating a positive relationship with the new 
Russia. I think we all see that as one of the major priorities 
of this administration.
    There have been all kinds of statements about how we were 
moving with NATO enlargement how it was going to undercut our 
relationship with Russia. It simply has not happened.
    First of all, let me say Russia does not like NATO 
enlargement. There is no question about that, and every time 
that I meet with Foreign Minister Primakov or President Clinton 
meets with President Yeltsin or Vice President Gore meets with 
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, that point is made clear. 
Nevertheless, it has not harmed us in terms of an ongoing 
relationship with them. As I mentioned, the permanent Joint 
Council meeting went very well. I have had extensive meetings 
with Foreign Minister Primakov dealing with a whole host of 
issues that we deal with on a mutual basis.
    I also think that those who have predicted that NATO 
enlargement would give solace to the hard-line members within 
Russia have been wrong also. The process there in terms of 
democratization is moving forward. I think we are seeing some 
advances in their movement toward a market economy. It is not 
without its problems, but it is not due to NATO enlargement. It 
is due to very serious issues involved in the transformation of 
that society, and our continued relationship with them and our 
ability to support the reform process is something that we must 
make sure continues.
    On START, I was very pleased that while I was in New York 
last week, I was able to sign a protocol to START II with 
Foreign Minister Primakov which is going to make it possible 
for them to move START II in the Duma. The Defense Minister and 
the Foreign Minister now together have gone to the Duma pushing 
for START II ratification. So, we are hopeful on that. They are 
going to take up the CWC Treaty first, but they are going to 
move on that in the next 4 or 5 weeks we have been told. I am 
hopeful on that, too.
    We have said that START III talks would begin after START 
II goes into effect, but there are already expert talks that 
are going on and there is a team in Russia right now that is 
following up on a lot of these decisions.
    So, I think that we are moving along well, not without 
problems, but I think we have to understand that the dire 
predictions about the end of the world if NATO enlarged are not 
coming true. I ask you all to look at the kinds of statements 
that Foreign Minister Primakov has been making when we sign 
these protocols or the kind of discussion we had in the 
Permanent Joint Council. So, the process is moving forward and 
we have to support the reformers in Russia.
    Senator Feinstein. Quickly on the subject of cost. With the 
opening cost being between $27 billion and $35 billion, with 
France's recalcitrance, and the limited means of the European 
Union monetarily, how is this money going to get paid and will 
it be paid?
    Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, as I said, we are 
now going through the process of determining what the cost 
actually will be under the current environment. The NATO allies 
have committed themselves--they did in Madrid--to paying the 
cost, and we are going to make sure that they do. We will pay 
our share and they will pay their share.
    I think for them this is a domestic question--whether they 
reallocate their defense resources in other ways; but they have 
made a commitment to pay for the cost of enlargement.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Madam Secretary, the Senator who will question you has a 
fan club in North Carolina. He is the only Senator, past or 
present, maybe not future, who has done heart transplants. He 
flies his own jet plane, and he has done transplants I 
understand at every major hospital in North Carolina and 
probably all the other 49 States as well. Dr. Frist.
    Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, I join my colleagues in thanking you for 
your forthright comments today.
    I want to turn and shift the focus a little bit on 
expectations of the various parties that are involved and what 
visions that they have. Undoubtedly, the singularity of mission 
has been the glue which in the past has bonded NATO members 
together so effectively since the creation of the alliance. 
However, we all now recognize that that bond and singularity of 
purpose created by the Soviet threat has largely dissolved.
    As we face the challenges of maintaining that alliance and 
at the same time redefining that common bond, something that 
concerns me in this or any other multilateral obligation is the 
difference in expectations of each of the parties, both 
currently at the table and coming to the table.
    The United States seems to believe that NATO can and should 
continue to maintain its original mission of mutual defense and 
include whatever necessary changes there might be to meet new 
evolving European demands.
    As indicated in remarks in Madrid in July, at least some of 
our main European partners view such a mission and a level of 
commitment as either too costly or unnecessary in the current 
environment and that a more loosely defined security should be 
the mission of the alliance.
    The incoming European countries with Soviet domination and 
presence clearly in their minds, really having had Soviet 
troops on their soil just a few years in the past, have an 
understandably even different expectation of NATO, especially 
how it will relate to membership in the European Union.
    I ask you to comment on these different visions and these 
different expectations and ask whether you think such different 
visions among the members and the potential members create an 
internal tension which the alliance simply has never had to 
address in the past, and then beyond that, how you see such 
differences in expectations affecting the alliance.
    Secretary Albright. Well, I think you have stated a very 
interesting proposition, but I am not sure that I totally agree 
with it. I think that the discussions that I have participated 
in and witnessed regarding our current NATO allies is that they 
are dedicated to the NATO they have seen and frankly are also 
proponents of enlargement. Otherwise, we would not have it.
    When we were in Madrid, I think our internal discussions 
there showed a basic dedication to the original purpose of NATO 
and the fact that it should be expanded to cover a certain 
number of countries. The discussion we had was whether it 
should not cover more. There is no one that is now arguing that 
it should not have expanded.
    I think what I have again found so interesting about the 
NATO alliance is its creativity in adapting itself and looking 
at how to restructure itself internally as well as look at what 
a new strategic concept is, and we are going through that 
process.
    As far as the new allies are concerned, I think there is no 
doubt that they see membership in NATO in terms of the 
possibility of being in the world that was denied them in the 
first place, as the chairman was saying, the promise of the end 
of the Second World War that they were cut out of. They do see 
that as a way of rejoining the West that they belong to. 
President Havel, who was in Washington on Friday getting the 
Fulbright Statesman Award, spoke, as is always his way, very 
movingly about what this means to come back to the West.
    At the same time, I think they do see it as an important 
security structure, one, within the original context, and two, 
as a way that is an impetus to them to deal with their current 
instabilities, the instability that we are trying to guard 
against: The problems that we see in Europe of ethnic conflict, 
of instability created as a result of that, and the fact that 
it has driven many of them to signing agreements with people 
and groups that they would never have imagined doing, as I 
mentioned in my statements, Hungarians and Romanians.
    So, they see it as a return to where they ought to be, but 
also a way of dealing with what they see as their security 
problems, not unlike I think what the original NATO group also 
sees.
    Senator Frist. Thank you. The expectations issue is one 
that I hope to continue to explore in our future hearings, but 
thank you for setting that foundation for me.
    We have mentioned Bosnia a couple of times and let me just 
go back because of my own mind. The U.S. has set next July as a 
date certain for withdrawal of at least our ground forces in 
Bosnia. Consequently our European allies have said that should 
the United States leave, withdraw, they too would withdraw. As 
you pointed out in your statement earlier, the implications for 
Bosnia are clear.
    Bosnia stands what realistically could be called the first 
test of an expanded or new mission of NATO, that is, 
peacekeeping or peacemaking beyond the borders of its members. 
Should this specific point of withdrawal become one of the 
major contentions between us and our allies? And if so, what 
are the implications for the so-called new NATO, and what 
implications are there for defining this mission?
    Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, I think there has 
been a meeting now in Maastricht where some of the discussion 
started in terms of how we all operate together as we look at 
Bosnia in the future. Let me just say not so parenthetically 
here that as we begin to think about this decision, obviously 
we will be consulting very closely with all of you.
    I think that what we have seen is that Bosnia in many ways 
has been a very good example of how NATO countries can work 
with non-NATO countries and how there can be the possibility of 
dealing with the kinds of destabilizing conflicts within a new 
context. I would imagine--I would hope in fact--that we would 
look at the lessons of Bosnia as we think about future 
missions, both positively and negatively, and try to see how 
NATO and NATO in coordination with Partnership for Peace 
countries and a wider alliance can in fact deal with different 
kinds of new threats.
    These two discussions are obviously going to intersect and 
we welcome that. I think that it is important for us to see 
that they are on parallel tracks. We cannot equate the 
discussions, but they will be intersecting here and in Europe.
    Senator Frist. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Senator Wellstone.
    Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, thank you for being here.
    I can very honestly and truthfully say that quite often I 
have a real clear view about issues and know where I stand, and 
on this question I am really quite undecided. I would like to 
give you just a little bit of context and then put at least one 
question to you.
    My father was born in the Ukraine, but his family kept 
staying one step ahead of the pogroms. He lived in Russia and 
ultimately he came to this country in 1914 when he was 17.
    He later had a chance to become friends with George Kennan 
and he always used to praise George Kennan not only for his 
wisdom but also for his command of the language.
    George Kennan wrote a piece in the New York Times a while 
ago now, in which he said something like he thought that this 
expansion of NATO could be the most fateful decision. It could 
have consequences that we could not even begin to prophetize. 
So, there you have George Kennan, a real giant.
    I have visited Russia, my father's home, and every time 
there is a delegation that comes here, I try and meet with 
people. I have not met anyone from Russia of any political 
persuasion who is not very much opposed to this. On the other 
hand, there is President Havel and there are you and others who 
have, of course, taken a very different position.
    This is what I do not quite understand. If we are talking 
about the importance of improving the economies and 
democratization of countries like Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
and Poland, there is the European Union. I do not know how a 
military alliance really meets those concerns.
    I do want to mention Senator Feinstein's discussion of the 
Prime Minister's remarks where he said I am not worried about 
Czechoslovakia or Poland or Hungary, but I am worried about 
what is going to happen in the country. You said, well, there 
is no evidence yet. But that is kind of a snapshot of right 
now. The question is where are we heading. We have to look to 
the future.
    If, for example, we are saying that this is not the end. 
The Baltic countries are welcome. Ukraine is welcome. What then 
would be the consequences within Russia?
    I guess all of this leads me to one question, and maybe 
this is my way, as somebody who is trying to sort through these 
issues, of getting closer to what I think would be the right 
position for me to take as a Senator.
    You said that if countries meet this democratic criteria, 
they are welcome. Would Russia be welcome? Maybe that is the 
question I should ask. If Russia meets the criteria, after all, 
all of us hope that they will build a democracy. I mean, it 
will be a very dreary world if they are not able to. This 
country is still critically important to the quality of our 
lives and our children's lives and our grandchildren's lives. 
If Russia meets this criteria, would they be welcome in NATO?
    Secretary Albright. Senator, the simple answer to that is 
yes. We have said that if they meet the criteria, they are 
welcome. They have said that they do not wish to be a part of 
it.
    But let me just say several things to your very well-
articulated question and your legitimate concern. I think all 
of us that have grown up in this era have the concerns that you 
have stated.
    I spent my entire life studying the Soviet Union and now 
Russia and the republics. I think we have to understand that 
Russia is not the Soviet Union and Russia is a different place 
than any of us ever thought it would be.
    All of us have genuflected in front of George Kennan. We 
all have felt that he was kind of the father of the way that we 
had studied the Soviet Union and Russia.
    But with all due respect, I disagree with him on this 
subject. I think that we are in a new era. I have spent a lot 
of time talking with the Russians about this and persuading 
them that if they want us to think about a new Russia, they 
have to think about a new NATO and a new Europe.
    Russia has a long way to go, but it is on a very important 
path. While they are objecting or stating that they do not like 
NATO expansion, we are involved in a whole web of relationships 
with them now in a way that I think is supportive of their 
democratic processes. We do not have time to go into all that. 
But the fact that we are in a set of arms control negotiations 
with them on a completely different approach than being 
adversaries in the way that we were, that there are trade 
agreements and market forces working, that there are democratic 
forces working, that they are part of a discussion about our 
mutual interests in Europe is for me a sign that we are heading 
in a different direction.
    Now, another aspect of this is I cannot understand why we 
would self-limit our desires for central and eastern Europe by 
what the Russians want. That is going back to the post World 
War II era, and I do not think that is correct. It is not 
correct in terms of security and it is not correct in terms of 
the morality that we talked about. Why should we now in 1997 
agree to a line that was created in 1945? I think it is wrong.
    Senator Wellstone. If I could, Mr. Chairman, just in 30 
seconds add, I do not have all of your intellectual capital in 
this area, but a different formulation might be why would we be 
trying to expand a military alliance, which we built, vis-a-vis 
a Soviet Union that does not exist any longer?
    It is not so much a question of our policy being governed 
necessarily by ``paranoia'' in Russia, but it has more to do 
with, as we look to the future, whether or not this could in 
fact invite the very instability that would be I think so 
dangerous to the world that we live in. It is a very 
legitimate, important concern that I think we will have more 
debate on. Again, for myself I still am trying to wade through 
this.
    Secretary Albright. May I, Mr. Chairman, respond?
    The Chairman. Sure.
    Secretary Albright. I would say the following. First of 
all, we had options here. We could say the threat is different, 
so let us just kind of junk NATO and start over. Why do that 
when NATO as a structure has worked very well and is, I think, 
capable of expanding and enlarging in terms of its strategy as 
well as its membership, as I answered to members over here.
    So, I think that the purpose here is NATO, while it 
maintains its central core of being a defensive alliance, has 
the capability of adjusting its strategic concept in a way that 
is not directed against Russia. The threat at the moment in 
Europe is instability and the undermining of the overall 
structure of what we want which is a free, undivided and fully 
united Europe. That is what is a priority for the United 
States, and NATO provides a very good structure for that. It is 
adjusting. It is a new NATO. It is not the NATO that you and I 
grew up with.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Now, my chairman of the Rules Committee, the Senator from 
Virginia, Senator Warner.
    Senator Warner.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and 
the other Members.
    I will ask but one question, the same question that I have 
debated very lively publicly with Senator Biden. I happen to be 
a very firm skeptic of this program.
    First, a quick answer. If Russia is admitted, I suggest 
that that would be the end of NATO because one of the primary 
missions of NATO would no longer exist. It would be the end 
because when I joined the Senator 19 years ago for the first 5 
years, this senior group up here led the defense against 
withdrawing from NATO, pulling our troops back, predicated both 
on an economic argument and other arguments. We remember very 
well our distinguished Majority Leader Mike Mansfield who led 
that fight. I think if Russia were admitted, that fight would 
start again.
    But my concern, Madam Secretary, goes to the other threat 
that faces all of the new nations that are looking toward 
admission, and that is they are fighting fairly today and 
peaceably for economic survival. By conferring a NATO status on 
the three, it puts the other three in my humble judgment at a 
severe disadvantage in two ways.
    First, they can put in their advertisements for foreign 
capital, come invest here because you will be more secure 
because NATO is here, not unlike the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation when you deposit in your bank.
    Second, these nations will not have to mount their own 
defenses because they will be a part of NATO. I have discussed 
this with the Ambassadors and foreign ministers and defense 
ministers of these countries. They readily admit our cost to 
build that level of defense we think and security that is 
necessary will be one-third or perhaps one-half of what the 
nations that are not admitted will have to cough up.
    All of this to me indicates that you will begin to breed 
dissension. As we know today, part of the security of the 
world, the growing part of it that is threatened, are the 
ethnic strife, the border strife, religious strife, and you 
superimpose on their struggle today for economic survival, 
economic competition NATO status and a less cost for their 
defense, and I think you are sewing the seeds of strife between 
these countries.
    I go back to Harry Truman's biography in which he said his 
two proudest accomplishments were the Marshall Plan and NATO, 
and I fear we may be undoing one of his proudest 
accomplishments.
    Secretary Albright. Senator, I was looking forward to 
coming to see you in your committee.
    Senator Warner.  We will make that opportunity available 
and this record will be a very important part of that 
discussion.
    Secretary Albright. Let me say we have had this discussion 
and we will continue to have it.
    But let me just say on the Russian question, first of all, 
I think that, they have expressed no interest in being members. 
I was answering a question of Senator Wellstone whether it was 
hypothetically possible, and it is because, as we have said, it 
is a process that is open to democracies that meet the agenda.
    But it is a hypothetical question at this stage, and I 
think we need to focus on the fact that we are looking at a 
very different world. Who would have ever expected the things 
that we have seen in the last 10 years? So, I would just leave 
it in the realm of the hypothetical at this stage.
    Now, on your other question, I think that there is no proof 
of the fact that NATO status confers better investment. If you 
just look, for instance, at what we have seen in western 
Europe, NATO membership has not been used over the past half 
century to draw investment, let us say, to Norway. I think that 
there is no historical evidence of the fact that NATO provides 
economic benefits.
    At the same time, having spent a lot of time studying 
central and eastern Europe, I can tell you that the other 
countries, the non-invitees, are working very hard in terms of 
their privatization, their various other institutions that 
would provide good investment climate. They are creating a 
whole web of other relationships with the hope that they will 
be in NATO.
    I also think that we cannot get ourselves into this 
argument of none or all. We have to do what is right for NATO 
which is expand in a way that is good for the central core of 
keeping a cohesive alliance.
    Senator, on your final point, I think that our greatest 
leaders historically have been those who have understood that 
history does not stand still and that there are opportunities 
to be seized. What Harry Truman did with both the Marshall Plan 
and NATO was go against the tide and assume leadership at a 
time when creativity was needed. While one can never speak for 
the dead, one would assume, in looking at his record, that he 
would be the kind of person that would see the opportunities 
that NATO enlargement offers for U.S. national interests.
    Senator Warner.  I thank the witness. I thank the chair and 
the Ranking Member.
    The Chairman. A bit of housekeeping. I ask unanimous 
consent that a statement by Senator Smith of Oregon be 
submitted at the appropriate place in the record.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]
                  Prepared Statement of Senator Smith
    Secretary Albright, thank you for appearing before the Committee 
today to begin the process of advice and consent on the proposed 
enlargement of NATO.
    The United States is engaged in an ambitious effort to reshape the 
political and security structures of post-Cold War Europe. The goal of 
this effort is to build strong states, stable democracies, prosperous 
economies, and friendly governments across the breadth of Europe. We 
are joined in this effort by our NATO allies and by newly democratic 
people yearning for the opportunity to pursue political freedom and 
economic prosperity. Working against us are certain, backward looking 
leaders, historical antagonism between certain states, and ethnic and 
religious intolerance. These challenges that we confront, together with 
our friends and allies, are significant but not insurmountable.
    In recent years, Europe has seen historic changes. On the continent 
of Europe, more people than at any other time in history live under 
democratic government and enjoy the opportunity to pursue freely 
economic prosperity for themselves and their families. This soaring 
accomplishment is offset by the tragedy in the former Yugoslavia, in 
which Europe experienced the most brutal and widespread violence since 
Hitler's armies stalked the Continent.
    These two extremes reflect the significant, competing pressures on 
U.S. foreign policy at this moment in time. The United States is at 
once pressing for the consolidation of the gains of democracy in Europe 
by expanding NATO and with it our country's commitment to European 
security. Simultaneously, we have reluctantly, and with some 
controversy, assigned our soldiers to serve as peacekeepers in Bosnia 
in a mission that is defined less by an exit strategy than an exit 
date.
    These conflicting impulses--to engage and withdraw simultaneously 
from Europe--are manifested as much in our people as in our policies. 
It is absolutely critical that these contradictory inclinations are 
resolved through the leadership of the President, and through the 
development of sensible foreign policies that will gain the support of 
the American people. The Congress can be a partner in this effort, but 
by its very nature it cannot lead the effort

    The Chairman. Also, the record will be kept open for 3 days 
for additional written questions to be submitted to the 
distinguished Secretary.
    Madam Secretary, you have acquitted yourself admirably and 
effectively as always. It has been a pleasure to have you with 
us.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, before you close, would you 
yield me 30 seconds?
    The Chairman. Certainly.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I think the last argument that 
Senator Warner made is the most compelling, which is that these 
nations are going to spend more money to go it alone or to put 
it another way,less money to be part of the west. It seems to 
me that he makes the argument for NATO when he makes the 
argument that in fact they will be spending less money. They 
are going to spend the money. They are going to seek their own 
alliances. Bring them to the west.
    Secretary Albright. I agree with that.
    The Chairman. Do you agree?
    Secretary Albright. Absolutely. That's why when people are 
saying can they meet their obligations, they know that they can 
do better by increasing their defense budgets to be a part of 
NATO and that they will spend less by being a part of it. Yes, 
I do.
    The Chairman. Madam Secretary, is there anything else? 
Sometimes when I make an appearance, driving home I make the 
best speech of my career.
    I think you have done well this morning, but do you have 
any closing note that you would like to add?
    Secretary Albright. Well, the only note that I would like 
to make, Senators, is that I do think we are embarked on a 
great historical partnership here of being able to take what we 
have been watching very carefully, the evolution of Europe, and 
being able to now put our stamp on it and do for the 21st 
century what our predecessors have done for the second half of 
this one.
    I consider it a great honor to be here working with all of 
you on this. I know we are going to have an interesting debate. 
I think the questions are terrific. I do not know about all the 
answers, but I really do appreciate this and I feel that we are 
all making history here together.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Very well.
    There being no further business, the committee stands in 
recess.
    [Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to 
reconvene at 2:06 p.m., October 9, 1997.]



                   PROS AND CONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1997

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m. in room 
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms 
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
    Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, G. Smith, Grams, 
Biden, Robb and Wellstone.
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    We have Members on the way, including the distinguished 
Ranking Member, Mr. Biden. Mr. Biden's representative suggested 
that I proceed. I will do that by welcoming all of the 
distinguished foreign policy people that we have scheduled for 
today, including my friend, and the friend of a lot of people, 
Senator Bill Roth, whom I admire greatly.
    Today we are honored to have with us people on both sides 
of the NATO expansion issue, and that is proper. I might say, 
parenthetically, that what I envision as our role is to get all 
of the facts laid out so that the American people, to the 
extent possible, will understand what the issues are and where 
who stands on what.
    Our first witness is going to be, as I have said, the 
distinguished President of the North Atlantic Assembly and 
Chairman of the Senate NATO Observer Group.
    Senator Roth will be followed by two prominent supporters 
of NATO enlargement, Dr. Brzezinski, whom everybody knows--
nobody needs an introduction to him--and Ambassador Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, who is on the way here. Both have, again, 
generously consented to help Senators acquire a better 
understanding of a complex foreign policy matter.
    After completion of this first panel, the committee will 
hear from two outspoken opponents of NATO expansion, Ambassador 
Jonathan Dean and Professor Michael Mandelbaum.
    Again, on behalf of the committee and on behalf of the 
Senate, I thank each of you for being here and welcome all of 
our guests.
    We will first hear from Senator Roth. We are glad to have 
you and I thank you for coming. You may proceed.

 STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., UNITED STATES SENATOR 
   FROM DELAWARE, CHAIRMAN, SENATE NATO OBSERVER GROUP, AND 
           PRESIDENT, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ASSEMBLY

    Senator Roth.  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a 
great honor to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee to provide my perspective on NATO enlargement.
    I come, as you pointed out, before your committee not only 
as a colleague, committed to sustaining and strengthening the 
Transatlantic Alliance, but as President of the North Atlantic 
Assembly, as well as Chairman of the Senate NATO Observer 
Group.
    Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the North Atlantic 
Assembly, representing over 40 political parties from the 16 
NATO nations, has given more serious and consistent study to 
the future of NATO than any other transatlantic organization. 
The Senate NATO Observer Group, organized just last May by 
Senators Lott and Daschle, has already held more than a dozen 
meetings to examine the challenges and promise of enlargement.
    My association with both the NAA and the Observer Group 
leaves me firmly convinced that enlargement is not only 
necessary and important to the alliance, but to the United 
States as well.
    Will enlargement be easy? Few things this important are 
ever easy. Will it be worth it? Absolutely. Let me explain why.
    As a leader in the North Atlantic Assembly, I was in Berlin 
shortly after the Wall came down--meeting with many of the 
young, democratic leaders who were emerging in Central Europe. 
On that occasion, I was struck by two oddly opposing insights. 
First, is that the cold war was over. Democracy had, indeed, 
prevailed. My second insight, however, was that the move toward 
democracy alone would not guarantee peace and stability on the 
European continent. Having served in World War II, I was 
painfully aware of just how important peace and stability in 
Europe are to the United States of America.
    As I see it, Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is an 
opportunity unprecedented in world history. For the first time, 
we have the chance to be proactive in shaping a strategic 
landscape that will contribute to peace and stability in 
Europe. We are not responding to aggression or disaster, but we 
are building a foundation for a secure future in a region of 
vital interest to the United States.
    Four significant arguments make it clear why NATO 
enlargement is in America's best interest.
    First, a wider alliance is a stronger, more capable, 
alliance. The proposal to grant NATO membership to Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic will add three democracies to 
the alliance that have demonstrated their commitment to the 
values and interests shared by NATO members: human rights, 
equal justice under the law, and free markets. Each of these 
nations has a growing economy and a military under civilian 
control.
    It is important to note that each also contributed forces 
to Operation Desert Storm as well as our peacekeeping missions 
in Haiti and Bosnia. In that NATO is first and foremost a 
military alliance, the admission of these three democracies 
will enable the alliance to better fulfill its core mission of 
collective defense, as these nations will add another 300,000 
troops to NATO.
    Second, NATO enlargement will eliminate the zone of 
instability that now exists in Europe. Throughout its history, 
Europe has been a landscape of many insecure small powers, a 
few imperialistic great powers, and too many nationalistic 
defense policies, each creating friction with the other. Three 
times in this century these dynamics have pulled America into 
wars on the European continent. As President Havel has said, 
``If the West does not stabilize the East, the East will 
destabilize the West.'' Every time America has withdrawn its 
influence from Europe, trouble has followed. This we cannot 
afford.
    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, NATO enlargement 
is the surest means of doing for Central and Eastern Europe 
what American leadership, through the alliance has done so well 
for Western Europe. This includes promoting and 
institutionalizing trust, cooperation, coordination and 
communication. In this way, NATO enlargement is not an act of 
altruism, but one of self-interest.
    Third, keeping the above argument in mind, it follows that 
the costs of enlargement are insignificant compared to the 
costs of remaining static. Should NATO fail to follow through 
on the commitments made in Madrid, the alliance would be 
denying what it has stood for and defended throughout the cold 
war. Why? It is because NATO is much more than a military 
alliance. It is also a community of values. Enlargement is not 
only a strategic opportunity, it is a moral imperative. We 
cannot ignore the valid aspirations of European democracies who 
seek to become contributing members of our community.
    Failure to expand must be considered in terms of what it 
will cost as disillusionment replaces hope in Central Europe, 
as nationalism--which enjoyed a renaissance following World War 
II--fills the security vacuum in a region that has given birth 
to two world wars. Costs must also be considered in terms of 
the consequences to Russia and its struggle toward democracy. 
Should Central Europe remain a gray zone of insecurity, such a 
condition would risk reawakening Moscow's history of 
imperialism. NATO enlargement is a critical, nonthreatening 
complement to the hand of partnership that the West and NATO 
has extended to Russia. It insures a regional context in which 
a democratic Russia will have the best prospects for normal, 
cooperative relations with its European neighbors.
    Fourth, and finally, Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is 
fundamental to Europe's evolution into a partner that will more 
effectively meet global challenges to the transatlantic 
community. An undivided Europe at peace is a Europe that will 
be better able to look outward, a Europe better able to join 
with the United States to address necessary global security 
concerns. A partnership with an undivided Europe in the time- 
and stress-tested architecture of NATO will enable the United 
States to more effectively meet the global challenges to its 
vital interests at a time when defense resources are 
increasingly strained.
    Mr. Chairman, these arguments make it clear that America's 
best chance for enduring peace and stability in Europe--our 
best chance for staying out of war in Europe, our best chance 
for reinforcing what has been a strong, productive partnership 
with Europe--is to promote a Europe that is whole, free, and 
secure.What better organization to do this than the North 
Atlantic Alliance, an organization that has kept the peace for 
more than 50 years and remains unmatched in its potential to 
meet the security challenges of the future.
    Thank you for giving me this opportunity.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Roth follows:]
                   Prepared Statement of Senator Roth
    It's an honor to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee to provide my perspective on NATO enlargement. I come before 
your Committee not only as a colleague, committed to sustaining and 
strengthening the Transatlantic Alliance, but as President of the North 
Atlantic Assembly, as well as Chairman of the Senate NATO Observer 
Group.
    Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the North Atlantic Assembly 
representing over 40 political parties from the 16 NATO nations--has 
given more serious and consistent study to the future of NATO than any 
other transatlantic organization. And the Senate NATO Observer Group--
organized just last May by Senators Lott and Daschle--has already held 
more than a dozen meetings to thoroughly examine the challenges and 
promise of enlargement.
    My association with both the NAA and the Observer Group leave me 
firmly convinced that enlargement is not only necessary and important 
to the Alliance, but to the United States, as well.
    Will enlargement be easy? Few things this important are ever easy. 
Will it be worth it? Absolutely.
    Let me explain why. As a leader in the North Atlantic Assembly, I 
was in Berlin shortly after the Wall came down--meeting with many of 
the young democratic leaders who were emerging in Central Europe. On 
that occasion, I was struck by two oddly opposing insights. First, that 
the Cold War was over. Democracy had, indeed, prevailed. My second 
insight, however, was that the move toward democracy alone would not 
guarantee peace and stability on the European continent. And having 
served in World War II, I was painfully aware of just how important 
peace and stability in Europe are to the United States. of America.
    As I see it, Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is an opportunity 
unprecedented in world history. For the first time, we have the chance 
to be proactive in shaping a strategic landscape that will contribute 
to peace and stability in Europe. We are not responding to aggression 
or disaster, but we are building a foundation for a secure future in a 
region of vital interest to the United States.
    Four significant arguments make it clear why NATO enlargement is in 
America's best interest:
    First, a wider Alliance is a stronger, more capable Alliance. The 
proposal to grant NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic will add three democracies to the Alliance that have 
demonstrated their commitment to the values and interests shared by 
NATO members: human rights, equal justice under the law and free 
markets. Each of these nations has a growing economy and a military 
under civilian control.
    It is important to note that each also contributed forces to 
Operation Desert Storm, as well as to our peacekeeping missions in 
Haiti and Bosnia. In that NATO is first and foremost a military 
alliance, the admission of these three democracies will enable the 
Alliance to better fulfill its core mission of collective defense, as 
these nations will add another 300 thousand troops to NATO.
    Second, NATO enlargement will eliminate the zone of instability 
that now exists in Europe. Throughout its history, Europe has been a 
landscape of many insecure small powers, a few imperialistic great 
powers, and too many nationalistic defense policies, each creating 
friction with the other. Three times in this century, these dynamics 
have pulled America into wars on the European continent. As Vaclav 
Havel has said, ``If the West does not stabilize the East, the East 
will destabilize the West.'' Every time America has withdrawn its 
influence from Europe, trouble has followed. This, we cannot afford.
    Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is the surest means of doing for 
Central and Eastern Europe what American leadership, through the 
Alliance, has done so well for Western Europe. This includes promoting 
and institutionalizing trust, cooperation, coordination and 
communication. In this way, NATO enlargement is not an act of altruism, 
but one of self-interest.
    Third, keeping the above argument in mind, it follows that the 
costs of enlargement are insignificant compared to the costs of 
remaining static. Should NATO fail to follow through on the commitments 
made in Madrid, the Alliance would be denying what it has stood for and 
defended throughout the Cold War. Why? Because NATO is much more than a 
military alliance. It is also a community of values. Enlargement is not 
only a strategic opportunity, it is a moral imperative. We cannot 
ignore the valid aspirations of European democracies who seek to become 
contributing members of our community.
    Failure to expand must be considered in terms of what it will cost 
as disillusionment replaces hope in Central Europe, as nationalism--
which enjoyed a renaissance following World War II--fills the security 
vacuum in a region that has given birth to two world wars. Costs must 
also be considered in terms of the consequences to Russia and its 
struggle towards democracy. Should Central Europe remain a gray zone of 
insecurity, such a condition would risk reawakening Moscow's history of 
imperialism. NATO enlargement is a critical, non-threatening complement 
to the hand of partnership that the West and NATO has extended to 
Russia. It ensures a regional context in which a democratic Russia will 
have the best prospects for a normal, cooperative relationship with its 
European neighbors.
    Fourth, and finally, Mr. Chairman, NATO enlargement is fundamental 
to Europe's evolution into a partner that will more effectively meet 
global challenges to the transatlantic community. An undivided Europe 
at peace is a Europe that will be better able to look outward, a Europe 
better able to join with the United States to address necessary global 
security concerns. A partnership with an undivided Europe in the time- 
and stress-tested architecture of NATO will enable the United States to 
more effectively meet the global challenges to its vital interests at a 
time when defense resources are increasingly strained.
    Mr. Chairman, these arguments make it clear that America's best 
chance for enduring peace and stability in Europe--our best chance for 
staying out of war in Europe, our best chance for reinforcing what has 
been a strong, productive partnership with Europe--is to promote a 
Europe that is whole, free and secure. What better organization to do 
this than the North Atlantic Alliance--an organization that has kept 
the peace for more than fifty years and remains unmatched in its 
potential to meet the security challenges of the future.

    The Chairman. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for being 
here. That is an excellent statement and an excellent 
introduction to what we are going to attempt to do here this 
afternoon.
    We would be delighted for you to say for as long as you 
wish. But with all the things you have on your front burner, 
you may want to depart. But please stay as long as you will and 
as long as you can.
    Senator Roth.  I am on my way to Bucharest for a meeting of 
the NAA. So I thank you for opportunity to be here before I 
leave.
    The Chairman. Well, do not miss the plane.
    Senator Roth.  Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Now two names always thought of in this town and across the 
country, for that matter, when foreign policy matters come up 
are the names of Dr. Brzezinski and Dr. Kirkpatrick, who will 
compose our first panel today.
    I might mention that I first met Dr. Kirkpatrick through a 
mutual friend, who later became President of the United States. 
His name was Ronald Reagan. I had a hope then and I continue to 
have the hope that one of these days Dr. Kirkpatrick may be 
Secretary of State or higher.
    Dr. Brzezinski, we will hear from you first. I certainly do 
appreciate your being here.

 STATEMENT OF HON. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, COUNSELOR, CENTER FOR 
      STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    In my initial comment I will not retrace the ground that 
was covered by your discussion with Secretary Albright on 
Tuesday. It was an excellent discussion and many cogent 
arguments were reviewed regarding the issue of NATO 
enlargement.
    In my brief comments, I would like to touch merely on the 
historic and geopolitical significance of NATO's enlargement, 
as I see it. In my view, that enlargement has truly global 
significance. It is central to the step by step construction of 
a secure international system in which the Euro-Atlantic 
alliance plays the major role in insuring that a peaceful and 
democratic Europe is America's principal partner.
    Hence, NATO's enlargement is about America's role in 
Europe, whether America will remain a European power, and 
whether a larger, democratic Europe will remain organically 
linked to America.
    It is about Europe's historically important self-
definition, whether its scope and security are to be confined 
to the lines drawn arbitrarily in 1945, thus to a rump Europe 
with NATO increasingly anachronistic in the post cold war era, 
or whether NATO's membership should correspond to the 
aspirations of the democratic European nations.
    It is about Russia's relationship to Europe, whether NATO's 
enlargement helps a democratizing Russia by foreclosing to it 
the revival of any self-destructive imperial temptations 
regarding Central Europe.
    Let me also note parenthetically that NATO and the European 
Union have creatively resolved the old question of 
disproportionate German power in Europe. The progressive 
expansion of NATO can similarly resolve the question of 
disproportionate Russian power in Europe. It is noteworthy also 
in this connection that public opinion in key European 
countries is favorable to expansion.
    Moreover, so far, all of the apocalyptic predictions of the 
critics of NATO expansion have failed to come to pass.
    In brief, to me, NATO expansion is not principally about 
the Russian threat for, currently, it does not exist, though 
one cannot exclude its reappearance and, hence, some insurance 
against it is desirable.
    Second, to me, NATO expansion is not primarily a moral 
crusade, meant to undo the injustice the Central European 
people suffered during the half century's long Soviet 
oppression, though one cannot ignore the moral right of the 
newly emancipated and democratic Central Europeans to a life no 
less secure than that enjoyed by the West Europeans, or, I may 
add, ourselves, as well.
    For me, the central stake in NATO expansion is the long-
term, historic, and strategic relationship between America and 
Europe. NATO expansion is central to the vitality of the 
American--European connection, to the scope of a secure and 
democratic Europe and to the ability of America and Europe to 
work together in promoting international security.
    The expansion of the Euro-Atlantic alliance will bring into 
NATO counsels new, solidly democratic, and very pro-American 
nations. That will further deepen the American--European 
kinship while expanding Europe's zone of peace and democracy.
    Such a more secure Europe will be a better and a more vital 
partner for America in the continuing effort to make democracy 
more widespread and international cooperation more pervasive. 
That is why NATO's enlargement, in itself a vivid testimonial 
to the dynamism of the democratic ideal, is very much in 
America's long-term national interest.
    I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Brzezinski follows:]
                  Prepared Statement of Dr. Brzezinski
    I would like to comment very briefly on the historic and 
geopolitical significance of NATO's enlargement. In my view, that 
enlargement has global significance--it is central to the step-by-step 
construction of a secure international system in which the Euroatlantic 
alliance plays the major role in ensuring that a peaceful and 
democratic Europe is America's principal partner.
    Hence

  <bullet> NATO's enlargement is about America's role in Europe--
        whether America will remain a European power and whether a 
        larger democratic Europe will remain organically linked to 
        America;
  <bullet> it is about Russia's relationship to Europe--whether NATO's 
        enlargement helps a democratizing Russia by foreclosing the 
        revival of any self-destructive imperial temptations regarding 
        Central Europe.

    (Let me note in passing that NATO and the EU have creatively 
resolved the old question of disproportionate German power in Europe; 
the progressive expansion of NATO can similarly resolve the question of 
disproportionate Russian power in Europe. It is also noteworthy that 
public opinion in key NATO countries is favorable to expansion. 
Moreover, so far, all the apocalyptic predictions of the critics of 
NATO expansion have failed to come to pass.)
    In brief, to me NATO expansion is not principally about the Russian 
threat, for currently it does not exist, though one cannot exclude its 
reappearance and hence some insurance against it is desirable.
    Secondly, to me NATO expansion is not primarily a moral crusade, 
meant to undo the injustice the Central European peoples suffered 
during the half-century long Soviet oppression, though one cannot 
ignore the moral right of the newly emancipated and democratic Central 
Europeans to a life no less secure than that enjoyed by the West 
Europeans.
    For me, the central stake in NATO expansion is the long-term 
historic and strategic relationship between America and Europe. NATO 
expansion is central to the vitality of the American-European 
connection, to the scope of a democratic and secure Europe, and to the 
ability of America and Europe to work together in promoting 
international security.
    The expansion of the Euroatlantic alliance will bring into NATO 
counsels new, solidly democratic and very pro-American nations. That 
will further deepen the American-European kinship while expanding 
Europe's zone of peace and democracy. Such a more secure Europe will be 
a better and a more vital partner for America in the continuing effort 
to make democracy more widespread and international cooperation more 
pervasive. That is why NATO's enlargement--in itself a vivid 
testimonial to the dynamism of the democratic ideal--is very much in 
America's long-term national interest.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski. Dr. Kirkpatrick.

   STATEMENT OF HON. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, SENIOR FELLOW AND 
    DIRECTOR, FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE STUDIES, AMERICAN 
              ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank 
you for inviting me today to testify before this distinguished 
committee.
    The Chairman. Thank you for coming.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the 
subject of today's hearing is exceedingly important and that 
the Senate's decision on NATO enlargement today is even more 
important. I have followed this issue with substantial interest 
since the end of the cold war made it a practical policy 
option.
    I begin with a question: why should we enlarge NATO? I 
believe that the case for admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary to membership in NATO is not only strong, but that 
it is essentially the same as the case for organizing NATO in 
1947--to provide a security shield behind which the free 
institutions of these more geographically vulnerable European 
democracies can strike deep roots and thrive, to deter 
aggression, and to discourage conflict.
    Of course, there are differences between 1939, 1947, and 
1997. There is no one major threat to peace and security 
throughout the region today. But if the threats of aggression, 
subversion, and conquest are less clear now than they were 
after World Wars I and II, the new democracies' appetite for 
democracy and peace is greater.
    More people understand the benefits of freedom and long to 
share in them, and long for a place in the prosperity and 
security of the West. More associate that freedom, prosperity, 
and security with joining NATO--and the European Union, which, 
unfortunately, is not an issue that we are free to resolve by 
action of this Senate or any other American forum.
    I believe, these candidates that have been proposed for 
membership in NATO, will strengthen that institution. Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary share a history and a 
civilization with the countries of NATO and were engaged in 
parallel patterns of democratic development when first Adolph 
Hitler and then Josef Stalin's expansionist policies abruptly 
strangled their evolution.
    The people in each of these countries share our culture. 
They have demonstrated their vocation for freedom with heroic 
efforts to throw off foreign domination and regain control of 
their own histories. This took place again and again during 
their tragic evolution of this century.
    Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary can be incorporated 
into NATO, I believe, without creating any serious disruption 
and without requiring a reorientation of NATO's operations. 
They will ``fit'' in NATO. Their inclusion will not require 
qualitative changes in its purposes, culture, or mode of 
operation. NATO has been and, after their inclusion, will be, a 
military alliance of democratic nations united in the 
determination to preserve their free societies from 
aggression--by force, if necessary.
    The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary applied for 
membership in the European Union and in NATO years ago. Hungary 
actually applied for membership in the European Union before 
Soviet forces had departed their country. They have met all the 
stated requirements, and have cooperated in all proposed 
projects, including Partnership for Peace. They have 
demonstrated their seriousness.
    Moreover, 4 years have passed since President Clinton said 
in Prague, ``Let me be absolutely clear: the security of your 
States is important to the security of the United States. The 
question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, 
but when and how.''
    Yet to this day, no country that suffered under Soviet 
dominance has been admitted into either NATO or the EU.
    The post cold war period has seen the emergence of numerous 
threats to the development of a democratic Europe. Resurgent 
anti-democrats have won power in some States and threaten peace 
in others. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Slovakian 
Prime Minister Vladimir Mecias are examples.
    Milosevic sponsored and encouraged Serbian aggression and 
``ethnic cleansing'' against Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovena, in that order. He has attempted to destabilize 
Macedonia and repeatedly violated democratic norms and the 
human rights of the Serbian opposition. He has undermined 
democracy in Serbia and outside it. The violent attacks he 
sponsored have devastated two States--Croatia and Bosnia, and 
have destabilized the region.
    This aggression could happen because he is not a democratic 
president, although he is, in fact, elected. This reminds us 
that not all elected presidents are democratic presidents, 
governing within a framework of law and constitutional rule.
    It is no accident, Mr. Chairman, as the Marxists like to 
say, that in democratic Czechoslovakia, the separation of 
Slovakia from the Czech Republic was peaceful, and that the 
separation of Yugoslavia was violent. The difference was not in 
the preference of the presidents because the President of 
Czechoslovakia also preferred that that country remain united. 
The difference was the respect of those presidents for 
democratic decisions.
    There was in the Czech Republic no will to conquest in the 
government. The Czech Republic is a democracy, prepared to 
accept the democratic self-determination of Slovakia. Serbian 
rulers were not committed to democratic methods and were not 
prepared to accept the democratic self-determination of the 
component States of former Yugoslavia. The result was, first, 
instability, and then aggression and war, which continues to 
this day.
    There is, finally, in my judgment, Mr. Chairman, only one 
reliable guarantee against aggression. It is not found in 
international organizations. It is found in the spread of 
democracy. It derives from the simple fact that true 
democracies do not invade one another and do not engage in 
aggressive wars.
    Numerous studies establish beyond reasonable doubt that the 
best system, the only reliable basis for collective security, 
is that all the governments in an area should be democratic 
governments. Therefore, what reinforces democracy reinforces 
peace. That is the reason that the top priority for the United 
States and NATO should, today, be to preserve and strengthen 
the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe, and in 
Russia as well.
    Preserving and strengthening democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe should be the United States' central goal and 
top foreign policy priority in Europe, in my opinion. 
Membership in NATO will help to achieve those goals and 
strengthen the alliance.
    Enlargement of NATO will assuredly expand the zone of 
security, to quote the distinguished Senator who testified 
before me. It will expand the zone of security in Europe and 
will shrink the zone of insecurity and instability.
    Unfortunately, I believe that it is necessary for the 
United States to take a leadership role on this issue, perhaps 
because we have had the opportunity to observe the inadequacy 
of a purely European security framework policy to achieve these 
desired goals. It is not graceful and perhaps not appropriate 
for an American to emphasize the inability of the European 
Union and the WEU or any of the purely exclusively European 
military groups to protect peace and provide collective 
security to Europe. Their failure is manifest, but more so 
because, at the time the Serbs took up arms against Slovenia 
and Croatia, then-President of the EU--and it was the EC, 
then--Mr. Poos, of Luxembourg, said, and I quote, ``This is a 
European problem that will be solved by Europeans. There is no 
role here for Americans.''
    I think President Bush was quite ready to have the 
Europeans take that turn.
    But everyone knows what happened. Presidents George Bush 
and Bill Clinton were more than willing to stand aside while 
first Europe, then the United Nations and Europe worked on the 
problem. Unfortunately, what that experience provided was 
additional and timely evidence of the inadequacy of purely, 
European security arrangements to deal with the problems of 
Europe.
    And UNPROFOR, under Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali's command provided, I think, definitive evidence on the 
inability of the United Nations to mount an effective military 
operation in Europe or, indeed, virtually anywhere else.
    The passive, inadequate response of the EU, the United 
Nations, the OSCE, and the Western European Union testify to 
the ineffectiveness of a collective defense based only on these 
organizations. NATO has a different and a better record, though 
it, too, was tarnished in Bosnia by its association with 
UNPROFOR. I think it has reestablished its credibility.
    I think we have seen clearly the inadequacy of a U.N. 
response, which I emphasize only because we hear rather 
frequently that peace can be defended by the United Nations and 
peace can be restored by the United Nations. I believe that 
certain lessons of great relevance to European security leap 
out of the Yugoslav experience: that membership in the U.N. 
cannot be regarded as a reliable guarantor of European 
security--we have seen that very clearly, beyond any reasonable 
doubt; that global institutions cannot necessarily provide 
reliable solutions to regional problems; that diplomacy may not 
be able to forestall aggression, whether or not that diplomacy 
is directed from the U.N.; that ``peacekeeping'' is not an 
adequate response to the determined use of military force; that 
the ``peacekeeping'' rules of engagement that the U.N. has 
invoked and imposed in former Yugoslavia may make peace keepers 
hostages without deterring aggressors or assisting victims; 
that effective force is often necessary to repel force.
    NATO can be, and indeed, is, that effective force, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Why should we act now?
    Czech President Vaclav Havel, a man of unusual foresight 
and courage told the ``Economist'' magazine about a year ago 
that he feared the spirit of Munich was returning to Europe. I 
quote, ``I do not have in mind some concrete political act,'' 
he said. ``Rather, I refer to a mentality marked by caution, 
hesitation, delayed decisionmaking, and a tendency to look for 
the most convenient solutions.''
    Havel charged the governments of NATO and the EU with 
excessive caution and worried aloud that the opportunity to 
build a Europe of independent democratic nations would not last 
forever.
    As usual, I think President Havel was right. Years which 
might have been used to integrate the new democracies and to 
reinforce them, to extend the institutions of freedom have 
already been lost through indifference, procrastination and 
timidity. These characteristics--indifference, procrastination, 
and timidity--are not examples of effective foreign policy and 
not examples of the kind of policy that Americans are proud of.
    There has been a persistent question about whether we could 
afford to support our share, our reasonable share, of the costs 
of enlarging NATO. I would like to say Mr. Chairman, that the 
United States spends each year in former Yugoslavia alone 
several times the cost of even the CBO's estimates of enlarging 
NATO. That is very interesting if you think about it.
    No one made a decision to spend that much money in former 
Yugoslavia. I would like to say that it would have been much 
more economical in money and lives, to have taken timely action 
to deter action that conflict.
    Some people might argue that we could save the money by 
simply ignoring the ethnic cleansing and the massacres in 
former Yugoslavia. But the fact is, the United States cannot be 
indifferent to a tragedy in the heart of the civilization of 
which we are a part.
    What about Russia? Mr. Chairman, I believe that NATO is a 
defensive alliance dedicated to deterring and, if necessary, 
defeating aggression. A democratic Russia will pose no threat 
to anyone and a democratic Russia should not fear NATO. The 
most urgent problem in my judgment in U.S. relations with 
Russia is to help the Russian democrats defeat the internal 
enemies of Russian democracy.
    I think our government is working quite hard on that 
problem and, indeed, has since the end of the cold war.
    I think that it should be remembered that President Yeltsin 
himself has on several occasions clearly indicated that he has 
no problem with the inclusion in NATO of these independent 
European neighbors who were formerly members of the Warsaw 
Pact.
    President Yeltsin is himself principally concerned with the 
strengthening of democratic institutions in Russia. We cannot 
help him achieve his goals or Russians achieve the goals of a 
strong, consolidated, democratic government by appeasing the 
extremists and anti-democrats in Russia. We do not help Russian 
democrats by handing the opponents of democracy in Russia a 
victory over NATO, a longstanding symbol of the West's 
commitment to defend democracy
    We can only help by strengthening and moving boldly toward 
the construction of a democratic Europe, which is, indeed, 
wholly consistent, indeed virtually identical, with his goal.
    Mr. Chairman, I believe that Americans understand the 
American stake in a stable democratic Europe. Public opinion 
surveys and studies over the period from the end of World War 
II, the Marshall Plan, and the establishment of NATO, down to 
last week demonstrate that Americans support an active U.S. 
role in Europe and support a strong America and a strong 
democratic NATO. I think that the Senate should do no less.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick follows:]
              Prepared Statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify before this 
distinguished committee today.
    The subject of today's hearing is important. The Senate's decision 
will be more important. I have followed this issue with interest.
Why enlarge NATO?
    The case for admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to 
membership in NATO is not only strong, it is essentially the same as 
the case for organizing NATO in 1949--to provide a security shield 
behind which the free institutions of these more geographically 
vulnerable European democracies can strike deep roots and thrive, to 
deter aggression and discourage conflict.
    Of course there are differences between 1939, 1949 and 1997. There 
is no one major threat to peace and security throughout the region 
today. But if the threats of aggression, subversion and conquest are 
less clear now, as they were after World Wars I and II, the appetite 
for democracy and peace is greater. Still, more people understand the 
benefits of freedom and long to share it--and the prosperity and 
security of the ``West''. And more associate that freedom, prosperity 
and security, with joining NATO and the European Union.
The new members ``fit'' in NATO
    Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary share a civilization with 
the countries of NATO and were engaged in parallel patterns of 
democratic development when first, Adolf Hitler's, then Joseph Stalin's 
expansionist policies interrupted their evolution. The people in each 
of these countries share our culture. They demonstrated their vocation 
for freedom with heroic efforts to throw off foreign domination and 
regain control of their own histories.
    Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary can be incorporated into 
NATO without creating serious disruption or without requiring 
reorientation of NATO's operations. They will ``fit'' in NATO. Their 
inclusion will not require qualitative changes in its purposes, 
culture, or mode of operation. NATO has been and, after their 
inclusion, will be a military alliance of democratic nations united in 
the determination to preserve their free societies from aggression--by 
force if necessary.
    The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary applied for membership in 
the European Union and in NATO years ago (Hungary actually applied for 
EU membership before Soviet forces had departed). They have met all 
stated requirements and cooperated in all proposed projects including 
Partnerships for Peace.
    Moreover, four years have passed since President Clinton said in 
Prague, ``Let me be absolutely clear: the security of your states is 
important to the security of the United States ... the question is no 
longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.'' But 
neither they nor any other country that suffered under Soviet dominance 
has been admitted to NATO or the EU.
``Threats'' to a democratic Eastern Europe
    The post Cold War period has seen numerous threats to the 
development of a democratic Europe. Resurgent anti-democrats have won 
power in some states and threaten peace in others. Serbian President 
Slobodan Milosevic and Slovakian Prime Minister Vladimir Mecias are 
examples.
    Milosevic sponsored and organized Serbian aggression, and ``ethnic 
cleansing'' against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovenia (in that 
order) and acted repeatedly to destabilize Macedonia. He repeatedly 
violated democratic norms and the human rights of the Serbian 
opposition. He undermined democracy in Serbia and outside it. The 
violent attacks he sponsored devastated two states--Croatia and Bosnia 
and destabilized the region.
    It is no accident, as Marxist liked to say, that in democratic 
Czechoslovakia separation of Slovakia from Czeck Republic was peaceful. 
And that the separation of Yugoslavia was violent. The difference was 
respect for democratic decisions. There was no will to conquest in the 
government of the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is a democracy 
prepared to accept democratic self-determination of Slovakia. Serbian 
rulers are not committed to democratic methods.
    There is, finally, only one reliable guarantee against aggression--
it is not found in international organizations. It is the spread of 
democracy. It derives from the simple fact that democracies do not 
invade one another, and do not engage in aggressive wars.
    Numerous studies establish beyond reasonable doubt that the best 
system, the only reliable system of collective security is that all the 
governments in an area should be democratic governments. Therefore, 
what reinforces democracy reinforces peace. That is the reason that the 
top priority for the United States and NATO should today be to preserve 
and strengthen the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe and 
Russia as well. Preserving and strengthening democracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe should be the United States central goal and top foreign 
policy priority in Europe. Membership in NATO helps achieve those 
goals.
The Inadequacy of a purely European Response
    It is not graceful and perhaps not even appropriate for an American 
to labor the inability of the EC and the WEU to protect peace and 
provide collective security to Europe. That failure is manifest, the 
more so because at the time Serbs took up arms against Slovenia 
Croatia, then President of the EC, Mr. Poos of Luxembourg, said, ``This 
is a European problem that will be solved by Europeans. There is no 
role for Americans.''
    Everyone knows what happened. Presidents George Bush and Bill 
Clinton were more than willing to stand aside while first Europe, then 
the United Nations and Europe worked on the problem.
    Unfortunately, this experience provided additional and timely 
evidence of the inadequacy of purely European security arrangements. 
And UNPROFOR, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghaii provided 
definitive evidence on the inability of the United Nations to mount an 
effective military operation.
    The passive, inadequate response of the EU, the United Nations, the 
Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Western 
European Union have testified to the ineffectiveness of a collective 
defense based only on these organizations. NATO has a different and a 
better record though it was tarnished in Bosnia by its association with 
UNPROFOR.
The Inadequacy of a U.N. Response
    Certain lessons of great relevance to European security leap out of 
the Yugoslav experience:

  <bullet> that membership in the United Nations cannot be regarded as 
        a reliable guarantor of European security;
  <bullet> that global institutions cannot necessarily provide 
        solutions to regional problems;
  <bullet> that diplomacy may not be able to forestall aggression--
        whether or not that diplomacy is directed from the U.N.;
  <bullet> that ``peacekeeping'' is not an adequate response to the 
        determined use of military force;
  <bullet> that the ``peacekeeping'' rules of engagement may make 
        ``peacekeepers'' hostage without deterring the aggressors or 
        assisting the victims; and,
  <bullet> that effective force is often necessary to repel force;
  <bullet> NATO can be that force.

Why Act Now?
    Czech President Vaclav Havel, a man of unusual foresight and 
courage, told the Economist magazine about a year ago that he fears the 
spirit of Munich has returned to Europe.
    ``I do not have in mind some concrete political act,'' Havel said. 
``Rather I refer to a mentality marked by caution, hesitation, delayed 
decision-making and a tendency to look for the most convenient 
solutions.'' Havel charged the governments of NATO and the European 
Union with ``excessive caution'' and worried aloud that the opportunity 
to build a Europe of independent democratic nations will not last 
forever.
    As usual, Havel was right. Years which might have been used to 
integrate the new democracies and extend the institutions of freedom 
have already been lost through indifference, procrastination and 
timidity.
Can we Afford It?
    The United States spends each year in former Yugoslavia several 
times the cost of enlarging NATO.
    How much more economical in money and lives it would have been to 
deter that conflict.
What About Russia?
    NATO is a defensive alliance dedicated to deterring and, if 
necessary, defeating aggression.
    A democratic Russia will pose no threat to anyone. The most urgent 
problem in U.S. relations with Russia is to help Russian democrats 
defeat internal enemies of democracy. Our government is working hard on 
that problem.
    It should be remembered that President Yeltsin has repeatedly 
indicated that he has no problem with the inclusion in NATO of these 
independent European neighbors. We do not help Russian democrats by 
appeasing their opponents.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Those were two excellent 
statements.
    In doing a little housekeeping arithmetic, I note that we 
have about 8 Senators here. I have to divide the time so that 
we share it equally as nearly as possible. So I suggest that we 
have a 5 minute time period each, at least on the first round.
    Dr. Brzezinski, some critics of NATO enlargement are 
alarmed by the negative reaction of Russia to this policy. If, 
as we are led to believe by those critics, Russia has no 
designs on the territory of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic, how does the membership of those countries in NATO 
impact Russian interests?
    Dr. Brzezinski. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it 
impacts on Russian interests adversely at all unless Russia is 
of the view that NATO is an enemy and that the United States is 
an enemy. If that is the Russian view, then we have a very 
serious problem, in which case we ought to expand NATO for that 
reason as well.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. That's right.
    Dr. Brzezinski. But I don't think the Russians think of 
NATO as an enemy. I don't think the Russians think of America 
as an enemy, though some members of the Russian foreign policy 
elite--in almost all cases, in fact, former members of the 
Soviet foreign policy elite--would like to have the potential 
option in the future of exercising dominant political influence 
in Central Europe. This is why they don't like the expansion of 
NATO.
    In my view, we shouldn't cater to these anachronistic 
prejudices. But we ought to work to create conditions whereby 
Russia is not tempted in that fashion and is, therefore, more 
likely to become really a democracy.
    Let me just quote one sentence from Andrei Kozyrev, the 
former Russian Foreign Minister. He says that to pay too much 
heed to the Russian critics of NATO expansion would play into 
the hands of the enemies of democracy in Russia.
    I completely agree with Kozyrev.
    The Chairman. An excellent answer.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick--and I like to call you that because 
you did so well at the United Nations--how will the memberships 
of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO enhance the 
defense of democracy in Europe? What you said addressed this 
very subject. What is the greatest strategic value, do you 
think, of these three countries to the NATO alliance?
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think that their principal value 
to the NATO alliance is to expand in Europe and in an area of 
Europe which has been, historically, one of turmoil and 
victimization, to expand the zone of peace and the conditions 
of peace and stability.
    I believe that Western Europe as well as Central Europe and 
Eastern Europe will, in fact, have enhanced stability and 
confidence in the peace of their region if these countries are 
accepted for membership in NATO.
    Mr. Chairman, I read that you had said that it was an 
historic opportunity. I think it is an historic opportunity and 
I think it is the right thing to do, as well. I think the 
people of these countries, having been denied by accidents and 
tragedies of history that we all know about should be given the 
opportunities for peace, prosperity, and stability that they 
seek and would be very reliable allies. They would, as Dr. 
Brzezinski said, and as I think Senator Roth said, strengthen 
the armies of NATO. They will be enthusiastic, disciplined, and 
effective members of NATO because they have already paid the 
greatest price to join.
    So I think both in war and in peace, militarily and 
politically they would strengthen NATO and the context of NATO 
operations.
    The Chairman. Thank you, ma'am.
    Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for 
being here. You lend a great deal to this discussion.
    I would like to parse this debate arbitrarily into two 
pieces. The political argument up here is going to get down to 
money, in my humble opinion, and whether or not there is any 
use for NATO, period. It's the old Mansfield argument--bring 
the boys home.
    There is a strong strain of isolationism, stronger in one 
party than in the other, but it exists in both, and there is 
the question of why can't the Europeans do this. I mean, what 
do they need us for?
    I will leave that argument aside and focus on the arguments 
that are made by the foreign policy establishment of which you 
are two prominent members--and we are going to hear two 
prominent members after you who are opposed to expansion--and 
the intellectual community. They usually do not talk about 
expansion in terms of money.
    All of you will come up here--and I am a strong supporter 
of expansion--and will say stability is the question. Mr. Dean 
and Mr. Mandelbaum are going to argue that enlargement will 
diminish stability rather than enhance it in Europe. I argue 
that enlargement enhances stability and I think you will also 
be making that argument.
    I would like to lay out, as I have been doing for the past 
6 months, what I think the arguments are devolving to. There 
are only 3 or 4 arguments in opposition to expanding NATO and I 
would like you to comment on them, if you will.
    You mentioned the present President of Russia does not have 
a problem--I might add that I met with Yavlinsky and he had no 
problem. I met with Zyuganov and he had no problem. I met with 
Lebed and he had no problem. I met with Baturin and he had no 
problem. Not a single one of them had a problem in face to face 
meetings each of which lasted a minimum of an hour. Not one of 
them viewed the expansion of NATO as a threat, a physical 
threat.
    They viewed it in terms of being excluded from Europe. They 
viewed it in terms of it having consequences for them 
culturally and politically. They viewed it as a slap in the 
face. They viewed it as an insult to their pride. But none of 
them--and I asked the explicit question, ``Do you view it as a 
threat?'' Not one of them has said that. Not one of the ones I 
mentioned. I think I have covered the various political 
factions.
    Now here is what the arguments against expansion come down 
to, as I see it, and then I would like you to comment. First is 
that expanding NATO will diminish the organization's ability to 
gain consensus on a lot of issues because 3 more countries are 
being added to the 16, making a total of 19. It is hard enough 
to get consensus now, and the added difficulty will unravel 
NATO.
    Second is that expansion will aid the Russian nationalists, 
the Browns and the Reds, although I see no evidence of that. 
This argument had much more saliency 10 months ago. It has 
little now, in my view, in light of the NATO--Russian accord 
that has been reached. But that is a second argument I have 
heard.
    The third argument is that expansion will require us to 
station troops in the new member countries on the border of 
Russia. Not one single head of state in each of these countries 
that I visited, not one single defense minister, not one single 
head of the military, not one single person of any authority in 
any party in any of the 3 countries, has said they want 
permanent troops stationed on their soil. We have all said we 
are not going to permanently station troops. We are not going 
to give Russia the right to veto stationing troops, but 
regardless of that nobody has said we are going to permanently 
station troops in any of those countries. That is the third 
argument that I hear.
    The fourth argument is that these countries cannot pay. My 
counter to that is that if they do not pay to go this cheaper 
route, does anybody think these regions are is going to sit 
around and not try to increase their military capability on 
their own; not try to establish bilateral or multilateral 
relationships in that gray zone? And then aren't they going to 
spend more money?
    The other counter argument is that this power vacuum that 
exists in Europe can be filled by the stability of extending 
the hand of NATO to the east and stabilizing the situation in 
Russia.
    So I would like you to comment on: one, whether expansion 
will diminish consensus; two, will Russian nationalism be 
enhanced; three, are we likely to permanently station American 
troops in those three countries; and, four, is joining NATO 
going to cause them to drain their treasuries where otherwise 
they would not, which is the implication?
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Brzezinski. If I may start, Senator, first of all, 
these are very good questions. Second, you have answered most 
of them very well. So I am not sure I can improve. But I will 
give it a try.
    Senator Biden. Well, do you agree or disagree? Maybe I 
should put it that way.
    Dr. Brzezinski. As for diminished consensus, I think you 
are going to get new NATO members who are going to be really 
gung-ho and who are very, very pro-American. I think it is 
going to strengthen the tendency of NATO to be vital. New 
members tend usually to be activists, and these are countries 
which are very pro-American.
    Will it aid Russian nationalism? This is one of these hoary 
arguments that has been made for several years, that Russian 
nationalists will come to power if NATO expands. Well, we have 
announced that it will expand. Have they gained power?
    What about the recent changes in the Russian Government? 
Have they moved them more toward the nationalists or more 
toward the reformers? There is simply no evidence for it.
    All of the evidence we have in terms of public opinion 
polls is that the vast majority of the Russian people don't 
give a damn. This is an issue which preoccupies the Russian 
foreign policy elite, the old Soviet foreign policy elite, that 
hobnobs with some members of our foreign policy elite and tells 
them well, of course, we know NATO is not a threat, but our 
stupid people think it is a threat and, therefore, if you 
expand NATO, they will move toward the nationalists.
    Then they go back home and say to the Russian people that 
NATO expansion is a threat, don't you think? And the most that 
they get is a yawn. So it is a hoary argument.
    The argument that this will bring American troops into 
these countries on the borders of Russia is a particularly 
perplexing argument because Hungary does not have a border with 
Russia, the Czech Republic does not have a border with Russia, 
Poland has a tiny strip of a border with the Kaliningrad 
region, but basically is separated from Russia. So, first of 
all, it is an argument made by people who don't know geography. 
Second, the countries concerned don't want American troops on 
their soil.
    Senator Biden. That's what I think.
    Dr. Brzezinski. All public opinion polls indicate that they 
do not want foreign troops. They want to be part of the 
alliance. They want to contribute to it. But I think they would 
like to have a status, say, like Norway.
    What about that they can't pay? Well, first of all, they 
are growing. They are now beginning to spend more or less on 
the NATO level. Poland I think actually is slightly above the 
NATO average. They know damn well that if they are not in NATO, 
they will have to spend a hell of a lot more.
    Senator Biden. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Dr. Kirkpatrick.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I have now heard two sets of good 
answers to those questions from Senator Biden.
    I think that the concern about consensus, how difficult 
will it be to build a consensus on NATO is not only a valid one 
but a very important one. But I think it is also true that as 
for these three countries, their membership in NATO will 
certainly not complicate or render more difficult the process 
of achieving consensus.
    I believe, as Dr. Brzezinski has just suggested, that these 
countries will make splendid, enthusiastic participants in NATO 
and will, indeed, strengthen American leadership in NATO, 
which, in my judgment, is important and necessary.
    Senator Biden. If you forgive me, Mr. Chairman, I must say 
that it is a pleasure to be agreeing with both of you.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. On Russian nationalism, I also 
agree with the view expressed by Dr. Brzezinski, and I think it 
is your view as well, that it would not enhance Russian 
nationalism.
    I think, as Dr. Brzezinski has said, that there is a lot of 
exaggeration of the strength of Russian nationalism by the old 
Soviet foreign policy elite, which looks for new grounds to 
make outrageous demands and support outrageous policies. I do 
not think that NATO's enlargement will have any discernible 
effect. It may have an effect on the argument, but I don't 
think it will have an effect on the strength of Russian 
nationalism. I don't think it is something we should lie awake 
worrying about.
    I think the Russian people have an agenda of their own 
which involves a better living than they have had in their 
lifetime and their history, and more peace and more freedom.
    I don't believe it will bring U.S. troops to the borders of 
Russia. That is for geographical reasons, as Dr. Brzezinski 
made clear. Also it is because it just won't happen. These 
countries don't desire troops just as we would rather not put 
them there. We control our own troops. We don't send U.S. 
troops anyplace that the U.S. Government does not decide to 
deploy U.S. troops.
    It is simply not true that these countries could not pay 
their way in NATO. They could, or if they can't right now, all 
of them soon will be able to, and I think they will be eager, 
in fact, to assume the burdens of full membership in NATO. The 
added security of NATO can only enhance their economic 
prospects.
    I fully expect that they will be very reliable participants 
and contributors and will enhance the strength of NATO.
    The Chairman. Representatives of all three countries with 
whom we met recently indicated precisely what you said.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. OK. Good.
    The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
    Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Brzezinski, two sentences that you wrote in your 
testimony I thought were really terrific. You talked about the 
relationship to Russia and whether NATO's enlargement helps 
democratize Russia by foreclosing the revival of any self-
destructive, imperial temptation. That is a different argument 
or way of phrasing than I have heard and I think it is very, 
very helpful.
    But I wanted to ask about the preceding sentence as regards 
America. You say that NATO's enlargement is about America's 
role in Europe, whether America will remain a European power--
that is, America as a European power--and whether a larger, 
democratic Europe will remain organically linked to America.
    Now this makes sense, I think, to members of this 
committee, to you, to Dr. Kirkpatrick and to others. But it is 
a basic argument with regard to NATO altogether that we are 
having or that many of us have never had before. In other 
words, as I talk to constituents, they would say why are we a 
European power, why do we want to be a European power and 
organically linked. They say that really stretches the bridge 
too far altogether.
    What is your rationale, just as a help to all of us, 
understanding why NATO is important, as to why America should 
want to be a European power? What advantages are there to us in 
this and if so, of course, this is the basic reason for being 
in NATO. Try to express that, if you can.
    Dr. Brzezinski. Senator, you have raised a very fundamental 
issue. It has been addressed in part by Dr. Kirkpatrick and I 
will follow her lead in that regard.
    Europe is the place in which some of the worst human 
suffering and some of the worst tragedies of this century were 
precipitated. We were dragged into two world wars by the 
dynamics of European politics.
    Some of the worst suffering experienced by people in the 
course of this century was a consequence of these wars.
    We have created a system over the last 50 years which has 
dramatically decreased the probability of war, which has 
deterred aggression, which has created security in a very 
important part of this very large Eurasian continent. I believe 
that our future role in the world and the peace of the world 
depends centrally on the maintenance of that relationship.
    If we were somehow to begin to withdraw from Europe, if the 
relationship with Europe started being loose, vague, 
antagonistic, I think the world would be sliding, maybe if not 
toward new wars since there are no immediate protagonists 
threatening us, but certainly toward anarchy.
    So I do think that the maintenance and enhancement of our 
relationship with Europe and of our presence in Europe is 
central to nothing less than global stability. The American 
people, for all of their hesitations about use of force and 
their uneasiness about casualties still instinctively 
understand that.
    I was struck by the fact that just today, as you have 
launched this very important national debate on the enlargement 
of NATO, a public opinion poll has been released regarding the 
question of the enlargement of NATO. An overwhelming majority 
of the American people favor the enlargement of NATO.
    Well, that certainly does not signal to me a desire to 
withdraw from Europe if at the same time the American people, 
with only 18--18--percent opposing, say that we should enlarge 
NATO. It seems to me that, instinctively, our people understand 
that our fates have become inter linked, our values are the 
same, and we share a common interest in making these values 
more pervasive, in expanding the area that is safe and 
democratic at the same time, that is strong and can, over time, 
attract others, or, if necessary, contain and deter others if 
they are threatening.
    Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
    I believe Senator Robb is next. Senator Robb.
    Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I thank our two 
distinguished witnesses. I regret that I had another commitment 
and could not hear Dr. Brzezinski's remarks today. I did have 
the privilege last evening of hearing one of the most 
extraordinary and provocative addresses I have heard in 
Washington in years and I suspect that it is taken directly 
from his most recent book which I would, on the basis of last 
night's remarks alone, commend to others who want to be pushed 
in terms of some of their thinking.
    Dr. Brzezinski. I hope this is being televised nationwide, 
Senator.
    Senator Robb. I am afraid that it is not, so this will have 
limited value in terms of a promotion for the book, but 
certainly for the speech. I won't go on beyond that. I think 
there are matters in there that I hope you will bring and 
repeat before this committee when different subject matter is 
the focus of our attention.
    But I would like to ask just one question of both of our 
distinguished witnesses, if I may. I am not very good at 
leading a friendly witness, which would give you some 
indication of where I am coming from in this particular debate. 
The question of cost is one which is raised frequently and the 
question of cost avoidance is not always factored in. I am not 
sure that it is possible to give precise numbers, even with a 
great deal of study.
    I believe last night and I know previously others have 
alluded to the cost avoidance of Nunn-Lugar funds, for 
instance, in terms of what we don't have to spend on our own 
defense if we reduce the capability and, presumably, the 
potential of a possible enemy at home.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick made reference to the amount of 
money that we are spending in Bosnia as compared to the amount 
of money that we would spend out of the U.S. Treasury for this 
particular NATO enlargement as things now stand.
    I wonder, if you can, put some sense of a comparative cost 
avoidance to the U.S. Government in terms of the kinds of costs 
that we might otherwise have to spend if we decided not to 
pursue this scenario, if we decided, for whatever reason, not 
to approve of the enlargement of NATO.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Robb, I have thought about 
this quite a bit. We have CBO estimates, which I think, by the 
way, are extremely exaggerated, about the costs of NATO 
enlargement to us and to other NATO powers. I think the costs 
can be kept substantially below those CBO estimates. But I 
don't think we know what they would be compared to.
    It occurred to me that one thing they could be compared to 
is the cost of our military expenditures in non-NATO areas of 
Europe today, and the most outstanding example is the former 
Yugoslavia, and Bosnia quite specifically. I had a research 
assistant who was formerly a member of the U.S. Government, 
working in budget matters, do some very careful research for me 
on the costs of some of the so-called U.N. peace operations. He 
calculated the cost to us--our agreed-to share--as it were--of 
those peace operations in former Yugoslavia.
    I might say that these estimates do not include the very 
large U.S. contributions that were made to what I call off 
budget items, that is, funds or resources spent but never 
submitted to the Congress for authorization or appropriation. 
They were simply provided through the Pentagon.
    The figures that I am about to propose were of expenses 
that were authorized and appropriated in the formal process, 
acknowledged by the administration and all parties. Those 
figures put our expenditures in Bosnia at something around $4.5 
billion between the end of 1992 and 1996. They put at about $2 
billion our expenditures for Bosnian activities in 1996 and 
1995. There is no year that we have participated that the 
expenses have not been at or over $1 billion, which is several 
times greater than anyone estimates the costs of enlarging 
NATO.
    Now why is that a relevant comparison? It is because if 
NATO enlargement will have the effects that several of us have 
suggested, it will enhance the stability and peace in the 
region by both consolidating and strengthening democracies in 
the region, but also consolidating stability in the region and 
expanding the area that no aggressive government would feel 
inclined to attack.
    I cannot be certain that there would not be continued 
efforts by Milosevic, let's say, to take such actions as he has 
in the past. But I believe that an expanded, active, ready 
NATO, who understands that neither the U.N. nor an exclusively 
European security force provides an alternative, will be a big 
deterrent to aggressive power and aggressive action.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Senator Hagel.
    Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    I, too, would like to add my thanks to both of you for 
contributing your distinguished voices to this debate.
    Dr. Brzezinski, I was struck by the first paragraph in your 
statement where you reference the global significance of 
enlargement of NATO. I have thought for some time that this 
might, in fact, be the most significant consequence of the NATO 
expansion issue. All the other issues we have discussed today 
that you both have thought through and written and talked about 
are all critical, such as Russia. But when you really start to 
think about the connection of security and stability as you 
move South and East to Central Asia, to the Middle East, and, 
as you say in your paragraph a step-by-step construction of 
security internationally, I think that has a powerful amount of 
insight into something that we need to really sort through as 
we debate this issue.
    I would very much like to hear in a little more detail from 
you, Dr. Brzezinski and Ambassador Kirkpatrick, your thoughts 
on this one issue.
    Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you.
    If I may, let me just add one footnote to the preceding 
very able answer by reading from a document prepared by former 
Secretary of Defense Perry and Ashton Carter, former Assistant 
Secretary of Defense. They say the following: ``Despite the 
debate over the estimated costs of enlargement, the fact 
remains all estimates of the costs to existing members of 
adding the three new candidate members identified at Madrid 
show them to be a small fraction of existing NATO expenditures, 
the current U.S. burden of supporting its NATO commitments, and 
the U.S. defense budget.'' Then they go on to estimate that it 
will be, in any case, less than 1 percent.
    So I think this cost issue, while important, should not be 
blown out of proportion.
    Now on your very large issue, I think we are entering a 
phase in world affairs in which the long-range choice for us is 
either a slow slide toward some form of international anarchy 
with no new single power emerging as a threat to us the way 
Nazi Germany was or Soviet Russia was, but a slow slide into 
international anarchy, or a gradual expansion of genuine 
international security cooperation by a process of building 
blocks and ink blotting effect, expanding particularly the zone 
of security and democracy.
    Here I think the American--European connection is 
absolutely central. But over time I would hope--and I hope it 
does not sound too illusory--over time, over the next 20 or 30 
years, I would think we would point toward the creation of what 
might be called eventually a Trans-Eurasian or a 
Transcontinental security system in which NATO, in effect, the 
Euro-Atlantic alliance, involving America and Europe, would 
become linked to some sort of cooperative security arrangement 
with Russia, eventually pointing toward China, and America and 
Japan allied together also in a security relationship with 
China. In effect, this would be a kind of transcontinental 
OSCE.
    But we can only get there if we create solid, vital blocks 
of cooperative States committed to the same values and sharing 
the same interests. This is why the argument for constricting 
NATO to a rump Europe--one look at the map today shows that 
NATO really is linked to a rump Europe--is historically 
irrelevant. It is an anachronistic way of looking at the world.
    We are building here a long-term structure, a long-term 
process of creating the architecture of peace across all of 
Eurasia. The way to start is where we can start, with the 
democratic, solidly philosophically committed to the same 
values we are countries, countries that want to be our allies 
and who are committed to the notion of cooperative security.
    So we are engaged here in a long-term process, the first 
step of which is being taken now. But I think it is going to be 
a long-term process well into the next century. That is why 
your task is so historic.
    Senator Hagel. Well, thank you. I think it is significant 
and I think there is no reason why we cannot connect it all the 
way around the world. I think we must.
    Dr. Kirkpatrick, I would be interested if you had any 
thoughts here.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. No. In my testimony, I emphasize 
the fact that the countries which are being considered for 
inclusion in NATO are countries that share our culture, our 
values, and our aspirations and goals. I think that is very 
important and I think it is possible, basically, to build 
really strong alliances where there are such shared goals and 
values, and broad agreement on institutional arrangements.
    I believe that an enlarged NATO will insure an enlarged 
zone of security as well as democracy in Europe and that it 
will serve as an even more powerful magnet for Russia and other 
countries in the region who are themselves tending in that 
direction in any case.
    I think this process of building strength, consolidating 
freedom and prosperity, which then serves as a magnet is a 
process by which we can hope for an indefinite expansion of 
this zone of peace and security.
    I think I want to read Dr. Brzezinski's new book before I 
comment on the extension to Asia. I do believe that Asia, some 
countries in Asia, are likely to pose some difficult problems 
to the security of that region. I believe that an active 
American role in Asia is also important to the peace and 
freedom in that region. That is a point, by the way, that was 
made by the Australian minister of defense at a luncheon here 
in Washington just a few days earlier this week. I think that 
is valid as well.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Senator Wellstone.
    Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I know we are going to have testimony from Mr. Dean and Dr. 
Mandelbaum, but the more I try to learn about this, I think the 
more skeptical I become. I want you all to help me work through 
these arguments.
    I am not exactly sure why we are talking about expanding 
NATO. I am not sure what the compelling need is. It certainly 
does not seem to me to be a military threat from Russia, a 
country that cannot even invade itself. It certainly does not 
seem to me to promote economies in democracies because I don't 
see how you do that in a military alliance and, in any case, 
the more I hear the discussion, the more I am attracted to what 
Senator Nunn used to talk about, which is we ought to be 
talking about expanding the European Union. That seems to me to 
be the way in which we focus on promoting market economies and 
democracy and it is win/win from the point of view of what the 
potential consequences are in Russia.
    Moreover, I know that both you, Dr. Brzezinski, and you, 
Dr. Kirkpatrick, are very committed and sincere in your 
viewpoints and are professional and knowledgeable. You put a 
tremendous emphasis on promoting peace and democracy in the 
world and I agree with you. The question is whether this will 
do that.
    I mean, there are people like George Kennan, who is not an 
isolationist, and Paul Nitze, who is not an isolationist, much 
less our panelists to come, who are not isolationists, who 
raise very real questions as to what exactly are we gaining 
from this, what is even the reason to do this, vis-a-vis what 
are the potential consequences or implications of this.
    Now I just want to go a little bit further and get your 
reaction.
    I think that from everything I have read--and there is a 
little bit of disagreement, I guess, with Ambassador 
Kirkpatrick--the democrats in Russia are the most vociferous in 
their opposition. The democrats--not with a large ``D'' but 
with a small ``d''--are the most worried about this, though, I 
must say, it seems to be the case that people of all political 
stripes are very worried about it as well.
    So the question becomes what is the reason to do this. The 
final part of my question, which I raised the other day and I 
want to go back to, is if the focus is on building economies 
and building democracy, the countries we are talking about are 
the most stable. We are talking about Czechoslovakia, Poland 
and Hungary.
    I would think we would be talking about Belarus, we'd be 
talking about Ukraine, we'd be talking about the Baltic States. 
Are we talking about them and if we are, are you going to tell 
me that this does not have any consequences for what happens in 
Russia?
    Finally, shouldn't we be talking about Russia?
    Secretary of State Albright spelled out the criteria for 
choosing new NATO members: ``If we were creating a new alliance 
today, we would not leave a democratic country out in the cold 
because it was once, against the will of its people, part of 
the Warsaw Pact. The only question we would consider is this: 
which democratic nations in Europe are important to our 
security and which are willing and able to contribute to our 
security?'' That was before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, April 23, 1997.
    Well, by these standards, it is Russia whose citizens 
certainly were not consulted about joining the Warsaw Pact and, 
by the way, whose officials have expressed the wish to belong 
to the Atlantic Alliance. The Secretary said that this was not 
the case, but that is not my understanding at all.
    Senator Biden. She said not NATO.
    Senator Wellstone. Pardon?
    Senator Biden. Excuse me, Senator. I think she said not 
NATO.
    Senator Wellstone. Let me just finish. So wouldn't we be 
talking about Russia? Wouldn't we be talking about Belarus? 
Which countries should we be talking about?
    This is a range of questions. Why are we doing this? What 
is the military threat? How does a military alliance expand 
economy and democracy? What are the consequences within Russia? 
Isn't it true that the democratic forces in Russia are the most 
opposed? Finally, would Russia be eligible, from your point of 
view, to join an expanded NATO?
    Dr. Brzezinski. Well, I can take part of your question and 
then perhaps Ambassador Kirkpatrick can take part of it.
    First of all, that the democrats are most vociferous in 
opposition to expansion of NATO, that, of course, depends on 
one's definition of ``democrat.'' I know that Zhirinovsky is 
vociferous in opposition to NATO. But he is surely not a 
democrat.
    Senator Wellstone. I'm certainly not talking about him.
    Dr. Brzezinski. Zyuganov is vociferous in his opposition to 
expansion of NATO. He is not a democrat. Gaidar is not 
vociferous in opposing the expansion of NATO. In fact, on 
occasion he has indicated that they should not be so worried 
about it and not make such an issue out of it.
    Yavlinsky is not opposed to the expansion of NATO. Kozyrev 
has written eloquently favoring the expansion of NATO. So I 
think the picture is more mixed.
    But there are some Russians who say they are democrats and 
who are opposed to the expansion of NATO. Then I think they 
have to explain what is it that they are really opposed to. Is 
it because they think NATO is an enemy? Is it because they 
think America is an enemy? Or is it just possible that they 
really would like to have a sphere of influence in Central 
Europe, which is exactly what the Central Europeans do not 
want?
    Insofar as the argument that we should be more worried 
about Belarus or Russia than about the new democratic States of 
Central Europe, I think there is something to the argument in 
the sense that we should be worried about where they are 
headed. But it certainly is not an argument for having them in 
NATO.
    I think NATO is an alliance of like-minded States that are 
securely committed to the practice of democracy and share 
common philosophical views regarding the nature of the 
individual and his relationship to society and the State. That 
is what is so discerning about the NATO alliance.
    I do not think Belarus by that standard qualifies for 
membership, though we should be worried about what is happening 
in it. But worrying about what is happening in it I think gives 
more salience to the idea of the adjoining States being 
securely part of Europe.
    What about that we should be expanding EU? Well, the United 
States cannot expand EU. We are not a member of the EU. I would 
like to see EU expand, but it is an infinitely more complicated 
process than expanding NATO. You have to adopt something like 
3,000 to 5,000 laws of the Common Market standard and implement 
them domestically in order to qualify. It is a longer-range 
process. But we encourage it. By the year 2002 or 2003, 
probably the three candidate members that you are now 
considering will be members of the EU as well.
    Insofar as Russian membership in NATO is concerned, first 
of all, it is a fact--and I think Senator Biden is correct--
that no Russian leader has stated clearly and explicitly that 
they would like Russia to join NATO. Joining NATO does have 
implications for them. It means that their armies should be 
subordinated to an integrated command, currently headed by an 
American and so forth. I see no evidence of Russia wanting to 
be part of NATO.
    Beyond that, there are certain objective criteria that 
countries ought to meet to be members of NATO, and on this 
there is consensus between us and the Europeans. They have to 
be stably democratic. Russia is not yet so. They have to have 
effective, working, market economies. Russia does not have 
that, not fully, not yet. They have to have effective civilian 
control over the military. Russia does not. They have to have 
real respect for minority rights domestically. Ask the Chechens 
about respect for domestic rights of minorities. They have to 
have no border conflicts with their neighbors. That is hardly 
true of most of Russia's southern and eastern frontier.
    So simply on the basis of objective criteria, the issue is 
not Russian membership in NATO. But there is a legitimate issue 
about structuring a relationship of stability with Russia and 
of reassuring Russia that NATO is not a threat, by: one, 
promising them not to station American or German forces on the 
soil of new members--we are doing that; no nuclear weapons on 
the soil of the new members--we are doing that by creating 
transparency in NATO, by having the Russians present there; we 
are doing that by having systematic consultations with Russia 
on NATO; we are doing that by having Russia participate in the 
Partnership for Peace. We are doing that.
    So I think we ought to strike a balance. I have advocated 
for the last 3 years not only NATO expansion but a 2 track 
approach: expand NATO and sign some accommodation, some 
agreement, with Russia which reassures the Russians regarding 
their legitimate concerns. But we should not cater either to 
anachronistic prejudices or to hidden geopolitical designs.
    Senator Wellstone. Just a clarification, by the way. My 
argument was not necessarily that if there was going to be 
expansion that Poland is not important, or Czechoslovakia. I am 
just saying that if the concern is about stability and 
democracy, it would seem to me there would be other countries 
as well. I would still raise the question--though I have run 
out of time and will come back to it--as to what exactly is the 
reason for this. Is it a military threat? I don't see it. How 
does a military alliance help these countries economically? I 
don't see that, either.
    Isn't it true--I quite agree with you that some people call 
themselves ``democrats'' in Russia, but they are not. But my 
impression from talking to a lot of people is there is a great 
concern in that country among democrats as to where this is 
going to take Russia.
    The Chairman. I hate to do this, but the Senator's time has 
expired a long time ago.
    Would you like, Dr. Kirkpatrick, to comment?
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to say concerning the fact that Russians were 
not consulted about their membership in the Warsaw Pact in the 
previous regime and therefore should not be held responsible 
for that membership, Russians were not consulted about anything 
in the previous regime. This is one of the reasons that that 
regime proved so brittle, I think, in the opinion of all of us. 
Neither was any other member of the Warsaw Pact consulted about 
its membership in the Warsaw Pact. They were not consulted 
about anything.
    I believe, too, that there are a lot of different reports 
about how many of Russia's democrats oppose NATO enlargement 
and how strongly. We know some who don't oppose it. I think it 
is particularly significant, personally, that a very critical 
Russian democrat, Boris Yeltsin, has repeatedly indicated that 
he saw no problem, basically, about the expansion of NATO into 
the area now in question.
    He has from time to time backed off this clearly under 
domestic political pressures as all prudent presidents do from 
time to time. But we all know that there are Russian democrats 
who oppose and Russian democrats who support. I think it is an 
oversimplification to suggest that Russian democrats generally 
oppose the enlargement of NATO. Even if they did, I would 
simply say they have not thought that through because Russian 
democrats have an especially large interest in the 
consolidation of democratic governments and the strengthening 
of stability and peace in Central Europe, which is closest to 
them.
    What are we trying to do and why are we trying to do this? 
I ask myself this. Just as a personal note, I became an 
advocate of the enlargement of NATO in 1992, and began at that 
time to both write and speak about it. I concluded at a certain 
point that maybe the time that we ought to enlarge NATO and 
really work on it had passed and that maybe it was not as 
desirable as it was in 1992, or 1993, or 1994, since the world 
seems to be a good deal more peaceable and stable than we might 
have dreamed--at least the European, the Western world is.
    Why, then, should we do it? I think, Senator Wellstone, 
that, first of all, NATO is a very great asset not for 
Americans exclusively, or perhaps even principally, but it is a 
great asset for democratic civilization and for Europeans who 
have had a lot more trouble in keeping peace than, for example, 
we in the Americas have had. NATO is a great asset, in my 
judgment, to that end.
    I have believed from the very beginning, and the more I 
read and think about it, the more it seems to me that, from the 
very beginning, NATO was a multi functional institution, which 
we political scientists know most institutions are. From the 
beginning it was engaged in the strengthening and consolidation 
of democratic governments and again and again it incorporated 
new democracies and provided and instilled in them the 
reinforcement, training, and experience of the other democratic 
countries. I think that has been particularly important with 
the military establishments in a number of relatively new 
democracies--Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, and other such 
countries, not to mention the initial reorienting of the German 
military.
    I believe it will be important to the new democracies in 
Central Europe and I believe always in conserving one's assets.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. I thank you very much.
    Dr. Brzezinski, I promised to try to get you out of here by 
3:15. I missed it by 12 minutes for which I apologize, but not 
very strongly because we are glad to have you and appreciate 
your coming.
    The same goes for you, Ambassador Kirkpatrick.
    Senator Biden. Thank you both.
    Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you very much.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. We will pause now momentarily while we set up 
the second panel.
    [Pause]
    The Chairman. We are genuinely grateful to have two 
additional experts here. They are Hon. Jonathan Dean, Senior 
Arms Control Advisor for the Union of Concerned Scientists here 
in Washington, headquartered here; and Dr. Michael Mandelbaum, 
Professor and Director of American Foreign Policy of the Paul 
H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns 
Hopkins University. I recognize that I may have mispronounced 
your name, sir.
    Thank you very much.
    Mr. Dean, you may proceed.
    By the way, your entire statements will be printed in the 
record. You may proceed.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JONATHAN DEAN, SENIOR ARMS CONTROL ADVISOR, 
         UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ambassador Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want the thank 
the committee for this opportunity to express my views on NATO 
enlargement.
    Mr. Chairman, I have been closely involved with NATO since 
the early 1950's, when I helped with German entry into NATO. It 
is painful for me personally to speak in opposition to 
enlargement, but necessary. NATO in its present form and 
present membership continues useful and important. But 
enlargement of NATO will be costly, risky, and above all, 
unnecessary.
    The estimates of enlargement costs, and reference has been 
made to that, are still very loose and imprecise. But, even if 
we take the low, $30 billion, total for the first group of 
candidates as estimated by the State Department in its February 
report to the Congress, the United States is likely to have to 
pay the largest part of that total if it is serious about these 
force improvements.
    Neither the European allies nor the candidate States can be 
expected to pay the amounts allocated to them in these 
estimates. Moreover, these estimates cover only the first three 
candidates for membership--the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland. I believe that if the enlargement process continues, 
the total cost at the end will be from 3 to 5 times this low 
State Department figure of $30 billion for the first group, 
with the United States paying at least half of this overall 
total of $90 billion to $150 billion.
    Nearly all of this expenditure would be, in my view, 
wasteful because the need for the expenditure is created by the 
enlargement program and not by objective factors.
    My estimate here rests on the fact that including the 
Madrid 3, there are now 12 candidates for NATO membership. This 
total of 12 candidates can easily increase to 15 if Austria, 
Sweden, and Finland decide to apply. In fact, I see a 16th 
country, Ukraine, on the horizon.
    Continuous enlargement of this scope and possibly doubling 
NATO's current membership insistently recalls the scenes in 
Disney's ``Fantasia'' about the Sorcerer's Apprentice who cast 
a spell to create a spring of water but ended with a flood 
because he did not know how to say ``stop.''
    NATO has already decided at its Madrid summit to entertain 
the candidacies of five more countries--Romania, Slovenia, and 
the three Baltic States. We very much hope that better wisdom 
will prevail, but if in fact the first group of three is 
actually admitted as NATO members, then there should be no 
doubt anywhere that negotiations on Baltic State membership 
will be seriously pursued.
    If nothing else, partisan political competition in the 
United States will push these negotiations fatefully forward. 
No one will wish to be accused of faint-heartedness in the face 
of certain Russian opposition.
    If the Baltic States do become members of NATO, then the 
costs to present NATO members of making a realistic effort to 
defend these countries, which border Russia at the Eastern end 
of the Baltic Sea, will include very large increases in NATO's 
force projection capabilities, including naval forces and 
combat aircraft, and, quite probably, explicit reliance on 
nuclear weapons, matching a parallel and ominous development in 
Russian nuclear weapons policy.
    There is no room, of course, in the small Baltic countries 
to station outside NATO forces. But defending Romania and 
Bulgaria, if they become members, would, in practical terms, 
probably require stationing large NATO forces there. Possibly 
part of them may have to be United States troops.
    As regards risks, enlargement on this scale would 
dangerously expand the scope of current United States security 
commitments. It would extend United States security guarantees 
to States with traditional mutual hostility, like Hungary and 
Romania, Greece and Bulgaria, not to mention Macedonia and 
Albania.
    Then there is Russia, which still has 20,000 nuclear 
warheads. The Russian public, as has been mentioned here, pays 
relatively little attention to foreign affairs. It has other 
worries. But the political class in its entirety, with very few 
exceptions, from President Yeltsin to Zhuganov, opposes NATO 
enlargement and strongly. This is the group which will form the 
views of the Russian public about the outside world for the 
next generation, with the message that Russia is hostilely 
encircled and has been cheated by the same countries on the 
cold war outcome.
    The NATO-Russia Joint Council is a useful device, but it 
cannot contain the negative Russian reaction to actual NATO 
enlargement, especially if that enlargement includes the Baltic 
States bordering directly on Russia.
    We have, of course, already seen adverse reaction to NATO 
enlargement in the Russian Duma's refusal thus far to ratify 
START II and its general blockage of arms control agreements.
    Mr. Chairman, the main thing that every one of these costs 
and these risks have in common is that they are completely 
unnecessary. They are unnecessary because what Eastern European 
countries most want and most need is a form of membership in 
the Western community that provides support for their growing 
economic, social, and political structures.
    The European Union, as has been mentioned, is preeminently 
qualified to provide this support. Negotiations to enlarge the 
Union will begin next year. Among the first group of candidates 
very likely to be admitted are the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland, the same three countries who are today the leading 
candidates for NATO enlargement.
    Because of its nature and its mission, the European Union 
can do this job better than NATO. It is significant that public 
opinion in all three candidate countries sees this and shows 
stronger support for European Union membership than for NATO 
membership.
    Moreover, Mr. Chairman, the European Union should do it. It 
is their primary responsibility, not ours, to nurture 
democratic and free market institutions among their European 
neighbors. They can do this without incurring the risks of NATO 
enlargement. European Union enlargement causes no problems with 
Russia.
    It is true that these negotiations for entry to the 
European Union may take considerable time, perhaps, as Dr. 
Brzezinski has mentioned, until 2003 or 2004, or even longer. 
But Eastern Europe has plenty of time for this. It is making 
continuous political and economic progress. There is no crisis 
in Eastern Europe and no military threat to the area to require 
rapid action.
    However, a special, fast track European Union enlargement 
program for the Baltic States is needed as a substitute for 
their NATO candidacy.
    NATO enlargement is also unnecessary because an improved 
Partnership for Peace program provides close bilateral security 
relationships between the candidate countries and NATO.
    Finally, NATO enlargement is unnecessary because NATO, in 
its present form and membership, effectively provides stability 
in Europe, tying the United States to Europe, reassuring 
European countries that a united Germany will not become 
dominant, and providing very adequate residual insurance 
against Russian misbehavior. NATO today performs all three of 
these functions without increasing the possibility of Russian 
misbehavior as the enlargement project does. It performs these 
functions at no extra cost to the United States.
    Mr. Chairman, I believe these circumstances justify a 
request from the Senate to the administration to suspend action 
on its present enlargement program until it has rethought this 
issue and has presented to the Congress and to the American 
public a detailed plan for organizing European security which 
is genuinely comprehensive and which has a specific place in it 
for all of the potential NATO candidates and also for Russia. 
Such a plan would place European security on a far more stable 
footing without the heavy costs and risks of the present NATO 
enlargement program.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Dean follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Ambassador Dean
    I am Jonathan Dean, adviser on international security issues of the 
Union of Concerned Scientists. I am also speaking on this occasion as a 
board member of the Council for a Livable World.
    I have been involved with NATO since the early 1950s, when I helped 
with German entry into the alliance.
    NATO in its present form and present membership continues useful 
and important. But enlargement of NATO will be costly, risky and, above 
all, unnecessary.
Costs
    The costs to the United States of NATO enlargement have been 
estimated at from two to twenty billion dollars for the first group of 
candidates over a ten to fifteen year period. These estimates are still 
very loose and imprecise. But even if we start with the very low $30 
billion total for the first group of candidates estimated by the State 
Department in its report of February 1997 to the Congress, the United 
States is likely to have to pay the largest part of that amount if it 
is serious about these force improvements.
    A great deal of evidence, including well attested statements by 
French President Chirac and German Chancellor Kohl as well as the views 
of UK, French, German and Netherlands defense ministers reported in the 
Washington Post of October 3, points to the conclusion that current 
NATO members will not pay the shares allocated to them in these 
estimates--and that the United States will consequently have to take on 
a much larger proportion of the enlargement costs.
    For their part, the Eastern European candidate countries are faced 
by a costly and unneeded remilitarization precisely at a time when they 
have to focus their resources on economic and social reconstruction. 
They will not be able to afford these force increases, whose cost has 
been estimated by the Congressional Budget Office at six times their 
current defense budgets. Again, if the U.S. is serious about these 
improvements, it will have to pay for most of them itself.
    Moreover, these estimates cover only the first three candidates for 
membership--the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The total cost of 
NATO enlargement will probably be three to five times this low State 
Department estimate of $30 billion, with the United States paying at 
least half of that total.
    This is because, including these three countries, there are now 
twelve candidates for NATO membership. The others are Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and 
Macedonia. This total of twelve candidates can easily increase to 
fifteen if Austria, Sweden and Finland decide to apply for NATO 
membership. In fact, I see a sixteenth country--Ukraine--on the 
horizon. Internal discussion in Ukraine about applying for NATO 
membership has gone back and forth. If the candidacy of the Baltic 
States appears to be malting progress, then Ukraine will either apply 
for full membership or fall into very serious internal dissension.
    Enlargement of this scope, doubling NATO's current membership, 
recalls the scenes in Disney's ``Fantasia'' about the sorcerer's 
apprentice who cast a spell to create a spring of water but ended with 
a flood because he did not know how to say stop.
The Risks
    NATO has already decided at the Madrid Summit to entertain the 
candidacies of five more countries--Romania, Slovenia, and the three 
Baltic States. We very much hope that better sense prevails, but, if in 
fact the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are formally admitted as 
NATO members, there should be no doubt that these negotiations on 
Baltic State membership will be seriously pursued. If nothing else, 
partisan political competition in the United States will propel them. 
No one will wish to be accused of faint heartedness.
    If the Baltic States do become members of NATO, then the costs to 
present NATO members of making a realistic effort to defend these 
states bordering Russia at the eastern end of the Baltic Sea will 
include very large increases in NATO's force projection capabilities, 
including naval forces and combat aircraft, and quite probably explicit 
reliance on nuclear weapons, matching a parallel ominous development in 
Russia. There is no room in the small Baltic countries to station NATO 
forces, but defending Romania and Bulgaria would in practical terms 
probably require stationing large NATO forces there. If this happens, 
part of them will have to be U.S. troops.
    With these points, we also come to the risks of NATO enlargement.
    Holding to the present twelve candidate states, enlargement would 
dangerously expand the scope of current U.S. security commitments. It 
would extend United States security guarantees to states with 
traditional mutual hostility like Hungary and Romania, and Greece and 
Bulgaria, not to mention Macedonia and Albania. More work has to be 
done to resolve the quarrels of these countries, but it is very 
doubtful that internalizing them in NATO is the most productive or the 
safest way to go about it.
    Then there is Russia. The Russian public is confronted by difficult 
problems of daily life. Consequently, it pays relatively little 
attention to foreign affairs. But the Russian political class in its 
entirety opposes NATO enlargement. And this is the group that will form 
the views of the Russian public on its outside environment for the 
entire next generation. Russian policymakers are also worrying about 
the activities of the Clinton administration and U.S. oil companies in 
the Central Asian republics. Together with NATO enlargement, their 
concerns reinforce the image of hostile encirclement that has already 
played such a negative role in Russian history.
    We have already seen negative reaction to NATO enlargement in the 
Russian Duma's refusal thus far to ratify START II and its general 
blockage of arms control agreements.
    The NATO-Russia Joint Council is a useful device, but it will not 
contain the negative Russian reaction to actual NATO enlargement, 
especially if that enlargement includes the Baltic States bordering 
directly on Russia.
    Do we really want to deliberately add a decade of trying to cope 
with this issue to the tasks of Russian governments already tottering 
under the burden of economic and social reforms--in a country that 
still has 20,000 nuclear weapons? It defies common sense to believe 
that applying more and more pressures like this to a weak political 
structure can have positive results.
Costs and Risks Not Necessary
    The main point that every one of these costs and risks have in 
common is that they are completely unnecessary.
    They are unnecessary because what Eastern European countries most 
want and most need is a form of membership in the Western community 
that provides support for growing economic, social, and political 
structures. The European Union is preeminently qualified to provide 
this support. Negotiations to enlarge the European Union will begin 
next year. The first candidates--very likely to be admitted--will be 
none other than the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, the same three 
countries who are today the leading candidates for NATO enlargement.
    Because of its nature and mission, the European Union can do this 
job better than NATO. It is significant that public opinion in all 
three candidate countries sees this and shows stronger support for 
European Union membership than for NATO membership (see NATO Review, 
#3, May-June 1997, p. 17). Moreover, it is appropriate that the 
European Union and not the United States take on these economic and 
political responsibilities for the Union's European neighbors. The 
European Union can do so without the risks that arise from foisting off 
this task on a less suitable NATO. It is true that these negotiations 
for entry to the European Union may take considerable time, perhaps 
until 2003 or 2004 or even longer. But Eastern Europe has the time for 
this--it is making continuous political and economic progress, and 
there is no crisis in Eastern Europe and no military threat to the area 
to require rapid action. A special European Union enlargement program 
for the Baltic States is urgently needed.
    NATO enlargement is also unnecessary because an improved 
Partnership for Peace backed by a coordinating Euro-Adantic Council 
provides close bilateral security relationships between the candidate 
countries and NATO.
    And NATO enlargement is unnecessary because NATO in its present 
form and membership provides stability in Europe--tying the United 
States to Europe, reassuring European countries that a united Germany 
will not become dominant, and providing very adequate residual 
insurance against Russian misbehavior. NATO today performs all three of 
these functions without increasing the possibility of Russian 
misbehavior, as the enlargement project does, and it performs these 
functions at no extra cost to the United States.
    In sum, there is no perceptible logic or gain to the NATO 
enlargement project, while the project entails many serious but also 
superfluous costs and risks to this country. I believe these 
circumstances justify a request from the Senate to the Administration 
to suspend action on its present enlargement program until it has 
rethought the issue and has presented to the Congress and the American 
public a plan for organizing European security which is genuinely 
comprehensive and which has a place in it for all of the potential NATO 
candidates and ultimately also for Russia.
    Such a plan would place European security on a far more stable 
footing without the costs and the risks of the present NATO enlargement 
program.

