U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN EUROPE

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The hearing will please come to order.

Mr. Secretary, welcome.

Secretary Powell. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. It is a delight to have you here. I have a brief opening statement. Then I am going to yield to the chairman, and I assume he has a statement. I understand you may have some guests whom you may want to introduce to us.

I am pleased to welcome Secretary of State Colin Powell to our committee today to report on the President’s trip to Europe and to participate in a broader discussion of U.S. security interests in Europe and the future of our transatlantic relationship.

At the outset, let me say that I was very heartened by President Bush’s trip. He had an opportunity to engage in a candid and substantive dialog with our European friends, and he was kind enough over the weekend to call me and brief me in some more detail, which was very kind of him.

I was telling the Secretary in there, Mr. Chairman, that I received the call while I was out watering plants, trying to stretch 200 feet of hose to get to some trees I had planted. My daughter, who is 20 years old and was home for the weekend, came out and said “the President is on the phone.” I said, that I would be there in a second. We all know when the President calls, that means the White House operator is on the phone. And she said, “no, Daddy, come now. The President is on the phone.” I said, honey, I will be there in a second. She said, “Daddy, I have taken enough calls from Presidents to know, this is the President. He is on the phone.”

And he was on the phone.

So, I want to publicly apologize for keeping the President waiting while I watered my trees, although he said something to the effect, that he hoped I was not watering them too liberally.

But at any rate, I appreciate the fact that the President and the administration and Dr. Rice, along with the Secretary, have been
so forthcoming and informative about the trip, and I am anxious to hear more.

Despite the remarkable progress that the 15 members of the European Union have made in creating in Europe, in the EU’s phrase, “an ever closer union,” the fact remains in my view that it is the United States that still plays the key role necessary to mobilize Europe on tough security questions.

Thus, I was pleased with the President’s speech in Warsaw declaring that the United States is an ally and is strongly committed to support for further NATO engagement in next year’s Prague Summit and that he believes that the zero option is not an option. In addition I agree with him when he says that at least one country must be admitted to membership next year.

Equally important, no arbitrary red lines on membership should be drawn by non-members. NATO must and will be open to all European democracies that are ready to handle the responsibilities that accompany the membership in the alliance. I compliment the President for his very strong and very clear statement.

This proactive U.S. leadership of NATO, however, should not be limited in my view to this enlargement. Last week’s Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the crisis in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia strengthened my belief that the United States, Mr. Secretary, has to play a more active and engaged role in the efforts to forge a political solution there. The President indicated to me Sunday that you are on your way to doing that, and I am anxious to hear in what way.

I was somewhat confused by unconfirmed newspaper reports last weekend that the administration decided not to commit any American troops to a NATO-led force requested by the Macedonian President to disarm ethnic Albanian insurgents after a peace agreement is reached, if one is reached.

As I have said before, the events in Macedonia today have a sense of history repeating itself. As the old joke goes, we have been there and done that in Croatia in 1991, in Bosnia in 1992, and in Kosovo in 1998. In my view we cannot afford once again to watch and wait to see how a low-level Balkan crisis erupts into all-out warfare.

A limited NATO involvement now to pacify this extremely delicate and volatile situation may avoid the need for more extensive and difficult intervention later on.

I am told that our British allies are prepared to commit troops to a limited peace enforcement mission.

Several hundred U.S. support troops are already stationed in Macedonia, some of them only a few miles from the territory controlled by the ethnic Albanian rebels. I would think that we would want, at the very least, to protect them and our own soldiers by being more deeply involved.

In any event, I am eager to hear from Secretary Powell whether in fact the decision has been made relative to what role we will play, if any, in Macedonia.

Finally, the President sought to convince our European friends on the need for a missile defense system to guard against ballistic missile threats. Despite the best efforts by the White House to indicate otherwise, it seems pretty clear that most of our allies still
harbor a deep skepticism of the President’s plans, especially those involving any decision to unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty. I wonder if the Secretary would elaborate on what he perceived to be the response of our allies and any indication he can give us on what the intentions of the administration are relative to the ABM Treaty.

By all accounts, the meeting in Slovenia between President Bush and President Putin went very well. I met with Sergeyev yesterday. He was not at the meeting in Slovenia, but he indicated he thought it went well from his perspective. So, this was a real important chance for the two men to get to know each other, if only for a short time. I understand that the chemistry was pretty good, which is always positive.

Some have criticized the President’s comments about his reaction to Putin. I would just point out that had the meeting not gone well, the headlines would have read “U.S./Russia Strained Relations,” and there would have been a whole different set of problems. So, I think the President did quite well.

I am, again, interested in hearing, if the Secretary is able to tell us, a little more about the Russian reaction to our proposal relative to a missile defense and the possibility of amending the ABM Treaty to accommodate the changes that this administration might think are necessary.

The U.S.-Russian relationship encompasses, as we all know, many more issues, ranging from the ongoing genocidal war in Chechnya to efforts by the Putin administration to stifle independent news media and thereby retard the development of a genuine civil society in Russia today.

I look forward to the testimony of our very distinguished witness, Secretary Powell, and as much as he is able to tell us about this trip we would appreciate.

Let me conclude by saying, Mr. Secretary, I think, as they say in southern Delaware, you done good. I think the President did a fine job, and I think the most important thing from my perspective that came out of the trip was the fact that America remains engaged. The Europeans know it, and the President is engaged. I am confident that this is a very, very strong platform from which the President starts.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

I am pleased to welcome Secretary of State Colin Powell to our committee today to report on the President’s trip to Europe and to participate in a broader discussion of U.S. security interests in Europe and the future of the transatlantic relationship.

At the outset, let me say that I am heartened President Bush had an opportunity to engage in a candid and substantive dialogue with our European friends.

In doing so, the President affirmed the critical role of the transatlantic relationship and the fact that the United States remains a European power.

Despite the remarkable progress that the fifteen members of the European Union have made in creating, in the EU’s phrase, “an ever closer union,” the fact remains that without the United States, mobilizing Europe on tough security questions is a very difficult task.

Thus, I was pleased with the President’s speech in Warsaw declaring that the United States will rally support for further NATO enlargement at next year’s Prague Summit.
I agree with the President when he says that at least one country must be admitted to membership next year. A “zero option” for the Prague Summit is no longer possible.

Equally important, no arbitrary red lines on membership should be drawn by non-members. NATO must, and will, be open to all of Europe’s democracies that are ready to handle the responsibilities that accompany membership in the Alliance.

This pro-active U.S. leadership of NATO, however, should not be limited to the issue of enlargement. Last week’s Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the crisis in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia strengthened my belief that the United States must play a more active and engaged role in the efforts to forge a political solution there.

I was disappointed, therefore, by unconfirmed newspaper reports last weekend that the Bush administration has decided not to commit any American troops to any NATO-led force requested by the Macedonian President to disarm ethnic Albanian insurgents after a peace agreement is reached.

As I have said before, the events in Macedonia today have a sense of history repeating itself. We have “been there, and not done that” in Croatia in 1991, in Bosnia in 1992, and in Kosovo in 1998. We cannot afford, once again, to watch and wait as a low-level Balkan crisis erupts into all-out warfare while the U.S. waits for Europe to put out the fire.

A limited NATO involvement now to pacify this extremely delicate and volatile situation may avoid the need for a more extensive and difficult intervention later.

I am told that our British allies are prepared to commit troops to a limited peace-enforcement mission.

Several hundred U.S. support troops are already stationed in Macedonia, some of them only a few miles from territory controlled by ethnic Albanian rebels. I would think that we would want, at the very least, to protect them with our own soldiers.

In any event, I am eager to hear from Secretary Powell whether, in fact, a decision has been made not to contribute American troops if a NATO-led force is created, and, if so, the rationale behind non-participation.

Finally, the President sought to convince our European friends on the need for a missile defense system to guard against ballistic missile threats.

Despite the best efforts by the White House to indicate otherwise, it is clear that most of our Allies still harbor a deep skepticism of the President’s plans, especially those involving any decision to unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

My position on missile defense is well known, and I do not intend for this hearing to become a debate on the pros and cons of the President’s policy.

However, what this administration does or does not do on missile defense and the ABM Treaty will profoundly affect our relationship with Europe, especially Russia.

By all accounts, the meeting in Slovenia between President Bush and President Putin served its modest purpose well: a chance for the two men to meet and get to know each other, if only for a short time.

The U.S.-Russian relationship encompasses many issues, ranging from the ongoing genocidal war in Chechnya to efforts by the Putin administration to stifle independent news media and thereby retard the development of a genuine civil society in Russia today.

I look forward to the testimony of our very distinguished witness, Secretary of State Powell.

The CHAIRMAN. I now yield to my colleague, Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Mr. Chairman, before I make my statement, I suggest that the Secretary be invited to present his guests for these television cameras here, Ms. Ali and Mr. Tafari. Is that correct?

Secretary POWELL. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. Why do you not have them step up here so you can present them?

Secretary POWELL. It would be my great pleasure. May I ask them to come to the table just for a moment?

Senator HELMS. That is what I suggested that you do.

Secretary POWELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is my great pleasure to present to the committee and to the American public who may be watching, Ms. Saffing Ali who is from the city of Leeds in the United Kingdom, and Mr. Ezekiel Tafari who is
from Liverpool. The presence of these two youngsters with me is part of their spending a day with the Secretary of State of the United States of America, and they will spend the whole week here in the United States. They will be visiting in New York. They will be doing many things here in Washington, DC.