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF 
 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, THE PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED 
     INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Mandelbaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you 
and my friend, Senator Biden, for giving me the opportunity to 
share my views with this committee.
    I have submitted for the record and a copy has been made 
available to all members of this committee a pamphlet I have 
written, entitled ``NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the 19th 
Century,'' which sets out in detail my reasons for opposition. 
In that pamphlet, I make at some length two points that I wish 
simply to state here without elaboration because time is short.
    [See appendix for the material received for the record.]
    Dr. Mandelbaum. First, I believe that we get no benefits 
whatsoever from NATO expansion. All public policy must weigh 
advantages and disadvantages. Whatever the costs of NATO 
expansion--and I will be talking about that--I believe that the 
advantages we incur are zero.
    Second, I believe that the only coherent reason for 
expanding NATO is to contain Russia. This is a military 
alliance. Russia might some day become a threat to its 
neighbors, but it is not a threat now and, therefore, NATO 
expansion, as planned by the administration, is at best 
premature and at worst counterproductive.
    Rather, Mr. Chairman, than dwelling on those points, I wish 
to address five others that I think are important for the 
committee and the Senate to consider: first, the costs of 
expansion; second, the status of the former communist countries 
that are not being included; third, an argument we are likely 
to hear with ever greater frequency, that we must proceed with 
this plan because our credibility is at stake; fourth, some 
alternatives to our current course; and, fifth, some comments 
on how this policy is being managed.
    Let me also state for the record, Mr. Chairman, that I do 
not agree with much of what was said about Russia and Russia's 
attitude toward this policy by the previous panel. I would 
hope, Mr. Chairman, that you and your distinguished colleague, 
Mr. Biden, would convene one or more sessions of this committee 
to hear the testimony on this subject of our best experts on 
Russia, those with a lifetime of study, reflection, and dealing 
with that important country.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I should 
point out to the witness that we have ordered just such a 
hearing and the very people you are talking about will all have 
a chance to testify.
    Dr. Mandelbaum. Thank you very much, Senator Biden. As 
often, you are ahead of me.
    As for the costs, I believe that the administration has 
dramatically underestimated both the total and the American 
share of these costs. The administration's estimate of the 
total is $35 billion, but the Congressional Budget Office 
estimate is 4 to 5 times that. Moreover, as my colleague, 
Ambassador Dean, has pointed out, the administration's 
estimates presume 3 or 4 new entries, but I believe we are now 
committed in some form to at least 8, with more to come. 
Moreover, the administration assumes that no American troops 
will be stationed in any of these countries.
    But I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that it will be 
possible to guarantee the security of the Baltic States without 
the deployment of Western troops. That, at least, is a question 
that I hope the Senate will ask the Department of Defense.
    As to the share, the administration forecasts the United 
States paying 15 percent of the fixed costs and 6 percent of 
the total costs. I do not believe that is remotely likely, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The administration foresees the Central Europeans, the new 
members, paying 35 percent of the total costs. I believe they 
will not be able to pay. They have steadily reduced their 
defense spending since their liberation. They have been warned 
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund not to 
increase defense spending. In no poll of public opinion in any 
of the three prospective members have I ever seen more than 20 
to 25 percent of respondents say that they are willing to spend 
more on defense.
    As for the Western Europeans paying 50 percent of the total 
cost, as the administration predicts, this reminds me of a 
story about the great Duke of Wellington, the victor at 
Waterloo, who was once approached on the battlefield by a 
junior soldier who did not recognize him and who approached him 
by saying, ``Mr. Smith, I believe.'' The great duke turned to 
him and said, ``If you believe that, you'll believe anything.''
    How do we know that the Western Europeans won't pay 50 
percent of the total cost--because they have said so. At the 
Madrid Summit, Chancellor Kohl, President Chirac and Prime 
Minister Blair all said on the record in one form or another 
that their countries would pay nothing. Nor, Mr. Chairman, do I 
believe that this is political posturing. It is politically 
impossible for these countries to spend more money for NATO 
expansion.
    Germany and France are under enormous pressure to reduce 
government spending in connection with the project of a single 
European currency which, despite all of the claims that have 
been made for NATO expansion, is far more important to them 
than anything having to do with NATO.
    Britain is under similar pressure.
    All the Europeans regard NATO expansion as an American 
initiative for which America will pay. So if we are going to do 
this, Mr. Chairman--and I believe we should not, but if we 
are--let us go in with our eyes open. No one else will share 
the burden which occasions a number of reflections.
    First, it may be that we won't have to spend very much 
money. But if there is no need for more spending, that means 
there is no threat to these countries, in which case there is 
no need to expand NATO.
    Second, whatever the near-term costs, we are undertaking 
the mother of all unfunded mandates here.
    Third, I believe that the refusal of the Europeans to bear 
what we would regard as their fair share of the burden will 
lead to a Transatlantic quarrel within NATO about burden 
sharing which will weaken the Atlantic Alliance, which I favor 
retaining, far more than expanding NATO could strengthen it.
    Fourth, and finally, given that the Europeans will spend 
nothing, this will raise one of two questions in the minds of 
those of us American taxpayers who do have to pay. First, if 
NATO is, indeed, a security organization, why is European 
security more important to Americans than to Europeans? If, on 
the other hand, as the administration sometimes claims, NATO is 
being turned into a social welfare organization, the question 
is why are American tax dollars being used for social spending 
in Europe rather than for social spending, or, as some would 
prefer, tax relief in the United States?
    Perhaps, Mr. Chairman. There are good answers to these 
questions, but I personally have never heard them.
    The next point I would like to address is the status of the 
former communist countries not being included in this 
expansion, notably the Baltic States.
    I believe that expansion as planned confronts the United 
States with a problem with respect to these countries that we 
can neither avoid nor solve. We have promised the Balts 
membership. We have made statements to that effect. They expect 
membership, and if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are 
entitled to join NATO, certainly Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia 
are equally, if not more, entitled. Yet the Russians have said 
unequivocally from Yeltsin on down that this is unacceptable 
and that they would respond negatively.
    If they should do so, Mr. Chairman, that would leave us 
with three options, each of which is worse than our present 
circumstance is not having expanded NATO.
    First we could expand NATO membership to the Baltics, 
meaning that we would bring the Western military alliance to 
Russia's border. At the very least, I believe we would have to 
expect a sharp diminution in cooperation with Russia and the 
remilitarization of the line between Europe, between NATO and 
Russia.
    Second, we could try to bring in the Baltic States but fail 
because our Western European allies vetoed this. This, I 
believe, they would do. I believe that Baltic membership is 
unacceptable to the Western Europeans, which means that we 
would have a huge Transatlantic quarrel with our Western 
European allies over this issue.
    Or, the third alternative where the Balts and Ukrainians 
are concerned is that we would fail to expand and thereby do 
precisely what the administration claims NATO expansion is 
designed to avoid. We would renege on a promise. We would give 
Russia a veto over NATO's affairs. We would draw a new line of 
division in Europe and we would strand new democracies on the 
wrong side of it.
    Now some argue privately that we can avoid this issue, that 
we can just expand to these three countries and let it go at 
that. I do not believe that this is feasible, even if it were 
proper, which I don't believe it is.
    First, we are on record as promising the Balts membership. 
Second, they will press us on this issue, and rightly so.
    Third, no American president will ever unequivocally rule 
out Baltic or Ukrainian membership, which means that the 
Russians will always have to assume that we may expand to 
Russia's border, which means at the very least that this issue 
will become a central one in relations between us and the 
Russians as far as the eye can see with no benefit to us.
    Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address an argument that 
we have heard already and will hear I think more insistently in 
the future. That argument is that, whatever reservations one 
may have about NATO expansion, it is now too late to turn back. 
The failure to ratify NATO expansion, as indicated by the 
administration, it will be said will shatter American 
credibility and the U.S. position in the world.
    I do not believe this is remotely the case. The argument 
about maintaining credibility was a powerful one during the 
cold war. It was the reason that we fought a major war in 
Korea. It was the reason we stood firm in West Berlin. It was 
the reason that we fought and continued to fight in Vietnam.
    That argument was persuasive because of its context. We 
were engaged in a global conflict with a militant, militarized 
adversary. It was reasonable to fear that retreat in one place 
would invite aggression elsewhere.
    But that context has disappeared completely. The cold war 
is over. The Soviet Union has collapsed. If the Senate decides 
that the course recommended by the administration is not the 
wisest one from the standpoint of American national interest, 
will the Soviet army be in West Berlin the next day? The 
question answers itself.
    I would like also, Mr. Chairman, to address another version 
of this issue, that is that this vote is a test of American 
international commitment and that if we fail to expand NATO as 
indicated, we will be guilty of isolationism.
    Now as a professor of American foreign policy, let me 
assure you that there is not now and never has been a policy of 
isolationism in the United States. No significant American 
figure ever imagined that the United States could or should 
isolate itself from the rest of the world.
    George Washington was not an isolationist. He was a shrewd 
and effective geopolitician. We could use some of his 
shrewdness now.
    More to the point, even if the Senate should decide that 
this particular course is not a wise one, this would not leave 
the United States disengaged from Europe. We would still be 
central to NATO. We would still be central to the Partnership 
for Peace. We would still be central to the unprecedented and 
under appreciated arms reduction treaties designed by President 
Reagan and negotiated by President Bush. We would still be part 
of a multiple series of bilateral and multilateral political, 
economic, and cultural ties with Europe and with the rest of 
the world.
    This would hardly signal a retreat from engagement.
    What is the alternative, then? Well, I echo my colleague's 
injunction that there is certainly no need to do anything 
rapidly, if at all. By the administration's own testimony, 
there is no threat, there is no urgency. If you want to get a 
sense of what is possible with respect to NATO expansion, 
listen to those now urging expansion to Central Europe on the 
subject of the Baltic countries.
    They have said and will say well, there is no hurry. We 
don't have to rush into bringing the Balts into NATO. We can 
devise different arrangements for them.
    Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that whatever security 
arrangements are adequate for the Balts are more than adequate 
for the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Czechs. Moreover, we 
have an excellent security order now in place consisting of 
NATO, the Partnership for Peace, arms treaties, and a Russia 
that is not a threat. We cannot be sure that that will always 
be true. But if circumstances change, we can change our policy, 
and we will have plenty of advance notice to do so.
    We should, I think, concentrate on the real security issues 
in Europe: clearing up the status of the Russian finger on the 
Baltic, Kaliningrad, getting some assurances on the status of 
Belarus, getting START II ratified and proceeding to reduce 
nuclear weapons even further, and proceeding further with the 
reduction begun in the Reagan and Bush administrations of 
reducing non-nuclear weapons in Europe.
    Ironically, NATO expansion is at best a distraction from 
and at worst a hindrance to dealing with the real security 
threats.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would echo my colleague's 
suggestion, first put forward by your distinguished former 
colleague, Senator Nunn, that we harmonize the expansion of 
security guarantees in Europe with European Union membership.
    I have one final set of comments, Mr. Chairman, on the way 
that this policy is being carried out.
    As I have said, I see no benefits whatsoever to this 
policy. But I recognize that there are those whom I deeply 
respect, including the two gentlemen who flank you, one of whom 
is present, also Senator Lugar, who have made important 
contributions to American foreign policy in the past and who I 
hope will in the future, who see things differently, who are 
able to detect what I cannot find in this policy, namely some 
merit.
    But I believe that, even those who do find some merit, 
ought to be concerned, indeed alarmed, about the way this 
policy is being carried forward. I believe that that way is a 
recipe for failure.
    We know from bitter experience, since 1945, that the 
foreign policies of the United States fail when they lack 
public support. Public support, in turn, has three 
requirements, none of which has been fulfilled here. The first 
requirement is clear aims. But they are muddled. Is NATO an 
organization to promote security or social welfare? Are we 
including or containing Russia? Is this the old sturdy NATO or 
an entirely new organization? The American public simply does 
not know what it is being asked to support.
    The second requirement for public support is a clear 
strategy. I do not mean necessarily an exit strategy; I simply 
mean a plan, some sense of how goals are to be achieved. There 
is an old military axiom that says don't take the first step 
without knowing the last.
    In this case, not only do we not know the last step, we 
don't know the next step. I find the way the issue of Baltic 
and Ukrainian membership is being treated by the administration 
particularly disturbing. In response to the question what comes 
next, they simply say well, this process is open ended and we 
won't name names.
    Mr. Chairman, that is not an answer and it's not a policy. 
It is an evasion. It amounts to saying to us, the American 
people and you, our elected representatives, in response to 
what may be the most momentous question hanging over this 
issue, we won't tell you. Well, that means either they know but 
won't disclose the answer or they won't disclose the answer 
because they don't know it.
    The first of these is constitutionally dubious, the second 
strategically alarming.
    The third requirement for attaining public support in any 
major undertaking of the United States is candor about cost. As 
I have said, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the discussion of 
costs is characterized by an absence of candor.
    The failure, finally, to fulfill these three requirements 
has led, bitterly, to failure for the United States--in Vietnam 
in the 1970's, in Lebanon in the 1980's, in Somalia in the 
1990's, and I fear in Bosnia in the future.
    Failure in Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia, and Bosnia was costly 
and tragic. But failure where NATO expansion is concerned, at 
the heart of Europe, involving the two greatest European 
powers, Germany and Russia, and the most destructive weapons on 
the planet, nuclear weapons, failure here, Mr. Chairman, could 
be far worse.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. I will say to you, sir, that I am very much 
interested in your questions, and that is precisely the reason 
these hearings have been scheduled.
    Now there are at least three more hearings and I can 
guarantee you, sir, that we are going to try to get to the 
bottom of all the questions that you have asked plus the 
hundreds that we have ourselves. So this is no done deal.
    Mr. Ambassador, there is a large volume of public 
information available for anybody who wants to find it that 
Russia is cheating or has cheated on the ABM Treaty, the CFE 
Treaty, the START I Treaty, the Missile Technology Control 
Regime, the Biological Weapons Convention and, already in 
advance, the as yet unratified Chemical Weapons Convention, 
which, by the way, I oppose vigorously.
    With the words of Sam Ervin ringing in my ears, I am going 
to quote him because I thought he had a point. He said, up to 
that time, when he was serving in the Senate, that the United 
States had never lost a war or won a treaty. I think that is 
what you are warning about here, both of you.
    Now with the backdrop of the cheating that I have just 
enunciated, could you be suggesting that the NATO enlargement 
should be put off so that the hard line elements in the Russian 
State Duma will approve the START II Treaty?
    Ambassador Dean. Well, Mr. Chairman, I do expect that the 
Yeltsin Government will make an effort shortly to gain Duma 
approval of the START II Treaty.
    I am not proposing, making the proposal you describe, but a 
different one, which is that the administration should develop 
a comprehensive program for, if you want to call it NATO 
enlargement or for European security, which term I think I 
would use, which has a place in it for all of these candidates, 
including the Baltic States, Ukraine, Romania and all of the 
other present candidates and possible future ones, and also 
which lays out a timetable and requirements for possible 
Russian membership in this system.
    It is not accurate to say, as some have been saying here, 
that Russia has expressed no interest in NATO membership. 
Gorbachev several times suggested this as a possibility. 
Yeltsin has several times suggested it as a possibility. Only 
last year, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, speaking at Davos, 
again suggested it as a possibility.
    It is true that they have never pressed a specific claim 
for it.
    But what I have in mind is a program which would allow NATO 
enlargement, which would defuse its negative aspects, and 
which, at the end of the road, would have a real prospect of 
Russian membership, but in a situation where they, because they 
had such a prospect, would not object to the membership of 
Baltic States, Ukraine and other potential candidates. That is 
what I find missing from the administration's approach: We 
should either not enlarge, or do it right.
    The Chairman. I am not going to try to play ``gotcha'' with 
you. But back in 1993--and I know you were going to be asked 
about this if you have not been before, and I do it for no 
reason whatsoever except to give you an opportunity to explain 
now for the record what others may ask you--in 1993, you wrote 
an op-ed for the ``Washington Post'' that made one of the best 
arguments I have ever seen in support of NATO expansion. You 
wrote that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic would be ``good for them, good for the West''--and I'm 
quoting you--``and good for Russia, too, provided that it is 
accompanied by a clear definition of a new NATO policy toward 
the former Soviet Union.
    [The information referred to follows:]

             [From the Washington Post, September 6, 1993]

                    Open the Ranks To Eastern Europe

                        (By Michael Mandelbaum)

    An event of symbolic significance took place in Warsaw last month 
when President Boris Yeltsin became the first Russian to visit Poland 
as the leader of a free and equal country rather than as an imperial 
master. The Polish government used the occasion to advocate a measure 
with practical consequences for the future, especially for the United 
States. Polish President Lech Walesa issued a joint statement with 
Yeltsin noting Poland's desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, the Western security alliance that had opposed the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War, and stating Russia's understanding of this 
desire.
    The idea is a good one. The inclusion of Poland--and of Hungary and 
the Czech Republic, the two other formerly Communist countries most 
firmly committed to democracy and free markets--would be good for them, 
good for the West and good for Russia too, provided that it is 
accompanied by a clear definition of a new NATO policy toward the 
former Soviet Union.
    Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic seek full participation in 
NATO along with membership in the European Community as a way of 
anchoring themselves firmly and irreversibly in the West. Their pro-
Western governments wish to strengthen the forces within their 
countries committed to consolidating democracy and building market 
economies.
    Poland, the largest and strategically most important of them, faces 
no immediate threat: It is on cordial terms with its historical 
adversary to the west, Germany, and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
means that, with the exception of the detached Baltic fragment of 
Kaliningrad, it no longer shares a border with Russia, its great 
imperial tormentor to the east. Membership in NATO is, for the Poles, a 
way to ensure that no threat will arise in the event that Russian 
political forces opposed to Boris Yeltsin and democracy and interested 
in recreating the Soviet empire should take power in Moscow.
    Because Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic face no imminent 
threat, the West would not risk war by admitting these countries to 
NATO. Nor would their membership saddle the alliance with internal 
territorial and political disputes of the kind that set Greece and 
Turkey at odds with each other during the Cold War.
    Including the three Eastern European countries in NATO would bring 
benefits not only to them but to the West as well. It would ensure 
stability on Germany's eastern border. It would extend the zone of 
stability and democracy in Europe eastward, thereby consolidating some 
of the gains of the Cold War. Perhaps most important, NATO membership 
for these three countries would begin the long complicated and 
necessary process of transforming NATO from a defensive alliance 
against a threat that no longer exists into a broader security 
community capable of contributing to the establishment of democracy and 
the maintenance of peace from the English Channel to the Pacific coast 
of Russia.
    Part of that process may well involve undertaking ``out of area'' 
missions, such as policing a negotiated settlement in the former 
Yugoslavia. Here Poland could be particularly useful. As a country with 
a proud military tradition and a strong sense of international 
responsibility, Poland would likely be more willing to furnish troops 
for such operations than many Western European members of the alliance.
    NATO's European members are not unanimously enthusiastic about 
opening their ranks to Eastern Europe. Many in Western Europe want the 
alliance to remain exactly as it is, as an insurance policy against the 
revival of a threat from the east and as a mechanism for preventing the 
``renationalization'' of defense policy, by which they mean independent 
German foreign and defense policies.
    The only way to perpetuate NATO, however, may be to change it. 
Unless the alliance adapts to the new circumstances of the post-Cold 
War world, public support for it, especially in North America, may 
wither. As Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana, the most influential 
Republican voice on foreign policy and a supporter of expanding 
alliance membership, recently put it, ``The choice is not between the 
current NATO and a new NATO but rather between a new NATO and no 
NATO.''
    Were it to accept the three Eastern European countries, the 
alliance would have to establish a timetable for their accession to 
membership. The most important issue this prospect raises, however, is 
NATO's relationship to the countries to its east. Specifically, 
expansion to the borders of the former Soviet Union unavoidably raises 
the question of NATO's approach to that vanished empire's two most 
important successor states: Russia and Ukraine. The suspicions and 
multiple sources of conflict between them make the relationship between 
these two new and unstable countries, both with nuclear weapons on 
their territory, the most dangerous and potentially the most explosive 
on the planet today.
    An expanded NATO must contribute what it can to promoting peaceful 
relations between them, while avoiding the appearance either of 
constructing an anti-Russian coalition or washing its hands of any 
concern for Ukrainian security.
    There is no more difficult task for the United States and its 
European allies and none more urgent. To the extent that their 
accession to NATO provides an occasion for addressing that task 
seriously, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have performed 
yet another service for the West.

    The Chairman. Now how should I put this.
    Have Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic veered so far 
from the course of democratic and economic reforms in the 
intervening years that you now oppose their membership in NATO?
    As I say, I am not trying to play ``gotcha'' with you. Take 
your time.
    Dr. Mandelbaum. Not at all, Mr. Chairman. It is a good 
question, a fair question, and it bears on your hearings and on 
the process that you and your colleagues are going through.
    I wrote that article in the fall of 1993 when it appeared 
that the expansion of NATO would be acceptable to the Russian 
political class, and you quoted a crucial point in that 
article--provided we could find appropriate arrangements for 
the countries between Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
and Russia.
    The administration has come up with no such proposals and 
that is what my colleague, Ambassador Dean, was suggesting and 
what I think is needed.
    But let me go further, Mr. Chairman. I wrote that piece and 
then I got detailed responses from people whom I deeply respect 
who said, we think you're wrong. You should rethink this issue.
    Because I respected them so much, I did sit down and 
rethink them, leading, incidentally, to a book that I published 
last year. I concluded that my critics were right and that I 
had been wrong. I believe this is important for the following 
reason, Mr. Chairman.
    This is one of those issues that sounds good at first 
glance. When you first hear about it, you think why not? Let's 
be inclusive. Who could object to that?
    But then, when you look further into it, you discover all 
the snares and pitfalls and disadvantages. So I changed my 
mind.
    If I can change my mind, Senator, so can others. It is 
never too late to be right. I would say to some of my friends 
that if you change your mind on this issue, you will feel 
better and you will be doing your country a service.
    The Chairman. Now you know how I felt about the Chemical 
Weapons Treaty.
    Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Smith.
    Senator Smith. I wonder if I could follow up your question 
with the gentleman.
    The Chairman. Sure.
    Senator Smith. It seems to me that the NATO--Russia 
agreement provides the very kind of security arrangement that 
you propose that they needed to make this all work. Yet, that 
is one of the things that gives some of us heartburn, that 
maybe it gave them too much.
    Is it defects in that agreement that caused you now to 
change your view?
    Dr. Mandelbaum. No. I changed my mind some time before. But 
I'm glad you raised the NATO--Russian agreement, Senator, 
because I think that does deserve some comment.
    I would make two comments in particular. First, this 
agreement has been put in place on the basis of publicly stated 
and diametrically opposite interpretations by the American and 
Russian Presidents. President Yeltsin said on television, 
publicly, to the Russian people that this gives Russia a veto 
over all the issues of concern to Russia in Europe. President 
Clinton told us just the opposite.
    So I fear that this could be a recipe for misunderstanding.
    More to the point, Senator, President Yeltsin and every 
other Russian has asserted that the NATO--Russia charter is 
null and void if and when NATO expands beyond these three to 
former Republics of the Soviet Union. That is why I say, 
Senator, that the current expansion, as planned, puts that 
second expansion irrevocably on the agenda, presents us with a 
problem that we can neither avoid nor solve, and to no benefit 
to ourselves.
    Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. Gentlemen, in the 24 years I have been here 
I have called on both of you to ask for your advice. I respect 
you both a great deal. I think on almost every issue, certainly 
with you, Mr. Ambassador, we have been in agreement.
    But I think you are dead wrong here. Let me tell you why. I 
think you are unintentionally disingenuous when you assume a 
dynamic situation in Eastern Europe and a static situation in 
Russia. Thank God you are not doing planning from this 
perspective regarding what the future of the United States and 
Europe will be.
    All of the criteria you lay out assume a static situation 
in Russia. All the criteria you set out assume a dynamic 
situation in Eastern Europe.
    Second, you ended, Professor Mandelbaum, with the comment: 
what purpose for NATO if not to contain Russia?
    Well, Ambassador Dean can tell you the purpose. It was not 
merely to contain Russia. It was to harness Germany; it was to 
bring stability in Europe; and it has never, never, never only 
been to contain Russia.
    Now if you accept the proposition you stated, then we 
should not only not expand NATO, we don't need NATO. We don't 
need NATO.
    Third, this idea that all of a sudden all of these arms 
control agreements have been put on hold because of expansion 
is a perversion of recent history. They were on hold before 
they got anywhere, before there was any serious discussion of 
expanding NATO. There wasn't anybody who believed it was going 
to happen.
    I visited Russia on several occasions; sat in the Duma; 
went and spoke to those folks. Mr. Ambassador, they were going 
nowhere fast. The reason is one of the arguments you have 
presented. From the Russian standpoint, they need START III, 
not START II. They cannot afford START II.
    It didn't have a damn thing to do--with all due respect--
with NATO expansion. Also, this idea that we must have clear 
aims, clear strategy, and candor about costs. If the costs are 
as you stated, I am the only one who has stated from the outset 
that there will be no expansion of NATO. We will not vote for 
it--flat out.
    I spent one entire week--and the Polish Ambassador is 
sitting back there and probably remembers that week--
embarrassing people on occasion, sitting with them and saying, 
``if you think you get a first class ticket without paying your 
35 percent, forget it.'' Our State Department folks sat there 
and thought oh, my God, what is he saying?
    Well, it is real simple, real basic. If you are correct and 
if the 15 European members of NATO have not gotten the message 
that they have to pay 50 percent of the cost and the expanding 
countries 35 percent, then there will be no vote here. You 
don't have a thing to worry about. Nothing will expand. I 
promise you that.
    It will not happen.
    The last point regards the projection of force, Mr. 
Ambassador, that was part of a 1991 NATO agreement before there 
was any discussion--any discussion--of NATO expansion. They are 
not meeting their agreement--``they,'' meaning the 15 European 
nations currently in NATO. They are not doing it. But it is not 
because of NATO expansion.
    Now, I could not agree with you all more if the costs are 
as you state, misrepresented and likely to be unmet. I agree 
with you. Expansion of NATO is a dead letter.
    But I find it fascinating to go back to this notion of the 
rationale for NATO in the first place. It is true that no one 
feels a threat. I sat in every Eastern European capital. No, 
that's not true. I didn't get to Romania. But I listened to 
them, all the leadership, opposition as well as elected 
leadership. None of them feels any threat from Russia right 
now. None. Zero. None.
    So if it is the Russian threat that propels the rationale 
for NATO, let's save ourselves $120 billion now. I'll tell you 
what I am more worried about. I am more worried about Germany 
and France 20 years from now. They have not yet established a 
degree of political maturation after over 100 years of being 
nation-states, where they are at peace with one another without 
the United States playing an integral role in Europe. That is 
what I worry about.
    I think that is a more real prediction and I'll bet you, if 
you have a differing view, our grandchildren will read that the 
more likely scenario than the amputated Russian bear lumbering 
across Europe to attack, is that Germany and France are at it 
again 30 years from now--maybe not in open war but in open 
conflict.
    So all these false premises create false choices. The 
choice between knowing now exactly how all of Central Europe 
and Eastern Europe are going to mature, or, without that 
precise knowledge now, doing nothing. You sound like the former 
general and revered figure in America today, General Powell. He 
is the reason why we did not get to the point that you and I 
think we should have gotten to in the Balkans. He said unless 
he could be guaranteed that no American would be killed or 
guaranteed that we could put 500,000 forces there, America 
should do nothing.
    That is a prescription for paralysis.
    You point out that if the rationale for NATO relates to a 
Russian threat only, we should not expand. Well, we should not 
have NATO, I would respectfully suggest, if that is the only 
rationale for its existence. We could save a lot of money.
    Second, what I am curious about is how we got to the point 
where anyone is thinking about permanently stationing troops in 
the Baltics or permanently stationing troops in Romania. You 
are correct, Ambassador, that if there is an open threat, we 
will have to do that. But, guess what? If they are not part of 
NATO, what do you think we are going to do?
    What do you think we are going to do? Are you all taking 
the position similar to what the Brits took in 1937, 1938, and 
1939, which said by the way, if there is a threat, we are not 
going to respond?
    If there is a threat to Romania, if Russian troops are 
massing on the border, or to the Balts, we are going to do one 
of two things. We are either going to capitulate or Europe will 
respond. All the President is saying is wherever we have new 
members coming in, we will put infrastructure in place, no 
permanent stationing of American forces, to accommodate the 
very thing that we would have to accommodate if this threat 
becomes a reality.
    So I think it is somewhat disingenuous to suggest that the 
Duma, because of its reaction--and by the way, I read every 
word of what you write, Doctor, every word; I can probably 
quote some of it from memory--that the Duma didn't go along 
with these arms control agreements because of expansion. 
Malarkey. I think it is disingenuous to suggest that if we are 
going to bring in a country to NATO, it means that we would 
have to permanently station troops there. That assumes that we 
would not react if, in fact, there was a threat to them anyway.
    So look, I think there are problems with expansion. But I 
think the idea of the Russians eventually becoming part of 
NATO, relies on their definition of NATO as an OSCE. It is not 
a NATO like you and I define NATO.
    No Russian leader that I am aware of has said--and it would 
be wonderful if I could stand corrected on this; I will not say 
it again and make the ``mistake'' again--no Russian leader has 
said they are willing to subordinate Russian forces under the 
command of an American general as required by the way NATO is 
now constructed. They have said a redefined NATO, i.e., OSCE, 
is something they could think about.
    So I just think it is real important for such impressive 
people for whom I have such great respect, not to raise the bar 
here in a way that creates a problem. It's a little bit like 
saying to me that if, in fact, in 1949, you couldn't tell me 
exactly whether or not Germany could ever become a member of 
NATO, we should have no NATO because we would be isolating 
Germany like we did after World War I. We are going to put new 
NATO members in that position.
    I think I have talked too much and I apologize.
    Senator Wellstone. Let's hear from the witnesses.
    The Chairman. Have at it.
    Dr. Mandelbaum. If I could respond, Mr. Chairman, certainly 
no one could accuse Senator Biden of lacking candor.
    Let me confine myself to three points by way of 
clarification and rebuttal. First, I do not take the position 
that the only justification for NATO is containing Russia.
    Senator Biden. What is the justification?
    Dr. Mandelbaum. The only justification for expanding NATO 
is containing Russia. But there is a continuing a continuing 
justification for NATO, which I have set out in my 1996 book, 
``The Dawn of Peace in Europe,'' and I would be happy to supply 
you and other interested members of the committee with a copy.
    Senator Biden. Can you summarize in a paragraph what the 
rationale for NATO is?
    Dr. Mandelbaum. The rationale for NATO is three-fold: to 
keep the United States engaged in Europe; to prevent the 
Germans from having to pursue an independent policy; and to 
serve as an insurance policy in case things go wrong in Russia.
    Let me add, since you ask me, Senator, that does not 
require any particular level of force or any particular level 
of expenditure. I remind you that in 1949, when the NATO Treaty 
was first signed, it was envisioned as a guarantee pact, not as 
an integrated military force on the continent.
    I certainly favor keeping that guarantee in place 
indefinitely, and I think that the military force we need in 
Europe, if any, to carry it out really depends on the nature of 
the threat, which depends on Russia. So we should be flexible 
on that as the founders of NATO intended.
    Senator Biden. With all due respect, how is that different? 
I'm sorry. We should debate this later, I guess. I'm sorry.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Dr. Mandelbaum. I would be happy to return and I have 
presumed on the chairman's patience. Could I have one more 
minute, Mr. Chairman?
    The Chairman. Sure.
    Dr. Mandelbaum. I would like to comment on the widespread 
assertion that NATO is a school for democracy, that being a 
part of the Western military alliance fosters democracy.
    Senator Biden. No straw men. I didn't say that.
    Dr. Mandelbaum. Well, this is widely said, Senator. I don't 
impute it to you, but I believe it is false. I believe there is 
no evidence for it.
    To give you an example, Germany, West Germany became a 
member of NATO in 1954, 9 years after the end of the war, when 
democracy was fully established. So many things are now imputed 
to NATO. In fact, such great claims are made for the 
democratizing benefits of NATO for which, as far as I can tell, 
there is no evidence that I sometimes think that one of the 
great miracles of history is 150 years of democracy without 
NATO membership in the United States.
    But I would like to say for the record that I believe these 
three countries are democracies. They are civilized, Western 
countries. They do not need NATO membership to behave properly. 
They have a wide range of problems, all of which stem from 40 
years of communism, all of which they will deal with 
successfully, none of which has anything to do with NATO.
    Senator Biden. Why does Germany need NATO, then?
    Dr. Mandelbaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 
indulgence.
    The Chairman. Now, Mr. Ambassador, I think you ought to 
have some time, too.
    Ambassador Dean. It would be difficult to respond to all of 
the issues that Senator Biden has raised.
    Senator Biden. Oh, we'd be here at midnight.
    Ambassador Dean. Yes, we would, or something close to it.
    Senator Biden. I apologize, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador Dean. However, I did not hear anything in what 
he said which would do anything other than strengthen my point 
of departure, which was that NATO, in its present form, is 
adequate to these tasks without enlargement.
    Senator Biden. I agree. We have not gotten to that. I was 
just pointing out the criticisms you made of expansion. We have 
not gotten to the next piece.
    The Chairman. Very well.
    Mr. Wellstone.
    Senator Wellstone. Mr. Chairman, I want to tell you, when 
that light turns red, I am not going to pay any attention to 
it, either.
    Senator Biden. You have to be here 25 years to do that, 
Paul, or be the Ranking Member, one of the two.
    Senator Wellstone. Then, Joe, I will do it proportionally 
and still won't pay any attention to that light.
    The Chairman. Just try.
    Senator Wellstone. Seriously, there are just a couple of 
specific points I want to pick up on that went back to my 
question earlier.
    As I understand the position that you all have taken--and, 
first of all, I am just trying to find out as somebody who is 
trying to work his way through this and trying to decide what 
is the right position to take, that is, the why of this, why 
are we expanding NATO--I think what I understood your 
testimony, what I think you have said is that it does not 
really make sense if you are trying to think about it from the 
point of view of expanding democracy or stability in these 
countries; and that probably the reason for expanding would be 
for containment; but then the question is who are we trying to 
contain. Am I correct or not correct, just in terms of what you 
said?
    Ambassador Dean. Yes.
    Dr. Mandelbaum. Yes.
    Senator Wellstone. The second point is cost and we will 
come back to that. I think that is a big issue in our country. 
I think we all agree on that. Senator Biden has made it crystal 
clear that, in fact, if some of the estimates of cost severely 
underestimate what we are going to be faced with, or the 
European countries are not going to be paying, then that is 
going to become a big concern in our country.
    But I still want to focus now on this. If there does not 
seem to be a clear reason to do this, let's then go to the 
downside of it beside cost. I want to go back to Russia because 
I keep feeling that what happens in Russia is going to 
crucially affect the quality of our lives and our children's 
lives for better or worse. I want for it to be better. I want 
the forces of democracy to triumph there.
    There are two points. You said, Professor Mandelbaum, that 
you did not agree--at least I thought I heard you say this, but 
you did not get a chance to comment on it--with the analysis of 
opinion, at least among the political class, the positions that 
President Yeltsin has taken, and so on and so forth, in regard 
to expansion. Could you spell that out a little bit more 
because the testimony prior to your testimony was very 
different.
    Dr. Mandelbaum. Yes, Senator. I am delighted to hear that 
you will have a panel in which people who are genuine experts 
on Russia will come and tell you this.
    What I would say is what I believe is a fact is that no one 
in Russia favors NATO expansion, period.
    Now there are many things you can say about this. You can 
say that they can't stop it, which is true. You can say that 
they will get used to it over time which may be true. We simply 
don't know. You can say that NATO expansion is so important 
that it is worth paying whatever price we have to pay with the 
Russians in order to secure it. Of course, I don't agree with 
that because I don't think it is worth anything at all. But 
that is certainly a legitimate position and I assume that the 
two panelists who preceded us would take that position.
    But I do not believe there is any basis in fact for saying 
that any Russian of any political stripe is at all well 
disposed toward NATO expansion. I also believe that it is the 
democrats who are most concerned because they care most about 
cooperating with the West and NATO expansion makes it more 
difficult--not impossible, but more difficult--for them to 
promote the policy that they prefer.
    Senator Wellstone. My final question is this. That, to me, 
is a very important issue. I think that is a serious question 
and one that we need to think deeply about.
    Now my last question is more one for the record because 
Senator Biden did not get a chance to follow up on this and I 
want to do so for him. There is the whole question of the 
definition of NATO and whether or not Russia has said that it 
would like to join an expanded NATO or not. Senator Biden was 
very vociferous in saying that he would like for somebody to 
clarify the record.
    Could one of you do that?
    Dr. Mandelbaum. Well, Senator, in my pamphlet I cite a 
number of published instances where senior Russian officials 
inquired on this and were told in no uncertain terms that they 
were not going to be allowed to join NATO.
    I would add, Senator, that I do not favor bringing Russia 
into NATO. I think we have the best of all possible worlds now, 
and it is only what I regard as the ill-advised plan to expand 
NATO that raises this issue at all. Were there no NATO 
expansion, I don't think the Russians would be interested. 
Given my view of NATO's continuing relevance, I see no purpose 
in Russian membership.
    Senator Wellstone. If there is no expansion, it is a moot 
point. If there is expansion, then the question becomes how 
this is perceived within Russia.
    Dr. Mandelbaum. Let me add one other point, Senator. If we 
expand to Central Europe, then the pressure will be enormous, 
and rightly so, to expand to the Baltic countries and to 
Ukraine. At that point, we may find ourselves in the position 
in which the only way we can honor the promise to the Baltic 
countries is to bring in the Russians at all.
    Now that might or might be a good thing. It might or might 
not be disastrous. But I would regard that as less good from 
the point of view of American national interest to the status 
quo, which I favor.
    Senator Wellstone. Ambassador Dean, is there anything you 
want to ask--and I am out of time?
    Ambassador Dean. Yes.
    Senator Wellstone. I'm sorry. I mean is there anything you 
want to add.
    Ambassador Dean. I think it is quite clear that the Baltic 
State membership issue is the danger line in this entire 
complex of questions. There is no doubt whatever about the 
record there, that both Yeltsin--and Chernomyrdin said it only 
2 weeks ago in Lithuania--feels that this would be a matter of 
the gravest security interest to Russia.
    That is the problem that I see. That is the reason why I 
suggested that there be a fast track European Union method of 
giving membership in the European Union to these three 
countries as a substitute for their membership. I believe since 
they are small and their economies are not large, this could be 
done and should be done.
    The Chairman. The distinguished Ranking Member, Mr. Biden, 
wants 5 minutes, and I tell him that I have the wire clippers 
in my hand.
    Senator Biden. All right and thank you.
    Gentlemen, Mr. Ambassador, I agree with you absolutely 
about the Balts. That is the fault line.
    Really, much of what is being said here is that if, in 
fact, we had said at Madrid only these three and never anybody 
else, concern would be significantly diminished for both of 
you--I think, diminished. You still would not be for NATO 
expansion, but it does not rise to the level that you are most 
concerned about.
    I fully agree with you and made the very point you made 
when I met with our European colleagues. I think when Senator 
Roth and I were with the NATO Observer Group and met with 
European defense ministers and foreign ministers, although they 
could not make such a judgment, we felt that a rapid move 
toward EU membership would really diffuse an awful lot of this.
    Next, would your view change if tomorrow the Duma passed 
the START Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention? If a week 
from now or a month from now that happened, what would you say 
then about whether or not this emboldens the Reds and the 
Browns, emboldens the nationalists, and undermines U.S.-Russian 
relations? Would it change your view at all if those arms 
agreements are passed by the Duma? That is for either one of 
you.
    Ambassador Dean. It would change my view as to the present 
impact. But the souring of Russian political opinion toward 
relations with the United States did take place earlier and has 
been a constant. My worry, of course, is about the long-range 
implications of this development over a period of decades.
    Senator Biden. I think that is a legitimate concern. I am 
not dismissing that concern.
    I remind you that 2 plus 4 was the same argument. I just 
want to remind you of that. The same, exact argument was made.
    It does not mean it should not have been made and it does 
not mean the argument should not be made now. My point is about 
dynamic change in Russia.
    The question I have is what do you think happens in the 
gray area? I read with great interest in your piece, Doctor, 
about moving the fault line East. We are just drawing new lines 
in Europe. That's a legitimate point that you made.
    Regarding the Poles and the Romanians who have not been 
invited to joint NATO thus far, what do you think these 
countries in this gray zone now do about their military 
relationships? I am not making the argument now that if we 
don't do this such and such will happen.
    The chairman and I agree. If, in fact, this thing goes down 
for whatever reason, that the idea of American credibility is 
not lost. We have credibility because we are the 10,000 pound 
gorilla. It does not matter what anybody thinks. There is 
credibility, period. I agree with that argument. So I am not 
making that argument in a back door way here.
    But what happens? What do you think will develop? Just as 
you feel it is appropriate to ask the President to be able to 
tell you now how that region is going to develop so that he has 
a comprehensive plan, you tell me how you envision Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet States evolving in terms 
of their security architecture over the next 10 to 15 years 
absent this move.
    Ambassador Dean. Maybe I could start.
    Absent this move, I think the main slack in the situation 
should be taken by the European Union and its expansion of 
membership.
    Senator Biden. Do you think they will?
    Ambassador Dean. Oh, yes. I do think so. As a matter of 
fact, most experts do agree that the first tranche will be 
accepted by the year 2003 or 2004.
    Senator Biden. Six months ago, those same experts did not 
think there was going to be one. I spent the last 2 years of my 
life doing nothing but this. I read the same experts.
    Ambassador Dean. Yes. But I think it will happen. Maybe the 
timing will be off. I think we realize that Estonia is in this 
first group.
    Senator Biden. That's right.
    Ambassador Dean. And I think there is good prospect that 
the other two Baltic States will get in, too.
    I think NATO in its present form should continue. I think 
the European Union should expand and that, indeed, the OSCE, 
which you have mentioned, should be built up somewhat. I have 
no objection whatever to the NATO--Russian Founding Act. I 
think it is a good thing which should be expanded. So it, too, 
should play a role. Those are the components, I think, of a 
stable European security order.
    Senator Biden. I will leave you with only one thought. The 
red light is about to go on, and I take the chairman seriously.
    I leave you with only one thought. Just as I will entertain 
the argument you have made--and sincerely, because I have an 
inordinate amount of respect for both of you. That is not 
hyperbole. You know that. You know what our relationship has 
been all these years.
    I would like you to think about the dynamism that exists 
within Russia now and why you feel we have to view it in a 
static sense rather than a dynamic sense.
    I cannot predict to you exactly how it is going to turn 
out. But I am prepared to predict, and my political future is 
resting on this prediction, that the dynamism in Russia is a 
dynamism that looks West. Russia sees, or ultimately will see, 
security and stability among its former ``charges'' and will 
moderate, not exacerbate, its attitudes toward dominion. I see 
that dynamic movement.
    I am not suggesting you agree with it. I just respectfully 
suggest you at least entertain the prospect that if past is 
prologue, the recent past, I think there is argument that my 
view is at least as probable as the one you have.
    The last point I will make is this. I have noticed in the 
French legislature, the German legislature, and the British 
legislature, that when it comes to a choice between farmers and 
foreign policy, farmers always win. Did you hear what I just 
said? Farmers always win.
    One thing I do know more about than either of you is 
politics. I mean that sincerely. Just look at the past. The 
reason why there has been any movement, in my view, on the EU 
is because of the movement on NATO.
    The Chairman. As they say it in order, so might it be.
    Senator Biden. Thank you, gentlemen.
    The Chairman. Thank you, all. I hope that we have 
ventilated this. We have tried to. This is the way we want to 
do all hearings.
    The record will be kept open for 3 days for Senators to 
submit written questions.
    Thank you for appearing.
    We stand in recess.
    [Whereupon, at 4:38 p.m., the committee adjourned, to 
reconvene at 2 p.m., October 22, 1997.]



   QUALIFICATIONS OF POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC FOR NATO 
                               MEMBERSHIP

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1997

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee was scheduled to meet, pursuant to notice, at 
2 p.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. 
Gordon H. Smith, presiding.
        
    The Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the 
Qualifications of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for 
NATO membership was canceled at 2:00 p.m. on October 22 due to 
an objection under Rule 26, Sec. 5a. Per the unanimous consent 
request of Senator Smith of Oregon on November 5, 1997, the 
testimony submitted for this hearing is included in the written 
record of the hearing on NATO enlargement.
      
                  Prepared Statement of Marc Grossman,
                     Assistant Secretary of State,
                     European and Canadian Affairs

    Senator Smith, Senator Biden, members of the committee It is an 
honor and a privilege to have this opportunity to appear before you 
today.
    On October 7th, Secretary of State Albright appeared before this 
Committee to make the case for NATO enlargement and to ask for your 
consent to the addition of three new members to the Atlantic Alliance.
    Today I hope to help contribute to your deliberations by talking 
about the reasons the United States and our NATO allies extended 
invitations to Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. As Secretary 
Albright said here on October 7: ``Let me assure you that we invited 
only the strongest candidates to join the Alliance.''
    NATO membership entails the most solemn security commitment one 
country can make to another--the commitment to come to their defense in 
a crisis. NATO's decision in 1994 to enlarge the Alliance, and the 
Alliance's decision in 1997 to invite Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic to begin accession negotiations were made only after a careful 
review of America's strategic interests and the qualifications of the 
countries involved. In making the decision to invite Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic to begin the process of accession, we put 
America's interests first.
    Secretary Albright reviewed for this committee the reasons NATO 
enlargement is in America's interests: extending the zone of stability 
which NATO provides to the countries to NATO's east would further our 
goal of a united, peaceful Europe.
    NATO must remain the strong Alliance that has served us so well for 
the last half century. That is why we have said from the onset that we 
will only admit countries that are willing and able to assume the 
responsibilities of membership and whose inclusion will serve the 
overall strategic interests of the Alliance. NATO is not a charity or a 
political club; it is and will remain a military Alliance.
    All aspiring nations must meet each of these two tests: first, they 
must prove that they are willing and able; second, we in the Alliance 
must agree that their membership serves our common interests.
    Before turning to the qualifications of these three countries, let 
me describe why their admission passes the test of being in the U.S. 
national interest.
    The United States is a European power. If we have an interest in 
the lands west of the Oder river, then we also surely have an interest 
in the fate of the 200 million people who live in the nations between 
the Baltic and Black Seas. We fought World War II in part because these 
nations had been invaded. We waged the Cold War in part because they 
were help captive. Had Poland, Hungary, and the Czech republic been 
allowed to choose in 1949, when NATO was first founded, there is little 
doubt that they would have chosen to join the Atlantic Alliance.
    As Secretary of State Albright said yesterday, now that the nations 
of central Europe are free, we want them to succeed and we want them to 
be safe. For if there were a major threat to the security of the 
region, I am certain we would chose to act, enlargement or no 
enlargement. Expanding NATO now is the surest and most cost effective 
way to prevent that kind of threat from arising, and thus the need to 
make that choice.
    Poles, Czechs and Hungarians do not look at NATO as a one way 
street. They are committed to the Alliance's principles of shared 
responsibilities. They want to join NATO for the same reasons current 
allies want to keep it. History has taught them to believe both in a 
strong Alliance and a strong American role in Europe. They want to 
start taking responsibility for their freedom and security. They want 
to contribute to the security of the trans-Atlantic region.
    But recognition of our strategic interest and their aspirations is 
not enough to earn an invitation to the world's most successful 
Alliance. These countries have to demonstrate to all current NATO 
members that they are qualified. NATO is a first class Alliance and we 
expect all new members to make a first-class contribution.
    Decisions on who to include in the Alliance are made by the 
Alliance. There are no set criteria for NATO membership. There is no 
checklist that countries can meet in order automatically to gain entry. 
But there are five basic principles which we have established as 
benchmarks and we have insisted that each prospective member meet. 
These five principles are based on the NATO Enlargement Study of 1995 
and were subsequently laid out by former Secretary of Defense Perry in 
a speech in Norfolk, Virginia in June 1996. They are:

  <bullet> commitment to democratic reform;
  <bullet> commitment to a free market economy; good neighborly 
        relations;
  <bullet> civilian control of the military; and
  <bullet> military capability to operate effectively with the 
        Alliance.

    Twelve Central and Eastern European Partners have expressed their 
desire to join NATO. Last spring at the NATO Ministerial in Sintra, we 
discussed with our allies which of the aspiring Partners met this twin 
test of being in our strategic interests and being qualified. In the 
run-up to the July Madrid summit, we consulted closely in the Alliance 
on our choice. The discussions were vigorous.
    At the Madrid summit, President Clinton and the allies reached 
consensus to extend invitations to the three countries we are 
discussing today: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
    Why these three? Because Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
have not only met the requirements for NATO membership; they have 
exceeded them. Because Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be 
security producers, not just security consumers. Because Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic will make the Alliance stronger and 
will enhance European security and stability. And because Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic will make America safer for future 
generations.
    I will address the first four principles, my colleague, Assistant 
Secretary Kramer will address the military capabilities and 
contributions of each of the three invitees.
POLAND:
    Poland has a solid track record of nearly eight years of reform. It 
has just witnessed its second democratic change of government since the 
collapse of communism. It has held seven fully free and fair elections 
at various levels since 1989. The press is free and the government has 
been a strong supporter of human rights. Poland has a new Constitution, 
approved by national referendum in May, 1997, which codifies the 
division of powers among the President, Council of Ministers, 
legislative and judicial branches.
    Poland's economic growth rates since 1993 have been among the 
highest in Europe. Economic reforms in 1989 removed price controls, 
eliminated most industry subsidies, opened markets to international 
competition, and imposed strict budgetary and monetary discipline. 
Poland was admitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in 1996. The government is committed to 
privatization, and the private sector accounts for nearly \2/3\ of GDP 
and employs 60 percent of the workforce. In 1996, Poland spent 
approximately 2.3% of GDP on defense.
    Poland has resolved outstanding differences with its neighbors. 
Last May, President Kwasniewski traveled to Kiev to sign a declaration 
of reconciliation with Ukrainian President Kuchma, and Poland and 
Ukraine are exploring the possibility of establishing a joint 
peacekeeping battalion. Poland has strong economic ties with Russia and 
expressed support for the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed last May. 
Poland's relationship with the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and with its NATO neighbors, Germany and Denmark, is excellent.
    Poland's new Constitution codifies civilian control of the military 
and Poland is establishing legal and administrative structures to 
ensure such control is effective and provides for parliamentary 
oversight of the military. The 1996 National Defense Law subordinated 
the Chief of the General Staff to the Minister of Defense.
HUNGARY:
    Hungary has had two complete democratic changes of government since 
1989, in fully free and fair elections. All six parliamentary parties 
strongly support Hungary's entry into NATO. The government upholds 
human rights, freedom of expression, the rule of law, and an 
independent judiciary. The government has taken steps to improve the 
conditions of its ethnic minorities and to deal more effectively with 
the growing problem of organized crime.
    Economically, in 1995, Hungary engaged in a successful strict 
stabilization program to cut the current account and budget deficits 
and to accelerate structural reform. Since 1990, Hungary has attracted 
almost \1/3\ of all foreign direct investment in Central and Eastern 
Europe (approximately 16 billion dollars). Hungary has privatized 
almost all of the telecommunications and energy sectors, and has almost 
completed the consolidation and privatization of its banking sector. 
Hungary joined the OECD in May, 1996. In 1996, Hungary spent 1.6% of 
GDP on defense and has committed to increase military spending by .1% 
of GDP per year for the next five years.
    Hungary has also resolved all outstanding differences with its 
neighbors. In 1996, Hungary concluded Basic Treaties on Understanding, 
Cooperation, and Good-Neighborliness with Slovakia and Romania, ending 
long-standing disputes among those countries. Hungary and Austria have 
a joint peacekeeping battalion which is part of the UN peacekeeping 
force in Cyprus, and Hungary and Romania are working to establish a 
joint peacekeeping battalion. Hungary's relations with Slovenia, Italy 
and Croatia are strong. In the last year, Hungary and Ukraine have 
signed bilateral cooperation agreements against organized crime, 
terrorism and drug trafficking.
    Hungary has effective civilian control of the military, guaranteed 
by legislative and constitutional mechanisms which provide oversight of 
the military by the Defense Ministry, and oversight of the Defense 
Ministry by the Parliament. The constitution gives Parliament control 
of the military budget, structure, deployment, fielding, stationing, 
and senior leadership. The 1993 National Defense Law specifies that the 
Minister of Defense, who is a member of Parliament, is the superior to 
the Chief of Staff (Commander) of the Armed Forces.
THE CZECH REPUBLIC:
    The Czech Republic has three fully free and fair elections since 
1989. In 1996, two national elections were held: one for the lower 
house and one for the newly-created Senate. The Constitution provides 
for an independent judiciary and guarantees internationally recognized 
human rights. Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of the 
press are fully protected.
    Since 1989, the Czech Republic has engaged in tight fiscal and 
monetary policies, liberalization of trade and prices, and 
privatization of state enterprises.
    Real GDP has been rising since 1994, inflation is controlled, and 
unemployment is low. The Czech Republic has, nonetheless, recently 
faced trade and current account deficits. The government has increased 
capital markets regulation and instituted fiscal austerity measures to 
address these problems.
    The Czech Republic entered the OECD in December 1995 and has 
concluded an association agreement with the EU, as well as free trade 
agreements with the members of the European Free Trade Area and the 
Central European Free Trade Area. The Czech government has committed to 
increase military spending by 0.1% of GDP per year with a goal of 
reaching 2.0% by the year 2000.
    The Czech Republic maintains excellent relations with its 
neighbors. In January 1997, the Czech Republic and Poland agreed to 
harmonize their countries' approaches to NATO and EU membership. 
Relations with Germany are especially strong and Germany is by far the 
Czech Republic's leading foreign investor. Austria and the Czech 
Republic have strong historical and economic bonds and Austria is the 
Czech Republic's sixth largest foreign direct investor. Relations with 
Slovakia are fundamentally sound, although some residual issues from 
the split of Czechoslovakia still remain. But ties and travel between 
the people of the two countries are very strong.
    Under the Czech Republic's constitution, the President is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the military. The Minister of Defense is a 
civilian and the Parliament is increasingly active in defense and 
military issues. Parliament is expected to enact a defense law this 
year that will formally confirm in law the civilian command structure 
mandated by the constitution.
CONCLUSION:
    We chose these three countries because we were convinced they will 
be good allies. They each have a track record that underscores their 
commitment to the values the Alliance is pledged to defend and uphold. 
In the past eight years, these countries have been among America's 
staunchest friends. Their forces fought with ours in the Gulf War and 
are with us today in Bosnia. They have joined with us on issues that 
are of vital importance to us, such as human rights, nonproliferation 
and the Chemical Weapons Convention. They are prepared to meet the 
responsibilities of NATO membership, including paying their share of 
NATO's costs. Our citizens and their citizens share many historical, 
familial, and cultural ties.
    Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic may not be as advanced as 
other current allies. They have work to do which require sacrifices to 
meet the obligations of NATO membership. They have challenges ahead of 
them.
    But, they know that the benefits of NATO membership outweigh the 
costs. And we know that their membership in NATO will make NATO 
stronger, and America and Europe safer.

                               __________

               Prepared Statement of Franklin D. Kramer,
                     Assistant Secretary of Defense
                   for International Security Affairs

    Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: I welcome the 
opportunity to testify on the issue of NATO Enlargement, and, in 
particular, on how the military capabilities of the three select 
countries--Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic--will contribute to 
the effectiveness of the NATO Alliance and the achievement of security 
and stability in Europe.
    Fundamental to answering this question is a recognition that Europe 
is changing and will continue to change in the 21st century. The 
preservation of security, including through military means, likewise is 
changing. The objective of NATO enlargement is to enhance security in 
the face of, and as part of, this change.
    Now, and in the 21st century, the United States has and will 
continue to have a vital interest in Europe, as critical to preserving 
our own security and stability. We likewise seek to preserve and ensure 
the expansion of freedom and democracy throughout Europe. For these 
reasons, we fought two World Wars and we stayed the course during the 
45 years of the Cold War. To serve these objectives in Europe in the 
century to come, we seek to avoid a power vacuum, the boiling over of 
ethnic divisions, the redress of old hatreds, or the establishment of 
any conditions that would create instability and insecurity and lead to 
future conflict. And we look to be able to perform the military 
missions, with our allies, that the 21st century may bring.
    Those 21st century goals will be achieved and those 21st century 
military missions will be performed by NATO in a changing European 
context where:

  <bullet> NATO itself is changing, from an Alliance committed to a 
        fixed defense to one that is mobile and can deploy to where new 
        threats may occur;
  <bullet> Allies are working with Partner countries outside the NATO 
        Alliance, in particular, through the Partnership for Peace;
  <bullet> But where NATO retains its core capabilities, including, 
        most importantly, its ability to perform collective defense.

    NATO enlargement is part of the process of the adaptation of 
security in Europe. The military capabilities of the three new 
countries therefore must focus on NATO's missions. Let me discuss them 
each, but let me begin with a context, the context of the existing 
capabilities that each country brings:
    It is important to recognize that each of these countries has 
military forces that will add to the Alliance's existing capabilities:

  <bullet> Poland has a force of 230,000, roughly the size of the 
        forces of the United Kingdom (228,000) and Spain (200,000).
  <bullet> The Czech Republic and Hungary have forces of 57,000 and 
        60,000, respectively, roughly the size of the armed forces of 
        Portugal (56,000) and Canada (64,830). Combined, the three 
        invitees will add almost 300,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen 
        to the Alliance, including units with unique and specialized 
        capabilities such as chemical decontamination and combat 
        engineering. All three countries have begun training their 
        troops in NATO doctrine in earnest, and all three will be able 
        to make a substantial contribution to the force projection, 
        strategic depth, and capabilities of the Alliance. Put simply, 
        from this perspective, an Alliance with nineteen committed 
        Allies has more to offer than one with sixteen, and a larger 
        Alliance can spread the fiscal and operational burden more 
        evenly.
    It goes without saying, of course, that these three countries need 
to make improvements in a number of areas, including operational 
capabilities, force structure and modernization. I would like to 
address how Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic plan to improve 
their capabilities and readiness and how they can make their 
contribution to the Alliance most effective.