The program that they are participating in flows from my America's Promise. You may recall the Crusade for Children that I was in charge of before I came back into Government. The former British Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, suggested to me one day, you know, as part of our contribution to what you are doing with America's Promise, why do we not just swap kids? We will send two youngsters to you for a period of time and you send two youngsters to us. And that is exactly what we have done.

So, Saffing and Ezekiel are with me today, and two American youngsters are going to be in England to do the same thing with the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jack Straw, who also supports this program.

I hope that the two youngsters will leave here with a better understanding of this marvelous constitutional process that they are about to observe for the next hour and a half, at least the legislative/executive branch interchange portion of our constitutional system. And I think they will go home with a better understanding of what America is all about and why there is this unique and special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

So, it is my pleasure to present Saffing and Ezekiel. I thank you so very much for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. Well, I thank you. I might say to you two young people that there are about 60 young people from this country here to see their Secretary in action, and there must be at least 400 lined up in case seats become available. So, he is a very popular television figure in this country.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, this is the second hearing that we have had since the disaster that befell the Republican Party.

The CHAIRMAN. We understand. We have been there.

Senator HELMS. The last time when I came in, they said, go through that door and turn left.

Anyway, we are glad to have you, your having returned from your very important and very successful, I might add, trip with the President to Europe. We are glad, as always, to have you before the Foreign Relations Committee. You are very special to us and I think you know that.

Now, you explained about the young people, and I hope that they can understand all of the questions and so forth.

But there should be no doubt that the transatlantic relationship is America's most important partnership and that NATO is our most important alliance. Acting together, Europe and America are the core global power and stability. Together we energize the world economy, and our community consists of the world's most successful democracies. NATO has proved itself to be history's most effective and powerful political and military alliance. President Bush's visit to Europe underscored this clear recognition of these basic truths.
I am so pleased with the leadership and commitment you and he
demonstrated to our Euro-Atlantic partnership. He cogently and
forthrightly explained, in my judgment, the rationale behind his
major policy initiatives, including missile defense and NATO en-
largement. Most importantly, he articulated his views in a manner
that framed a coherent and powerful vision for the transatlantic
community.

In this regard, the President’s speech in Warsaw, I thought, was
almost historic. It may well be remembered as one of the defining
moments of his administration, and building upon his discussion in
Brussels with NATO heads of government, the President’s speech
moved decisively forward the debate over NATO enlargement.
Now, the point is that we are no longer quibbling over whether
and when. It is now an unambiguous alliance priority for addi-
tional NATO membership invitations to be issued during its sum-
mit meeting in Prague next year. The question is how many.

Mr. Secretary, in my mind—and we are going to find out what
is on your mind—my mind tells me that the list must include the
three Baltic democracies: Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Failure
to fulfill this goal would undermine the moral and strategic im-
peratives of American engagement in Europe. So, I hope you will
focus on what is necessary to ensure that these three former cap-
tive nations are invited to join NATO during the alliance’s summit
meeting in Prague next year.

But I would be misleading you if I did not admit to raising my
eyebrows over the assertion that Mr. Putin is “trustworthy.” “A re-
markable leader” he was called, and a man with whom we “share
common values.” Now, I criticized officials from the previous ad-
ministration for using nearly those precise words to describe Mr.
Putin, and I was dumbfounded to hear them from mine because we
must not forget that under Mr. Putin’s leadership, the press has
once again felt the jack boot of repression. Arms control treaties ob-
ligations remain unfilled and violated. Dangerous weapons tech-
nologies have been transferred to rogue states, and Georgia’s and
Ukraine’s security has been threatened, and a brutal, indiscrimi-
nate military campaign in Chechnya remains unabated.

For these reasons, Mr. Putin is, in my judgment, far from deserv-
ing the powerful political prestige and influence that comes from
an excessively personal endorsement by the President of the United
States. Indeed, prematurely personalizing this relationship only
undercuts the incentives he has to reorient Russia’s domestic and
foreign policy goals, goals I know that this administration shares.

But let me now close, Mr. Secretary, on a positive note. I com-
mand the decision to unify the State Department’s offices respon-
sible for U.S. policy toward Europe and what we mistakenly still
call the New Independent States. I have always been uncomfort-
able with previous bureaucratic structures that segmented U.S.
policy toward Europe and the successor states of the Former Soviet
Union.

Now, that bureaucratic structure contradicted the very vision
that we are supposed to have of an undivided Europe that includes
the Russian people. It bureaucratically ostracized important Euro-
pean countries such as Ukraine from our vision of a Europe whole
and free. This merger was long overdue, and I congratulate you, Mr. Secretary, for recognizing this need.

Again, I commend both the President and you for your historic, significant trip to Europe that brought much needed strategic vision to America’s most important global partnership. I look forward to hearing your analysis of the U.S.-Europe relationship in the wake of the trip.

Finally, on personal privilege, I would like the committee to recognize the presence of a former chairman of this committee, Senator Percy. Senator, stand up.

The CHAIRMAN. Welcome, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Percy. I would just say a word that I admire our Secretary of State now, for so many years as Chief of Staff, and worked with him then. But I am more proud than ever that he could be Secretary of State.

He knows Everett Dirksen asked me to be the founding Vice Chairman of the Kennedy Center, which has beautified the city. But also he has written me a wonderful letter saying that he congratulated me on taking this volunteer job of being chairman of the Georgetown Waterfront Park Commission. Every 2 months, we have a meeting, and Patricia Gallagher, the new Commissioner for planning the parks in Washington, DC, will be our speaker at St. John’s Church in Georgetown. We will be commenting on you and what you have done, and I am going to read the letter you sent to me about that, when you said to me, I congratulate you on taking this job. You are going to take an eyesore in the Nation’s capital and turn it into a beautiful national park. I thank you ever so much.

Secretary Powell. Thank you.

Senator Percy. This is the first time I have been able to be back for many, many years. When I read in the Washington Times this morning that the Secretary was going to be here, I rushed down right away.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Secretary Powell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Chairman.

It is a great pleasure to be with you this morning. This is my first appearance before the committee since the disaster, which Senator Helms made reference to a little earlier.

The CHAIRMAN. I still have the gavel, boss. Be careful.

Secretary Powell. But the fact of the matter is I have always tried to work closely with this committee and I am sure that the close relationship that exists between the State Department and the committee will continue even with the change in leadership.

Before I turn to our European security interests and the President’s trip, let me take the occasion to thank the members of this committee and the full Senate for what you have done to ensure that we have the $582 million that we have requested to make immediate payments on our United Nations arrears, and it is my
strong wish that the Senate and the House can produce legislation that not only pays our immediate arrears, but all of our U.N. arrears so we can clear this up once and for all, and legislation that hopefully makes no preconditions for payment. We can talk more about that in the question and answer period.

I also want to thank the committee and the Senate for moving expeditiously on the President’s State Department nominations. I hope that we were all mutually pleased last week when we saw that bar chart in the Washington Post that showed that the State Department was at the top of the pile among cabinet offices with respect to the number of nominations that have cleared the Senate. I think that is a result of the close cooperation that exists, and I want to express my appreciation to all of you for that. We now have 22 State Department nominees in place, including me. And 26 more people have been officially nominated and sent here for your consideration, and I just ask that you all keep it up and give me these troops so I can send them out to the field as soon as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt you for a second, Mr. Secretary. There are 26 nominations before the committee and we will have hearings on 13 of them this week, and we expect to move efficiently. I have asked the subcommittee chairs to move on all ambassadorial nominations that are before us and others. We would like to get it cleared up by the time we leave for the July recess. So, hopefully, you will be very pleased.

Secretary POWELL. For that I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me turn now to Europe. I returned Saturday night from a week in Europe with President Bush, as he visited Spain, Belgium, Sweden, Poland, and finally Slovenia. We had the opportunity to attend historic meetings with other NATO leaders and with leaders of the European Union, and the President also met with President Putin of Russia, as you have noted.

Throughout that trip, every step of the way in every city, President Bush emphasized the changing nature of Europe, change characterized by the cities we chose to visit, as well as by the transforming nature of the President’s message. And no city that we chose to visit reflected this change more vividly than one of the oldest cities in Europe, Warsaw, a Warsaw now whole, free, democratic, vibrant, and alive. As President Bush said in Warsaw: “I have come to the center of Europe to speak of the future of Europe.”

Make no mistake about this transformation, however: it is firmly anchored in what has made the Atlantic Alliance the most powerful, the most enduring, and the most historic alliance ever—our common values, our shared experience, and our sure knowledge that when America and Europe separate, there is tragedy; when America and Europe are partners, there is no limit to the horizons we can reach for.

The members of this committee know how fundamental our security interests are in Europe. You know that the transatlantic partnership is crucial to ensuring global peace and prosperity. It is also crucial to our ability to address successfully the global challenges that confront us, such as terrorism, dealing with the tragedy of HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, and the proliferation of missiles and of weapons of mass destruction.
So, President Bush’s trip was about affirming old bonds, creating new frameworks, and building new relationships through which we can promote and protect our interests in Europe and in the wider world.

President Bush did not hesitate to address head on the perceptions held by some Europeans, and by some Americans as well, of American disengagement from the world and of unbridled unilateralism, as some of the commentators like to call it. Over and over, he underscored America’s commitment to face challenges together with her partners, to strengthen the bonds of friendship and alliance, and to work out together the right policies for this new century of unparalleled promise and opportunity. “I hope that the unilateral theory is dead,” the President said. “Unilateralists do not come to the table to share opinions. Unilateralists do not come here to ask questions.”