                 I. CONTRIBUTING TO AN ADAPTED ALLIANCE

    In the 21st century, NATO must be able to deal with the problems of 
instability and insecurity, and each of the new countries has 
demonstrated already the ability to contribute to these new missions.
    With the largest and most capable military in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Poland has brought its 25 years of peacekeeping experience to 
NATO's efforts in Bosnia. Since 1974, Poland has participated in more 
peacekeeping operations than any former Warsaw Pact country, and it 
currently has more personnel in UN peacekeeping, military observer and 
civilian police missions than any other country. These deployments with 
multinational operations have enabled Polish troops to gain experience 
which has greatly enhanced their NATO-interoperability. It currently 
has a 400-person airborne infantry battalion in SFOR's U.S. sector, a 
355-person logistics battalion in the Golan Heights (UNDOF), an 
infantry battalion and military hospital (632 troops) in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL), 53 soldiers in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), and troops 
supporting eight UN observer missions. In 1989, they established a 
military training center for UN operations in southeastern Poland. In 
1992, the Poles deployed an infantry battalion with UN forces in 
Croatia. Since then, Poland has shown an increased willingness to 
provide combat forces in support of peacekeeping, as reflected by their 
commitment to IFOR and SFOR. Poland is currently working to establish 
joint peacekeeping battalions with Ukraine and Lithuania, and the Poles 
have contributed to UN efforts in Rwanda (UNIMIR), Georgia (UNOMIG), 
Tajikistan (UNMOT), Iraq/Kuwait (UNIKOM), the Western Sahara (MINURSO) 
and Cambodia (UNTAC).
    The Czech Republic currently has a 620-person mechanized battalion 
in SFOR, and prior to that it contributed an 870-person mechanized 
battalion to IFOR and a 985 person infantry battalion in UNPROFOR. The 
Czechs also deployed a 200-man decontamination unit to DESERT SHIELD/
DESERT STORM and have provided observers to UN observer missions in 
Croatia (UNTAES), the Prevlaka Peninsula (UNMOP), the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP), Mozambique (UNOMOZ), Georgia (UNOMIG) 
and Liberia (UNOMIL).
    Hungary contributed a 400-500 man engineer battalion to conduct 
bridging and other engineering operations in support of IFOR. This 
battalion, now reduced in number to 200-250, is currently deployed in 
support of SFOR. Hungary's support to IFOR and SFOR also included 
allowing U.S. and NATO forces to transit its airspace, station at its 
airfields and use its facilities. Hungary demonstrated its ability to 
operate as part of the NATO team with every bridge that was built and 
every plane that landed and took off from its airfields. Over 80,000 
U.S. military personnel rotated in and out of IFOR and SFOR assignments 
through the Hungarian airbase at Taszar. U.S. armor units calibrate 
their guns at Hungarian ranges prior to deploying to Bosnia, and again 
upon re-deploying.
    Past Hungarian peacekeeping contributions have included a 39-troop 
contingent in Cyprus (recently increased to more than 100) as part of 
an Austrian battalion assigned to UNFICYP; a 26 soldier and 15 
policemen contingent in the Sinai (MFO); and 20 observers in Iraq/
Kuwait (UNIKOM), Angola (UNAVEM), Cambodia (UNTAC), Mozambique 
(UNOMOZ), Tajikistan (UNMOT), and Georgia (UNOMIG). Hungary may also 
provide forces to the UN Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade 
(SHIRBRIG).
    In short, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are already 
working with NATO and NATO Allies in the field.

                  II. AVOIDING NEW DIVISIONS IN EUROPE

    NATO must also work with the other countries of Europe to keep new 
dividing lines from being created. The Partnership for Peace and its 
recent enhancements are integral efforts in this regard. Each of the 
three new countries has many substantial outreach efforts, including 
significant involvement in the Partnership for Peace, which will 
strengthen the bonds between NATO and those countries not yet selected 
for membership.
    The Czech Republic has served as a political role model for Central 
and Eastern Europe. It has made great progress in establishing broad 
democratic control over its armed forces; it is fully dedicated to a 
free, open market economy and since 1989 it has been a fully 
functioning democracy. The Czech Republic has also cultivated close 
ties with all of its neighbors. No border is in dispute with Germany, 
Austria, Poland or Slovakia, and the Czechs have no conflicts with 
neighboring countries relating to minority ethnic groups. Since the 
Madrid Summit, Prague has also increased its trilateral regional 
defense cooperation with Warsaw and Budapest. The Polish, Hungarian and 
Czech militaries agreed to jointly address the NATO Defense Planning 
Questionnaire (DPQ), air defense, logistics, human resources 
management, and the preparation of delegations to the accession 
negotiations. Bilaterally, the Czechs have also contributed to the 
security of Central Europe by resolving historical disputes and 
developing close ties with Germany. In 1993, they signed a military 
cooperation agreement with Germany, and they have worked closely with 
the German military since then.
    Poland is forming joint NATO-interoperable peacekeeping battalions 
with both Ukraine and Lithuania, efforts which not only improve its 
ability to deploy to peacekeeping operations, but which also reassure 
both Kiev and Vilnius that their future lies with Europe. It is also 
working with Germany and Denmark to form a trilateral mechanized 
infantry corps that would be fully integrated into the NATO force 
structure.
    Outreach initiatives like these, combined with Poland's geographic 
location, will enable Poland to serve as an important ambassador for 
NATO to the East. Poland has also undertaken active defense cooperation 
with the Baltic states, particularly Lithuania, to reassure them of 
Europe's commitment to their security. Poland has also made efforts to 
normalize relations with Moscow, which reinforces the increasingly 
close cooperation between NATO and Russia. Finally, Poland's internal 
reforms, including enhancing civilian control of the military and 
taking steps to strengthen its democratic polity and market economy, 
serve as a role model for other Central and Eastern European states 
which aspire to increased integration into Western political, economic 
and defense institutions.
    Hungary participates in several Central-European regional 
cooperation organizations that indirectly reduce the effects of risks 
and instability. Hungary has concluded more than 170 cooperation 
agreements with its neighbors, encompassing a broad variety of fields. 
Especially noteworthy are agreements with Slovenia and Italy to form a 
trilateral peacekeeping brigade; an agreement with Romania to form a 
combined peacekeeping battalion; and a treaty with neighboring Slovakia 
on good-neighborly relations and friendly cooperation that covers 
everything from protecting the environment, to protecting minorities, 
to pledging never to use force against each other. Hungary is also a 
participant in the U.S.-established secure ``hot line'' network, which 
provides secure communications among most central European Ministers of 
Defense in the event of a crisis.
    Each of these countries' outreach efforts helps to strengthen ties 
with current NATO members, as well as to build bridges from the 
Alliance to important non-NATO allies and Partners. Their efforts are 
thus already contributing to the enhancement of the Alliance.

                      III. ENHANCING THE ALLIANCE

    The three new countries have, as I have already discussed, shown 
the ability and willingness to contribute to the Alliance's new 
missions and to work in Europe to erase old divisions and to bring all 
European countries into an effective security structure. Ultimately, 
however, NATO depends on its ability to perform collective defense. 
Each of the three new countries is taking steps in the right direction 
to perform that collective defense mission. To understand these steps, 
let me again give some context.
    Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic all maintained their 
militaries for four decades under the Warsaw Pact. Not surprisingly, 
then, the current status of these militaries reflect Warsaw Pact 
doctrines and approaches. In our working with these countries, we have 
sought to make their militaries more like NATO militaries, for such a 
transformation is important to make their inclusion into NATO as 
effective as possible. We recognize that they will not have fully 
transformed militaries by 1999. Instead, we have sought to ensure that 
each country has a plan to effect such a transformation over time. We 
have done so in NATO and also through bilateral efforts, as have other 
members of the Alliance. In NATO, we have focused on interoperability 
through the Partnership for Peace and, since the Madrid Summit, on the 
NATO Defense Planning Process. We have also focused on the key national 
priorities for each country to make it most able to work effectively 
with NATO. As we considered such priorities, we found that there were 
three broad, critical categories: personnel reform; training and 
doctrine; and interoperability, this last with a focus on command, 
control and communications, air defense architecture, logistics, and 
infrastructure to facilitate reinforcement.
    Let me discuss the plans of each of these countries to deal with 
these critical NATO and national issues. Each of the three countries 
has recognized that NATO compatibility depends on the implementation of 
a well thought-through plan. As noted above, these plans include 
involvement with PfP, the NATO Defense Planning Process, and the 
establishment of national efforts.

         A. Interoperability Through the Partnership for Peace

    I have discussed previously the benefit of PfP toward avoiding 
further divisions of Europe. But the PfP program, particularly the 
conduct of military exercises, has also been a training ground for NATO 
enlargement. For example, in 1997 alone, Poland will have participated 
in 22 PfP exercises in which the United States also took part; the 
highlight of these events was exercise BRAVE EAGLE, one of the largest 
and most complex Pfp exercises to date, which Poland hosted. Poland 
also participates in a hundreds of bilateral and multilateral 
exercises, seminars, and other activities with other Partners and NATO 
Allies, all of which contribute to increasing their interoperability. 
The Poles have emphasized military training and tactical exercises in 
their PfP participation.
    Hungary has been an enthusiastic participant in the PfP program and 
the enhanced PfP effort, as the Hungarians believe that PfP activities 
contribute directly to the establishment of NATO interoperability and 
its declared objective of NATO integration. Hungary was, in fact, the 
first Partner to include a PfP line item in its defense budget. Like 
Poland, Hungary has participated extensively in bilateral and 
multilateral military exercises and activities which have produced 
valuable lessons learned. The Hungarians have participated in seventeen 
multilateral PfP exercises in 1997 in which the United States also took 
part, and it will host a major exercise next Spring. The invitation in 
Madrid will gradually alter the nature of Hungary's participation in 
PfP, making Hungary not only a consumer but more and more a contributor 
to the enhanced PfP program. Since the Madrid Summit, for example, 
Hungary has offered to mentor Romania on the DPQ process, and they have 
volunteered to participate in the twelve NATO teams assessing Albania's 
post-conflict military.
    The Czechs participated in eighteen multinational PfP exercises 
with U.S. involvement in 1997. They have also conducted numerous joint 
training activities and joint exercises with a majority of other 
Allies, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. They have conducted joint 
company, battalion and brigade training with the French 7h Infantry 
Division and the British Royal Marines, just to name a couple of the 
major training partners. In overall numbers of activities, they have 
been particularly closely involved with Germany, where they signed up 
for 100 joint activities for 1997 alone.
    In addition, during the last three years all three countries have 
participated in PfP's Planning and Review Process (PARP), in which NATO 
established 41 specific Interoperability Objectives (IOs). Examples of 
these objectives include: C3/SAR, ground refueling of aircraft, 
commonality of airfield procedures, use of NATO communications 
procedures and terminology, aircraft IFF system, logistics support, and 
interoperability of communications equipment and of air navigation 
aids. Poland committed to attain all 41 IOs by 1999, Hungary pledged to 
reach 38, and the Czech Republic promised to meet 31.
    As NATO assessment teams have visited each country over the past 
two months they have increasingly discovered evidence that PfP and PARP 
have produced results directly relevant to NATO enlargement. For 
example, when the American general heading the NATO team visiting 
Kecskemet Air Base asked how Hungary would accommodate a squadron of 
NATO F-16s, he was surprised by the precision and level of detail of 
the Hungarian response--and the level of installation readiness 
achieved. He was told that the Hungarians has not just ``planned'' for 
the accommodation of NATO's F-16s--they had done it. Through a PfP 
exercise, Hungary had hosted a squadron of Dutch F-16s for several 
weeks in 1996.
    In many cases, the selectees have used the interoperability 
objectives as guideposts for procurement decisions--decisions they have 
made and implemented--in advance of NATO membership. For example: a 
SHAPE analyst monitoring the NATO Common Fund Cost Study's progress 
noted that even though communications and information systems 
requirements were increasing, the prospective costs to the Czech 
Republic kept dropping. Upon closer inspection, it turned out the 
Czechs had already anticipated the requirements for secure and non-
secure digital communications programs and had applied NATO standards 
to the national programs they are pursuing on their own. In short, 
because of PfP the Czechs have already spent their own money to fund 
some projects that we had assumed would be paid for by NATO as a whole 
through the common budgets.
    All three countries' active participation in PfP activities and 
exercises have helped them understand how to operate with NATO forces 
and are preparing them for the burdens and responsibilities of NATO 
membership. Experience gained through PfP was integral, for example, in 
each country's preparation of its DPQ reply.

                B. Successful Completion of Initial DPQ

    Since Madrid, the three invitees have gone beyond PfP activities 
and worked with the NATO international staff to fill out a special 
Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) as their initial step into the 
NATO Defense Planning Process. These questionnaires, which all NATO 
allies submit annually, are a disclosure of each country's force and 
financial plans. Each of the invitees was visited in July and September 
by the international staff, which delivered and explained the DPQS. 
Teams with the international staff met frequently with the invitees to 
assist their defense ministries in preparing their replies. I am 
pleased to be able to tell you that all three of the invited countries 
submitted their DPQ replies by the deadline of 1 October--a deadline 
that was not announced to them until the Madrid Summit in July. To put 
this in perspective, only four of the current NATO allies met their 
deadline this year--and the United States was not one of them.
    Poland has declared its willingness to commit all of its 
operational military forces to NATO. One-third will be designated as 
``NATO-Assigned,'' meaning they will be fully integrated into the NATO 
force structure and placed under the operational command or control of 
a NATO commander when called upon. These NATO-Assigned forces, which 
include both immediate and rapid reaction forces, are already partly 
capable of joint operations with NATO and should be fully interoperable 
by 2002. The types of units to be assigned to NATO include airborne, 
armor and air defense units, as well as fighter squadrons and transport 
aircraft. Poland will designate the remaining two-thirds of its armed 
forces as ``NATO Earmarked,'' meaning they could be put under NATO 
operational command or control in time of need.
    Since its DPQ submission, Czech officials have noted that they are 
willing to earmark up to 90 percent of their operational forces to NATO 
in times of crisis. The Czech Republic is also expected to assign to 
NATO's force structure elements of both their immediate and rapid 
reaction brigades, as well as fighter and combat helicopter squadrons, 
search and rescue units, chemical defense units, and mechanized and 
artillery brigades. The military and MOD staffs will also continue to 
refine the DPQ Reply with NATO and help develop its Target Force Goals, 
which are due early next year.
    Presently, Hungary has assigned to NATO both immediate reaction and 
rapid reaction forces, consisting of combat brigades and battalions, 
support brigades and battalions, fighter squadrons, artillery units, 
and anti-air, anti-armor and combat helicopter assets. These forces are 
only partially able to conduct joint operations with NATO at present, 
but the Hungarians are working hard to increase capabilities. Hungary 
has also earmarked to NATO a number of air force units.

                          C. National Efforts

    PfP and NATO defense planning efforts are only part of the work of 
these countries to be able to perform the task of collective defense. I 
have regularly worked with the governments of these countries on NATO 
issues. In mid-September, I traveled to Budapest, Prague and Warsaw to 
discuss with senior civilian and military officials the steps which 
these countries are taking to prepare themselves for NATO membership. 
In extremely candid sessions, they provided their assessments of their 
own strengths and weaknesses, and they discussed in great detail their 
plans for improving their interoperability with NATO forces. Remedying 
many of the shortcomings they identified will be costly, and some will 
take time. I was, however, pleased with what I heard. Let me review 
some of their efforts.
1. Military reforms and modernization
    In Poland, I was briefed last month on the wide range of military 
reforms and modernization programs that will reshape Poland's military 
doctrine, restructure the armed forces, and modernize military 
technology and capabilities. The Ministry of Defense has developed a 
comprehensive 15-year plan to modernize the military and make it 
interoperable with NATO, assisted by the defense planning skills 
learned from the processes of compiling Poland's Defense Planning 
Questionnaire Reply and cooperating with NATO Staff on the development 
of Target Force Goals. The initial focus of the long-term plan will be 
on several key areas: command, control and communications (C3); air 
defense and air traffic control; logistics and infrastructure; and 
personnel reform, including a 21 percent reduction in forces and an 
increase in the quality of training provided to those that remain. 
These areas of focus are identical to those we see as critical.
    Hungary has developed its own plan, ``Force 2000'', to better 
prepare it for NATO admission. Its goals are to downsize the armed 
forces, standardize structures along NATO lines, further 
professionalize and increase the volunteer personnel in its force, and 
improve the quality of military life. This plan is scheduled for 
completion in 2001. After 1998, the Hungarians will focus on additional 
NATO adaptation requirements and the modernization of land and air 
force equipment. Hungary has an integrated system of defense planning 
compatible with the NATO system. The new command and organizational 
structure, to be in place by the end of 1997, places the main emphasis 
on establishing NATO compatibility. The medium-term plan priorities 
include the modernization of air defense, reconnaissance, information 
and control systems, the acquisition of modem armored and transport 
vehicles, modernization of aircraft and helicopters, implementation of 
NATO standards, and training and equipment interoperability for NATO 
designated units. Hungary has devoted a large amount of staff time to 
learning the NATO defense planning process. The staff is now turning 
its attention to completing the process and focusing on the development 
of NATO-directed Target Force Goals by early next year.
    The Czech defense leadership is well aware that their process of 
creating a new defense establishment is far from complete. They know 
that they need to take steps to increase public support for membership 
(and recent polls do show much increased support); that serious, 
effective military personnel reform must take place; that a series of 
defense acts must be passed by parliament to legalize the reforms being 
implemented in the Czech Armed Forces; and that interagency 
coordination on defense issues must be improved. They realize that they 
have much work to do in these areas; while they are working with us and 
other Allies to overcome them, the Czechs know that they will have to 
do the majority of work themselves. The Ministry of Defense will be 
working hard to implement the recommendations of its recently-approved 
long-term defense plan, ``National Defense Concept 2005,'' which 
addresses most of the Czech Republic's crucial defense reform 
challenges.
2. Allocating Sufficient Resources
    The reforms called for in each country's long-term modernization 
plan will not come cheap, and each country has pledged to commit the 
resources required to achieve their objectives. Poland has carefully 
thought through the financial implications of the broad reforms in its 
15-year plan, which calls for annual increases in defense spending 
which are pegged to the levels of GDP growth to cover the necessary 
costs. Based on a conservative estimate of 4.2 percent annual growth, 
defense spending will increase approximately 3.2 percent annually. In 
1996, Poland spent 2.3 percent of its GDP on defense, a higher 
percentage than half of current NATO Allies.
    Hungary has also focused on the need to provide adequate resources 
for defense. The total national defense budget for 1997 is about $800M, 
which represents about 1.8% of projected GDP. Hungary has stated that 
it plans to link defense spending growth to the rate of GDP growth and 
to increase the percentage of GDP dedicated to defense by 0.1 percent 
annually for the next five years. If so, Hungarian defense spending may 
increase in real terms by three to eight percent annually during the 
next four years. Between 80-85% of future planned defense budgets will 
be dedicated to the maintenance of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF), 
and 15-20% will be allocated to its development. Hungary assesses that 
this budget may not provide the necessary funds for a significant 
degree of modernization in the armed forces. Until the end of 1998, 
Hungary will allocate 12% of its military budget to procurement and 
modernization; in 2001, Hungary plans to increase the amount allocated 
to 25%. Lacking sufficient overall fiscal resources for modernization 
of the entire force, we can anticipate that Hungary will concentrate 
its efforts in specific areas such as modernizing air and air defense 
forces, modernizing C41 capabilities and preparing selected ground 
units capable of operating alongside NATO forces in peacekeeping and 
out-of-area operations.
    Czech military, defense, foreign affairs and parliamentary 
officials assured me in September that the Czech Republic plans to 
increase its defense budget by 0.1 percent of GDP for each of the next 
three years, bringing defense spending up to 2.0 percent of GDP by the 
year 2000. For 1998, using Czech Defense Ministry figures, this would 
raise total defense spending from approximately $900 million to $1.1 
billion dollars. Such a decision is a positive sign, particularly in 
light of the devastation caused by the recent floods, which hit about 
one-third of the country. I am confident that their determination to 
implement crucial reforms and their decision to devote substantial 
resources to the restructuring and modernization of the armed forces 
will help make the Czech military a net provider of security by 1999.

               D. CORE CAPABILITIES AND INTEROPERABILITY

    The Czechs, Poles and Hungarians are all focusing on the 
deficiencies that we believe present the greatest challenges: 
personnel; training and the adoption of NATO doctrine; and 
interoperability.
1. Personnel
    We have made it clear to all three that serious, effective military 
personnel reform must be accomplished as soon as possible within the 
Armed Forces, and all three have begun to take the necessary steps. The 
Czechs agree that they need to create a Western structured military, 
reliant on an effective Non-Commissioned Officer corps, with quality, 
well-trained forces that are properly recruited, paid, housed, and 
retained. To accomplish these goals, they understand that they need to 
dedicate the required resources and, in some cases, pass appropriate 
legislation.
    Personnel reforms will encompass perhaps the most drastic and the 
most difficult changes to the Polish military. The military has 
announced plans to cut total forces from 230,000 to 198,000 by 1999, 
and to 180,000 by 2004. It will increase the number of career soldiers 
from 36 percent to 50 percent of total troops, and it plans to improve 
the junior-to-senior officer ratio from its current 50:50 to a more 
appropriate 70:30 by the year 2012. To reflect better the reliance by 
NATO militaries on a skilled, professional NCO corps, Poland plans to 
increase the number of NCOs to one-third of its total forces and to 
invest heavily in their training.
    Difficult personnel reforms are also needed in Hungary. Hungary's 
priority areas for personnel also include improving the ratio of junior 
to senior officers and of officers to NCOS, but they also plan to 
address quality of life issues for the military, win a 23% pay raise 
for the military in 1998 (Parliament votes on this issue in early 
December), and enact legislation on pay standards (scheduled to take 
effect on January 1, 1999). The military has stated that it will cut 
ground forces personnel from the present 59,715 to 34,000 by 2005, and 
Air Force personnel from the current 17,500 to 14,000. Hungary hopes to 
have a 60:40 professional to conscript ratio by the end of the century. 
Another important objective is to increase the present one-to-one 
proportion of NCOs to officers to two-to-one, and ultimately three-to-
one. The length of service for conscripts will be reduced from 12 to 9 
months.
    Like Poland and Hungary, personnel reforms will be perhaps the most 
drastic and most difficult change for the Czech military to implement. 
The Czechs assured us during a recent visit to Prague by Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy Fred Pang that 
personnel reform is their number one military priority. They pledged to 
develop, with our support, a concrete action plan that will address and 
correct their personnel deficiencies.
    The Czechs began the process of implementing personnel reform back 
in March when it approved the National Defense Concept. The primary 
objective of the concept is to reorient the military away from the 
heavy, manpower-intensive Soviet-style corps of the Warsaw Pact and 
toward smaller, more mobile, NATO-compatible units in both the Czech 
Ground Forces (Army) and Air Forces. The plan aims to downsize the 
armed forces to 55,000; develop a professional cadre of career 
soldiers; standardize structures along NATO lines; improve the quality 
of military life; and, most importantly, develop a professional NCO 
corps. The implementation of this plan, which started on July 1, is 
scheduled for completion by the end of 1998.
2. Training and NATO Doctrine
    Each country has begun to aggressively adopt NATO doctrine and 
incorporate it into their training programs. Within the PfP framework, 
all have obtained NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) and 
regulations and are translating them as fast as they receive the 
documents from Brussels. All three have also set up NATO Integration 
departments in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, as well 
as in the General Staff, to help achieve their prioritized 
interoperability goals and facilitate their swift operational 
integration into the Alliance.
    Training will become a crucial element of each country's 
integration plans. The operational experience gained through active 
participation in PfP exercises has greatly improved the ability of all 
three invitees to operate jointly with NATO forces. Each country is 
conducting staff exchanges with the United States in such areas as 
acquisition, budget and finance, logistics, public affairs and 
legislative affairs.
    The one million dollars Poland received from the United States 
under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program 
has provided training in such key areas as English language skills, NCO 
development, and logistics. Poland has also received training from 
other Allies in logistics, English language, C3, and defense planning. 
English language proficiency is a critical element of NATO 
interoperability. and Poland plans to have 25 percent of officers in 
NATO-designated units proficient by 1999. Over 1,100 officers per year 
are currently studying NATO languages (primarily English).
    The Hungarians have placed a great deal of emphasis on training. 
Two of Hungary's highest priorities are to increase English proficiency 
and to improve the quality of professional training, and the one 
million dollars in IMET funds which the United States provided in 1997 
has been spent wisely in both areas. NATO Allies also provide training 
to Hungary in NATO doctrine, recruitment, defense planning, and force 
modernization.
    Training provided by the United States and Allies has directly 
impacted both Hungarian operational capabilities and senior-level 
defense planning and reform. The Chief of the Defense Staff and 
Commander of the HDF is the first officer of his grade and 
responsibility from all of Central and Eastern Europe to attend the 
U.S. Army War College. His First Deputy Chief of Staff is also a U.S. 
War College graduate. Together, based on their U.S.-training, they have 
successfully restructured the Hungarian General Staff and Service 
Staffs along NATO lines to be more compatible and interoperable with 
NATO.
    The Czech Republic rightfully views the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
program as the most direct path to achieving NATO compatibility, and 
its participation with the United States and other Allies have enabled 
it to begin developing the capabilities needed for it to operate with 
NATO forces. Active PfP participation, coupled with its peacekeeping 
activities, already allows Prague to contribute well-trained and 
seasoned personnel that are familiar with NATO procedures and 
operations. The Czechs have used the $800,000 in IMET funds provided by 
the United States in 1997 for training in such areas as English 
language skills, NCO development, and defense planning. The Czech 
Republic has also received training from other Allies--the United 
Kingdom, France and Germany, among others--in C3, logistics, air 
defense, and air traffic control.
3. Interoperability
    The third broad area of national effort for each of these countries 
is interoperability with a focus on C3, air defense architecture, 
logistics, and infrastructure. All three invitees will be making 
significant investments to infrastructure improvements--some of which 
they would have made whether they were invited to join the Alliance or 
not--and they know that those improvements will be costly. We are 
finding, however, that some of the infrastructure inherited from the 
Warsaw Pact is adequate and does not require significant modifications 
for NATO use. When a SHAPE assessment team visited Poland in September, 
for example, they asked a Polish major familiar with the details of a 
particular rail complex whether we could reasonably expect to transport 
a NATO armored division through it in one week's time. The amused major 
replied by asking the SHAPE general how many Soviet heavy divisions he 
thought they planned on moving through the same location when the 
trains were heading west.
    All three countries are also moving quickly ahead on initiatives to 
improve interoperability in key areas. For example, sweeping reforms to 
existing air defense and air traffic control systems have greatly 
improved the three invitees' ability to defend and manage their 
airspace. When their Air Sovereignty Operations Centers (ASOC) come 
online in 1998, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have 
consolidated control of their civilian and military air traffic control 
networks into one streamlined system and be ready to establish a future 
link with NATO's air defense system when the political decision to do 
so is made. Hungary has already completed the installation of 
``identification-friend-or-foe'' (IFF) transponders to their modem 
combat aircraft, and Poland and the Czech Republic plan to do so by 
1999.

                                 POLAND

    Poland has ensured that most senior unit commanders are familiar 
with NATO command, control and communications procedures by 
incorporating NATO C3 procedures into its training, by participating in 
C3-related Partnership for Peace exercises, and by adopting NATO 
command structures, military maps, and hundreds of standardization 
agreements (STANAGs). U.S. Warsaw Initiative funds are being used to 
acquire NATO-interoperable communications equipment, and a U.S. Air 
Force team conducting a C3 interoperability study reported that Poland 
already has ``an excellent foundation for achieving NATO 
interoperability objectives'' in this area.
    Poland has selected two air defense squadrons for full NATO 
interoperability, and it is working to implement NATO air defense 
doctrine across the board. Improvements made under the Warsaw 
Initiative-funded Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI) have enabled 
Poland to cut air defense personnel from 110,000 in 1991 to 56,000 in 
1997, and it is striving ultimately to bring this number down to 
38,000.
    Poland's ports, airfields, rail and road networks and other 
infrastructure are already largely capable of receiving NATO troops and 
materiel, and its logistics forces are working to improve their ability 
to support NATO troop deployments to Poland and Polish troop 
deployments abroad. Poland has identified specific areas where 
improvements continue to be required, and it has included them in its 
15-year modernization plan. Poland's defense infrastructure includes 
nine training facilities that are available to NATO, several of which 
have already been used by NATO Allies.
HUNGARY
    Along with the Poles and the Czechs, the Hungarians are moving 
ahead with their new NATO-interoperable Air Sovereignty Operations 
Center. Force modernization is required in all services but will take 
many years due to lack of available funds. Approximately 70-80% of 
major equipment is becoming antiquated, for example, and the current 
air defense capability is limited.
    In the area of command, control, and communications (C3), the 
Hungarians have incorporated NATO C3 procedures into training, ensured 
that all major unit commanders are familiar with NATO C3, stressed 
English language training, and made very effective use of the funding 
Congress has made available through the International Military 
Education and Training program. All Service schools and academies 
include NATO C3 in their curricula. Active participation in C3-related 
PfP exercises has helped them adopt NATO-compatible procedures. They 
are using over $3 million in Warsaw Initiative funding to acquire NATO-
interoperable communications equipment, and plan on spending more this 
fiscal year.
    In the area of Air Defense and Air Traffic Control, the Hungarians 
are in the process of merging civilian and military air traffic control 
networks. They hope to see the ASOC operational in 1998 and already 
have aircraft equipped with IFF systems, as previously mentioned. In 
addition to the U.S., Belgium and the Netherlands are providing Air 
Traffic Control assistance.
    In the area of infrastructure, the Hungarians are well on their way 
toward the creation of a NATO-compatible air base at Taszar that can be 
used as a staging base. Their assistance has allowed us to throughput 
more than 80,000 U.S. military personnel for rotation into and out of 
IFOR/SFOR assignments, and Hungary will continue to provide such host 
nation and transit support for Allied forces.
    As far as logistics are concerned, the Hungarians have set a 
medium-term objective to improve interoperability and the capability to 
receive NATO troops and materiel. They hope to have NATO fuel 
classification and increased distribution capabilities by 1999. They 
have established a NATO logistics liaison unit in the General Staff, 
and the U.S.-contracted Logistics Management Institute conducted a very 
successful logistics exercise last month.
CZECH REPUBLIC
    The Czech modernization program also focuses on C3; air defense and 
air traffic control, and infrastructure. In the area of C3, the Czechs 
have incorporated NATO C3 procedures into training; all major unit 
commanders are familiar with NATO C3 and they have stressed English 
language training. All Service schools also include NATO C3 
instruction. In the area of Air Defense and Air Traffic Control, the 
Czechs are in the process of merging their civilian and military air 
traffic control networks (considered state-of-the-art), a process which 
will be completed with the introduction of their Air Sovereignty 
Operations Center (ASOC) in 1998.
    In the area of infrastructure, the Czech Republic's airfields, rail 
and road networks, as previously mentioned, are already capable of 
receiving some NATO troops and materiel. It is also working closely 
with NATO to make sure its infrastructure will be NATO-compatible.
    As far as logistics are concerned, the Czechs, like the other two 
invitees, have set a medium-term objective to improve interoperability 
and the capability to receive NATO troops and materiels They are 
working with NATO on a number of key issues, including plans to 
increase their distribution and storage capabilities by 1999. They have 
also established a NATO logistics cell in the General Staff. They have 
flexible and redundant distribution networks for petroleum, oil and 
lubricants; are increasing their links to western oil and gas 
pipelines; and possess sufficient munitions for their current weapons 
systems.

                               CONCLUSION

    Reforming military doctrine, overhauling personnel systems, and 
modernizing weaponry and equipment are not small tasks, and all three 
countries' armed forces certainly have hard work ahead of them. It goes 
without saying that much still needs to be done to turn their plans 
into reality. However, their Political and military leaders are firmly 
committed to their integration with the West and to their membership in 
NATO. They have promised to dedicate the necessary resources to improve 
their military capabilities, and the defense establishments of the 
United States and other NATO Allies will continue to help them achieve 
their objectives by providing training, advice and material assistance. 
I am fully confident that, with the reforms and strategies currently 
being implemented in all three countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic will be both reliable allies and net Producers of security to 
the North Atlantic Alliance.
    Thank you.

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             Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone,
           Senior Fellow, Political-Military Studies Program,
             Center for Strategic and International Studies

    Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before this Committee to 
discuss with you my judgment of the military capabilities of Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, each of which have been invited to 
accede to the Washington Treaty and become members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization.
    My judgment of the candidates' military capability is based on two 
factors. First, the strategic objective of the United States in seeking 
the enlargement of NATO. Second, on an estimate of the contribution to 
be made by the military capabilities of the enlarged alliance to the 
achievement of that objective. I will define both factors, briefly, 
because I derive the criteria for judging the military capabilities of 
the candidates from them.
Strategic Objective of Enlargement
    By enlarging NATO to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, the US can reasonably assure itself that economic, political 
or military developments in the heart of Europe will not provide the 
occasion, as it has repeatedly in the past, for tension, crisis and 
war. Those occasions in the past have been rooted in what seem to be 
two, immutable, facts of European history, over the last three 
centuries. The first is the inherent weakness of the states within the 
Central European region. The second is their location between the 
powerful states of Europe to their west and east. Over those three 
centuries it is possible to trace the origins of Europe's major wars, 
in whole or in part, to these two immutable facts.
    We enter the fourth century of Europe's modern history with the 
facts of European political, economic and military life fundamentally 
unchanged. Western Europe possesses political and economic power 
unimaginable only fifty years ago and far in excess of what any state 
in Central Europe can hope to approach for a generation or more. 
Russia, while weak as it recovers from the ravages of communism, it is 
not without substantial political, economic and military potential. 
That potential is fully within its reach and if realized its power 
would dwarf the states in the Central European region within a 
generation. We are hopeful that these facts will not lead to tension, 
crisis and war in the coming generation. We also are hopeful that the 
states of Europe have renounced war as an instrument of state policy.
    But prudence dictates that we not rely on our hopes and that we 
ought not to allow chance the opportunity to play its fickle role in 
our affairs. This is especially so when we have at hand the means to 
assure, so far as it is possible, that the immutable facts of 
political, economic and military power in Europe do not follow their 
historical course. The enlargement of NATO to the states of Central 
Europe can provide this assurance. Through enlargement the members of 
the alliance, and none more than the US, can assist the candidate 
states to complete their transition to modem liberal states and 
establish friendly relations with their neighbors. But more than this, 
the enlargement of NATO creates the conditions under which these states 
are shielded from pressures from their east while permitting the US and 
its allies to extend through them a liberal and liberating influence 
into the Baltics, the Balkans and eastward toward Minsk, Kiev and 
Moscow.
    For those schooled in the old concept of geopolitics, enlargement 
consolidates in Europe the political victory of the democracies over 
tyranny in the Cold War, deters those who might seek to exploit the 
real and potential disparities of power on the continent and defends 
the still nascent civil society of Europe against aggression of any 
form. For those schooled in the new concept of preventive diplomacy, 
enlargement further reduces the likelihood of conflict today, protects 
the newly founded liberal regimes in the heart of Europe and increases 
the possibility that nations further to the east will find in the 
success of their immediate neighbors examples worthy of emulation.
The Military Contribution to our Strategic Objectives
    The achievement of our strategic objective requires a combination 
of political, economic and military initiatives. Our attention here is 
on the contribution to be made by our military capabilities to 
achieving our objective. With respect to those capabilities, the US 
chose to ally itself through the Washington Treaty and to combine its 
forces in NATO with those of its allies in order to assure that in 
Europe sufficient military capability would exist to accomplish the 
following missions.

  <bullet> a defense by each ally of its borders and its air and sea 
        approaches,
  <bullet> collective defense among the allies to maximize their 
        individual deterrent and defense capabilities,
  <bullet> and, in the aftermath of the Cold War, ``out of area'' or 
        peace support operations by any combination of allies operating 
        as a combined force.

    This mission list remains the priority listing for allies within 
NATO. The priority is dictated by the requirement of a sovereign state 
to see first to its own security, to that of its allies and then to 
that of the regional or international system. But if the list reflects 
the obligations of states to their citizens, circumstances dictate how 
best to accomplish these missions. During the Cold War each ally had to 
provide substantial forces to defend its borders and air and sea 
approaches. But each ally understood that no member of the alliance was 
capable of providing for its security alone. The collective 
capabilities of all were needed to lend to each the confidence that 
together they could defend themselves should deterrence fail.
    The decisive victory of the Cold War has made it possible for the 
allies individually and the alliance as a whole to pursue these 
missions in ways different than they did during the Cold War. Today, 
the maintenance of the collective defense capabilities of the alliance 
remains essential to the defense of each ally. But today, and into the 
future, the absence of a massive, imminent and direct hegemonic threat 
means that the requirements imposed on each ally to defend itself are 
substantially lower than they were during the Cold War. Yet the risks 
to allied nations have not disappeared by any means. A few examples 
illustrate the point. Kaliningrad is still a depot for a large number 
of competent troops that could be used to influence affairs in the 
Baltic region or in Belarus, with direct consequences for Poland. 
Ukraine and Russia are closer today than at any time in the post-Soviet 
era. But Ukraine has embarked on a security policy that is not entirely 
coincident with that of Moscow. Tension between Russia and Ukraine will 
affect Poland, Hungary and the rest of NATO. We have seen how crisis 
and conflict in the Balkans can threaten allied security. Iraqi and 
Iranian arms build-ups pose a threat as well. So, too, do developments 
along the African littoral. Again, these are not threats of the same 
kind as posed by the Red Army and the USSR. But they are threats to the 
territory of NATO's member states that must be addressed by a 
combination of national defense establishments and collective defense 
efforts.
    In this reduced threat environment all allies have agreed that 
their security depends more today than in the past on their ability to 
conduct military operations on or beyond the periphery of the alliance. 
A reactive defense doctrine does not meet the strategic conditions of 
the day. Based on this assessment, and given the logic and the habits 
of allied cooperation the allies have reached agreement on two points. 
First, they will continue to maintain collective defense capabilities 
to deter the lower but not insignificant probability of a direct and 
massive attack on one or more of them. Second, some or all of them may 
draw on those capabilities to conduct operations on or beyond the 
periphery of the alliance to deter or defeat threats that each of them 
believe undermine their security.
    It is into this newly revised framework for collective defense that 
the national capabilities of new members of the alliance must be 
fitted, And it is in the context of that framework, and the 
requirements for collective defense and power projection that it 
imposes on the allies that the contributions of the new members should 
be judged.
NATO's New Standards
    Mr. Chairman, it is not so long ago that we measured the military 
capability of NATO in terms of armored division equivalents. But such 
measurements have been rendered anachronistic by two developments. The 
most obvious is the absence of an immediate and massive armored threat 
to NATO. The second, and more important, is that modem military power 
is no longer measured in the terms associated with armored division 
equivalents--general defense positions (GDPs), forward edge of the 
battle area (FEBA), echeloned forces, etc. In today's combat 
environment the silicon chip has all but conquered rolled homogenous 
steel. Precision strikes, launched by platforms in the air, on land and 
at sea, are replacing massed forces. High speed, secure communications 
to relay information to combatant forces are now rivaling traditional 
lines of communication as the essential arteries of combat operations. 
While seizing and holding territory may remain the key to securing the 
aims of a war, it is now possible to think of winning battles and 
campaigns by destroying an enemy's forces and supporting infrastructure 
from long range and without having to mass friendly forces on the 
adversary's soil.
    Whether one views these changes in warfare as a revolution or as 
the natural progression in technology and tactics over the last twenty 
years, the fact is that the military forces required to conduct 
operations today and into the future are very different from those 
fielded in the past. Among the allies, the US has moved swiftly to 
exploit these new technologies and tactics. The reasons for this are 
complex but may boil down to this: Americans have a penchant for 
adapting to new technology and a pressing need to increase the 
effectiveness of our forces to meet our unique global commitments in an 
age of fixed military budgets.
    Our allies have not moved to exploit the new technologies and 
tactics as quickly as we have, but they have made substantial progress 
nonetheless. Like us, each of them has taken the difficult steps of 
reducing their manpower overall, reducing the proportion of their 
forces made up of conscripts and making the transition from military 
capabilities designed in the late 1970s to those designed for the next 
century. The pace of this transition, begun later than ours, is 
hampered by the fact that allied defense spending is not directed by a 
central authority, but by the governments of each ally. The result is 
that the efficiency of spending on new technology and the adaptation of 
their forces for new tactics is degraded.
    That said, the allies are confident enough in their own progress to 
have adopted a new approach to NATO defense planning. Instead of the 
fixed GDPS, FEBAS, etc., of the past, the alliance has decided to plan 
its defense around ``projection forces.'' That is, rather than suffer 
the expense of maintaining large numbers of troops for deployment to 
pre-planned defense positions when the threat does not demand such 
deployments, the alliance has agreed that it would rely on the rapid 
assembly and deployment of forces to conduct both traditional 
collective defense missions as well as newer, out of area and peace 
support operations. As a result smaller, more professional forces 
supported by advanced C41SR (command, control, communications, 
computational, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) 
capabilities and armed with more lethal weapons for ground-, air- and 
sea-based combat are being introduced into national forces and assigned 
to NATO to meet allied mission priorities.
Converting Cold War Forces
    The United States has led the way in converting its forces from its 
Cold War emphasis on national defense and contributions to allied 
collective defense forces. A few example suffice to make the point.
    In 1985, the US spent 6.5% of its GDP on defense. By 1995 spending 
had fallen to 3.8% of GDP. In 1995 constant dollars, this means we are 
spending <difference>$90 billion less a year than we spent in 1986. 
This absolute decline in spending is reflected in the forces. Over the 
same period the armed forces were reduced by some 600,000 personnel. 
The number of active army divisions shrank from 18 to 10; the number of 
navy combatants from nearly 600 to less than 350 and the number of 
active air force fighter wings from 25 to 12. Equally important, 
weapons acquisition spending has been cut in half, from about $150 B in 
the mid-1980s to about $80 B today with only half of that in 
procurement. Procurement is slated to increase after the turn of the 
century, but for much of the 1990s the US bought only a handful of 
tanks, aircraft and ships.
    Allied military capabilities have been adjusted as well. In 1985, 
allied spending amounted to 3.1% of GDP; by 1995 it was 2.3%. In 1995 
constant dollars the decline in allied spending is not so great as that 
of the US: today the allies are spending <difference>$10 billion less 
in a year than they did in 1985. The armed forces shrank by about 
600,000 troops as well. Weapons acquisition spending in 1996 was about 
$40 B, down from about $50 B in 1990. Substantial efforts are being 
made in national and multinational programs to bring on line modern 
fighter aircraft (France: Rafale; IT/GER/UK: EFA), transport aircraft 
(UK: C-130J, others: FLA), communications and surveillance satellites 
(UK; FR/GER/SP); new transport and attack helicopters and self-
propelled artillery, new frigates, minehunters, amphibious ships (UK 
and FR) and an aircraft carrier (FR). These efforts are being slowed by 
domestic budgetary restrictions and the difficulties experienced by the 
Europeans in multinational program management.
    It is the case that the US and its allies are presently out of 
phase with respect to modern military capability. The reason is the 
high level of procurement spending by the US in the 1980s which was 
nearly three times that of its allies. These so-called legacy systems--
displayed to such effect in Iraq--were designed in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s and began coming on line in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. 
They will carry us through the 1990s and will form the backbone of US 
forces until 2005-2010. New technology forces--advanced C41SR systems 
and processes, the F-22, the digitized army, new navy ship designs, 
more accurate and lethal stand-off weapons, etc.--will begin to come on 
line in large numbers post-2010.
    The advent of new technology systems in the US will occur about the 
time allies are completing the process of fielding the systems they are 
currently procuring. These systems, designed in the mid- to late-1980s 
for the most part, will not possess the most advanced ``stealth'' 
characteristics of American aircraft, be able to provide the 
situational awareness available to US Army forces or be able to provide 
the volume and variety of firepower US navy ships will be able to 
project from the sea. But for all that, allied forces will be not be 
interior to anticipated threats and will be interoperable with US 
forces. The silicon revolution and constant training makes it possible 
to do with software and tactics what hardware would otherwise prevent.
    The more troubling aspect of the modernization efforts of the 
current allies is the lack of funding for those assets that operate 
above the corps level--C4ISR, long-range air transport, air refueling, 
hospital units, engineering units, logistics and supply capabilities. 
That is, the allies are not investing as heavily as they might in those 
elements of military power essential to the sustained projection of 
military power. The allies are conscious of their shortfall and, within 
what they believe are real constraints related to enlarging the EU and 
bringing about European monetary union, are doing their best to 
overcome it.
    France is determined to develop in the next ten years the ability 
to project 40,000 troops at a distance of 2,000 km and sustain them 
indefinitely. This effort is hampered by its need to shed itself of 
thousands of conscripts and its determination to equip the force out of 
European industry. The UK is procuring amphibious ships and shorter-
range C130Js to give them greater lift and mobility. Its desire to 
balance procurement between the US and Europe, however, leads it to 
hesitate to commit to a buy or lease of a US C-17 capability so long as 
there is a reasonable prospect of the future large aircraft being 
launched by its European industrial partners. Germany is putting 
together a KRK or crisis reaction corps of 50,000 men for projection 
missions. But it is reluctant to provide it with above corps echelon 
capability because it does not want to give the impression that it is 
able to conduct modern military operations independently of its allies.
    The projection shortfall of our major allies can be overcome. But 
it will require a political agreement between the US and them on a 
major issue--defense industrial base reform and long-term procurement 
practices. This is beyond the scope of NATO enlargement, but it is 
critical to its success.
Candidate Member's Capabilities
    Mr. Chairman, in providing insight into the capabilities of the 
candidate members it is always helpful to have a few static figures in 
mind. These figures do not by themselves tell us enough about the 
potential of candidates. But they are useful for comparative purposes.
    Poland:  In 1985 Poland had some 320 thousand personnel in the 
armed forces. It spent about $7.8 billion (in 1995 dollars) or 8.1% of 
its GDP on defense. Today, Poland deploys about 215 thousand personnel; 
it spends about $3.6 billion or 2.4% of GDP. Its plans call for it to 
further reduce its armed forces to around 180 thousand and to maintain 
spending at the current level of 2.4% of GDP. The EIU estimates GDP in 
1997 at about $136 billion and real growth at an average of 5.7% 
between 1996 and 2004. Thus, a roughly $163 billion GDP should yield 
about $4.0 for defense in 2001, an increase of $600 million in 
comparison to today.
    Hungary: In 1985 Hungary had some 106 thousand personnel in the 
armed forces. It spent about $5.2 billion (in 1995 dollars) or 7.2% of 
its GDP on defense. Today, Hungary is reducing its armed forces to 
about 44 thousand personnel; it spends about $630 million or 1.4% of 
GDP on defense. Its plans call for it to increase spending at a rate of 
0.1 percent of GDP per year until it reaches 1.8% of GDP. The EIU 
estimates GDP in 1997 at about $43 billion and real growth at an 
average of 4.5% through 2001. Thus, a roughly $60 billion GDP should 
yield about $1.0 for defense in 2001, an increase of <difference>$400 
million in comparison to today.
    Czech Republic:  Figures for the Czech Republic are not comparable 
due to the ``velvet divorce'' between it and Slovakia. Under the 
settlement the Czech Republic took a roughly 2:1 share of defense 
assets. Today the Czech Republic deploys about 60 thousand troops, it 
spends about $850 million or 1.7% of its GDP. Its plans call for an 
increase in spending to 2.0% of GDP by 2000. The EIU estimates GDP at 
about $50 billion today and real economic growth through 2001 at about 
3.3% Thus, a roughly $60 billion GDP should yield about $1.2 billion 
for defense in 2001, an increase of $350 million in comparison to 
today.
    These figures should not be viewed as predictions and some 
variations in the numbers are possible, depending on deflators, which 
elements of the budget are counted against defense, etc. Nevertheless, 
what then, tell us is that, all else being equal, the three candidate 
countries in 2001 could have, in comparison to 1997, some $1.3-1.4 
billion a year among them in additional funds to spend on defense. This 
suggests that the cost of enlargement, reasonably defined, are 
certainly affordable.
    But the availability of funds is not an indicator of a willingness 
to spend those funds or to spend them in ways that make sense from the 
perspective of the military capabilities of the alliance. With respect 
to a willingness to spend, we can only take the word of the ministers 
and parilaimentarians of the three countries. With respect to spending 
in ways that make sense, that depends on a close collaboration between 
national authorities and those of NATO. And in this regard developments 
tend to support the view that these nations have begun to make concrete 
decisions that will yield substantial military capability for 
themselves and the alliance in about a decade's time.
    Manpower: I have already indicated that each of the candidates has 
dramatically reduced their overall manpower. Now they are taking, or 
about to take, two very difficult decisions. The first is to reduce the 
overall ratio of senior officers to junior officers and to raise the 
percentage of quality of non-commissioned officers. The surplus of 
officers and lack of trained NCOs is a product of their Warsaw Pact 
heritage when command structures were oriented to top-down orders to 
execute set-piece battle plans. NATO armies have always favored 
initiative by junior officers and NCOS. The new technology and tactics 
require that these junior officers and NCOs have a great deal of 
responsibility. To improve the ratios of officers and the competence of 
NCOS, Hungary introduced mandatory retirement at age 55, leading to a 
reduction of 25% of existing general officers in 1995. An additional 10 
generals were expected to retire in 1996. The Czech Republic has 
promised to reverse the 2:1 ratio of officers to NCOs and began that 
process in 1996. The issue is more sensitive for the Poles, but they 
have committed to make the changes. In order to bring up new talent, 
they are offering retirement at 15 years and 40% pay to currently 
serving officers.
    The second significant manpower-related decision is to increase the 
ratio of professionals to conscripts in the armed forces. Poland and 
Hungary plan their forces to be 60% professional; the Czech Republic is 
moving to a 50% ratio. In all three cases the increased ratio does not 
represent a dramatic increase in the total number of professionals 
because in all three cases the dramatic cut in armed forces personnel 
since 1985 has occurred in the conscript ranks. But what it does mean 
is that the per soldier cost will rise. In return, each will have a 
professional-based units available for NATO operations.
    Modernization:  Existing stocks of weapons in each nation, except 
perhaps for aircraft, are not so inferior in age or technical 
capability as compared to those of other NATO powers. All three are 
committed to upgrading their C41 capability, air defense forces, and 
ground force components, the last primarily through upgrades of 
existing equipment. To be sure, each of the three is faced with the 
need to replace the bulk of their fighter aircraft. However, 
appreciating the cost of aircraft and in light of NATO assurances that 
Brussels is not expecting the candidates to invest heavily in new 
platforms (specifically aircraft), all three nations have delayed 
making firm plans or commitments to new purchases. Nevertheless, Soviet 
MiGs and Sukhols will eventually need to be replaced (more on this 
below). But in keeping with the overall commitment to make the less 
glamorous and often unseen changes to infrastructure first so that the 
effects of subsequent modernization can be maximized, all three nations 
have committed to bringing a modem regional air control system on line. 
The military and civilian systems inherited from the Warsaw Pact were 
unacceptable to NATO. The new regional air control system will both 
improve civil and military air traffic control and improve safety while 
making the next step in the process--settling on IFF (identification 
friend or foe) codes and procedures--easier and quicker to implement. 
Thus, when replacement aircraft are deployed, they will operate in a 
NATO-compatible environment.
    Military Contributions: The internal reform of the armed forces and 
their modernization are intended to make the military forces of the 
candidates capable of operating alongside their NATO allies. But none 
of the three has waited for NATO membership to contribute.
    The Czech Republic offered chemical warfare detection vehicles to 
the coalition forces in the Gulf War. It has deployed a mechanized 
infantry unit of some 850 men to Bosnia as part of IFOR/SFOR. This unit 
is made up of volunteers from the Czech rapid deployment brigade, which 
is already considered to be NATO compatible. It is also the view of 
many that the Czech infrastructure--roads, rail nets and stations, 
pipelines, airports, etc.--is already adequate to support NATO's rapid 
reaction corps.
    Hungary has made its airspace and its base as Taszar available to 
NATO forces to support operations in Bosnia. And given the modest 
amount of upgrading needed at Taszar, its infrastructure may prove, 
like that of the Czech republic, to be in better condition to support 
allied forces than has previously been thought. The allied use of 
Hungarian airspace has resulted in its completion of efforts to equip 
all of its aircraft with NATO-compatible IFF. In addition to its 
airspace and bases, Hungary has also made available a 450 man 
engineering battalion for service with IFOR/SFOR. Individuals from this 
unit are now reconstructing the bridge in Mostar. By 2005 It is 
expected that Hungarian reforms and modernization will allow it to 
deploy as many as three rapid reaction brigades fully NATO compatible.
    Poland, like the Czech Republic supported the coalition in the 
Gulf, allowing transit rights and sending medical teams to Saudi 
Arabia. It has contributed an airborne battalion of troops in Bosnia 
under IFOR/SFOR, deployed as part of the multinational Nordic Brigade. 
(It also has a battalion in Syria as part of the UNDOF.) The Poles have 
made at least two brigades and a field hospital unit available to NATO 
in 1997 and plans to have two more brigades sufficiently NATO 
compatible to conduct peace support operations by 2000. Observers 
believe its infrastructure generally adequate to support all elements 
of NATO's rapid reaction corps.
    All three are full and eager participants in PFP. Since 1995, all 
three have participated in a dozen or more PFP exercises. Hungary funds 
its PFP activities outside the military budget, a sure sign of its 
commitment. Poland has become a favored location for armored training 
by the UK.
    In summary, Mr. Chairman, it is evident that the candidates will 
have the financial resources to meet their anticipated obligations, 
they have made significant efforts to reform their military forces, 
began modernization efforts and are contributing to allied military 
operations.
Looking to the Future
    Does this mean that all is in hand and we can rest assured of a 
successful outcome? No. Economic forecasts are notoriously unreliable 
and growth projections could fall short. But even if their economies 
grow less than suggested earlier, the combination of force draw downs 
and reform and real economic growth should provide the three together 
with additional defense funds to meet their new obligations to NATO.
    There are four additional factors which, if managed with a clear 
eye on our ultimate goal, could smooth the integration of the candidate 
nations into the alliance and substantially enhance the capability of 
its member states to provide for modern national defense forces, to 
contribute to collective defense and cooperate in ``out of area'' 
missions. They are listed in increasing order of importance:

  <bullet> the evolution of the transatlantic defense industrial base 
        and national procurement policies. US industry has a 
        substantial lead on its European counterparts in the process of 
        down sizing and consolidation. European efforts are hampered by 
        the complicating issues of policy within the EU. But the 
        introduction of the Euro (European Monetary Union) will speed 
        the process in Europe as fiscal and budgetary policies are 
        harmonized in the Euro's wake. This will affect the candidate 
        members as well, all of whom are also EU candidates. The US and 
        the EU need to put in place soon the laws and regulations that 
        will allow for two consolidated defense industrial bases to 
        maximize their comparative advantages while minimizing 
        politically disruptive economically unproductive competition.
  <bullet> the candidate states have been given assurances by NATO that 
        they are not expected to undertake large, near-term purchases 
        of expensive defense equipment and platforms. This assurance 
        makes good sense in light of the earlier discussion. 
        Nevertheless, the obsolescent state of their air forces will 
        require that each of them put in place soon a long range plan 
        to reduce their force structures, upgrade units where feasible 
        and plan for the financing of replacement aircraft. It will be 
        important that the effort be financed in a business-like way. 
        ``Give away programs'' will not, in the end, provide the 
        necessary incentives to the West to moderate their offers or 
        for the candidates to ration their acquisitions. Loan 
        guarantees, ``lease-to-buy'' and other arrangement using US FMS 
        funds or other programs need to be explored.
  <bullet> the progress of the next round of the Conventional Forces in 
        Europe (CFE II) needs to be monitored for its potential effect 
        on the force goals and structures of new alliance members. The 
        assurances given by NATO that it would not deploy a large 
        number of NATO forces on new members' territory was based on 
        current and foreseeable circumstances. Those circumstances 
        could change. We must be careful not to convert current 
        requirements into legally binding restrictions. Otherwise, we 
        could find ourselves in the future in the embarrassing position 
        of wanting to take a decision in Brussels to deploy forces to 
        allied territory but deterred by the prospect that the 
        deployment would require the receiving ally to reduce its own 
        force structure to remain compliant with CFE II.
  <bullet> NATO's current Strategic Concept, drafted in 1991, is under 
        review and likely to be revised in the next year or two to take 
        account of the changing strategic circumstances in Europe and 
        the addition of new allies. It is important that the final 
        document preserve as the core mission of the alliance the 
        collective defense of its members and the European region for 
        two reasons.
  <bullet> Each ally bases a significant fraction of its 
        national military requirements on that mission statement and 
        NATO's military components derive their own requirements from 
        it. As noted earlier, modern technology and tactics have made 
        it possible to satisfy the collective defense mission in the 
        coming decades with forces smaller in size, higher in mobility 
        and more lethal in their effects than was imagined just a 
        decade ago. It is from the collective defense capabilities of 
        the alliance that the means for conducting ``out of area'' 
        missions are drawn. No ally, including the US, has yet to 
        identify ``out of area'' requirements in such a way that they 
        yield forces adequate to meet either the collective defense or 
        national military requirements.
  <bullet> Apart from the impact of the collective defense 
        mission on technical military capabilities, focusing on it 
        rather than the ``new'' missions of the alliance is important 
        for political reasons. We are only in the earliest stages of 
        defining the ``new'' missions of the alliance. We have not yet, 
        at the current sixteen or the projected nineteen, taken time to 
        assess the strategic situation outside the NATO area, compared 
        our interests in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and beyond, 
        and agreed on a common political and military agenda. The 
        successful conclusion of such an effort is surely a long way 
        off and its outcome should not be prejudged by a near-term 
        revision of the alliance's strategic concept.
Conclusions
    An assessment of the military component of the qualifications of 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic must be conducted in two 
dimensions, The first is the contribution, today and anticipated in the 
future, of the current allies to the security of Europe. Each of them, 
including the US, has experienced a sharp draw down in military 
spending and reductions in force sizes. At the same time each has made 
a longer-term commitment to modernize its forces and take a new 
approach to meet their enduring Article 5 obligations. Past approaches 
have been made obsolete by the collapse of the USSR and the advent of 
new technology. The new approach will depend less on the prior 
deployment of massive forces by each ally than the rapid projection of 
highly lethal ground- air- and sea-based multinational task forces to 
perform all alliance missions. The modernization of US forces is well 
advanced and noticeably ahead of its allies. But the allies are making 
a sustained effort to close that gap. This effort may, in the end it 
may require that they increase their defense spending modestly.
    The second dimension is the capability of the candidate members, 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Like the current 16, each of 
them has experienced a sharp reduction in manpower and funding for the 
military. But their forces are not so old or incapable that they cannot 
make a contribution to NATO's capabilities, even today. All three have 
troop contingents in Bosnia. All three are reforming and retraining 
their troop structures and units. All three are taking a measured 
approach to the upgrading and modernization of their forces.
    Most importantly, all three have economies that are expected to 
grow in the coming years by an average 4.5-5.0% per year. As a result, 
on present plans their base defense budgets could be as much as $1.3-
1.4 billion higher in 2001 than in 1997. This growth, even if it should 
slow some in succeeding years, in combination with military reform, 
ought to allow them to meet the costs of enlargement.
    Mr. Chairman, the success of the candidate member's efforts, and 
therefore to the enlargement of the alliance, rests in an important way 
with the US Senate.
    The advice given to the president by the Senate ought to insist 
that the new allies be provided by NATO with realistic defense planning 
guidelines and time lines informed by the collective defense mission of 
the alliance. The Senate should make clear its preference that the plan 
stress infrastructure improvements, the installation of modern C41 
capabilities, near-term upgrades of critical platforms and systems and 
on internal reform and that these take precedence over major platform 
purchases and drastic restructuring. Such an insistence will help set 
the expectations of the US in this matter and help to bound within 
reasonable parameters the military requirements of the new members. The 
combination ought to set the stage for a successful enlargement of the 
alliance.
             Prepared Statement of Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee,
                                  RAND
                             Washington, DC

    Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I welcome this opportunity 
to testify today on the issue of NATO enlargement. This is an issue of 
vital importance--both for the United States and for European security 
more broadly.
    In my view, NATO enlargement is clearly in the U.S. national 
interest. It will lead to a more secure, more stable and more 
integrated Europe, one that can act as a more reliable partner in 
helping to manage the challenges the U.S. and the Alliance are likely 
to face in the coming decades.

                NATO ENLARGEMENT IN BROADER PERSPECTIVE

    Before discussing the qualifications of the three candidates for 
membership in NATO--Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic--I would 
like to make a few preliminary remarks designed to put the issue of 
NATO enlargement in perspective.
    First, NATO enlargement cannot be seen in isolation. It must be 
seen as part of a much wider comprehensive strategy to enhance security 
in Europe. The goal of this strategy is to project stability to the 
East. For this a multiplicity of institutions is needed. No one 
institution alone can provide this type of comprehensive security. NATO 
has an important role to play. But it is not the only institution. 
Other institutions such as the EU, WEU, and OSCE, also have a role to 
play. Together they are part of the larger process designed to enhance 
stability in an expanded Euro-Atlantic space.
    Second, membership in the European Union (EU) will contribute to 
enhancing stability in Eastern Europe. But EU integration alone is not 
enough. EU integration must be complemented by a security framework. 
The main institution providing that security framework is NATO. Only 
NATO can provide ``hard security''--as developments in Bosnia have made 
clear.
    Third, NATO enlargement is not being carried out because there is a 
specific military threat but as part of a broader process of promoting 
stability and integration. The goal is to anchor the countries of 
Eastern Europe in a broader European and transatlantic framework and 
prevent a ``return to history.''
    Historically, Eastern Europe has been a region marked by 
instability and a geopolitical bone of contention, especially between 
Russia and Germany. The Western goal is to prevent a return to the old 
19th Century geopolitical rivalry and nationalism that led to 
instability--and eventually to two world wars. This can best be done, 
if Eastern Europe is integrated into a broader transatlantic and 
European framework rather than being left as a political gray zone. 
Leaving Eastern Europe as part of such a gray zone would only encourage 
the type of geopolitical rivalry and maneuvering that has created so 
many problems in the past.
    It is well to remember that the three candidates for NATO 
membership--Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic--were historically 
part of Europe. Prague, after all, is further West than Vienna. The 
Cold War artificially separated these countries from their historical 
and cultural roots. These countries now want to return to their roots 
and join Euro-Atlantic institutions.
    NATO is the keystone of this Euro-Atlantic structure. If they meet 
the qualifications for membership, they should become members. This is 
the best guarantee that these countries will develop healthy economies 
and democratic institutions and avoid becoming the objects of 
geopolitical rivalries of the past. The Western goal should be to 
project stability into the area and help those countries develop stable 
democratic institutions--that is, the type of political institutions 
and culture that developed in Western Europe after World War II.
    Some may ask, if the aim is to promote stability, then why not 
admit Ukraine or the Balkan countries first, since they need stability 
even more than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The answer is 
that prospective new members need to have achieved a certain degree of 
political, economic and military maturity before they can become 
members. They need to be ``contributors to security'' not just 
``consumers'' of it. Otherwise, NATO and the EU would simply become a 
collection of economic and political basket cases and both 
organizations would be unable to function effectively.
    Indeed, NATO membership provides an incentive for reform. Aspirants 
know that they will be considered for membership only when they have 
achieved a certain level of economic and political reform and have 
resolved their internal problems, including minority problems. This has 
given aspirants--especially the three prospective new members--a strong 
incentive to carry out the political and economic reforms necessary to 
qualify for membership.
    The prospect of membership has also provided an incentive for these 
countries to regulate their relations with their neighbors. The desire 
for EU and NATO membership, for instance, was a major factor behind 
Hungary's efforts to sign the bilateral treaties regulating its 
minority problems with both Slovakia and Romania. The same is true for 
Poland, which has signed important bilateral treaties with Ukraine and 
Lithuania regulating long-standing territorial disputes and differences 
over minority issues.
    The importance of these treaties should not be minimized. They 
represent an important contribution to stability in the region. And 
they would not have taken place--certainly not with the same speed and 
impact--if the West had not made clear that a regulation of territorial 
and minority problems was prerequisite for entry into NATO.
    This is not to say that integrating the new members into NATO and 
transforming their militaries so that they can function effectively 
with NATO forces will be easy--either for NATO or the new members 
themselves. But the United States--and the Senate--should not lose 
sight of what is at stake. We have a historic opportunity today to 
stabilize Eastern Europe and prevent a return to old 19th Century 
nationalism and a rivalry that was so destructive and led to two world 
wars. History--and our grandchildren--will not forgive us if we fail to 
seize this opportunity.
    NATO membership alone will not do this. But together with EU 
enlargement it provides a prudent insurance policy against a return to 
history.
    However, as NATO enlarges, we need to ensure that NATO's core 
functions--particularly collective defense--are not weakened. New 
members must be able to contribute to carrying out NATO's core 
functions as well as be able to participate in NATO's new missions 
elsewhere on NATO territory and, if required, beyond it. In order to 
perform these missions, the forces of new members need to be capable of 
working effectively with NATO forces.

                 THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE NEW MEMBERS

    Now let me turn to the issue of the qualifications of the 
prospective new members. How qualified are the three countries for NATO 
membership? Will they contribute to Alliance security?
    I believe the answer to both questions is clearly ``yes''. This 
does not mean that there are no problems or that the three countries do 
not have a lot of work to do to modernize their military forces and 
make them compatible with NATO forces. They do. But all three countries 
have demonstrated that they are committed to the values of the Alliance 
and are willing to undertake the reforms--economic, political and 
military--necessary to qualify for membership.
    Since 1989 the three prospective new members have made significant 
progress in four important areas:

                           DEMOCRATIC REFORM

    All three countries have established stable democratic political 
systems based on the rule of law. Democracy, to use Juan Linz's phrase, 
has become ``the only game in town.'' All the major political forces in 
the three countries accept the democratic rules of the game and are 
prepared to abide by them. In addition, there is a broad consensus in 
all three countries about the basic strategic directions of policy, 
whether it be market reform, membership in the EU, or membership in 
NATO. These goals are espoused not only by the former democratic 
opposition but also by the post-communist parties. Indeed, in Poland 
and Hungary these post-communist parties have pursued EU and NATO 
membership just as aggressively as their noncommunist predecessors.
    The recent elections in Poland illustrate this growing political 
maturity. The elections in September 1993 led to the formation of a 
left-wing government led by former communists. On most major issues, 
the post-communist government continued the basic policy of its non-
communist predecessors. In, September of this year, the non-communist 
forces were returned to power. This alteration of power illustrates the 
health and viability of the new democratic political system. In short, 
politics in Poland--as well as Hungary and the Czech Republic--is 
increasingly beginning to resemble politics in Western Europe.

                            ECONOMIC REFORM

    The three countries have also made significant progress in 
implementing market reforms. Today nearly 80 percent of the Polish and 
Czech economy is in private hands; the figure is only slightly lower in 
Hungary. Last year Poland's growth rate was 6 percent--one of the 
highest in the Western industrialized world--far higher than in most 
countries in Western Europe. After several years of slow growth, 
Hungary has begun to emerge from the recession that characterized its 
economy in the last years. The Czech economy has begun to witness some 
problems lately but it still maintained a very respectable growth rate 
of about 4 percent last year.

                       MINORITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

    All three countries have also made substantial progress in 
regulating their relations with their neighbors and in assuring the 
rights of minorities. Hungary has signed bilateral treaties with 
Slovakia and Romania, which provide important provisions for minority 
rights. Poland has signed similar treaties with Lithuania and Ukraine. 
These treaties have served to enhance stability and significantly 
defuse potential tensions in the region. All three countries have also 
become members of the Council of Europe.
    This does not mean that there are no minority problems in these 
countries. But these differences have diminished significantly since 
the signing of the bilateral treaties and are not of such a magnitude 
as to pose a threat to regional security.
    The prospect of NATO membership played an important role in this 
process. Indeed, without the prospect of NATO membership the bilateral 
treaties might not have been signed. All three countries knew that they 
had to regulate their minority problems if they were to have any hope 
of entering NATO. Thus NATO has already contributed in important ways 
to enhancing stability in Central Europe.

                            MILITARY REFORM

    At the same time, the three candidate members have also begun to 
undertake important military reforms designed to restructure their 
militaries and make them more compatible with those of NATO.
    They have also taken important steps to establish civilian control 
over their militaries. For instance, in Poland the 1996 National 
Defense Law clearly subordinates the Chief of the General Staff to the 
Minister of Defense. Similarly, in Hungary the 1993 National Defense 
Law specifies that the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces is 
subordinate to the Minister of Defense.
    Some critics have expressed concern that the East European 
countries will be consumers rather than producers of security and that 
they will require a massive assistance program in order to bring their 
militaries up to NATO standards. This is not the case. The three 
prospective new members do face important challenges in the military 
field but these challenges are by no means insurmountable if the 
countries implement prudent defense policies.
    These countries do not face a major military threat in the 
foreseeable future. In order to modernize their armed forces they do 
not need--and should be discouraged from embarking on--crash military 
programs that might weaken their economies. What is needed in each case 
is a well thought out and well designed long-term defense program over 
the next 10 to 15 years to modernize their military forces and bring 
them up to NATO standards.
    The basic problem these countries face is to increase the quality 
of their forces while reducing the quantity. The manpower levels of the 
prospective new members are significantly above those of NATO members 
of comparable size, while their quality does not match that of NATO. 
The new members can significantly reduce the size of their forces and 
still fulfill their defense requirements to join NATO. The money saved 
from the reductions can then be reinvested to improve the quality of 
their forces.
    Again, the answer to this dilemma is not a crash military program 
designed to bust the budgets of these countries. But rather a prudent 
long-term defense program designed to increase the quality of their 
forces in key areas--modernization, readiness, logistics support, 
technical compatibility, and interoperability--while reducing the 
quantity of their forces, in some cases by 30 to 40 percent.
    Doing this will not bankrupt the economies of their countries. 
Their economies are growing at an average rate of about 4 percent a 
year. This is higher than the growth rate of most of our West European 
allies. They do not have to allocate a far larger share of GIDP to 
defense in order to restructure their militaries. They can retain the 
current share, while steadily elevating defense spending as their 
economies grow.
    Indeed, one of the great attractions of NATO membership to these 
countries is that it will allow them to keep their defense expenditures 
modest and to focus their resources on economic reconstruction. 
Alliances save money. If they were not members of NATO, they would have 
to spend even more money for national defense.
    This does not mean that NATO membership will be a free ride. On the 
contrary, NATO membership will require these countries to spend their 
resources differently than they otherwise might if they had to provide 
for their own defense using national means, and to increase spending in 
some areas while decreasing it in others. But it will allow them to 
purchase a greater degree of security at a much lower cost than would 
otherwise be the case if they were not members of NATO.
    Moreover, the types of changes needed to make the forces of the 
three prospective new members compatible with those of NATO do not have 
to be built overnight. As noted, what is needed is a prudent long-term 
defense modernization program. During the Cold War, NATO had to begin 
to build a posture in Central Europe almost from scratch in 1950. It 
took three decades for the Alliance to meet many of its military 
objectives, but it managed to do so gradually in a step-by-step fashion 
by laying out prudent defense modernization programs. A similar result 
is achievable in Eastern Europe over the long run.
    The three prospective members have already begun to take steps to 
modernize their militaries and make them better able to work 
effectively with the forces of NATO.
    Poland has advanced the farthest in this regard. Poland recently 
presented a detailed 15-year plan for the modernization and reduction 
of the Polish armed forces. The plan calls for a reduction of the armed 
forces to 180,000 men, with a complete overhaul of the officer corps 
structure, and the introduction of professional NCOs and warrant 
officers. Under the new plan the Polish forces will be systematically 
upgraded in order to meet NATO standards of readiness and 
interoperability.
    In addition:

  <bullet> Poland is currently preparing two airfields, two ports, and 
        two large depots for operations with NATO.
  <bullet> It has established national military centers for language 
        education.
  <bullet> more than 100 officers a year are enrolled in courses at 
        Western higher military schools and universities (including 
        West Point and the National Defense University).
  <bullet> Poland has also set up a joint peacekeeping battalion with 
        Ukraine (operational by Summer 1998) and Lithuania (expected to 
        be operational in 1999).

    The Czech Republic has also begun to modernize its military forces. 
The Czech government recently pledged to increase defense spending by 
.1 percent of GDP a year for the next three years. This commitment is 
reflected in the new budget and was maintained despite the severe 
floods this Summer that caused millions of dollars of damage. As a 
result, defense spending will rise 17 percent this year. While the 
Czech government still has a way to go, this increase reflects the 
government's commitment to take the steps necessary to modernize the 
Czech military and make it more compatible with NATO forces.
    Hungary has also committed to increase defense spending by .1 
percent of GDP a year over the next five years. It has introduced a 
comprehensive military reform designed to restructure the Hungarian 
armed forces and make them compatible with NATO. In the process its 
forces have been reduced from a little over 100,000 in 1985 to 48,000 
today.
    In addition, Hungary plans to set up a peacekeeping battalion with 
Romania and a Hungarian Italian-Slovenian peacekeeping brigade. Indeed, 
military-to-military relations between Romania and Hungary are 
excellent. This underscores the way in which NATO can contribute to 
promoting peace and stability among once antagonistic neighbors.
    Perhaps most important, Hungary has made facilities available for 
U.S. troops in Bosnia. This is a very strong indication of Hungary's 
commitment to NATO. Hungary may not yet be in NATO, but NATO is already 
in Hungary.

                     PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MEMBERSHIP

    There is also strong public support in all three countries for 
joining NATO In all three countries, support has remained steady or 
increased. Support is highest in Poland (83 percent), followed by 
Hungary (65 percent), and the Czech Republic (59 percent). \1\ In 
addition, publics in all three countries have expressed a willingness 
to continue with political and economic reform that would allow these 
countries to qualify for NATO membership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Figures are based on USIA opinion data taken in the Spring and 
Fall of 1997. See 'NATO Enlargement: The Public opinion Dimension,' 
office of Research and Media Reaction, United States Information 
Agency, October 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This support, moreover, is likely to grow as the publics in these 
countries come to better understand the benefits and obligations of 
NATO membership. One of the reasons for doubts on the part of some 
parts of the population in the Czech Republic and Hungary is ignorance. 
Many Czech and Hungarian citizens do not really know what NATO is; for 
others, the idea of an alliance has a negative connotation. They 
associate it with domination and loss of sovereignty--their experience 
as members of the Warsaw Pact. However, the governments in Hungary and 
the Czech Republic have undertaken efforts lately to better educate 
their publics and this has led to a rise in support for NATO in both 
countries.

                               CONCLUSION

    In sum, Mr. Chairman, I believe the three prospective members are 
fully qualified to become members of NATO. Their inclusion in NATO will 
contribute to a stronger, more stable and more secure Europe, one that 
is a more reliable partner for the United States. Such a Europe is 
clearly in the U.S. national interest.
    Thank you.

                               __________

               Prepared Statement of Dr. John S. Micgiel,
                               Director,
                     East Central European Center,
                          Columbia University

    Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to address this 
distinguished body today on the matter of extending membership in NATO 
to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
    Two world wars began in the region between Germany and Russia in 
this century. After World War II, NATO provided a shield against 
aggression behind which Western European states could build a community 
of democracies, prosperous market economies, and civil societies. 
Postwar arrangements effectively barred the Czechoslovak, Hungarian, 
and Polish nations from being able freely to elect governments, from 
participating in the Marshall Plan, the 50th anniversary of which we 
are celebrating this year and, in short, from acting as sovereign 
states.
    The implosion of the Soviet system and the emergence of 
democratically elected governments in most of the states in the region 
beginning in 1989 resulted in those governments pursuing European and 
Euro-Atlantic policies, joining Western multilateral organizations like 
the Council of Europe and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, and being invited to enter into accession talks with the 
European Union and NATO.
    The mere prospect of membership in the latter has acted as a 
catalyst for political reform and served a point of reference for 
decision makers. In Poland, for example, prospective membership in NATO 
resulted in the clear establishment of civilian control over the 
military. The precondition of friendly relations with neighboring 
countries has had a dramatic impact throughout the region. Poland has 
Good Neighbor Treaties with all seven of the states that now adjoin it: 
Belarus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Lithuania, Russia, the Slovak 
Republic, and Ukraine. Hungary concluded Basic Treaties with Ukraine, 
Romania, and Slovakia. Following its peaceful separation from Slovakia 
in 1992, the Czech Republic concluded a much awaited Treaty with 
Germany, The prospect of being included in the first group of countries 
invited into NATO also caused the Romanians to conclude controversial 
Basic Treaties with Hungary and Ukraine. And the very tone of political 
discourse and culture has changed, with much less anti-Russian rhetoric 
in evidence today than just a few years ago, a sure sign of increasing 
political maturity and self-confidence,
    The three prospective member countries have each taken a proactive 
role in cooperating with their neighbors and sometime former 
adversaries. Poland, the only country among the three bordering on 
Russia, has led the field here by engaging the Germans and Danes in 
plans for a European Corps, and it has engaged the Lithuanians and 
Ukrainians separately in the establishment of joint battalions. Poland 
has also begun a wider political strategic partnership with both 
Lithuania and Ukraine. Hungary and Romiania are cooperating militarily, 
and the Czech Republic is now cooperating with Poland and Hungary on a 
regional air defense network.
    The desire to demonstrate the ability to cooperate regionally 
resulted in the establishment of the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement, and what is now known as the Central European Initiative, 
both of which have brought politicians on various levels together at 
regular intervals to discuss trade issues, the reduction of tariffs, 
and the development of infrastructure throughout the region. And trade 
within CEFTA doubled between the organization's inception in 1993 and 
1996, as economies grew and tariff barriers dropped. The declaration by 
the Czech, Hungarian, and Polish ministers of defense regarding plans 
for joint military procurement are another logical step in the 
direction of increased regional cooperation.
    Inclusion in multilateral organizations, and the concomitant 
legislative, political, and economic reforms have played and continue 
to play a great role in attracting direct foreign investment (FDI). 
Hungary, in particular, has been successful in obtaining investments of 
over $16 billion, while in Poland, FDI jumped from $6 billion in 1995 
to $14 billion in 1996. Each has obtained an investment grade rating 
and is making progress in meeting the economic criteria for European 
Union membership. Much progress has been made in constructing viable 
market economies, all of which have demonstrated growth despite 
occasional setbacks. Current account deficits in Hungary and the Czech 
Republic resulted in the implementation of difficult and generally 
unpopular stabilization measures. Yet each country has declared its 
ability and willingness to adequately support its membership in NATO. 
The Czech Republic has announced that military spending will rise in 
each of the next three years to a level of two percent of GDP in 2000, 
while Hungary's defense budget will rise from 1.4 percent of GDP in 
1996 to about 2 percent by 2001. Poland is already devoting and will 
continue to devote about 2.5 percent of GDP. As the economies grow, the 
funds devoted to the military will grow substantially in absolute 
terms. In the Polish case, for example, the economy has grown an 
average of seven percent over the last 3 years, and if that tempo were 
kept up, the amount in absolute terms would double in a decade.
    Each of three candidate countries has adopted different 
modernization strategies for their armed forces. They share, however, 
several commitments: to implement and drop below CFE limits; to 
reorganize and restructure units to bring them into alignment with NATO 
standards; and to cooperate with NATO in PfP exercises, in Bosnia, 
Eastern Slavonia, and other Unapproved operations. Each candidate 
country has a modernization plan that aims toward enhancing the 
interoperability of its armed forces with NATO, All three are reducing 
their armed forces, by 40 percent in the Czech case, 35 percent in the 
Polish case, and nearly 60 percent in the Hungarian case.
    And following the third round of discussions between Poland and 
NATO in Brussels earlier this month the Poles declared their 
willingness to contribute 1-9 percent of the current NATO budget. It is 
worth noting that seven of the current sixteen members of NATO make 
lower contributions.
    Are Czech, Hungarian, and Polish citizens in favor of joining NATO? 
A Hungarian public opinion survey taken in September 1997 indicated 
that 75 percent of those people who indicated that they would 
participate in a referendum on NATO would vote in favor of joining 
NATO; they will have an opportunity to do so on November 16 when a 
referendum on NATO accession will be held. A USIA survey of Czech 
citizens in May 1997 indicated that 60 per- cent favored entering NATO. 
Polish surveys have consistently reported approval ratings of above 83 
percent.
    The fact is that these countries share Western values and 
principles and want to contribute to, not merely benefit from, the 
stability and security that accompanies NATO membership. Suffice it 
here to mention Czech and Polish participation in Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm, Polish action on behalf of American interests in Iraq following 
the war, active participation in SFOR by Poland and the Czech Republic, 
and Hungary's support of SFOR by permitting NATO bases to be 
established in Hungary, and allowing NATO troops to pass through and 
over Hungarian territory to and from Bosnia.
    At present, no real major threat to the peace and security of any 
of the three candidate countries exists, including Russia. However, the 
perception of a Russian threat, still exists in Poland and Hungary, 
based on a shared historical experience and, in the Polish case, the 
proximity of a quarter million Russian troops in Kaliningrad blast and 
the establishment of the recent Russian-Belarusian Union. NATO is seen 
as being the only ready and tested structure that can effectively 
discourage potential trouble before it occurs.
    Despite the posturing we see in some Russian circles, NATO 
expansion does not pose a threat to a democratizing Russia that, after 
all, has a special relationship with NATO. According to a recent Brown 
University poll Russian elites express greater fear of Chinese 
demographic pressure and Islamic fundamentalism. Nonetheless, the 
failure to ratify the accession treaties would be perceived as a clear 
signal of U.S. disinterest in a region over which the United States had 
waged a forty-year struggle against the Soviet Union. That would result 
in a grey zone, a security vacuum, and temptation for the radicals that 
today are on the fringes of Russian politics.
    With dynamic economies, solid democratic values, excellent 
relations with neighbors, strong moral and political support for and a 
record of cooperation with NATO, and strongly pro-American attitudes, 
the three candidates have much to offer the Euro-Atlantic community. At 
a meeting of the New Atlantic Initiative on September 9, 1997, former 
National Security Adviser Anthony Lake spoke of the relatively low 
priority that NATO expansion holds for the average Russian, and 
concluded that enlargement ``is the opportunity of a generation and it 
would be the shame of our generation if we do not now seize it.'' The 
overwhelming majority of the 60 million inhabitants of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the 11 million co-nationals residing 
here in the U.S., and the many more Americans who see a safer America 
in an enlarged NATO, would only echo that assertion.