President Bush’s presence at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council was historic not only because it was his first, but because it was undoubtedly, in my memory, one of the most robust and substantive discussions that we have ever seen at a NAC meeting.

We discussed the five key challenges facing the alliance: one, developing a new strategic framework with respect to nuclear weapons; second, maintaining and improving our conventional defense capabilities; third, enlarging the alliance, as the Senator and both chairmen have talked about; integrating southeast Europe; and finally, reaching out to Russia.

Since the day of President Bush’s inauguration, our objective has been to consult with our allies on a new strategic framework for our nuclear posture. This framework includes our addressing the new challenges the alliance faces as a result of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that might deliver them. But it includes much more than that.

As President Bush told our allies, we must have a broad strategy of active non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, a new concept of deterrence that includes defenses sufficient to protect our people, our forces, and our allies, and to reduce reliance on offensive nuclear weapons.

We must move beyond the doctrines of the cold war and find a new basis for our mutual security, one that will stand the trials of a new century as the old one did the century past.

In this context too, President Bush praised NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson’s call for the allies to invest vigorously in developing their conventional defense capabilities, including voting larger defense budgets. There has been too much of a reduction in European defense budgets in recent years, and to make sure that NATO remains vibrant and to make sure that the Europeans can adequately participate in their own European security defense initiative, they need to increase their investment in defense efforts.

The President pledged to work with European leaders to reduce the barriers to transatlantic defense industry cooperation. Moreover, he welcomed this enhanced role for the European Union in providing for the security of Europe, so long as that EU role is properly integrated with NATO. The European Union and the Atlantic Alliance must not travel separate roads, for their destinies are too entwined.
Also, an important part of our relations with Europe is the reality of an expanding alliance and a growing union. “I believe in NATO membership,” the President said, “for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings.”

The question is not whether but when. And the Prague Summit in 2002 is the next “when.” We are not planning to go to Prague with damage limitation in mind but with a clear intent to advance the cause of freedom by enlarging NATO.

And our vision of Europe, whole, free, and at peace, cannot exclude the Balkans. That is why the President welcomed and applauded the leading role of NATO in bringing stability to southeast Europe.

President Bush acknowledged also the critical place that America holds in this process. Though 80 percent of the NATO-led forces in the Balkans are non-U.S., we know that our GI’s are critical. “We went into the Balkans together, and we will come out together,” the President told the Europeans. “And,” he added, “our goal must be to hasten the arrival of that day” when we can all come out together.

President Bush also commended the work of NATO and KFOR in helping bring an end to the violent insurgency in southern Serbia and cited their partnership with the European Union. He stressed that building on this experience, NATO must play a more visible and active role in helping the government in Macedonia to counter the insurgency there.

Consistent with this call, NATO, the United States, and our allies are taking a proactive approach in Macedonia. The day after the NATO meeting of heads of state and government, on June 14, NATO Secretary General Robertson and EU High Representative Solana, assisted and accompanied by the State Department’s European Bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary, James Swigert, my man in Macedonia, met with Macedonian Government officials in Skopje to insist that the parties begin discussions immediately to hammer out solutions to inter-ethnic problems.

We are now in intense consultations with our allies and with the EU on how we and NATO can best support a political solution in Macedonia and protect Macedonia’s territorial integrity. Both we and our European partners know that we must do all we can to help the Macedonian people avoid the same tragedy of violence and warfare that has afflicted so many of their neighbors in southeast Europe.

Equally important to our relations with Europe is Russia. We have a stake in that great country’s eventual success, success at democracy, success at the rule of law and at economic reform leading to economic recovery.

Russia must be closely tied to the rest of Europe, and the only way for that to happen is for Russia to be as successful at practicing democracy and building open markets as the rest of Europe has been. And that day will come.

President Bush and President Putin had a productive meeting in Slovenia. President Putin’s assessment was that “reality was a lot bigger than expectations.”
The two Presidents discussed the importance of a sound investment climate, including firm establishment of the rule of law, the importance of this to Russia’s future economic prosperity. And President Bush made clear America’s willingness to engage in meaningful economic dialog with Russia, beginning with the travel to Moscow in July of Secretaries O’Neill and Evans.

The two Presidents also agreed to launch serious consultations on the nature of our security relationship within the context of a new approach for a new era. The challenge is to change our relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on openness, mutual confidence, and expanded areas of cooperation.

President Bush proposed and President Putin agreed to establishing a structured dialog on strategic issues, and the two Presidents charged Foreign Minister Ivanov and me and Secretary Rumsfeld and his Russian counterpart, along with our respective defense establishments, to conduct and monitor a new dialog to find a new strategic framework. Among the first subjects for this dialog will be missile defense, offensive nuclear weapons, and the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Presidents also agreed to continue their search for common solutions in the Balkans, the Middle East, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Afghanistan, and they discussed their common interest in developing the resources of the Caspian Basin.

President Bush also raised areas of concern with Russia, such as Chechnya, arms sales to Iran, and religious and media freedom in Russia. He also expressed the hope that Russia would develop constructive relations with its neighbors, such as Ukraine and Georgia.

Both Presidents clearly look forward to continuing their discussions at the Genoa Summit in July. I believe we made significant progress in this first meeting and we will be working hard to ensure our followup efforts are coordinated and productive.

The President also wanted to signal to European leaders, who sometimes look a little too inwardly, that not only is our partnership crucial to our peace and prosperity, but that the very fact that we are at peace and are prosperous places obligations upon us.

President Bush said that “those who have benefited and prospered most from the commitment to freedom and openness have an obligation to help others that are seeking their way along that path.” And then he pointed to Africa.

We must shut down the arms trafficking, fight the terrible scourge of HIV/AIDS, and help Africa enter the world of open trade that promises peaceful, prosperous days.

The President discussed these issues at the U.S.-EU Summit in Goteberg. He made it clear that we must look even beyond Africa to the challenges that confront us all as inhabitants of this Earth. We must shape a balance of power in the world that favors freedom so that from the pivot point of that balance we can lift up all people, protect our precious environment, including dealing with global climate change, and defend and secure the freedoms of an ever-widening world of open and free trade, the rule of law, and respect for the rights of humanity and the dignity of life.
In this regard, President Bush and his European Union counterparts are committed to launching an ambitious new round of multilateral trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting in Doha later this year. We seek a round that will lead both to the further liberalization of world trade and to clarifying, strengthening, and extending WTO rules so as to promote economic growth and equip the trading system to meet the challenges of globalization.

This new round must equally address the needs and priorities of developing countries, demonstrate that the trading systems can respond to the concerns of civil society, and promote sustainable development. We will work closely together and with our partners in the coming weeks to secure consensus to launch a round based on this substantive and forward-looking agenda.

At the end of the day, Mr. Chairman, it was a very momentous trip. We are embarked in a new era. We have set in motion with some of our most important allies a mighty debate to determine the path we shall take. On the outcome of that debate may rest our future peace and prosperity. In my lifetime and yours, and in the reasonable span of our memories and our fathers’ memories, it is mainly in Europe that the colossal struggles have begun, struggles that in their evolution could well have determined another fate for our world.

At the mid-point of the last century, we devised a way to prevent such struggles. It is called the transatlantic alliance. For this present century, we must shape that alliance anew, but without sapping the great strengths that make it what it is. An historic opportunity awaits this President, this Congress, and this people. We must seize it for all it is worth, and we fully intend to do so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Powell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN L. POWELL

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to testifying before this committee again and to answering your questions. I have just returned with President Bush from Europe. It was my third trip to Europe since assuming the position of Secretary of State five months ago—and of course it was President Bush's first trip.

I look forward to answering your questions with respect to that trip and with respect to the very positive discussions the President had there and that I had there.

Before I turn to our European security interests, however, I want to thank the members of this committee and the full Senate for what you have all done to ensure we have the $582 million to make immediate payments of our United Nations arrears. It is my strong wish that the Senate and the House can produce legislation that not only pays our immediate arrears but ALL our UN arrears—and legislation that makes no new preconditions for payment.

I also want to thank the committee and the Senate for moving expeditiously on the President's State Department nominations. You have made my life much easier—and far less lonely.

We have clearly enjoyed a tremendous amount of cooperation with this committee. And I look forward to adding a number of talented people to the Department as soon as possible, with your advice and consent.

This committee has approved 22 State Department nominees this year so far—including me. Twenty-six more people have been officially nominated and sent here for your consideration.

Of the 26 nominees, 21 are nominated to bilateral posts as ambassadors. Four have a hearing tomorrow. No one knows better than the members of this committee how our embassies depend on having these diplomats on the ground doing the people's business. I know that you will consider these nominees as a top priority.
Now Mr. Chairman, let me turn to our relations with Europe, the reason you called this hearing.

I returned Saturday night from a week in Europe with President Bush as he visited Spain, Belgium, Sweden, Poland, and Slovenia. We had the opportunity to attend historic meetings with other NATO leaders and with leaders of the European Union (EU). We met also with President Putin of Russia.

Throughout the trip, President Bush emphasized the changing nature of Europe—change characterized by the cities we chose to visit as well as by the transforming nature of the President’s message. And no city reflected this change more vividly than one of the oldest cities in Europe, Warsaw—a Warsaw whole, free, democratic, vibrant and alive. As President Bush said in Warsaw: “I have come to the center of Europe to speak of the future of Europe.”

Make no mistake about this transformation, however: it is firmly anchored in what has made the Atlantic Alliance the most powerful, the most enduring, the most historic alliance ever—our common values, our shared experience, and our sure knowledge that when America and Europe separate, there is tragedy; when America and Europe are partners, there is no limit to our horizons.