   COSTS, BENEFITS, BURDENSHARING AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO 
                              ENLARGEMENT

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1997

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m. in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms 
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
    Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Biden, Robb, Feinstein and 
Wellstone.
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I would 
say, for the record, that we are in the midst of the end of 
session frustration. At the moment, the Senate is trying to get 
a quorum, which may take a while. They may have to go to a live 
quorum to get a vote on it.
    And then, we have at least one vote to follow immediately 
after that. So rather than have the witnesses sit here all 
morning, not to mention the guests, I am going to start it and 
I think we can get pretty far down the road before anything 
happens on the floor.
    In any case, let's see what we can do.
    Now, we'll begin for the record.
    The Foreign Relations Committee today continues its 
examination of the critical issues surrounding the proposed 
expansion of NATO. This morning, the subject for our discussion 
will be the cost, the benefits, the burden sharing, and the 
military implications of NATO enlargement.
    Maybe you recall that during Secretary Albright's recent 
appearance before this committee, I mentioned that the issues 
that we would consider this morning may very well be the issues 
that would determine whether NATO enlargement will succeed or 
fail in the Senate.
    Now our first panel will consist of the Honorable Walter 
Slocombe from the Department of Defense who is here and I have 
already greeted him. Mr. Slocombe will discuss the military 
implications of NATO and will present the administration's 
analysis of how much NATO enlargement will cost.
    Now, Mr. Slocombe will be followed by a private panel 
consisting of Dr. Richard Kugler of the National Defense 
University; Dr. Ivan Eland of the Cato Institute; Mr. Stephen 
Hadley, a former Defense Department official during the Bush 
administration. By the way, Mr. Hadley is now with the law firm 
of Shea and Gardner.
    Now, all of these gentlemen have checked the 
administration's mathematics, and are here to tell us whether 
anything has been missed in putting together the 
administration's estimate of how much NATO enlargement will in 
fact cost the American taxpayers, as well as how this policy 
will benefit the national interests of the United States.
    So I say to you, Mr. Slocombe and the other gentlemen who 
will follow you, we welcome you, we deeply appreciate your 
coming, and we look forward to your comments. You may proceed, 
Mr. Slocombe.

   STATEMENT OF THE HON. WALTER SLOCOMBE, UNDERSECRETARY OF 
                       DEFENSE FOR POLICY

    Mr. Slocombe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm 
honored to have the opportunity to appear before this committee 
on behalf of the administration and the Department of Defense 
to address the military implications and costs of NATO 
enlargement.
    I want particularly to express our appreciation for the 
fact that the committee has chosen to have these series of 
hearings early on as we begin to define the issues and open the 
debate on this fundamental question.
    Nowhere are American concerns more vital or are efforts 
more focused than in the case of Europe. The United States 
maintains a commitment to Europe in terms of troops on the 
ground, in terms of capacity to reinforce as needed, and in 
terms of political engagement in seeking to resolve problems. 
America makes this commitment not as an act of charity, but 
because the security of Europe is vital to our own security as 
events in this century have shown.
    As a result of the success of freedom and the collapse of 
communism and the end of the cold war, we know have a chance to 
build a security system for all of Europe. We need to do so, 
for, unfortunately, while the massive Soviet threat has 
evaporated, we continue to face problems as well as 
opportunities--threats to stability and security can still 
arise from old national and ethnic hatreds, from home-grown and 
state-sponsored terrorism, from threats from unstable regions 
outside Europe, and from the prospect of the threat of weapons 
of mass destruction.
    In the new European security system we seek to build, the 
key instrument is NATO. NATO enlargement is the most 
publicized, but not the only part, of a much broader strategy 
to create a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe. In my 
full statement, I outline the other elements of that effort.
    Enlargement, which is the focus of this committee's and, 
indeed, the country's attention, will serve the common security 
interests of all the member NATO--all the member nations of 
NATO, including the United States. Adding nations to the 
alliance in a gradual and careful way as they meet the 
standards for membership will, first of all, foster stability 
throughout Europe and the world by providing for stability, 
which has historically been a principal source of conflict in 
Europe.
    Second, it will make NATO stronger by creating a larger 
circle of like-minded nations prepared to work together in the 
common defense.
    Third, it provides an institutional setup for improving 
relations among the region's states, both members and non-
members. Indeed it is--the prospect of NATO enlargement has 
already had an important positive effect in that direction.
    Fourth, it will broaden the number of countries that can 
participate in burden sharing within NATO, both in financial, 
in manpower, and in strategic terms. It will create a better 
environment for trade, investment, and economic growth in 
Eastern and Central Europe because it is as true in Europe as 
it is in other parts of the world that without basic security 
and stability, free economies cannot prosper.
    It will help secure the historic gains of democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe by providing the security in which 
those newly free societies can flourish. It will help all of 
Europe become a stronger partner for the United States in 
political, economic, and security affairs.
    Thus, the enlargement will serve American interests and 
American principles just as it will serve those of all of 
Europe, both old and new members, states inside and outside the 
alliance.
    As you are, of course, aware, at the Madrid Summit this 
summer, the NATO alliance, the NATO countries decided to invite 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin negotiations 
toward an accession agreement, which we expect to have signed 
in December.
    The main focus of my testimony this morning is with regard 
to the military implications of the accession of those 
countries and the associated costs.
    With respect to military implications, NATO's first task 
now and as an enlarged alliance will be the so-called ``Article 
5'' defense of the territory of its members. This core function 
will not be diminished with enlargement, or indeed with other 
changes in the alliance.
    Back in 1991, NATO adopted a new strategic concept that 
recognized the end of the cold war and shifted from the cold 
war program of position forward defense to place new emphasis 
on flexibility and mobility and an assured capacity for 
augmentation.
    Applying this concept to enlargement, NATO does not need, 
in the existing strategic environment, to permanently station 
combat forces of any substantial numbers on new members' 
territory. Instead, the military forces of the new members will 
be made capable of operating with NATO forces, supplemented by 
the capability of current members, to provide appropriate NATO 
reinforcements in a crisis if necessary.
    Thus, the defense posture associated with enlargement will 
apply to those new members the same concept of regional 
reinforcement that it applies to current members. Similarly, 
NATO has agreed that while new members will be expected to 
support the concept of deterrence and the essential role that 
nuclear weapons continue to play in the alliance strategy, 
enlargements won't--enlargement will not require a change in 
NATO's current nuclear posture.
    For this reason, the alliance has stated that it has no 
intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on 
the territory of new members nor does it foresee a future need 
to do so. But with respect to this statement as well as the 
statement about stationing forces, these positions depend on 
current conditions and could, of course, be reviewed where 
conditions have changed.
    NATO will also, of course, expect new members to be able to 
contribute to non-Article 5 missions, including being able to 
participate in out-of-area deployments and, indeed, it is 
relevant that all three of the countries which have been 
invited to join are active participants with forces in Bosnia, 
and, indeed, in other operations.
    With respect to costs, of course NATO enlargement areas 
cost. Security is not free. It is a price well worth paying but 
it is not free. Analysis of the financial costs of enlargement 
can, I think, usefully be broken into three components.
    First, there are the costs to new members; that is, to 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to develop military 
forces that are better able to contribute to their own defense, 
to the defense of other NATO members, and to other NATO 
operations.
    Second, there are the costs to current members so that they 
can improve their forces' mobility, deployability, and 
flexibility--in short, to proceed with the efforts they are 
already committed to and needed to meet the defense 
requirements of NATO's current membership.
    These first two categories of costs are for actions that 
the countries concerned would need to take to provide for their 
own defense whether or not NATO added members. Indeed, to get 
comparable levels of security without NATO enlargement, new 
members and, arguably, even current members, would have to 
spend more than they will have to spend with an enlarged 
alliance.
    And finally, there are the costs to both new and old 
members of integrating the new members into NATO or building 
the links that make the alliance a real working military 
alliance.
    From one point of view, these direct costs could be 
considered the only real costs of NATO enlargement, since they 
are the only costs that are uniquely associated with 
enlargement--the only costs that would not be incurred if NATO 
did not add new members. But we have thought it appropriate to 
count all three categories of costs to present a complete 
picture of what the requirement will be.
    But these direct costs are associated with enhancing 
interoperability. They include improvements in communications, 
air command and control, logistics, infrastructure, and 
conducting the program of exercises necessary to be sure that 
this linking system works. As you know, earlier this year the 
Department of Defense had prepared and submitted to the 
Congress are--an initial analysis of what the costs would be.
    It's important to understand the assumptions that lie 
behind this or any projections of cost. Our estimated assumed 
that while there will be a need for serious defense 
capabilities for an enlarged NATO just as there is now, there 
is currently no threat of large-scale conventional aggression 
in Europe, and that any such threat would take years to 
develop.
    That is, of course, the same assumption that we make in the 
United States for our own national planning and that NATO makes 
in planning for the defense of its current members. That 
assumption includes a recognition that there is no guarantee in 
an absolute sense that that threat could not arise, and that we 
have to hedge against the possibility and NATO provides an 
important basis for the hedge.
    Total costs, as we estimated them for all three categories 
aggregate, was $27-$35 billion over the period from now through 
2009; that is, 10 years after the planned accession of the new 
members.
    Let me give you a brief breakdown of how those costs were 
allocated. First, new members costs for restructuring their own 
national forces. Those costs were estimated at between $10 and 
$13 billion over that timeframe or around $1 billion a year.
    Those costs amount to some 10-30 percent of the projected 
defense budgets for the prospective new members over that 
period of time. Now, that is a significant part of the total 
budgets for those countries. On the other hand, it represents 
the investment that they will need to make in making a 
fundamental new direction in their own national defense.
    To meet those costs, they will have to increase their 
defense budgets to some degree and they will outline plans to 
do that. But we and they expect that a substantial part of the 
costs will be met by savings from reducing the size of the 
three nations' current forces.
    I also want to emphasize that all of these costs would be 
borne by new members, except to the likely very limited extent 
that the American Congress, or indeed, other NATO parliaments, 
decided to continue the limited support that we now have for 
some of the Central European militaries.
    For example, as you know, the United States now provides 
about $100 million a year through the so-called Warsaw 
Initiative to fund PF--Partnership For Peace countries and to 
support their participation in PFP.
    These costs for the three new members will be the cost of 
moving from their own Soviet-style forces, which were little 
more than auxiliaries of the Red Army, to militaries 
appropriate for independent democracies in a free alliance.
    But it's important to recall that these countries do not by 
any means start from zero. Indeed, they have per capita rather 
larger militaries than most NATO allies; probably in terms of 
just number of people, larger than they need.
    What they need to do, and we have made clear the priorities 
for this, is first to invest in quality personnel. Make sure 
those personnel are trained. Achieve a real degree of 
interoperability with NATO, which means upgrading 
communications, logistics capability, infrastructure, and 
integrated their air defense with that of the alliance as a 
whole.
    It is certainly the case that each of the invited nations 
will have to modernize its equipment in the years ahead. But it 
is our view and theirs that acquiring large amounts of high-
tech weapon systems should not be the highest priority.
    These countries are already working hard to demonstrate 
that they are ready for membership in NATO. Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Cramer and Assistant Secretary of State Grossman 
are, as I understand it, prepared to testify before this 
committee next week. They were scheduled last week and it was 
canceled--postponed regarding these preparations, so I will not 
go into them in detail beyond noting that each nation 
acknowledges the need both to restructure and increase their 
defense effort.
    The second broad category is the current allies' cost; that 
is, the cost to improve deployability. I want to begin by 
noting that our cost estimates to date do not anticipate any 
added costs to the United States in this category--that is, 
ability to deploy--because the United States forces are already 
highly deployable and sustainable at long distances.
    Their requirement to deploy to meet contingencies in places 
like Korea or Southwest Asia is actually more demanding than a 
hypothetical crisis in Central Europe. U.S. costs of 
enlargement are relatively low because we've already provided 
for the force's projection missions that the new NATO requires.
    But it is certainly the case that the other members of the 
alliance need to improve their capabilities to deploy. Now we 
have estimated that the costs of meeting the requirements will 
be in the range of $8 to $10 billion, or around $600-$800 
million per year.
    Now, these are a very modest share of the total defense 
budgets of the non-U.S. NATO allies, on the order of 1 percent. 
For the most part, they represent efforts already under way to 
adapt their forces to new postcold war needs and missions.
    These costs would all be borne by current allies and not by 
the United States. As this committee is well aware, for decades 
now, the United States has made no financial contribution to 
NATO allies' defense budgets except for the limited amounts for 
loan support to Greece and Turkey.
    We believe that our current allies can and should do more 
to increase their capability for the sort of mobile, flexible 
operations that NATO will need to be ready for in the future. 
But it is important to recognize that most of these countries 
have already made improvements and are committed to make more, 
and detailed examples are set forth in my statement.
    Finally, turning to third category, the direct enlargement 
costs for linking new and old allies, those were estimated at 
about 9 to $12 billion over this period, or about $700-$900 
million per year. This, again, is the cost of things like 
communications reinforcement, reception infrastructure, and 
other interoperability measures.
    We estimated that about 60 percent of these costs, or about 
$5.5 to $7 billion in total, would be paid for out of the NATO 
common budgets over the 10 years following accession. The 
remainder would be paid almost entirely by the new members.
    Now, this number is particularly important because this is 
the only number to which the United States would have to 
contribute. As you know, the United States pays approximately 
25 percent of each of the three NATO common budgets. We expect 
that this relative cost share will stay the same--the ratio of 
three European to one U.S. in the period when NATO is meeting 
these requirements.
    With these assumptions, the U.S. share would be about $150-
$200 million per year. Now, that is simply our share of the 
common budgets.
    These are, certainly, manageable costs. Obviously, $200 
million is a lot of money, but it is only a fraction of a 
percentage point of the entire U.S. defense budget, which is 
$266 billion this year.
    We are still discussing whether or what portion of those 
direct costs of enlargement, which would be paid for from 
common budgets, will represent a net increase overall in the 
common budgets, but whether some can be offset by reductions in 
lower priority programs. Now, there will be certainly be some 
reprioritizing of projects, and, therefore, less than dollar 
for dollar increase. The United States continues to expect that 
additional resources will be required.
    Having explained the numbers that we provided earlier this 
year, I now want to talk about them, the next step, to get more 
refined estimates. Our estimates earlier this year were 
necessarily preliminary, if only because we didn't know what 
nations would be invited to join, and we certainly didn't know 
the detail of the steps needed to link them into the alliance.
    Immediately after the Madrid decisions, NATO started a 
detailed review of the military implications, the miliary 
requirements, and the costs of meeting those requirements that 
are associated with enlargement.
    The present NATO costing effort is highly specific and 
focused on individual installations. In an effort to better 
understand requirements as well as the current capabilities of 
the three invited nations, members of NATO's international 
military staff have been conducting cite visits at various 
military facilities in the invited countries. They actually go 
out and look at the air field, at the rail head, at the 
communications' facility, and the air defense radar stations to 
identify what changes will be necessary in order to bring those 
facilities up to the required standard.
    They will then cost these requirements and prepare a 
proposed schedule on which they will be met. That work is to be 
completed in time for approval at the December NATO 
ministerials. This--and those cost estimates based on these 
detailed analyses will, therefore, be available to Congress 
simultaneous with the signing of the accession agreements and 
well before any vote on enlargement.
    Based on what we know now, we expect that the NATO cost 
estimates will be somewhat lower than those you received from 
us in February. First of all, the initial U.S. cost estimate 
assessed that four, not three, new members would be admitted, 
so there is some reduction simply from that.
    Second, and this is important in terms of the debate, 
remember that the number which NATO will come up to is 
comparable to the $5.5 to $7 billion that we estimated for the 
costs to the common budgets. NATO will only be estimating the 
costs to the common budgets, not the other categories.
    But we also expect that the NATO cost estimates will be 
lower because some of the things in these countries are better 
than we expected. It is clear that there is a lot for them to 
do, but we believe that the additional investment required to 
prepare for membership will be less than initially anticipated. 
My detailed statement gives some examples of our experiences 
showing why this is the case.
    In general, we found that the old Soviet-style 
infrastructure, while having lots of defects, provides a sound 
base on which to build and perhaps, more important, that the 
prospective new members have been making good use of the time 
and opportunities that the Partnership For Peace and nearly a 
decade of freedom has afforded in their ability to improve 
their--the capacity of their militaries to work as a part of 
the NATO team.
    There is on--this is a question of making the estimates. 
Then there is the matter of finding the money. Once the 
military requirements and cost estimates are agreed, we will 
move forward to make good on the commitments taken by--
undertaken by the leaders of the alliance in Madrid that, 
quote, ``The resources necessary to meet the costs of 
enlargement will be provided.''
    At Maastricht earlier this month at the informal Defense 
Ministerial, Secretary of Defense Cohen reminded his colleagues 
that all of the allies have acknowledged that the admission of 
new members will involve the alliance providing the resources 
which enlargement will necessarily require.
    There was no disagreement on this point. Of course, until 
we know the detailed costs and the proposed schedules, we will 
not able to determine the net increase in NATO common budgets 
as British Defense Minister George Robertson noted last week in 
an article published in the American press.
    Because enlargement is a high priority for NATO, we may 
have to delay some lower priority subjects. As I said, there is 
a question whether the enlargements costs to common budget can 
be fully offset.
    But Minister Robinson added, ``If additional spending is 
requiring, Britain will pay its share. We are confident that 
that will, in the end, be the position of all the allies. We 
will keep you informed over the coming months as this 
discussion continues.''
    Finally, I want to emphasize that these estimates of the 
cost of enlargement relate to capabilities required in the 
security environment that we in fact or see. Nation's need 
serious defense capabilities, which we have to hedge against 
the possibility things turning bad, in which there is no 
immediately threat of large-scale conventional aggression and 
whether any threat would take years to develop.
    Of course, a fundamentally different and far more demanding 
set of requirements for defense, in NATO and worldwide, would 
arise if trends in Russia or anywhere else developed in such a 
way such as to renew a direct territorial threat to NATO 
members.
    Because such a threat is hypothetical, it's impossible to 
estimate with any precision the costs of meeting it. But there 
can be no question that those costs would be substantial--they 
would be affordable, but they would be substantial. Remember 
that just 10 years ago, the United States and most of its 
allies were spending nearly twice as much as a share of GNP on 
defense as we do today.
    There can, however, be no question that if we ever had to 
meet such a threat, we could do it more effectively and less 
expensively in an expanded alliance than in a Europe still 
divided along cold war lines. In such a circumstance which we 
do not expect and hope never to see, the added manpower, 
military capability, political support, and strategic depth 
afforded by NATO enlargement would amply justify whatever 
additional costs there were at having additional members within 
the alliance's security umbrella.
    But perhaps the most important point to be made about cost 
is that there would be greater cost and greater risks in not 
enlarging. If we fail to seize this historic opportunity to 
help integrate, consolidate, and stabilize Central and Eastern 
Europe, we would risk a much higher price later.
    The most efficient and cost-effective way to guarantee 
stability is to do so collectively through NATO. That was true 
in the cold war; it is true now; it will be true in the future. 
The costs of doing so are manageable for all concerned. 
Alliances save money. Collective defense is both cheaper and 
stronger than solely national defense.
    A decision to defer enlargement, much less to withhold it 
altogether, would send the message to Central and Eastern 
Europe that their future does not lie with NATO and the West. 
It would falsely validate the old divisions of the cold war. 
The resulting sense of isolation and vulnerability would be 
destabilizing in the region, and would encourage nationalists 
and disruptive forces throughout Europe.
    NATO would remain stuck in the past, in danger of 
irrelevance, while the United States would be seen as 
inconstant and unreliable in its leadership, withdrawing from 
its responsibilities and its interests in Europe and in the 
world.
    The years ahead will be challenging ones in Europe in 
trans-Atlantic security. NATO enlargement is an essential 
feature of adapting the Western military and security 
organization to efficiently and effectively meet the challenges 
ahead. While there will be costs, they are manageable.
    Most important, for the United States, for our allies, for 
our partners, the costs--not just the financial costs of a 
strong, effective, and engaged North American alliance pale in 
comparison to the costs that would be implicated by stagnation, 
instability, and failure of leadership in Europe. I appreciate 
the committee's attention and I look forward to the chance to 
answer your question.
    [The prepared statement of the Mr. Slocombe follows:]
                   Prepared Statement of Mr. Slocombe
    Thank you. I am honored to be invited to appear before this 
Committee to address the security and military aspects of NATO 
enlargement. I would like to address first the rationale for NATO 
enlargement in the context of the European security framework and then 
talk about the military implications of enlargement, including the 
aspect of costs, which I know has been of interest to this committee, 
the Senate, and the public at large.

                    I. American Interests in Europe

    As Secretary Albright made clear in her appearance before this 
Committee, nowhere are American concerns more vital, and our efforts 
more concentrated, than in Europe. We will maintain our commitment to 
Europe in troops on the ground, in capability to reinforce as needed, 
and in political engagement in seeking to resolve problems. America 
makes this commitment not as an act of altruism, but because the 
security of Europe is vital to our own, as events in this century have 
repeatedly shown.
    And we have an historic opportunity before us. President Clinton 
said recently, ``Taking wise steps now to strengthen our common 
security when we have the opportunity to do so will help build a future 
without the mistakes and the divisions of the past, and will enable us 
to organize ourselves to meet the new security challenges of the new 
century.''
    Twice before in this century, America had the opportunity to help 
build a system of European security. The first time, after WWI, we 
foolishly held back from the responsibilities our interests required we 
assume. The second time, after WWII, 50 years ago, Western Europe and 
the United States together chose a path of reconciliation and 
reconstruction through the Marshall Plan, and together moved from 
terrible destruction to unprecedented prosperity and security. However, 
Eastern Europe and Russia did not participate because of Stalin's 
paranoia and relentless expansionism.
    We now have a third chance . . . this time to build a security 
system for all Europe that will:

  <bullet> Solidify the place of the newly free nations in a secure 
        Europe linked to the U.S.;
  <bullet> Maintain U.S. leadership and engagement;
  <bullet> Foster growing European integration;
  <bullet> Ensure that Russia will play a constructive role, 
        commensurate with its importance and weight in European 
        affairs; and
  <bullet> Preserve and strengthen NATO as the core instrument of 
        military security in Europe.

    And, unfortunately, we face problems as well as good opportunities. 
The end of the Soviet threat, while very welcome, has not meant the end 
of threats. Threats to stability and security can still arise from old 
national and ethnic hatreds, home-grown and state-sponsored terrorism, 
threats from unstable regions outside Europe, and the prospect of the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction.

                       II. NATO in the New Europe

    In the new European security system we seek to build, the key 
instrument is NATO. NATO is the only effective, continuing multilateral 
military alliance in the world. It has risen to the challenge of 
providing a critical instrument to promote peace in Bosnia. The best 
evidence of NATO's continuing relevance is the eagerness of many 
countries to join it--and the determination of its current members to 
keep it strong and to shape it to respond to the new challenges and 
opportunities we face. Countries want to join NATO because of what it 
is--a strong military alliance, with strong U.S. leadership. It will 
remain so.
    To that end, we have embarked on an historic program to build a new 
NATO. NATO enlargement is the most publicized, but not the only, part 
of a much broader strategy, to help create a peaceful, undivided and 
democratic Europe. That strategy has included many other elements: 
support for German unification; fostering reforms in Russia, Ukraine 
and other new independent states; assistance to the withdrawal of 
Russian forces and nuclear weapons from newly independent states; 
negotiation and adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty; 
and the evolution and strengthening of European security and economic 
institutions, including the European Union, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and the 
Western European Union, and working toward the creation of a European 
security and defense identity within NATO.
    With regard to NATO itself, NATO enlargement is also part of a much 
broader series of steps to adapt the Alliance to the post-Cold War 
security environment, including adaptation of NATO's strategy, 
strategic concept, command arrangements and force posture; 
strengthening its ability to carry out new missions beyond NATO's 
territory, as it has in Bosnia, while maintaining its core function of 
collective defense; and the creation and enhancement of the Partnership 
for Peace (PFP). As part of this broad series of steps, NATO 
enlargement aims to help the United States and Europe erase outdated 
Cold War lines and strengthen shared security into the next century.

                         III. NATO Enlargement

    The impulse for so many of the nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe to wish to join NATO stems from their desire for thorough, 
permanent inclusion in the broad Atlantic community and for the sense 
of living in the secure neighborhood that NATO has brought to its 
current members. They want to be irreversibly part of the West, and we 
want to help them in this endeavor.
A. Benefits of Enlargement
    Enlargement will serve the common security interests of all current 
NATO members. Adding nations to the Alliance in a gradual and careful 
way as they meet the standards for membership will:

  <bullet> foster stability throughout Europe by providing an 
        institutional stability for Central Europe, which has 
        historically been a principal source of conflict in Europe;
  <bullet> make NATO stronger by creating a larger circle of like-
        minded nations devoted to collective defense, both for 
        protection of their own territory and for mutual action when 
        their security is threatened by events outside their territory;
  <bullet> improve relations among the region's states--both members 
        and non-members--as in the historic reconciliation of Germany 
        and the Czech Republic, and of Hungary and Romania;
  <bullet> broaden burden-sharing within NATO;
  <bullet> create a better environment for trade, investment and 
        economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe;
  <bullet> help secure the historic gains of democracy in Central and 
        Eastern Europe by providing the security in which their free 
        societies can flourish and the hatred of the past be 
        permanently buried, just as it did for Western European nations 
        such as Germany, Italy, and Spain; and
  <bullet> help all of Europe become a stronger partner for the United 
        States in political, economic and security affairs. This will 
        serve American interest and American principles, just as it 
        will serve those of all of Europe, both old and new members and 
        states inside and outside the Alliance.
B. The Choice of Prospective New Members
    Of course, the process of enlargement must be carefully prepared. 
Formal membership in NATO carries with it both political and military 
obligations of a special character--what President Clinton has called 
``the most solemn security guarantees.'' Enlargement must not, and will 
not, dilute the Alliance's military effectiveness, nor its political 
cohesion. The broader context of European security, including impact on 
Russia, on Ukraine, and on nations that remain outside NATO, must be 
taken into account.
    Sincere aspiration to join cannot alone be enough for membership. 
New members must be ready to accept the obligations of membership. They 
must demonstrate a commitment to democracy and the rule of law, to an 
open market economic system, to civilian constitutional control of 
their militaries, to peaceful resolution of disputes with neighbors, to 
respect for human rights and the rule of law, and to a gradual 
development of military capabilities that are congruent and 
interoperable with NATO systems.
    After extensive discussion with allies, with candidate countries, 
with members of Congress, and within the Administration, the President 
decided this year that the US would support Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic for first round invitations. In Madrid, NATO invited 
these three new democracies to begin accession talks to join the 
Alliance. This decision was based on our conclusion, shared by the 
military and our allies, that the three invitees--Poland, Hungary and 
the Czech Republic--have made sufficient progress on military, 
political, economic, and social reforms. They are clearly ready to take 
the next steps to becoming full members, accepting all the rights and 
responsibilities of membership.
    Nine other European states had also declared their desire to join 
NATO, and many of them are making excellent progress in preparing 
themselves for membership. The United States and the Alliance 
recognized the arguments in favor of several other candidate countries, 
including Slovenia and Romania. We concluded, however, that the 
alliance should extend an invitation now only in the clearest cases, 
where there is a broad consensus that the candidate countries have 
already demonstrated readiness for membership on all relevant 
standards. Inviting accession is a profoundly significant action, which 
carries heavy obligations both for new and old members. Where there is 
reasonable doubt about whether a nation has yet made sufficient 
progress, the prudent course is to defer invitations. This approach is 
all the more appropriate, given that the door to membership will remain 
open, so that there will be ample opportunities to invite additional 
members.
    The key non-selects--Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic 
states--have naturally all expressed disappointment at their non-
selection. But all have also indicated that, far from abandoning the 
course of integration, NATO membership will remain a top foreign policy 
goal for them. They are committed to continuing and accelerating 
reforms. They are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices. In 
addition, all aspirants have expressed their intentions to participate 
in enhanced PFP and the EAPC.
C. Military Implications
    NATO's first task is ``Article 5'' defense of the territory of its 
members. NATO's adoption of a new Strategic Concept in 1991 shifted 
from the Cold War program of positioned forward defense to place a new 
emphasis on enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability 
for augmentation when necessary. Consistent with this concept, NATO 
does not see a need in the existing strategic environment to 
permanently station substantial combat forces on new, members' 
territory. Instead, it envisions an effort to make the military forces 
of new members capable of operating with NATO forces, supplemented by 
the capability of current members to provide appropriate NATO 
reinforcements in a crisis.
    Thus, the defense posture associated with enlargement will apply to 
new members the same concept of regional reinforcement that it applies 
to current members, relying on the capability of new members' forces to 
operate with and be reinforced by NATO units. The same forces and 
capabilities needed to meet today's needs will apply to meeting those 
associated with the new members.
    Similarly, NATO has agreed that while new members will be expected 
to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear 
weapons play in Alliance strategy, enlargement will not require a 
change in NATO's current nuclear posture. For this reason, the Alliance 
has stated that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy 
nuclear weapons on the territory of new members; nor does it foresee 
any future need to do so.
    NATO will also expect new members to be able to contribute to 
NATO's non-Article 5 missions, including being able to contribute to 
out-of-area deployments.

                        IV. Costs of Enlargement

    Of course, NATO enlargement carries costs. Security is not free.
     There are new financial costs to enlarging, but these costs are 
affordable. They are modest compared both to our total defense 
spending--and to the costs and risks of not enlarging. The most 
important costs--like the most important benefits are non-financial. 
The United States and its allies will, by enlargement, extend solemn 
security guarantees to additional nations. NATO members must provide 
the capability, with that of the new members, to back those guarantees. 
The Madrid Statement acknowledges that the Alliance will need to find 
the needed resources.
A. Categories of Enlargement Costs
    Analysis of the financial costs of enlargement can be broken into 
three components:
    First, there are the costs to new members to develop military 
forces to contribute to their own defense, to the defense of other NATO 
members, and to other NATO operations. While they currently make some 
contribution, in order to be greater producers of security, the new 
members must over time re-build, re-equip, and re-train their forces. 
They must have smaller, better equipped, better supported, and better 
led forces, and those forces must be better able to operate with other 
NATO forces.
    Second, there are the costs to current members to improve their 
forces' mobility, deployability, interoperability, and flexibility--in 
short, to proceed with the efforts already committed to and needed for 
NATO's current membership.
    These two categories of costs are all for actions that the 
countries concerned would need to take to provide for their own 
defense, with or without NATO enlargement. Indeed, to get comparable 
levels of security without NATO enlargement the new members would have 
to spend more. Similarly, existing members would need to meet their 
commitments to improve their forces' flexibility and deployability 
whether or not NATO added members. But with enlargement, the 
capabilities that these other costs will fund will be needed all the 
more. So it is important that the commitments actually be met, and we 
have thought it right to identify the first two categories of costs 
that will need to be paid to ensure that an enlarged NATO is able to 
meet its obligations.
    Finally, there are the costs to both new and old members of 
integrating new members into NATO. These direct costs to enlarging 
could be considered the only true costs of NATO enlargement, since they 
are the costs that would not be incurred if NATO did not add new 
members.
    These costs are associated with enhancing interoperability in 
communications, reinforcement, exercises and air operations. They 
include:
Communications:
  <bullet> Refurbishment/renovation of new members' existing 
        headquarters facilities to accommodate a NATO C2 element 
        (including necessary intel & comms equipment).
  <bullet> Extension of communications interfaces to all new member 
        forces.
  <bullet> Education in NATO languages & procedures for new members' 
        officers.
Air Command and Control:
  <bullet> Acquisition of interoperable air traffic control 
        capabilities and weapons engagement capability.
  <bullet> Interoperable aircraft avionics (IFF).
Logistics:
  <bullet> Acquisition of interoperable fuel facilities and other 
        support equipment at reception sites.
  <bullet> Host-nation support planning and procedures for arranging 
        routine logistics support.
Infrastructure:
  <bullet> Improvements to new members' airfields, road and rail links, 
        ports, and staging areas to accommodate NATO reinforcements.
  <bullet> Enhanced fuel storage and distribution capabilities.
Exercises:
  <bullet> Upgrades to existing exercise facilities to ensure 
        compatibility with NATO safety standards.
  <bullet> Transportation and operating costs for incremental combined 
        exercises tied specifically to enlargement.
B. Initial U.S. Cost Estimate
    As you know, the Department of Defense has prepared a notional 
estimate of the costs of enlarging. This estimate was part of the 
report, requested by the Congress, that the President submitted to you 
in late February of this year.
    Our initial estimate assumed that, while there would be a need for 
serious defense capabilities for an enlarged NATO, there is currently 
no threat of large-scale conventional aggression in Europe, and that 
any such threat would take years to develop. This is, of course, the 
same assumption that we make for our own national planning, and that 
NATO makes in planning for defense of its current members.
    Total costs for achieving all three categories were estimated as 
$27-35 billion. These costs would be spread over the 13-year time frame 
of 1997 through 2009--ten years after the planned accession of new 
members.
    Now, using the breakdown for these costs which I just outlined for 
you, let me give you what we estimated each group would have to bear 
for each of the three categories of costs:
1. New Members' costs for restructuring their national forces.
    Prospective new member costs for restructuring their militaries 
were estimated at about $10-13 billion over that time frame or about 
$800 million to $1 billion per year. These costs amount to some 10-30% 
of the total current defense budgets of the prospective new members.
    New members will be expected to increase their defense budgets to 
some degree, and they have outlined plans to do so. But we expect a 
substantial part of these costs will be met by savings from reducing 
the size of the three nations' current forces. These costs would all be 
borne by the new members, except to the limited extent Congress decides 
to continue limited support to Central European militaries. (As you 
know, the U.S. now provides about $100 million in Warsaw Initiative 
funding to all PfP countries combined to support their participation in 
PfP.)
    These will be costs of moving from their old Soviet-style forces, 
which were little more than auxiliaries of the Red Army, to militaries 
appropriate for independent democracies. These countries do not start 
from zero. Indeed, they have, per capita, rather larger militaries than 
most NATO allies. They each are contributing to NATO's force in Bosnia. 
They have begun restructuring their forces, which are poorly equipped, 
trained, and manned.
    We have, since our first analysis, discovered some unanticipated 
capabilities in the three invitees; however, as our study continues, we 
will, of course, likely also find some deficiencies--especially 
regarding personnel, specialized training, communications, and force 
modernization. While the three cannot be expected to ``fix'' everything 
by 1999, each must have a serious program that lays out a defined path 
toward the enhancement of their defense capabilities.
    We have told each invitee that its highest priority should be 
investing in quality personnel. They must develop effective systems for 
recruiting and retaining good troops. Key to this is the development of 
an effective NCO corps. The next priority is training, including 
English language training, for personnel and equipment are meaningless 
without adequate training. The next priority is achievement of a real 
degree of interoperability with NATO, including communications, 
logistics, infrastructure for reinforcement, and air defense. In all 3 
cases, the outcome will be smaller, but more capable forces.
    While it is clear that each of the invited nations must undergo 
modernization of major weapons systems in the years ahead if it is to 
remain a contributor to overall alliance security, acquiring high tech 
weapons systems should not be the highest priority.
    These three countries are working hard to demonstrate that they are 
ready for membership in NATO. Right after the Madrid Summit, Secretary 
of Defense Cohen met with the three Ministers of Defense to explain 
what they would need to do and to hear their plans. After the Madrid 
Summit, Secretary Cohen traveled to Budapest while the President and 
Secretary Albright traveled to Warsaw and Prague. We made these trips 
not only to congratulate them but to remind them that the journey to 
Alliance membership had just begun, not ended.
    In the past month, Assistant Secretary Kramer has traveled to each 
of the invitees' capitals to discuss their preparations for membership. 
He and Assistant Secretary Grossman will testify before you next week 
regarding these preparations, so I will not go into them in detail, but 
it bears saying that each of these nations wants to be a contributor 
to, not just a consumer of, security. They are already contributing to 
the security of Europe by restructuring and modernizing their 
militaries to operate with NATO, by serving with our soldiers in 
Bosnia, and by helping to make a success of the Partnership for Peace.
    Each country has some work to do. The Czechs, for example, in their 
original DPQ responses to NATO, did not, commit enough of their forces 
to NATO missions, but their most recent response commits virtually all 
of their forces to NATO. Their future budgets need to allocate greater 
resources for defense; they have promised to increase their defense 
budget, currently 1.7% of GDP, to 2% by the year 2000. While both 
Poland and Hungary have had similar deficiencies they are overcoming 
them. Hungary has increased its budget and Poland has an extensive 
fifteen year plan. I am encouraged by the rapid Czech response to our 
and NATO's constructive criticism during the past few weeks.
2. Current Allies' Costs to Improve Deployability.
    Current allies' costs for NATO regional reinforcement upgrades were 
estimated at about $8-10 billion, or about $600-800 million per year. 
These are a modest share of their total defense budget--less than 1%--
and for the most part, represent efforts already underway to adapt 
their forces to new post-Cold War needs and missions.
    These costs would all be borne by the current allies. For decades 
now, the U.S. has made no financial contribution to Allies' defense 
budgets (except for some loans to Greece & Turkey).
    It is important to note that our cost estimates to date do not 
anticipate any added costs to the U.S. in this category because U.S. 
forces are already readily deployable and sustainable. The requirement 
to deploy to meet a contingency in places like Korea or Southwest Asia 
is more demanding than a hypothetical crisis in Central Europe. US 
costs of enlargement are relatively low because we have already 
provided for the forces' projection missions that the new NATO 
requires.
    Both the U.S. and our NATO allies have made big cuts in our defense 
budgets since the end of the Cold War. But, using the key indicators of 
burdensharing, as set by Congress, most of our NATO allies still make 
very substantial contributions to the common defense. For example, more 
than two-thirds of the troops participating in SFOR are non-U.S. 
forces.
    We believe the allies can and should do more to improve their 
capability for the sort of mobile, flexible operation NATO will need to 
be ready for in the future. But is it important to recognize that most 
have already made improvements, and are committed to more. For example, 
Britain provides NATO's only rapidly-deployable corps headquarters 
committed to NATO and British forces are the backbone of the Allied 
Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The U.K. also has the 
capability to deploy and sustain a division-sized force of 20-25,000 
personnel in a Gulf War-style scenario.
    France, in general, is restructuring its armed forces to be more 
mobile and easily deployable. The French are establishing a Rapid 
Action Force (FAR) designed for rapid response in both European and 
overseas contingencies. France also participated heavily in IFOR 
efforts to implement the Dayton peace accords in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. With nearly 10,000 troops, France was the third largest 
troop contributor, after the U.S. and Britain, and was responsible for 
one of the three geographic sectors--and continues to be in SFOR.
    Likewise, Germany is standing up a Rapid Reaction Force of some 
53,000 fully-equipped troops from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The 
first units stood up in 1996 and the force will be fully capable in 
1998. In general, German armed forces are in the process of re-creating 
themselves into a mobile, deployable--rather than static home defense--
force.
    The smaller European nations are also improving their forces. For 
example, the Royal Netherlands Navy and Air Force have improved both 
their transport and air defense capabilities with new procurements such 
as: two KDC-10 transport/tankers (the Dutch can now deploy their own F-
16s without reliance on the U.S.); an amphibious-lift ship to make the 
marine brigade self-deployable; and upgrades to their F-16 fleet and 
their Patriot systems.
3. Costs to Link NATO and New Members.
    Turning to the third category of direct enlargement costs for 
linking new and old allies, those were estimated at about $9-12 
billion, or about $700-900 million per year. This again, is the cost of 
items such as communications, reinforcement reception infrastructure, 
and other interoperability measures. We estimated that about 60% of 
these costs, or about $5.5-7 billion, would be paid for out of NATO 
common budgets over the ten years following accession, with the 
remainder paid by new members. We further assumed that the U.S. would 
pay its current approximately 25% share of the NATO common budget.
    In 1997, total NATO common budget spending totaled about $1.8 
billion. The total U.S. contribution to the three budgets was about 
$485 million, while the allies contributed the other $1.3 billion. We 
expect these relative percentage cost shares will stay the same three 
European to one U.S.--in the period when NATO is meeting the 
requirements of enlargement.
    With these assumptions, the U.S. share of the direct costs of 
enlargement would be about $150-200 million per year, representing our 
share of the NATO common budget that would be applied to the linking of 
new and old members.
    These costs are manageable. Projected U.S. requirements to meet 
direct enlargement common budget costs amount to only a fraction of a 
percentage point when compared with total U.S. defense spending ($266 
billion in 1997).
    Still under discussion is whether that portion of the direct costs 
of enlargement which are a shared responsibility and funded from the 
common budget will result in an overall increase in the NATO common 
budget--or whether some can be offset by reductions in lower priority 
programs currently in the common budget. While there will certainly be 
some reprioritizing of projects, and therefore a less than dollar-for-
dollar increase, we continue to believe that additional resources will 
be required.
C. Ongoing NATO Work to Help Refine the Cost Estimate
    As noted, our February estimates were necessarily preliminary, if 
only because we did not know what nations would be invited to join, nor 
the detail of steps needed to link them to the Alliance. Immediately 
after the Madrid decisions, NATO started a detailed review of the 
military implications and costs of enlargement, what new members will 
bring to the Alliance, and any additional requirements for current 
allies. The U.S. has long argued that any NATO cost estimate must be 
driven by the military requirements of enlargement. We were successful 
in pressing. that argument in the Alliance, and a review of the 
military requirements is currently underway by the NATO staff.
    These reviews are ongoing at NATO this fall, with recommendations 
to be completed in November for consideration by ministers in December. 
The invitees worked with the NATO international staff to fill out a 
special Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) response as their initial 
step into the NATO Defense Planning Process. All NATO allies respond to 
the DPQ annually.
    The present NATO costing effort is highly specific and focused. In 
an effort to better understand requirements as well as the current 
capabilities of the invited nations, members of NATO's international 
military staff have been conducting site visits at various military 
facilities in the invited countries this summer. They visited airfields 
and railheads in each country. They checked out communications 
facilities and visited air defense radar stations. This month they are 
visiting other facilities in each country to try to ensure that the 
first facilities they inspected are representative of the condition of 
the majority of facilities in that country.
    The international staff of NATO will then cost those new 
requirements. They will also help determine a schedule by which to meet 
requirements. That is part of the work that is to be completed in time 
for the December ministerials. This level of detailed information was 
obviously not available to us when we did our first cost study, and it 
is still being formulated. But cost estimates based on these detailed 
analyses will be available to Congress well before any vote on 
enlargement.
NATO cost estimates may be lower
    Based on what we know now, we expect that the NATO cost estimates 
will be lower than those that you received from us in February. First, 
the initial U.S. cost estimate assessed four, not three, new members. 
Further, the NATO estimate will address only the direct, common-funded 
costs, which, as explained above, OSD estimated at $5.5-7 billion over 
10 years. National costs borne by each ally or prospective ally are 
separate from, and will not be estimated by, the NATO work.
    But we also expect the NATO cost estimates will be lower because 
some things are better in the invited nations than people thought. As a 
result of assessments NATO planners and logisticians have been 
conducting, we believe the additional investment required to prepare 
each of these nations, their military forces, and their infrastructures 
for full NATO membership will be less than initially anticipated.
    Let me share some examples of our experiences during these 
assessments to show why this is the case.
Interoperability Progress by the Invitees
    When the American General heading a small NATO team visiting 
Kecskemet Air Base asked his Hungarian host how he might accommodate a 
squadron of NATO F-16s, he was surprised by the precision and detail of 
the Hungarian response--and the level of installation readiness already 
achieved. He commented that the Hungarians had done some excellent 
research. He was told it wasn't just research. Hungary had hosted a 
squadron of Dutch F-16s for several weeks in 1996, and a United States 
Air National Guard squadron was scheduled to arrive the week after the 
general's visit. The Dutch and American planes were in Hungary as part 
of a series of PfP exercises designed to improve interoperability. Thus 
Hungarians are already capable of handling NATO aircraft at some of 
their airfields. There is less work that needs to be done--and in 
turn--less money to be spent to improve these airfields than we had 
estimated earlier this year. This example also shows how PfP has 
contributed in direct and practical ways to preparing for NATO 
membership.
    In another example, an analyst monitoring the NATO Common Fund Cost 
Study's progress noted that even though communications and, information 
systems requirements were increasing, the prospective costs to the 
Czech Republic kept dropping. Upon closer inspection, it turned out the 
Czechs had already anticipated requirements for secure and non-secure 
digital communications programs and had applied NATO standards to the 
national programs they are pursuing on their own. In short, the Czechs 
had already spent their own money to fund some projects that we had 
assumed would be paid for by NATO as a whole through the common 
budgets.
    Finally, an American general asked a Polish major familiar with the 
details of a particular rail complex whether we could reasonably expect 
to transport a NATO armored division through it in one week's time. The 
amused major replied by asking the general how many Soviet heavy 
divisions he thought they planned on moving through the same location 
when trains were going the other way?
    These examples demonstrate an important point. When we conducted 
our initial cost study, we assumed a very substantial need for 
improving military bases and equipment to support interoperability and 
reinforcement. As we spend more time on the ground in the countries of 
each of the invitees, learning the details of their military forces and 
infrastructure, we are gaining a better appreciation for just how well 
prepared they were to fight against NATO, and for how much effort they 
have subsequently dedicated to preparing to integrate into NATO. Of 
course, we will also find deficiencies, but the new members will be 
modernizing from a relatively robust foundation. We will not be 
building airfields from scratch. In fact, NATO will be inheriting a 
great deal of usable infrastructure. Accordingly, the direct costs of 
enlargement will likely be less than we originally estimated.
    During the Cold War these levels of capabilities would have been 
bad news stories, but today they are all good news stories. What I am 
attempting to demonstrate is that we are increasingly impressed by the 
levels of readiness, understanding, and initial success of the invitees 
in working toward NATO interoperability. These capabilities will 
contribute to driving down the need for NATO common-funded improvements 
once they become members of NATO. These capabilities are generally 
higher than we assumed in our February study on the requirements and 
costs of enlargement. I'm convinced, as we delve deeper into the 
circumstances in these countries, we will discover more examples of 
infrastructure capabilities either inherited from the Cold War or built 
up over the past three years through the Partnership for Peace.
    The NATO staff work I have been outlining for you, when forwarded 
to Ministers in December, will provide the basis for a more refined 
assessment of the costs associated with NATO enlargement. In order to 
support the Congress' review of issues associated with enlargement, we 
will, as Secretary Cohen stated in his 16 October letter to Senator 
Stevens, provide you with an update based on these NATO efforts in 
early 1998.
D. Finding the Resources
    Once the military requirements and cost estimates are agreed to in 
December, we will move forward to make good on the commitment 
undertaken by national leaders at Madrid that, ``the resources 
necessary to meet [the costs of enlargement] will be provided.''
    In Maastricht, at the informal NATO defense ministerial, Secretary 
Cohen led the discussions on this issue. Secretary Cohen reminded his 
colleagues that at our defense ministerial in June, we all pledged to 
play our full part: (1) in preparing the nations invited to join NATO 
for their future roles and obligations as Alliance members; (2) in 
providing sufficient resources to maintain the Alliance's ability to 
perform its full range of missions; (3) in implementing the Alliance's 
decisions to further enhance its relations with partners; and (4) in 
acknowledging that, ``the admission of new members . . . will involve 
the Alliance providing the resources which enlargement will necessarily 
require.'' These commitments were reaffirmed at the Summit in Madrid, 
where our Heads of State agreed: (1) that there will be costs 
associated with the integration of new members; (2) that these costs 
will be manageable; and (3) that the resources necessary to meet these 
costs will be provided.
    There was no disagreement on this point in Maastricht. Of course, 
until we know the detailed cost and proposed schedule of action, we 
will not be able to determine how much net increase in the NATO common 
budgets will be needed. And, as British Defense Minister George 
Robertson stated last week, ``[b]ecause enlargement is a high priority 
for NATO, we may have to delay some lower priority projects.'' But, 
Minister Robertson added, ``if additional spending is required, Britain 
will pay its share.'' We are confident that will, in the end, be the 
position of all the allies.
    We will keep you informed over the coming months as this discussion 
continues.
E. The Effect of a Greater Threat on Costs
    Finally, it is important to understand that these estimates of the 
cost of enlargement--and of keeping NATO capable in new conditions--
relate to the capabilities required in the European security 
environment that we in fact foresee--one in which nations need serious 
defense capabilities, but in which there is no threat of large scale 
military conventional aggression and where any such threat would take 
years to develop. Of course, a fundamentally different--and far more 
demanding--set of defense requirements would arise if trends in Russia 
or elsewhere developed in such a way as to renew a direct territorial 
threat to NATO members. Such a threat does not exist, nor is there an 
expectation that it will reemerge. Moreover, the United States and its 
allies would have years of warning and preparation time in the very 
unlikely event such a dramatic change in the European security 
environment were to occur.
    Because such a threat is hypothetical, it is not possible to 
estimate with any precision the costs of meeting it. But there can be 
no question that the cost of responding to such a threat would be 
substantial. Just ten years ago, for example, the United States and 
most of its Allies were spending nearly twice as much of GDP on defense 
as today.
    There can, however, be no question that, if we had to meet such a 
threat, we could do so more effectively and less expensively in an 
expanded alliance than in a Europe still divided along Cold War lines. 
In such circumstance, the added manpower, military capability, 
political support and strategic depth afforded by NATO enlargement 
would amply justify whatever additional cost there were in having 
additional members in the Alliance.
    Perhaps the most important point to be made about the costs of 
enlargement is that there would be greater costs and risks to not 
enlarging. If we fail to seize this historic opportunity to help 
integrate, consolidate and stabilize Central and Eastern Europe, we 
would risk a much higher price later. The most efficient and cost-
effective way to guarantee stability in Europe is to do so collectively 
through NATO. The costs of doing so are manageable for all concerned. 
Alliances save money. Collective defense is both cheaper and stronger 
than national defense. A decision to defer enlargement, much less to 
withhold it altogether, would send the message to Central and Eastern 
Europe that their future does not lie with NATO and the West. It would 
falsely validate the old divisions of the Cold War. The resulting sense 
of isolation and vulnerability would be destabilizing in the region and 
would encourage nationalist and disruptive forces throughout Europe. 
NATO would remain stuck in the past, in danger of irrelevance, while 
the U.S. would be seen as inconstant and unreliable in its leadership 
and withdrawing from its responsibilities in Europe and the world.

                             V. Conclusion

    The years ahead will be challenging ones in European and 
Transatlantic security. NATO enlargement is an essential feature of 
adapting the Western military and security organization to efficiently 
and effectively meet the challenges ahead. While there will be costs, 
they are manageable. More important, for the United States and its 
allies and partners, the costs--and not just financial costs--of a 
strong, effective and engaged North Atlantic Alliance pale in 
comparison to the costs that would be implicated by stagnation, 
instability and failure of leadership in Europe.

    Senator Hagel (presiding): Mr. Slocombe, thank you. We 
appreciate your appearing here this morning. Chairman Helms 
went to vote, if you wondered what was going on up here.
    Mr. Slocombe. He explained.
    Senator Hagel. I know you are no stranger to this. He will 
be back, and in the interest of time, I will proceed with 
questions and then ask Senator Feinstein for her questions.
    Mr. Slocombe, in light of the news this morning about the 
present--or at least it appears to be a present shakeup in the 
Czech government, have we anticipated problems that might occur 
with the three new invited nations into NATO--government 
problems, financial problems? And if we have anticipated those 
problems, for example, on the financial assistance side, if one 
of these new nations is unable to finance its share of its 
membership, what is plan B?
    Mr. Slocombe. I think that whatever shape of the 
governments in any of these three coun--the short answer to 
your question is yes, we have looked at the political stability 
of these three governments. One of the requirements was that 
any country that was going to be seriously considered for an 
invitation would have to have clearly established a democratic, 
stable system.
    And that is certainly true for these three. It's true for 
other countries in Central Europe, but that was a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition. I think it is clear that any 
conceivable government in any of these three countries will be 
dedicated to NATO membership and to paying the costs that are 
necessary to do that.
    Now, they may have economic ups and downs. The possibility 
of occasional blips in the economic structure is not confined 
to Central and Eastern Europe. But I think the base--their 
basic commitment to NATO membership and to paying the costs 
will be met.
    The problems in the Czech Republic--and I have to confess, 
Senator, that in the time that I had been getting up here, 
whatever's happened in the Czech Republic has happened. I can't 
comment in any detail. There have been some special issues in 
the Czech Republic and I think they have had a wakeup call and 
they understand they need to make a stronger effort. We expect 
they will make that.
    Senator Hagel. Let me delve into this a little more 
specifically. Would members, current NATO members, do you 
believe, step up their assistance in order to cover the nation 
or two or three invited nations if there was a shortfall or a 
problem in their commitment to financially support their 
involvement in NATO?
    Mr. Slocombe. We have made clear from the beginning that on 
the whole, NATO is a club in which you pay your own dues. The 
United States has had a modest program for all of the 
Partnership For Peace countries, although a large part of it 
goes to these three countries, to support participation in the 
Partnership For Peace.
    A number of the other European countries have small 
programs of their own that work on particular focused areas. 
But except for that very limited and very focused effort, there 
is no contemplation by anybody that there will be financial 
assistance to meet the basic defense budgets of any of these 
countries.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you.
    The Congressional Budget Office and the RAND Corporation, 
as you know, both estimated NATO expansion costs, but came up 
with dramatically different numbers. How would you explain the 
differences? If the major difference is in the threat 
assumption, what threat assumptions underlie the 
administration's projections?
    Mr. Slocombe. The answer to that question differs for the 
two studies. The CBO study, at least its big number--the $120 
billion, which gets all the attention--assumed a dramatically 
larger threat and assumed that we would need to recreate in 
Central Europe the sort of forward positional defense which we 
had in the middle of Germany during the cold war.
    Obviously, if you make that assumption, the costs are going 
to be very substantially higher--whether they're $120 billion, 
for all I know, could be low. But it is a--that is an 
assumption about a threat which does not exist now, which there 
is no prospect of existing in the future in the sense of any 
indications, and which even if you make the most pessimistic 
possible assumptions about Russia, could not exist without 
years of warning.
    The--I'm sure you're aware, the committee is aware, that 
the Russian army--leaving aside the geographic problem--the 
Russian army is in a state of considerable trouble, and to put 
it mildly, is not sitting on the border of Poland or--Poland is 
the only country that would be relevant here--threatening 
anybody. That's the main difference for the assumptions in the 
CBO study.
    I also want to be clear, and I understand that the 
principal researcher on the CBO study is also the man who did 
the recent study for Cato. He also has very different views 
about what you would need to do to meet the current threat. It 
has essentially to do with the level of current threat and the 
response.
    Now, with respect to the RAND study, that--those numbers 
are obviously a lot closer to the ones which we reached in the 
Department of Defense. Indeed, the range in the RAND study 
overlaps with the range in the Department of Defense study. The 
principal difference there is a relatively technical one about 
the number of divisions that you would need to provide for 
reinforcement.
    I believe that Mr. Kugler, Dr. Kugler, who did the RAND 
study, is going to testify on the second panel and you'll have 
an opportunity to ask him in more detail. But my understanding 
is that the RAND study and the Defense Department study made 
essentially similar assumptions and came to essentially similar 
conclusions.
    Obviously, these estimates have a--are notional estimates, 
and until we have the NATO analysis--as I say, going down and 
looking at the particular facilities, the particular ports, the 
particular communication centers--that's when we'll be able to 
say, ``Yes, this is the work which is going to need to be 
done.''
    Senator Hagel. Thank you. Those NATO allies who were also 
members of the European Union are currently, as you know, 
working with us and attempting to meet strict budgetary 
requirements for the proposed European Monetary Union.
    Could you give us your sense of how likely it is that this 
effort, as well as domestic political factors, will constrain 
their willingness or lack of willingness, or their ability to 
increase defense spending sufficient to accommodate an expanded 
NATO?
    Mr. Slocombe. There's no question that in all of the 
countries in the EEL that are trying to meet the financial--the 
fiscal criteria for the European Monetary Union, there are 
pressures on public spending and that includes pressures on 
defense spending. That is, perhaps, particularly dramatic in 
the case of France and Germany.
    So their defense budgets are constrained--I mean, 
everybody's defense budget is constrained in some sense. But 
these countries are clearly going to continue to have serious 
defense budgets, serious defense efforts.
    And most important, they are all of them--all of the 
principal European allies, not just France and Germany--are 
embarked on an effort to restructure their forces so that they 
shift from forces that were essentially oriented toward 
territorial defense toward forces that are more mobile, more 
deployable, more able to do what we need to do in the future.
    I think there's no question that the European defense 
programs will be--well, they'll be constrained to use your 
term. They will be constrained by the requirements to meet the 
EMU criteria, but they will not be gutted, they will not become 
ineffective. They will continue to work toward this goal of a 
more flexible, more deployable force.
    Senator Hagel. Have we had--I assume we have in-depth 
conversations with our allies on this point?
    Mr. Slocombe. We have indeed. The most important 
conversation, in a sense, that we have with the allies is the 
conversation that takes place through the NATO defense planning 
process.
    Every year, every member of the alliance, including the 
United States, responds to the so-called Defense Planning 
Questionnaire and lays out its defense program. That program is 
then reviewed and discussed.
    Now, it's always up to national governments to decide what 
they will do, but the--this provides a formal process for 
exchanging views on our respective national defense programs.
    In addition, of course, we have--particularly through the 
Department of Defense--we have continuing discussions about our 
respective defense programs, about where the emphasis ought to 
be, about meeting common needs.
    I think it's in the nature of these things that no defense 
establishment is ever convinced it has completely and 
thoroughly met all of the things it would like to do. But all 
of these countries have serious defense programs and will 
continue--particularly will continue this really historic shift 
in emphasis from territorial defense to deployability, and you 
see that in Bosnia.
    I mean, the--almost all the NATO countries, certainly all 
the principal ones, have larger relative contributions to their 
population, total size of armed forces, in Bosnia than we do. 
That's been an important--in addition to other reasons it's 
been important--that has been an important experience for them 
in sustaining forces outside their national territories, and 
that's essentially what we're talking about in terms of 
reforming.
    Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
    Mr. Slocombe. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Hagel. We have been joined now by the--both the 
chairman and the distinguished ranking minority member. So it 
is a high honor for me indeed to--is that all right to pass the 
baton over here, Mr. Chairman?
    The Chairman. (presiding) Thank you.
    The fact is, Mr. Secretary, I voted against these new 
trolley cars and every time I get on one it seems it breaks 
down, and you cannot do a thing in the world about it. You sit 
there.
    Mr. Slocombe. Well, at least it's not a Defense Department 
system.
    The Chairman. They cost $23 million bucks, and the excuse 
for them was they would save 10 seconds or something for the 
Senators to get over there. I said, ``They ought to start 
earlier, keep the old ones.''
    I have only one question--well, maybe I have more than one.
    Have you had yours?
    Senator Biden. No, but you go ahead.
    The Chairman. No, no!
    Senator Biden. No, no, no! I just arrived. Go ahead, 
please.
    The Chairman. So did I.
    Senator Biden. It would give me a chance to figure out what 
he had to say.
    The Chairman. I was interested in one statement you made. 
Of course, what you said was true. You said ``Certainly''--in 
effect--``Certainly, there are going to be additional costs. 
It's not free. But it's well worth paying.'' And that is what 
we are trying to determine.
    But my point is that Uncle Sugar--Uncle Sam--should not be 
forced to pick up the tab on this to protect Europe. Anyway, 
representatives of the three new members were here, and they 
assured me and other Senators that they were perfectly willing 
and prepared to pay their fair share.
    And as far as Germany and France and all the rest of them, 
they ought to ante up a little bit more because we have sent 
men over to die and spent billions of dollars saving their 
bacon twice in this century. So I do not have very much 
sympathy for their unwillingness to pay the cost.
    Now, the United States and its NATO allies are in the 
middle of an effort to identify the specific costs. Did you 
make clear exactly the answer to the question ``Will NATO have 
an agreed estimate by December of this year?''
    Mr. Slocombe. Yes. That, as the statement explains in sort 
of bureaucratic detail, we're in the middle of a process----
    The Chairman. And I assume you did.
    Mr. Slocombe. [continuing]. to produce that by December.
    The Chairman. Was it different from the Clinton 
administration's estimate?
    Mr. Slocombe. We expect that it will be somewhat lower.
    The Chairman. Somewhat lower?
    Mr. Slocombe. Yes.
    The Chairman. And, now, the other 15 members--since we are 
talking about fair share. Are they going to help pay the cost 
of bringing new members into the alliance?
    Mr. Slocombe. Yes, they will, Senator. Mr. Chairman, the--
one thing which is not in dispute is that the common budgets 
will continue to be distributed essentially as they are now.
    Obviously, the percentages will change slightly because the 
three new members will pay a contribution. Given their relative 
size and relative economic position, it'll be quite small, so 
that everybody's absolute percentage will go down a little bit.
    But the most important point is that the relative shares 
will not change and that's three European dollars for every 
American dollar. The United States pays about a quarter of the 
European--of the NATO common budgets and the other members of 
the alliance pay the other three quarters.
    And there is no proposal that I have heard about--and I 
think I would have heard about it--there is no proposal to 
change that ratio.
    The Chairman. Well, I am going to have one or two more 
questions which will be of an arithmetical nature and I will 
file those in writing and you can respond in writing in order 
to save time.
    Mr. Slocombe. If I could, Mr. Chairman, there is one point 
that I think it is important to have in mind as we think about 
what the NATO estimate will be.
    NATO is estimating what the cost to the NATO common budgets 
will be. The number that we estimate for that is not the $25--
$27-$35 billion. It is about $5.5 to $7 billion, which is 
embedded within the larger estimate, but it is important that 
we be clear what NATO will be estimating is the cost of common 
budgets, not the estimates for the whole range of costs.
    The Chairman. Good point. Senator Biden?
    Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman--a good point that 
no one understands.
    I'm not being facetious.
    Mr. Slocombe. This is a----
    Senator Biden. No, no, no--see--Walt, you know this place, 
Mr. Secretary. You know this place extremely well. I am not 
being solicitous when I suggest that you have the respect of 
both sides of the aisle here.
    You have been here awhile. You have been here in more than 
one administration. One of the things that I think is very, 
very important for those of us who support expansion is to make 
sure that we are able as clearly as possible to delineate for 
our colleagues and for our constituencies the difference in the 
additional cost that would be required as a consequence of 
expansion, and the difference as a consequence of plans and 
agreements already made within NATO to modernize and upgrade 
NATO capacity and capability even if we did not expand NATO.
    Mr. Slocombe. Exactly, sir.
    Senator Biden. And so I hate to ask you to do this, but in 
light of what you have just stated, the common budget that you 
just referred to, what does that common budget speak to? What 
elements does it take into account? Does it take both those 
elements into account--the element of the cost of expansion of 
the additional three nations and the element of the cost of 
modernization that we had already agreed to, I guess, what, 
more than 2 years ago?
    Mr. Slocombe. It does not include any of the costs of 
modernization in that--in the sense to which you refer.
    Senator Biden. Right.
    Mr. Slocombe. Those are paid, they have been paid for--
again, with the special exception of Greece and Turkey, they 
have been paid for by the NATO members for the last--right at 
the beginning of NATO, there was some direct grant assistance.
    But for decades, those costs have been--national costs paid 
for by--the Belgian taxpayer pays for the Belgian army, the 
German taxpayer pays for the German army and so on.
    Senator Biden. Right.
    Mr. Slocombe. And the American taxpayer pays for the 
American armed force.
    There are--and that will continue to be true.
    In a sense, the answer to the question is if those costs 
are not met, we may have a problem, but we will not have a 
bill.
    Senator Biden. Right.
    Mr. Slocombe. We may have a problem in the sense that our 
allies will not have done what we think is necessary for the 
common defense.
    Senator Biden. Or what they agreed to do.
    Mr. Slocombe. Or what they agreed to do or what they 
proposed to do.
    Senator Biden. Right.
    Mr. Slocombe. In general, they have proposed to do all 
this. We may have a problem, but the one thing which we will 
not do is write a check to the German government.
    Senator Biden. Right.
    Mr. Slocombe. And that is not going to happen.
    Senator Biden. Good. I am sorry, go ahead.
    Mr. Slocombe. Now, you asked if--you asked what the NATO 
common budgets cover. There are--and this gets complicated. 
There are three of them.
    One is the civil budget, which essentially--one is the 
civil budget, which essentially pays for the NATO headquarters, 
science program, a few things like that.
    Senator Biden. Now, if I can stop you on that one. The 
incremental cost to that common budget as a consequence of 
adding three nations is relatively small, is it not?
    Mr. Slocombe. I do not have a breakdown as to----
    Senator Biden. No, I am not asking you for a specific 
breakdown.--I mean--in relative terms----
    Mr. Slocombe. It would be very small.
    Senator Biden. It would be small.
    Mr. Slocombe. It should be very small.
    Senator Biden. Here is the point I am driving at in each of 
these, at some point, we have to, on the floor of the Senate, 
be able to parse out for our colleagues that when they hear 
``common budget,'' they are going to hear a big number, a 
bigger number.
    Mr. Slocombe. It is going to be a few billion dollars.
    Senator Biden. Right. And a lot of people, even well-
informed people or informed people, are going to assume that 
amount is what we are talking about the United States having to 
pay.
    And so, it would be a useful thing for DOD or whomever to 
break out for us on the common budget number we are going to 
hear the three categories, you are about to tell me. One 
relates----
    Mr. Slocombe. Civil, military, and what we used to call 
``NATO infrastructure,'' now called ``NATO Security Investment 
Program.''
    Senator Biden. If you could, when that common budget is 
agreed upon, break out for the committee the incremental 
increase in each of those categories as a consequence of adding 
three additional nations, that would be helpful.
    And, further, whether or not that expansion--I think it is 
self-evident, but--if that expansion cost is being shared on 
the same basis among the 16 nations as the underlying cost is--
or as the base cost is.
    My terminology may not be correct.
    Mr. Slocombe. You mean the present NATO common----
    Senator Biden. The present NATO common budget.
    Mr. Slocombe. Right.
    Senator Biden. You follow me?
    Mr. Slocombe. Yes, exactly.
    Senator Biden. Because you are going to have people 
focusing on two things--one, what is the total cost to the 
American taxpayer in writing additional checks to anything 
related to NATO as a consequence of expansion? And, two, of 
that additional cost, does that reflect a fair share of what 
other people are paying?
    And, so, we are going to have to be able to answer those 
questions. I am not being--again, to use the phrase twice--
facetious on this point.
    Mr. Slocombe. I understand.
    Senator Biden. We are going to have to be able to put up a 
big old chart on the floor, a colored chart, and say, ``Now, 
look, this is the total cost of adding these three nations. 
These are the categories into which it falls. We are paying 
this amount, and the other 15 nations are paying this amount of 
that expansion cost.''
    Because you are going to get people very upset--not you, 
us. Those of us pushing expansion are going to get people very 
upset here if a) the cost is real high, which I believe it will 
not be, or b) even if it is not high, we are paying a larger 
proportion of that bill than seems fair relative to what the 
breakdown to date has been in terms of sharing costs for NATO.
    Are you with me?
    Mr. Slocombe. Absolutely.
    Senator Biden. If you have any other better ways of doing 
it, I am open. I do not pretend to have the best way of 
presenting that. But we are going to have to be able to present 
that in fairly concrete terms.
    So I will not bore you anymore with it now. But if you 
could have your staff work on that notion for me, for us, and 
maybe you could assign one of your staff members to actually 
just give me a call. I am sure everybody is interested.
    But in addition to the committee, I would like to sit down 
with----
    Mr. Slocombe. To make it----
    Senator Biden. [continuing]. somebody to actually go 
through that process.
    Mr. Slocombe. To add to its baroque complexity, the three 
NATO military budgets are funded in three separate 
appropriations bills for the United States.
    Senator Biden. Exactly, exactly. But we can handle that 
piece, in my view--in terms of the debate.
    One last question--my time is up. I realize I may make your 
negotiation a little harder by this question, but it will make 
my negotiations easier, so--better you because you are a better 
negotiator.
    What is not reflected, I do not believe--correct me if I am 
wrong--is the benefit that may flow to American taxpayers in 
jobs and equipment--sales of military equipment and 
infrastructure possibly from--as a consequence of this 
expansion.
    Is there any estimate as to what benefit may flow to the 
economy as a consequence of selling products, communication 
systems, whatever?
    Mr. Slocombe. The--there will certainly be some such 
benefit because a fairly substantial part of what the new 
members will be paying is to improve their own equipment.
    Now, I do not want to oversell this because we are--this 
is--we are sometimes accused from the other side----
    Senator Biden. Of it being everywhere.
    Mr. Slocombe. This is just a trick by the Americans to go 
peddle a whole lot of fancy stuff these countries do not need 
and it will bankrupt them and so on.
    But, they will have to re-equip their forces. A lot of that 
equipment will be--some will be produced domestically because 
almost all of these countries have some kind of defense 
industry of their own.
    A lot of that will be produced in partnership with U.S. 
companies--they are increasingly doing teaming arrangements, 
and that benefits the U.S. economy.
    To some degree, they will buy end items in the United 
States, and that obviously benefits the U.S. economy.
    I want to make the point, though, that the real economic 
benefit is stability in Eastern and Central Europe.
    Senator Biden. Oh, I agree with that.
    Mr. Slocombe. This is a--an area that is doing quite well 
economically. It has every prospect in a decade of becoming--
probably take longer than that before they get to be like 
Switzerland--but of becoming major regular, developed, 
European-style economies. Those are big export markets for the 
United States.
    And the only way you get big export markets on a 
sustainable basis, especially where you are talking about an 
industrialized society, is with security and stability. That is 
the--I want to be clear. I will try to answer your question 
about the----
    Senator Biden. I could not agree with you more.
    Mr. Slocombe. That is the real economic benefit.
    Senator Biden. And I think we who support this all agree 
that stability is the rationale for expansion--economic, 
political, and otherwise. But that little bit would help.
    Thank you, Mr. Slocombe.
    Mr. Slocombe. Thank you, sir.
    The Chairman. I know Senator Robb will forgive me, but 
Senator Feinstein has been here quite awhile. If it would be 
all right, I shall call on her first, and then the Senator from 
Virginia.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
Welcome, Mr. Slocombe.
    I--you mentioned that the allies--allied costs would be 
about $9-$12 billion. But I think you also mentioned that 
modernization costs are separate and not included in that. Is 
that correct?
    Mr. Slocombe. No. If I gave that impression, I--in all the 
confusion and numbers.
    Senator Feinstein. Could you correct just what this is?
    Mr. Slocombe. Our estimate is that the costs for the 
current members, to improve their deployability, their ability 
to move--their ability to move forces and deploy them like we 
already are able to.
    Senator Feinstein. You call that modernization. That is----
    Mr. Slocombe. It is modernization. Our estimate for that is 
$8-$10 billion.
    Senator Feinstein. All right.
    Mr. Slocombe. The $9-$12 billion is actually our estimate 
of the costs, all of the costs, of linking the new members into 
the alliance. We anticipate that of that $9-$12 billion, about 
60 percent will be funded through the NATO common budgets, and 
the remainder--virtually all of it will be paid for by the new 
members.
    Senator Feinstein. And, so, the new members cost is what?
    Mr. Slocombe. The new members cost is that--what? $3--$4 
billion,--which is for linking to the alliance, plus the cost 
of modernizing their own forces, which is also on the order of 
$10 billion.
    One way just to remember--the way I remember it all----
    Senator Feinstein. So you add those two together? So it 
is----
    Mr. Slocombe. Yeah. The way I remember all this is that it 
is three categories and it is about $10 billion a category.
    But the NATO common budgets are only 60 percent of the 
link--what I call the linking cost.
    The three--three categories. One of the new members have to 
pay for their own military modernization.
    Senator Feinstein. Which is considerable.
    Mr. Slocombe. Which is around $10 billion over the whole 
period. Or do current members have to pay--current European, 
and Canada--members have to pay to be able to deploy, to meet? 
There are already existing commitments to the alliance, to the 
alliance's new strategic concept.
    And third, what do--what does everybody have to pay to link 
the new members to the existing members?
    And that latter category is further broken down. About 60 
percent of it would be paid for by common budgets. There are 
complicated rules which determine what you can get paid for out 
of the NATO common budget and what has to be paid for 
nationally.
    And about 40 percent of that would be paid for nationally 
by the new members.
    Senator Feinstein. And so you are saying each category is 
about $10 billion?
    Mr. Slocombe. Each category is $10 billion, and the last 
category is divided 60/40--60 percent coming out of the NATO 
common budget, 40 percent--almost all of it, a little bit would 
be paid for by current members.
    But almost all of it would be paid for by the new members 
because it is for facilities and activities in their countries. 
It is for exercises, that sort of thing.
    Of the--60 percent share, a quarter, or 15 percent, would 
be paid for by the United States because that is our share of 
the NATO common budgets. We pay about a quarter and the other 
allies pay the other three quarters.
    It varies very slightly among the three different 
categories.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you, that is helpful. Now 
everything I have been reading about our allies, particularly 
France and Germany, is negative with respect to the increased 
costs.
    Is this just their spin for the present time? Are there 
specific commitments that they will pay their fair share--I 
think particularly, President Chirac has been rather verbal 
about it. What specific commitments do you have that the allies 
will pay this increased share?
    Mr. Slocombe. The argument on this point has to do with the 
NATO common budget. The European allies--the Germans, the 
French, everybody else--is committed to a serious defense 
program for the future which will restructure their forces to 
make them more mobile.
    That is, as we were saying in response to Senator Hagel's 
question--like everybody else, their defense budgets are under 
pressure. But that part is not in dispute--I do not argue with 
that.
    What they are saying is with respect to the NATO common 
budgets that we all pay together. The shares are agreed--
whatever it is, three to one, European to American.
    They are saying in effect ``We understand there will be 
costs of building the facilities for enlargement. But let us 
meet those costs by cutting back on existing programs''--by 
what they call ``reprioritizing.'' And clearly, there is going 
to be some of that.
    The number we have estimated it, gross cost, to be--and to 
the degree you do not do projects in Western Europe, you can do 
projects in Central Europe.
    This argument is over whether or not there is a net 
increase in the common budgets. Until we know in detail the 
size of the requirement for the common budget, we will not 
know--and what somebody's proposal is for what you are going to 
reprioritize out of, you are kind of arguing in the air.
    The Europeans are certainly saying, ``We think we can do 
these improvements at''--it is partly scale. It is partly pace. 
It is partly how much can you reprioritize out of other 
projects?
    Senator Feinstein. Just one quick question, Mr. Chairman 
if--it requires a ``yes'' or ``no'' answer.
    In your best professional judgment, do you believe there is 
a full commitment that however this works out, that your--our 
present European allies, the present NATO members, will pay 
their full share?
    Mr. Slocombe. Yes.
    Senator Feinstein. And that the three new members will be 
able to pay their share?
    Mr. Slocombe. Yes.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Senator Robb?
    Mr. Slocombe. Those ``yeses''--one of the problems with a 
``yes'' or ``no'' answers is that yes covers a lot of 
assumptions, but I am confident that those are the answers when 
the smoke clears.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
    The Chairman. What he means is ``Yes, but.''
    Mr. Slocombe. No, sir. I mean ``Yes because.''
    The Chairman. OK. Senator Robb?
    Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the 
asterisk was appropriately noted in your last answer, and Mr. 
Chairman, I do thank you.
    And let me just observe--I appreciate your yielding to 
Senator Feinstein. As one who sat on the end of the dais for 
many, many years and would constantly see somebody come in just 
ahead and realize that I had been there for 2 or 3 hours 
acknowledging the differences in terms of when we arrived, it 
still makes sense and it is appreciated.
    I would have been here at the start but I had two judges 
who were finally up for confirmation and that was important 
that I be there to introduce them so I am a little bit late. I 
apologize to Secretary Slocombe for missing his opening 
statement.
    I do not know that these questions have been asked, but I 
have just a couple that relate in part to questions that you 
have addressed, at least.
    The IMF has recommended that the three NATO invitees avoid 
large defense spending increases and I was just wondering what 
your view of the IMF recommendations was.
    Mr. Slocombe. First of all, we understand--and when I say 
we, I mean the U.S. Government and the Defense Department--
understands that for all of these countries, the first priority 
is to solidify their democracy and establish market economies. 
Nobody is talking about increasing their defense budgets at a 
rate which will jeopardize that.
    These countries spend actually not too far off the NATO 
norm. They could all do with a little increase and they are all 
pledged to an increase in terms of the percentage of GDP spent 
on defense.
    More important, as their economies grow, the amounts that 
they spend on defense, obviously, will grow if the percentages 
increase.
    I do not see any--in any sense an irreconcilable conflict 
between doing what they need to do to attend to what is rightly 
their first priority, their internal economic stability and, in 
a sense, really, to become mature market democracies, and doing 
what they need to do for defense.
    In general, for these countries, what they need to do is to 
restructure what they have in terms of defense. As the 
statement says, basically, these countries had armies which 
are, in some sense, too big--too many people which were 
auxiliaries of the Red Army which were there to support a 
Soviet assault on Western Europe.
    They have already begun this process, but it is a--you can 
appreciate. It is a long and complicated process to take a 
military establishment which was aimed at this and convert it 
into the kind of military establishment for medium-sized 
European countries that is appropriate for what they need and 
for how they can contribute to the alliance.
    For example, each of these countries will make substantial 
cuts in the total number of people in the military. They will 
begin for the first time to have serious professional non-
commissioned officers corps. They will probably, all three of 
them, keep conscription, but they will substantially increase 
the percentage of professionals in the forces. They will go 
away from large mobilization-based forces to more deployable, 
more capable forces. They will begin to build the links--
indeed, they have already begun the links--through the 
Partnership For Peace and so on back to NATO.
    So it is not fundamentally an issue of massive increases in 
amount. There are going to be some increases, but it is not 
massive increases in amount.
    In a sense, a sum which may almost be harder to re--it is 
massive changes in the way they do business in their 
militaries. Hey, you are either talking about militaries with 
an officer structure, which even after, what, 8 years, is still 
largely a holdover from the old days at the senior level? You 
are talking about military cultures that are still, to some 
degree, holdovers, and those have to be changed.
    Senator Robb. Mr. Secretary, the Ambassadors, and in some 
cases, the ministers from the countries have been in or will be 
in to continue to both brief individual members, reassure on 
some of those questions.
    But, as my time is about to expire, let me just ask you the 
``what if'' question. What if, for whatever reason, one of the 
new members is simply unable to meet their expansion related 
program? What happens then?
    I realize none of them contemplate facing a difficulty nor 
do you contemplate facing a difficulty, but----
    Mr. Slocombe. And I do not--I think it is an extremely 
unlikely possibility that they would. The arguments about 
whether or not they made their one-tenth of a percent increase 
in a particular year, something like that--that is an issue of 
pace and direction, not of absolute capacity.
    The one thing which I think is clear is that it is--no one 
is talking about substantial scale, direct assistance to these 
countries. It is not--it is a little bit like I said in the 
more general problem. We may have a problem but we will not 
have a bill--a bill in the sense of anybody expecting the 
United States to meet that payment.
    And these countries obviously will have problems. But there 
is every reason to expect that over the next decade, which is 
the period we are talking about, their economies will continue 
to grow, maybe not in a straight line, but they will continue 
to grow.
    And they are all, as I think you will know from talking to 
their spokesmen, they are all deeply committed. They see this 
as a huge opportunity to do something of absolutely fundamental 
historic dimension for these countries--that is, to become 
firmly a part of the trans-Atlantic system and for the first 
time in their history, solve their security problem. They are 
going to give that a very high priority, even if they fall into 
economic difficulty.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Slocombe.
    We appreciate your coming.
    Mr. Slocombe. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Let me just add this thought. I had the 
impression that there was no dancing in the streets in Paris or 
in London about this, but am I wrong about that?
    Mr. Slocombe. Dancing--it takes a lot to get either the 
British or the French to dance in the streets these days. But I 
think it is----
    In all seriousness, I think all of the European countries, 
all of the European members of the alliance, understand that 
this is something which is very much in NATO and Europe's long-
term interest.
    The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
    The second panel of distinguished witnesses this morning--
and I apologize to them because of the high jinks of the trying 
to fit this in the Senate schedule.
    As I said earlier, Dr. Richard Kugler, the distinguished 
research professor, Institute for National Strategic Studies of 
the National Defense University; Dr. Ivan F. Eland, Director of 
Defense Policy Studies at Cato; and the Honorable Steve Hadley, 
a partner in Shea and Gardner in Washington, D.C.
    Mr. Kugler?
    I would emphasize again how grateful we are to each of you 
gentlemen for being here and for your patience.
    We have a little bit of a time problem. We want all of your 
statements, and they will be included in the printed record and 
they will be distributed. I am not going to run any clock on 
you, but as close as you may come to 5 minutes would be 
beneficial. Then we could all get out of here in a reasonable 
length of time.
    But do not feel like that is an absolute necessity. Do what 
you need to do to make your point and state your case.
    And I thank you very much. Sir, if you will proceed.

    STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD KUGLER, DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH 
 PROFESSOR, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL 
                       DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

    Dr. Kugler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators. It is a 
pleasure to be here. I hope to make a contribution. I 
particularly will address RAND's cost estimate as it compares 
to DOD's cost estimate. I was a RAND employee at the time and 
helped prepare the RAND estimate. I am currently a DOD 
employee, but I am speaking for myself and not for DOD or RAND.
    Obviously, I support enlargement. I agree with the 
testimony given by Secretary of Defense Cohen and Mr. Slocombe 
recently. In fact his points were almost identical to mine in 
so many ways.
    Let me be very brief. Mr. Chairman, you asked earlier 
whether the administration has its mathematics about the costs 
correct and the answer is ``yes, roughly.'' That is my opinion.
    And so that is my testimony.
    I will now go through the cost issue in more detail. I have 
a written testimony that I shall submit.
    Why do not I just go directly to this RAND/DOD cost 
estimate and discuss that for a couple of minutes?
    The RAND study--this is important--preceded the DOD study. 
It came before and so it was, by definition, an independent 
estimate. As a matter of fact, it came before any other study. 
It was an original.
    And so we did not have an opportunity to be biased or 
prejudiced. There was no other study: There was nobody else to 
be biased or prejudiced against at the time.
    Both the RAND study and the DOD study are merely initial 
forays into a new and complex issue. As a result, both are 
notional estimates. They are aimed at identifying the costs and 
defense measures of enlargement in approximate terms. They are 
both well-done, but they are not meant to be definitive.
    When RAND did its study, we were responding to Defense 
Department guidance. We initially looked at a very wide 
spectrum, including options that fell outside NATO's strategy, 
both less and more ambitious. So this generated a very wide 
range of costs.
    Then we looked at options that were consistent with NATO's 
strategy, and our cost estimate for that, for about the same 
period of time, was $30-50 billion. So, as Mr. Slocombe says, 
this RAND estimate overlaps the DOD estimate of $27-$35 
billion.
    RAND then looked at an illustrative option that we deemed 
to be sensible, a sound one. The cost of that option was 
estimated at $36-$42 billion. So we have here a RAND estimate 
of a single option of $36-$42, and a DOD estimate of $27-$35, 
and you see how close they were.
    There are 30 different measures in both estimates, and the 
studies are not absolutely consistent in how they deal with 
each measure. They vary somewhat from one measure to the next. 
RAND has higher air defense costs than DOD; DOD has higher 
infrastructure costs than RAND: There are many similar 
technical differences, but they do not have a big impact on 
total cost differences.
    The key difference is in the NATO reinforcement postures, 
as Mr. Slocombe said. RAND assumed a NATO reinforcement 
posture, of 5 divisions and 10 wings because this is a standard 
U.S. practice for reinforcement of the various regions--5 
divisions and 10 wings.
    DOD assumed a smaller commitment of four divisions and six 
wings because this is NATO's practice. So RAND was using DOD's 
practice, and DOD was using NATO's practice. The two postures 
have exactly the same strategic intent. So that is where the 
primary cost difference came.
    Now, if you went into the RAND estimate and inserted DOD's 
reinforcement posture, RAND's estimate would have been $28-$34 
billion and the Pentagon's is $27-$35--the two estimates would 
have been identical.
    So that is the end of the issue of RAND versus DOD over 
costs--they are singing from the same sheet of music here, and 
they are in the same strategic ballpark. So that is my opinion 
on that matter, and I hope I have laid that issue to rest.
    A couple of final points. The DOD plan, in my view, is not 
sacrosanct. Some say it is too high, others too low. Others 
would change its internal details. We will be fighting about 
these issues for years.
    But seen in perspective, the DOD plan makes political and 
military sense. It is a good launching pad for considering how 
to enlarge. The Pentagon got the costs about right in my 
opinion, and I have been studying this issue for 3 years.
    Another point is that the DOD plan, in my view, is not 
susceptible to far higher or lower costs unless its theory of 
requirements is greatly altered in one direction or another. 
Let me explain why this is the case.
    Again, there are 30 separate measures in the DOD plan and 
the RAND plan. So the total expanse is determined by adding 
together a large number of measures, each of which is very 
moderate in cost.
    In the RAND study--and I suspect the DOD study is similar--
for each measure, there is a range of uncertainty from high to 
low. When I performed this analysis, it was a very thorough and 
detailed analysis; it took a long time--I basically took the 
midpoint for each measure.
    So, for each measure, there is a somewhat higher range and 
a somewhat lower range. For example, the mid-point for one 
measure might be $1 billion; the high range $1.25 billion; and 
the low range, $75 million.
    But in order to get a much higher aggregate total cost, all 
30 measures, or the vast majority of them, would all have to 
cost a lot more than the mid-point.
    What we are likely going to get here is some measures being 
higher than DOD estimated, other measures being about what DOD 
estimated, and others being lower. If so, there will be an up 
and down and offsetting dynamic that I think, in the end, is 
going to keep the final estimate to within the range of what 
DOD is estimating.
    Mr. Slocombe also said correctly that there is a 
forthcoming NATO cost estimate which will be lower than DOD's 
estimate because NATO is looking at common funding and common 
infrastructure. Even so, there is a common theme among all 
three studies here, and the common theme is that the costs of 
NATO enlargement are going to be affordable and moderate.
    This should be the case as long as we maintain political 
control over these measures and as long as we plan and carry 
them out carefully.
    So my expectation is that this effort is going to end 
happily, that we will, in fact, carry out an effective 
enlargement, and that we will, in fact, do it ways that are 
affordable. Clearly one goal is to minimize costs, and another 
goal is to do enlargement right so that we carry out credible 
security guarantees.
    We have 50 years of working with NATO in this context. By 
and large, NATO has gotten it right most of the time, and I 
think that is what is going to happen here. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Kugler follows:]
                    Prepared Statement of Dr. Kugler
    Mr. Chairman and Senators, it is a pleasure to be here.
    I Hope to make a contribution to your hearings.
    I have been asked to provide testimony on the costs of NATO 
enlargement.
    My testimony will include how RAND's cost estimate compares to 
DOD's estimate. I was a RAND employee at the time, and I helped prepare 
its estimate.
    I speak only for myself, not for DOD or RAND.
    Obviously I support NATO enlargement, and I agree with the 
testimony given by Secretary of Defense Cohen.
    For the record, I am submitting two short ``Strategic Forum'' 
papers recently prepared at the National Defense University.
    The first, written by myself, explains why the costs of a sound 
defense program are likely to be moderate and affordable.
    The second, prepared by David Gompert, explains why such a defense 
program will produce major strategic benefits.
    I will be brief, but I will gladly answer questions about the 
technical issues. My testimony consists of seven key points.
    Key Points
    First: The strategic purpose of a defense program for enlargement 
is not to deter a threat, but to meet NATO's preparedness standard for 
peacetime.
    It is vitally important that a gradual, long-term program be 
carried out so that enlargement will be safe and successful.
    What we want to achieve is new members that are defended as 
effectively as old members.
    What we want to avoid is a purely political enlargement and a 
hollow commitment.
    Second, the exact costs and requirements of a sound defense program 
are uncertain and will remain so for some time.
    But we do know enough to judge that if this program is well-
managed, it can be both affordable and effective.
    Third: the RAND estimate is a little higher that the DOD estimate, 
but seen in perspective, the two estimates are similar.
    They are in the same strategic ballpark.
    Fourth: the DOD plan is not sacrosanct. Some say it is too high, 
and others, too low. Others would change its internal details. But seen 
in perspective, it makes political and military sense.
    It is a good launching pad for considering how to enlarge.
    Fifth: The DOD plan is not susceptible to far higher or lower costs 
unless its theory of requirements is greatly altered in one direction 
or another.
    A less-ambitious plan is unwise, and a bigger plan is unneeded 
unless a major threat emerges. Such a threat is not anticipated.
    NATO's forthcoming cost estimate likely will be lower than DOD's 
estimate, but in limited ways because it focuses only on common 
infrastructure and related items.
    The effect is not to invalidate DOD's plan, or to greatly lower its 
overall sense of goals and capabilities.
    Seventh, hopefully enlargement can be carried out at even less 
expense than DOD has estimated. But although cost reduction is an 
important aim, it is not the only aim.
    We also need to work with NATO and our allies to ensure that DOD's 
plan--or a reasonable facsimile of it--is launched and carried out.
    With these points in mind, I will now briefly discuss the RAND and 
DOD cost estimates.
    The RAND study preceded the DOD study. Both are merely initial 
forays into a new and complex issue. As a result, both are notional 
estimates.
    They were aimed at identifying the costs and defense measures of 
enlargement in approximate terms.
    They are both well-done, but they were not meant to be definitive.
    Rand considered a wide spectrum of options, including some that lie 
outside NATO's strategy. To carry out NATO's strategy, RAND portrayed a 
set of options costing $30-50 billion. The option that RAND deemed most 
appropriate costs $36-42 billion, for all of NATO, through 2010.
    This option includes 30 separate measures. Roughly one-half of the 
expense is needed to prepare the forces of new members and their 
military infrastructure. The other half is needed to improve NATO's 
forces for projection missions in the CEE region and elsewhere.
    An important point is that the RAND study includes only measures 
that are required by enlargement. As a result, it counts only about 20% 
of the total defense efforts of new members.
    It treats the remainder as national programs. These programs are 
important for the overall health of new-member military postures, but 
they are not counted as part of enlargement, per se.
    When this study was first briefed to the executive branch and NATO 
officials, the common reaction was relief that the costs are low.
    The primary reason for low costs is that no new forces must be 
created. Instead, the task is merely one of improving forces that 
already exist.
    The DOD study focused on a similar, but not identical, set of 
measures. Its estimate is $27-35 billion, or a little lower than RAND's 
option of $36-42 Billion.
    The two estimates differ in their internal particulars, but the 
primary difference is their treatment of NATO's reinforcement posture.
    Rand assumed a posture of 5 divisions and 10 fighter wings because 
this is consistent with U.S. practice. DOD assumed a smaller posture of 
4 divisions and 6 wings because this reflects NATO's practice.
    If RAND had used DOD's posture, its estimate would have been $28-34 
billion--identical to DOD's estimate.
    The DOD cost estimate can cause sticker shock, but when it is seen 
in perspective, it comes across as genuinely moderate.
    It is less than the cost of buying and operating a single ground 
division or a carrier battle group.
    It is similar to the cost of a single normal modernization program.
    The annual cost is only $2-3 billion. Of this, NATO's new members 
will pay about $1 billion or a little more, the West Europeans together 
will pay about $1 billion, and the United States, only $150-200 
million. These are not onerous amounts.
    The new members will need to increase their defense spending in 
order to fund their measures and otherwise prepare their forces. But 
their growing economies will permit them to gradually elevate their 
spending in the necessary amounts, without greatly increasing the share 
of GDP allocated to defense.
    NATO's current members will need to allocate only 1% of their 
current budgets to enlargement. They can fund most of their measures by 
reallocating their budgets in small ways, rather than increasing their 
spending.
    The burden on the United States will be small. It will be only 
about \1/10\ of 1% of DOD's budget, and the costs of stationing U.S. 
forces in Europe will not rise appreciably.
    To put things in perspective, the average U.S. citizen will have to 
pay only 67 cents annually, and the average west European, only $2.60. 
This is hardly an onerous expense for building a new and better NATO, 
and a stable and democratic Europe.
    I doubt that anybody regards the DOD plan as fixed in concrete. It 
is merely a starting point, and it clearly will evolve as more analysis 
becomes available.
    But it makes strategic sense because it embraces sound goals, 
identifies the correct types of measures, and points NATO in the right 
direction, with fair burden-sharing.
    It will enable NATO to carry out its new security commitments in 
the CEE region, and to become better at projecting power elsewhere.
    Let us also remember that if NATO does not enlarge, the cost of 
defending the CEE region will be far higher: perhaps double the DOD 
estimate.
    To me, the DOD plan is an immense strategic bargain. It is 
equivalent to finding a new Rolls-Royce on sale at Filene's Basement 
for $1000. Let's buy the car first, and quibble about the price second.
    Obviously some parts of the DOD plan may prove more costly than 
estimated. But UMR parts likely will be less expensive.
    For example, costs for air defense may rise. But costs for 
infrastructure and reinforcement measures may fall.
    The effect of this ``up-and-down'' dynamic likely will be to keep 
the cost in the general vicinity of DOD's estimate, and perhaps less.
    Regardless, the costs will be ours to determine. We will not be 
captured by an inflating dynamic beyond our control.
    NATO's estimate will be lower than DOD's estimate primarily because 
its focus on common infrastructure and related items accounts for only 
10-20% of the overall plan.
    Even if some infrastructure items cost less, the overall plan will 
decline by only a few billion.
    Costs for the entire program will not be known for some time, and 
these issues probably will be studied and debated for years.
    What can be said is that although enlargement is not going to be a 
free lunch, its cost will be moderate and affordable.
    In summary, we clearly should minimize costs and resist unnecessary 
expenses.
    But we also should guard against any unwise dilution of an already 
inexpensive defense program that is vital for enlargement's success.
    A principal challenge is to mobilize the multinational political 
consensus and willpower needed to fulfill a sound plan
    Strong U.S. leadership and hard work by all countries will be 
needed.
    The future is uncertain, but NATO's history provides confidence 
that while the result may not be perfect, it will get the job done.
    Thank you. I will be happy to answer questions.

                               __________

                            STRATEGIC FORUM

                      National Defense University

                Institute for National Strategic Studies

                        Number 128--October 1997

                       COSTS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

                        Moderate and Affordable

                          by richard l. kugler
Conclusions
  <bullet> NATO must pursue a sound defense program as it enlarges--not 
        to prepare for a threat, but to meet its peacetime preparedness 
        standard.
  <bullet> DOD's cost estimate of $27-35 billion for all NATO 
        enlargement measures through 2009 causes sticker shock to some, 
        but it is moderate: only about 1% of NATO's total defense 
        spending.
  <bullet> This estimate is now low-sided or prone to major inflation. 
        it is similar to the RAND estimate, and lower than the CBO 
        estimate because CBO embraced a higher threat and theory of 
        requirements.
  <bullet> The United States will not be carrying unfair burdens. Its 
        expense may be no more than $2 billion through 2009. The cost 
        of stationing U.S. forces in Europe will not rise appreciably.
The Cost Issue in the Enlargement Debate
    Cost has become an important factor in the NATO enlargement debate. 
It will influence the Senate's vote on ratifying the admission of three 
new members in 1999-Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. NATO's 
willingness to fund key defense measures will influence whether 
enlargement unfolds safely and effectively.
    This Strategic Forum explains the costs of NATO enlargement in 
clear terms. Strategic Forum #129 by David C. Gompert addresses the 
benefits of a sound defense program. This paper focuses on seven key 
issues:
  1. Why pay costs if no threat exists?
  2. What is DOD's cost estimate and its rationale?
  3. Is the cost affordable or excessive?
  4. Is DOD's estimate accurate or vulnerable to inflation?
  5. Is DOD's estimate lower than other estimates, and if so, why?
  6. Will enlargement require bigger defense budgets?
  7. Will the United States have to carry an unfair share of the 
        burden?
Why Pay Costs If No Threat Exists?
    The answer is that NATO needs strong defenses even though its new 
borders today face no major threat. NATO's ``peacetime preparedness 
standard'' needs smaller forces and budgets than during the Cold War, 
but it is still demanding. As NATO enlarges, it must avoid a two-tier 
alliance in which new members receive less security than old members.
    Strong forces are required for peace support missions, minor 
crises, as well as other interventions. These forces will help build 
partnership relations with non-NATO powers, deter threats from 
emerging, and prevent destabilizing trends. Members must be assured of 
their security in the event relations with outside powers sour. NATO 
also needs to promote sound planning and integration. Members can 
decide upon defense efforts and multinational involvements only if they 
are given a clear definition of NATO's commitments to their security. 
NATO must ensure that the forces of new and old members are sufficient 
both now and for the future.
What is DOD's Cost Estimate and Its Rationale?
    In February 1997, the Clinton Administration issued a study judging 
that the costs of NATO enlargement will be $27-35 billion for the years 
1997-2009. This is the cost facing the entire alliance. The United 
States will pay only a small portion of it--perhaps no more than $1.5-
2.0 billion. The average annual cost will be $2.1-2.7 billion for NATO 
as a whole, and $150-200 million for the United States over the decade 
following accession. The primary reason for the low U.S. expense is 
that the United States already has paid the cost of developing forces 
for projection missions.
    This DOD estimate is notional, but it was a product of a serious 
review that employed sound methods. It was prepared before NATO began 
assessing defense requirements for enlargement. It also was prepared in 
advance of validated cost data for some specifics. Its purpose is not 
to be definitive, but instead to gauge costs in approximate terms. It 
is a starting point for designing NATO's defense relationships with new 
members. Doubtless it will be refined as NATO develops better 
information.
    It should be viewed as a basis for judging broad policy and 
strategy, not as precise tool for programming and budgeting.
    DOD's estimate grows out of NATO's strategic concept and defense 
strategy. It presumes that new members will take primary responsibility 
for their self-defense, and that NATO's current members will provide 
necessary reinforcements. Because it judges that adequate levels of 
combat forces already exist, it focuses on steps needed to make 
existing forces capable of carrying out enlargement.
    Some of these measures are already underway, and many arguably 
would be needed irrespective of enlargement. The DOD estimate divides 
costs into three categories:

1. New Members' Military Restructuring. This category costs $10-13 
        billion during 1997-2009. It includes force structure 
        adjustments and enhancements by new members so that they 
        improve their self-defense capability. It includes measures to 
        upgrade modernization, readiness, and sustainment.
2. NATO Regional Reinforcement Capabilities. This category costs $8-10 
        billion. It deals with steps for upgrading NATO's capacity to 
        deploy forces eastward in peace, crisis, and war. It includes 
        measures to enhance deployability, logistics, and sustainment. 
        It assumes a NATO reinforcement posture of four divisions and 
        six fighter wings.
3. Direct Enlargement Costs. This category costs $9-12 billion. It 
        includes measures directly tied to enlargement so that the 
        forces of new members and old members can operate together. It 
        includes such measures as improved C3I, infrastructure (e.g., 
        roads and rail), reception facilities, training sites, and 
        storage areas.

    This estimate is based on assumptions that first establish an 
``initial capability'' and culminate in a ``mature capability'' by 
2009. It calculates that new members will pay $13.0-17.5 billion, the 
non-U.S. NATO members will pay $12.5-15.5 billion, and the United 
States, the remainder. Because this estimate includes only enlargement-
related measures, it does not include the larger defense preparations 
that all NATO countries will be pursuing. The costs for new members 
will consume 15%-25% of their future defense spending of $65-100 
billion; the remainder will be used for national programs.
    This estimate is based on a ``middle-ground'' theory of 
requirements. It is not minimalist. It is not a bare-bones estimate 
aimed at minimizing costs at the expense of necessary capabilities. It 
does not reflect a high theory of requirements that acquires all 
plausible capabilities. It is not threat-based, and it does not expect 
trouble with Russia. It reflects a normal NATO peacetime preparedness 
standard in which the goal is to acquire essential capabilities at an 
affordable price.
Is the Cost Affordable or Excessive?
    To some, DOD's cost estimate of $27-35 billion causes sticker 
shock. Seen in a broader perspective, it is moderate and affordable:

  <bullet> It is similar to the cost of normal defense departures of 
        this type: e.g., a U.S. air modernization program or defense of 
        another region.
  <bullet> It imposes a high financial burden only on new members, who 
        will gain big strategic benefits.
  <bullet> For the West European members of NATO, it will cost only 
        about 1% of the $2 trillion that they will be spending on 
        defense.
  <bullet> For the United States, it will cost only about one-tenth of 
        1% of DOD's future spending of $3 trillion. The cost of 
        stationing U.S. forces in Europe will not rise appreciably (by 
        my estimate 2-5 percent or less).

    Other comparisons reinforce the conclusion of moderate costs:

  <bullet> The cost of $27-35 billion for all of NATO is equal to the 
        full expense of a single U.S. active division or carrier battle 
        group for a similar period.
  <bullet> The annual cost is about 30% of what the United States and 
        NATO spend on military construction, and 40% of their expense 
        on family housing.
  <bullet> The cost is equal to what they spend on revolving accounts 
        and management funds--small accounts that fluctuate upward and 
        downward.

    For the average citizen, the costs are affordable (see Table 1: A 
Comparison of Enlargement Costs). For the average American, the annual 
cost is equal to the price of a candy bar. For a West European, it is 
equal to that of a McDonald's hamburger. For the CEE citizen, the cost 
would pay for one dinner at a restaurant.
    Given the immense strategic benefits of NATO enlargement, all are 
getting their money's worth. Moreover, alliances save money. For all 
participants, NATO enlargement lowers the cost of integrating and 
defending the CEE region. If NATO does not enlarge, the costs could be 
double that of enlargement.
Is DOD's Estimate Accurate or Vulnerable to Inflation?
    Can DOD's estimate be trusted as accurate? Is there a risk that DOD 
is underestimating? These questions are being asked because many 
previous defense programs became far more expensive as they unfolded. 
When the details are considered, the DOD estimate merits confidence--
provided its underlying plan is not changed in a wholesale way.

               Table 1: A Comparison of Enlargement Costs               
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Cost To:                     Annual Cost   Total Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average U.S. Citizen..........................        $0.67        $8.75
Average West European Citizen.................        $2.60       $34.15
Average New-member Citizen....................       $21.00      $272.50
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The DOD estimate is based on judgments about more than 30 measures. 
No single measure dominates. If the true cost is radically different 
from the DOD estimate, it will occur because several measures are 
pulling in that direction, not just one measure. As a result, the 
primary determinant of costs is not the expense of individual items, 
but strategic decisions about requirements.
    The actual costs for each measure might prove to be different than 
DOD has estimated. This owes to potential variations in both costs and 
the measures themselves. For example, the cost of a single prepared 
airbase might be higher or lower than DOD estimated. Alternatively, 
NATO might decide to acquire fewer or more airbases. But unless the 
totality of measures is greatly expanded or contracted, the final cost 
for the entire plan likely will be similar to the DOD estimate. Higher 
costs for some measures probably will be balanced by lower costs for 
others. For example, acquisition of Patriot rather than I-Hawk could 
elevate costs for air defense improvements, but pursuit of less costly 
measures for airbases and other facilities could offset this increase. 
This up-and-down dynamic likely will keep the cost in the $27-35 
billion range.
    The actual costs will not be known until NATO's force planning 
process for enlargement is finalized. NATO may decide to trim or delay 
some of DOD's measures. Moreover, NATO develops cost estimates only for 
common-funded programs (e.g. infrastructure). These factors may lower 
NATO's estimate, below the DOD estimate. The real issue is not these 
narrow costs, but instead costs for the entire defense program when it 
is complete.
    When the dust settles, the costs could be somewhat lower than DOD 
has estimated. The specific needs of the three invitees might change, 
thus lowering the cost a little. Another reason is that some measures 
(e.g., reception facilities) may cost less than estimated by DOD. Even 
so, the total cost could be far lower only if the major features of 
DOD's estimate are scaled back sharply. This step is inadvisable 
because it could result in a weakened effort that fails to meet future 
requirements.
    The cost could rise above $35 billion, but the DOD estimate is 
vulnerable to major cost inflation only if its theory of requirements 
is elevated far upwards. The DOD estimate does not develop new 
technologies, which can be a principal source of cost inflation. Costs 
could surge if NATO commits to a much larger reinforcement posture or 
if new members buy more expensive equipment than envisioned by DOD. 
Such measures could be needed if a threat emerges, but not in today's 
setting. NATO will be able to control costs, for they are largely a 
product of strategic decisions.
Is DOD's Estimate Lower Than Other Estimates?
    DOD's estimate is in the same ballpark as RAND's estimate. For the 
same defense strategy, RAND estimated a cost of $30-52 billion. RAND's 
mid-point estimate of $42 billion is higher than DOD's estimate 
primarily for a single reason. Whereas RAND costed a NATO reinforcement 
posture of five divisions and 10 wings (a typical U.S. force practice), 
DOD costed four divisions and six wings because this commitment 
reflects NATO's practice. Had RAND costed the DOD program, its estimate 
would have been $28-34 billion: virtually identical to DOD's estimate.
    The General Accounting Office (GAO) has assessed the DOD estimate 
and, despite questioning specifics, pronounced its assumptions as 
reasonable. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) tabled a higher 
estimate of about $125 billion, but the differences are readily 
explained. About $30 billion of the difference owes to CBO's inclusion 
of new-member measures that DOD deemed as falling outside the NATO 
enlargement account. The remaining difference owes to CBO's decision to 
embrace a higher theory of threats and requirements. CBO costed a NATO 
reinforcement posture of 12 divisions and 12 wings, a difference of 
nearly $30 billion. CBO also included more robust measures for C3I 
systems, munitions, and facilities. To CBO, these measures make 
military sense. DOD's estimate judges that they are not needed.
Will Enlargement Require Bigger Defense Budgets?
    If the DOD estimate is carried out, new members will need to 
increase their defense spending in order to fund enlargement measures 
while also improving their forces. NATO membership will allow them to 
downsize their currently large postures because they will be receiving 
security guarantees. This downsizing will generate savings to help pay 
for many enlargement measures. These countries need to increase their 
defense spending not only because they are joining NATO, but because 
the quality of their forces has eroded in recent years. If they do not 
gain membership in NATO, their defense budgets will need to rise far 
faster. As they join NATO, economic recovery may allow higher spending 
without allocating greatly increased shares of GDP to defense.
    NATO's current members can fund enlargement by increasing their 
defense budgets, or reprioritizing, or both. Increased spending avoids 
the need to pare defense assets elsewhere. Reprioritization is always 
painful, but the amount required to fund NATO enlargement is feasible--
only about $1 billion annually split among all current members.
    If the West Europeans choose to reprioritize, they could trim 
spending on operations and maintenance. Alternatively, retiring a few 
units would not compromise their security.
Will the United States Have to Carry an Unfair Share of the Burden?
    The DOD commitment to defense of new members is one division and 
one fighter wing, or about 25% of NATO's reinforcement posture. The DOD 
funding commitment of $1.5-2.0 billion is only about 10% of the expense 
for enlargement facing NATO's current members. The West Europeans and 
NATO's new members will be carrying the bulk of the burdens in forces 
and money.
    The U.S. expense could rise if other NATO members fail to carry 
their fair share of the burden, or if the United States decides to aid 
new members by giving them security assistance.
    The U.S. costs could rise moderately and still be affordable. The 
United States will have control over the expense. If it chooses to 
spend more, it will act because the strategic benefits are worth the 
added cost--not because of circumstances beyond its control.
Summary
    The costs are moderate and, as Gompert argues, the benefits are 
compelling. To gain these benefits, an appropriate set of defense 
measures must be implemented. NATO has carried out many similar 
innovations before, but such efforts are never easy. Careful management 
and sustained political commitment will be needed. The outcome will 
influence the enlargement's success.

Dr. Richard L. Kugler is a Distinguished Research Professor in INSS. He 
focuses on NATO and U.S. defense strategy. He can be reached at (202) 
685-2328. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or 
implied in this paper are solely those of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic 
Studies, National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any 
other government agency.

The ``Strategic Forum'' provides summaries of work members and guests 
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                               __________

                            STRATEGIC FORUM

                      National Defense University

                Institute for National Strategic Studies

                        Number 129--October 1997

                            NATO ENLARGEMENT

                    Putting the Cost in Perspective

                          by david c. gompert
Conclusion
    Fundamentally, Europe is now more secure than it has been in a 
century--one of the most secure regions on Earth. Our strategy should 
be to: (1) keep it that way; and, (2) get more contribution from 
Europeans to strengthen security in Europe and elsewhere. The 
investments needed to implement NATO enlargement directly support this 
strategy:

  <bullet> The U.S. share of $150-200 million per year will update the 
        security infrastructure of Europe, thus helping to ensure that 
        recent progress is made permanent.
  <bullet> The new members' share of about $1 billion per year--which 
        they willingly, democratically, are choosing to accept--will 
        transform their ex-communist militaries into lean and competent 
        organizations fully answerable to civilian leadership.
  <bullet> The old members' share of about $1 billion per year will 
        give the United States added security and reduced strain by 
        augmenting U.S. power projection capabilities for use not only 
        in Europe but beyond, where more acute dangers lie.

    The security of Europe, after a century of unprecedented violence, 
is so vital that we need not expect a specific future threat to justify 
this investment. Moreover, if some new threat arose, we would surely 
feel compelled to defend European democracy, as we did in the past 
whether or not NATO has been enlarged. Rather than ``costs of 
enlargement,'' these payments should be considered an investment in the 
future of democracy in Europe and in the ability of our allies to bear 
more of the burden of common defense in Europe and elsewhere.
Introduction
    Congress faces two questions about the cost of admitting Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO: (1) How much will it cost? (2) 
Is the cost worth it? In Strategic Forum #128, Richard Kugler explains 
that, based on reasonable and consistent assumptions, the Clinton 
Administration's figures--$2.1-2.7 billion per year for NATO as a 
whole, with $150-200 million per year the U.S. share--are sound. The 
debate should now shift to whether this would be a good investment.
    Although the U.S. cost is small, it is important for Congress to 
understand the justification. The Pentagon's budget is already tight: 
planned reductions in U.S. military infrastructure will barely pay for 
needed modernization of forces in the years to come. With so little 
slack, every new obligation must make sense. Moreover, the young 
democracies about to join NATO are still going through a difficult 
economic transition and cannot afford any unnecessary military outlays. 
Finally, most of NATO's current European members are struggling to live 
within more austere national budgets in order to qualify for the 
European Monetary Union; they, too, are pinching their francs, lire and 
deutchmarks.
    As Richard Kugler explains, the ``costs of enlargement'' are minor 
compared to total current U.S. and European defense budgets. There is 
no need to beef up forces to defend Europe from some new threat. But 
there is a need for NATO members, new and old, to invest in peacetime 
preparedness. This paper identifies three strategic dividends from that 
investment:
1. Insurance that Europe will be fundamentally secure in the twenty-
        first century--quite a change for the continent that produced 
        two world wars and one cold war in the twentieth century.
2. The creation within the new members of military establishments that 
        are streamlined, competent, accountable, and integrated into 
        NATO--a crucial step on the road to permanent democracy.
3. Improvement in the capability of our current West European allies to 
        bear more responsibility and burden for security in Europe and, 
        just as significant, the defense of common interests beyond 
        Europe, e.g., the Persian Gulf.
Insuring the Security of Europe
    Because there is no specific threat to Europe on the horizon, this 
is the least concrete strategic gain from the proposed investment. Yet 
in a sense, it is the most basic. In this new era of uncertainty and 
flux, those charged with responsibility for their citizens' security, 
be they American, German or Polish, cannot neglect defense capabilities 
in hopes that new threats will not arise. Indeed, a consensus exists in 
the United States--among Democrats and Republicans, the President and 
Congress, the government and voters--that prudence demands a capable 
military even when the country is unthreatened. The same reasoning 
should apply to the security of Europe, scene of the worst violence in 
world history. To be sure, European security has improved dramatically 
over the last decade. Our strategic goal is to lock in that progress.
    Historically, central Europe has been the fuse of European 
conflict. Two world wars were ignited there; a third might have been, 
but for NATO. Reasonable American voices now ask: Would we risk the 
lives of our sons and daughters to defend Poland, Hungary or the Czech 
Republic? But surely a threat of aggression against the new democracies 
of central Europe would have to be regarded as a threat to Europe 
itself. To presuppose a future attack on Poland that we would not 
consider a threat to Europe flies in the face of both experience and 
geography So the fairer question is: Would we defend Europe? Three 
times in 80 years, Americans answered yes.
    If our answer remains yes, we would defend Europe (and thus 
Poland), it follows that we would be wise to make that intent clear by 
admitting these countries into NATO, thus reducing the likelihood of 
actually having to do so. It follows, as well, that we should invest in 
the peacetime preparedness of Europe, including the new democracies. 
Failing to do so would suggest that the security of half but not all of 
Europe is important to us. In the remote event that the threat of 
aggression reappeared, we would rue our failure to make our position 
clear and to make at least minimal preparations. Conversely, the return 
on this investment, in that admittedly unlikely event, would be 
incalculable.
    The expectation of a future Russian threat is not necessary for 
this commitment and this investment to make sense. We should take a 
longer view of the safety of Europe, the security of this part of 
Europe and the value of NATO. The Cold War and the former Soviet threat 
were but one episode in a continuing history of a continent at once 
blessed with promise and cursed with conflict, whose future, like its 
past, will affect the United States and the rest of the world. Being 
purely defensive, this investment in peacetime preparedness will help 
insure a far safer century for Europe, and thus for us, than the one 
now ending.
    In a practical sense, $150-200 million per year should also be seen 
as the cost of upholding the principle that NATO must have military 
integrity--a principle championed by the United States. If we decline 
to make this contribution to NATO's infrastructure, and our current 
allies followed our ``lead,'' as they surely would, we would be 
signaling an indifference to NATO's military underpinnings, 
contradicting and weakening our insistence that this is not a hollow 
alliance, with commitments it cannot fulfill. At best, this would 
suggest that we stand behind the security of the alliance's old members 
but not its new ones. At worst, it would lead to the erosion of NATO's 
entire military foundation. This investment will reinforce the 
discipline that enabled NATO to prevail in the Cold War, to become the 
world's most credible alliance, and to respond to the security 
challenges of the new era.
Transforming the Militaries of the New Democracies
    A military establishment that is integrated into NATO will never be 
the same. NATO ``denationalized'' the militaries of the original West 
European members, which had previously warred with each other on a 
regular basis. It helped reform the armed forces of several current 
members that were once undemocratic: Spain, Portugal, Turkey and 
Greece. And now it can help Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
develop militaries that lend strength and add confidence to democracy's 
future.
    Their inclusion in NATO's military organs, their streamlining and 
modernization, and their use of NATO's physical infrastructure will 
rivet the armed forces of the new members to a model that has worked 
extraordinarily well for the rest of the alliance. This, too, should be 
considered a strategic return on the proposed investment, since the 
success of democracy depends on military reform, and the United States 
has a huge equity in democracy's success. For the country that stood, 
for many decades, for the right of Poles, Hungarians and Czechs to 
become democratic, the cost of transforming their militaries to 
strengthen democracy should not seem too large.
    No one is more mindful of the need to reform and integrate the 
military establishments of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic than 
the countries themselves. When communism ended, the old militaries--
overfed, unresponsive to democratic direction, environmental polluters, 
mismanagers of public resources--were unacceptable. In the years that 
followed, military reform was disappointingly slow compared to the rest 
of their political and economic metamorphosis. Creating new 
militaries--trim, professional, accountable, efficient, respected--is a 
high priority.
    There are already signs of progress in anticipation of NATO 
membership. Civil-military relations have begun to improve; plans to 
streamline forces and ready them for NATO are being drawn up; the 
vestiges of the old Warsaw Pact militaries are vanishing. With 
ratification and subsequent integration, the transformation will be 
accelerated and finished.
    One hears from American skeptics of NATO enlargement, or of bearing 
the costs, that the new democracies have better things to do with their 
money than to remold their armed forces. This point of view 
underestimates the importance of having a professional, apolitical 
military establishment in making democracy succeed. Perhaps because 
U.S. democracy is so secure and the U.S. military is so able, we take a 
responsive military for granted. In any case, who is in a better 
position to understand whether the cost of joining NATO is worth it 
than the countries that are joining? Suggesting that these countries 
cannot make the right decisions on matters as weighty as their own 
security and the path of their own transformation is not helpful. We 
must show confidence in them and their democracy.
    Moreover, it is by no means clear that the cost of restructuring 
their armed forces within NATO will be greater than the amounts they 
would spend over time--inefficiently, no doubt--on national defense if 
they were excluded from NATO. Becoming members of the world's strongest 
alliance, led by the world's strongest country, is bound to improve 
their security, perceived and real. So Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, if excluded, would either end up spending more on security or 
else feeling less secure. In any event, without the military and 
management discipline provided by NATO, they could waste their 
resources and squander their chance for permanent security. If we are 
genuinely concerned about the wise and economical allocation of 
resources on defense by the new democracies, NATO membership is not the 
problem but the solution.
Improving West European Contributions to the Defense of Common 
        Interests
    The third strategic dividend from the proposed NATO investment is 
potentially the biggest for the security of U.S. interests. Unlike the 
United States, which is highly capable of projecting military power, 
the bulk of West European forces are suitable mainly for border 
defense--a holdover from the Cold War. If another Gulf War occurred 
today, the NATO allies would be no more able to contribute major forces 
to a U.S.--led coalition than they were in 1990, when they provided 
less than 10 percent of the force (by the most charitable measure). If 
we could increase this to, say, 20 percent, the benefit for the United 
States would be great. The allies could share more in the cost and 
risk--and, in the worst case, the casualties--while giving the 
coalition more overall muscle. In peacetime, the allies could take some 
of the strain off the U.S. force structure, which is now laboring hard 
to meet the need for peacekeeping while also remaining ready for major 
conflict.
    What has NATO enlargement to do with the defense of the Persian 
Gulf and other common interests? A great deal. The military strategy to 
provide for the security of the new members does not call for permanent 
forward defense, Cold-War-style. There is no need to base U.S. and West 
European forces on the soil of the new members. Provided the necessary 
NATO infrastructure improvements are made--which depends on the United 
States and the other allies making the investment--we can refrain from 
deploying forces eastward unless and until a need arises. This strategy 
will not require any improvement in U.S. forces, which are already 
highly mobile. (This explains why the U.S. share of the cost of 
enlargement is less than Western Europe's.) But major improvement is 
needed in the ability of German, French, British and other West 
European forces to deploy and operate at a distance. Enlargement gives 
our current allies not only a motivation but an obligation to enhance 
their forces in this direction.
    As they do, they will be able to help more in defense of shared 
interests not only in Europe but in more dangerous adjacent regions, 
including the unstable but critical swath of lands from North Africa 
through the Middle East to the Persian Gulf. This would lessen the 
burden and risk of the United States and make the current $250 billion 
defense budget go much further. In this sense, the nearly $1 billion 
per year the West Europeans should spend on improving their forces--
roughly 40 percent of the total investment--can be seen from the U.S. 
perspective not as a cost at all but as a direct benefit.
    But can the current NATO allies afford this? Absolutely. 
Collectively, the European members of NATO spend about $160 billion per 
year on defense, second only to the United States. By reprogramming $1 
billion, they can improve significantly their ability to project 
forces. We should be concerned less about whether the allies increase 
their total defense spending than about how they intend to spend it. 
The key is for them to invest more of their money on forces that can 
conduct distant operations. Some allies understand the need for this: 
the British and French, and to a lesser degree the Germans, have begun 
to point their defense programs away from stationary defense and toward 
the ability to protect far-away interests. But their progress has been 
slow, and enlargement should provide the needed impetus.
    Congress should focus not on whether the current European allies 
are going to increase defense spending but on whether they are going to 
modernize their forces in this strategically beneficial way. And the 
Clinton Administration should direct its energies to ensuring that 
allied plans are adequate. If they are, congressional concerns about 
fair burden-sharing should be satisfied. It would be reasonable for 
Congress to ask NATO's Supreme Allied Commander to confirm that the 
defense programs of our current allies are sufficient to increase their 
share of the burden of defending NATO's new members and other common 
interests.
    Let's not underestimate the potential of the new members to 
contribute in the future to the security of common interests other than 
their own territory--especially as they develop more modern armed 
forces that work with ours through NATO. They helped as best they could 
during DESERT STORM, and they are helping in Bosnia. As their 
confidence in their own security and future gains strength, we should 
count on them to join the rest of the European allies in shouldering 
more of the responsibility and burden of protecting common interests.

David C. Gompert is a Distinguished Research Professor at INSS, on 
leave from RAND, where he is vice president. He was Senior Director for 
Europe and Eurasia on the NSC staff of the Bush Administration. He can 
be reached at (202) 685-2355. Opinions, conclusions, and 
recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of 
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute 
for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the 
Department of Defense, or any other government agency.

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Defense University faculty. These include reports of original research, 
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    The Chairman. Dr. Eland?

    STATEMENT OF DR. IVAN ELAND, DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE POLICY 
            STUDIES, CATO INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Eland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I would like to 
deal with some of the things that have come up during the first 
couple of speakers here.
    There seems to be a repositioning of estimates--DOD and 
RAND versus the CBO estimate, which I originally did as you 
know. It seemed that DOD first criticized the CBO estimate, 
which had five options--a range of $61-$125 billion--as being a 
cold war estimate that was based totally on a resurgent Russian 
threat.
    Well, in my Cato policy analysis, I have made it directly 
comparable to the administration's plan of four divisions and 
six wings in projection, so they can no longer say that.
    [See appendix for Dr. Eland's Policy Analysis, ``The High 
Cost of NATO Expansion: Clearing the Administration's Smoke 
Screen.'']
    Today, Mr. Slocombe said, that my estimate had a very 
different opinion of what needed to be done under the current 
threat. This is a different argument, now that I have 
normalized my estimate to make it comparable with DOD.
    So I guess I would have to plead guilty of that to some 
extent because I think DOD did so little in its estimate. For 
instance, just to give you an example, both infrastructure and 
weapons. They took it very light on the infrastructure. The DoD 
analysts said that they felt constrained in how much 
infrastructure they could put in these countries or assume that 
they would put into these countries.
    They did not say whether the constraints were based on 
Russian sensitivities or Congressional sensitivities about 
cost. Anyway, they felt constrained.
    Here is an example. They put in one reception facility for 
one division and when they are moving four divisions. Well they 
actually put in two divisions region-wide, but they spread them 
out so that the most reception facilities put in any one 
country was Poland--three brigades or one division.
    When you have four divisions descending on a facility meant 
for one division, in time of crisis that could be a bottleneck 
that the enemy could have fun with, so to speak.
    Mr. Biden was saying earlier, ``Well, we have got to stack 
the costs of NATO expansion into different categories. What 
will the U.S. really pay?''
    Well, DoD did include the category of the cost for new 
member weapons. But they had a very low amount--they had $1.6 
to $1.8 billion. In my original CBO study, I had $11.5 billion.
    Now, what they got for that amount was one squadron of 
boneyard aircraft for each of the three countries. That is 18 
aircraft per country. In contrast, these countries are planning 
to buy over 300 new aircraft. So, some of their assumptions are 
not very realistic.
    The other thing that went into that $1.6-$1.8 billion was 
what they called ``a level of effort'' which was basically 
picking a number for the amount of anti-tank, air-to-air, and 
air-to-ground weapons that they purchased with the amount.
    They did some ground modernization that was outside of that 
amount, but again, they did a level of effort. Basically what I 
am saying is that they did not do very much in the way of 
upgrading or modernizing to new members' forces, even though 
they count it as a category. They also did not include very 
much infrastructure.
    The other problem that I have is that the DOD has been 
offering the possibility of discounts, leases, and other types 
of financing arrangement for foreign military sales, but they 
do not include that in their cost estimate, either. That could 
mean additional costs.
    So I think I do more in my estimate in a certain sense, but 
only because they do less.
    In my original study, I assumed very modest buys for these 
countries. We bought rudimentary precision guided munitions. We 
have upgraded existing weapons and then bought new ones in the 
long term. In the long term, a 13 to 15-year estimates is what 
we are talking about here. These countries are going to have to 
buy new weapons by 2005. They are not going to have air forces 
if they do not.
    So I think, to some extent, DOD has understated the costs 
of what they need to do to meet the current threat. So I do not 
believe their numbers at all.
    Also, I have an observation about the RAND number. If you 
refer to the Potomac Foundation Report, they compare the RAND 
and the DoD numbers using comparable categories and they do not 
come out the same.
    To the extent that they appear to coincide, they do so 
almost by coincidence because they had different methodologies. 
RAND had a requirements-based, detailed estimate, whereas DOD 
picked these numbers and did not give a rationale or detailed 
costing information for them.
    I think you have to add in weapons costs. RAND did it as an 
add-on, whereas DoD had included the new member weapons costs 
in their estimates. So the numbers come out to be the similar, 
but it is a different analysis and a different methodology. So 
I think there has been a repositioning of some of the estimates 
here.
    I would just respond to a couple of other things and then I 
will give it back to the chairman.
    The statement was made, ``alliances save money.'' But the 
question is for whom does it save money? It is going to save 
money for the countries that are getting in. Whether it will 
save money for us is another story.
    As Mr. Biden was saying, ``Well, we need to detail who is 
paying for what,'' but if the new members cannot pay this, the 
you have one or two choices. You can either provide security 
assistance or other types of assistance. There is a precedent 
for this under PFP in small amounts that grow bigger with NATO 
enlargement. Or you will have the problem if these 
improvements, both to the existing member allied forces and the 
new member allied forces, do not get made. This problem will 
occur some years down the road when a threat arises. I am not 
talking about a resurgent Russian threat. I am talking about 
maybe a Serbia attacking Hungary.
    You are not going to have many mobile forces from the 
allies or you are not going to have any new member 
capabilities. Who are people going to call? Well, the United 
States, of course, because we have the only very potent forces 
that have strategic and tactical mobility. My bottom line is 
that the U.S. could end up paying a large share of these 
expenses either now through helping these countries or later 
because we have to come and intervene when the--threat changes.
    I project that the new countries are going to have to pay 
$34 billion, which is almost a 60 percent increase in their 
defense budgets. Undersecretary Slocombe said 10-30 percent 
increase; I project a 60 percent increase. That is going to be 
a problem for them to pay.
    And so I think it is difficult to segment these things 
because you have to say, ``Well, what would these countries 
have done anyway?'' That is very hard analytically, and any 
analyst who tells you that they can actually figure that out 
with certainty is trying to mislead. These countries have an 
incentive to say, ``Well, we would have done that anyway.'' And 
so, I think that the U.S. could be in for bigger costs than we 
are planning at this time.
    I think you want to include these countries' militaries' 
costs for a very important reason: If they cannot pay it, you 
may have to pay it. Also, if you sell these countries weapons, 
there is going to be pressure to provide security assistance. 
Such security assistance and that was not figured into the DOD 
estimate. You are going to have to add that in.
    Plus, these nation's budgets have been declining since the 
end of the cold war up until recently when they wanted to get 
into NATO. They have not done much. Also, the existing allies 
have not done much to improve their projection of power. So you 
say, ``Well, what is the base line? What would they have 
done?'' I say ``Not much.''
    DOD itself has said that the expanded NATO will not be 
effective if these improvements, both to the new member forces 
and to the existing allied forces, are not made.
    So those are just some thoughts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Eland follows:]
                    Prepared Statement of Dr. Eland
    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to be here 
today to talk about the real costs of NATO expansion. When I was at the 
Congressional Budget Office, I wrote its cost study on NATO expansion. 
I have recently moved to the CATO institute. I am submitting the CATO 
Policy Analysis entitled, ``The High Cost of NATO Expansion: Clearing 
The Administration's Smoke Screen,'' for the hearing record. It 
provides a detailed critique of the administration's cost estimate and 
makes the original CBO cost analysis directly comparable to it.
    I believe the United States will pay a large share of the expenses 
for expansion, either now or later. And U.S. costs will be at least 
three to five times as great as the administration claims.
    Under the administration's defense concept of projecting four 
divisions and six wings eastward to reinforce these nations in time of 
crisis, I project U.S. costs to be at least $7 billion, compared with 
the administration's $1.5 to $2 billion estimate. The words ``at 
least'' are very important because I believe, based on my work at CBO, 
that the $7 billion is a conservative estimate. If the potential new 
members cannot afford all of the $34 billion that will be their 
responsibility, U.S. expenses could increase dramatically,
    Potential new members will probably be unwilling and unable to pay 
the $34 billion. That sum amounts to roughly a 60% increase in their 
collective defense budgets at a time when their economies are in 
transition. Also, because these nations realize that President Clinton 
has staked his prestige on NATO expansion and is unlikely to retract 
the offer, we have lost much of our leverage in getting them to pay a 
significant amount. Polls indicate that their populations don't want to 
increase defense spending.
    The United States is likely to get stuck picking up the tab for new 
members because key NATO allies--such as France and Germany--have 
already indicated that they will not pay more than they are now.
    I am always struck when people say, ``I support expansion, but we 
must make our allies pay their fair share.'' Well, they are not going 
to!!! Even during the cold war, when the Soviet threat was severe, we 
complained that our European allies were not paying their fair share. I 
had one Air Force general say to me once, ``as long as we care more 
about European security than the Europeans do, they won't pay up.'' In 
the post-cold war world, they will be even less likely to pay up. The 
threat is drastically reduced, the Europeans are under pressure to 
lower government spending for the EMU, and NATO expansion was our idea. 
They will say and are saying, ``you pay for it.''
    Of course, some people have suggested privately that we shouldn't 
worry that nobody will pay for expansion, because we can skimp on 
military improvements. After all, the threat environment is currently 
relatively benign. We must consider what will happen if some years down 
the road a significant threat appears. And I'm not talking about a 
resurgent Russia. Let's say Seribia attacks Hungary or Belarus becomes 
a problem for Poland. If European forces have not been augmented to 
project power and new members' forces and infrastructure are still 
inadequate, there is only one place to turn.
    The United States, of course. It is the only nation with potent 
forces that have the tactical and strategic mobility to get to the 
conflict relatively quickly. This unilateral intervention will be 
costly in American lives and dollars because military preparations and 
improvements will not have been made. That's why I say the United 
States will pay for a large share of the expenses for expansion sooner 
or later. So if the Senate is concerned about the U.S. paying too much, 
it has no other choice but to vote expansion down.
    The costs will also be much higher than the administration claims. 
The administration projects $27 to $35 billion in total costs, with 
$1.5 to $2 billion accruing to the United States. Some have said that 
other estimates are no more reliable than the administration's. That's 
ridiculous!!! The administration, unlike CBO and RAND, failed to do a 
bottom-up costing of the detailed military improvements needed for 
expansion. In many cases, they simply chose an amount of money that 
they wanted to spend on a broad category of items--for example, 
logistics improvements. They often picked a number without providing a 
military analysis of what was needed or many details on the 
improvements made or costs incurred. In essence, DOD's estimate is not 
a requirements based cost analysis but an estimate of what is 
affordable--that is, the costs the administration believes the Congress 
will accept.
    In other cases, DOD used very questionable assumptions. Here are 
some egregious examples:

  <bullet> Even though their analysis stretched 13 years into the 
        future, to lower their estimate, they assumed that each nation 
        would purchase the outdated I-Hawk air defense system. The I-
        Hawk, originally deployed in the late-1960s, is being phased 
        out by the Army and will likely be phased out by the Marine 
        Corps.
  <bullet> Another example is tactical aircraft. They assumed that each 
        nation would buy one squadron of worn-out F-16s from the 
        boneyard. Yet, over the long-term, potential new member 
        countries plan to purchase almost 300 new aircraft.

    DOD analysts also admitted to me that they felt ``constrained'' in 
the amount of military infrastructure that they assumed would be built 
or upgraded in new member nations. It's possible that they felt 
constrained by Russian sensitivities, or even more likely, 
congressional sensitivities to cost. In either case, their estimate was 
not based on what military improvements would be required for NATO 
expansion.
    Finally, despite the fact that DOD is holding out the possibility 
of grants, discount loans, and free leases to encourage new members to 
buy U.S weapons, the Department did not include the costs of any U.S. 
security assistance in its own estimate.
    In short, the administration's estimate is flawed and substantially 
understates the cost of NATO expansion. In my policy analysis, I made 
CBO's original study, which had five options for expansion costing from 
$61 to $125 billion, comparable to the administration's very specific 
plan. The administration's plan, which projected four divisions and six 
air wings east to reinforce new members, did not compare exactly with 
any of the five CBO options, but tended toward the lower end of the 
range. For the total costs of the administration's plan, instead of 
DOD's $27 to $35 billion estimate, I project the cost to be almost $70 
billion, or at least double that amount.
    For U.S. costs, instead of DOD's $1.5 to $2 billion, I project at 
least $7 billion (with emphasis on the ``at least''). Therefore, my 
estimate is at least 3 to 5 times greater than that of the 
administration.
    I spent 15 years at GAO and CBO evaluating government programs in 
the defense and foreign affairs area. The vast majority of government 
initiatives cost significantly more than their initial optimistic cost 
targets. Given the flawed cost estimate of the administration, cost 
escalation is especially likely to happen with NATO expansion. After 
all, the Clinton administration's original cost estimate for the Bosnia 
operation was only $2 billion. Even if the United States pulls out in 
June 1998--which is unlikely--costs will have escalated to over $6.5 
billion.
    Also, the total costs of expansion could increase to as much as 
$125 billion, or in the extreme case--$167 billion, if Russia again 
became a threat.
    Furthermore, I am pessimistic that the Congress will get any better 
cost numbers from the administration or NATO before the ratification 
vote. Conveniently, NATO will not decide how much to increase its 
common budgets and who will pay for any increases until June 1998, 
months after the ratification debate set for early next year. Perhaps 
Congress should delay the ratification vote until then so that it can 
demand a more rigorous estimate of costs from NATO and get a better 
idea of who will pledge to pay them. Otherwise, Congress is being asked 
to write a blank check for expansion.
    The cost estimate that NATO is currently conducting will be a 
political deal. Even more so than the negotiated settlement reached 
between the White House and DOD over what administration cost figures 
the Congress would accept.
    The United States rejected the original NATO estimate for its 
faulty assumptions and costs that were too low. then administration 
officials realized that the Europeans would refuse to pay a lot of 
added costs. Secretaries Albright and Cohen have already begun to say 
that the administration's already low estimate of $27 to $35 billion is 
probably too high. They are beginning to sound like contestants on the 
``price is right.''
    Last week, the Secretaries suddenly found the military 
infrastructure in new member nations to be better developed than they 
thought. When I did the CBO study, however, I received an unclassified 
intelligence briefing that said that the military infrastructure, the 
armed forces, and the road and rail systems of the new member states 
were in terrible shape. Finally, theNATO estimate will leave out the 
substantial costs to correct shortfalls in new member and allied 
forces. In short, don't look for the cost estimates to get any better. 
In fact, it looks like they're going to get worse.
    But high costs are not the only reason that the Congress should 
reject expansion of the alliance. Expansion impairs the flexibility of 
U.S. foreign policy in an uncertain post-cold war world. We could be 
tied down in Europe when the major challenges may come in Asia. Also, 
we might benefit from Russia's help if China becomes a rising, 
aggressive power. Why needlessly antagonize Russia for ill-defined 
security gains in a non-strategic region of Europe, when we might want 
its cooperation on other issues that are more critical to U.S. 
security, Russia is still the only nation that can completely devastate 
our homeland with nuclear weapons and NATO expansion is impeding 
strategic arms reduction.
    If the NATO military alliance is so good at ensuring stability, and 
the real goal of expansion is to stabilize this part of Europe, why 
have so few proponents considered admitting Russia. It is the nation 
which is the most crucial to stabilize. Instead there is euphemistic 
talk of ``consolidating the gains of the cold war,'' which implies that 
expansion is really aimed at a future Russia that is resurgent and 
aggressive. This pessimistic scenario is not a given. Besides, what's 
the rush to expand? We have plenty of warning time to spot the rise of 
a future peer competitor.
    Finally, an Article 5 defense guarantee to new members could 
involve the United States in regional quagmires in an unstable and non-
strategic area--future Bosnias. Yet, we are expanding both the 
territory and the missions of the alliance at a time when western 
defense budgets have been declining.
    That concludes my prepared remarks. I will be happy to answer any 
questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Hadley?

    STATEMENT OF THE HON. STEPHEN HADLEY, PARTNER, SHEA AND 
                    GARDNER, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Hadley. Thank you Mr. Chairman, members of the 
committee.
    In my statement, I suggest that we get too quickly in this 
debate into dueling dollar figures and details of costs, and 
not enough talking about what are the requirements associated 
with the admission of these three countries in NATO and what 
are the military capabilities needed to meet those 
requirements?
    In that connection, let me just make a few points here.
    One, I think we can all agree that the security guarantee 
that comes with NATO membership for these countries must be 
credible. We do not want to make commitments that we cannot 
deliver on. I think that is a starting point.
    So then the second question becomes are we doing that if we 
bring them into the alliance? I think the answer is no. You are 
going to want to hear testimony from current military leaders 
on this subject, but my understanding is there is a fairly wide 
consensus that it is a benign security environment in Europe 
today and that the current forces deployed in NATO are adequate 
to defend this territory today.
    That raises a question, of course----
    Senator Biden. Excuse me, point of clarification, Mr. 
Hadley.
    Mr. Hadley. Sir?
    Senator Biden. The credible guarantee--were you talking 
about the guarantees required by the Atlantic alliance, or by 
the Atlantic treaty? In other words, the Washington treaty--
that we would go to the common defense?
    Mr. Hadley. Right, article 5.
    Senator Biden. And you are saying that is not credible?
    Mr. Hadley. No. I am saying that it is very important that 
that be credible and to make it credible, we have to have real 
military capability to stand behind it.
    No one wants to give that guarantee----
    Senator Biden. I see. I am sorry.
    Mr. Hadley. [continuing]. and not have the wherewithal to--
and I think that is a point of departure for all of us here.
    So there--the question then becomes if in the current 
security environment, we are not extended an incredible 
guarantee, but in fact, the guarantee is credible, what about--
what is the likelihood in the requirement if there is a major 
threat down the road to NATO and to these three countries?
    And, of course, for such a change--threat to emerge, it 
would probably come from Russia. It would require a change of 
policy in Russia. It would require a major reconstitution of 
their conventional military capability. That will take time.
    The United States would have to--and NATO, its NATO 
allies--would have to do a lot of things to respond to that 
kind of threat. Again, while I think it is a question for 
senior military leaders to talk about, my own view is that 
having these three countries in NATO would not add 
significantly to the burden of what the United States and NATO 
would have to do in light of that eventuality.
    Indeed, I would think that because of the forces these 
countries would have and the strategic significance of the 
territory they occupy, we would be glad to have them in NATO 
should that eventuality arise.
    So it raises the question about the military requirements 
that result from the entry of these three countries into NATO 
for both the countries themselves, for, as Secretary Slocombe 
talked about, the common funding programs, and for our existing 
allies. Let me just make, if I could, three points about that.
    First, I think it is important to emphasize that there is a 
normal NATO planning process that is going to identify the 
answers to all of these things--what is required for the NATO 
common funding, what these countries need to be doing in terms 
of their own forces. There is a process under way to do that.
    One of the elements is the cost of integrating these 
countries and their militaries into NATO. The estimate placed 
by the OSD people was that is a $9-$12 billion item over a 10-
year period.
    I would agree with the GAO report of August 1997 that this 
really is the true cost of NATO enlargement, the cost that but 
for enlargement, you would not be incurring. My own judgment is 
those kinds of numbers over a 13-year period is a small price 
to pay for the benefits of NATO enlargement.
    Now, there is the issue of the requirements for these 
countries, these three countries who would join NATO. It has 
been made clear that is a national responsibility out of 
national budgets.
    Concern was raised earlier in the questioning as to whether 
this is an unreasonable burden to impose on these countries. I 
would simply say we have to recognize these are not bombed-out 
economies in the post World War II period. These are robust 
economies, they are expected to expand.
    What we are really talking about is getting them to the 
point where they would spend 2 to 3 percent of their gross 
domestic product on defense. That is not an unreasonable 
number. It is what we have tried to get our other allies to do.
    And I think these countries have indicated that they are 
willing to do it, and that because of their histories, they 
understand the price the--that freedom requires and I think 
they are liable to pay it. I do not think it is an unreasonable 
burden.
    Finally, there has been a lot of talk about the requirement 
of the existing NATO allies to improve the ability of their 
forces to go out of area, to deploy and be sustained. I would 
just point out that is a requirement that predates NATO 
enlargement. It came in 1990 and 1991 timeframe when we 
revising NATO's strategy at the end of the cold war.
    It is not, in my view, fairly a cost of NATO enlargement. 
That is not to say it is not important for our European allies 
to do this--it is. We should push them.
    But rejecting the applications for membership from Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic will not somehow make it more 
likely that the Europeans will undertake these expenditures. 
Rejecting membership of these three will not make NATO any 
safer if the Europeans fail to undertake these expenditures.
    On balance, I am optimistic that they will. I think the 
Germans are critical on this point. I think you are going to 
want to talk with German government officials, but my 
conversation with them suggests that they understand that the 
security of these three countries is essential to the security 
of Germany, that NATO's ability to defend Poland is essential 
to the defense of Germany, and I think that gives them the 
incentives to do what needs to be done.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared Statement of Mr. Hadley follows:]
                    Prepared Statement of Mr. Hadley
    Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. I appreciate very much the 
opportunity to appear before you today on the question of the costs, 
benefits, and military implications of bringing Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(``NATO'').
    Recent public debate on the issue of NATO enlargement has focused 
increasingly on the issue of the cost. You have my sympathies as you 
try to come to grips with this difficult issue. I believe the public 
debate has perhaps disserved you a bit by moving too quickly into a 
battle of competing estimates and different dollar figures. Before we 
get into the details of the cost issue, it may be useful to step back a 
minute and ask ourselves the question: what are the military 
requirements associated with NATO membership for Poland, Hungary, and 
the Czech Republic, and what military capabilities are needed to meet 
these requirements? I will try to walk briefly through the kinds of 
questions that present themselves when one begins the cost debate from 
this starting point.

                 Requirements, Capabilities, and Costs

    But before doing so, there is one point of principle on which I 
would hope everyone involved in this debate can agree. That is, that 
the security guarantee that comes to these countries with NATO 
membership must be a credible one. It must be backed up by real 
military capabilities which would allow NATO, if necessary, to make 
good on its defense commitment to these new members. We do not want an 
alliance with two tiers of members--the secure, and the less secure.
    With that as a starting point, the first question is simple:
What are the military requirements for making credible the security 
        guarantees extended to the three new members as part of NATO?
    The answer to this question requires an assessment of the current 
security situation. In brief, with the important exception of Bosnia, 
the security situation in Europe is probably the most benign that it 
has been at any time in this century. There is no immediate threat of a 
major attack on our NATO allies and no prospect of one in the 
foreseeable future. The Committee will want to hear testimony from 
current U.S. military leaders on this subject. But my understanding is 
that there is a fairly widespread consensus that NATO's current 
military forces deployed in Europe are adequate to insure the security 
of NATO's current members and these three countries in the current 
security environment.
    The question that logically follows from this conclusion is this:
What additional military requirements would result from bringing these 
        three countries into NATO if a major conventional military 
        threat were to arise at some point in the future?
    Perhaps the most readily identifiable source of such a potential 
threat would be Russia. I would argue that one of the benefits of NATO 
enlargement is precisely that it makes such a future Russian threat 
less likely by stabilizing Central Europe, an area that has played a 
central role in two World Wars and one Cold one. The effort to develop 
a positive relationship with Russia and to bring Russia into a variety 
of political and economic relationships with Western nations are all 
designed to reduce the prospect of such a threat. For such a threat to 
emerge, it would require not only a major change in policy on the part 
of the Russian government but also a major reconstitution of Russian 
conventional military capabilities. This would require a major effort 
that Russia cannot now afford, and could only arise over a period of a 
decade or more. I believe this conclusion reflects the consensus of 
most analysts who have looked at the question.
    The emergence of such a threat would require a major response from 
the United States and NATO in upgrading and expanding their military 
forces. The United States and NATO would have to act decisively based 
on evidence of such an emerging threat and build up their own forces 
within the timelines of the force buildup of their potential adversary 
in order to try to deter a conventional conflict. While it is a 
question for the nation's senior military leaders, I would be surprised 
if they would conclude that the presence of Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic in NATO would add significantly to the burden that the 
United States and NATO would otherwise have to bear in order to meet 
such a reconstituted Russian threat. Indeed, because of the forces that 
these countries will themselves have, and the strategic significance of 
the territory they occupy, I believe that should such a threat arise, 
we will be very glad that we had included them as members of NATO.
    This leads to a third question:
If we do not need to be prepared today to deal with a major 
        conventional military threat, what standard should we apply in 
        judging NATO's military requirements?
    One might think of a standard that would call for sufficient 
military capability:
  <bullet> To provide security and reassurance within Europe in the 
        current relatively benign security environment;
  <bullet> To provide highly capable military forces able to move 
        rapidly to areas of crisis in the event that some unexpected 
        military threat arises; and
  <bullet> To provide a solid military base on which NATO can build in 
        the event a major conventional military threat should 
        materialize.
How would one identify the military requirements that result from this 
        standard as applied to the entry of Poland, Hungary, and the 
        Czech Republic into NATO?
    The process of identifying these requirements is already underway 
within NATO as part of the traditional NATO force planning process, now 
expanded to include these three potential member countries.
    The first part of this force requirement process will be to 
identify those military facilities and capabilities required for these 
three countries to operate as part of the NATO alliance. This involves 
such things as airfields that can receive, refuel and service NATO 
aircraft, communications equipment that will allow the military forces 
of these three countries to talk to other NATO forces, and 
participation in the NATO air defense network. NATO is engaged right 
now in defining these requirements and will have its results in 
December. The great majority of the costs associated with these 
requirements will be funded out of three so-called ``common funded'' 
programs to which all NATO members contribute. These costs are spread 
among NATO members using a well-established formula, with the current 
U.S. share being 24 percent.
    The point here is that there is an existing procedure for obtaining 
NATO consensus on what these requirements are, what it will cost to 
meet them, and how that cost will be shared among the NATO allies. How 
much if anything NATO members will be asked to contribute over and 
above what they have already committed to these three common funds will 
depend on the requirements actually identified by NATO, the cost of 
meeting those requirements, and whether those costs can be met by 
taking funds from existing lower priority projects. The study prepared 
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (``OSD'') last February 
estimated these costs at between $9 and $12 billion over a ten year 
period. Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen have indicated that the 
actual number might turn out to be significantly lower. The U.S. share 
of the OSD estimate would be about $150 to $200 million per year.
    I would agree with the General Accounting Office in its report of 
August, 1997, that these are the true costs of NATO enlargement--costs 
that NATO would not incur but for the admission of these three 
countries into the Alliance. It seems a small price to pay when 
compared to the benefits of NATO enlargement in terms of enhancing 
stability in Europe, strengthening the NATO alliance, contributing to a 
more stable relationship between NATO and Russia, and maintaining U.S. 
leadership and influence in Europe.
    That said, however, the three new states will be joining a military 
alliance and will assume an obligation, like the other members of that 
alliance, to contribute their fair share to the common defense. But 
this is hardly a cost of NATO enlargement. This is the cost that every 
nation incurs in providing for the common defense of its citizens.
    Which leads to the fourth question:
What are the requirements for the militaries of the three new members 
        of NATO?
    Generally, these nations need smaller forces, of higher quality, 
that are interoperable with those of NATO. NATO will help these 
countries turn this principle into specific military requirements and 
the kinds of military capabilities best suited for meeting those 
requirements. This will be done as part of the normal force planning 
process in which all NATO members participate. But as is the case for 
all NATO members, the cost of fielding the forces needed to meet these 
requirements will be a national responsibility, funded out of the 
national budgets of these three countries. It will not represent an 
additional cost for NATO or its current members.
    Some have suggested that these costs pose an unacceptable burden 
upon these three countries. The studies I have consulted and the 
experts I have talked to do not agree with this assessment, however. 
Because of the relatively benign security environment in Central 
Europe, these countries should have a considerable period of time over 
which to improve their forces. They will have the flexibility to trade 
off meeting military requirements against other budgetary priorities. 
All three countries have robust, expanding economies projected to grow 
at a rate of about four to five percent per year into the next decade. 
They have indicated that they believe they can ultimately afford 
defense spending at the level of two to three percent of their gross 
domestic product--the level that is expected from NATO members 
generally. This level of spending should provide sufficient financial 
resources to meet NATO requirements. While such expenditures do reflect 
an economic burden, I believe these countries would be the first to say 
that this is a relatively small price to pay for preserving their 
newly-won freedom. And it is certainly a lower price than they would 
have to pay if they were outside the NATO alliance.
    That is not to say that our NATO allies, and the United States, 
have not in the past or will not in the future decide voluntarily to 
provide some assistance on this score. But I do not believe, as some 
have suggested, that these countries need a military ``Marshall Plan.'' 
These are not ruined economies recovering from the devastation of war 
and facing an imminent, overwhelming military threat. They have the 
time to upgrade their militaries, and the economies from which to fund 
it.
    Which leads to the fifth question:
What are the military requirements of NATO enlargement for our existing 
        NATO allies?
    In addition to paying their prescribed share of the NATO ``common 
funded'' programs (such as the NATO Infrastructure Program), our NATO 
allies should continue, as they have already been doing, to work 
bilaterally with these three countries to help prepare them for the 
responsibilities of NATO membership. There are a number of examples of 
what our allies have undertaken in this regard, the most recent being 
an effort to create a joint multinational military unit among the 
Danes, Germany, and Poland. This is the kind of ``burdensharing'' that 
we can rightly ask our allies to undertake in connection with NATO 
enlargement.
    It has been suggested in the public debate, however, that part of 
the cost of NATO enlargement are expenditures by our NATO allies to 
enhance the re-enforcement and the sustainment capability of their own 
forces--the ability to maintain those forces outside of their home 
territory on military operations for a sustained period of time. I 
believe strongly that our NATO allies need to make the expenditures 
required to give their forces this capability. But I do not believe 
these expenditures are properly viewed as a cost of or a prerequisite 
to the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO. 
These force requirements had their origin in the NATO force planning 
process during the 1990-1991 timeframe as a result of a change in NATO 
strategy to reflect the end of the Cold War. NATO changed its defense 
concept from one of fixed forces defending the NATO homeland against a 
known threat to increasingly multinational forces able to deploy 
flexibly to meet contingencies within NATO territory or outside its 
borders. While these forces would be used to reinforce Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic in the event of a major conventional threat (of 
the kind that presently seems quite unlikely in Central Europe), the 
requirement predates NATO enlargement and would exist even if NATO were 
not to expand. Therefore, it seems unfair to assess this as a cost of 
NATO enlargement.
    Let me be clear. These are expenditures that our European allies 
should make as part of their contribution to the common defense 
regardless of NATO enlargement. But rejecting the applications for 
membership from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will not make 
it more likely that the Europeans will undertake this expenditure. 
Quite the contrary.
    On balance, I am optimistic that our NATO allies will carry out the 
commitments they have made to upgrade the reinforcement and sustainment 
capability of their forces. The Germans are key in this regard. I hope 
the Senate will have an opportunity to hear senior German governmental 
officials on this point. But my conversations with German officials 
suggest that they clearly view the security of Poland as essential to 
the security of Germany--that NATO's ability to defend Poland is 
essential to the defense of Germany. This increases the incentive that 
force enhancements useful in defending this territory will in fact be 
made. In addition, the U.K., Germany, and France all have programs 
underway to create rapid reaction forces of various kinds. These plans 
result not just from their NATO commitments but also from their desire 
to enhance European defense capabilities as part of an emerging 
European defense and security identity. This gives these countries an 
added incentive for carrying out these plans.
The Benefits of Enlargement
    It seems unfair to address the costs of NATO enlargement without 
also addressing the benefits--or, to put it another way, without 
addressing the cost of not expanding NATO. If the OSD cost study is 
even close to right as to the direct cost of NATO enlargement--$9 to 
$12 billion over 13 years--and even considering the additional cost 
associated with modernizing the forces of the three new entrants and 
upgrading the forces of our remaining NATO allies, the benefits of 
expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic more 
than outweigh these costs.

  <bullet> It will make Europe more stable, not less stable, and will 
        reduce the risk of military competition or conflict.
  <bullet> It will strengthen NATO, not weaken it, and will make NATO a 
        better instrument for protecting the security of Europe.
  <bullet> It will contribute in the long run to a more stable 
        relationship between NATO and Russia by eliminating a potential 
        area of competition.
  <bullet> It will help to maintain U.S. leadership and influence in 
        Europe.

    Let me elaborate on these points:

                           Stabilizing Europe

    The experience of Western Europe after the Second World War has 
shown that encouraging greater integration among the countries of 
Europe is the best way to overcome a long history of military 
competition and conflict among European states. That is why since the 
end of the Cold War it has been the policy of both Republican and 
Democratic administrations to bring the nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe into a closer political and economic relationship with the West.
    We know from history that leaving these nations in a geopolitical 
no-man's land in Central Europe has contributed to two World Wars and 
one Cold one. Membership of these three countries in NATO will 
eliminate the future possibility that they will be caught in a 
geopolitical competition between a unified Germany and a potentially 
resurgent Russia. In this way, we can eliminate an historic area of 
instability and one of the few that in my judgment could present the 
risk of a serious and renewed military confrontation in Europe.

                           Strengthening NATO

    The addition of these members will strengthen, not weaken, the NATO 
alliance. These three nations, and Poland in particular, already 
possess significant military capability that exceeds that of a number 
of existing NATO nations. They have already shown a willingness to 
shoulder the responsibilities of collective defense by contributing 
military forces during the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crisis. Because of 
their histories, these are countries that take security seriously.
    In NATO, these countries will be a force for stability in Europe. 
Just the prospect of NATO membership has been a real incentive to these 
states to resolve border disputes with their neighbors and to establish 
frameworks for managing their relations with ethnic communities located 
within the territory of their neighbors. These nations have made real 
progress in building democratic societies and have reached a level of 
maturity that I believe should provide confidence that they will 
continue to make a positive contribution to security in Europe and will 
not, as some would suggest, use their position within the Alliance to 
provoke or bully their neighbors. The best way to encourage their 
continued democratic evolution and maturation is to bring them into the 
NATO family of democratic states, not to put them through the domestic 
political trauma of turning down their bid to join NATO.

                    Improvinig Relations with Russia

    Expanding NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
does not exclude Russia from Europe and is not intended to do so. Both 
Republican and Democratic administrations since the end of the Cold War 
have sought to support democratic and free market reform in Russia and 
to include Russia in Western political and economic institutions. In 
addition, Russia has been included in the NATO force in the Balkans, 
has been included in NATO's Partnership for Peace program, and now has 
its own special relationship with NATO as reflected in the Founding Act 
signed in Paris last spring.
    Despite the concern expressed by some that enlargement of NATO 
would lead to a crisis in relations between Russia and the West, it has 
not done so. While even Russian democrats cannot be seen to sanction 
NATO enlargement publicly, opinion polls in Russia suggest that 
bringing Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO is just not 
an issue of concern to the bulk of the Russian population. Even General 
Lebed has recently said publicly that inclusion of these three 
countries in NATO does not present a threat to Russia but is only ``the 
legal formalization of the historically developed community of western 
civilization.'' NATO enlargement in the long run will support democracy 
in Russia by making clear to more reactionary elements that a ``return 
to greatness'' by reestablishing a Russian sphere of influence in 
Central and Eastern Europe is simply not in the cards.
    There is great uncertainty about the future direction of Russia, 
but what Russia becomes in the future will be determined by what 
happens inside Russia, particularly to its economy. What is important 
is for us to impress upon the Russians that we welcome a democratic 
Russia as part of the West and that we take Russia's legitimate 
security concerns seriously. Our goal should be to cooperate closely 
with Russia on issues of common interest, while at the same time 
providing reassurance and stability to Russia's Central and Eastern 
European neighbors and discouraging any inclination in Russia toward 
trying to reassert a military sphere of influence there. This is a 
sophisticated policy, hard to sustain. But despite some evidence to the 
contrary, I believe that a U.S. foreign and security policy can 
successfully pursue both of these policies at the same time.

                      Insuring American Leadership

    Since the end of World War II, the United States has expended 
enormous effort and trillions of dollars in seeking to build a unified 
Europe composed of free and democratic states at peace with one 
another. For the first time since the end of World War II, we have a 
realistic possibility of achieving this objective. It is important that 
the United States not turn its back on this great European project but 
continue to provide the commitment and leadership required to see it 
through. For the reasons I have already suggested, inclusion of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO substantially advances this 
goal.
    The United States needs a vital, robust NATO as not only an 
instrument for assuring long-term stability but also for deterring or 
dealing with those security crises that are likely to emerge in Europe 
(such as Bosnia), on the periphery of Europe (such as in North Africa), 
or from outside of Europe (such as the Persian Gulf). If NATO does not 
adapt to the changes that are occurring in Europe--including most 
particularly the emergence of these three Central European nations as 
free, independent, and democratic states--then NATO will become 
irrelevant to Europe.
    It is true that America has important interest elsewhere in the 
world and that the threats to those interests are in some sense more 
acute--whether it is the possibility of a nuclear Iran or uncertainties 
about the intentions of an emerging China. But precisely because of 
these other interests and potential threats, it is critical that Europe 
remain a zone of relative peace and stability so as to give the United 
States the freedom of action it needs to exercise its power and 
leadership to deal with crises and problems outside of Europe. The 
absence of an immediate threat in Europe is precisely the time to take 
those actions that will help to ensure that a threat to stability in 
Europe does not arise in the future.