The members of this committee know how fundamental are our security interests in Europe. You know that the transatlantic partnership is crucial to ensuring global peace and prosperity. It is also crucial to our ability to address successfully the global challenges that confront us such as terrorism, HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, and the proliferation of missiles and of weapons of mass destruction.

So President Bush’s trip was about affirming old bonds, creating new frameworks, and building new relationships through which we can promote and protect our interests in Europe and in the wider world.

President Bush did not hesitate to address head-on the perceptions held by some Europeans—and by some Americans as well—of American disengagement from the world and of unbridled unilateralism. Over and over again he underscored America’s commitment to face challenges together with her partners, to strengthen the bonds of friendship and alliance, and to work out together the right policies for this new century of unparalleled promise and opportunity. “I hope that the unilateral theory is dead,” the President said. “Unilateralists do not come to the table to share opinions. Unilateralists do not come here to ask questions.”

President Bush’s presence at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was historic, not only because it was his first but because it was undoubtedly, in my memory at least, the most robust and substantive discussion of real issues the NAC has ever conducted.

We discussed the five key challenges facing the Alliance: (1) developing a new strategic framework with respect to nuclear weapons, (2) maintaining and improving our conventional defense capabilities, (3) enlarging the Alliance, (4) integrating southeast Europe, and (5) reaching out to Russia.

Since the day of President Bush’s inauguration, our objective has been to consult with our Allies on a new strategic framework for our nuclear posture. This framework includes our addressing the new challenges the Alliance faces as a result of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that might deliver them. But it includes much more.

As President Bush told our Allies “we must have a broad strategy of active non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, ... a new concept of deterrence that includes defenses sufficient to protect our people, our forces, and our Allies, and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.”

We must move beyond the doctrines of the Cold War and find a new basis for our mutual security—one that will stand the trials of a new century as the old one did the century past.

In this context too, President Bush praised NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson’s call for the Alliance to invest vigorously in developing their conventional defense capabilities, including voting larger defense budgets. The President pledged to work with European leaders to reduce the barriers to transatlantic defense industry cooperation. Moreover, he welcomed an enhanced role for the European Union in providing for the security of Europe—so long as that role is properly integrated with NATO. The Union and the Alliance must not travel separate roads for their destinies are entwined.

Also an important part of our relations with Europe is the reality of an expanding Alliance and a growing union. “I believe in NATO membership,” the President said, “for all of Europe’s democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO brings.”
The question is not whether but when. And the Prague Summit in 2002 is the next "when." We are not "planning to go to Prague with damage limitation in mind but with a clear intent to advance the cause of freedom."

And our vision of Europe whole, free, and at peace cannot exclude the Balkans. That is why the President welcomed and applauded the leading role of NATO in bringing stability to southeast Europe.

President Bush acknowledged also the critical place that America holds in this process. Though 80 percent of the NATO-led forces in the region are non-U.S., our GI's are critical.

"We went into the Balkans together, and we will come out together," the President told the Europeans. "And," he added, "our goal must be to hasten the arrival of that day."

President Bush also commended the work of NATO and KFOR in helping bring an end to the violent insurgency in southern Serbia and cited their partnership with the European Union. He stressed that, building on this experience, NATO "must play a more visible and active role in helping the government in Macedonia to counter the insurgency there."

Consistent with this call, NATO, the U.S., and our Allies are taking a proactive approach in Macedonia. The day after the NATO meeting of Heads of State and Government, on June 14, NATO Secretary General Robertson and EU High Representative Solana, assisted by the State Department's European Bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary for Eastern and Southern Europe, James Swigert, met with Macedonian government officials in Skopje to insist that the parties begin discussions immediately to hammer out solutions to inter-ethnic problems.

We are now in intense consultations with our Allies and with the EU on how we can and NATO can best support a political solution in Macedonia and protect Macedonian territorial integrity. Both we and our European partners know that we must do all we can to help the Macedonian people avoid the same tragedy of violence and warfare that has afflicted so many of their neighbors in southeast Europe.

Equally important to our relations with Europe, is Russia. We have a stake in that great country's eventual success—success at democracy, at the rule of law, and at economic reform leading to economic recovery.

Russia must be closely tied to the rest of Europe—and the only way for that to happen is for Russia to be as successful at practicing democracy and building open markets as the rest of Europe. And that day will come.

President Bush and President Putin had a productive meeting in Slovenia. President Putin's assessment was that "reality was a lot bigger than expectations."

The two Presidents discussed the importance of a sound investment climate including firm establishment of the rule of law—to Russia's future economic prosperity. And President Bush made clear America's willingness to engage meaningful economic dialogue with Russia, beginning with the travel to Moscow in July of Secretaries O'Neill and Evans.

The two Presidents also agreed to launch serious consultations on the nature of our security relationship within the context of a new approach for a new era. The challenge is to change our relationship from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on openness, mutual confidence, and expanded areas of cooperation.

President Bush proposed, and President Putin agreed to, establishing a structured dialogue on strategic issues, and the two Presidents charged Foreign Minister Ivanov and me, and Secretary Rumsfeld and his Russian counterpart along with their respective defense establishments, with conducting and monitoring this dialogue. Among the first subjects for this dialogue will be missile defense, offensive nuclear weapons, and the threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Presidents also agreed to continue their search for common solutions in the Balkans, the Middle East, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Afghanistan, and they discussed their common interests in developing the resources of the Caspian Basin.

President Bush also raised areas of concern such as Chechnya, arms sales to Iran, and religious and media freedom in Russia. He also expressed the hope that Russia would develop constructive relations with its neighbors such as Ukraine and Georgia.

Both Presidents clearly look forward to continuing their discussions at the Genoa Summit in July. I believe we made significant progress in this first meeting and we will be working hard to ensure our follow-up is coordinated and productive.

The President also wanted to signal to European leaders—who themselves sometimes look too inwardly—that not only is our partnership crucial to our peace and prosperity but that the very fact we are at peace and are prosperous places obligations upon us.
President Bush said that “those who have benefited and prospered most from the commitment to freedom and openness have an obligation to help others that are seeking their way along that path.” And he pointed to Africa.

We must shut down the arms trafficking, fight the terrible scourge of HIV/AIDS, and help Africa enter the world of open trade that promises peaceful and prosperous days.

The President discussed these issues at the U.S.-EU Summit in Goteborg. He made it clear that we must look even beyond Africa, to the challenges that confront us all as inhabitants of this earth. We must shape a balance of power in the world that favors freedom so that from the pivot point of that balance we can lift up all people, protect our precious environment—including dealing with global climate change, and defend and secure the freedoms of an ever-widening world of open and free trade, the rule of law, and respect for the rights of humanity and the dignity of life.

In this regard, President Bush and his European Union counterparts are committed to launching an ambitious new round of multilateral trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting in Doha. We seek a round that will lead both to the further liberalization of world trade and to clarifying, strengthening and extending WTO rules, so as to promote economic growth and equip the trading system to meet the challenges of globalization.

This new round must equally address the needs and priorities of developing countries, demonstrate that the trading system can respond to the concerns of civil society, and promote sustainable development. We will work closely together and with our partners in the coming weeks to secure consensus to launch a round based on this substantive and forward looking agenda.

At the end of the day, Mr. Chairman, it was a very momentous trip. We are embarked in a new era. We have set in motion with some of our most important Allies a mighty debate to determine the path we shall take. On the outcome of that debate may rest our future peace and prosperity. In my lifetime and yours, and in the reasonable span of our memories and our fathers’ memories it is mainly in Europe that the colossal struggles have begun—struggles that in their evolutions could well have determined another fate for our world.

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Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

We will have 10-minute rounds.

What I would like to explain to your two guests is, in your country there is a question time where the Prime Minister stands before the Parliament. We do not have that. This is as close as we come to that system, if you are wondering what your new friend is about to undergo here.

I would like to jump right to ABM and national missile defense. The President asserted, when speaking with his colleagues and counterparts, that there will be no deployment of any missile system that is not fully tested and operational. At least that is how it was reported. Is that an accurate representation of the President’s comments to the heads of state with whom he met in Europe, that there will be no deployment until a missile defense system has been fully tested and operationally effective?

Secretary POWELL. We, of course, would not deploy anything, for the purpose of defending ourselves against an incoming missile, if we did not think it would work. And the way to find out whether it will work or not is to make sure you have invested properly in research and development and you have done sufficient operational testing so that you have some level of confidence, a significant level of confidence, that it would work and serve its intended purpose.
It does not necessarily mean that you have to wait until every last test has been concluded and the whole thing has been fielded to some level of inventory before you actually start deploying it.

So, I think what Secretary Rumsfeld is doing is moving in this direction rapidly with research and development and testing on chosen technologies, and as soon as a confidence level has been reached these technologies can do the job, we might take the option of deploying them as they become ready.

The Chairman. Well, General, that is the first State Department answer you have given me. I do not quite understand the answer.

Secretary Rumsfeld has been quoted as saying that we understand that any system we have ever deployed has not necessarily worked the first time we deployed it, and that we have to deploy and we will work it out after that. Some have started to refer to it as the Scarecrow Defense.

What I am trying to get at here is, in one transatlantic conversation I had since the President has been back, there is a question in the minds of at least one person who was a participant, not a head of state, in the meetings that he thought the President was saying that there would be no deployment until there was a high level of confidence that whatever was deployed would work, that it had been tested, and that it was operationally effective, as opposed to the way Secretary Rumsfeld has been quoted as talking about it.

So, the reason I ask the question is a lot of Europeans and a lot of Americans—I speak for myself—are wondering, when you take that comment, coupled with the comments that have been made, which to the best of my knowledge, are not specifically accurate—not made by the President—the assertion made is that in order to be able to deploy a missile defense system, we have to be able to test in ways that violate the ABM Treaty. Thus, the impression is that we have to abandon ABM now in order to be able to test.

That is not accurate, as you know. There is no test that I am aware of—none at all—in classified briefings and open briefings, that is even on the board before the year 2003 that even gets us close to a violation of ABM, were we to proceed.

So, what I am trying to get at, without being too convoluted here, is, how related is the assertion that we will not deploy till tested to a commitment that we are not unilaterally going to pull out of ABM in the next 6 or 8 or 10 months? Because that is really what everybody wants to know.

Secretary Powell. Well, you know, the system that President Clinton was proposing just a year ago would have broken the limits of the ABM Treaty rather quickly.

The Chairman. Had he deployed it.

Secretary Powell. Had he deployed it. Had he made a decision to deploy it, it would have broken those limits rather quickly.

My State Department answer I thought rather brilliantly bridged the two points—

The Chairman. I am looking for General Powell here, not Secretary Powell.

Secretary Powell. No. You are hearing both.

The correct answer is you have different technologies at different levels of development. As you bring them along, you are liable to
have a greater confidence in one technology than in another technology. As you go up that confidence level, through research and development and testing and operational testing, you may have a higher level of confidence in deploying one than, say, another.

But the one thing that we do know is that as you go down this road, whether it is with deploying the radar to Shemya, or going down the road of that system that President Clinton was considering—and is still a possibility—or whether you are starting to move in the direction of boost phase interception, say, using Navy ships, Aegis-based systems, you will at some point run into the constraints of the ABM Treaty.

And when you are running into the constraints of the ABM Treaty, a judgment has to be made at that time as whether or not you have to find some way to get around those constraints either with some form of negotiation with our partner in the ABM Treaty, the Russian Federation, or you have to tell them we have got to move forward because we are determined to have missile defense and we have the technology that will accomplish that for us and this treaty is standing in the way. We have not been able to find a way to get it aside, move it aside in a mutual way. Then we are going to have to move forward unilaterally. When that time comes, I will leave to Mr. Rumsfeld to make the judgment, not me.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess what I am getting at is the reason why the President did not deploy is that the system did not work. The test had failed. They had not met the criteria of the Defense Department which would have given the go ahead to begin the deployment of the system by pouring concrete and putting the radars in Alaska.

But I do not want to belabor the point. I do think it is an important issue. At some point it is my intention to have some hearings, consistent with the time table of the administration, as to at what stages they believe that certain tests would require them to have to abandon ABM because there are generic assertions being made—not by you today, but in this debate—that we have to break out in order to test to know what system to deploy. I have met with everyone in the intelligence community I can, and I have met with everyone that I can in the Defense establishment, and I know of no such tests that are required for any system being contemplated that would require us to break out of ABM or seek an amendment in order to conduct the test before the year 2003 at the earliest.

But at any rate, I will go back to that at another time and date. But the fact that the President has stated to our allies that—my phrase, not the administration’s—no Scarecrow Defense is going to be erected without their knowledge, and it is going to be something you think is workable before you would move forward.

Secretary POWELL. You were reading a report of what the President said. You were not quoting the President.

The CHAIRMAN. Correct. I did not get that from the President of the United States.

My time is about to expire. Let me move to Macedonia for a second, if I may, Mr. Secretary.

I know I am not the only one on this committee and it is not only on this side of the aisle that shares the view that we cannot temporize our actions too much as it relates to Macedonia. We may
find ourselves in a very difficult situation that requires more action.

I am a little bit confused as to what it is that the administration is pushing as a political settlement—we all agree that this requires ultimately a political settlement in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—and what it has indicated, if you are able to tell us, to our allies about what role we are prepared to play in conjunction with them if, in fact, there is some success coming out of the meetings that have begun in Macedonia among the parties to seek a political settlement.

Would you elaborate on, A, what you think it is that politically must be done by the Macedonian Government to move the ball here? And B, if you can, tell us what America is prepared to do, in conjunction with our allies, as it relates to enforcing any settlement in that country.

Secretary Powell. On the political track, we are doing a great deal. As I noted in my prepared remarks, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jim Swigert works very closely with Mr. Solana, the High Representative of the United Nations, and with Lord Robertson, the Secretary General of NATO, and he travels in the region. So, we do have an almost constant envoying going back and forth in the person of Jim Swigert. He has done a terrific job. And, of course, we have our Ambassador there as well.

We are pressing the Macedonian Unity Government very hard now to deal with the aspirations, desires, and complaints of the Albanian minority with respect to representation in the government, with respect to representation in civil life and in the military and the police, the use of language, and all the other issues that you are familiar with. We have been saying to them consistently in all of my meetings with President Trajkovski, in my phone calls with him—I met with the new Foreign Minister a couple of weeks ago in Budapest—making the case that they really do have to not just talk about changes, but make the necessary changes.

They have been off in a retreat for the last couple of days, working hard, and they have now received the bill of particulars, the desires of the Albanian side, as to what they really would like to see happen. And it is going to require, at the end of the day, some constitutional changes.

So, we are pressing that as hard as we can because it is only through a political solution they will be able to keep moderate Albanians, Macedonians, from joining the extremists.

At the same time, the government has a responsibility to defend itself against attacks from people who are taking over villages, people who are using violence to pursue these political aims.

We hope that if this political track works, it will provide the basis to draw those extremists into the political process and to stop fighting, stop taking over villages, stop using violence as their weapon of choice. If that succeeds, then an element of that will be for them to disarm, to turn their weapons in.

What NATO is examining as a military matter now—and we are supporting this examination, and our people in Brussels at NATO headquarters are participating in this work. Our military authorities are participating in this work. NATO may be asked to provide disarmament points, places where these individuals who have
taken up the gun can turn in those guns and return to civil society and return to the political process. What the NATO military authorities have come up with in recent days is a concept of operations as to how you would perform such a disarmament task. It is a disarmament task in the sense that you are not going out and fighting people to disarm them, but you are setting up points where their weapons can be received.

To date, as you noted earlier, some nations have made a direct contribution of additional forces to such a force. We have not yet. In fact, we have roughly 700 people in Macedonia already, and they at some point could become a part of that process. As you know, we also have elements in KFOR in Kosovo who are working on the Kosovo-Macedonian border to help seal off.

So, I think we are involved militarily. We are involved politically. We are involved diplomatically. And we are, I think, doing everything that has been asked of us so far, but we have not yet made any commitment to troops for the purpose of this potential disarmament mission because we really do not see a need to make such a contribution yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. My time is well expired. Senator Helms.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think it is well known that Senator Biden and I have a good working relationship and I admire him very much. He on occasion has expressed his disagreement with me, and I have expressed mine with him.

But I want the record to show that I pray that this Government of ours will never hesitate to throw whatever we have available at any incoming missile, no matter what the stage of development is, if we have got a fighting chance to knock it down.

The ABM Treaty. I do not know of a deader duck than that one. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and that is whom we made the agreement with. But let me move on.

President Bush has clearly stated, I think, for all to understand, his determination to have NATO enlarge at the alliance’s Prague Summit and has signaled his desire for the next round of invitations to have a Baltic dimension. What are the next steps for the United States on this initiative?

Secretary POWELL. We will continue to work with our allies and consult with our allies as to how we will go through the process of deciding which nations will actually be invited to join. We will also work with the nine aspirant nations, those who are in the process of moving forward, so that they can complete the activities required under the Membership Action Plan and to make sure that they are prepared to be contributing members of the NATO alliance.

What we are not doing at this point is to start placing bets on individual countries because we do not want to deter any country from doing more over the next year and a half because they think, well, we are in, we have got a lock on it, or setting off a beauty contest among the countries.

What the President clearly said, though, was from the Baltic region, all the way down to the Balkans, we should not let any country be excluded because of geography, because of history, or because some other country may not like them becoming a member...
of the alliance. The President made this very clear in his speech in Warsaw. He made it very clear to President Putin, and he made it very clear to every audience he spoke to. So, the alliance is wide open for business.

I got into a discussion with one of my Russian colleagues recently about this. Well, the Warsaw Pact went away. Why will NATO not go away? And the answer is because people keep trying to join it. It is hard to say it is not relevant when people keep knocking on the door.

So, the door will be opened, and at an appropriate time, the alliance as a group, 19 nations, will decide how many nations come through the door in the next window, which is Prague 2002.

Senator HELMS. I guess everybody has a wish list on the next entries, and I certainly have mine. I am going to ask this question just for the record. If Latvia and Lithuania and Estonia continue their progress, particularly in terms of their respective defense policies, do you expect that they have a pretty good chance of getting an invitation to NATO?

Secretary POWELL. I think any nation of the nine——

Senator HELMS. Now, there comes a State Department answer.

Secretary POWELL [continuing]. That continues to make progress toward their MAP requirements and pursue democracy and all the other things that are expected of a NATO nation would have a pretty good chance.

I learned a lot since I got to the State Department, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HELMS. On June 14, the democratically elected President of Chechnya sent a moving letter—and I know you read it—to President Bush describing the atrocities committed by Russian forces against the Chechnyan people. That President pleaded for the United States to do more to pressure the Kremlin to cease its military attacks and to begin peace negotiations with the Chechnyan resistance.