    The Chairman. Senators, suppose we take 5 minutes apiece. 
Let us see how we do on that.
    Senator Biden. OK.
    The Chairman. And then have two or three rounds in case 
somebody else comes in.
    The one I hear most from my constituents who discuss this 
expansion--not many of them are discussing it. They have got 
things closer to home.
    But they said that, ``Well, everything is peaceful in 
Europe now. No Hitlers in sight,'' and so forth.
    ``But our problem,'' they have said, ``lies in the other 
direction over in the Pacific.'' And I guess what they are 
asking me is does the NATO alliance offer the United States any 
benefits beyond Europe, especially in the event of war in the 
other side? You want to address that?
    I had a young group of people ask me that, and I did the 
best I could with it, not knowing the answer to it, and I am 
sure you do not, either. But what is your speculative answer to 
it?
    Mr. Hadley. I think they can help us in those situations. 
We had a number of our NATO allies, almost all of our NATO 
allies, with us in the Gulf War. We also had a number of these 
three countries in the Gulf War. So I think there is an 
advantage, and they can help us in those contingencies.
    But I think it is also important to emphasize that Europe 
is secure and stable right now and we have an interest to 
keeping it stable and secure.
    And that is why I think NATO enlargement is important 
because with a NATO--with a Europe that is safe and secure, we 
have the freedom and flexibility to use our forces to deal with 
some contingencies in other areas where it is--where we have 
real interests and where those interests may seem to be more 
imminently threatened such as places like the Gulf, with a 
potentially nuclear Iran, or uncertainties about China.
    But it is precisely stability and security in Europe that 
is going to both free us to deal with those problems, and I 
think also, give us some allies to help us.
    The Chairman. OK. Now, Dr. Eland, another thing that comes 
up in the conversation with not only the folks back home, but 
people I meet from other states. Considering the estimate--your 
estimates of the costs involved in this expansion, do you think 
the United States continues to derive sufficient benefits from 
the NATO alliance with or without expansion? And if you were 
asked that question by a group to which you just addressed, 
what would you say?
    Dr. Eland. Well, I would say that the NATO alliance and, 
especially, an expanded NATO alliance, somewhat impedes our 
flexibility in foreign policy. I think it may tie us down and 
take a lot of resources when we may want more flexibility in an 
uncertain world.
    For instance, we might want Russia's help in containing an 
aggressive China if one comes up--I am not predicting that.
    The other thing is it may take a lot of resources that we 
should be saving for other theaters. Maybe we will be too 
concerned with Europe and not enough with Asia. I think those 
are issues of flexibility.
    This was originally a cold war alliance, and the cold war 
is over now. So I think you really have to assess whether it 
impedes your foreign policy flexibility to some extent.
    The Chairman. Are you asking that question--I know you make 
a lot of public appearances. Are you asking the--essentially 
the same question that I just asked you? Is that the answer you 
give--to the question?
    Dr. Eland. Well, I do not make a lot of public appearances, 
really. So I really have never given that answer before.
    But I think it is a good answer.
    The Chairman. All right. Dr. Kugler, very quickly. If we do 
not proceed with the expansion, do you have any estimate of 
what the potential cost to the United States would be if 
tensions should rise in Europe?
    Dr. Kugler. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I earlier did an analysis 
for the Pentagon. It was not focused so much on the cost of 
rising tensions. Instead, it was focused on this issue: If we 
do not admit these countries into NATO, how much will it cost 
to defend this region without having them in NATO? And my 
estimate was that the cost would double--in peacetime.
    Now, if we got into a crisis confrontation, and these 
nations are in NATO, the RAND estimate put forth an estimate of 
about $110 billion. But if they were not in NATO, the estimate 
would be far higher.
    The Chairman. I see.
    Dr. Kugler. Yes.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Biden?
    Senator Biden. Thank you. Mr. Hadley, I think the way you 
approach this really kind of sets out the issues, how we should 
be looking at expansion--and people can reach a different 
conclusion than you and I reach on this.
    But this notion of credible guaranteeing, what Dr. Kugler 
is talking about, and that is--what would it cost to defend 
these countries were they in or not in NATO in a different 
circumstance?
    Interestingly I think that--and Mr. Eland, I suspect you 
would agree with this as well; maybe the only thing we would 
all agree on--is that right now, if you asked the 100 United 
States Senators ``Would you respond with aid if Poland were 
invaded by Russia?,'' I think you would get 99 ``yeses.''
    I may be wrong, who knows? But I think there would be an 
overwhelming sense, whether it is official or not, that we 
would not tolerate another invasion of Czechoslovakia--I mean, 
excuse me, of Hungary. We would not tolerate Russian troops 
moving back into the Czech Republic, and so on.
    Part of this debate is kind of surreal because we talk 
about it in terms of whether we are going to defend, be part of 
defending those countries, or we are not going to defend them 
when, in fact, our stated public policy--and I cannot imagine 
it changing from this president to a Republican president--
would be to say, ``No, no to either option. That is we will 
make our decision when an invasion occurs.''
    Now, granted, treaties are serious business, so when you 
sign the treaty, you are pledging the sacred honor of this 
country that you will do it. So I am not diminishing the 
significant difference in actually being in the treaty and not 
being in the treaty.
    But it kind of confuses me, in terms of the way the debate 
is conducted. If we could all kind of start from a basic 
premise, the same basic premise, we could construct a syllogism 
here that might serve us well.
    Do you start, Dr. Eland, from the premise that the United 
States either commits to defending those countries if it is in 
NATO, if they are in NATO, or if they are not in NATO, we make 
no such commitment?
    Do you address that in your threat assessment? You went 
through a threat assessment based upon what the world will look 
like in your view, and it is a reasonable view. I mean, I am 
not criticizing the assessment of what the world looks like 
today and what Europe looks like today, what Europe will look 
in 10 years from now or 15 years from now.
    You conclude that our European--that the three countries in 
question will have to do something we did not with any other 
admittees--with Spain, for example. You suggest they have got 
to be up to snuff with modern precision aircraft within that 
10-year period.
    Dr. Eland. No, they say that.
    Senator Biden. Pardon me?
    Dr. Eland. They are planning on doing that, in the long 
term.
    Senator Biden. Yeah. They are saying that, but you and I 
both know that they do not have the money to do that.
    And the question is whether or not it is reasonable--well, 
whether or not that will be demanded of them by NATO.
    In other words, there are two issues here. You sit down and 
you talk to the Poles, as I did in Warsaw, and they say what 
they would like their military to look like in 10 years is--it 
may or may not be what is a minimum requirement for them to be 
a contributor to NATO.
    If we look at Spain and Spain's accession to NATO and the 
manner in which it modernized its military, the speed with 
which it did it, the proficiency with which it acquired that 
capability--that expansion is significantly different.
    And they are a great ally--I am not in any way belittling 
their contribution. But we did not look at them and say, ``Now, 
look, here is the deal. You have to do what, quote, some in 
Poland are saying they would like to do.''
    So is there a distinction between what the Poles, for 
example, say they plan on doing, and what is required to meet 
the Perry principles for Poland to have to be able to do to be 
a contributor to NATO? Is there a difference there?
    Dr. Eland. Well, I think if you want them to do peace-
keeping exercises, you give them a few radios and that is 
pretty much it.
    But if you want them----
    Senator Biden. They are already doing peacekeeping 
exercises.
    Dr. Eland. Right--under PFP. So just admit them and have no 
costs at all then.
    But I think that these countries are going to buy these 
aircraft over time.
    Senator Biden. Yeah.
    Dr. Eland. This is a 13 to 15-year window.
    Senator Biden. Right.
    Dr. Eland. And in my estimate, I did not gold plate this at 
all. I mean, we rewired existing MiGs, we rewired T72 tanks, 
and then over time we only replaced one-third of the T55 tanks 
which do not work today.
    So as far as my estimate goes, there is no disconnect 
between those two. I think it was pretty modest because we 
assumed that basic precision weapons would be purchased. We did 
not gold plate the estimate.
    And they are going to have to buy some aircraft because in 
2005, they are not going to have an air force if they do not do 
that. All of these estimates are over a 13 to 15-year period.
    So I think it depends on how effective you want them to be, 
but DOD says that they must have a basic defense capability. 
Their militaries are not in very good shape.
    DOD includes these costs to improve new member's weapons. 
As I mentioned before, you probably should include these costs. 
``What would they have done anyway'' is basically what your 
question is.
    Senator Biden. No, no, no. That is not my question. My 
question is what is needed for them to do to be a contributing 
member to NATO, what is needed for them to do over the next 
decade, versus not what they would do, what they want to do, or 
what they will do. What is needed for them to do to be a 
contributing member?
    Mr. Kugler would like to--is it all right with you, Mr. 
Chairman? May he respond to----
    The Chairman. Well, let me say this. We need to wind this 
up.
    I was going to say, beginning with Mr. Kugler, each to have 
a--3 or 4 minutes, if you need it, for a postscript to answer a 
question or extend a comment or whatever. We will begin with 
you.
    Dr. Kugler. This is the question that I want to answer: The 
difference between what the new members should do and what they 
will do. The difference will be only 7 percent. Let me explain.
    Subsequent to this RAND work that I have talked about here, 
I have been working on an additional study on this issue. I 
performed this study for the Pentagon--it contained about 40 
different dimensions--that identified where we will want these 
new members to go in terms of NATO military capabilities.
    The basic goal was to make them average and normal for NATO 
as a whole--not at the top of NATO and not at the bottom, but 
in the middle--thus, solid and capable of carrying out NATO's 
defense plans.
    Now, subsequent to that, I have gotten access to the Polish 
defense budget and where they are going.
    We did a study at RAND for Poland and they are doing 
excellently. They literally--given what they plan to spend and 
what is in their budgets--will draw within 7 percent of, on 
average, of the goal of making them solid and normal. This is 
well within the range of adequacy.
    So, the Poles in my view get a grade of A. If we can have 
all of our allies like the Poles, we will have an excellent 
alliance. I cannot speak so much for the other two countries; I 
have not looked at them in as much detail. But, anyway, that is 
my answer. You, Senator, have asked the proper question: where 
should we drive the new members, where are they going, and is 
there a difference between the two?
    And in the case of Poland, there is not much difference.
    The Chairman. OK. Mr. Hadley, let us jump down to you for a 
postscript.
    Mr. Hadley. I would like to pick up on Senator Biden's 
point because I think he has asked the right question.
    If you think, and if 99 Senators think that we would come 
to the defense of these three countries, I would argue that 
that is a very strong argument for bringing them into the 
alliance and making that clear. I think it is the right answer 
because I see defense of these three countries as an extension 
of our commitment to defend the current allies.
    But you want to make that clear so that the Russians 
understand it are not--do not--we do not have any 
miscalculations here, and so that these three countries 
understand it and know where their place is. So I think that is 
a good place to start this debate.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Eland?
    Dr. Eland. Well, I would just like to say that if we are 
going to defend these countries then that is a national 
decision whether we do that or not if we have not admitted them 
into the alliance.
    To admit them there are also going to be additional 
expenses for interoperability and things that we are going to 
have to pay as well. So I think the costs are going to be 
greater to admit them in the alliance.
    The other thing is what is a basic defense? I mean, we may 
differ on that, I think. I received an unclassified 
intelligence briefing when I was doing the study, that 
concluded their armed forces and their military 
infrastructure--for example, their road and rail system--are in 
very poor shape.
    I would also like to respond to one other thing. I made the 
statement that the NATO alliance and especially expanding the 
NATO alliance, might impede your flexibility. I mentioned Asia.
    But you can also get pulled into things in which you do not 
want to be involved. As you were saying, Senator Biden, there 
is a difference between saying, ``Well, we are going to give 
you aid'' and actually being committed to defend and put troops 
on the ground.
    I think the costs will increase dramatically. What I think 
is going to happen here is that we are going to let these 
countries in. The new countries are not going to pay very much 
to improve their militaries and infrastructures and the 
existing allies are not going to pay very much either. And the 
United States is constrained by budgetary constraints. We think 
we do a lot in NATO already.
    So what happens then if, say, Serbia attacks Hungary down 
the road or Belarus becomes a problem for Poland? We are going 
to have to come to the rescue. That is going to be a lot of 
lives and dollars, and that is going to increase the cost.
    Even if you vote in favor of expansion, you should get the 
Department of Defense to provide a better cost estimate. I have 
gone into the details and I just do not think it is a very good 
cost estimate.
    Senator Biden. You are opposed to expansion unrelated--in 
addition to your concern about costs?
    Dr. Eland. Well, when I did the study, I worked at the CBO, 
and I made an honest attempt to not gold plate the thing just 
to----
    Senator Biden. I am not suggesting you did. I am just 
asking your view of expansion. Do you support expansion, 
assuming the costs were able to be met?
    Dr. Eland. I am opposed to expansion and not just on the 
basis of costs. I think there are a lot of other reasons.
    Senator Biden. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. This has been a very 
enlightening morning for me, and all of this will be printed 
and made available to the media and to others.
    Now, we will submit some written questions--Senators who 
were not present, and I am sure you will not mind responding to 
them.
    There being no further business to come before the 
committee, we stand in recess.
    [Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to 
reconvene at 9:32 a.m., October 30, 1997.]



                    NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP--PART I

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1997

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room 
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms 
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
    Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Smith, Grams, Frist, Biden, 
Robb, and Wellstone.
    The Chairman. Good morning, Dr. Kissinger. It is great of 
you to come after having had such a late evening last night. It 
is a pleasure to welcome you on behalf of the committee. The 
subject this morning, of course as everybody knows, is the 
NATO-Russia Relationship.
    Now, Henry Kissinger needs no introduction by me, or for 
that matter by anybody else in the world. He is that well 
known. The Secretary and I have sometimes had slightly 
different views during the decades that we have known each 
other, but I have always respected Dr. Kissinger and 
particularly his appraisals of important foreign policy 
matters. So I say to you, sir, in addition to good morning, 
your views on NATO enlargement and specifically the NATO-Russia 
relationship will be enormously helpful to this committee.
    I see the Ranking Member will be here shortly, but I 
suggest that you proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, PRESIDENT, KISSINGER AND 
                 ASSOCIATES, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

    Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I 
have submitted a formal statement and I stand by all of it, but 
in order to permit more time for questions I will just read 
some extracts from it and then respond to your questions.
    It is an honor to appear before this committee on a matter 
of such importance to America's future. If this century has 
taught any lesson, it is that our security is inextricably 
linked with Europe's. NATO, the institution expressing this 
conviction, has successfully deterred war in Europe for 50 
years. Now that Soviet power has receded from the center of the 
continent, NATO needs to adapt itself to the consequences of 
its success.
    Let me add here a comment which is not explicitly in the 
text. Whatever we believe about the evolution of other parts of 
the world, I believe that the rock bottom organization and 
grouping which we must foster is that of the nations which 
share our democratic tradition and much of our history. So I 
believe that the relationship of the democracies in the North 
Atlantic and in the Western Hemisphere should be the key 
building block of the future American foreign policy. Therefore 
of course a key question is, what is this Europe? What is this 
North Atlantic area to which we want to relate ourselves, to 
which we must relate ourselves? I think it is essential that 
the nations of Eastern and Central Europe, which were excluded 
from their historical traditions by the arrangements that were 
made at the end of World War II, find their place in the 
relationship of the democracies.
    Now, critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission 
of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary threatens prospects 
for the democratic evolution of Russia, and therefore magnifies 
perils rather than allays them. I hold the opposite view. The 
Russian Defense Minister, Rodionov, explained Russian 
opposition to NATO enlargement on the ground that it deprives 
Russia of a buffer zone in Central Europe. Were NATO to fall in 
with this argument, it would perpetuate the injustice of the 
Soviet satellite orbit by condemning the recently liberated 
nations of Central Europe to institutionalized impotence, and 
it would store up endless future troubles.
    Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land 
between Germany and Russia runs counter to all historical 
experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would 
bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe, those that 
are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that 
are guaranteed but not threatened. If America were to act to 
defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east, the 
credibility of all the existing NATO guarantees would be 
gravely weakened, nor would this exclusion of traditional 
Central European nations from the common defense achieve its 
purpose. Once Russia succeeded in establishing a military 
buffer zone, it would logically follow with demands for a 
political corollary that would imply a veto over foreign 
policy.
    If the eastern border of Germany is defined as the limit of 
Western Europe, and the western defense, Germany will be driven 
to doubt America's leadership and to try to influence the 
security position of the buffer zone on a nationalist basis. 
Failure to enlarge NATO would thus risk either collision or 
collusion between Germany and Russia. Either way, American 
abdication would produce a political earthquake threatening 
vital American interests.
    Considerations such as these have transformed the great 
Czech president, Havel, into a strong advocate of early NATO 
enlargement. An ardent human rights activist, he surely 
appreciates the argument for encouraging a democratic evolution 
in Russia, but he obviously believes that even the most 
optimistic outcome will take longer than is safely compatible 
with the establishment of a vacuum in Central Europe. I know no 
leader of Central Europe who does not share this view.
    NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing of two 
conflicting considerations: The fear of alienating Russia 
against the danger of creating a vacuum between Germany and 
Russia in Central Europe. Failure to expand NATO is likely to 
prove irrevocable. Russian opposition would only grow as its 
economy gains strength. The nations of Central Europe would 
drift out of their association with Europe. So I would strongly 
urge the Senate to ratify NATO enlargement.
    Now, let me turn to another matter. While I strongly favor 
NATO expansion and recommend its approval, I am deeply worried 
about the Founding Act which seeks to reconcile Russia to NATO 
expansion by offering Russia a role in NATO councils. Part of 
my objection is philosophical. Alliances define a common 
threat; collective security deals with a legal contingency. 
Alliances delineate an area to be defended; collective security 
is open-ended and is redefined from case-to-case.
    The language of the Founding Act is that of collective 
security, not of alliance. I have gone through a lot of 
analysis of the language, which we do not have to do here.
    The words ``common defense'' apparently proved so offensive 
to their commitment to collective security that the drafters of 
the Founding Act could not bring themselves to invoke them, and 
used instead the euphemism, quote, ``commitments undertaken in 
the Washington Treaty,'' unquote, which created NATO in 1949.
    This view is assuredly not shared by the new members who 
are seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the 
opposite of what the Founding Act describes, not to erase 
dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed 
territory by shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 200 
miles to the east.
    My major concern is not philosophical. The most worrisome 
aspect of the Founding Act is the consultative machinery for 
which it provides. The act calls into being, side-by-side with 
existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council 
composed of the same Ambassadors who form the existing NATO 
Council, plus a Russian full member. The Russian ambassador is 
located inside the same building as the other Council members, 
as are the military representatives. The Permanent Joint 
Council is supposed to meet at least once a month. Twice a year 
the Council is to meet at the foreign ministers' level. The 
first such ministerial meeting was held in the shadow of the 
United Nations last month. Regular meetings of the defense 
ministers are also envisaged, as well as regular summits.
    The act designates the Permanent Joint Council as the 
principal venue for crisis consultation between Russia and 
NATO. Each side agrees that, quote, ``it will promptly 
consult,'' unquote, within the Permanent Joint Council, quote, 
``in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its 
territorial integrity, political independence and security,'' 
unquote. Thus, if Poland feels threatened by Russia, it may 
first have to appeal to the Permanent Joint Council on which 
Russia is represented.
    It will be argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, 
the regular NATO Council remains free to perform its historic 
functions. That is true in theory, but it will never work in 
practice. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the 
membership is identical, each country will assess the grave 
step of meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its 
overall relationship with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO 
Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to 
merge. The free and easy ``family atmosphere'' of existing 
institutions will vanish.
    As for the new members of NATO, they are joining in these 
restrictions with respect to the deployment of other NATO 
forces and nuclear weapons. The ultimate irony is that Russia 
will be participating in the Permanent Joint Council and 
achieving a voice in NATO 2 years before the new members, who 
have to wait for ratification of the enlargement by all the 
parliaments of NATO.
    The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement now face is 
that the Founding Act has already gone into effect upon 
signature. As an executive agreement, it does not have to be 
ratified by the Senate, while NATO enlargement, involving a 
treaty, does. Thus if the admission of new members were not 
ratified, we will have inherited the worst possible outcome: 
The demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO rendered 
dysfunctional by the Founding Act.
    Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this 
committee share my concerns about the possibility that the 
Founding Act has given Russia too much of a role in NATO 
matters; and I am aware that you pressed the Secretary of State 
for clarification on a number of these issues when she appeared 
before the committee 2 weeks ago.
    I was pleased to note that, in her response to your 
questions, the Secretary reassured you and the American people 
that nothing which has been agreed to with the Russians will 
detract from the primacy of NATO. If I may make a suggestion, I 
believe this offers the Senate an opportunity in the course of 
the ratification procedure to address the philosophical 
ambiguities of the Founding Act.
    Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I recommend that, in its 
instrument of advice and consent, the Senate explicitly 
reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance for American 
foreign policy, and insist that nothing in any other document 
shall detract from the North Atlantic Council as the supreme 
body of the alliance. Such a resolution could draw directly on 
the forthright response which Secretary Albright gave to your 
questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution should declare 
that the United States expects Russia to desist from all 
pressures and threats in Europe on this issue. In the meantime, 
while ratification proceeds, a joint resolution of Congress 
should urge that the new NATO members be permitted to join the 
Permanent Joint Council while waiting for ratification. This 
would remove the anomaly that the institution created to 
reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion should come into being 
years before the expansion actually occurs.
    In this way I believe a truly bipartisan approach to the 
European security relationship can be achieved.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]
                  Prepared Statement of Dr. Kissinger
    Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: It is an honor to appear 
before this committee on a matter of such importance to America's 
future. If this century has taught any lesson, it is that our security 
is inextricably linked with Europe's. NATO, the institution expressing 
this conviction, has successfully deterred war in Europe for 50 years. 
Now that Soviet power has receded from the center of the continent, 
NATO needs to adapt itself to the consequences of its success.
    The stakes involved are large, for the nations of the Atlantic area 
need each other, and NATO is the fundamental link between the two. 
Without America, Europe would turn into a peninsula at the tip of 
Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium, much less unity, and at risk of 
gradually subsiding into a role similar to that of ancient Greece in 
relation to Rome--the only outstanding question being whether America 
or Russia will play the role of Rome. Without Europe, America would 
become an island off the shores of Eurasia, condemned to a kind of pure 
balance-of-power politics that does not reflect its national genius. 
Without Europe, America's path would be lonely; without America, 
Europe's role would approach irrelevance. This is why America concluded 
twice in this century that the domination of Eurasia by a hegemonic 
power threatens its vital interests and has gone to war to prevent it.
    A major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for European 
coherence. Without it, the European Union would founder on the fear of 
German domination; France would see reinsurance in a Russian option; 
historic European coalitions would form, compounding their traditional 
tenuousness with irrelevance; Germany would be tempted into a 
nationalist role, Russia into revanchism. That role requires a 
definition of Europe that is historically valid--that is, which 
includes the nations of Central Europe.
    An American presence in Europe provides a measure of equilibrium. 
It gives France a safety net against German hegemony and Germany an 
emotional harbor as European unification slows down, as well as 
protection against outside dangers and excessive European nationalism. 
Even Russia has much to gain from an American presence, which is the 
best guarantee against the reemergence of historical European 
rivalries. Europe by itself cannot handle the two most dangerous 
Russian contingencies: resurgence of nationalism or implosion. A Russia 
facing a divided Europe would find the temptation to fill the vacuum 
irresistible. An America cut off from Europe would lose an anchor of 
its foreign policy.
    Critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission of Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary threatens prospects for the democratic 
evolution of Russia and therefore magnifies perils rather than allays 
them.
    I hold the opposite view. The former Russian Defense Minister Igor 
N. Rodionov explained Russian opposition to NATO enlargement on the 
ground that it deprives Russia of a buffer zone in Central Europe. Were 
NATO to fall in with this argument, it would perpetuate the injustice 
of the Soviet satellite orbit by condemning the only newly liberated 
nations of Central Europe to institutionalized impotence. And it would 
store up endless future troubles.
    Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land between 
Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience, especially 
that of the interwar period. It would bring about two categories of 
frontiers in Europe: those that are potentially threatened but not 
guaranteed, and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. If 
America decides to defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to 
the east, the credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be 
gravely weakened. Nor would this exclusion of traditional Central 
European nations from the common defense achieve its purpose. 'Once 
Russia had succeeded in establishing a military buffer zone, it would 
logically follow with demands for a political corollary that would 
imply a veto over foreign policy.
    If the eastern border of Germany is defined as the limit of the 
common defense, Germany will be driven to doubt America's leadership 
role and to try to influence the security position of the buffer zone. 
Failure to enlarge NATO thus would risk either collision or collusion 
between Germany and Russia. Either way, American abdication would 
produce a political earthquake threatening vital American interests.
    Considerations such as these have transformed the great Czech 
president, Vaclav Havel, into a strong advocate of early NATO 
enlargement. An ardent human rights activist, he surely appreciates the 
argument for encouraging a democratic evolution in Russia. But he 
obviously believes that even the most optimistic outcome will take 
longer than is safely compatible with the establishment of a vacuum of 
power in Central Europe. I know no leader of Central Europe who does 
not share this view.
    NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing of two conflicting 
considerations: the fear of alienating Russia against the danger of 
creating a vacuum in Central Europe between Germany and Russia. Failure 
to expand NATO is likely to prove irrevocable. Russian opposition is 
bound to grow as its economy gains strength; the nations of Central 
Europe may drift out of their association with Europe. The end result 
would be the vacuum between Germany and Russia that has tempted so many 
previous conflicts. When NATO recoils from defining the only limits 
that make strategic sense, it is opting for progressive irrelevance.
    While I strongly favor NATO expansion, I am deeply worried about 
the Founding Act which seeks to reconcile Russia to NATO expansion by 
offering Russia a role in NATO councils. Alliances define a common 
threat; collective security deals with a legal contingency. Alliances 
delineate an area to be defended; collective security is open-ended and 
is redefined from case-to-case.
    The language of the Founding Act is that of collective security, 
not of alliance. The Act speaks of the parties' ``shared commitment to 
build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free'' and 
refers to the parties' ``allegiance to shared values, commitments and 
norms of behavior.'' But Russia sells nuclear power plants, submarines 
and other arms to Iran, ignoring specific American requests to desist. 
Russia supports, in opposition to American policy, the lifting of the 
embargo on Iraq. It refuses to delineate its border with Ukraine. Of 
what, then, do the shared commitments cited in the Founding Act 
consist?
    The words ``common defense'' apparently proved so offensive to 
their commitment to collective security that the drafters of the 
Founding Act could not bring themselves to invoke them and used instead 
(and only once) the euphemism commitments undertaken in the Washington 
Treaty'' (which created NATO in 1949). But they did not specify the 
nature of these commitments.
    The view assuredly is not shared by the new members, who are 
seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the opposite of what 
the Founding Act describes--not to erase dividing lines but to position 
themselves inside a guaranteed territory by shifting the existing NATO 
boundaries some 200 miles to the east.
    The most worrisome aspect of the Founding Act is the consultative 
machinery for which it provides. The Act calls into being, side-by-side 
with existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council composed 
of the same ambassadors who form the existing NATO Council, plus a 
Russian full member. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at least 
once a month. Twice a year, the Council is to meet at the foreign 
ministers' level. The first such ministerial meeting was held in the 
shadow of the United Nations last month. Regular meetings of the 
defense ministers are also envisaged, as well as summits.
    The Act designates the Permanent Joint Council as the principle 
venue for crisis consultation between Russia and NATO. Each side agrees 
that ``it will promptly consult'' within the Permanent Joint Council 
``in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its 
territorial integrity, political independence and security.'' Thus if 
Poland feels threatened by Russia, it may have to appeal first to the 
Permanent Joint Council. Similarly, according to the letter of the Act, 
Russia could have insisted that the Gulf War be brought to the 
Permanent Joint Council where--as the Founding Act repeatedly states--
decisions are made by consensus.
    It will be argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, the 
regular NATO Council remains free to perform its historic functions. 
That is true in theory but will not work in practice in all but the 
most extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the 
membership is identical, each country will assess the grave step of 
meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its overall relationship 
with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent 
Council sessions will tend to merge. The free and easy ``family 
atmosphere'' of existing institutions will vanish.
    As for the new members of NATO, they are clearly joining in a 
second-class status subject to unprecedented restrictions with respect 
to the deployment of other NATO forces and nuclear weapons. The 
ultimate irony is that Russia will be participating in the Permanent 
Joint Council and achieving a voice in NATO two years before the new 
members who have to wait for ratification of the enlargement by all the 
parliaments of NATO.
    The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement now face is that the 
Founding Act has gone into effect upon signature. As an executive 
agreement, it will not have to be ratified by the US Senate, while NATO 
enlargement, involving a treaty, does. Thus if the admission of new 
members is not ratified, we will have inherited the worst possible 
outcome: the demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO rendered 
dysfunctional by the Founding Act.
    Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this committee 
share my concerns about the possibility that the Founding Act has given 
Russia too much of a role in NATO matters. And I am aware that you 
pressed the Secretary of State for clarification on a number of these 
issues when she appeared before the committee two weeks ago.
    I was pleased to note that, in her response to your questions, the 
Secretary reassured you and the American people that nothing which has 
been agreed to with the Russians will detract from NATO's primacy. And 
if I may make a suggestion, I believe this offers the Senate an 
opportunity, in the course of the ratification procedure, to address 
the philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act.
    Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that, in its instrument of 
advice and consent, the Senate should explicitly reassert the central 
role of the Atlantic Alliance for American foreign policy and insist 
that nothing in any other document shall detract from the North 
Atlantic Council as the supreme body of alliance. Such a resolution 
could draw directly on the forthright response which Secretary Albright 
gave to your questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution should 
declare that the United States expects Russia--after the qualitative 
changes that we have made--to desist from all pressures and threats in 
Europe on this issue. In the meantime, while ratification proceeds, a 
joint resolution of Congress should urge that the new NATO members be 
permitted to join the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for 
ratification. This would remove the anomaly that the institution 
created to reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion comes into being years 
before expansion occurs.
    If the administration does not want to be remembered as having in 
effect atrophied the most effective alliance of this century, it should 
welcome efforts to clarify the many ambiguities in the Founding Act. In 
this way, a truly bipartisan approach to American-European security 
relations can be restored.

    The Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, I thank you very much. I am so 
glad that you got into the matter that I exchanged 
correspondence with the Secretary about recently.
    I think we will go on 5 minutes for each Senator for the 
time being, because as soon as this breakfast is over we are 
going to be joined by many other Senators. Let us see how we 
can do on that.
    I am hesitant to do this, Dr. Kissinger, but you know about 
as much about China as anybody I know. I guess all of us have 
been thinking about the advice to give visitors, that includes 
me.
    Dr. Kissinger. That I give the advice--
    The Chairman. To the Chinese leaders who are visiting us. 
That has nothing to do with NATO, but I want you to spend a 
minute or so saying, telling, revealing what you think would be 
the best course for the United States to follow in trying to 
work out an amicable relationship with China.
    For my part, I have made several contacts over a period of 
time now trying to point out to the Chinese that the American 
people like the Chinese people and they want to do business 
with them and want to recognize them as the power they are, but 
the human rights thing is standing in the way. It certainly 
stands in the way as far as I am concerned. As I put it to one 
leader yesterday, you have no idea, Sir, how much cooperation 
and goodwill you would build if there could be not an 
expression of retreat but an expression that we are going to 
work on it sincerely and honorably. I do not know whether that 
did any good or not, but I thought the President of the United 
States did quite well yesterday in standing up for that.
    If you would give your opinion, what would you say to the 
President, or maybe you have said it since he has been here, 
the President of China, what would you say to him?
    Dr. Kissinger. Mr. Chairman, I am doing this really off the 
top of my head.
    The Chairman. I know that.
    Dr. Kissinger. I have not made any formal preparation for 
this, however it is obviously a topic about which I have 
thought. I did not have an opportunity on this trip, because I 
just came back from Europe yesterday late afternoon, to talk to 
the President of China, but I have had other occasions and I am 
sure I will have the opportunity.
    Of course we are all influenced by our experiences. I was 
the first American official to visit China. I was sent there by 
President Nixon. In those days there was a huge philosophical 
gap between China and the United States. President Nixon, with 
my enthusiastic concurrence, agreed or felt that peace, 
flexibility for American foreign policy, the ability to play a 
significant role in Asia, required that we have diplomatic 
exchanges with China, even though philosophically we could not 
have disagreed more than we did with the China of the Cultural 
Revolution.
    So we have on the face of it two somewhat contradictory 
problems. We have a national security problem, a national 
interest problem, which is that China has a population of 
1,250,000,000. There are 60 million overseas Chinese with a 
major influence on the economies of Southeast Asia. China plays 
a significant role in Korea, Cambodia, and elsewhere. So it is 
in our interest, if we can, to find a basis for cooperation to 
serve our own purposes and to see whether there are joint 
interests that can be developed.
    Confrontation with China is not the same as it was with the 
Soviet Union. China's is a different history, a different 
society. Its method of conducting confrontations is to make 
them extremely prolonged and exhausting. On the other hand, it 
is also true that, being a democracy, our government will not 
find support among the people if fundamental American values 
are consistently being violated. These are the dilemmas that we 
face.
    For somebody who has been in China in the Seventies, the 
present China looks more respectful of individuals than the 
China we saw then. Now, I recognize this is a relative 
statement, and I believe that in terms of day-to-day life the 
lot of the Chinese has greatly improved. In terms of their 
right to political opposition, it has not.
    Then, assuming as we must that there will be strong 
disagreements between us and China on human rights, there is 
the question of how we can influence it better. I believe we 
can influence it better as a Nation by quiet diplomacy than by 
visible pressures.
    Let me add, incidentally, that I have no problem with, in 
fact I respect, the demonstrators who express their views as 
private citizens. This is how our system operates. I, however, 
believe that, as a government, we should, if at all possible, 
avoid sanctions and attempt to find areas where we have 
genuinely common interests. Therefore, if China's leaders asked 
me, I would tell them that they should take very seriously 
expressions of concern such as the one you mentioned. If the 
President asked me to what extent he should do that publicly 
and with pressure, I would urge him to try to find another way 
to do it if at all possible.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Wellstone.
    Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for 
being here, Dr. Kissinger. I have just one comment about the 
last day or two, and I much appreciate your comments about 
people in the parks.
    Dr. Kissinger. I was not here, though.
    Senator Wellstone. On the question of the situation in 
China, you of course have a perspective that I do not have, but 
I know that one of the things that I find personally--and Mr. 
Chairman, this refers to some meetings we had yesterday--really 
quite devastating is the State Department's report on human 
rights in China. It is really dismal. In fact Assistant 
Secretary Shattuck, I believe met with Wei Jingsheng and 
because of that meeting Wei now finds himself back in prison. 
He just wrote a book called, ``The Courage to Stand Alone.''
    It is troubling that we don't see a lot of evidence of this 
quiet diplomacy working, at least by our own State Department 
reports on the state of human rights. I quite agree with you, 
there is of course a very legitimate question as to what we 
should do, what is most effective. But, boy, the most recent 
empirical evidence we have on what is going on in China is not, 
it certainly does not give one much reason for optimism, and I 
think that is why many of us are speaking up and are proud to 
identify ourselves with the human rights community.
    You can respond to that if you want to, but I want to ask 
you a question about NATO expansion. Do you want to respond 
first?
    Dr. Kissinger. Could I make a response to the Senator?
    Senator Wellstone. Of course.
    Dr. Kissinger. If I may make a response, Senator, I have 
never criticized the people who express their views on human 
rights, and I have, on several occasions which I have chosen 
not to publicize, intervened on behalf of some of the cases, 
and in at least two cases have succeeded. But my approach 
requires that I do not talk about it afterwards.
    What bothers me as I see this debate evolving is that we 
are dealing here with a huge country still in the process of 
evolving, and I believe it is really not in the American 
national interest to conduct its relations with it from a 
posture of confrontation. First, because I do not believe that 
any other Asian nation will support us. Second, because all the 
other Asian nations will then adopt a posture of semi-
neutrality between us, which means a more nationalist policy. 
So our capacity to shape events will diminish.
    When I became, first Security Advisor and then Secretary of 
State, we had 500,000 Americans in Vietnam, where we thought we 
would bring democracy and then found ourselves in a struggle we 
did not know how to end. So I am very influenced by the 
experience and do not believe in getting ourselves into a 
confrontation if it is avoidable, and second, that we make 
absolutely sure that when we do, the American public 
understands why we have done it.
    If China threatens the equilibrium in Asia, and if it 
becomes a military threat, I will be before this committee 
supporting opposition to it. But I am trying to avoid the 
situation, and I think the future of China is now still 
somewhat open. I cannot believe that it is possible to change 
the economy as they have without political consequences. What 
these consequences are exactly, I do not pretend to know.
    So this is my profound worry. Incidentally, I must add, it 
has nothing to do with economics. I would like to see trade, 
but that is minuscule in my consideration.
    Senator Wellstone. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.
    Dr. Kissinger. So this is what is on my mind as we go 
through these dramatic few days.
    Senator Wellstone. Let me ask one question. I very much 
appreciated--
    The Chairman. He will have to answer it on the next round.
    Senator Wellstone. OK. I will put the question out there. 
You have written that the new nations that are hoping to join 
NATO, and I quote: ``are seeking to participate in NATO . . . 
not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside a 
guaranteed territory by shifting existing NATO boundaries 300 
miles to the east. . . .'' I really appreciate your candor. 
This position, though, at least seems to me to be in 
contradiction with the administration's pronouncements that 
NATO expansion will erase dividing lines in Europe. In the 
words of the President, it is intended to, ``build and secure a 
new Europe undivided at last.''
    Maybe you can get to it later. I do not think it is, Mr. 
Chairman, an inconsequential question, because if there is 
anything we want to know about NATO expansion, it is whether it 
is going to unify or whether it will redivide Europe. I wonder 
whether you could comment at some point in time on what I 
identify at least as a contradiction here.
    Dr. Kissinger. Should I do that later?
    The Chairman. Yes, Sir. Senator Hagel.
    Senator Hagel. Dr. Kissinger, thank you for coming this 
morning. I have just a quick comment on China, and then I would 
like to get your thoughts on a couple of the elements that you 
talked about in your opening statement. I have always thought 
on the China debate that we have somehow misplaced some of the 
focus of the debate. It should not be about do we support human 
rights or do we not support human rights. Of course we all 
support human rights in China. The debate should be focused on 
how we best influence the behavior of the Chinese leaders to 
bring more human rights, and I only say that because as I have 
listened and witnessed much of this debate, it is like 
environmental issues and other issues, you are either for a 
clean environment or you are against it, and we need to get 
back to the real issue.
    Your points about the Founding Act, what do you believe the 
Russians think about the Founding Act, but more importantly, 
what do you believe their view is of the Founding Act?
    Dr. Kissinger. Let me just make a very quick comment about 
your China point. I am somewhat disturbed by the impression 
that is being created in the debate that the only issue we have 
vis-a-vis China is human rights, and that the only debate we 
have in this country is how we can improve human rights in 
China. I would urge that there be examination of whether we 
have any common interests in terms of our national security 
that would drive us to some degree of cooperation with China. 
This aspect of the relationship must be included, otherwise we 
will always seem as if we are somehow inadequate.
    Now about Russia. I do not agree with the administration's 
analysis of the Russian problem, and therefore I do not agree 
with the statement about erasing dividing lines in that sense. 
My analysis of Russia is as follows.
    A dominant view of some of the administration spokesmen 
seems to be that the obstacle to relations with Russia is the 
absence of pluralistic democracy, and that once democracy is 
established in Russia, all other problems will disappear. Then 
Russia will merge into some kind of big Eurasian structure.
    I think the problem of Russia is more complicated. First of 
all, the country is partly in Europe but also partly in the 
Middle East and partly in Asia, so that the pulls on Russia are 
much more complex than those faced by any other nation in 
Europe. Second, the history of Russia is quite different. It 
has not had a separate religion, as was the Catholic religion 
during the Medieval period, which established its own principle 
of justice. It did not have the Reformation, it did not have 
the Enlightenment, it did not have the Age of Discovery, it did 
not have capitalism. So the evolution toward democracy in 
Russia is more complex. Hopefully it will develop.
    Second, Russia has also been an imperialist country that, 
for 400 years of its history, acquired territories, expanding 
from the region around Moscow to the shores of the Pacific, 
into the Middle East, to the gates of India, and into the 
center of Europe. It did not get there by plebiscite. It got 
there by armies. To the Russian leaderships over the centuries, 
these old borders have become identified with the nature of the 
state.
    So I believe that one of the major challenges we face with 
Russia is whether it can accept the borders in which it now 
finds itself. On the one hand, St. Petersburg is closer to New 
York than it is to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to 
Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they should not feel 
claustrophobic. But they do. This idea of organizing again the 
old commonwealth of independent states is one of the driving 
forces of their diplomacy. If Russia stays within its borders 
and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan and Israel all 
developed huge economies with no resources and in small 
territories, they, with a vast territory and vast resources, 
could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no 
security problem.
    So for all of these reasons I do not believe that in any 
foreseeable future it is possible for Russia to join NATO, and 
I think it would be a lot better if we said explicitly that 
this cannot happen. If I am very much in favor of negotiating 
with Russia, and the Chairman will remember, as I surely do, 
that in earlier incarnations he expressed some doubts about 
what he considered my excessive propensity for negotiating with 
the Soviet Union.
    But I believe that this is a question for political and 
diplomatic efforts. If we created a body within the European 
Security Conference to conduct dialog with Russia, I would 
favor that. What I do not favor is giving this impression that 
everything sort of mergers and everything is sort of evolving 
toward some kind of mini-U.N. From the Chinese border to the 
Canadian border up in Alaska. I have been very opposed to this 
approach and have said so repeatedly publicly.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. It is good to see you, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. 
Secretary. I apologize for being late. I was where the Chairman 
was wise enough not to be. I was at the breakfast, and I 
apologize.
    My understanding, and please correct me if I am wrong, is 
that on the central issue before this committee, which is 
whether or not we should expand NATO, whether we should vote to 
amend the Washington Treaty, you think that we should.
    Dr. Kissinger. I strongly support it, and I urge you to do 
that.
    Senator Biden. The primary criticism is the way in which 
the relationship with Russia, as it relates to what was the 
Partnership for Peace and is now becoming the expansion of 
NATO, on those two fronts has changed.
    Dr. Kissinger. Correct.
    Senator Biden. I, quite frankly, got myself in a little bit 
of a bind because I quoted you in a debate. I referenced you in 
a debate I was having as a source of authority for a position I 
was taking, and was later informed that it was not your 
position. This was about 8 months ago. I recalled, and I had my 
staff go back and get it, a piece you had done in December 1994 
where you called for, and it confused me, you called for a 
treaty with Russia, a U.S. treaty with Russia. You said such a 
treaty would provide that no foreign troops be stationed on the 
territory of new NATO members on the model of the arrangements 
for East Germany (or better, no closer than fixed distances 
from the eastern border of Poland). In the next paragraph you 
say, at the same time such a treaty would provide for 
consultation between NATO and Russia on matters of common 
interest.
    I kind of thought that was what the President did, and that 
is what confused me. Now, I am not being a smart guy here or a 
wise guy. What is different between what you are recommending 
and what actually took place?
    Dr. Kissinger. First of all, that was the first article I 
wrote on this subject, and I do not believe that the President 
goes to bed at night worrying necessarily what I think of the 
subject.
    Senator Biden. I do. He does not, but I do.
    Dr. Kissinger. But he can be in no doubt that I modified my 
thinking on this. What I had in mind then was to accept some 
restrictions on the deployment of troops, and I still favor 
that on the model of East Germany. I did not think that it 
could be interpreted into this elaborate machinery which makes 
Russia, to my mind, a de facto member of NATO, no matter what 
we say about a voice and not a veto.
    Senator Biden. Again, as you know, as you were kidding me 
earlier today when I saw you in the hallway, you were saying 
you were hoping I would not be here because you and I have gone 
round and round. I want the rest of you to know the first 
meeting I ever attended as a young Senator was over in the 
Foreign Relations Committee room in the Senate, Mr. Chairman.
    I came to this meeting room at age 30 thinking I was 
supposed to be here because Dr. Kissinger was at that time 
presenting in closed session, quote, ``his world view.'' That 
is how we billed it. I was here ready and waiting, and a young 
staffer walked out and asked me, Senator, I had been here 2 
months, what are you doing. I said I am here for the hearing. 
He said no, it is over in the other building.
    So I went running over to the other building looking for S-
116 on the little door handles, and to make a long story short, 
I burst into the room, perspiring, I was nervous as heck. The 
door opened, and remember you used to have those filing 
cabinets right by the door, it came out and it smashed against 
the filing cabinets. I think I gave everybody coronary arrest, 
almost everybody. Then I walked in, sat down, making myself the 
second ranking member of the committee, looked over at Dr. 
Kissinger whom I had only known from watching on television, 
and Senator Mansfield said, ``do you have any questions?'' He 
was the acting chairman. I said yes, and Dr. Kissinger said, 
``I thought this was for Senators only.'' At which time I said, 
``well, Secretary Dulles, I am here to ask you whatever I 
can.''
    That is how our relationship started.
    Dr. Kissinger. Now you understand why my relations with the 
Senators were not always what they should have been.
    Senator Biden. Anyway, my time is up. I truly appreciate 
your clarification. I am not being facetious when I say my view 
of the arrangement that has been worked out is what I thought 
you were envisioning by a treaty providing consultation between 
NATO and Russia on matters of common interest. My reading of 
the agreement we made is not, and I could be dead wrong, but as 
I read the text, and talking to the principals, there is no 
including the non-NATO members of other countries. It was 
literally consultation, not intertwining the, as you put it, 
larger matrix of relationships. But you have answered my 
question.
    Dr. Kissinger. I have high regard for the people who 
negotiated this. I can live very happily with what Secretary 
Albright said here. I simply think that it is difficult to make 
it work that way as time goes on. You have these Ambassadors 
sitting in the building, they meet every day. Then the NATO 
members go off and say we are going to have our own meeting. 
Legally, of course, they can do it, but the human nature of 
these multi-lateral parties is against it.
    You asked me what the Russian strategy is. Russian strategy 
cannot be to build NATO. It is against their whole tradition. 
So they have every interest to water down NATO into some vague 
multi-lateral U.N. type talk shop. Therefore they will bring 
issues before the NATO Council that will achieve this purpose. 
This is my concern. I have no doubt at all that Secretary 
Albright means exactly what she is saying.
    Senator Biden. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    The Chairman. Senator Smith.
    Senator Smith. Mr. Secretary, first, thank you for coming 
to this hearing. For those of us who are new and trying to 
catch up with what you know and to learn the history that you 
both have and have made, I for one am grateful to you.
    When I listen to the President of the United States and 
others, well-intentioned, use words like we are not redrawing 
lines in Europe, Europe is undivided and free, and I see us 
expanding NATO, I frankly must confess I think we are playing 
word games. I think in fact what we are doing, and rightfully 
doing, is redrawing lines that say American values, western 
interests, principles that we value such as private property, 
the rule of law, human rights, that we do draw lines, and that 
as a community of western nations we reflect this not just 
economically and politically but even militarily in order to 
provide security arrangements. So frankly I find somewhat 
puzzling some of the language that we use to talk around this 
issue.
    I think what we are doing is moving lines, but I do think 
we have got to allow others, other people on the other side of 
those lines, we have to give them an eraser. They have to be 
able to join the western community by taking on our values, our 
culture, if they will, if they want to, and we need to be 
prepared to receive them. In my mind that certainly includes 
Hungary and Poland and the Czech Republic. I would have even 
allowed Slovenia and Romania into this first round.
    I guess the real push is going to come when it comes to the 
Baltics. Even we must be honest and say should it not also 
ultimately include Russia, if they would take on the kinds of 
institutions and abide by the rule of law that we share 
commonly with Western Europe. I wonder how you feel about 
further expansion, and ultimately Russia's inclusion if they 
would join Western Europe more than just rhetorically.
    Dr. Kissinger. Let me tell you what historic models I have 
in mind. I know there are a lot of people who think I burn 
votive candles to Metternich every night in my devotion to the 
19th century----
    Senator Biden. We thought you were.
    Dr. Kissinger. I knew it. May I give, however, an historic 
example. At the end of the Napoleonic wars France was in the 
position Russia is in today, that is, it was considered to be 
the aggressor in Europe. Everybody was deeply concerned about 
the fact that they might start on expansion again. So they 
created two separate institutions. One was the Quadruple 
Alliance. This was aimed at preventing a military attack from 
France. Second they created something called the Concert of 
Europe in which France could participate. The Concert of Europe 
discussed all the political issues, and in fact that became in 
time the dominant element. The Quadruple Alliance was never 
abolished, but it never needed to be activated.
    This is sort of the model that I have in mind for Russia. I 
think Russia should be consulted and participate in political 
discussions that affect its vital interests and the peace, and 
that as Russia evolves those institutions become more and more 
dominant. But I would keep NATO as a safety net, and keep it as 
unspoiled as possible as a community of democratic nations. If 
values were to be shared, then the political organs would 
become more dominant.
    But what worries me is that we have now created something 
that in the terms of the day-by-day, competes with the NATO 
Council and that historical analogy, kind of merges the 
Quadruple Alliance and the Concert of Europe. And that worries 
me deeply. I do not think that Russia should be permanently 
excluded. The Chairman knows very well that I was in favor of 
exploring with Russia even then whether there might be any 
common areas, and I certainly believe it even more today.
    Senator Smith. There is no more reason then to keep the 
Baltics out than to keep Poland out.
    Dr. Kissinger. The problem with the Baltics or, say, 
Ukraine, is that when you move former republics of the Soviet 
Union into NATO and an integrated military structure, then you 
have, especially with Ukraine, a major challenge to Russian 
self-consciousness. On the other hand, we have to find a way of 
conveying that a threat to the independence of the Baltics and 
Ukraine would be inimical to any friendly relationship with the 
United States, and that this is something we would look at with 
the greatest gravity.
    The Chairman. Senator Robb.
    Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, thank 
you for being with us this morning. You have indicated 
skepticism about the consultative process and the degree of 
influence that Russia might have on the NATO operations. Are 
there any steps that the United States ought to pursue, in your 
judgment, during this formative period that could be included 
in whatever charter arrangements are ultimately agreed to or 
changes that might be made that would restrict that role in 
ways that you believe are appropriate?
    Dr. Kissinger. Senator, I made clear before you came in the 
room that I strongly favor ratification in any event.
    Senator Robb. Unless there be any doubt, I do too.
    Dr. Kissinger. Nothing I have said should be interpreted as 
negative.
    Senator Robb. Nor was my question intended to imply that.
    Dr. Kissinger. I did not interpret it that way. What I have 
recommended to the Chairman and to the committee is that, in 
the instrument of ratification, the Senate find a way of 
expressing its view that the NATO Council is the dominant 
instrument for the operation of the alliance that the Permanent 
Council is a more political instrument, and that the 
fundamental decisions are taken in the first instance in the 
NATO Council. In order to keep the bipartisan character, I have 
also recommended that some of the language, or for all I know, 
all of the language that Secretary Albright used before this 
committee in explaining how she interprets the Founding Act, be 
incorporated in this so that we have a basis for a bipartisan 
consensus.
    I am convinced that future Secretaries of State would be 
grateful to be able to point to a Senate instruction to them, 
so that it does not look as if they are the spoil sports if 
they want to move more issues into the regular NATO Council. I 
would do my utmost to establish a procedure whereby no 
significant issue moves into the Permanent Council until there 
is a NATO Council decision with respect to it, and that this 
not be used as an alternative method. First there is a NATO 
Council decision, and then one meets with the Russians.
    Senator Robb. Well, with respect to current or future 
progress in terms of coming to decisions, I think it is fair to 
say that the rather lengthy and protracted process where we 
move from UNPROFOR into IFOR was not a model of efficiency. Are 
there suggestions you might have to address that particular 
question?
    Dr. Kissinger. One of the problems with respect to Bosnia 
was that the United States did not really have a policy; and 
history shows that a strong American lead is usually needed to 
crystallize a position. But I do not have any great structural 
suggestion.
    Senator Robb. There were a number of us, including members 
of this committee, who made certain recommendations earlier in 
that process that might have facilitated that.
    Dr. Kissinger. As to policy or as to procedure?
    Senator Robb. Really as to procedure. I take it back, as to 
policy in terms of what we ought to do, when we ought to do it.
    Dr. Kissinger. I agree. If that had been done, Senator, the 
likelihood is that there would have been a more unified NATO 
position.
    Senator Robb. It certainly proved to be beneficial once 
that was achieved. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is about up, and 
I am expected to be the acting Ranking Member over in the Armed 
Services Committee at this point. I thank you for the time, and 
I thank Dr. Kissinger for his appearance before this committee.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Robb. Dr. Frist.
    Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr. 
Kissinger, for being with us. I am interested in the differing 
expectations that current members and prospective European 
members of the expanded NATO might have and what that might 
mean in terms of obligation and role in a postcold war Europe. 
These potential differences in expectations I would think would 
have real implications as we project ahead what the 
participants and potential participants would see as the future 
mission of NATO and how effective that future NATO can be.
    First of all, there is our own expectation, and it seems to 
me that the United States is struggling with what we should 
really think and expect of a future NATO. It is something that 
these discussions help all of us with, I think, to a great 
degree. If we look at the European current participants, their 
visions and expectations with our European partners seem to be 
different in many ways, but judging from their view of NATO's 
role in Bosnia and of numerous comments, there seems to be an 
indication that their expectations are different than our own.
    Then if we look at the prospective members, and you might 
help us with this in terms of what their expectations might be, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, clearly their 
expectations are very high, and understandably so, viewing NATO 
membership as a long overdue reentry back into the West.
    With the common bond or the glue that has held NATO 
together in terms of an external threat clearly changing, and 
with members and future members having these different visions, 
I guess I have two questions, do we have today an internal 
culture in NATO that is consistent with the expectations of the 
three potential new members to support an alliance strong 
enough to hold the expanded NATO together, again, the 
expectations today being very different than they might have 
been 10 years ago?
    Dr. Kissinger. Well, I think that is a very important 
question. I had the privilege of being in Poland at just about 
the time that its membership in NATO was approved. I thought it 
was one of those exhilarating moments somewhat comparable to 
being in Europe at the end of World War II, the liberation from 
German occupation, in that the Polish people that I met felt 
they were at last, after several hundred years, rejoining 
Europe as an integral member and as a charter member.
    A personal friend was Havel, the President of the Czech 
Republic. I did not see him at that time, but I saw him shortly 
afterwards, and he has a similar view. I might add, that when I 
first met Havel, he had some of the classic left wing notions 
of European socialism. He thought that NATO was sort of what 
the bellicose people do, and that the elevated people did 
something better. He has changed that view completely because 
he thinks it is now essential for the morale and cohesion of 
Europe.
    In this respect the Central Europeans have a different view 
from the West Europeans. They are more like the West Europeans 
were in the Fifties, and they also do not have the view that 
dividing lines are being erased. They still feel threatened. 
Now, in Western Europe and in America the problem is that NATO 
has not been given a new morale impetus, or psychological 
impetus-- or political impetus, whatever you want to call it--
for a long time, and that we are running on just operating the 
institutions.
    The Europeans are now absorbed in creating a common 
currency and in elaborating some kind of European identity. But 
what is that identity? What is it they are trying to do? There 
are too many voices in Europe that want to create this identity 
in some sort of opposition to the United States. If that 
becomes the dominant theme, then NATO will wither, no matter 
what institution we create. So I think it is very important 
that some new political initiative be taken to tie the Western 
democracies together.
    I find myself in the position that, on the issue of 
democracy I do not go along with all the exuberant notions of 
the protesters on China, but I would go much further on pushing 
the cohesion of the democracies in the West. This is a question 
of emphasis, and I am very worried that our relations in the 
North Atlantic are sort of withering. Nothing bad is happening, 
but a whole new generation is growing up that does not have the 
experience that my generation had of working together for noble 
objectives. We have become sort of mechanics in operating a 
system, and Bosnia is a symptom of this. So in this respect I 
much prefer the attitude of the East and Central Europeans, for 
whom NATO enlargement represents a moral act, and why not 
ratifying it would be a terrible blow to their whole image of 
what recent history has meant.
    Senator Frist. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Secretary, I think 
you can imagine the correspondence we receive, maybe you get 
some of it too, that at best is an over simplification of what 
the problems are. Even some of the witnesses, and I respect 
them all, who have appeared here, some of them have appeared to 
suggest that this is an either/or proposition, that either we 
expand NATO and get drawn into future conflicts in Europe, as 
they put it, or we do not expand NATO and perhaps stay free of 
any involvement in Europe's recurring calamities.
    Now, my question to you almost answers itself, but I want 
to get it as a matter of record. Can you foresee a major 
European war occurring in which the United States would not be 
involved?
    Dr. Kissinger. No. There has not been one in which we have 
not been involved in this century.
    The Chairman. Our involvement in a European conflict is all 
but inevitable, if it happens, and, as you just indicated, it 
happened twice in this century. May I say what advantages does 
NATO expansion provide us in the best case to prevent wars and 
in the worst case to win them? I know that is sort of a 
convoluted question, but I would like to have your answer to 
that so that, to be honest about it, we can quote you.
    Dr. Kissinger. First, Mr. Chairman, with respect to some of 
the testimony you have received, I am frankly astonished that 
professionals of diplomacy could argue that a treaty we have 
signed and that is then not ratified--well, let me put it this 
way: If 3 years ago when this debate started, somebody had said 
let us not do this, I would understand that position. I would 
disagree with it but understand it. But I do not understand how 
it can be recommended to the Senate not to ratify an agreement 
which, if it is not ratified, would have such devastating 
impact on Eastern Europe, and which, in my view, would also 
have in the longer term a devastating impact even on the 
existing NATO countries.
    How can one say to the Germans that we are absolutely 
determined to defend the Oder, but that the Vistula, which is a 
few hours' drive away, we will not defend; that Poland, which 
has been as much part of the West, is excluded when Germany, 
which in a way was the cause of the war that created this mess, 
is included? Therefore failure to ratify would absolutely 
undermine the existing NATO.
    I have been astonished at some of the statements that I 
have seen made by people who used to be great Cold Warriors but 
who are suddenly acting as if history had been totally 
abolished.
    Second, the main argument for NATO expansion is, in my 
view, that these countries are historically members of the 
community of the West, that they feel themselves to be so, and 
that to say we will not defend you but we will defend those a 
few hundred miles further east does not make any sense. Third, 
it then will set up a competition between Germany and Russia in 
this area, because that vacuum is going to be filled anyway.
    Fourth, I believe that the best way to draw Russia into a 
cooperative relationship, which I strongly favor, is to remove 
its historic temptations and beliefs, because once you have 
declared Poland and this whole region a neutral zone, the 
inevitable next step for any Russian leader will be to try to 
influence the foreign policy of that region. Then we are right 
back to what caused the European wars in this century.
    So I believe that NATO expansion will stabilize Europe and 
improve our long-term relations with Russia, provided we give 
Russia an honorable opportunity to participate in dialog, and 
these would be my major reasons.
    The Chairman. Very good. Thank you. Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, I really appreciate the way 
only you can express very, very fundamental basic ideas. It 
amazed me, some of the people who have testified here, people I 
have great respect for, who seem not to understand the history, 
the very recent history. When in history, in the last 300 
years, has there been a vacuum in Central or Eastern Europe 
that has not been filled? And when has there been a 
circumstance where countries that were part of this grey zone 
or supposedly neutral have not sought their own separate 
arrangements for their own security because they are wise 
enough to understand that someone is going to attempt to fill 
the vacuum? That seems to me to beg the issue whether we should 
expand.
    The question in light of the way the Soviet Union has 
collapsed, is not whether we expand NATO or keep it the same, 
it is whether we have NATO or we expand it. The way you 
describe the attempt, the necessary foreign policy judgment 
would have to be made in Berlin and in Bonn and in Moscow, that 
they would have to compete to try to fill that Central and 
Eastern Europe vacuum. That seems to me the absolute last thing 
in the world we want--either the Germans filling the vacuum or 
the Russians. I am not eager for either of those outcomes.
    I am not by this question suggesting that you do not feel 
and believe we have a commitment to the Baltics, but I think 
there is a factual historical difference between Ukraine and 
the Baltics. For example, I think the immediate effect on the 
Russian psyche of admitting either the Baltics or Ukraine would 
be very similar. But in fact we never recognized that the 
Baltics, which were annexed by the Soviet Union, were 
legitimately part of the Soviet Union. We have never recognized 
that, and it seems to me that any further actions will take 
some time and may need some massaging. I am not smart enough to 
know exactly how to do it, but it seems to me as a matter of 
principle that it is very important to make a distinction 
between the Baltics, for example, and Ukraine.
    Dr. Kissinger. I agree with this. On the current schedule 
of NATO expansion, there is no way the issue of the Baltics can 
arise until well into the next term, if not later. If we simply 
look at the priorities that have been established, I doubt that 
there will be another similar hearing in this administration 
about new members. But that is my judgment. It is simply the 
way these things work. So we are talking about well into the 
next administration, or maybe even the one after that.
    I think however that some steps should be taken immediately 
to make clear that the Baltics are members of the Western 
community, and that the European community has almost an 
obligation to speed up the membership of these countries in the 
European Union. It is absurd to say that 10 million Baltics, 
because their economic evolution is not quite at the right 
level, is going to create an insuperable problem for a union 
that has some 300 million population.
    Senator Biden. I absolutely agree with this.
    Dr. Kissinger. But this is only the first thing that should 
be done. The second thing we should do is to study how military 
arrangements can be made that do not necessarily involve the 
advance of the integrated command, because the method of 
defending the Baltics does not have to be the same as the 
method of defending the Vistula, being geographically 
different. This I would recommend as a study-though I have not 
come to any view, I would not just sit until 2005 or whenever 
that issue becomes ripe on the present schedule. These are the 
interim steps we should be able to take almost immediately.
    Senator Biden. Again, my time is up, Mr. Secretary. Let me 
just make two very brief comments. One, nothing has 
disappointed me more or reinforced my view of the lack of 
political maturation that still exists in Europe, in Western 
Europe, than the failure of the EU to understand how it could 
play, without any damage to its economic integration, a 
historic role here to ameliorate a circumstance that could 
fester in a way that causes political problems. It is one of 
the great disappointments, the disconnect between their view of 
their naked economic interests and their long-term political 
interests. I think it is a very little chance they would be 
taking, although they have made some steps now with regard to 
Latvia, or maybe it is Estonia, I am not sure.
    The second point--
    Dr. Kissinger. But they do it as a purely economic issue. 
It is not an economic issue.
    Senator Biden. No, it is not. It is well beyond an economic 
issue. But the second point that I would make, if I may 
conclude, Mr. Chairman, is that by 5 years from now one of two 
things is going to happen. This progression within Russia 
toward democracy and a market economy will be considerably more 
evident or it will be in difficulty, in my view. It will not be 
settled, but we will have a clearer picture. That, I think, is 
going to impact significantly on what the next president of the 
United States feels he or she is able to do relative to the 
Baltics without upsetting the apple cart in meeting what I 
think is a recent historic obligation.
    Again, I thank you for the way in which you phrased the 
dilemma relative to expansion of NATO and this neutral zone and 
the vacuum.
    Dr. Kissinger. One slightly heretical point on the Russian 
situation. We have a tendency to present the issue entirely in 
terms of Russian domestic politics. I could see Russia making 
progress toward democracy and becoming extremely nationalistic, 
because that could become a way of rallying the people. We also 
have to keep an eye on their propensity toward a kind of 
imperialist nationalism, which, if you look at the debates in 
the Russian parliament, is certainly present.
    Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
    Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, following up a little bit on 
what Senator Biden was talking about, your response to Senator 
Frist, you mentioned in your opening comments about reasserting 
the central role of NATO. You mentioned a theme, you talked 
about new political initiatives, the interconnects that Senator 
Biden was talking about that have been discussed here the last 
hour and a half. Should we take some initiative to redefine 
NATO after 50 years? It is being somewhat redefined. Should we 
take the initiative to really start focussing on its mission?
    The thing that you mentioned earlier in response to a 
comment I made on China it seems to me is very clear here, and 
that is the interconnects here. You mentioned Bosnia. All these 
are going to have major consequences and impacts on what we do 
with NATO expansion. I was wondering if you could develop that 
a little further.
    Dr. Kissinger. I believe that the next major, constructive 
phase of American foreign policy should be an emphasis on 
uniting the existing democracies as the base from which we 
operate, and I would apply that to the Western Hemisphere and 
to the North Atlantic. These are separate building blocks, but 
I would try over time to merge them.
    Right now there is no significant initiative in the North 
Atlantic area. We are operating on momentum. The Europeans are 
creating their own currency and are trying to evolve a new 
identity without any significant input from the United States 
on what might emerge in the long run. A few years ago I 
recommended a North Atlantic free trade area, but there may be 
other, better, ideas. And unless there is something by which we 
define that relationship, I think the evolution of the rest of 
the world is going to make what I consider the central 
relationship less and less relevant. If that continues, then we 
will be in the strange position of being confined sort of to an 
island off the coast of Europe and Asia.
    This will drive us into the kind of policy that, for 
example, my critics always say is unsustainable, namely a 
balance of power policy all over the world. If we do not have a 
community within which we operate, then we have to try to 
balance interests, rewards, and punishments.
    Now, in Asia, we have no choice in this matter, but in 
Europe and the Western Hemisphere we do have a choice. One 
reason, to get back to the question of German tradition, is 
that in Asia we have to balance the various nations, but in 
Europe and in the Western Hemisphere we can create a community. 
In Europe and in the Western Hemisphere war is highly unlikely. 
There, we can build structures based on common values, and we 
should give this more emphasis. In fact we have not given it 
any significant emphasis. We have put much more emphasis on 
relations and trade with Russia and other similar things.
    That would be my basic theme, even if I do not have a 
precise notion. If you put the best minds we have to work on 
it, as we did in the early Fifties, we will come up with 
something. I have no doubt.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Grams.
    Senator Grams. Dr. Kissinger, welcome. I am sorry I am 
late. I do not know if I will retrace some steps that have been 
taken or questions that have been asked, but if I do you may be 
brief in answering those for me. I have a couple of questions. 
In June 1997, in an op-ed article in the Washington Post you 
said that you were gravely concerned that the Founding Act will 
dilute NATO into being a U.N.-styled system of collective 
security by grafting an elaborate and convoluted machinery for 
consultations with Russia at every level of the alliance. Now, 
what steps do you suggest that the Senate take in the 
resolution of ratification to ensure that this would not occur?
    Dr. Kissinger. I have made this recommendation. As I said, 
I strongly favor ratification, and nothing I have said should 
detract from that. I would, however, find it helpful, and I 
believe succeeding Secretaries of State and Presidents will 
find it helpful if the Senate expressed its view that the NATO 
Council remain the priority, that the central relationship we 
have in the North Atlantic area is within the Atlantic 
Alliance, and that relations with Russia should be friendly and 
cooperative but not part of the essence of NATO. I complimented 
Secretary Albright with respect to her forthright statement in 
response to a question by the Chairman, and some of the 
language she used might be incorporated so that it does not 
look like a partisan attack.
    Senator Grams. Is that an adequate response to the argument 
that while the Founding Act may give Russia no formal veto over 
NATO decisions, Russia will acquire basically a de facto veto 
through the Permanent Joint Council since some NATO countries 
could hesitate to decide a sensitive issue in NATO's policy 
making North Atlantic Council. Are we giving Russia too much 
voice, whether de facto or actual?
    Dr. Kissinger. I look at NATO, Senator, as our core group, 
and therefore I would not begin a new initiative by diluting 
it. There are many fora that can be created to deal with 
Russia, and I would favor those. But to use a military alliance 
as the principal forum confuses things. You know, I may be too 
old fashioned. I was not wild about the idea of a NATO Council 
meeting--of a Permanent Council meeting within the context of 
the U.N. in which the NATO Council meets with Russia in New 
York. If we had tried to have a NATO Council meeting in New 
York in the context of the United Nations, everyone would have 
screamed that this was extremely provocative and merging with a 
military organization. But here now you have a Permanent 
Council meeting in New York. That is not what NATO was 
originally designed to do.
    Second, you have this machinery in Brussels. You have the 
Secretary General who sits in on all these meetings. His staff 
serves both the NATO Council and the Permanent Council. Russia 
and the Secretary General are there all the time in the 
Permanent Council, and the United States rotates through it 
every 16th or 18th time. So these are two different 
institutions that are being merged by the same bureaucracy and 
in the same building.
    I do not doubt the good intentions of the people who are 
testifying here about a voice and not a veto. I am saying 
however that, operationally, I am very uneasy about this, and 
therefore the committee and the Senate could make a 
contribution by defining the role in a way so that future 
Presidents and Secretaries of State can point to it as 
instruction from the Congress, from the Senate. Even then I do 
not like it, for I would not have gone this way, but it would 
improve it.
    Senator Grams. There are some critics of enlargement that 
have stated concerns that enlargement will push Russia away 
from being cooperative with the West and toward more 
cooperation with China and with rogue states such as Iran, 
Iraq, and Libya. Do you think that this is a valid concern?
    Dr. Kissinger. Russia's relations with China will be 
determined by its own perception of its national interest and 
not by irritation, as may be the case with the West. I would 
think that there are certain geopolitical realities. They have 
a 4,000 mile frontier on one side of which is a billion people 
and on the other side of which are 30 million people. Normally, 
this is not an ideal situation for close political cooperation. 
After all, what brought the Chinese into a relationship with 
the United States when Nixon and Mao started it was not that 
both of them had suddenly become sentimental, but that there 
was a common national interest between the United States and 
China. So I think that whether Russia and China cooperate will 
be determined by their own fundamental interests. It is not a 
natural partnership, and I do not think it can possibly be 
affected by whether Poland joins NATO.
    One ought to remember another thing. Here is Russia with 
20,000 nuclear weapons. Who in Western Europe can even conceive 
of an attack on Russia? It is a myth. If one looks at history 
one has to say that Russian armies entered Europe more 
frequently than even European armies entered Russia. So if war 
becomes excluded in that region, a whole new consideration will 
arise. But I do not accept the proposition.
    I might point out one other thing from my own experience. 
When we made our first tentative overtures to China, all the 
former Ambassadors to the Soviet Union--and they were a very 
distinguished group including George Kennan and Chip Bolen--
requested an appointment with President Nixon and called on him 
to say that Russia would never forgive us, that our relations 
with Russia would never recover from these little moves we were 
making. It was a long time before President Nixon sent me there 
and the exact opposite happened. Our relations with the Soviet 
Union improved after our opening to China.
    If we conduct ourselves sensibly, which is to continue a 
serious dialog with Russia, but not within the context of them 
being tempted every day to see what they can do to weaken NATO, 
but on those issues that are of principal concern between us, I 
think our relations are more likely to improve than not. In any 
case, I do not believe that their relations with China will be 
driven by whether Prague is in NATO.
    Senator Grams. So we are not going to push Russia into a 
closer alliance with China just because of this? Such an 
alliance would have to be in their best interest?
    Dr. Kissinger. If you look at what Russia is actually doing 
rather than at the rhetoric, you realize that Russia is trying 
to needle us in many places, such as Iran and in many 
institutions in order to establish some claim to great power 
status. That is understandable. Some of this we can deal with 
by consulting with them, but we cannot change the structure of 
what we consider to be the essence of future relationships. I 
really feel that when you look at the world--at the upheavals 
that are likely to arise in the Islamic world, at the evolution 
in Asia and elsewhere--that the Western democracies have a 
basis for cooperation that should be preserved. I do not know 
what will happen 20 years from now with Russia. We could see 
this thing evolve, but that is more of a political than a 
military issue.
    Senator Grams. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.
    The Chairman. Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have no further 
questions. I want to thank you again, Mr. Secretary, for being 
here. You, unlike anyone in the 25 years I have been here, have 
a way of putting the issues we are discussing in perspective in 
the broad sweep of historical change, and I for one appreciate 
it.
    It is presumptuous of me to predict anything, but I predict 
that you are going to be dead right. That is, I am absolutely 
convinced an expansion of NATO in the near-term and long-term 
will enhance our relationships with Russia, not diminish them. 
I am absolutely convinced of that. I am also convinced that as 
you look back over the last 50 years the very people who knew 
the most about Russia and the Soviet Union are a little bit 
clientized as they look at these things. I think their focus is 
so narrow in terms of what negative impact may come as a 
consequence of moves we make that I think sometimes, it is 
presumptuous of me to say this, they are somewhat blinded by 
the extent of their knowledge, if that makes any sense.
    The last point I will make is, and this is the only thing I 
disagree with what you said, and time will tell, I predict that 
we will have another hearing in this committee before this 
President's term is up on admission of Romania and Slovenia.
    Dr. Kissinger. I will be here testifying for it.
    Senator Biden. I know you will. But I was just referencing 
the point about how long this process is going to take. I agree 
with you that it probably will not be the Baltics within the 
time of this President, but I suspect, I hope at least we will 
be considering those other two countries sooner rather than 
later.
    At any rate, I want to thank you very much, and thank you, 
Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make a concluding comment.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, we are all indebted 
to you for being available. We may not always agree, but the 
young folks on the Foreign Relations Committee staff, both 
Democrat and Republican, they know that they can ask you for 
your opinion and you always take the time to answer. We have 
two or three people like that, but we have a whole lot of 
people who say they do not have the time. I thank you for 
coming here this morning, and we are getting you out at 
approximately the time we had agreed to do. I bid you farewell, 
and good luck.
    Dr. Kissinger. Thank you for this opportunity.
    The Chairman. There being no further business to come 
before the committee, we stand in recess.
    [Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, to 
reconvene at 2:08 p.m., October 30, 1997.]