He also noted that his earlier letter to the Department of State, articulating a peace proposal for a just end to this conflict, is still unanswered. I do not know when he wrote that letter to the State Department, and that does not bother me as much as some other things.

I guess the question I want to ask you is, do you endorse this peace proposal?

Secretary POWELL. I would endorse any proposal that would bring a conclusion to this terrible crisis.

Let me answer your question this way, Mr. Chairman. President Bush spoke directly to Mr. Putin about Chechnya. I do it at every meeting I have with my Russian colleagues, human rights abuses, the fact that we have seen now evidence of some of the atrocities committed by Russian soldiers. We succeeded in having the Russians agree to let an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] delegation back in to have a permanent presence in the region, and we have noted recently that the Russians have arrested and put before the Bar of Justice some soldiers who may have been responsible for this kind of atrocity.

But nevertheless it is an unacceptable situation and we are pushing the Russians in every way that we know how to try to find
a political solution because they are sure not going to find a military one.

Senator HELMS. Let me ask you this. Will you respond to that letter?

Secretary POWELL. Yes, sir. I will go back to the Department and look for the letter. I do not know if it came in on my watch or previously——

Senator HELMS. I will send it down to you.

Secretary POWELL. Yes, sir.

Senator HELMS. But I would appreciate your doing it because if you do not respond to this letter, that is going to have implications that are undesirable. Now, I do not think you want to have the reputation—and you do not have it—that you are not going to worry about people like the Chechynans who are really suffering. So, if you could get a letter off to them and maybe one that could be released by us, if you want it that way, or whatever you want, but I think you ought to give them some encouragement.

Secretary POWELL. I will get the letter, Mr. Chairman, take a look at it, and see what we can do. I am not sure who it comes from.

Senator HELMS. I guess I have got to ask this question. How, if any, does the Bush administration’s policy toward Chechnya differ from the Clinton administration’s policy? Is there any difference?

Secretary POWELL. I do not know that I can answer that. I cannot speak for the Clinton administration policy. I know that from day one we have been pressuring the Russians to find a political solution. We have made it a priority item in all of our discussions. We have told them it will have an effect on our overall relationship with the Russians. It represents human rights abuses that are unacceptable, and we will speak out about it constantly and continuously.

Senator HELMS. Well, you just cannot lock arms with people who allow their government to do what Russia is doing to Chechnya. I do not think you can. I have known you for a long time, and I do not think you like what is going on over there. Not one bit.

A recent NATO review of current allied force plans conclude that our allies will fulfill less than half of their respective force goals. And you know what I mean by that. And that is a failure that will leave them even more dependent upon the United States if they and we were to face a new conflict.

Now, my question is, obviously, can we anticipate a reversal of this military decline prior to the alliance’s summit meeting in Prague next year? It has two parts. The second question, how was this issue addressed, if at all, in the President’s meeting at Brussels?

Secretary POWELL. I cannot answer what those governments might do between now and Prague 2002. I can say that it came up in the President’s meetings in Brussels. It was discussed very directly at the NAC meeting. Lord Robertson spoke directly to all the heads of state and government that they were falling short of their force goals. They had to do more. He even had prepared a little brochure, passed out to each member who was there, to describe the shortfalls. So, it is a high priority in Lord Robertson’s mind and it is a high priority in President Bush’s mind.
Whether or not those individual heads of state and government will be able to go back and get their parliaments to actually do what is necessary to improve attainment of those force goals remains to be seen, but it is something that we discuss with them at every NATO meeting, whether it is a defense ministerial or my ministerials with my Foreign Minister colleagues.

Senator HELMS. You say you discussed it?
Secretary POWELL. I raise it at my ministerial meetings with my fellow Foreign Ministers, and I know Don Rumsfeld raises it when he meets with his defense colleagues in NATO meetings. And I make the point. You all talk about a European security and defense identity, but unless you are adding capability, it is not going to work and it is not going to be good necessarily for NATO. You have got to make the investment. You cannot just talk a good game; you have got to pay for a good game.

Senator HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me congratulate you, Joe, on your chairmanship. I thank Senator Helms for his leadership of the committee over the years.

It is a pleasure to have you, Mr. Secretary, with us today.

Let me begin by just telling you I want to commend you for the work you have done in Europe recently. I think you have done very, very well. I think the President’s trip went a lot better than certainly the indications were from reports I have heard independently from people.

Senator Helms, I gather, expressed some concerns about the meeting with President Putin, and I share some of those concerns he has. But I think having a good meeting like that, we should not overreact to the personal reactions of how two individuals judge the first meeting with each other. So, my assessment was it was pretty good.

Senator Helms has raised Chechnya, and I would like to bring up two subject matters to you that may seem a bit unrelated to the subject matter of the hearing, but in fact, I think they are related if you look at events in the Balkans and elsewhere. The issue of human rights is very much on the minds of people.

You were very gracious earlier this week to meet with an individual for whom I have a high, high regard, Mary Robinson, the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the United Nations. In fact, a group of us met with her after your meeting here in the U.S. Senate. She had asked to meet with us about the upcoming conference in Durbin, South Africa at the end of August and early September, I believe the dates are for that. You, as I said, very graciously gave her time, and she was very grateful for the opportunity to express her interests and what is hoped to be achieved at that conference.

I would just like to raise with you the issue about our participation there. I know you are weighing this. I know there are some very legitimate concerns about what could come out of that kind of conference. My point would be, I guess, to leave it to chance probably heightens the degree that some tough things could come out of there that are not in our interest and the interest of some of our
allies, particularly Israel. So, there is somewhat of a risk of participating, but I think it diminishes the risk of some of the other outcomes that people are worried about.

So, I would urge you to possibly even lead the delegation. I know you are thinking about that. I do not expect you to answer that question in a public hearing today, but I would at least like to express my support for the idea that you might lead that delegation. I think you could do a tremendous amount to raise the profile of that meeting and really address some very, very critical issues.

The title is the Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Race-Related Intolerance. I wish they would be more optimistic and positive about it, instead of dark.

I wonder if you might just share with us at least some of the preliminary thinking about it. I know there is a preconference in Geneva coming up to work out some remaining issues that need to be addressed at the Durbin conference. So, that is the first question I have for you.

You have been to Africa, by the way, and I commend you for making this one of the first trips on your agenda. I thought your speech in Zimbabwe was terrific. I know we have differences from time to time, but I also like an opportunity like this to express my gratitude to you for the kind of leadership you are showing in a number of areas.

But if you might comment for me.

Secretary POWELL. Yes, thank you. The World Conference on Racism I think can be a powerful vehicle if it is a forward-looking conference and points the way ahead. There is some danger of it becoming mired in past political issues and past events that could take away from the value of such a conference.

I met with High Commissioner Robinson twice—the other day as you indicated, but I met with her very early on in my tenure as Secretary of State—and told her that I was anxious to see strong U.S. participation in the conference, but that some serious work had to be done to eliminate such issues such as a zionism as racism proposition or getting into slavery and compensation and things of that nature, which would detract from the purpose of the conference.

Senator DODD. I agree.

Secretary POWELL. She understood that and was working on it. From our conversation the other evening, there may be some progress and we may see more at the upcoming meeting that you touched on.

When I was in Africa, I made this same point to President Mbeki and Foreign Minister Zuma in South Africa, to President Moi in Kenya, to President Museveni in Uganda, and everywhere I went. I made the same point in Mali because we do not want to derail this conference. But these issues could derail it and make it harder for us to participate unless they are dealt with.

Senator DODD. I appreciate that.

If you talk about some of our greatest exports, I suppose the mind would quickly run to movies and Coca-Cola and the like, but I think our greatest export has been our commitment to human values, human opportunity, and human rights. I think we are noted for that, and certainly in the last half of the 20th century,
the United States’ lead on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Nuremberg experience, which you know I have a strong personal interest in as my father was the Executive Trial Counsel in Nuremberg in 1945, the Genocide Convention. Senator Helms and I worked out some language finally after years and years of having that convention language around, not to the satisfaction of everyone, but we finally ratified it. So, there is a strong history and background of the United States really being the leader in the world on these issues.

Senator Helms raised Chechnya. I appreciate, by the way, Jack Tobin. You have raised the issue of my constituent, and I do not want to turn this hearing into constituent service related matters, but I am very grateful for you raising it to that level. I appreciate it.

Which brings me to the issue of the criminal court issue. I know you are in the process of thinking this through, and I know my colleague from North Carolina has some very strong reservations, to put it mildly, about what the implications could be for an international criminal court.

But I would hope, given our long history and involvement in these issues as we enter the 21st century, and given the problems that emerge around the globe, there may be a way for us to be an active proponent of the creation of an international criminal court. I am not satisfied that the present document is any one that we ought to ratify or support, but I would hate to see us walk away from it entirely and sort of relinquish the ground to others, given the leadership we have shown over the years.

My father used to say—and I do not know if he was right or wrong, but he always felt that had there been an international court in the 1920’s and 1930’s after World War I, there might have been a way to stop the horrors that occurred during the Nazi regime. If there had been a place where the issues could have been raised about the genocidal behavior of Hitler, it just might have avoided it. You can argue as to whether or not it would have occurred.

But the idea in the 21st century that somehow we are going to relegate a decision to others on something so fundamental, something we are so associated with as a Nation worries me a great deal. I wonder if you might just comment on where we are and whether or not there is still an opportunity for some discussion about how we might frame this debate and discussion, other than, with all due respect, the Servicemen’s Protection Act, which I worry about the implications of that.