                   NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP--PART II

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1997

                                      U. S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m. in room 
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Chuck Hagel, 
presiding.
    Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Thomas, Biden and 
Wellstone.
    Senator Hagel. Welcome. Mr. Secretary, nice to have you.
    Ambassador Pickering. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. 
Nice to be with you.
    Senator Hagel. I note you were looking at the nameplate 
there. I can assure you it is not Kissinger. It is Pickering, 
spelled right.
    The Foreign Relations Committee this afternoon continues 
its examination of the critical issues surrounding the proposed 
expansion of NATO. The subject of our discussion will be the 
evolving NATO-Russia relationship. Appearing before the 
committee is a distinguished panel of our nation's leading 
experts on Russia.
    We will first hear from the Undersecretary of State for 
Political Affairs, the Honorable Thomas Pickering, who also 
served most recently as United States Ambassador to the Russian 
Federation.
    He will be followed by a second panel of non-governmental 
experts including Ambassador Jack Matlock, the George F. Kennan 
professor at the Institute for Advanced Study and America's 
last Ambassador to the Soviet Union; Lt. Gen. William Odom, 
director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute; 
and Mr. Dimitri Simes, president of the Nixon Center for Peace 
and Freedom.
    Gentlemen, on behalf of the committee, I welcome you and 
thank you for being with us and we look forward to your 
testimony this afternoon.
    Mr. Secretary, you may proceed. Good to have you.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING, UNDERSECRETARY OF 
                  STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

    Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Senator Hagel and members 
of the committee. I am very pleased to have this opportunity to 
appear before you today. With respect to the nameplate, I would 
be delighted to appear here as Dr. Kissinger but I am sure 
there would be no confusion, at least in the physiognomy.
    These are truly historic hearings. They have begun the 
process of advice and consent on the enlargement of NATO. They 
have accelerated the national debate on this important 
initiative. Now the fate of NATO enlargement is in your hands 
and in those of the American public.
    We welcome this because as Secretary Albright said, we know 
that the security commitment that NATO enlargement entails will 
only be meaningful if it reflects the informed consent of the 
American people and their representatives.
    It is a special pleasure for me to come before you today to 
discuss NATO's emerging relationship with Russia. Having spent 
the past 38 years in the foreign service, I witnessed and 
participated in the remaking of the U.S./Soviet, and later, the 
U.S./Russian relationship from the confrontation of the cold 
war to the new opportunities of cooperation which we have 
today.
    As Ambassador to the Russian Federation from 1993 to 1996, 
I had the opportunity to meet the new leaders of this 
remarkable country and witness firsthand the salient changes 
that made such cooperation possible, and to participate in some 
of the planning which led to the founding act; the CFE second 
stage negotiations; to the ABM, TMD, and Start III issues.
    In her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee earlier this month, Secretary Albright explained the 
rationale for NATO enlargement and the reasons why we believe 
it is in our national interest. Today, I would like to tell you 
why we think a cooperative NATO-Russian relationship is also in 
that national interest.
    The challenge for the United States in relations between 
NATO and Russia can be framed in four simple declarative 
sentences.
    First, it is in the security interest of the United States, 
NATO, and the States of Central Europe to have constructive 
relations with Moscow, and to integrate a democratic, peaceful 
Russia into the world community.
    Second, while Russia's reforms have been impressive, 
Russia's future is not yet certain. In any case, our interests 
and those of Russia sometimes diverge. Third, the enlargement 
of NATO significantly advances U.S. security interests. Fourth, 
Russia's leadership voices its opposition to NATO enlargement.
    Today, I want to describe how we have framed our policy in 
a way that takes into account each of these realities.
    One of the greatest challenges of diplomacy is how a 
country structures its relations with former adversaries. After 
World War I, the United States and its allies failed that test, 
and the tragic results are well known. After World War II, the 
United States and its allies got it right, and the 
reintegration of Germany and the other Axis Powers into the 
community of democracies and the West stands as one of the 
great diplomatic accomplishments of this century.
    Today, there are few challenges more important than 
ensuring that we structure our relationship with the new Russia 
in a manner that serves our national interests and helps to 
promote United States/Russian cooperation. Russia today is 
still in the throes of a titanic political struggle over its 
future. We cannot be neutral bystanders in that struggle, for 
its outcome is not predetermined and American national 
interests are at stake.
    Our goal, like that of many Russians, must be to see Russia 
become a normal, modern state, democratic in its governance, 
abiding by the rule of law, market-oriented and prosperous, at 
peace with itself, with its neighbors, and with the rest of the 
world, and playing its full constructive role in the world 
community. Quite simply, we want to see the ascendancy of 
Russian reformers--those who look outward and forward rather 
than inward and backward.
    Ultimately, however, Russia's future rests squarely and 
completely in the hands of its people. A Russia that defines 
its national greatness in terms of the peace, well-being, and 
accomplishments of its people is likely to be part of the 
solution to Europe's and the world's problems.
    Conversely, a Russia that defines its greatness at the 
expense of its own people, or its neighbors, could be in the 
21st century just as it was in the 20th century--a serious and 
significant problem for us and others.
    Our objective must be to craft the political arrangements 
that help to encourage Russia to pursue the first path and not 
the second. This objective is fully consistent with our policy 
of adding new states to NATO. Indeed, the two complement each 
other.
    For example, I know that many Senators are concerned about 
the costs of NATO enlargement. One way to ensure that the costs 
remain low is to ensure that Russia remains on track, and 
continues on a cooperative course with the rest of Europe.
    Conversely, as Secretary Albright said to this committee 
earlier this month, and I quote, ``By engaging Russia and 
enlarging NATO, we give Russia every incentive to deepen its 
commitment to democracy and peaceful relations with neighbors 
while closing the avenue to more destructive alternatives.''
    Thus, a cooperative and functioning NATO-Russia 
relationship can become a pillar of stability in the new 
Europe. The importance of this objective is what led Presidents 
Ronald Reagan and George Bush to reach out to the then-Soviet 
Union, and later Russia, and to take the first steps in laying 
the foundation for a new NATO-Russia relationship.
    Already, at the Rome Summit in 1991, NATO declared that it 
no longer considered Russia a threat. It invited Russia to be a 
part of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994, NATO 
created the Partnership for Peace and asked Russia to be a part 
of that program as well--an invitation that Russia ultimately 
accepted.
    We also began the so-called 16+1 conversations with Russia 
and other partner states, which refers to the discussions 
between the 16 members of NATO and other parties on a one-by-
one basis.
    The United States and NATO also consulted closely with 
Russia in formulating our strategy to stop the war in Bosnia 
and found a way for our troops to work together to implement 
the Dayton peace accords.
    Today, American and Russian soldiers are working side-by-
side in Bosnia, an arrangement that few of us would have 
believed possible a decade ago. It is a unique arrangement in 
which Russian soldiers serve side-by-side with NATO under 
American command.
    The most important step in relations between NATO and 
Russia, however, came on May 27 of this year when President 
Clinton and the other NATO leaders joined President Yeltsin in 
signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
    The Founding Act is a landmark document. It opens the door 
to a new and constructive relationship between these two cold 
war adversaries. It sets out the principles of the 
relationship; describes possible areas for consultation and 
cooperation; establishes a new forum, the Permanent Joint 
Council, for discussions between the alliance and Moscow; and 
it sets out a number of points regarding the political/military 
aspects of the relationship.
    In crafting the Founding Act, NATO structured its 
discussions with Russia with extreme care. We declared at the 
outset that there were some things we were willing to do, and 
that there were some that we were not.
    We said we were willing to create a document that would 
describe our new relationship. We said we were willing to 
create a new consultative forum. We said we would be willing to 
pursue adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe.
    But we also had five red lines. We said Russia would have 
no veto over NATO decisions including its own enlargement. We 
said there would be no delay in the enlargement process. We 
said we would not subordinate NATO and the North Atlantic 
Council, its decisionmaking body, to any other body or 
organization. We said we would not do anything that would 
consign new NATO members to second class status. We said that 
the act does not automatically exclude any qualified European 
state from future consideration for NATO membership.
    As we have explained to this committee on previous 
occasions, the ultimate text of the Founding Act stayed 
completely within these red lines.
    Barely 5 months have passed since the Founding Act was 
signed, but we have already seen some important steps to 
implement its provisions--most significantly, Russia is taking 
the Permanent Joint Council seriously, as is NATO.
    On July 18, the PJC met for the first time in Brussels at 
the level of permanent representatives. On September 26, 
Ambassador Albright and her counterparts held the first 
ministerial level meeting of the PJC in New York. The most 
recent PJC meeting was held among the permanent representatives 
on October 24.
    In addition, the PJC has adopted rules of procedure and a 
work plan for the remainder of 1997--documents that have been 
shared with this committee and the Senate NATO Observer Group.
    We have also made progress in implementing other parts of 
the Founding Act. On October 20, the Russian Minister of 
Defense named General Viktor Zavarzin as Russia's military 
representative to NATO. The general is expected to assume his 
duties before the end of the year, and he recently visited NATO 
with General Kvashnin, chief of the Russian General Staff.
    In addition, at the most recent Ambassadorial level meeting 
of the NATO-Russia PJC, NATO and Russia agreed on steps to 
implement the work program, including experts' talks on 
peacekeeping.
    As NATO and Russia deepened their record of consultation 
and cooperation in the PJC, in Bosnia, and in other ways, our 
own government continues to support Russia's reforms and to 
pursue important issues with Russia in other ways as well.
    We are continuing our efforts to achieve mutual and 
balanced reductions in both our countries' nuclear arsenals. 
Both countries have ratified the START I Treaty and are 
implementing its reductions in arms levels. We are looking 
forward to Russian ratification of START II, a treaty which we 
have already ratified. President Yeltsin and his advisors have 
begun making serious efforts to obtain the approval of the 
Russian Duma.
    And at the Helsinki Summit in March, President Yeltsin and 
President Clinton agreed that we will begin to work on a START 
III treaty as soon as START II has entered into force, so that 
we can make even deeper reductions in both countries' strategic 
stockpiles on an even and balanced basis. At Helsinki, we 
agreed that START III would be focused on reducing warheads to 
levels between 2,000-2,500 on each side.
    We also have continued efforts with Russia on conventional 
arms reductions in Europe. Along with 28 other states, we are 
pursuing a major adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe treaty, and in July, all 30 states parties signed a 
decision on basic elements for treaty adaptation that can help 
us to achieve that goal.
    We also have deepened our cooperation with Russia and have 
worked to integrate Russia more fully into world economic 
institutions, into the Paris Club as a creditor country, and 
the World Trade Organization on terms normally applicable to 
newly acceding members.
    The regular discussions between Vice President Gore and 
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin have produced important agreements 
concerning cooperation on energy and the environment, as well 
as in seven other areas of significant cooperation, from 
agricultural and health to defense conversion.
    And through the Gore/Chernomyrdin process, and other 
bilateral discussions, we have raised our concerns with Russia 
about its relations with Iran, arms control, and other security 
issues.
    Those are the steps we have taken to build the new 
relationship between NATO and Russia. This relationship is 
based on shared principles and shared interests. It is a 
relationship that holds great promise for us and for all of 
Europe, as Russia continues in joining us in making the 
Permanent Joint Commission a constructive forum focused on 
problem solving.
    This new relationship is also, I want to remind members of 
the committee, a serious two-way street. Do not forget that 
while the Russians can propose raising issues in the PJC that 
they are concerned about, so can we, and we will.
    It is also not a process that can spin out of our control 
or out of NATO's control. Every item on the PJC agenda must be 
agreed to by consensus. That means we do not have to agree to 
discuss any issue that we think would be inappropriate or 
harmful to our interests or those of NATO.
    I know that there are two major concerns about the 
direction of our policy on NATO-Russia relations. One concern 
is that despite the Founding Act in the PJC, NATO enlargement 
will leave Russia isolated; strengthen Russian hard-liners who 
stress that isolation; undermine Russian reform; and doom 
prospects for security cooperation, especially in arms control. 
This would be a serious problem if it proved correct, for one 
of our goals is to integrate a democratic Russia into the new 
Europe.
    But a fair reading of recent events suggests that NATO 
enlargement is not having this impact on Russia and its 
policies. Over the past 18 months, precisely when NATO 
enlargement has been a salient part of our agenda, Russian 
reform and security cooperation have moved forward, not 
backward.
    To cite but a few examples, during this period, President 
Yeltsin was re-elected. He elevated reformers within his 
government. He appointed a new defense minister who supports 
START II and is actively working for its ratification.
    As I noted earlier, President Yeltsin agreed to negotiate a 
START III Treaty as soon as START II enters into force. He 
signed the Founding Act. We have made progress in the CFE 
negotiations. Russia has made positive steps in its relations 
with Ukraine.
    This track record does not support the hypothesis that 
Russian reform or reformers and security cooperation will 
inevitably suffer as a result of NATO enlargement. Russia has 
pursued these steps because they are in Russia's interest.
    We should also understand that the broad Russian public is 
not well-informed on NATO and does not consider NATO to be the 
key threat to their future. They are far more concerned about 
other issues, from wages and pensions to corruption and crime.
    That is why I am persuaded that we must continue to pursue 
both NATO enlargement and a steadily more constructive 
relationship with Russia, that they are not incompatible, and 
that they are in the long-term interests of both NATO and 
Russia in producing stability, prosperity, and cooperation in 
Europe.
    We are realists. We know that Russian opposition to NATO 
enlargement is real. But we must see it for what it is--a 
product of misperceptions about NATO's true purpose, a token or 
an artifact of outdated Soviet thinking about former satellites 
in Central Europe.
    Instead of changing our policy to accommodate outdated 
fears, we need to encourage the new Russia's more modern 
aspirations. This means we should be Russia's steadfast 
champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness by joining 
rule-based organizations, opening its markets, or by 
participating constructively in regional or world affairs. But 
when some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is a 
threat, we must say that this is false and base our policies on 
what we know to be true.
    If the first group of critics worries that we have not done 
enough to promote cooperation with Russia, a second group of 
critics worries that we have done too much. I know that former 
Secretary of State Kissinger testified here before you this 
morning. Dr. Kissinger, along with others, has charged that the 
Founding Act and the PJC give Russia too much influence over 
NATO decisionmaking.
    I am a great admirer of Dr. Kissinger, and once had the 
privilege of serving as his special assistant. But on this one, 
as I have told him, I respectfully disagree with his judgment.
    I believe Secretary Albright has described cogently and 
carefully the limitations on any potential jeopardy regarding 
our consultations with Russia, and that this is the correct 
model for the future. She did this here before the committee, 
and I am happy to say that Dr. Kissinger apparently agrees that 
this is the correct model.
    We designed the Founding Act and the PJC to protect NATO's 
independent decisionmaking authority, and I believe we have 
succeeded. The PJC has no role in NATO's internal 
decisionmaking--none. It gives Russia a voice but not a veto.
    The North Atlantic Council remains NATO's sole and supreme 
decisionmaking body. The Founding Act imposed no restriction on 
NATO's military doctrine, strategy, or deployments. The 
unilateral statements of NATO's military policy are just that--
unilateral statements of policy that NATO had previously 
adopted outside the context of NATO-Russian discussions.
    The Founding Act in no way works to the detriment of NATO's 
new members. They will come into the alliance the way all the 
other allies did--as full and first-class members.
    It is also just not true that the U.S. and NATO created the 
Founding Act and the PJC as compensation to Russia or as 
concessions in exchange for Russian acquiescence to NATO 
enlargement. Rather, our goal has been for Russia to find ways 
to work together with Russia in spite of our disagreement on 
NATO enlargement.
    We insisted that every provision of the Founding Act had to 
meet this test--does it make sense on its own terms in regard 
to American interests? Our answer in each case has been yes.
    These are the two schools of criticism we hear most often 
regarding NATO-Russian relations. They come at this question 
from quite different perspectives, but there is one point on 
which they sometimes converge.
    Both camps often charge that we are ducking the issue of 
Russia, or being disingenuous about our motives. People in both 
camps often ask me a simple question--is not NATO enlargement 
ultimately about Russia? Is not it premised on a real or 
potential Russian threat? The question is important because it 
goes to the core of our fundamental intentions in pursuing the 
alliance's enlargement and this new relationship with Russia.
    Let me be clear. For the reasons I have listed, our policy 
is to engage Russia and to maximize the likelihood that that 
country will stay on the path of democratic development.
    But as the Secretary said before the Senate Appropriations 
Committee last week, none of us in the State Department has a 
perfect crystal ball. One contingency that the alliance must be 
able to respond to, even though we see it as unlikely and are 
working hard to make it even less likely, is the possibility 
that Russia could abandon democracy and return to old 
threatening patterns of behavior.
    That, however, is not the only reason or even the primary 
reason to enlarge the alliance. It is a mistake in our view to 
assume that this is the unspoken single premise guiding our 
policy.
    NATO does not need an enemy. It has enduring purposes--
deterring future threats, keeping the United States engaged in 
Europe, ensuring that Europe's security policies remain 
cooperative rather than competitive, and providing a collective 
defense capability for a range of future contingencies.
    That is precisely why we are pursuing both NATO's 
enlargement and a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, and why 
both of them serve our interests. What we are asking you and 
your Senatorial colleagues to ratify is not a policy of NATO 
enlargement instead of a positive relationship with Russia, but 
NATO enlargement together with a positive relationship with 
Russia. We are committed to pursuing both, and we believe our 
policy is already showing positive and reassuring results.
    Thank you again, Senator Hagel, very much, and I stand 
ready to address your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Pickering follows:]
               Prepared Statement of Ambassador Pickering
    Senator Hagel, members of the Committee: I am pleased to have this 
opportunity to appear before you today. These are truly historic 
hearings. They have begun the process of advice and consent on the 
enlargement of NATO. They have accelerated the national debate on this 
important initiative. Now, the fate of NATO enlargement is in your 
hands, and those of the American public. We welcome this because, as 
Secretary Albright said, we know that the security commitment that NATO 
enlargement entails will only be meaningful if it reflects the informed 
consent of the American people and their representatives.
    It is a special pleasure for me to come before you today to discuss 
NATO's emerging relationship with Russia. Having spent the past 38 
years in the Foreign Service, I witnessed and participated in the 
remaking of U.S.-Soviet and later U.S.-Russian relations from the 
confrontation of the Cold War to the new opportunities of cooperation 
we have today. As Ambassador to the Russian Federation from 1993-1996, 
1 had the opportunity to meet the new leaders of this remarkable 
country, and witness first hand the salient changes that made such 
cooperation possible, and participate in some of the planning which led 
to the Founding Act, the CFE negotiations and ABM and START III talks.
    In her testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
earlier this month, Secretary Albright explained the rationale for NATO 
enlargement and the reasons why we believe it is in our national 
interest. Today I would like to tell you why we think a cooperative 
NATO-Russian relationship is also in that national interest.
    The challenge for the United States in relations between NATO and 
Russia can be framed in four declarative sentences. First, it is in the 
security interest of the U.S., NATO, and the states of Central Europe 
to have constructive relations with Moscow, and to integrate a 
democratic, peaceful Russia into the world community. Second, while 
Russia's reforms have been impressive, Russia's future is not yet 
certain, and in any case our interests and those of Russia sometimes 
diverge. Third, the enlargement of NATO significantly advances U.S. 
security interests. Fourth, Russia's leadership voices its opposition 
to NATO enlargement. Today, I want to describe how we have framed our 
policy in a way that takes account of each of these realities.
    One of the greatest challenges of diplomacy is how a country 
structures its relations with former adversaries. After World War I, 
the United States and its allies failed that test--and the tragic 
results are well known. After World War II, the United States and its 
allies got it right--and the re-integration of Germany and the other 
Axis powers into the community of democracies and the West stands as 
one of the great diplomatic accomplishments of this century. Today 
there are few challenges more important than ensuring we structure our 
relationship with the new Russia in a manner that serves U.S. national 
interests and helps to promote U.S.-Russian cooperation.
    Russia today is still in the throes of a titanic political struggle 
over its future. We cannot be neutral bystanders in that struggle, for 
its outcome is not pre-determined, and American national interests are 
at stake. Our goal, like that of many Russians, must be to see Russia 
become a normal, modern state--democratic in its governance, abiding by 
the rule of law; market oriented and prosperous; at peace with itself, 
with its neighbors, and with the rest of the world and playing its full 
constructive role in the world. Quite simply, we want to see the 
ascendancy of Russian reformers, those who look outward and forward 
rather than inward and backward. Ultimately, however, Russia's future 
rests squarely and completely in the hands of the Russian people.
    A Russia that defines its national greatness in terms of the peace, 
well being, and accomplishments of its people is likely to be part of 
the solution to Europe's and the world's problems. Conversely, a Russia 
that defines its greatness at the expense of its own people or its 
neighbors could be in the 21st century just as it was in the 20th 
century--a great problem for us and others. Our objective must be to 
craft the political arrangements that help encourage Russia to pursue 
the first path rather than the second.
    This objective is fully consistent with our policy of adding new 
states to NATO. Indeed, the two complement each other. For example, I 
know that many Senators are concerned about the costs of NATO 
enlargement. One way to ensure that the costs remain low is to ensure 
that Russia remains on track and continues on a cooperative course with 
the rest of Europe. Conversely, as Sec. Albright said to this committee 
earlier this month, ``By engaging Russia and enlarging NATO, we give 
Russia every incentive to deepen its commitment to democracy and 
peaceful relations with neighbors, while closing the avenue to more 
destructive alternatives.'' Thus, a cooperative and functioning NATO 
Russian relationship can become a pillar of stability in the new 
Europe.
    The importance of this objective is what led Presidents Ronald 
Reagan and George Bush to reach out to the then Soviet Union and later 
Russia and to take the first steps in laying the foundation for a new 
NATO-Russian relationship. Already at the Rome summit in 1991, NATO 
declared that it no longer considered Russia a threat. It invited 
Russia to be a part of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. In 1994, 
NATO created the Partnership for Peace, and asked Russia to be a part 
of that program as well--an invitation that Russia ultimately accepted. 
We also began so-called ``16+1 conversations'' with Russia and other 
partner states which refers to the discussions between the 16 members 
of NATO, and other parties on a one-by-one basis.
    The United States and NATO also consulted closely with Russia in 
formulating our strategy to stop the war in Bosnia, and found a way for 
our troops to work together to implement the Dayton Peace accords. 
Today, American and Russian troops are working side by side in Bosnia--
an arrangement that few of us would have believed possible a decade 
ago. It is a unique arrangement in which Russian soldiers serve side by 
side with NATO under American command.
    The most important step in relations between NATO and Russia, 
however, came on May 27 of this year, when President Clinton and the 
other NATO leaders joined President Yeltsin in signing the NATO Russia 
Founding Act. The Founding Act is a landmark document. It opens the 
door to a new and constructive relationship between these two Cold War 
adversaries. It sets out the principles of the relationship, describes 
possible areas for consultation and cooperation, establishes a new 
forum, the Permanent Joint Council, for discussions between the 
Alliance and Moscow, and sets out a number of points regarding the 
political-military aspects of the relationship.
    In crafting the Founding Act, NATO structured its discussion with 
Russia with extreme care. We declared at the outset that there were 
some things we were willing to do, and some that we were not. We said 
we were willing to create a document that would describe our new 
relationship. We said we were willing to create a new consultative 
forum. We said we would be willing to pursue adaptation of the Treaty 
on Conventional Forces in Europe.
    But we also had five red lines. We said Russia would have no veto 
over NATO decisions, including its own enlargement. We said there would 
be no delay in the enlargement process. We said we would not 
subordinate NATO and the North Atlantic Council, its decisionmaking 
body, to any other body or organization. We said we would not do 
anything that would consign new NATO members to second-class status. We 
said that the Act does not automatically exclude any qualified European 
state from future consideration for NATO membership. As we have 
explained to this Committee on previous occasions, the ultimate text of 
the Founding Act stayed completely within these red lines.
    Barely five months have passed since the Founding Act was signed. 
But we have already seen some important steps to implement its 
provisions. Most significantly, Russia is taking the PJC seriously, as 
is NATO. On July 18, the PJC met for the first time in Brussels at the 
level of permanent representatives. On September 26, Ambassador 
Albright and her counterparts held the first Ministerial level meeting 
of the PJC in New York. The most recent PJC meeting was held among 
PermReps on October 24. In addition the PJC has adopted rules of 
procedure and a work plan for the remainder of 1997--documents that 
have been shared with the Committee and the Senate NATO Observer Group.
    We have also made progress in implementing other parts of the 
Founding Act. On October 20, the Russian Minister of Defense named 
General Viktor Zavarzin as Russia's Military Representative to NATO. 
The General is expected assume his duties before the end of the year 
and recently visited NATO with General Kvashnin, chief of the Russian 
General Staff. In addition, at the most recent ambassadorial level 
meeting of the NATO Russia PJC, NATO and Russia agreed on steps to 
implement the work program including holding experts talks on 
peacekeeping.
    As NATO and Russia deepen their record of consultation and 
cooperation in the PJC, in Bosnia, and in other ways, our own 
government continues to support Russia's reforms and to pursue 
important issues with Russia in other ways as well. We are continuing 
our efforts to achieve mutual and balanced reductions in both our 
countries' nuclear arsenals. Both countries have ratified the START I 
Treaty and are implementing its reductions in arms levels. We are 
looking forward to Russian ratification of START II--a Treaty we have 
already ratified--and President Yeltsin and his advisers have begun 
making serious efforts to obtain the approval of the Russian Duma. And 
at the Helsinki Summit in March, President Yeltsin and President 
Clinton agreed that we will begin work on a START III Treaty as soon as 
START II has entered into force, so that we can make even deeper 
reductions in both countries' strategic stockpiles. At Helsinki we 
agreed that START III would be focused on reducing warheads to levels 
between 2000 and 2500 on each side.
    We also have continued efforts with Russia on conventional arms 
reductions in Europe. Along with 28 other states, we are pursuing a 
major adaptation of the Conventional Force in Europe Treaty, and in 
July, all 30 states parties signed a Decision on Basic Elements for 
Treaty Adaptation that can help us achieve that goal.
    We also have deepened our cooperation with Russia and have worked 
to integrate Russia more fully into world economic institutions--into 
the Paris Club as a creditor country and the World Trade Organization 
on terms normally applicable to newly acceding members. The regular 
discussions between Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chemomyrdin 
have produced important agreements concerning cooperation on energy and 
the environment as well as in seven other areas of significant 
cooperation from agriculture and health to defense conversion. And 
through the Gore-Chemomyrdin process and other bilateral discussions, 
we have raised our concerns with Russia about its relations with Iran, 
arms control and other security issues.
    Those are the steps we have taken to build the new relationship 
between NATO and Russia. This relationship is based on shared 
principles and shared interests. It is a relationship that holds great 
promise for us and all of Europe, as Russia continues in joining us in 
making the PJC a constructive forum focused on problem-solving. This 
new relationship is also a two-way street. Don't forget: while the 
Russians can propose raising issues in the PJC that they are concerned 
about, so can we. And we will. It is also not a process that can spin 
out of our control, or out of NATO's control. Every item on the PJC 
agenda must be agreed to by consensus. That means we do not have to 
agree to discuss of any issue that we think would be inappropriate or 
harmful to our interests or NATO's.
    I know that there are two major concerns about the direction of our 
policy on NATO-Russian relations. One concern is that, despite the 
Founding Act and the PJC, NATO enlargement will leave Russia isolated, 
strengthen Russian hardliners who stress that isolation, undermine 
Russian reform, and doom prospects for security cooperation, especially 
arms control. This would be a serious problem, if it proved correct, 
for one of our goals is to integrate a democratic Russia into the new 
Europe.
    But a fair reading of recent events suggests that NATO enlargement 
is not having this impact on Russia and its policies. Over the past 18 
months, precisely when NATO enlargement has been a salient part of our 
agenda, Russian reform and security cooperation have moved forward, not 
backward. To cite a few examples, during this period, President Yeltsin 
was re-elected. He elevated reformers within his government. He 
appointed a new Defense Minister who supports START II and is actively 
working for its ratification. As I noted earlier, President Yeltsin 
agreed to negotiate a START III treaty as soon as START II enters into 
force. He signed the Founding Act. We have made progress on CFE. And 
Russia has made positive steps in its relations with Ukraine. This 
track record does not support the hypothesis that Russian reform or 
reformers and security cooperation will inevitably suffer as a result 
of NATO enlargement.
    Russia has pursued these steps because they are in its own 
interest. We should also understand that the broad Russian public is 
not well informed on NATO and does not consider NATO to be the key 
threat to their future. They are far more concerned about other issues, 
from wages and pensions to corruption and crime. That is why I am 
persuaded that we must continue to pursue both NATO enlargement and a 
steadily more constructive relationship with Russia, that they are not 
incompatible and that they are in the long-term interests of both NATO 
and Russia in producing stability, prosperity and, cooperation in 
Europe.
    We are realists. We know that Russian opposition to NATO 
enlargement is real. But we must see it for what it is--a product of 
misperceptions about NATO's true purpose and a token of outdated Soviet 
thinking about former satellites in Central Europe. Instead of changing 
our policy to accommodate these outdated fears, we need to encourage 
the new Russia's more modem aspirations. This means we should be 
Russia's steadfast champion whenever it seeks to define its greatness 
by joining rule-based organizations, opening its markets or by 
participating constructively in regional or world affairs. But when 
some Russian leaders suggest that a larger NATO is a threat, we must 
say that this is false and base our policies on what we know to be 
true.
    If the first group of critics worry that we have not done enough to 
promote cooperation with Russia, a second group of critics worries that 
we have done too much. I know that former Secretary of State Kissinger 
testified before you this morning. Dr. Kissinger, along with others, 
has charged that the Founding Act and the PJC give Russia too much 
influence over NATO decisionmaking.
    I am a great admirer of Dr. Kissinger, and once had the privilege 
of serving as his Special Assistant. But on this one, as I have told 
him, I respectfully disagree with his judgment. I believe Secretary 
Albright has described cogently and carefully the limitations on any 
potential jeopardy regarding our consultations with Russia and that 
this is the correct model for the future.
    We designed the Founding Act and the PJC to protect NATO's 
independent decisionmaking authority, and we succeeded. The PJC has no 
role in NATO's internal decision making--none. It gives Russia a voice, 
but not a veto. The North Atlantic Council remains NATO's sole and 
supreme decision making body. The Founding Act imposed no restrictions 
on NATO's military doctrine, strategy, or deployments. The unilateral 
statements of NATO's military policy are just that--unilateral 
statements of policy that NATO had previously adopted outside the 
context of NATO-Russian discussions. The Founding Act in no way works 
to the detriment of NATO's new members. They will come into the 
Alliance the way all the other allies did--as full and first class 
members.
    It also is just not true that the US and NATO created the Founding 
Act and PJC as compensation to Russia, or as concessions in exchange 
for their acquiescence to NATO enlargement. Rather, our goal has been 
to find ways to work together with Russia in spite of our disagreement 
on NATO enlargement. We insisted that every provision of the Founding 
Act had to meet this test: does it make sense on its own in terms of 
American interests? Our answer is yes.
    These are the two schools of criticism we hear most often regarding 
NATO Russian relations. They come at this question from quite different 
perspectives. But there is one point on which they sometimes converge. 
Both camps often charge that we are ducking the issue of Russia or 
being disingenuous about our motives. People in both camps often ask me 
a simple question: ``Isn't NATO enlargement ultimately about Russia? 
Isn't it premised on a real or potential Russian threat?'' The question 
is important, because it goes to the core of our fundamental intentions 
in pursuing the Alliance's enlargement and this new relationship with 
Russia.
    Let me be clear. For the reasons I have listed, our policy is to 
engage Russia and to maximize the likelihood that this country will 
stay on the path of democratic development. But, as the Secretary said 
before the Senate Appropriations Committee last week, none of us in the 
State Department has a crystal ball. And one contingency that the 
Alliance must be able to respond to--even though we see it as unlikely 
and are working hard to make it even less likely--is the possibility 
that Russia could abandon democracy and return to old, threatening 
patterns of behavior.
    That, however, is not the only reason, or even the primary reason, 
to enlarge the Alliance, and it is a mistake to assume that this is the 
unspoken single premise guiding our policy. NATO does not need an 
enemy. It has enduring purposes: deterring future threats; keeping the 
U.S. engaged in Europe; ensuring that Europe's security policies remain 
cooperative rather than competitive; and providing a collective defense 
capability for a range of future contingencies.
    That's precisely why we are pursuing both NATO's enlargement and a 
cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, and why both of them serve our 
interests. What we are asking you and your Senate colleagues to ratify 
is not a policy of NATO enlargement instead of a positive relationship 
with Russia, but NATO enlargement together with a positive relationship 
with Russia. We are committed to pursuing both, and we believe our 
policy is already showing positive and reassuring results.
    Thank you.

    Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. I am 
joined here by my colleagues Senator Wellstone from Minnesota, 
Senator Lugar from Indiana, Senator Thomas from Wyoming. What 
we will do is--and the distinguished ranking minority member, 
Senator Biden.
    Senator, we have just taken the eloquent testimony of 
Secretary Pickering, and if you would like to make a comment, 
we will get to questions.
    Senator Biden. No, no. I am sure I could not improve on 
anything the former Secretary said.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, what do you 
believe the expectations, goals, are of the Russians, their 
leaders, in signing the Founding Act? What do they wish to get 
out of this? What do have in their minds as short-term, long-
term goals?
    Ambassador Pickering. Senator, ever since my arrival in 
Russia in the middle of 1993, I have been impressed by the fact 
that a key pillar of President Yeltsin's policy, alongside 
democratic and economic reform, has been to play a serious role 
in the world community as a democratic State with an open and 
developing and prosperous set of market arrangements.
    And while President Yeltsin has objected to NATO 
enlargement, the Founding Act provided him and his colleagues 
in the reform group in Russia a serious opportunity to play a 
role alongside NATO in the future of European security to deal 
with problems through consultation that might arise in the 
context of European security, hopefully before they became 
serious problems, and to cooperate as he had with us in the 
Contact Group, where there is no question in dealing with 
Bosnia we had differences.
    But there is no further question that we were able to work 
out and resolve those differences as we went through the 
process of Dayton, and in the implementation of the Dayton 
accords.
    This, in my view, is a record we need continually to look 
at, and it is a picture of Russia that I think is important to 
understand despite the fact that there are many who believe 
that Russia is bent on recreating a Soviet-style imperialist 
State.
    I think the facts of President Yeltsin's leadership belie 
that. I think a number of the points that I have made in my 
opening statement about their pursuit with us jointly of arms 
control arrangements and their interest in playing a 
constructive role in European security is culminated, if you 
would like, in getting into the Founding Act with NATO and 
seeking to provide a way to assure further cooperation in 
European security, which is what the NATO Founding Act is 
designed to provide.
    Senator Hagel. I want to read back to you just for a minute 
a sentence or two from your testimony and ask for a little 
further explanation. Page seven you say, The PJC has no role in 
NATO's internal decisionmaking--none. It gives Russia a voice, 
but not a veto.
    Could you explain, Mr. Secretary, for the committee, what 
that means, it gives them a voice but no veto? What kind of 
voice?
    Ambassador Pickering. I would like first, Senator Hagel, to 
make sure that you understand that the PJC is a consultative 
mechanism, and that consultation in diplomatic parlance means 
just that, talking together.
    It does not mean a situation in which you are obliged to 
negotiate. It does not mean you are in a situation where you 
are obliged to make a decision. It is an exploration of finding 
ways to harmonize policy on the basis of your interest and 
intent. So, it provides that kind of opportunity.
    It is extremely important, I believe, that we all 
understand that even the subject matter to be raised in the PJC 
is subject to consensus. In cases where the Russians might 
suggest subject matter on which there is no NATO position, it 
is clearly provided that NATO is not required to undertake any 
such discussion and certainly can, if it wishes and chooses to 
make such a discussion, first agree among itself, its members, 
as to what its position is.
    It is important, however, because it is a two-way street. 
There are benefits, I believe, from talking to the Russians 
about a whole range of questions, from peacemaking through the 
issue of broad security questions inside the European 
continent. In this day and age, I think a level of transparency 
consistent with our security interests is very important.
    Second, a two-way street is a two-way street. We have equal 
rights to ask the Russians to discuss issues with us, and we 
have equal rights to expect a comparable level of attention to 
the issues as we are prepared to give them. I believe this is 
important in carrying on a dialog and I believe it is 
significant that the Russians have agreed to this.
    The Founding Act contains a number of important principles. 
One of those is, of course, that internal affairs are internal 
affairs. Others are that no particular discussion item is 
required to be brought forth if either party does not wish to 
discuss it.
    So it is an opportunity to conduct, if you like, diplomacy 
and relations between the alliance and Russia on a constructive 
basis but on a willing buyer/willing seller/willing partner 
basis, and that is precisely what it is designed to achieve.
    From the Russian perspective, to go back to your first 
question, it gives them an opportunity to have a voice in the 
process of developing European security. That voice is 
important because just as the Contact Group led to cooperative 
Russian participation in the forces implementing Dayton, so a 
voice with NATO in future questions could open the door to an 
equally productive and cooperative relationship with respect to 
other problems in Europe.
    Russia is a considerable power. It has significant 
interests. It can speak with an important voice. To have Russia 
inside the tent, to borrow a phrase from Lyndon Johnson, rather 
than outside, I think, is extremely important.
    The price we pay for that is only our willingness to 
discuss, but I believe there is important benefits to both 
Russia and the United States for being willing to pay that 
price, which is to lend an ear and a voice to the process.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you. Senator Biden?
    Senator Biden. It is good to see you, Tom. It has been a 
long time that you have been coming up before this committee. I 
am getting a little worried my staff reminded me, as if I could 
forget, that you are now the senior guy at the State 
Department. My God, we are getting old. We have been here a 
long time.
    Ambassador Pickering. Senator, I do not know whether I came 
up here before you did or not.
    Senator Biden. I think you probably did. I did not come 
until 1973, so it was January 1973, but----
    Ambassador Pickering. I can remember some bad days before 
that.
    Senator Biden. Yep. I--it is interesting that--I think, by 
the way, what we put together today is one of the most--
beginning with Dr. Kissinger this morning and with the panel 
that will follow you including your predecessor, Ambassador 
Matlock and others--distinguished panels we have had to comment 
on this. What strikes me is the divergence of opinion.
    And it reflects what goes on up here in that the Founding 
Act is viewed by some as having given too much and by others as 
not having given nearly enough. Some think it not only 
mollifies Russia but emboldens Russia to have a greater say in 
what happens in NATO, and others think that it really isolates 
Russia.
    And we are going to hear that divergence today, I expect, 
as we will in the future of this debate about the security 
concerns Russia has relative to the expansion of NATO.
    I have only made one trip to Moscow in the last 12 months, 
and met with every leader of every major faction. And nobody 
talked about the direct security concerns. They talked about 
their anger, their sense of rejection, this meaning that we 
really never want them to be part of the West, the isolation of 
Russia, and so on.
    But it was actually a Russian that reminded me that Norway 
has long been a member of NATO, the only country with a common 
border of the ones that are involved, including the three new 
ones that are about to come in. There has never been any great 
concern because Norway and NATO made fundamental decisions 
about nuclear weapons and the stationing of troops there. The 
same decisions that have unilaterally been made by NATO with 
regard to the three new countries who are a hell of a lot 
further from the Russian border.
    But I would like to pursue a point made by Secretary 
Kissinger this morning. I, quite frankly, have misunderstood 
his position twice. I think I understand it now, and I am not 
being facetious when I say that. He had early on in 1993 or 
1994 written about the need to have, I thought, just such a 
consultative group or arrangement. Then, I realized he was 
opposed, I thought, unalterably opposed to the notion.
    Really, what he said today as I understand it and maybe 
everybody understood it all along, but I did not--was, look at 
the way these institutions function--it was kind of the 
argument that the old anti-arms controllers used. If you start 
to negotiate, you are going to be compelled to bring back an 
agreement. Kind of like the way Senators talk about special 
prosecutors these days, no matter how honest he or she is, you 
appoint them, their reputation rests on an indictment, and if 
they do not get one, they will find one.
    And as I listened to him, he talked about, as I understood 
it, the concern that notwithstanding the fact that you and the 
President and Secretary Albright and others are of the view 
this is a voice, not a veto, the practical effect of being in 
the same building, the same proximity, the same circumstances, 
is that women and men are not going to get up from this 
consultative group in room B after having talked about 
something that the Russians raised--that we do not have to 
listen to if we do not want to, we do not have to respond to if 
we do not want to--and then walk down to room A where the NAC 
is meeting and say, Now, I am not going to consider what was 
just said in there.
    His concern is there is going to be this--this is kind of 
my phrase--porous wall between those two rooms or those two 
floors or those two separate wings of the building.
    How do you respond to that concern because in one sense, he 
reflects how human nature basically functions in that even 
though officially they will not have this direct an impact, the 
kind of impact many worry about, practically, they will have an 
impact?
    Again, I may have butchered his view, but I think that is 
the essence of what his concern was--that the effect will be a 
Russian veto, although the institution does not require it, 
does not call for it, and actually explicitly says they will 
not have a veto, that will be the net effect because of the 
proximity--physical proximity.
    Ambassador Pickering. Thank you. Senator, thank you also 
for your kind words.
    It is an interesting point because I, too, had 
misunderstood his position although I knew that this was part 
of his position. I thought his position had more weight in 
other directions, and it may now be reduced to its simplest 
proportions.
    I, in no way, would ever second guess Dr. Kissinger on the 
frailties of human nature. But I would say that having seen him 
operate in the position of Secretary of State and having seen 
Secretary Albright, I in no way can share his doctrine which is 
a kind of fundamental presumption on the frailty of human 
nature or the inability of Secretaries of State and their 
servants to understand American national interests and pursue 
them.
    I think we have lots of checks and balances, a group of 
them are in this room. There are others out there in the press, 
and there is the necessary transparency in the foreign policy 
process. But I do not think we necessarily need you biting our 
ankles to be sure that we understand what American national 
interests are and continue to pursue them.
    And besides, if it was such a problem, why has not our 
bilateral relationship with Russia totally contaminated our 
NATO policy and I do not believe it has? I think, in a sense, 
that we have the ability as a country to be big enough to 
listen to all points of view; indeed, we ought to welcome it. 
We ought to consider that a helpful check on the innate 
correctness of our position.
    But at the same time, I think, we should have an unerring 
compass and that is the President's responsibility and the 
Secretary's responsibility and our responsibility as advisors 
to make certain that we do have paramount before us American 
national interests. I can tell you in our building 100 times a 
day in all corners these are problems and issues that are 
constantly re-examined against the bedrock of what are our 
national interests.
    So I do not believe they go out the window or are forgotten 
or are elided by discussion. I do not believe Secretary 
Kissinger's secretaryship was characterized by that particular 
problem.
    And so, while his discernment in characterizing human 
failures in other individuals may be large, it is not 
necessarily in my view a contamination of the total Government 
by that particular issue; rather, the contrary. I do not think 
we would be able to stay on our jobs, or in office, if we 
pursued that kind of weakness on this set of issues.
    It is, however, important that we hear other views, as I 
said. It is important we take those into account. It is 
important that we continue to review our national interests 
against the backdrop of this.
    Senator Biden. But he argues that--in fairness to him, he 
strongly argues that it is necessary as well. It is ironic. He 
has become the darling of many conservatives now, and for 
years, was pilloried, because he wanted dialog.
    But, and I mean this sincerely when I say he made a very 
important point, that there should not be a military 
institutional framework within which to discuss these issues. 
It should be a separate entity like the Concord of Europe early 
on.
    I mean, he makes a distinction that both should occur. But 
they should not be within the context of a military 
organization, even though one is separate and apart but can 
comment on it. It should be a different institutional 
arrangement, that is all.
    Ambassador Pickering. But there are--if I could just make 
one other comment on that--obviously differing views of NATO. 
It is essentially a collective defense organization, but it has 
many other facets. We have known for years that NATO members 
have found, indeed, that security is broader than, even if 
fundamentally founded upon, the central military interests, and 
that we talk widely about everything from the environment to 
political relationships in foreign States in the organization. 
So it is not so narrowly constructed.
    But second, I still think that the sense of pressure, 
contamination, influence by osmosis, is not there. I think that 
we have enough clearheadedness to avoid that.
    Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you. Senator Lugar?
    Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary 
Pickering, in his testimony this morning, former Secretary of 
State Kissinger commented upon what he felt was the threat of 
second-class status for the new and potential entrants to NATO.
    Specifically, he said the dilemma supporters of NATO 
enlargement now face is that the Founding Act has gone into 
effect upon signature. As an executive agreement, it will not 
have to be ratified by the Senate, while NATO enlargement, 
involving a treaty, does have to be ratified.
    Thus, if admission of the new members is not ratified, we 
would have the worst of the two worlds; namely, the Founding 
Act--demoralization, as Secretary Kissinger saw it, of Central 
Europe--``and a NATO rendered dysfunctional by the Founding 
Act.''
    Two paragraphs later, he offers a solution.
    Secretary Kissinger has offered what I suppose is the first 
amendment or reservation, to the resolution of ratification. I 
would like your comments on the effect of reservations and 
amendments, that Secretary Kissinger and others might propose 
to the resolution of ratification.
    Specifically, the Secretary suggested the Senate should 
explicitly reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance 
for American Foreign Policy insist that nothing in any other 
document shall detract from the North Atlantic Council as the 
supreme body of the alliance. Such a resolution could draw 
directly on the forthright response of Secretary Albright:
    ``Additionally, the Senate resolution should declare the 
United States expects Russia, after the qualitative changes we 
have made, to desist from all pressures and threats in Europe 
on this issue.
    ``In the meantime, while ratification proceeds, a joint 
resolution of Congress should urge that the new NATO members be 
permitted to join the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for 
ratification. This would remove the anomaly that the 
institution created to reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion 
comes into being years before the expansion occurs.''
    What is your opinion of Secretary Kissinger's 
recommendation?
    Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Senator Lugar. It is a 
challenging and interesting question, and I would like to first 
to address the premises, although I am at a disadvantage 
because I was not here and did not hear the testimony or read 
the statement of Secretary Kissinger. As a result, if I get it 
wrong, I can say only that I heard what you had to say.
    But my sense is that it is important to understand that 
advice and consent to changes in the NATO treaty is 
fundamental. It is fundamental in my view for many reasons, but 
most fundamentally because of article 5. The fact is that we 
all collectively agree to treat an attack against one as an 
attack against all. Therefore, it must be through the agreement 
of all of the NATO member parliaments or through the process of 
ratification in each NATO member state that we can add new 
members to the alliance. I think that is extremely significant 
because it involves a very serious security commitment.
    On the other hand, the Founding Act is an executive 
agreement that does not involve such security commitments and 
indeed, if we had taken it up the other way around, we would 
have implied quite to the contrary that we were doing something 
more portentous with respect to security obligations of the 
United States that merited advice and consent to ratification.
    So I think the initial distinctions here are very important 
to keep in mind, and I think they go further to answering the 
question that we are over committed to NATO in the Founding Act 
and I think it is important to keep that in mind.
    Second, with respect to reservations, while you have been 
kind enough to welcome executive branch advice if not consent, 
it is clearly something within your province.
    But let me, on the basis of your invitation, offer you a 
couple of thoughts--one, that Secretary Albright's statement in 
response to Chairman Helms' question was carefully thought out 
to try very, very clearly to define for you precisely how we 
saw and interpreted the Founding Act with relevance to that 
particular question of Is Russia playing too large a role in 
this process and is Russia now able to intrude into NATO 
decisionmaking? And our answer remains a resounding no.
    And I am sure the Secretary would be happy to have you take 
into account, in whatever way you thought best, her very clear, 
very thoughtful, and I think very open reassurance on that 
particular subject.
    The issue of Russian behavior is always of concern to us, 
and I do not believe under any circumstances the executive 
branch would reject the notion that should Russia seek to use 
unconscionable pressure or outrageous threats or anything else 
that we would not object to it immediately, certainly, 
directly, and forthrightly.
    It is a principle of our diplomacy. It is a principle, 
perhaps, of our national existence. I do not believe it 
requires a treaty reservation to take something as fundamental 
as that and make sure that we understand where our interests 
lie on that particular problem.
    Again, that is something you would have to answer for 
yourself. But I do not believe that any administration would 
feel that it should be presumed to be deficient, if I could put 
it that way, in that particular area.
    With respect to new members, potential new members 
participating in the PJC, the PJC is a NATO-Russia agreement. 
It is limited to NATO members. NATO members are members when 
all 16 parliaments and the parliament of the exceeding country 
have ratified the protocol admitting that country. You cannot 
be half a member; it is like pregnancy. You either are or you 
are not.
    In this particular set of issues, I do not believe that 
countries which are not yet members could sit on PJC and 
exercise the same rights, the same role, as the other member 
states without creating what I would say is elements of 
discord, discontinuity, and difficulty.
    That having been said, we would hope that the PJC remains a 
transparent body, one that we can in its overall lines of 
activity, inform others about. It is not meant to be a secret 
conclave. Its meetings are closed as a lot of diplomatic 
meetings are, but we would hope that in fact there is enough 
openness so that new members and potential new members down the 
road--because we do not a closed door policy on membership--
would know and understand exactly what is happening in the PJC 
and in a sense be clearly informed about that process as it 
goes ahead.
    And of course, they are always free to say what they think 
about things. It is a free and open world, and countries do 
accept those responsibilities.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you. Senator Wellstone?
    Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have to be 
brief because I have another panel to attend to, and there are 
witnesses there that I know we want to hear from.
    I guess my--I guess I want to put this in a somewhat 
different framework and ask you a question that I have asked 
earlier. I mean, I do not any evidence of any military threat 
to the countries of Eastern Europe, Central Europe. In some 
ways, I think this is sort of a bit of a relic of a cold war as 
to why we are really expanding NATO. I know my colleagues 
agree; it makes me skeptical.
    You talked about putting Russia inside the tent. If Russia 
meets the same criteria that we are going to apply to new 
members--because after all, it is Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Hungary, but then we could be talking about the Baltic states, 
talking about the Ukraine. Then my question is sort of what 
this--what effect this has on Russia.
    If Russia meets up the criteria, would they, Russia, be 
eligible for membership?
    Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Senator Wellstone, for 
that question. It is not the first time that that question has 
been raised, I know. I would tell you this, that the United 
States believes that it is essential to maintain an open door 
to membership.
    In respect to that, Russia has continually asserted its 
view that it does not wish to be a member. Nevertheless, our 
view has been that all states which meet the criteria are 
eligible for membership. There are two sets of criteria, 
obviously--one is the capability and willingness of States to 
meet the responsibilities of NATO membership, and indeed the 
trust and faith of the members of the alliance the applying 
states have the capabilities and the intentions to meet the 
objectives of the alliance.
    And so, in fact, it is a two-way street, and so Russian or 
Lithuanian or, indeed, anybody else's membership would have to 
meet those criteria. But I see nothing at this stage that would 
ipso facto rule out what your question implies except at the 
moment what we understand to be the Russian opinion on this 
question.
    Senator Wellstone. We have this kind of internal debate 
here. I am actually going to try to go to the larger question, 
and I do not--I know that Senator Biden and I talked to it. 
Again, my understanding for the record is that the Ambassador 
to--that Russia's Ambassador to the United States, Yuli 
Vorontsov? Vorontsov? Have I got the pronunciation right?
    Ambassador Pickering. Vorontsov.
    Senator Wellstone. Vorontsov. My father was from Russia--
look how poorly I am doing. That according to him, that when 
the idea of expanding NATO was originally floated, he asked 
whether or not this invitation was also to Russia, and was told 
no and that he has received the same answer from others in the 
United States Government--maybe so, maybe not.
    The point is--and you are shaking your head no so we do not 
need to debate it. I guess my question is we have got--and this 
is what I keep coming back to, because I do not want to keep 
going over the same ground--Ambassador Matlock is going to 
testify, and I just want to quote.
    He starts out his testimony and he says--I will just read 
one part of it. If it should be approved, talking about the 
expansion of NATO, by the U.S. Senate, it may well go down in 
history as the most profound strategic blunder made since the 
end of the cold war.
    Far from improving the security of the United States, he 
goes on, says he thinks it would lead to a chain of events 
which could pose a serious security threat, including something 
that Senator Lugar has been very concerned about, which is what 
happens with all of this nuclear weaponry and it gets into the 
hands of rogue states and is taken out of the country.
    I mean, given that concern, why--what, again, is the case 
for this? I mean, we do not have a military threat. This is 
primarily a military alliance. Why are we doing this? Given 
this potential--what Ambassador Matlock is talking about, what 
George Kennan has talked about, why--if could you just in a 
very succinct way tell me why are we doing this?
    Ambassador Pickering. Yes, I could, and let me try to do 
this in very clear and simple terms. NATO enlargement, as I 
indicated in my speech, has a series of concerns.
    One is the one that I think stems from your first question. 
While we recognize that Russia is on the democratic track and 
on the reform track, and we want to do everything to keep it on 
that track.
    Senator Wellstone. Right.
    Ambassador Pickering. There is no certainty that in the 
long-term, that is an inevitable outcome. So, states in the 
region who felt concern about the uncertainties of the long-
term future have for their own reasons sought to join and 
enlarge NATO.
    Second, we see a whole series of seriously disruptive--and 
that is a massive piece of understatement if you have been 
through Bosnia--problems in Europe or emerging in Europe which 
not only NATO enlargement but I would submit the NATO-Russia 
cooperative arrangements in the Founding Act are well-designed 
to attempt to deal with.
    A third point is that we in this country have been drawn 
into two horrendous wars in this century, in large measure, as 
a result of opting out, if you like, of serious problems all 
across Europe. Unfortunately, the new area of focus of NATO 
was, in many cases, a kind of cockpit for difficulty in the 
historical past.
    And as a result, we believe, NATO can provide an 
arrangement for security in that area which can help us to 
avoid it.
    Fourth point--our involvement in Europe, we believe, has 
had a very useful effect in dealing with old, long-standing 
animosities and antagonisms in the center of Europe. So our 
role in being helpful in those kinds of problems is, in my 
view, not irrelevant.
    Fifth point is a negative one. What would happen if we 
accepted the Russian view that there is no need to expand NATO? 
Would we be accepting the Stalin dividing line, or somebody 
else's--Churchill's dividing line--on Europe, that on the one 
side you could be members of a collective defense arrangement; 
on the other side, you were forbidden that kind of membership 
by a pure accident of geography and not by the application of 
rational thought?
    The next question. Is this a fundamental security threat to 
Russia with all of the problems and difficulties that that 
might portend for internal and external Russian concerns? And 
the answer, in my view, is yes. If you accept Stalin's 
characterization of NATO, you have got to believe that.
    I do not know anybody in this room, frankly--I have not 
talked to them all--who is persuaded that that view is right. I 
know a lot of people who tell me they are persuaded that view 
is right, but they have not persuaded me. I have seen a lot of 
people among the Russian reformers who are not persuaded that 
view is right.
    But they do not know how to persuade the rest of the 
Russians that that view is not right, except by a process of 
moving ahead and building a relationship with NATO, West and 
the rest of the world, which is the way I believe the new 
Russian leadership sees the role for the future of its country.
    Senator Wellstone. Thank you.
    Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, I have got only one 
additional question, and then my colleagues may have additional 
questions.
    In light of the activity of the past year, more 
specifically, the NATO enlargement issue and what we have been 
talking about here the last hour, do you detect--see in any way 
any efforts to reach or implement arms control agreements with 
the Russians going any easier or better as a result of these 
negotiations the last few months?
    Ambassador Pickering. I would say that the safest thing I 
can say is that it is not getting harder, and there are some 
signs that it is getting easier.
    The reason I say this is that I have focused my attention 
principally on START II. I can recall that when former 
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry spoke about this in the Russian 
Duma, there were a long series--the deep litany of problems 
having to do with Start II, and that a large number of them 
have been resolved, even if you like--if you accept the view 
that NATO enlargement is so terribly negative.
    Even under the shadow of the enlargement discussion in 
Europe and in Russia, steps have been made forward--steps have 
been taken forward in dealing, for example, with the Russian 
problem in the ratification of START II having to do with the 
fact that the configuration of START II and the nature of 
Russian security forces requires that they dismantle a lot of 
multiple warhead missiles, and then, in order to come to parity 
to the United States, construct a lot of new single warhead 
missiles.
    And so, we came forward with the concept, Secretary Perry 
and others, that we go to a START III and that START III would 
parallel the implementation of START II. START III would aim to 
have both countries reduce warheads overall so that there would 
not be a build-down to buildup on the Russian side which they 
said they could not afford.
    We have resolved, in my view, a very thorny and difficult 
problem in distinguishing between anti-ballistic missile 
defense and theater missile defense, talking with the Russians 
under a set of circumstances which permits all of the theater 
missile defense programs that we had in view and in plan to go 
ahead while at the same time, I believe, carefully assuring the 
Russians that the lines of control under the ABM Treaty have 
not been breached--a very important part because we had huge 
disagreements about this. This was another premise for people 
in Russia to reject START II.
    A third premise from the point of view of Russia, although 
it has nothing to do, in my view, in any direct sense with 
START II, was NATO enlargement. Now we have the Founding Act. 
Not all Russians are reconciled, but we have a Russian 
government which, after all, has to go and defend START II and 
says that they are prepared to cooperate with NATO even as they 
object to its enlargement.
    The difficulty, I think, is that in the Russian Duma on 
Start II, you have a parliamentary body dominated by communists 
who clearly do not believe that START II, for political 
reasons, is something that they want to ratify and gratify 
President Yeltsin's reform government. As a result, they search 
for any set of arguments.
    Having, even in the period of NATO enlargement, winnowed 
out and cut down the whole series of those arguments, we have 
given President Yeltsin additional ammunition and backing in 
the process of trying to move his Duma forward, and we have 
recently seen in his efforts with the Duma the beginning, at 
least I think, of the assertion of a number of the very 
considerable advantages he has in dealing with his Parliament 
which the American president does not have, including an 
opportunity to dismiss over a period of time, and an 
opportunity independently to legislate, on areas where the 
legislative has not gone or does not choose to go.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you. Senator Biden?
    Senator Biden. We call that executive fiat here.
    It kind of happens sometimes. I have one very brief comment 
and one question off of it.
    You know, one of the arguments used against expansion of 
NATO is that it was obviously a military organization designed 
to meet a specific military threat. It was the Soviet Union, 
although we never mention the Soviet Union--in any place I can 
recall. There is no place it is mentioned in the Washington 
treaty.
    And therefore, since we do not have the Soviet threat--it 
is an argument made by my distinguished colleague from 
Wisconsin--since we do not have that threat, why are we 
enlarging?
    Well, it seems to me if that argument makes sense, a 
logical argument is why NATO? I mean, why do we have NATO? So I 
think those who suggest that we should not enlarge and make 
that argument have to examine whether or not the argument they 
are making justifies the continuation of NATO in the first 
instance because NATO no longer has the same precise purpose. 
It may have that purpose in the future, it may be anticipatory.
    But there seems to have been a transition and a 
recognition, although never stated for the last 40 years, that 
it was also about stability. It was also about England and 
France,--I mean, France and Germany. It was also about 
something other than, in addition to--not other than, in 
addition to--whether or not the Fulda Gap was going to be 
breached by 45 divisions of Russian soldiers.
    But in keeping with this notion of what NATO is, has 
become, what its purpose was, what it has evolved to, and what 
it will evolve into, in my discussions with people who are 
above my pay grade in Russia, NATO expansion is usually 
discussed in the context of wounded pride and isolation.
    Now, this may be a strange question, and I realize the 
answer is totally subjective. But you are there, day-to-day. 
You are trying to figure out everything from whether or not you 
have enough electricity coming into the compound--with no 
interruption because of a faulty electrical system, whatever, 
straight through to whether START II is going to be ratified, 
or START III.
    You have been there. In all the things that end up on your 
desk, get to your level, that affect bilateral relationships 
with the United States, where does enlargement of NATO rank? 
How often is that a central concern expressed to you, whether 
that is the purpose of your interfacing with your counterparts 
or whether it is brought up as an adjunct to other issues? What 
role does it play in your day-to-day running of the business of 
our country's relations with Russia?
    Ambassador Pickering. Let me first tell you that I have not 
been in Russia since I left the post almost a year ago. So, I 
cannot give you--except from my close relationship in my new 
job in the State Department with the charge and now with 
Ambassador Collins--my successor, a sense of this issue.
    Senator Biden. But you were there leading up to all of 
the----
    Ambassador Pickering. But I was there leading up to it and 
I wanted to try to point out to you that a significant amount 
of my time was spent dealing with the questions, as I indicated 
in my statement, of how we could build together a NATO-Russia, 
a US/Russia relationship in light of the enlargement to deal 
with either significant or putative problems in the 
relationship so that in a sense we could build a framework that 
we have brought to you, what I think is the win-win--the 
Founding Act, the CFE negotiations, and the NATO enlargement--
if not in a package for ratification, at least in a package for 
presentation.
    But I would tell you that my feeling was in my time there, 
it went from about a 3-percent of the public interest inside 
the Moscow Beltway to slightly over a 20 percent interest 
nationally, but that it is extremely clear that in the 
hierarchy of Russian issues of angst, if I could call it that 
way, it was well down the list--that there were a whole lot of 
other things, again as I said in my statement, having to do 
with existential, economic, and social issues that bothered 
Russians a great deal more than this.
    And that at the same time, that the major groupings who 
were concerned about this happened to be the Russian 
equivalents of our think tanks, the Russian equivalents of our 
editorial writers, the Russian equivalents of our legislators, 
and some of the Russian equivalents of our executive branch 
people.
    Senator Biden. In my much more limited encounters than 
yours or Jack's--and I know he was not there at the time in the 
capacity, and others will testify--NATO expansion would be 
raised, but then it was like, well, let us get onto something 
that we can really deal with here.
    Ambassador Pickering. I think quite so, and there were, in 
fact, several times when I was there that there really had to 
be a small group of Russian so-called thinkers and 
intellectuals--opinion influencers--who would sort of gather up 
themselves and produce a new paper and then spread it around in 
the paper and say: Let us reinvigorate our lagging concern.
    At the same time, a number of Russians, some of whose names 
have been mentioned in this hearing, had come to me time after 
time and said, Cannot we work out a set of arrangements that 
helps deal with this particular problem?
    And many of the ideas in the Founding Act came out of those 
kinds of conversations. They were constructive, they were 
useful. They were people concerned about isolation and how do 
you deal with it. You get into consultations.
    Senator Biden. I am over my time. Can I go for another 2 
seconds?
    Senator Hagel. Well, I am going to do better than that. How 
about a minute?
    Senator Biden. OK.
    Ambassador Pickering. I apologize. I made you go over the 
time in my answer.
    Senator Biden. My impression is that even when enlargement 
was the focus of the discussion, it was almost always used, and 
has continued to be, to make a larger point that does not 
relate to physical security concerns, but relates to ``Do you 
love me? What is this relationship going to be? Where am I on 
this--where are we in this deal?''
    I mean, I am not being very articulate here, but, you had 
Yeltsin, for example, when telling Walesa, Look, you are an 
independent country. You are a sovereign. You want to be part 
of NATO? It is OK.
    He gets back--he got the living hell kicked out of him 
rhetorically back home, and then, things change.
    But I just never have gotten the sense that it was viewed 
by most Russian intellectuals or think tankers, legislators, or 
other--in the security context as much as in a context of are 
we equals? What is this relationship going to be? What does 
this say about where it is going?
    Ambassador Pickering. Mr. Senator----
    Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, you have 1 minute.
    Ambassador Pickering. [continuing]. there are two answers, 
two pieces to the answer. One is that it was even deeper than, 
`` Do you love me?'' It was a fundamental of who is most 
important--Western Europe or us?
    Second set of questions was--in Russia, politics is 
domestic, preeminently, and it is economic. Therefore, Yeltsin 
was prepared not to take on his nationalists and right-wing 
opposition, if I could phrase it that way, over a foreign 
policy issue of this size, when he had a lot of other important 
fish to fry in bringing reforms about.
    Senator Biden. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you, Mr. 
Secretary.
    Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, as always, we are grateful. 
Thank you.
    Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Senator Hagel so much.
    Senator Hagel. Good seeing you, Tom. If our distinguished 
second panel would come forward.
    [Pause]
    Senator Hagel. Gentlemen, welcome. Ambassador Matlock, 
would you like to begin? Thank you.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JACK F. MATLOCK, JR., GEORGE F. KENNAN 
PROFESSOR, INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY.

    Ambassador Matlock. Thank you very much. At the outset, let 
me say that I agree totally with what Secretary Pickering has 
said about the Founding Act, and about the advantages of the 
relationship that the administration has negotiated with Russia 
and with NATO.
    I think that everything he said about that not only agrees 
with my judgment, but I think that negotiating that agreement 
is a real achievement of this administration.
    Having said that, I must also point out those elements in 
his testimony and in the administration's position with which I 
disagree.
    I am probably the only person on the panel you have called 
today who disagrees that the enlargement of NATO significantly 
advances U.S. security interests, one of statements that 
Secretary Pickering made earlier in his testimony.
    I think that to bring in new members at this time under 
these conditions is a misguided policy and if it should be 
approved by the Senate, that it could go down in history as a 
profound strategic blunder.
    Now, far from improving the security of the United States, 
its allies, and the nations that wish to enter the alliance, it 
could well encourage a chain of events that could produce the 
most serious security threat to this nation since the Soviet 
Union collapsed.
    I know these are strong words, but I am convinced they are 
justified, and I appreciate the opportunity to explain why I 
use them.
    In Russia today, there are somewhere between 40 and 50,000 
nuclear warheads, maybe even more--22,000 of them tactical 
weapons relatively easy to transport. Furthermore, there are 
enormous stocks of highly enriched uranium of weapons grade, 
and plutonium, at research institutes, naval facilities, and 
warehouses scattered throughout that vast country.
    In addition, Russia has something like 50,000 tons of 
chemical warfare agents, and an amount which one can only guess 
of biological warfare agents, agents the possession of which 
they only admitted officially after Russia became independent 
and Yeltsin was President.
    Equally important, Russia has a veritable army of 
scientists and engineers who are adept at turning these 
materials into weapons and devising ingenious delivery systems.
    There is no serious danger now, or in the foreseeable 
future, that the Russian Government intends to use any of these 
weapons against us, our allies, or for that matter, against any 
other country. It would be totally irrational for them to do 
so, and though Russian Governments may sometimes see things 
differently from the way we do, they are not irrational.
    The danger these weapons pose is not that they may be 
intentionally used by a Russian Government, but that they may 
fall into irresponsible hands or rogue states.
    It is very much in Russia's interest that such weapons and 
the materials and know how to make them not leak out of secure 
control to other quarters. But the sad fact is that the Russian 
authorities may no longer have an ability to ensure their 
safety. When the people guarding them have not been paid for 6 
months and weapons scientists literally have trouble feeding 
their families and heating their apartments in sub-zero 
weather, it is unreasonable to expect that all are going to 
resist the temptation of selling dangerous materials to local 
criminals or of going to work for some unsavory regime.
    Let us count it a miracle that there has yet been no 
documented diversion of a nuclear weapon, though we may never 
know for sure that one has occurred until one turns up in some 
unexpected place.
    Now, in general, I do not use the term ``vital interests'' 
lightly. Countries can have many interests. It is rare, 
particularly in a country as strong as the United States, to 
say that a given threat or a given interest is absolutely 
vital.
    But it seems to me by any definition secure, responsible 
control of weapons of mass destruction has to be one of them, 
and maybe the top one. If any of these weapons get into the 
hands of a rogue regime, the United States will be right at the 
top of the list of the terrorists they sponsor. They could do 
it in a way to render our deterrent force useless.
    If we did not where the weapon came from, how could we 
retaliate? And very likely we would not know until we had lost 
a city or two anyway. Nor will a missile defense protect us 
from weapons delivered by means terrorists are most likely to 
choose: a ship, a small plane, a minivan, even perhaps a large 
knapsack two men could lift.
    Chemical and biological weapons are potentially equally 
dangerous, as the attacks on the Tokyo subway a few months ago 
showed. They are even easier to deliver than nuclear devices, 
and would not require a suicide bomber do it.
    Now, what has this to do with the question before us? 
Simply this. Adding members to NATO will do nothing to protect 
us from the real threat I have described. But it does convey to 
the Russian nation, and particularly their military, that we 
still consider Russia at least a potential enemy, unsuited for 
the same security guarantees and the same degree of cooperation 
that countries in Central and Eastern Europe are being offered.
    Even if the Russian Government is forced to acquiesce to 
the enlargement of NATO, which, in effect, it has, there is no 
question that our decision to take on new members now, when no 
country in Eastern Europe faces a security threat from the 
outside, will greatly complicate our efforts to see to it that 
the vast stocks of nuclear weapons now in Russia are never used 
against us or our allies.
    We are constantly being assured that nuclear and other 
weapons of mass destruction in Russia are under full and 
responsible control. This may be correct when it is a question 
of intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBM's, and other large 
missiles in the Rocket Forces. But smaller weapons, and much 
weapon-grade nuclear material, is much less secure.
    General Lebed has recently said that 84 portable weapons 
are missing from Russian arsenals. His allegation has been 
denied by Russian authorities, but still it is impossible to be 
complacent about this question. Even if it is a matter of 
sloppy recordkeeping rather than actual theft of a nuclear 
weapon--and, frankly, that is the hypothesis I would put 
forward first--it, nevertheless, seems most likely that neither 
we nor the Russians know how many weapons they have and where 
they are at all times.
    Given the prevalence of organized crime and the high prices 
some regimes or terrorist groups would pay for nuclear weapons 
and materials, the possibility of diversion is clearly the most 
immediate and tangible threat to American security today. The 
progress we have made in assisting Russia to improve the 
security of its weapon stocks is substantial, but still 
inadequate.
    I would recommend, if you have not seen it yet, Mr. 
Chairman, a book just recently out, called ``One Point Safe.'' 
I have no financial or other authorial interest in this book. 
You really ought to read it or at least have your staff 
summarize it for you. It may contain a few exaggerations. The 
prose is sometimes a bit hyped. But I think it describes a real 
situation, and a situation which we must take into account when 
we think about U.S. security.
    Now, the fact is it is going to become increasingly 
difficult to obtain Russian cooperation in securing this 
material if our actions are interpreted as attempts to exploit 
Russia's current weakness, as they are by most officials in 
those Russian institutions responsible for weapons security. 
Let me say here that I agree with Secretary Pickering in his 
judgment on one thing: This is largely an elite issue, and most 
Russians do not spend a lot of time talking about it. That is 
true. But such issues as NATO enlargement counts very heavily 
in military minds and others in the security complex--the very 
complex with the very people we now have to depend upon to keep 
these weapons under control.
    I would point that out. I would also say in that regard--
and I was there when we negotiated German unification and so 
on--the basic steps that brought an end to the cold war did not 
elicit that much interest from the broader public. The degree 
of interest in the public is not necessarily a measure of the 
importance of an issue or what its future impact is going to 
be.
    Now, adding new members to NATO--and what is announced will 
be nearly the first stage in a continued process of 
enlargement--will inevitably undermine our ability to influence 
Russian attitudes on the nuclear question. This has nothing to 
do with whether Russia has designs on Eastern Europe or not. I 
think they do not have designs on Eastern Europe. Their 
problems are precisely the psychological problems that we heard 
discussed between Secretary Pickering and Senator Biden just 
now.
    The fact that these problems are abstract issues does not 
mean that they do not play a great role, particularly in the 
psychology of people whom we are going to have to depend on, to 
some degree, for our own security.
    Now, I am convinced that this policy has in fact caused a 
delay in the ratification of START II. I know that the 
Communists do not want to give Yeltsin a victory. But I believe 
his case would have been much stronger if we had not started 
the announced policy of bringing new members into NATO without 
regard to Russia's position and without regard to whether there 
is a threat to the candidate countries or not.
    And also, this move has produced pressures for the Russian 
Army to rely more, rather than less, on nuclear weapons in the 
future. After all, they are feeling very weak after their 
defeat in Chechnya, and the Army is running into increasingly 
difficulties. They are going to have to restructure, to 
restructure radically. Of course, as they do so, a lot of 
people are going to lose their jobs--people, including those 
who work in these nuclear and other weapons establishments.
    It is hard to overestimate the security Russian weapons 
hold for the safety and well-being of the American people. 
Although the administration has paid some lip service to its 
importance, its efforts to deal with the problem have been 
hobbled by bureaucratic infighting, some of which you can read 
about in this book and elsewhere, lack of senior-level 
attention, and, most of all, the failure of the President and 
his senior associates to give the matter the priority and the 
day-to-day attention it deserves.
    I can tell you, as one who worked for 3 years on the staff 
at the NSC during the Reagan administration, that nothing gets 
done in the American Government, except things the bureaucracy 
does every day, unless it gets a push from the top. That push 
has to be continual, day in and day out. This issue, is not 
getting that push.
    What little we are doing--and it is more than a little, but 
it is still not enough--came from an initiative from this end 
of Capitol Hill. Notably in the Nunn-Lugar appropriations. This 
has been, I think, highly successful. It is probably the best 
value of all of our defense appropriations.
    The Nunn-Lugar program has been implemented reasonably well 
by the administration. But instead of a strategy that would 
enhance our ability to work on this issue in an effective 
partnership with those Russian agencies responsible for weapons 
security, we see instead enormous efforts to promote an ill-
conceived plan that does not meet the real security dangers we 
face, and, in fact, makes it substantially more difficult to 
deal with it.
    The plan to increase the membership of NATO, in my opinion, 
fails to account for the real international situation following 
the end of the cold war and proceeds in accord with the logic 
that made sense only during the cold war. The thing that many 
people seem to forget is that Russia is not the Soviet Union.
    It was my privilege to be present in those last few years 
of the Soviet Empire. The Russian political leaders who are 
still in power in Russia today were the final force that broke 
up the Soviet Empire. That is something that people who say, 
Russia is always imperialistic and is likely to be in the 
future, forget, or maybe they never noticed.
    But the fact is, if Yeltsin and his associates had not 
pulled Russia out of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, there 
would be a Soviet Union of some sort, with at least seven or so 
republics. The Central Asians and Belarus did not want to leave 
the Soviet Union. Russia, in the final analysis, broke up that 
Empire, and they did it in their own interest.
    When we were winding up the cold war, the influence of the 
Russian leaders was pushing Gorbachev to go even further than 
he went. When there was the war in the Gulf, Yeltsin told me at 
that time--he was head of the Parliament in Russia--he said, 
``We not only should cut off all arms supplies to Iraq during 
this crisis, we should cut them off to all the radical states 
in the Near East, and we should send our troops to fight with 
you.
    Well, this was not politically possible. But I would 
emphasize that we did end the cold war with the cooperation 
with the Russian leadership. Those who say, ``We won the cold 
war,'' of course are right. But we won the cold war over the 
Soviet Union. We won it in part because we convinced the 
Russians it was in their interest as well to end it.
    So to treat Russia now, as if it is a defeated enemy and a 
potential threat in the future would be making the same mistake 
we made after World War I, when we blamed Germany exclusively 
for the First World War and did not heal the rift between 
Germany and the Western powers, which left Europe vulnerable to 
a new war.
    The division of Europe ended before there was any thought 
of taking new members in NATO and, the fact that this was the 
case was recognized by this administration, at least a few 
years ago. Here is a statement made from the White House podium 
in January 1994:
    ``The United States believes that the objective of 
promoting security and stability in Europe could be undermined 
if NATO were to be expanded too rapidly. Such a course as that 
would risk dividing Europe by creating new blocs and 
unintentionally replicating a bit further to the east a line of 
demarcation that NATO has fought for such a long time to 
erase.''
    Who made that statement? Former Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher.
    Now, obviously, he must have changed his mind, or was 
ordered to change his mind, somewhere along the line. He made 
that statement before we announced the Partnership for Peace. 
The Partnership for Peace has now been in operation only about 
3 years, which is a very short time to organize a multinational 
effort, and not really enough to show what it can achieve. Yet, 
for 2 years now, we have been on a course that, in effect, 
ignores that and ignores the wisdom in Christopher's statement 
in 1994.
    The fact is that no one is threatening to redivide Europe. 
It is therefore absurd to claim, as some have, that it is 
necessary to take new members into NATO to avoid a future 
division of Europe. This not only misrepresents history, since 
the division of Europe ended under previous administrations; it 
ended because the Warsaw Pact collapsed, because the Soviet 
Union collapsed. NATO never divided Europe. Europe is not 
divided today.
    It is also, I think, devoid of logic to make the statement 
that to rectify the division of Europe in the past we have to 
move NATO eastward. If NATO is to be the principal instrument 
for unifying the continent, then logically the only way it can 
do so is by expanding to include all European countries. But 
that does not appear to be the aim of the administration. Even 
if it is, the way to reach it is not by admitting new members 
piecemeal.
    Now, Mr. Chairman, all of the purported goals, in my 
opinion, of NATO enlargement are laudable. Of course the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe are culturally part of 
Europe and should be guaranteed a place in European 
institutions. Of course we have a stake in the development of 
democracy and stable economies there. But membership in NATO is 
not the only way to achieve these ends. It is not even the best 
way, in the absence of a clear and identifiable security 
threat.
    I am one who has always been a champion of NATO, and I 
continue to be. I agree with Secretary Pickering and others who 
point out that the aim of NATO was much more than simply 
deterring the Soviet Union. All of those reasons which he cited 
for us to stay in NATO are there. That is one of the reasons I 
do not like to see a premature move to expand the alliance, 
which I believe will weaken the organization ultimately.
    Even if NATO is able to absorb the three candidate members 
successfully, there are going to be other applicants who we 
have already been told that they are also in line for 
membership. I think there are about 12 applicants in the line 
now. If Russia has not applied, it is only because it fears 
being turned down, not that it has no interest in membership.
    It seems to me that this starts a process which will 
require NATO for the next decade or so, to focus not on the 
real security threats that we face, but on the questions of who 
should be the next member, and under what conditions. In other 
words, NATO will be condemned to contemplate its navel, its 
expanding waistline, and will have little time to attend to the 
real security threats, particularly those that I have 
described.
    It seems to me, therefore, that although the goals that 
have been described are laudable, this is not the right time or 
the right method to pursue them, and to proceed as the 
administration has proposed would be a strategic error.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Matlock follows:]
                Prepared Statement of Ambassador Matlock
    In contrast to the other persons invited to testify today, I 
consider the Administration's recommendation to take new members into 
NATO at this time misguided. If it should be approved by the United 
States Senate, it may well go down in history as the most profound 
strategic blunder made since the end of the Cold War. Far from 
improving the security of the United States, its Allies, and the 
nations that wish to enter the Alliance, it could well encourage a 
chain of events that could produce the most serious security threat to 
this nation since the Soviet Union collapsed. Those are strong words, 
but I am convinced that they are justified, and I appreciate the 
opportunity to explain why I use them.
    In Russia today there are somewhere between 40,000 and 50,000 
nuclear warheads, 22,000 of them tactical weapons, relatively easy to 
transport. Furthermore, there are enormous stocks of HEU and plutonium 
at research institutes, naval facilities, and warehouses throughout 
that vast country. In addition, Russia has something like 50,000 tons 
of chemical warfare agents and an amount which one can only guess of 
biological warfare agents. Equally important, it has a veritable army 
of scientists and engineers who are adept at turning these materials 
into weapons and devising ingenious delivery systems.
    There is no serious danger now, or in the foreseeable future, that 
the Russian government intends to use any of these weapons against us, 
our Allies, or for that matter against any other country. It would be 
totally irrational to do so, and though Russian governments may 
sometimes see things differently from the way we do, they are not 
irrational. The danger these weapons pose is not that they may be 
intentionally used by a Russian government, but that they may fall into 
irresponsible hands or rogue states. It is very much in Russia's 
interest that such weapons and the materials and know-how to make them 
not leak out to other quarters, but the sad fact is that the Russian 
authorities may no longer have an ability to insure their safety. When 
the people guarding them have not been paid in six months and weapons 
scientists literally have trouble feeding their families and heating 
their apartments in sub-zero weather, it is totally unreasonable to 
expect that all are going to resist the temptation of selling dangerous 
materials to local criminals, or of going to work for some unsavory 
regime. Let us count it a miracle that there has as yet been no 
documented diversion of a nuclear weapon (though we may never know for 
sure until one turns up in some unexpected place).
    I do not use the term ``vital interest'' lightly. But by any 
definition, secure, responsible control of weapons of mass destruction 
has to be one of them. If any get in the hands of a rogue regime, the 
United States will be right at the top of the list of the terrorists 
they sponsor. And they could do it in a way that our deterrent force 
would be useless. If we didn't know where it came from, how could we 
retaliate? And, very likely, we would not know, until we had lost a 
city or two. Nor will a missile defense protect us from weapons 
delivered by means terrorists are most likely to choose: a ship, a 
small plane, a minivan, even perhaps a large knapsack two men could 
lift. Chemical and biological weapons are potentially equally 
dangerous, as the attacks on the Tokyo subway a few months ago showed. 
They are even easier to deliver than nuclear devices, and would not 
require a suicide bomber.
    What does this have to do with the question before us? Simply this: 
adding members to NATO will do nothing to protect us from the real 
threat I have described. But it does convey to the Russian nation, and 
particularly their military, that we still consider Russia a potential 
enemy, unsuited for the same security guarantees and the same degree of 
cooperation that countries in central and eastern Europe are being 
offered. Even if the Russian government is forced to acquiesce to the 
enlargement of NATO, there is no question that our decision to take in 
new members now, when no country in Eastern Europe faces a security 
threat from the outside, will greatly complicate our efforts to see to 
it that the vast stocks of nuclear weapons now in Russia are never used 
against us or our Allies.
    We are constantly being assured that nuclear and other weapons of 
mass destruction in Russia are under full and responsible control. This 
may be correct when it is a question of ICBMs and other large missiles 
in the rocket forces. But smaller Weapons and much weapon-grade nuclear 
material is much less secure. General Lebed has recently said that 84 
tactical weapons were missing from Russian arsenals. His allegation has 
been denied by Russian authorities, but still it is impossible to be 
complacent about the question. Even if it is a matter of sloppy record 
keeping rather than actual theft of nuclear weapons, it seems most 
likely that neither the Russians nor we know how many weapons they have 
and where they are at all times. Given the prevalence of organized 
crime and the high prices some regimes or terrorist groups would pay 
for nuclear weapons or materials, the possibility of diversion is 
clearly the most immediate and tangible threat to American security 
today. The progress we have made in assisting Russia to improve 
security of its weapon stocks is substantial, but still inadequate.
    It is going to become increasingly difficult to obtain Russian 
cooperation in securing this material if our actions are interpreted as 
attempts to exploit Russia's current weakness, as they are by most 
officials in those Russian institutions responsible for weapons 
security. Adding new members to NATO, in what is announced will be 
merely the first stage in a continued process of enlargement, will 
inevitably undermine our ability to influence Russian attitudes on 
nuclear questions. This policy has already caused a delay of at least 
two years in the Duma!s ratification of the START II treaty, and has 
produced pressures for the Russian Army to rely more rather than less 
on nuclear weapons in the future.
    It is hard to overestimate the importance of this issue to the 
safety and well being of the American people. Although the 
Administration has paid some lip service to its importance, its efforts 
have been hobbled by bureaucratic infighting, lack of senior level 
attention, and most of all a failure of the President and his senior 
associates to give the matter the priority and the day-to-day attention 
it deserves. In fact, I see no evidence of an overall strategy to deal 
with the problem, What little we are doing came from an initiative from 
this end of Capitol hill. Instead of a strategy which would enhance our 
ability to work in an effective partnership with those Russian agencies 
responsible for weapons security, we see enormous efforts to promote an 
ill conceived plan that does not meet the real security dangers we 
face, and in fact makes it substantially more difficult to deal with 
them.
    The plan to increase the membership of NATO fails to take account 
of the real international situation following the end of the Cold War, 
and proceeds in accord with a logic that made sense only during the 
Cold War. The division of Europe ended before there was any thought of 
taking new members into NATO. No one is threatening to re-divide 
Europe. It is therefore absurd to claim, as some have, that it is 
necessary to take new members into NATO to avoid a future division of 
Europe; if NATO is to be the principal instrument for unifying the 
continent, then logically the only way it can do so is by expanding to 
include all European countries. But that does not appear to be the aim 
of the Administration, and even if it is, the way to reach it is not by 
admitting new members piecemeal.
    All of the purported goals of NATO enlargement are laudable. Of 
course the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are culturally part 
of Europe and should be guaranteed a place in European institutions. Of 
course we have a stake in the development of democracy and stable 
economies there. But membership in NATO is not the only way to achieve 
these ends. It is not even the best way in the absence of a clear and 
identifiable security threat.
    The effect on Russia, however, is perhaps not the most important 
reason for saying that the Administration's proposal is misguided. I am 
a strong supporter of NATO, which I believe is essential for the future 
stability of the European continent. And I am convinced that the 
process which the Administration proposes to start is going to weaken 
the alliance ultimately. For a decade or more we will be debating who 
should or should not be a member, and these debates are bound to be 
divisive within the Alliance. Meanwhile, these debates will distract us 
from dealing with the real threats that exist.
    If ever there was a case of misplaced priorities, this is it.