Secretary Powell. Well, as you know, President Clinton signed——

Senator Dodd. Yes.

Secretary Powell [continuing]. It just before he left office, but even in the process of signing, he indicated that it was not something that he would send up for ratification at that time. The Bush administration also does not believe this is an agreement that should be sent up for ratification because of the impact it would have, in our judgment, on U.S. servicepersons serving overseas who might get caught up in this court.
And I felt the same way as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sharing all the values that you have just discussed, Senator Dodd, but there is a fundamental constitutional right that our youngsters have with respect to how they should be held accountable for their actions under our laws. I was never able to quite square what the ICC might cause to happen with respect to the rights that our youngsters should enjoy under our constitutional system.

I am always willing to listen to new ideas and new thoughts, but I had difficulty with the ICC as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when it was emerging, when it was being talked about, and I still have problems with it, as does the Department of Defense.

So, at this point, we signed it so we can participate in some of the work that goes on with respect to the development of such a concept, but the administration will not be sending it up for ratification.

Senator Dodd, I would worry as well about our servicemen and women. But I happen to believe what the court did with Mr. Milosevic and others, for instance, played a tremendously valuable role. I am fearful we are going to see more of these types, the Osama bin Ladens and others around the world. To the extent that we can play a leadership role in providing an international forum where these thugs are brought to justice is something that I would like to see my country associated with.

Secretary Powell. And we do, Senator, with specific tribunals for specific issues and areas, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.

Senator Dodd. I thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Helms. Before you start the clock on Senator Lugar, we have been talking about three chairmen of the Foreign Relations Committee. No. 4 is to my left, and he is not to my left normally. Dick Lugar was one of the fine chairmen of this committee. You are going to be interrogated by a good former chairman.

Senator Lugar. Thank you.

Senator Dodd. We got an authorization bill done when you were chairman.

Senator Lugar. I appreciate this recognition by all the chairmen who are here today.

Secretary Powell. I want to thank you for the strong statements you made about the African Growth and Opportunity Act. I think the boost that you and the Department are giving to that legislation is crucial. Its implementation has moved slowly, but perhaps is taking on speed. I just mention this in passing.

Likewise, at the State Department your subordinates are working on the sanctions issue. I withheld offering legislation this year prior to making certain we are on the same page so that there can be strong coordination. Other Senators on the committee I know are very much interested in that subject also. So, as you can give us a heads-up, we would appreciate it.

Secretary Powell. Thank you, sir. We will.

Senator Lugar. I want to mention specifically in Macedonia, the point you have made about the potential for NATO troops to be in the disarmament role. As I understand the political situation—you
may be more up to date on this—the negotiations have not gone well in the last 24 or 48 hours in large part because some of the Slavic leaders of the government have become more intransigent, even suggesting a military solution is a better idea than concessions to the Albanians.

The Albanians, who are still holding certain of the villages, apparently are giving the impression that they are prepared to be disarmed by the NATO peacekeepers, wherever they are positioned. But their negotiating position is very strong. They want a Vice President of the country, for example, an Albanian to be part of this process, and various other concessions to the Albanian minority that apparently some of the Slav folks find unacceptable.

I am wondering if the politics of the situation—and if we are pursuing the political solution you and the President have talked about—do not dictate some recognition of where those negotiations stand and, in your own deft way, weighing in to make certain that this does not fall apart. It is the same type of antagonism that has been very clearly observed in Bosnia and to some extent in Croatia before that. To go through a repeat as a spectator of this crisis would be tragic because all the consequences would be more difficult.

Do you have any comment?

Secretary POWELL. You have very accurately described the current state of negotiations of the last 24 to 48 hours where the positions are well known and fairly entrenched. We are working hard to find ways to bridge these differences of opinion or to find compromises. I do not want to say too much in this hearing, but we are also looking for others who are respected by both sides to come play a role in bridging these differences.

Senator LUGAR. Other countries that might—

Secretary POWELL. Other persons from other countries who are well respected by the two sides and have experience in bridging these kinds of differences to come in and see if they can keep this process moving forward.

But it has been a tough 24 hours, and some of the demands that the Albanian side has put down simply are unacceptable to the Slav side, and vice versa. So, we have got to try to find ways to bridge this, and we are doing everything we can do to do that.

Senator LUGAR. Great.

Let me ask about NATO. The President’s Warsaw speech, outlining from the Baltics to the Black Sea and a Europe free and whole, was very forthright. And you have been, too. But I just want to review the roster.

I agree with Senator Helms that the accession to NATO of the Baltic states is extremely important, and I am hopeful that occurs in Prague. You have indicated the readiness factor, the door is open.

But nevertheless, U.S. leadership is absolutely imperative. The nervousness of some of our European allies regarding that is palpable, and without a very, very strong United States push from here on to Prague, it is likely to falter, which would be tragic.

Slovenia and Slovakia are barely mentioned because it is assumed that Slovenia is going to be a member and Slovakia most probably. I hope that is the case in both situations.
The southeast Europe situation is more complex. My own view after seeing the Bulgarians, as they came through to see you and others in the State Department, is that joining NATO is very important. I am unable to trace exactly the implications of the weekend election of the former king and the government that is about to be produced and what this means. Information for the committee about your impressions of the evolution of government in Bulgaria would be very helpful.

Obviously, Romania is more murky. But I saw a piece by Bill Odem in the Wall Street Journal this morning, and I thought it was very good that he suggested both countries are important. Even if 2002 is not to be the time for formal invitation, very clearly some type of conditional invitation needs to be involved so that as they progress to the point where they meet the membership criteria, it happens, as opposed to being speculative. Because the filling in of southeastern Europe is important and those two countries are basic to that.

My question today is twofold. First, very little mention has been made of Ukraine in all of this. I mention it because a delegation from Ukraine has visited me under the auspices of the Center for Democracy. It is in town now, including representatives of the government, President Kuchma, and three members of the Rada, who are influential. The impression they are giving is not that they are looking for membership, but clearly trying to strengthen the ties of security with the United States. They are trying to make certain that nothing has been occurring in Ukraine that weakens the desire of everybody in the country for independence and that independence is perceived to be part of Europe and very close to us as their major advocate.

This is why I am hopeful that further exploration may take place in your Department with regard to Ukraine. Now, I understand the implications of all this and you do even better. But it just seems to me that this ought not to be off the map as we are talking about a Europe, whole and free.

Even more complex, what is to be done with regard to the Balkan states? Clearly we discussed earlier the fact that Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo are all wrapped up now in a crisis that you are working on even as we speak. So, it is a stretch to think in terms of membership when you are talking about states that are in potential conflict and difficulty.

I am wondering if there is some road map that you or others have in mind as to how the criteria for these states fit any of these conditions. Even if we were to say in the extremity, Kosovo is not a proper candidate, under what conditions would Kosovo ever be a proper candidate, or Albania, or Macedonia?

In other words, as we are talking about keeping the door open and maintain the criteria, how can we make sure that each of these countries knows that, as well as our European friends, that we have this idea of the whole Europe and the eligibility criteria that people measure up to them and we back them?

Do you have any comment about this?

Secretary POWELL. Let me start to respond by going to one of your first points, that the United States has to show leadership. You are quite right. We will do this between now and Prague 2002.
To some extent, I think the President did this very effectively last week by making it clear that zero option is out. That was a decision really that the alliance came to last week, that zero option is out. It is not stated that way. So, yes, I would say that there is no doubt—I do not know of any of my colleagues who are going to stand up and try to defend a zero option any longer as a result of what I heard last week in NATO councils, the President’s Warsaw speech. There may be one of them out there of the 19, but I cannot tell you who it is. So, what was essentially done last week was take zero option off the table.

Over the next year and 4 or 5 months, slowly but surely a consensus will develop, and it will be a consensus that will have a strong component of U.S. leadership as to what seems to make sense for Europe and for the alliance. Senator, you know all the permutations, big bang, little bang, middle bang, low option, high option. They are all on the table. Over time, U.S. leadership will be asserted as to what we think makes sense.

With respect to Ukraine and the states you talked about, some of which are not yet nations, such as Kosovo, Ukraine is a challenge right now. The government is going through some difficult times, but we made it clear to Ukrainian leaders that we believe they belong to the West as well, and we want to help them. It is not a matter of NATO membership, but there are other ways that we can interact with Ukraine. We can help them with their economy. We can make sure that they understand what is expected with respect to human rights and democracy and accountability of everybody within a society no matter how high. So, we can help them become a more Western inclined, European inclined, European community inclined nation.

In due course there may be a period, 2004, 2006, 2008, when these other countries have met the standards of democracy that are expected of a NATO nation, are integrated into the economic system that drives all NATO nations, and make a contribution to the alliance. There is a logic to bringing them into this political and defensive military alliance.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope Slovenia comes quickly.

I yield to the Senator from Florida, Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to followup on your line of questioning, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the missile defense. I would be curious as to your response, Mr. Secretary, to what the chairman had suggested, which is why would the testing of a missile defense system break the ABM Treaty.

Secretary POWELL. It depends on the nature of the test. If you run a test on computers or without actually putting components together, it probably would not, but there comes a point in the development of a system where, when you start putting components together and you start testing that system in certain modes, where the treaty is rather precise. And there will be little disagreement that you have hit a limit specified in the treaty, and at that point, something has to be done. You either stop the development or you get out of the condition that is provided for in the treaty.
I was asked on television this past Sunday, well, are you guys not just interested in getting out of the ABM Treaty? Somebody accused us of that. And my answer was, if the treaty permitted us to do what we needed for a limited defense, we would not want to get out of it. But it constrains us.