    Senator Hagel. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. General 
Odom.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM E. ODOM, LT. GEN., USA, RETIRED, DIRECTOR 
 OF NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC

    General Odom.  Mr. Chairman, it is not only an honor, but 
an exceptional responsibility to testify before the committee 
on enlargement. The gravity of the issue inspires a sense of 
humility. I think too much is at stake to make the decision 
based on clever arguments and representation.
    And I must say, after Ambassador Matlock's presentation, I 
have a huge sense of cognitive dissonance. I do not know how 
NATO, if he asserts it never divided Europe, how will it divide 
it by expanding? But let me get on to a more important issue.
    You have already heard, I think, virtually all of the 
arguments that can be made for and against. You are hearing a 
lot of arguments added that do not have anything to do with it 
one way or the other.
    Now, I do not suffer the illusion that I can bring much new 
remarkable evidence to this debate. Instead, I would rather 
offer a way to stand above the plethora of arguments and 
details and evidence in order to get our bearing, and to 
simplify things and see what the evidence and arguments which 
are truly important and which can be set aside in making the 
decision.
    Now, how does one do that? I believe it comes down to 
focusing on three questions--basic questions, questions that 
draw out what is at stake, the most significant forces 
affecting what is at stake, and the priorities we must maintain 
to defend what is at stake.
    The first basic question is whether or not the United 
States should remain committed militarily and politically to 
Europe. This may not strike you as a relevant question, but I 
think it will soon become so in my further remarks.
    The major lesson in the first half of this century is that 
when we have had bad relations or no military ties to Germany 
and Japan--we have tried--and when we have tried to avoid 
dealing with emerging German and Japanese power, we have had 
war in Europe and Northeast Asia. The lesson of the second half 
of the century is that when we have had strong military ties to 
Germany and Japan, we not only have had peace, we have enjoyed 
unprecedented prosperity, and our liberal democratic values 
have spread in the world. We too often lose sight of this 
simple yet critically important understanding.
    Now, for example, I think people tend to forget it when 
they complain that our wealthy allies in Europe do not carry 
their share of the military burden. One can debate how fairly 
the burden has been distributed, but one cannot deny that we 
have grown wealthier than our freeloading friends, even while 
carrying the larger share. Our defense allocations in Europe 
should be seen not primarily as a burden. Actually they have 
been a very profitable investment, because they have made 
possible freer trade, more trade and lower transaction costs in 
trading activities. Without them, both we and our European 
allies would be poorer.
    Now, this is not to suggest that costs are irrelevant. 
There has been greater burdensharing precisely because U.S. 
Senators have pressed it with our allies. Rather it is to 
explain why the cost issue is not fundamental for deciding the 
NATO enlargement issue. It should not figure in one's final 
decision, because remaining committed to European security has 
proven a money-making, not a money-losing, proposition.
    Now, the case for keeping U.S. forces in NATO in Europe is 
overwhelming when one considers the political and military 
consequences that would ensue if U.S. forces were withdrawn. 
Now, this is an important conclusion. Again, you may react by 
asserting that we are not debating whether or not to remain in 
Europe, but whether or not to enlarge NATO. My colleague here 
to the right obviously does not see the connection.
    That strikes me as a seriously mistaken impression. It 
takes me to my second basic question: Can NATO survive if it 
remains static, refusing to enlarge in a dynamic and changing 
Europe?
    I have heard no opponents of enlarging NATO address this 
question. I have heard--they merely assume that NATO can more 
or less remain as it is, making only internal adjustments. Now, 
this is highly unrealistic. The reasons why take us to a 
question of our strategic priorities in Europe. Which country 
is more important and consequential for the United States in 
Europe, Russia or Germany?
    Economically, politically and militarily, Germany clearly 
deserves first priority.
    Too many American policymakers take Germany for granted. 
They assume that the European political/military integration 
process is irreversible, even close to full success, something 
that removes the century-old German question from the European 
agenda. Now, if you share that mistaken impression, then I 
would ask you to consider several facts.
    First, Britain and France opposed German reunification, and 
are still not happy about it, a point the Germans will not 
forget soon.
    Second, Britain and France fell into a serious quarrel with 
Germany over Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia during 1992-1995, 
making a mockery of a common European defense policy. The 
British Foreign Secretary, in 1994, was reported to have said 
that it is better to have Russia on the Adriatic coast than 
Germany. This quarrel is now repressed only because the United 
States belatedly took a leadership role and put NATO forces in 
Bosnia. If U.S. troops are withdrawn any time soon, it will 
resurface with a vengeance.
    Would that be in our strategic interest? Hardly.
    Third, in Germany, virtually all political leaders of all 
parties but the Greens, and even some of the Greens, support 
NATO enlargement. Why? Several SPD leaders who were never very 
pro-NATO, have offered the most articulate and compelling 
answer. They cite the inter-war period, when Moscow, Berlin, 
London, Paris, and Rome, which George Kennan ought to remember, 
but seems to have forgotten, competed irresponsibly for 
influence in Eastern Europe, a competition that set up the 
conditions allowing World War II to break out. They remember 
that even a weak Soviet Union was able to use diplomacy to play 
off major powers in Europe, one against another, inducing 
strategic instability.
    These German spokesmen argue that if NATO is not enlarged, 
Germany will be forced to follow a unilateral Ostpolitik, a 
foreign policy that will make Germany vulnerable to deals by 
Moscow at the expense of the small states in Central and 
Eastern Europe. That, in turn, will exacerbate Germany's 
relations with its Western allies. A common European foreign 
and defense policy will fade even as an aspiration. The 
consequences for European security and economic prosperity will 
be adverse.
    Can it be in the United States strategic interest for 
Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Russia, and perhaps others to 
fall into a major struggle for influence in the countries of 
Central Europe? The Germans argue that the most effective way 
to prevent this is to enlarge NATO.
    Now, fourth, I recently spoke with a group of journalists 
from the three new candidate members. In our discussion, they 
forthrightly admitted that although their publics want them to 
join NATO because of the Russian threat, the more thoughtful 
people want to join because of U.S. forces in Germany, which 
will protect them from Germany.
    Does the United States really want Poland to believe and 
act as thought it is threatened both by Moscow and Berlin?
    Fifth, a well-placed Russian national security official 
told me about a year ago that he and his colleagues foresee 
their main challenge as strategic competition with Germany over 
hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe. They oppose NATO 
enlargement precisely because this would neutralize this 
competition.
    Can it be in the U.S. interest to allow this competition to 
distract Russia from dealing with its problems of economic and 
political reform, and controlling nuclear weapons?
    These five points indicate something of the postcold war 
dynamic in a changing Europe. They reveal emerging forces that 
a static NATO cannot control. If it cannot control them, what 
will be the consequences?
    Just imagine the impact on Germany if the United States 
decides against enlargement. Not only will its western 
neighbors, but the United States as well will be at odds with 
Germany over its policy toward Russia and Central Europe. No 
matter how good our relations with Russia are, the United 
States will find itself embroiled in all kinds of intra-
European bickering and competition, but without NATO embracing 
a sufficient number of the troublesome countries to prevent a 
downward spiral. Reluctant to enlarge NATO, the United States 
will find itself on the path of withdrawal. It can only stay in 
Europe as long as its ties to Germany are strong and 
cooperative, a condition that now requires NATO enlargement.
    The third question is this: What will be the consequences 
for Russian political development if NATO enlarges?
    I put this question number three, because in the context of 
U.S. strategic interest, it is the lowest priority. Russia is 
indeed an important country. But in deciding on NATO 
enlargement, one is dealing with the U.S. stake in two mutually 
related goals: first, a secure and economically prosperous 
Europe; and, second, ensuring that a reunified Germany does not 
catalyze a new balance of power game among our European allies. 
I see now way that Russia can be more important for the U.S. 
strategic interest than these two goals.
    This has been the U.S. strategic priority since the 
formation of NATO: Europe and Germany first; Russia second. Let 
us suppose that all the direst warnings about Russia's 
reactions to NATO enlargement were to come true. Would that 
provide sufficient cause for the United States to reverse these 
priorities? Obviously not. I simply see no way that Russia, 
even if it becomes a thriving liberal democracy, can be more 
important or more critical to the U.S. than Europe and Germany.
    Those who oppose the NATO enlargement because of Russia's 
possible reaction are really asking us to reorder our most 
fundamental strategic priorities without even debating the 
question, not even bringing it up, without even consciously 
considering what it would mean.
    If I were in your position and had to vote on NATO 
enlargement, I would want the opponents to explain to me why 
they believe that this well-established and stabilizing order 
of strategic priorities should be reversed. I would want to 
know how they believe the dynamics of Europe, from the Atlantic 
to the Urals, in the decades ahead will not drive us out of 
Europe, leaving Europe politically and militarily not 
integrated--far from completion of its integration, but perhaps 
giving way to disintegration.
    Clearly the NATO enlargement issue should be decided not on 
the basis of Russia's reaction. Even if we knew that the worst 
will happen in Russia, that is simply not sufficient reason to 
fail to enlarge.
    Happily, the most dire warnings about Russia's reaction are 
not persuasive. In fact, NATO enlargement is far more likely to 
contribute objectively to the prospects of liberal democracy in 
Russia. I know that several experts on Russian and Soviet 
affairs believe otherwise, but I believe they are fundamentally 
mistaken. I will be glad to elaborate this dissenting view in 
the question period, but let me offer one point now.
    The key issue that will determine whether or not Russia has 
a fair chance at democratic development is empire. Both in the 
Imperial Russian period and during the Soviet period, the 
imperatives of empire made a liberal development path 
impossible. If Russia returns to empire, it has not prospects 
for becoming democratic. NATO enlargement will diminish the 
likelihood of Russia taking that path. Failure to enlarge NATO 
will encourage it.
    Other Western policies will also be required to lower the 
chances that it will return to empire. But NATO enlargement 
will make it more difficult. It will encourage those liberals 
in Russia who favor NATO enlargement precisely for this 
objective reason, but who have been intimidated into silence by 
neo-imperialist voices, trumpeting so loudly against NATO 
enlargement in Moscow today--voices which do not reflect public 
opinion polls or genuine Russian strategic interests.
    Now, to sum up, I believe that when all these arguments, 
pro or con, are sorted out, and when we look at the basic 
questions on which our foreign policy ought the turn, we will 
reach the following inexorable conclusions:
    First, the U.S. commitment to Europe has long enjoyed a 
consensus in the United States. A negative vote on enlargement 
would be to reject this consensus and go against it without 
even considering the consequences.
    Second, it is most doubtful that NATO can remain in a 
static in a rapidly changing Europe. Many of the arcane and 
complicated developments in Central Europe contributing to 
change receive too little attention or understanding in our own 
public debates on NATO enlargement.
    Third, even if all the dire warnings about Russia, if they 
come true--and I think not very probable--this should not be a 
decisive factor.
    Now, in light of these conclusions, the prudent decision, I 
think, is obvious and not even a close call. This is not to 
say, however, that enlarging NATO will not bring problems, and 
some of them quite trying. The arguments about the impact of 
dilution on the NATO military structure are serious. The 
reactions of the countries not admitted are serious. The 
Russian reaction could be troublesome. There will be some 
financial costs. To avoid these problems by not enlarging the 
Alliance, however, is to risk creating far larger problems.
    Finally, it seems to me that you members of the Senate face 
a choice in this question of no less historical importance than 
when the Senate refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty and 
when it did ratify the North Atlantic Treaty. The outcomes of 
both of those decisions are a sound guide for facing the choice 
today. Going forward with new commitments was not risk free in 
1949, but it transformed the world in a positive way. Standing 
pat, refusing to go forward in 1920, was intended to avoid 
risk, but it also transformed the world, making this the 
bloodiest century in history.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Odom follows:]
                   Prepared Statement of General Odom
    Mr. Chairman, it is not only an honor but an exceptional 
responsibility to testify before this committee on NATO enlargement. 
The gravity of the issue inspires a sense of humility. Too much is at 
stake to make the decision based on clever arguments and 
representation.
    You have already heard virtually all of the arguments that can be 
made, for and against, on this question. I do not suffer the illusion 
that I can provide much new or remarkably enlightening evidence. 
Instead I want to offer a way stand above the plethora of arguments, 
details, and evidence in order get our bearings, to simplify things, 
and to see what evidence and arguments are truly important and what can 
be safely set aside in deciding the question.
    How does one do this? I believe it comes down to focusing on only 
three basic questions, questions that draw out what is at stake, the 
most significant forces affecting what is at stake, and the priorities 
we must maintain to defend what is at stake.
    The first basic question is whether or not the United States should 
remain committed militarily and politically to Europe. This may not 
strike you as a relevant question, but I believe that will soon become 
clear that it is.
    The major lesson of the first half of this century is that when we 
have had no military ties to Germany and Japan, when we have tried to 
avoid dealing with emerging German and Japanese power, we have had war 
in Europe and Northeast Asia. The lesson of the second half of the 
century is that when we have had strong military ties to Germany and 
Japan, we not only have had peace; we have enjoyed unprecedented 
economic prosperity, and our liberal democratic values have spread in 
the world. We too often lose sight of this simple yet critically 
important understanding.
    For example, people seem to forget it when they complain that our 
wealthy allies in Europe do not carry their share of the military 
burden. One can debate how fairly the burden has been distributed, but 
one cannot deny that we have grown wealthier than our free-loading 
friends even while carrying the larger share. Our defense allocations 
in Europe should not be seen primarily as a burden. Actually they have 
been extremely profitable investments because they have made possible 
freer trade, more trade, and lower transactions costs in trading 
activities. Without them, both we and our European allies would be a 
lot poorer today.
    This is not to suggest that costs are irrelevant. There has been 
greater burden sharing precisely because US Senators have pressed it 
with our allies. Rather it is to explain why the cost issue is not 
fundamental for deciding the NATO enlargement issue. It should not 
figure in one's final decision because remaining committed to European 
security has proven a money-making, not a money-losing proposition.
    The case for keeping US forces in Europe is overwhelming when one 
considers the political and military consequences that would soon ensue 
were US forces withdrawn. This is an important conclusion, although 
again you may react by asserting that we are not debating whether or 
not to remain in Europe but whether or not to enlarge NATO.
    That strikes me as a seriously mistaken impression, and it takes me 
to the second basic question: Can NATO survive if it remains static, 
refusing to enlarge, in a dynamic and changing Europe? I have heard no 
opponents of enlarging NATO address this question. They merely assume 
that NATO can remain more or less as it is, making only internal 
adjustments. This is highly unrealistic. And the reasons why take us to 
the question of our strategic priorities in Europe. Which country is 
more important and consequential for both the United States and Europe? 
Russia or Germany? Economically, politically, and militarily, Germany 
clearly deserves first priority.
    Too many American policy-makers take Germany for granted. They 
assume that European political and military integration is 
irreversible, even close to full success, something that removes the 
century old German question from Europe's agenda. If you share that 
mistaken impression, then I ask you to consider several facts.
    First, Britain and France opposed German reunification and are 
still not happy about it, a point the Germans will not soon forget.
    Second, Britain and France fell into a serious quarrel with Germany 
over Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia during 1992-95, making a mockery of a 
common European defense and foreign policy. The British foreign 
secretary in 1994 was reported to have said that it is better to have 
Russia on the Adriatic coast than Germany. This quarrel is now 
repressed only because the United States belatedly took the leadership 
role and put NATO forces in Bosnia, and if US troops are withdrawn 
anytime soon, it will resurface with a vengeance. Would that be in our 
strategic interest? Hardly!
    Third, in Germany, virtually all political leaders of all parties 
but the Greens, and even some of the Greens, support NATO enlargement. 
Why? Several SPD leaders, some who were never very pro-NATO, have 
offered the most articulate answer. They cite the interwar period when 
Moscow, Berlin, London, Paris, and Rome competed irresponsibly for 
influence in Eastern Europe, a competition that set up the conditions 
allowing World War II to break out. They remember that even a weak 
Soviet Union was able to use diplomacy to play off the major powers in 
Europe against one another, inducing strategic instability. These 
German spokesmen argue that if NATO is not enlarged, then Germany will 
be forced to follow a unilateral Ostpolitik, a foreign policy that will 
make Germany vulnerable to deals offered by Moscow at the expense of 
the small states in Eastern and Central Europe. That in turn will 
exacerbate Germany's relations with its Western European allies. A 
common European foreign and defense policy will fade, even as an 
aspiration. And the consequences for European security and economic 
prosperity will be adverse. Can it be in the US strategic interest for 
Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Russia to fall into a major 
struggle for influence in countries of Central Europe? The Germans 
argue that the most effective way to-prevent it is to enlarge NATO.
    Fourth, I recently spoke with a group of journalists from the three 
new candidate NATO members. In our discussion, they forthrightly 
admitted that although their publics want them to join NATO because of 
the Russian threat, the more thoughtful people want to join because US 
forces in Germany will protect them from Germany. Does the United 
States really want Poland to believe and act as though it is threatened 
both by Moscow and Berlin?
    Fifth, a well placed Russian national security official told me 
that he and his colleagues foresee their main challenge as strategic 
competition with Germany for hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe. 
They oppose NATO enlargement precisely because that would neutralize 
this competition. Can it be in the US interest to allow this 
competition to distract Russia from dealing with its problems of 
economic and political reform?
    These five points indicate something of the post-Cold War dynamic 
in a changing Europe. They reveal emerging forces that a static NATO 
cannot control, and if it cannot control them, what will be the 
consequences? Just imagine the impact on Germany if the United States 
decides against NATO enlargement. Not only its western neighbors, but 
the United States as well will be at odds with Germany over its policy 
toward Russia and Central Europe. No matter how good our relations with 
Russia are, the United States will find itself embroiled in all kinds 
of intra-European bickering and competition but without NATO embracing 
a sufficient number of the troublesome countries to prevent a downward 
spiral. Reluctant to enlarge NATO, the United States will find itself 
on the path of withdrawal. It can only stay in Europe as long as its 
ties to Germany are strong and cooperative, a condition that now 
requires NATO enlargement.
    The third basic question is this: what will be the consequences for 
Russian political development if NATO enlarges? I put this question as 
number three because in the context of US strategic interests, it is 
lowest in priority. Russia is indeed an important country, but in 
deciding on NATO enlargement, one is dealing with the US stake in two 
mutually related goals: first, a secure and economically prosperous 
Europe, and second, insuring that a reunified Germany does not catalyze 
a new balance of power game among our European allies. I see no way 
that Russia can be more important for US strategic interests than these 
two goals.
    This has been the US priority since the formation of NATO--Europe 
and Germany first, Russia second. Let us suppose that all of the direst 
warnings about Russia's reactions to NATO enlargement were to come 
true. Would that provide sufficient cause for the United States to 
revise these priorities? Obviously not. I simply see no way that 
Russia, even if it becomes a thriving liberal democracy, can be more 
critical to the United States than Europe and Germany.
    Those who oppose NATO enlargement because of Russia's possible 
reaction are really asking us to reorder our most fundamental strategic 
priorities without even debating this question, without even 
consciously considering what it would mean. If I were in your position 
and had to vote on NATO enlargement, I would want the opponents to 
explain to me why they believe this well established and stabilizing 
order of strategic priorities should be reversed. I would want to know 
how they believe the dynamics of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals 
in the decades ahead will not drive us out of Europe, leaving European 
political and military integration not only incomplete but giving way 
to disintegration.
    Clearly the NATO enlargement issue should not be decided based on 
Russia's reaction. Even if we knew that the worst will happen in 
Russia, that is not a sufficient reason to fail to enlarge NATO.
    Happily, most of the dire warnings about Russia's reaction are not 
persuasive. In fact, NATO enlargement is for more likely to contribute 
objectively to the prospects for liberal democracy in Russia. I know 
that several experts on Soviet and Russian affairs believe otherwise, 
but I believe they are fundamentally mistaken. I will be glad to 
elaborate this dissenting view in the question period, but let me offer 
one reason for it at this point.
    The key issue that will determine whether or not Russia has a fair 
chance at democratic development is empire. Both in the Imperial 
Russian period and during the Soviet period, the imperatives of empire 
made a liberal development path impossible. If Russia returns to 
empire, it has no prospects for becoming democratic. NATO enlargement 
will diminish the likelihood of Russia taking the imperial path once 
again, and failure to enlarge NATO will encourage it to do so. Other 
western policies will also be required to lower the chances that it 
will return to empire, but NATO enlargement will make it more 
difficult. And it will encourage those liberals in Russia who favor 
NATO enlargement precisely for this objective reason but who have been 
intimidated into silence by the neo-imperialist voices trumpeting so 
loudly against NATO enlargement in Moscow today, voices which do not 
reflect public opinion polls or genuine Russian strategic interests.
    To sum up, I believe that when all the arguments, pro and con, are 
sorted out, and when we look at the basic questions on which our 
decision ought to turn, we will reach the following inexorable 
conclusions:
    First, the US commitment to Europe has long enjoyed a consensus in 
the United States, a consensus among both policy elites and the public 
for very good military, economic, and political reasons. A negative 
vote on enlargement would be to reject this consensus and go against it 
without even considering the consequences.
    Second, it is most doubtful that NATO can remain static in a 
rapidly changing Europe. Many of the arcane and complicated 
developments in Central Europe contributing to change receive little 
attention or understanding in our public debates on NATO enlargement.
    Third, even if all the warnings about Russia's reaction come true--
not very probable--this should not be a decisive factor in deciding 
whether or not to expand NATO.
    In light of these conclusions, the prudent decision on enlargement 
is obvious, not even a close call. This is not to say, however, that 
enlarging NATO will not bring problems, some of them quite trying. The 
arguments about the impact of dilution on the NATO military structure 
are serious. The reaction of those countries not admitted is serious. 
The Russia reaction could be troublesome. There will be some modest 
financial costs. To try to avoid those problems by not enlarging the 
alliance, however, is to risk creating far larger problems.
    Finally, it seems to me that you face a choice in this question of 
no less historical importance than when the Senate refused to ratify 
the Versailles Treaty and when it did ratify the North Atlantic Treaty. 
And the outcomes of both of those decisions are a sound guide for 
facing the choice today. Going forward with new commitments was not 
risk free in 1949, but it transformed the world in the most positive 
way. Standing pat, refusing to go forward in 1920-21, was intended to 
avoid risks, but it also transformed the world, making this century the 
bloodiest in history.

    Senator Hagel. General Odom, thank you. Mr. Simes.

  STATEMENT OF DIMITRI K. SIMES, PRESIDENT, NIXON CENTER FOR 
               PEACE AND FREEDOM, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Simes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am also 
very privileged to testify before the committee. I know that it 
is a great responsibility. I know that at this late hour, my 
particular responsibility is to try to be very brief, which I 
will, especially as so much of ground has already been covered 
and you already have my statement, in which I tried to be, to 
the best of my ability, sophisticated and nuanced.
    Senator Hagel. Your statement, Mr. Simes, will be included 
in the record.
    Mr. Simes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me say first that if we were debating today the 
question of whether Russia supports NATO enlargement, we would 
probably find a consensus among all students of Russia that the 
answer is negative. I have yet to find a single Russian who 
believes that NATO enlargement, which they assume would exclude 
Russia, is a good idea.
    But I presume that this is not what we are debating. I 
believe we are debating whether NATO enlargement may adversely 
affect important American interests vis-a-vis Russia. If that 
is the question, it is very difficult for me to find evidence 
which would suggest that we are going to lose anything of 
importance in the U.S. relationship with Russia if we proceed 
with NATO enlargement, particularly with the very cautious and 
moderate first stage of NATO enlargement, which, mind you, 
would not bring the Alliance to the Russian border, with the 
one exception of the Kaliningrad enclave.
    Even in Russia, to the best of my knowledge, no one 
seriously claims that Poland will become a staging ground for 
the invasion of Kaliningrad. If one looks at public opinion 
polls, they suggest that in today's Russia this is, for all 
practical purposes, a non-issue, particularly after Helsinki 
and Madrid.
    One can find Russian officials who duly register their 
opposition to NATO enlargement, which in Russia has become the 
functional equivalent of belief in God and apple pie. But this 
is not an emotional issue.
    Like Senator Wellstone's father, my father was also born in 
Russia. Unlike in the case of Senator Wellstone, however, my 
father-in-law still lives in Russia, as do as many of my other 
relatives and friends, some of whom actually negotiated with 
Ambassador Matlock and Ambassador Pickering these very issues 
of NATO enlargement.
    I have yet to remember a single conversation I have had 
with anyone in the Russian foreign policy establishment or in 
the Yeltsin government after office hours in which NATO 
enlargement has been a serious emotional issue. They do not 
like it. They do not approve of it. They worry about the second 
stage, especially Ukraine and the Baltic nations. But as far as 
the three Visegrad nations are concerned, it is simply not a 
serious political matter for anyone in Russia.
    When I hear that NATO enlargement could move Russian public 
opinion in a nationalist/extremist direction, I really want to 
know what kind of naivete it requires to believe this about a 
country in which, as Ambassador Matlock observed, the Russian 
leadership was the principal architect of the destruction of 
its own empire. Unlike General de Gaulle's withdrawal from 
Algeria or the British pullout from India, Russia's leaders 
made no arrangements whatsoever to protect its own citizens, 
the 26 million ethnic Russians living in other Soviet 
republics.
    They also engaged in terrible atrocities in Chechnya 
against, among others, many Russian civilians. They are not 
paying wages and pensions to their own people at the time when 
the people can easily observe the huge mansions of the new, 
elite and the private jets of Russia's new tycoons. None of 
this moves the Russian politics in a nationalist or reactionary 
direction. But somehow an obstruction like NATO enlargement is 
supposed to have a mystical destructive impact on Russian 
politics. It is very difficult for me to believe.
    As far as arms control agreements are concerned, let me 
simply say that President Yeltsin has not lifted a finger to 
have START II ratified by the Russian Duma. We have been told 
this by many Russian political commentators. We have been told 
this by many members of the Russian Duma. It has simply never 
been a priority for the Russian Government.
    I am not going to engage in speculation about what Yeltsin 
would do if he had a friendly Duma and if ratification could be 
delivered to him on a silver platter. But the fact remains that 
even before NATO enlargement became a major issue, Yeltsin was 
not interested in ratification of the START II treaty--at least 
he was not interested in fighting with Communists and 
nationalists in the Duma over this arms control agreement.
    The Nixon Center hosted Mr. Zyuganov. We had a very 
interesting presentation by him and another very interesting 
presentation by General Lebed. Both of them made very clear 
that while they have serious concerns about the START II 
agreement, these concerns connected much more to the ABM 
treaty, with all the differences between theater and 
intermediate-range nuclear defenses, than with anything that 
may happen in the first stage of NATO enlargement.
    General Lebed is a nationalist politician and a very 
ambitious man. I do not think that he would be so outspoken in 
arguing that NATO enlargement is not a problem, that the first 
stage of NATO enlargement is not a problem, if he were 
concerned that such statements would alienate his nationalist 
constituency.
    What really should be discussed is whether we need NATO 
enlargement as a protection against a new Imperial Russia. I 
agree with Ambassador Matlock that Russia is not a threat 
today. I am not going to dwell on that. It is almost self-
evident.
    However, I disagree with Ambassador Matlock that simply 
because the Yeltsin leadership was instrumental in destroying 
the old Soviet Union, we should say that it is anti-Imperial. 
It was very much to Yeltsin's advantage to destroy the Soviet 
Union and to take the country from under President Gorbachev. 
Looking at the composition of the Russian leadership today, it 
is clear that they are certainly not Jeffersonian democrats. 
They are not people who came from the ranks of dissidents or 
any kind of opposition. As Russia becomes minimally stronger 
today as the economy begins to stabilize, we see a growing 
Russian assertiveness.
    I think that Bismarck was quite right when he observed that 
Russia is never as strong or as weak as it appears to be. I 
think chances are quite good that at the beginning of the 21st 
century Russia is going to be a serious power once again--not a 
superpower--but a serious power. I can well understand that 
nations in Central Europe may be somewhat nervous about it.
    Now, I would not suggest for a second that Russia is a 
prisoners of its history. Germany and Japan prove otherwise--at 
least hopefully prove otherwise in the long run. I would not 
suggest that the current Russian leadership is interested in 
aggression. In fact, they are interested primarily in the 
enrichment of themselves and the Russian elite as a whole. But 
taking into account Russia's past and its potential power, it 
is simple prudence to proceed with a new security architecture 
in Central Europe, if it can be done without seriously damaging 
your relationship with Russia and without alienating Russian 
public opinion.
    I believe it can be done without alienating Russian public 
opinion. And the time is precisely now, when Russia is 
preoccupied with domestic issues when we have a fairly benign 
relationship with Yeltsin, and when Russia is still modestly 
dependent upon foreign aid, particularly from the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. The present time is a 
window of opportunity to expand NATO without entering into a 
confrontation with Moscow.
    Where I see a problem with Russia and NATO enlargement is 
exactly where Secretary Kissinger sees it. I am not going to 
talk about that a great deal. I am sure that he presented his 
perspective; mine is very close to his. I am not going to talk 
about NATO bodies and what kind of voice Russia will have 
within them. This is not a purely technical question. I think 
that the administration is entitled to argue that there is 
enough ambiguity in the Final Act for us to believe that Russia 
is getting a voice but not a veto.
    But everything depends on who interprets the Final Act. Mr. 
Yasrtrzhembsky, Yeltsin's press secretary, said, 2 days after 
the Final Act was signed that it was not the end of the battle 
over NATO enlargement,end, but rather the beginning of the 
battle of the interpretation of the Final Act, and that Russia 
would try to interpret it in the broadest possible way.
    Looking at the Clinton administration record vis-a-vis 
Russia, I have to admit that I am concerned that the Clinton 
administration is not always prepared to be sufficiently 
realistic about Russian behavior and intentions. I think that 
the administration has not leveled with the American people 
about President Yeltsin's undemocratic practices, including the 
gross violations of human rights in Chechnya, which were real 
atrocities perfectly comparable to what happened in Bosnia.
    I think the Clinton administration has not leveled with the 
American people and the Congress about the extent of 
corruption, which reaches into the highest echelons of the 
Russian Government. Some of the people labelled reformers by 
the administration are called thieves in Moscow.
    I think that the administration has been somewhat too 
lenient about Russian arms control violations, about violations 
of a variety of other agreements and, even more important, 
about defending American interests, particularly in the case of 
Russian nuclear missile and energy deals with Iran. Under these 
circumstances, I am not confident that the administration's 
interpretation of the Final Act will be based on sufficiently 
realistic assumptions about Russia rather than our best hopes 
and sometimes naive expectations.
    That is why it seems to me we have to appreciate one very 
simple fact. NATO, of course, has to be adjusted in a number of 
ways. The call to reform it is proper. NATO adaptation should 
be debated in this building and across the Atlantic, and a 
great deal of innovative thinking and serious discussion is in 
order. But I am concerned that sometimes people in the 
administration, and especially those who opposed the expansion 
and have now joined the administration, are trying to use NATO 
expansion to change the very nature of the Alliance, and to 
turn it into a collective security body. That, in my view, 
would be a major mistake.
    Let me conclude with a very simple proposition. A strong 
and effective NATO will be not an obstacle, but an asset in 
dealing with Moscow in the 21st century. It will not create new 
dividing lines in Europe as long as we cooperate with Russia on 
many other levels, from trade to security. It is precisely 
because we want to have a united Europe that we need to create 
certainty in Russia's about what is permissible and what is off 
limits. That security climate would be much better for a united 
Europe than the misguided accommodation of Russia today, which 
can lead only to trouble, misunderstanding and confrontation 
tomorrow.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Simes follows:]
                    Prepared Statement of Mr. Simes
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, for the 
opportunity to explain my views on the impact of NATO enlargement on 
Russia, its foreign policy, and its relations with the United States. 
Let me state first, however, that the Nixon Center for Peace and 
Freedom does not take institutional positions on policy issues and, 
accordingly, that my remarks today represent strictly my own opinions.
    To put the impact of NATO's enlargement on Russia in its proper 
context, it is important to remember the original reasons behind the 
expansion of the Alliance. Those reasons did not include strengthening 
U.S. ties with Russia; rather, they were built around promoting 
stability and security in Central Europe, consolidating the gains of 
democracy in the region, and responding to the historical aspirations 
of its peoples to be included in the Western community of nations. It 
is these goals that have been presented as the principal rationale for 
NATO's expansion by the U.S., its NATO partners, and prospective 
members in the Alliance. Accordingly, in evaluating the impact of NATO 
enlargement on Russia, the key question is not ``Will NATO enlargement 
have a positive effect on Russia?'' but ``Will NATO enlargement 
adversely affect key U.S. interests with respect to Russia?'' By such a 
standard, NATO expansion--especially in its first stage--is not a 
problem.
    Even before the agreements reached between Presidents Clinton and 
Yeltsin in Helsinki in March of this year--and despite the efforts of 
some Russian opinion-makers--the Russian public was not at all 
exercised about the prospect of NATO expansion. A variety of polls 
indicated that under 10% of Russia's citizens see NATO enlargement as a 
serious threat. After the Helsinki Summit, and particularly after the 
July 8-9 Madrid Summit, the NATO issue has for all practical purposes 
dropped off the radar screens of the vast majority of Russia's 
citizens.
    Nevertheless, opponents of NATO enlargement continue to predict 
darkly that expanding the Alliance will undermine the Yeltsin 
government and turn Russian domestic politics in a reactionary, 
nationalist direction. It requires an inordinate degree of naivet6 to 
take this argument--which is also the principal argument against NATO 
expansion made by some elements of the Russian government and foreign 
policy establishment--at face value. If the Yeltsin regime could 
survive nationalist ire after playing a leading role in the destruction 
of the USSR and essentially abandoning 26 million ethnic Russians 
living in the other Newly Independent States; if it could survive 
public outrage over its conduct of a genocidal war in Chechnya in which 
at least 40,000 civilians (including many ethnic Russians) were killed; 
if it could withstand the humiliation of defeat in that same war by the 
Chechen rebels; if it could be forgiven for using tanks against its own 
democratically-elected (albeit very imperfect) parliament in October 
1993 (after Yeltsin issued a decree to dissolve it that he himself 
admitted at the time was ``extra-constitutional''); if it could survive 
the massive redistribution of Soviet/Russian state property to corrupt 
officials and well-connected tycoons who make America's 19th century 
robber barons look like innocents; if it could sustain itself while 
withholding wage and pension payments to millions of citizens for 
months while the same officials and tycoons built huge mansions and 
bought private jets, it is difficult to imagine how an abstraction like 
the incorporation of three Central European states with no shared 
border with Russia (with the exception of Poland's border with the 
Kaliningrad enclave) into NATO could have a serious impact on Russian 
politics. If such an impact were to any serious degree imaginable, it 
is highly unlikely that an unabashedly nationalist presidential 
candidate such as General Aleksandr Lebed would say point-blank that 
NATO enlargement ``poses no threat at this stage.''
    Those in Russia who oppose NATO enlargement can be divided into two 
broad categories. The first category includes xenophobic Communists and 
hardline nationalists who have made opposition to the West, and the 
U.S. in particular, their battle cry. This group does not need NATO 
enlargement--or any other Western policy--to become motivated and 
mobilized. What little basis is necessary to trigger complaints and 
accusations from them is demonstrated by an open letter to President 
Clinton from the heads of several Duma committees (with the notable 
absence of the Yabloko faction) on October 16 charging that NATO's 
``Sea Breeze-97'' maneuvers with Ukrainian forces in Crimea violated 
the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 1949 Geneva 
Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons because they took 
place in the vicinity of a children's hospital.
    The second category of Russian critics of NATO enlargement consists 
principally of government officials and pro-government establishment 
figures who want to establish their patriotic credentials on the cheap 
to protect themselves in Russia's increasingly nationalist political 
climate. Significantly, after Helsinki and particularly Madrid, these 
voices have been considerably muted--at least as far as the first stage 
of expansion is concerned. Some even argue that if Russia manages to 
develop meaningful cooperation with NATO through the NATO Russia 
Permanent Joint Council, it is not inconceivable, as an influential 
Izvestia columnist recently wrote, that in two years the Russian press 
agency ITAR-TASS will report on President Yeltsin's congratulations to 
the Presidents of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic on their 
entry into the Alliance.
    For the United States to fail to proceed with NATO enlargement 
would be a stunning event, even in Russia, and a tremendous victory for 
the hardliners.
    Some American critics of NATO expansion also argue that enlarging 
the Alliance may complicate the Russian State Duma's ratification of 
the START II treaty and other arms control agreements. However, this 
argument ignores the fact that to this day--before and after Western 
discussions of NATO enlargement--the Yeltsin government has done next 
to nothing to get START II ratified. NATO enlargement cannot be an 
alibi for President Yeltsin's failure to make START II ratification a 
priority, especially as the Duma opposition connects ratification much 
more closely to the maintenance of the ABM treaty than to NATO 
expansion. Paradoxically, the process of NATO enlargement could even 
improve Russian cooperation on arms control if the Clinton 
Administration indicates that the scope and timing of the next round of 
expansion may be influenced by Russia's arms control performance. At 
present, there is simply not a single negative development in Russian 
foreign policy which can be attributed to NATO expansion.
    The relationships with China and Iran--which are often cited as 
``responses'' to NATO enlargement--also have other, prior, and more 
substantial causes.
    Thus, I believe that the impact of NATO enlargement on Russia 
should not be a major concern in evaluating the future of the Alliance. 
Conversely, however, the potential Russian challenge should be a 
legitimate consideration in deciding when and how to expand the 
Alliance. Russia today is not in a position to threaten its European 
neighbors. Its armed forces are too weak and its dependence on foreign 
aid and investment is too great to encourage provocative conduct. Also, 
Russia is led by a relatively benign government which seems generally 
committed to developing a reputation as a good international citizen. 
It is not a government which seems prepared to take chances in the name 
of anything other than the immediate economic interests of the new 
post-Communist elite.
    But the Russian economy is beginning to show signs of 
stabilization. Russia's leaders seem to believe, perhaps prematurely, 
that their country is now less dependent on credits from the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund. Also, for the first time, there is 
serious talk of military reform. And there are indications of a new, 
more assertive foreign policy in Moscow aimed at undermining U.S. 
global leadership and shaping a new, ``multipolar'' international 
system. Finally, Boris Yeltsin will not be the President of Russia 
forever and, since the Russian constitution was uniquely tailored to 
his personal political needs, there is a good chance of significant 
changes in Russia when Yeltsin leaves office. Simple prudence suggests 
that an appropriate security architecture should be created to define 
the limits to any revanchist aspirations should they ever again impel 
Russian policy. It is precisely now, when Russia is relatively weak and 
preoccupied with its own evolution--and when, due to its benign 
relationship with the West, NATO enlargement is less likely to be 
perceived through the prism of hostility--that is the right time to 
proceed .
    As Germany and Japan have demonstrated in the second half of the 
20th century, no nation is a prisoner of its history. It would be both 
unfair and counterproductive to accuse the presently peaceful Russia of 
aggressive designs preemptively. But history should not be ignored 
either. It is outright recklessness not to take Russia's past--and 
power--into account when considering the future of Europe. This is all 
the more true as we have already seen how extremely brutal today's 
relatively benign Moscow can be, even with its own citizens, when 
Russia's leaders believe they can get away with such behavior.
    The inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO 
will not create new lines of division in Europe as long as Russia 
remains on the path of democratic development and does not threaten its 
neighbors. The new ties between Russia and the West--in the economic, 
political, security, and even social spheres--are broad and deep enough 
to preclude such an eventuality. What NATO enlargement does is create 
certainty in Moscow that policies of aggression and intimidation in 
Central Europe will have profoundly negative consequences.
    That understanding will be advantageous even to the nations not 
invited, at least in the near future, to join the Alliance just as the 
presence of NATO members on the borders of Austria, Sweden, and Finland 
provided an essential security umbrella during the Cold War. Ukraine 
and the Baltic States will benefit in a similar manner from the 
inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the Alliance. 
Although Ukraine is not at this point seeking membership in the 
Alliance as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are, all four states are 
united in the belief that NATO enlargement--even if limited to its 
current parameters--is advantageous to their security. As a matter of 
fact, as expansion of the Alliance has become increasingly likely, 
Russian treatment of Ukraine and the Baltic States has become more 
moderate and more flexible. Russian policymakers clearly appreciate 
that rocking the boat too much could accelerate NATO's expansion to 
Russia's frontier--something they are eager to avoid.
    It is not the implications of NATO expansion within Russia but 
rather Russia's new role in NATO which could create profound problems. 
From the outset, when Central European nations first announced their 
intentions to join NATO, Moscow has taken the position that enlargement 
would be acceptable to Russia only if the Alliance changed its name and 
transformed itself into a universal collective security system. The 
Clinton Administration rejected the first symbolic demand but has made 
major concessions to accommodate the second, substantive one.
    There is enough ambiguity in the so-called Founding Act between 
NATO and Russia to allow the administration to claim that Russia has 
been given a voice but not a veto. But the Permanent Joint Council 
established by the Founding Act has at least the technical possibility 
to deal with a broad range of political and security matters central to 
the ability of the Alliance to maintain its character as a cohesive 
military organization. The Russian government is certain to interpret 
its prerogatives under the Founding Act as broadly as possible. As 
Yeltsin spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky put it, ``the signing of the 
agreement is not the end but the beginning of its life: it begins the 
struggle over its interpretation.''
    Thus, a great deal depends on who interprets the agreement and how 
it is interpreted on the NATO side--particularly in Washington. In this 
respect, the Clinton Administration's record does not inspire 
particular confidence. The President and his advisors have consistently 
demonstrated a predisposition to go the extra mile to accommodate the 
Yeltsin government. This excessively generous attitude has ranged from 
a reluctance to criticize Russian atrocities in Chechnya to a refusal 
to acknowledge the undemocratic practices and pervasive corruption 
evident at the highest levels in Moscow, and from the promotion of 
Russian membership in the G-7 and the Paris and London Clubs--none of 
which are justified on economic merits--to lobbying on Russia's behalf 
with the IMF and World Bank. The administration is also hesitant to 
introduce any penalties for undesirable Russian behavior when important 
U.S. interests--and even U.S. laws--are disregarded, as in the case of 
Russian nuclear, energy, and weapons deals with Iran. Further, senior 
administration officials make clear that they visualize not just an 
expanded NATO but a fundamentally altered NATO, redesigned in a manner 
which appears to be largely along the collective security lines 
advocated by Russia.
    After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO is in need of 
adaptation if it is to cope with a radically different international 
environment. This reform will require innovative thinking and serious 
debate on both sides of the Atlantic. But it would be a great mistake 
to use the expansion of the Alliance as cover to change its nature 
fundamentally simply in order to avoid alienating Russia. A strong and 
effective NATO is not an obstacle, but an asset in dealing with Moscow 
in the 21st century.

Dimitri K Simes is President of the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, 
a non-partisan public policy institution with offices in Washington, DC 
and Southern California.

    Senator Hagel. Mr. Simes, thank you very much.
    To all three of you, thank you.
    Ambassador Matlock, have you missed your train, or will you 
be taking another train?
    Ambassador Matlock. I have another 10 minutes, yes.
    Senator Hagel. May I start with you. I know you have to get 
a train, and I am grateful that you would spend some time with 
us.
    I noted you being a little itchy, listening to your friends 
and colleagues. Would you care to respond? This is not open 
ended, by the way. But if you would take a couple of minutes to 
respond, I would be interested in a couple of your responses to 
what you heard.
    Ambassador Matlock. Just two points. Although, obviously, 
to discuss them thoroughly would take a long time.
    First of all, I really cannot understand General Odom's 
feeling that NATO is static if it does not take in new members. 
It seems to me NATO has been substantially changing its focus 
and its orientation. We made some rather significant changes in 
connection with German unification. We since have had the 
Partnership for Peace, which is just beginning to be 
implemented. All the states in the area are members of that. 
Some are going to be more active than others. We still have not 
really tested the limits of that. Now we have the Founding Act 
with Russia.
    I think these are all very, very important changes in NATO. 
I do not understand how is can be considered ``static.''.
    I would say I simply do not accept that we have to take new 
members in now, under these conditions, in order to preserve 
NATO. I do have the strong feeling that it is not just a matter 
of these three countries. We have said that others are coming. 
I do not see how we can avoid a divisive debate for many years 
to come about who they are going to be. I do not think that is 
the primary security issue we face.
    Regarding Mr. Simes' comments, I would simply clarify my 
own position. My position is not that we should accommodate 
Russia. Far from it. It does seem to me that whatever residual 
imperialistic tendencies, which, indeed, can be a problem, can 
best be contained by methods other than adding members to NATO. 
I can think of no lever more effective, no political lever, 
than the threat that if Russian behavior does not meet certain 
standards, NATO will be enlarged, and enlarged very rapidly, 
and even further, and considerably further, than the current 
proposal envisages.
    As a diplomat, I would love to have such leverage to try to 
keep them in line. Therefore, I think that my position is not 
properly described as one calling for concessions to Russia.
    My final point would be that if indeed NATO is to be the 
primary instrument for preventing conflict among its members, 
then why not enlarge it to cover those areas where there is 
actual violence? The current proposal is to bring countries 
into NATO that do not need it to keep them from becoming 
threats to the press. If that is the objective, then, for 
goodness sake, let us look at the Balkans. Let us look at 
Transcaucasia.
    My point is that we need to use other means to deal with 
violence-prone areas in Europe. They will be much more 
effective. I do not see that Germany is a potential problem. I 
am just not seeing evidence that supports General Odom's 
assertion. One can draw all sorts of scenarios, and yet, he 
says that his scenario has not been refuted. Well, if I had a 
week or so to write it out, I could refute it, and probably 
write a book almost as long as the one I wrote before. But, 
obviously, we do not have time for that now.
    Thank you.
    Senator Hagel. Mr. Ambassador, do you foresee at any time 
in the future a need or a reason for NATO enlargement?
    Ambassador Matlock. Possibly, yes. I testified here 2 years 
ago that I could see two conditions under which NATO 
enlargement would not only be desirable but necessary. One 
would be an arrangement which would include Russia, and either 
have some Russia/NATO arrangement where this would be part, but 
would make Russia a partner in responsibility for helping 
maintain the security of Europe.
    The other would be a situation whereby Russia potentially 
or actually begins to threaten other countries in Europe. In 
either instance, I would be in favor of enlargement. But it 
does seem to me that we have many instruments today to meet the 
legitimate concerns of the East Europeans.
    I am one who feels that their membership in the European 
Union is much more important to their future and to the 
development of democracy and to the development of their 
economies than is membership in a military organization, when 
their security is not under threat from military sources.
    Thank you.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you.
    Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. I am going to direct my questions to you at 
the moment, since you have to leave. I am a little confused--
and I mean that seriously--about the correlation between the 
expansion of NATO and Nunn-Lugar. Rather than my characterizing 
it, can you explain that to me again?
    Ambassador Matlock. I did not connect the two. What I said 
was that I consider the most serious potential security threat 
to the American people the possibility that weapons of mass 
destruction from Russian arsenals will seep out to 
irresponsible rogue regimes or terrorist groups.
    Senator Biden. I agree with that concern.
    Ambassador Matlock. And that I do not see a strategy 
emerging from the administration to deal with this. I said that 
one of the most effective things we are doing did not originate 
there. It originated here on the Hill, which shows that the 
influence. So I was praising this program and praising the 
initiative from the Senate to do so.
    Senator Biden. I understood that. I just thought you were 
suggesting a connection and you have clarified it. I thought 
you were making a connection that the one thing that made a lot 
of sense was Nunn-Lugar. Nunn-Lugar worked as far as it was 
allowed to go. This administration has not had a larger or 
broader or more encompassing initiative to either keep 
scientists and/or materiel from----
    Ambassador Matlock. I think you are absolutely--yes, that 
was the point I was making. I think if I look and try to assess 
what are the real near-term security threats to the American 
people, threats that could result in substantial casualties, 
this is the one that I would put at the top of the list.
    Senator Biden. All right.
    Ambassador Matlock. And I think it is the responsibility 
to--and I am convinced that bringing new members into NATO is 
irrelevant to it, and potentially can undermine the effort. I 
would like to know how the administration--I would think the 
Senate would like to know--what plans it has to deal with this 
and how it relates to its plans for NATO enlargement.
    Senator Biden. I would also like to know their plan to deal 
with a number of issues that relate to Russia and other places. 
But I do not know why we cannot sort of walk and chew gum at 
the same time. That is, press them on that, and if this other 
matter is unrelated--and I think it is, although you say 
potentially it could undermine efforts to deal with weapons of 
mass destruction--I am lost on how it potentially undermines 
those efforts--press the administration and still do our job. 
Constitutionally Senators are constituted to do one thing and 
only do one thing in foreign policy--and that is, we have to 
react.
    We cannot make foreign policy. We can initiate things like 
Nunn-Lugar, which I played a small part in. But, ultimately, we 
basically react in the area of foreign policy. If we had our 
way, I could make the argument that continuing the Partnership 
for Peace, which turned out to be much more robust and much 
more successful than I think anyone thought it would be at the 
outset, may arguably have been a better way to go, and that to 
continue that process and beef it up before you move to 
expansion, if you move to expansion, would have been better.
    But we are where we are. From my perspective--I speak only 
for myself, but I do not think I am totally alone in this--I 
did not see a threat when I was in Warsaw or Budapest or in 
Slovenia or anyone else seeing an immediate threat from Russia. 
But I see the threat lying in a gray zone existing where there 
is instability, where individual nations seek their own 
individual alliances, like they have in past historical moments 
like this, and where competing interests on the continent 
conclude that they will, not by the use of force but by the use 
of economic, political and diplomatic leverage, attempt to 
affect the foreign policy of those nations that are in play.
    And Poland is in play. Ukraine is in play. These countries 
are in play. So my view is that by making them part of NATO we 
enhance stability, although arguably there could be a better 
and more successful way of doing what I seek, and that is to we 
enhance stability. It seems to me if I am a Russian democrat, 
the last thing I want happening is the various countries that 
were either part of the Union and/or were satellites out there 
deciding what their relationships with their neighbors are 
going to be.
    I would argue, for example, that the only reason Romania 
has worked out, for the first time in my lifetime, some 
reasonable arrangement with their Hungarian brothers is because 
of the prospect of NATO admission. I would argue the reason why 
Germany and Poland moved on border disputes as rapidly as they 
did, in part, was related to this issue.
    So I find it to be something that is calming troubled 
waters. I do not think the Russian bear is going to, all of a 
sudden, resurrect itself and come roaring across Europe again. 
Quite frankly, I do not think so. Where I disagree with Mr. 
Simes is that I think it is not only crippled, I think it is an 
amputee right now.
    Now, maybe bears can grow back limbs; I do not know. That 
may happen. I am not suggesting anything is permanent in this 
business. But for the next 10 to 20 years, it seems to me 
incredibly difficult to figure out a circumstance where anyone 
in Russia would contemplate the use of land forces or engaging 
in an all-out war in Europe. I mean, I just think that is not 
likely.
    But whether that is true or not, it seems to me there is a 
fairly compelling argument, Jack, that something is going to 
happen. Something is going to happen, over the next 5 years, 
with Poland and with the Czech Republic and in countries not 
invited, Romania and others, as to how they are going to 
determine what their security arrangements are going to be.
    We, in a sense, talk about them like they are orphans. You 
know, either we or the Russians are going to decide their 
future. When, in fact, I quite frankly think they are sitting 
there thinking, OK, if we do not get this deal, what do we do?
    Ambassador Matlock. Well, Senator, I do know the area well. 
I speak Czech. I read Polish. I know the literature, the 
history. I was Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, not only the 
Soviet Union.
    Senator Biden. I know that. That is why I am asking.
    Ambassador Matlock. I would simply say that I do not buy 
the argument that we hear from some--and I know this is not 
yours--that this is a geopolitical vacuum. It is not a vacuum. 
These are countries that are now basically very healthy 
politically. They know where their orientation is. It is to the 
West. They are not going to start making alliances elsewhere. 
That would be idiotic, and it would be against their whole 
culture.
    Senator Biden. Well, I am not suggesting they will make 
them elsewhere. They may make them amongst themselves.
    Ambassador Matlock. But the thing is, I think this is 
actually a very stable part of Europe now. If there is 
instability and if the argument is that NATO has to bring 
members in and order to give them incentives to make it stable, 
then look at the Balkans.
    Now, I am not making that argument.
    Senator Biden. That is why I think Slovenia should be part 
of NATO.
    Ambassador Matlock. Well, and we need to go even further. 
Slovenia is stable. Do you want Bosnia in? This would give them 
a real incentive to get together.
    Senator Biden. No, Jack.
    Ambassador Matlock. No, I mean, really. If you follow that 
logic, if you follow that logic----
    General Odom.  The answer is NATO out-of-area action.
    Senator Hagel. What we will do here is we will let 
everybody in this.
    Ambassador Matlock. Thank you very much. I do have a train 
I have to catch.
    Senator Hagel. General Odom, do you want to jump in? Mr. 
Simes?
    Senator Biden. You better catch your train. I am accustomed 
to having to catch the train.
    Senator Hagel. Ambassador Matlock, thank you very, very 
much.
    Senator Biden. Thank you.
    Ambassador Matlock. Thank you both.
    Senator Hagel. Why don't we just pursue what we have been 
throwing around here. I know you both have some thoughts 
regarding some of the statements Ambassador Matlock made. So 
you just jump in where you want, General Odom. Please, Mr. 
Simes, feel free to engage here.
    General Odom.  Let me followup on this point, because I 
think Senator Biden, in responding to Ambassador Matlock, is 
putting his finger right on the point I tried to highlight and 
say is being lost entirely in the situation. The Ambassador 
said he did not understand why NATO is static. He understands 
it is changing. I say that it makes internal adjustments, 
surely, but my statement was that NATO does not have its arms 
around all of the dynamic forces and change in Europe in a way 
that will allow it to control, either with out-of-area 
operations in Bosnia or otherwise.
    And Senator Biden has just gone down and reiterated the 
kinds of dynamics in Central Europe that are outside of NATO 
and that will, as the Germans warn us, become the basis for 
deals between Moscow and Berlin at the expense of the East 
Europeans, which, in turn, will invite the British and the 
French to cut deals inside, or it can work the other way. We do 
not know. But we do know that we had several variants of that 
in the inter-war period.
    We also know that 7 years out, 5 years out from the 
Versailles Treaty, if we had been in this room, having the 
debate again, we would have had an ambassador telling us about 
how stable the democracies in Poland and Czechoslovakia and 
Romania and Hungary were. They were then.
    By the mid-1930's, they were all gone but the Czechs. We 
are much too early to reach those kind of conclusions. That is 
the point I want to make.
    The other point I want to relate to you and reemphasize is, 
having said that, we do not draw the further connection that if 
you really buy in the arguments against expansion, you are 
raising a very real prospect that you are voting to leave 
Europe. Now, I do not hear people saying that, and I do not see 
people thinking about that. I think you make that probability. 
Nothing is certain. But I think you make that probability very 
significantly higher.
    And if you want to convince yourself, go talk to the 
Germans. I think they are pretty critical.
    Senator Biden. We have similar isolationist friends up here 
today that we have talked to. We may have to go to Germany.
    General Odom.  But those are the essential components. That 
is the point I want to leave you.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you.
    Mr. Simes?
    Mr. Simes. I would like to respond to Senator Biden, if I 
may.
    Senator, I completely agree with you that if we lived in an 
ideal world, we would not need NATO enlargement in Central 
Europe. But I would like to remind you of the dynamics of the 
process. The idea did not originate in Washington. It did not 
originate in the White House. It originated in Central Europe.
    I would even go one step further. If Boris Yeltsin did not 
go to Warsaw and, as we are now told, have a little bit too 
much to drink with President Walesa, and then say things that 
encouraged the Poles, which Walesa exploited very carefully to 
claim that Russia now did not mind NATO expansion, we perhaps 
would not be having the discussion. But we are dealing with a 
real situation, not a hypothetical one.
    I did not mean, Senator, for a second to imply that 10 or 
15 years from now I expect Russian armies moving----
    Senator Biden. No, I was not suggesting you said that.
    Mr. Simes. I understand. But let me continue. What worries 
me is that Central European nations, whose history with Russia 
is very different than America's history with Russia, look at 
the situation with a much greater degree of concern. They will 
want to go even one step further. So we should also discuss 
Ukraine and the Baltic nations.
    Opponents of enlargement very often say, well, if you 
really want to protect those who are truly vulnerable, why 
don't you expand instantly into Ukraine and the Baltic nations? 
Of course, Ukraine has not asked us. They have not applied for 
membership. As far as the Baltic nations are concerned, 
however, something very interesting has happened recently.
    Once NATO's expansion into Central Europe became almost 
inevitable from the Russian standpoint, and once Russia became 
concerned what could happen with the Baltic applications, 
Moscow's treatment of the Baltic states improved immeasurably. 
As has Russian flexibility vis-a-vis Ukraine. During the Cold 
War the Austrians, Finns, and Swedes were neutral, but they 
benefited from the power equilibrium in Europe and the 
certainty, in the Russian mind, that certain things Moscow 
tried to say would be off limits.
    It is these kind of subtle concerns, rather than the 
apocalyptic scenarios, that, in my view, favor NATO 
enlargement.
    Senator Biden. Let me ask you a question. I would argue 
that the same dynamic is going to take place within Russia. And 
there is an expression that I always use with my younger staff 
when they come on, and they say, why don't you tell Senator so 
and so why he should vote for this? And I say, I never tell 
another man or woman her politics. They know their politics 
better than I do. They know what works in their State better 
than I can presume to tell them what their best political 
judgment is.
    And it is kind of presumptuous, in carrying that a little 
further, to tell another country what its interests are. But it 
seems to me--and I mean this sincerely--it seems to me that the 
dynamics put in play here not only are the ones that, in my 
view, have required the Romanian Government to accommodate the 
Hungarian minority, but have required the Russian Government to 
accommodate more readily the Baltic concerns. I think you are 
going to see that same dynamic occur within Russia.
    It is a very basic decision. You two have forgotten more 
about this than I am going to learn. But let me just state it 
for you and ask you to comment.
    Part of the struggle within Russia, historically, in the 
last 70, 80, 90 years--70 years--has not been merely communism 
or capitalism. It has been West versus rejection in the West. 
It seems to me that the dynamic that gets put in play here, is 
for Russia and successive Russian Governments, if I had to bet, 
to look West for anchors rather than looking to Central Europe 
or to the East. Because Central Europe is no longer an option 
as we make this judgment--Central Europe alone.
    And so I would think--and I would like you to comment on 
this, the human mind has an incredible ability to rationalize--
I made the judgment this expansion is a good idea, and I want 
to make sure I am not kidding myself about this. But it seems 
to me that one of the potentials is that it is as likely that 
this will ameliorate the conduct, the negative conduct, of 
Russian Governments in the future as it is that it will 
exacerbate the negative aspects of their conduct.
    Is that because you have, I would say, a more--some would 
say--more realistic, others would say more pessimistic view of 
what may happen in Russia? Would you comment on that?
    Mr. Simes. Senator, first of all, my view is not 
pessimistic. Let me put it differently. It is more open minded. 
What I see in Russia today is a mixed bag. There are a variety 
of trends. Some, on the top, very disturbing. Others are quite 
encouraging, such as the emergence of a middle class and 
something that begins to look like civil society. I am not 
pessimistic about the Russian future. I am agnostic.
    The most fundamental choices, of course, will have to be 
made by Russia. But to the extent that empire has traditionally 
been a straight jacket on Russian democracy, a better Russian 
relationship with the Balts and a more normal Russian 
relationship with Ukraine would be a contribution to Russian 
democracy, to the establishment of checks and balances, and, in 
the long run, to a more benign Russian foreign policy.
    Senator Biden. Well, that is a more succinct and rational 
way of saying what I was attempting to say.
    General Odom.  I would add that most of the arguments you 
are making I have made in writing for some time. I think most 
of my colleagues in the Soviet area really got it wrong. The 
impact on Russia internally of NATO expansion has been 
positive. You had a very distinguished scholar, like Sergei 
Blogavolin, make this argument openly and strongly in Russia 
back in 1993. In fact, an article that I wrote was translated 
for NATO expansion.
    It was translated and published in a Russian newspaper, and 
Blogavolin was asked to respond to it. He said, I do not 
disagree. He made the argument for the Russian side.
    So I also remember having a discussion in March 1996 with a 
former very high-level official in the Foreign Ministry, who 
said the minute the elections are over this summer, the next 
day you should enlarge NATO. If you were to, again, to 
understand his rationale for that, it would follow exactly the 
line that you are making, Senator.
    Senator Biden. I agree. By the way, to get Western Europe 
to react to a threat that is a perceived threat or an agreed-
upon threat from Moscow, that calls for enlargement, as the 
Ambassador suggested, seems to me to run counter to every 
instinct that would likely come to the fore. As the Ambassador 
says there are two circumstances in which he would suggest 
expansion, one of which is the emergence of a genuine threat.
    It would seem to me that every apologist argument in the 
world would begin to be made once that occurred. I mean, the 
likelihood of it expanding in that circumstance seems to me to 
be highly unlikely, if past is prologue. Second, in terms of 
being viewed as whether or not it is a pejorative act, whether 
it is a threatening act, it would be put in that context of 
emergency or threat. Because it would be. It would be a 
counter.
    Senator Hagel. We are going to do one more minute. I do not 
want to in any way inhibit the good Senator Biden's voting 
record. I want to keep a perfect record for him. We had a vote 
called about 5 minutes ago. So if we can get 1 minute more. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Simes. Let me make a second comment. Senator, as you 
explained very well, we have to be practical about our choices. 
You cannot rewrite history. You can advise, consent and perhaps 
amend agreements signed by the President. You have to ask how 
the Russians, particularly Russian hardliners, would interpret 
it if this NATO enlargement were rejected by the U.S. Senate.
    I do not know whether NATO enlargement will help Russian 
politics. But I know that the rejection of enlargement would 
have a devastating impact on the credibility of Russian 
reformers.
    Senator Hagel. General Odom?
    General Odom.  I will take 30 seconds.
    Senator Biden raised one of my concerns when he said he has 
convinced himself of this and he wants to be sure. I have had 
the same reaction. It seems to me the case, even though great 
imponderables face us here, the case is enormously compelling 
to expand. Therefore, I have been going through what I call an 
honesty in advertisement exercise, in trying to foresee the 
problems that are going to emerge. There are some. I list a few 
here. I think one that this body may face is that merely the P-
for-P force requirements are overextending the troop levels we 
have in Europe today, plus Bosnia.
    Another one is whether or not we understand the connection 
of succeeding in Bosnia with NATO enlargement. We cannot fail, 
and separate that issue.
    Senator Biden. Absolutely.
    General Odom.  There are tough issues here.
    Senator Biden. The chairman and I have been talking about 
that one for a few months.
    Senator Hagel. Yes.
    General Odom.  Thank you.
    Senator Hagel. Gentlemen, you have been very, very helpful. 
Thank you.
    Senator Biden. Thank you.
    Mr. Simes. Thank you very much.
    [Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to 
reconvene at 10:04 a.m., November 5, 1997.]



                    PUBLIC VIEWS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1997

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon Smith 
presiding.
    Present: Senators Smith, Kerry and Robb.
    Senator Smith. Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.
    Today's hearing will provide an opportunity for the Foreign 
Relations Committee to hear from a broad spectrum of ethnic, 
civic interest, and religious groups with views on NATO 
enlargement. We will hear from a total of 15 witnesses, both 
for and against NATO enlargement.
    In the letter of invitation to each of these witnesses, the 
committee asked that oral statements be limited to 5 minutes. I 
plead with our witnesses in advance to please adhere to that 
limit in order to insure that all views can be heard today.
    Longer written statements, of course, will be submitted in 
their entirety as part of the permanent record of the NATO 
expansion debate. So we would welcome any additional comments 
you would like to enter for the record.
    I expect the witnesses to express their views with 
precision and ask Senators, if they find it necessary to ask 
for additional explanations, to limit their questions to one 
per witness.
    Before we start, I ask unanimous consent to include in the 
record the testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Marc 
Grossman, Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Cramer, that of 
Dr. Stephen Cambone, Dr. Steve Larrabee, and Dr. John Micgiel. 
This testimony was prepared for an October 22 hearing on the 
qualifications of candidates for NATO membership. That hearing 
was canceled at the last minute due to an unrelated objection 
in the Senate.
    Finally, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the 
Ambassadors of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as well 
as testimony of several organizations not able to appear today 
be included in the printed record of this hearing.
    It is so ordered.
    [The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
    Senator Smith. Senator Biden will be joining us shortly. He 
is at the White House at another meeting. But I know he wants 
to be here, especially to greet and I think ask questions of 
Mr. Jan Nowak.
    I now recognize Mr. Nowak, the representative of the 
Central and Eastern European Coalition as the first witness, to 
be followed by the remaining witnesses, which I will announce 
after Mr. Nowak.
    Mr. Nowak, we welcome you and thank you so much for being 
here to share your experience and your views with us.

  STATEMENT OF JAN NOWAK, REPRESENTATIVE, CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
            EUROPEAN COALITION, ANNANDALE, VIRGINIA

    Mr. Nowak. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am here as 
a spokesman of the Central and Eastern European Coalition, 
which unites 22 million U.S. citizens from 14 ethnic 
communities.
    At the first stage of NATO enlargement, the Senate will be 
asked to ratify the admission of only three new NATO members. 
Why, then, do all our ethnic communities unanimously support 
this decision?
    We do not believe that the isolation or humiliation of 
Russia would serve the interests of the United States or the 
countries of our heritage. We would like to see a new European 
security architecture based on close cooperation between the 
enlarged NATO and Russia. This is why our organizations do not 
oppose the Founding Act as long as it offers partnership with, 
and not the participation of, Moscow in the NATO 
decisionmaking.
    There is no animosity between the Russian people and their 
neighbors. 2 million Russians cross the Polish border every 
year to trade with Poles. According to a public opinion poll 
conducted by the Moscow Center of Sociological Research last 
April, 68 percent of Russians expressed friendly feelings 
toward Poles. Intense Russian propaganda against NATO does not 
seem to have any impact. Attempts to organize protest meetings 
against NATO enlargement in front of the Polish and American 
embassies in Moscow last July were a spectacular failure.
    The Russian people do not see NATO as an enemy or a threat. 
They are mainly interested in the improvement of their 
desperately bad living conditions.
    Unfortunately, the Russian political ruling class has not 
reconciled itself to the loss of its empire. The economic and 
political system has been changed, but the mentality of the 
people who are pursuing global designs for the Soviet super 
power all their lives cannot be changed overnight. Eduard 
Shevardnadze warned the American people that the Russian empire 
disintegrated but the imperialistic way of thinking still 
remains. Andrei Kozyrev also warned against the old guard which 
has a vested interest in presenting NATO as a threat and an 
enemy. ``Yielding to them,'' wrote Kozyrev in Newsweek, ``would 
play into the hands of the enemies of democracy.''
    Both statesmen have inside knowledge of the Russian ruling 
elite. They certainly speak with authority. Moscow is opposed 
not to the enlargement of NATO but to the very existence of 
NATO because it rightly sees a defensive military alliance as a 
threat to its long-term ambitions to regain in the future a 
controlling influence over the former nation of the Soviet 
orbit.
    As in the time of the Soviet Union, we have to expect that 
the continued enlargement of NATO will meet with threats and 
fierce opposition from Moscow. Once, however, the process is 
complete, any imperialistic dreams will become unrealistic and 
Russia may accept the present boundaries of its influence as 
final. Such a reconciliation with reality would prompt Moscow 
to concentrate its full attention and resources on internal 
recovery. A change of the present mind set would open a new 
chapter of friendly relations between Russia and her neighbors, 
who would no longer see Moscow as a threat. This new sense of 
security would be an historic turning point.
    This is exactly what happened between Germany and Poland. 
Final recognition by Germany of its postwar borders brought an 
end to the centuries-old German drive to the East. German 
nationalists finally lost hope of regaining the territories 
they had lost in two world wars. With the loss of hope came the 
loss of nationalists' influence. Traditional enemies, Germany 
and Poland, are today friends and are ready to become allies.
    In a similar way, the enlargement of NATO may bring to an 
end Russia's relentless drive to expand its huge territories. 
For over 5 centuries, this urge to expand has been a scourge 
for the Russian people. Russia remains the largest country in 
the world, but Russians remain the poorest people of the world.
    Let me emphasize that we want to see the continued 
enlargement of NATO, which would leave no gray zone and no 
unprotected nations between Germany and Russia, because we want 
peace and friendship with Russia--a Russia finally reconciled 
to the loss of its empire. Only then will the United States be 
able to reap its full and lasting dividend of peace. Only then 
will the United States be free to turn her attention to other 
potential sources of conflict.
    Allow me to end with a few personal observations as an 
eyewitness of much of the dramatic history of this century. I 
was born on the eve of World War I in Warsaw under the rule of 
Czarist Russia. Five years later, Poland reemerged on the map 
of Europe thanks to its own indomitable will and thanks to 
President Woodrow Wilson. As a child, I was saved from 
starvation, in a country totally devastated by war, by the 
Herbert Hoover Relief Committee for Poland. There was a 
monument of gratitude to America in the heart of Warsaw which 
was erased by the Nazis. There was the George Washington Rondo 
and monuments to President Wilson in Polish cities. Every 
American who was in Poland will tell you that Poland, as well 
as other countries in that region, are the most pro-American 
nations in the world.
    The admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
into NATO and later the admission of other nations in this 
region with their traditional ties to America will considerably 
strengthen American leadership and presence in Europe. The 
rejection of these nations by NATO would do much to destroy 
this strong pro-Western and pro-American orientation.
    The United States' withdrawal from Europe after World War I 
and the appeasement of Hitler by France and Britain led to 
World War II. Hitler would never have attacked Poland and have 
set the world on fire had he known that he would face the 
awesome power of the United States.
    When I look at the thousands of white crosses on the hills 
of Arlington Cemetery, I am painfully aware that these young 
Americans could have lived full, happy lives. World War II 
could have been prevented; 60 million people killed, executed, 
and tortured to death in concentration camps and 6 million 
Jews, extinguished like insects in gas chambers, could have 
been saved.
    In World War II, I crossed enemy lines five times, both 
ways, as an emissary between the Warsaw underground and the 
allies in London. I was there between Tehran and Yalta. I met 
Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and other British leaders. I 
watched with despair how the appeasement of Stalin led to the 
enslavement of Poland and others. The allies made it so easy 
for Stalin to subjugate eight nations with a total population 
of 100 million people that he was led to believe he could go on 
expanding his empire without risk beyond the dividing lines 
established at Yalta and Potsdam. This is how the cold war 
began.
    Today, I have a horrible feeling of deja vu when I hear 
opponents of NATO asking why the United States should risk 
American lives in defense of distant countries such as Poland, 
Hungary or the Czech Republic. Neville Chamberlain asked the 
same question on the eve of the Munich Agreement. Hitler 
perceived these words as a signal that dismemberment of 
Czechoslovakia and the onslaught on Poland would not be 
resisted by the Western democracies. Should we today encourage 
the hopes of Russian nationalists that the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe may one day, once again, become a Russian 
sphere of influence?
    Throughout the period of the cold war, the United States 
stood ready to defend its allies. Because of our determination, 
not one single American soldier lost his life in defense of 
such distant countries as Greece or Turkey. Should we not learn 
from this historical experience?
    The United States will not be safe either economically or 
militarily without a safe Europe. Europe will not be safe 
unless the smallest European nation feels safe.
    The United States won World War I and then lost the peace. 
The United States won World War II and lost the peace for the 
second time. The United States won the cold war, and I beg of 
you, let's not lose the peace for the third time.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Nowak follows:]
                    Prepared Statement of Mr. Nowak
    I'm here as a spokesman of the Central and Eastern European 
Coalition, which unites 22 million U.S. citizens from 14 ethnic 
communities.
    At the first stage of NATO enlargement, the Senate will be asked to 
ratify the admission of only three new NATO members. Why then, do all 
our ethnic communities unanimously support this decision?
    We do not believe that the isolation or humiliation of Russia would 
serve the interests of the United States or the countries of our 
heritage. We would like to see a new European security architecture 
based on close cooperation between the enlarged NATO and Russia. This 
is why our organizations do not oppose the Founding Act as long as it 
offers partnership with, and not the participation of Moscow, in NATO 
decision-making.
    There is no animosity between the Russian people and their 
neighbors. Two million Russians cross the Polish border every year to 
trade with Poles. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the 
Moscow Center of Sociological Research last April, 56 percent of 
Russians believe that Polish-Russian relations are friendly; 30 percent 
consider them normal; and 68 percent \2/3\ expressed friendly feelings 
toward Poles. Intense Russian propaganda against NATO does not seem to 
have any impact. Attempts to organize protest meetings against NATO 
enlargement in front of the Polish and American embassies in Moscow 
last July were a spectacular failure. The Russian people do not see 
NATO as an enemy or a threat. They are mainly interested in the 
improvement of their desperately bad living conditions.
    Unfortunately, the Russian political ruling class has not 
reconciled itself to the loss of its empire. The economic and political 
system has been changed, but the mentality of the people who were 
pursuing global designs for the Soviet super power all their lives 
cannot be changed overnight. Eduard Shevardnadze warned the American 
public that the Russian empire disintegrated but the imperialistic way 
of thinking still remains (ABC's Nightline with Ted Koppel; 9/28/93). 
Andrei Kozyrev also warned against the old guard, which has a vested 
interest in presenting NATO as a threat and an enemy. Yielding to them, 
wrote Kosyrev in Newsweek, ``would play into the hands of the enemies 
of democracy.'' (Newsweek, 10/2/97)
    Both statesmen have inside knowledge of the Russian ruling elite 
(one was a foreign minister of the Soviet Union, the other of the 
Russian Federation). They certainly speak with authority. Moscow is 
opposed not to the enlargement of NATO but to the very existence of 
NATO, because it rightly sees a defensive military alliance as a threat 
to its long-term ambitions to regain in the future, a controlling 
influence over the former nations of the Soviet orbit.
    As in the time of the Soviet Union, we have to expect that the 
continued enlargement of NATO will meet with threats and fierce 
opposition from Moscow. Once, however, the process is complete, any 
imperialistic dreams will become unrealistic and Russia may accept the 
present boundaries of its influence as final. Such a reconciliation 
with reality would prompt Moscow to concentrate its full attention and 
resources on internal recovery. A change of the present mind set would 
open a new chapter of friendly relations between Russia and her 
neighbors, who would no longer see Moscow as a threat. This new sense 
of security would be an historic turning point.
    This is exactly what happened between Germany and Poland. Final 
recognition by Germany of its post-war borders brought an end to the 
centuries-old German ``drive to the East''. German nationalists finally 
lost hope of regaining the territories they had lost in two world wars. 
With the loss of hope came the loss of the nationalists' influence. 
Traditional enemies, Germany and Poland, are today friends and are 
ready to become allies.
    In a similar way, the enlargement of NATO may bring to an end 
Russia's relentless drive to expand its huge territories. For over five 
centuries, this urge to expand has been a scourge for the Russian 
people. Russia remains the largest country in the world, but Russians 
remain the poorest people in the world.
    Let me emphasize, we want to see the continued enlargement of 
NATO--which would eventually leave no gray zone and no unprotected 
nations between Germany and Russia--because we want peace and 
friendship with Russia, a Russia finally reconciled to the loss of its 
empire. Only then will the United States be able to reap its full and 
lasting dividend of peace. And only then will the United States be free 
to turn her attention to other potential sources of conflict.
    Allow me to end with a few personal observations as an eyewitness 
of much of the dramatic history of this century. I was born on the eve 
of World War I in Warsaw under the rule of Czarist Russia. Five years 
later, Poland reemerged on the map of Europe thanks to its own 
indomitable will, and thanks to President Woodrow Wilson. As a child I 
was saved from starvation--in a country totally devastated by war--by 
the Herbert Hoover Relief Committee for Poland. There was a monument of 
gratitude to America in the heart of Warsaw which was erased by the 
Nazis. There was the George Washington Rondo and monuments to President 
Wilson: Wilson Squares, Wilson Parks, and Wilson Streets in Polish 
cities. Any American who was in Poland will tell you that Poland, as 
well as other countries in that region, are the most pro-American 
nations in the world. The admission of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic into NATO, and later, the admission of other nations in this 
region, with their traditional ties to America, will considerably 
strengthen American leadership and presence in Europe. The rejection of 
these nations by NATO would do much to destroy this strong pro-western 
and pro-American orientation.
    The United States withdrawal from Europe after World War I and the 
appeasement of Hitler by France and Britain led to World War II. Hitler 
would never have attacked Poland and have set the world on fire, had he 
known that he would face the awesome power of the United States. When I 
look at the thousands of white crosses on the hills of Arlington 
Cemetery, I am painfully aware that these young Americans could have 
lived full, happy lives--World War II could have been prevented; 60 
million people killed, executed and tortured to death in concentration 
camps and 6 million Jews, extinguished like insects in gas chambers, 
could have been saved.
    In World War II, I crossed enemy lines 5 times both ways as an 
emissary between the Warsaw underground and the allies in London. I was 
there between Tehran and Yalta. I met Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden 
and other British leaders. I watched with despair how the appeasement 
of Stalin led to the enslavement of Poland and others. The allies made 
it so easy for Stalin to subjugate eight nations--with a total 
population of 100 million people--that he was led to believe he could 
go on expanding his empire without risk beyond the dividing lines 
established in Yalta and Potsdam. This is how the Cold War began.
    Today, I have a horrible feeling of deja vu when I hear opponents 
of NATO asking why the United States should risk American lives in 
defense of distant countries such as Poland, Hungary, or the Czech 
Republic. Neville Chamberlain asked the same question on the eve of the 
Munich Agreement. Hitler perceived these words as a signal that the 
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and the onslaught on Poland would not 
be resisted by the Western democracies. Should we today encourage the 
hopes of Russian nationalists that the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe may once again become a Russian sphere of influence? Throughout 
the period of the Cold War, the United States stood ready to defend its 
allies. Because of our determination, not one single American soldier 
lost his life in defense of such distant countries as Greece or Turkey. 
Should we not learn from this historical experience?
    The United States will not be safe either economically or 
militarily without a safe Europe. And Europe will not be safe unless 
the smallest European nation feels safe.
    The United States won World War I and then lost the peace. The 
United States won World War II and lost the peace for the second time. 
The United States won the Cold War and I beg of you: let us not lose 
the peace for the third time.
    Thank you.

    Senator Smith. Mr. Nowak, thank you for coming and sharing 
with us your views and the history that you helped to make. 
Your counsel is wise and we will heed it.
    I wonder if you have any misgivings about the NATO--Russia 
agreement and if there are things that the Senate should do to 
make sure that the administration's words, which are that 
Russia has a voice but not a veto, are, in fact, so, that, in 
fact, Russia does not have an operative or a de facto veto. Are 
there some changes that you think we need to shore up or 
assure?
    Mr. Nowak. Well, I take the assurances and the 
interpretation of the administration on their face value. I 
mean, we are told that it is not a treaty, not a commitment, 
but it is a unilateral declaration of intentions. There is no 
commitment that, for instance, NATO troops should never enter 
Poland. It simply says there is no need for it right now. We 
agree with that.
    So I believe that there is no reason to be concerned as 
long as Russia does not have a right to a veto and a right to 
participate in the decisionmaking. But the partnership with 
Russia is necessary, is important. NATO enlargement would not 
make much sense if it would not be linked with the partnership 
and cooperation with Russia.
    Senator Smith. We hope the same thing. We hope that 
people's intentions are met and we hope that this vacuum that 
exists will soon be filled by the presence of NATO. We will win 
the peace this time.
    Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Nowak. Thank you very much.
    Senator Smith. We will now call up Edward Moskal. He is the 
President of the Polish American Congress. Mr. Moskal, welcome.

   STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. MOSKAL, PRESIDENT, POLISH AMERICAN 
                    CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Moskal.  Thank you, Senator Smith and members of the 
committee. Because we are of Polish heritage, we are, of 
course, concerned that the freedom and independence of Poland 
is maintained. We are, however, Americans first, some by birth 
and others by choice. Therefore, our primary interest is in the 
well-being of these United States.
    Almost 6 decades ago, the Polish American Congress warned 
that the peace of this country, indeed that of the entire 
world, was inextricably tied to the security and welfare of 
Central Europe, in general, and of Poland, in particular. The 
result of inattention to that prediction is well known and 
there is no need to repeat that historical account today.
    If the past is but prologue, however, we chance renewed 
disaster when we do not heed its lessons.
    More than ever, as events have placed the United States as 
the world's major economic and military power, discord among 
other nations is bound to draw this country into the eye of the 
hurricane, perhaps as peacemaker, but just as likely as a 
participant.
    The newly emancipated nations arising from a half-century 
of virtual occupation are strategically fragile today and, 
without international assurance for their security, will remain 
basically weak tomorrow. A world still rejoicing in the 
collapse of communism and the end of the cold war is not 
anxious to consider the possibility of future conflict, even 
though the sober contemplation of experts will demonstrate just 
how precarious peace really is.
    Such self-inflicted blindness is a potential danger to our 
own continued freedom from conflict.
    It has long been a policy of our nation that military 
preparedness is our best defense against the possibility of 
war. Great sums have been expended in the pursuit of that 
concept, a concept in which a vast majority of the American 
people continue to believe. Oddly, although there appears to be 
a general agreement on the expansion of NATO, there are also 
voices of concern about the price of such expansion. 
Admittedly, there are differences of opinion regarding the 
actual cost to the U.S. and its allies that may be attendant to 
the addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. We 
suspect, however, that even the highest estimates would be far 
less than the costs resulting from intervention in a conflict 
involving these nations, an intervention that no one reasonably 
denies as a possibility. More realistically, considering the 
proven effectiveness of the alliance, the investment will be an 
excellent bargain.
    If we examine the highest estimates of $60 billion as a 
total cost of admitting the three proposed countries to NATO, a 
sum I hasten to add with which we do not agree, expended over 6 
years it equals the amount spent annually to assist friendly 
nations in the Middle East, an expenditure which is only rarely 
questioned in these halls.
    It is remarkably, however, a similar overall cost involving 
clear allies in Europe, a continent into whose problems and 
conflicts we have been drawn with too great a frequency.
    There is a tendency in some quarters to develop an urgent 
sense of economy. Moreover, the cost to the United States will 
be only a fraction of the total, our allies being expected to 
accept their share and the new members having indicated a 
willingness to assume their fair portion of costs associated 
with their assimilation into the alliance.
    Estimates of NATO enlargement have varied widely. We 
suggest that the confusion is largely due to the failure to 
make a distinction between what Poland in particular would be 
required to spend for modernization and military reorganization 
as opposed to those costs which may arise directly from its 
membership.
    The Polish Ministry of National Defense, for which it was 
vitally necessary to assess NATO membership costs, determined 
that modernization, integration and the adoption of new 
methodology will require an expenditure of $1.26 billion. 
Adding payments for the NATO civil and military budgets, as 
well as costs of joint missions, total costs are estimated at 
$1.5 billion, which, if spread over 15 years, until the year 
2010, amounts to 4 percent of Poland's 1995 military budget.
    These figures may, indeed, seem minuscule when compared to 
other estimates. The Poles, however, recognize that the cost of 
modernizing their armed forces or of reorganization are not 
validly calculated as NATO--related expenses. On the contrary, 
those are expenses that must be made under any circumstances. 
In fact, an even larger investment in modernization would 
surely be insufficient to defend the nation without the 
security inherently provided through NATO.
    It is not surprising, then, that the Defense Ministry of 
Poland has stated with clarity that it is ready to pay the 
largest part of costs arising from its NATO admission.
    In the brief time that Poland has enjoyed independence, it 
has already taken the necessary steps for the improvement of 
its internal defense industry. That development, however, is 
hampered by the inability to fully adopt international 
standards until its membership status is solidified.
    Similarly, the Polish communication infrastructure, 
purposefully inadequate under the recent occupation, is being 
modernized and expanded with surprising alacrity. A program 
known as the National Communications System, funded by private 
domestic and foreign corporations, will assure total 
communications interoperability with NATO nations within only a 
few years.
    Regarding transportation, Poland already has a highly 
developed rail system and is expending over $15 billion in 
highway construction and has a long-term plan for development 
of 12 interconnected airports. This plan provides for air 
traffic control and safety, including state-of-the-art radar 
systems, all of which are demonstrable assets which Poland 
brings to NATO, the benefits of which are not properly added to 
the actual cost of admission to the alliance.
    Two conclusions must be made. First, Poland is well aware 
of the direct costs arising from admission to NATO. It has 
considered them, implemented plans to deal with them, and 
accepts its responsib