We are not trying to put in place a defense of the kind that should cause Russia and China to have sleepless nights. We are not trying to put in place a missile defense of the kind that the ABM Treaty was intended in 1972 to constrain and keep from happening. It is quite a different thing.

Therefore, we think that the Russians and others should have an open mind to designing a new strategic framework that would either set aside or put in place a new arrangement or give us a codicil or a protocol, something which removes these constraints that keep us from going in a sensible direction to deal with the kinds of new threats that are out there.

Claims that the Russians will suddenly break out in an arms race and start doing this, that, and the other I think are a bit overstated, even by the Russians, even when they say it, because if there was no ABM Treaty right now, if it went away, if somebody came up and said, we just discovered it is null and void and has been since 1972, would this cause Russia and China suddenly to do something that they were not planning to do yesterday merely because the United States is pursuing a limited missile defense option? I do not think so. I do not think so. I think the transparency that exists in our society would be such that their actions would be conditioned on what we are doing, not what their greatest fears might be.

Senator NELSON. Well, let us take some specific examples. For example, in the boost phase, the Aegis system off of our ships, the testing of that. Would that be a transgression of the ABM?

Secretary POWELL. There will come a time where if it is tested in an ABM mode, it would bust the treaty. I do not know at what point that occurs, and I would rather yield to my colleagues and experts in the Defense Department. But there will come a time when all of these technologies ultimately, when you test them in an ABM mode, will violate the treaty.

Senator NELSON. Well, let us take another example. In the middle phase, on such a thing as a laser from a flying 747, would that be a contradiction of the ABM Treaty? The testing of that laser?

Secretary POWELL. If it is tested in an ABM mode with other elements, such as the detection element, it puts it all together in an ABM mode, my understanding is that you are running against the constraints of the ABM Treaty.

Senator NELSON. All right. Let us take the final phase, which is the reentry phase, the existing test that we have going from California to Kwajalein Island. No one has suggested that that is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

Secretary POWELL. No.

Senator NELSON. Yet, that is preliminary in our research and development before we would ever get to a decision about deployment. So, when in that research and development, that testing, does it become a violation of the ABM even on the much more so-
phisticated system of the reentry phase of knocking down an incoming warhead?

Secretary Powell. I would rather not guess about individual systems, and I would rather yield to an answer for the record or for the Defense Department and the experts who monitor these tests to make sure they are treaty compliant to answer your specific question, Senator.

But my knowledge of it from previous experience and my current responsibilities is when you start putting components together that puts the whole system into an ABM mode, and it is clear that it is in an ABM mode, that is when you run into the constraints of the treaty.

Senator Nelson. What the chairman had suggested which I find most compelling is the fact that you can continue a robust R&D phase without the violation of the treaty and that clearly we ought to be doing that because we cannot deploy something that we have not developed. It seems to me that the administration might be getting the cart before the horse to say that we are at a point that we are going to deploy when, in fact, we have not developed it, and therefore that this is going to cause this immediate international diplomatic crisis by virtue of the ABM Treaty having been violated.

Secretary Powell. Of course, we cannot deploy something we have not developed. But what the administration is saying to our friends and to our allies and others and saying to the Congress is that as you move down this track of research, development, testing, prototyping, and then ultimately fielding, there will come a point along that continuum—and it will be at a different point for different weapons systems, different technologies—where you are going to run into the constraints of the treaty.

We want to give fair warning that when those constraints are hit, we will have to make a judgment as to whether we will stay within those constraints, go no further, or we have to find a way to get around those constraints. And that is what we are talking to the Russians about who is our partner in the treaty.

Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, you have summed up my feelings most accurately when you said we cannot deploy something that we have not developed. We could deploy the Aegis system in the boost phase with some tweaking. We are developing the laser system, and we are continuing the testing on the final phase, the descent phase. I agree with you. If we approach it in that way, it seems to me, as a country boy from Florida, that is the common sense way to approach what could be a very valuable system for the protection of this country, missile defense, if and when it is in fact developed.

The Chairman. Will the country boy yield for a point of clarification?

Senator Nelson. I certainly will to my chairman.

The Chairman. Are you saying, Mr. Secretary, that the national missile defense being contemplated is a limited defense? Because the President says three things. He says he wants to protect against rogue nations, protect our allies, and protect against an accidental launch, which by definition is not a limited defense. Against an accidental launch, you need a worldwide system. So, the reason why many of us get confused is we do not know what the
devils you are talking about. Are you talking about a limited defense which would preempt developing a system against an accidental launch?

Secretary Powell. We are talking about a limited defense that would protect—however it is deployed and whatever technologies and whatever systems Secretary Rumsfeld and his colleagues come up with, that would defend that which we chose to defend against a limited number of missiles coming at that system.

The Chairman. Well, that is very encouraging. By the way, as the Senator from Florida knows, you can test airborne lasers. It just depends on the target whether or not you violate the ABM Treaty.

Secretary Powell. That is what makes it whether it is in an ABM mode or not.

The Chairman. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Senator Nelson. Well, I thank my chairman. I would like to followup on something that my other chairman, the Senator from North Carolina, had stated. He expressed his concern in his opening comments, and I want to associate myself with his remarks of being concerned about the label of “trustworthy” with regard to Mr. Putin. I would like to have the value of your thoughts about such a label.

Secretary Powell. Well, the President spoke clearly about his view of Mr. Putin after their meeting, and I do not have anything to say about that.

Let us put it in perspective. This is a President who walked in the room with that gentleman and met him for the first time and laid down his markers with respect to missile defense, with respect to the constraints of the ABM Treaty, with respect to Chechnya, with respect to proliferation, with respect to the fact that he wanted to welcome the new Russian Federation, as it is emerging, into a Western relationship. He wanted to help them with economic development, with the rule of law. So, there was nothing off terra firma about the President’s performance in that 1 hour and 40 minutes. He went in there strong. He came out strong. And he met a man who is strong as well, who exchanged his views and presented the positions of his nation.

The President I think communicated to the world that this is somebody I am going to be working with, dealing with, and at least out of this meeting, we emerged with a relationship of trust, and I look forward to greeting him at my ranch in Crawford, Texas. So, I think a little bit too much is being made of this language.

Just remember, the President went in there and made it clear what he believed in and what he stood for, and he did not blink in the slightest. And I would leave it at that.

Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Hagel.

Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Powell. Senator Hagel.

Senator Hagel. Let me congratulate you and the President and your team. I thought your days in Europe last week were effective, direct, to the point, well received. I thought you, the President,
your team fulfilled every expectation and beyond. So, thank you for the job you did.

I want to comment on a couple of points that have been made here and then ask some questions. Picking up on my colleagues from North Carolina and Florida’s comments regarding the President’s analysis of trustworthiness. I was not in that room. Most of us in this room I guess were not. I do not know where you were. You were not. So, I put some confidence in the President’s personal analysis and I take the President at his word there.

But more important than that, it seems to me what the President did here is he placed some expectations on this relationship between the two of them, and I do not find that altogether that disturbing. As a matter of fact, I think expectations are not all bad.

Something else that I think this President needs to be congratulated for in his first 6 months—and his directness in Europe with our allies and friends puts some emphasis on that—and that is his plain, straight talk. I have believed, over a long period of time in all the different things I have done in my life, that the benefits of strategic ambiguity are often overblown, overstated, overemphasized, and overvalued. Nations have gone to war over strategic ambiguity, and it has not been all that long that we have had to deal with some of that. I am not so sure—this is not the right forum for that—that we might not have found ourselves in Desert Storm if we would have had a little more direct dialog with Mr. Saddam Hussein.

But I wanted to at least go on the record in saying that I think what the President did, how he handled himself, and his analysis of that relationship is one that does put some new expectations into our relationship. And that is good.

I also want to go back to something else that was said and has been bandied about here this morning. This is not the right forum for a treatise, lecture on missile defense. But, Mr. Secretary, generally it is my understanding that we are working through our missile defense process—and I might remind my colleagues here that the Senate voted something like 97 to 3 a couple of years ago on a resolution about national missile defense. That somehow gets overlooked when we start talking about missile defense.

There is a series of 19 tests, if I understand this, that we are working our way through, and we have now gone through three or four. I have never known a technology of certainly missile defense or any defense-related technology that has hit it the first, second, or third time during a test. So, I think we should not overlook that this is an ongoing process and, again, I think it is 19 tests. It may be less, it may be more.

The last thing I would say about this point is I have met, as many of my colleagues, over the last year with many of our European friends and allies, Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, National Security Ministers, Defense Ministers, all kinds of Ministers. I do not find any international crisis on this issue. I find a lot of questions, a lot of probing, a lot of misunderstanding, a lot of efforts to clarify what is going on, but I do not in any way sense an international crisis over this. So, whatever that is worth, I want to be on the record with those points.
Now, we will get to what is most important, and that is this, your testimony. You said, Mr. Secretary, “President Bush proposed and President Putin agreed to establishing a structured dialog on strategic issues, and the two Presidents charged Foreign Minister Ivanov and me and Secretary Rumsfeld” and others with doing that.

Could you develop that a bit for this committee? What does that mean?

Secretary Powell. It means that Igor Ivanov, who is my counterpart—he is the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation—and I, along with Secretary Rumsfeld and Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov, will set up working groups that will discuss the threat, discuss proliferation efforts, discuss how to go about looking at the strategic framework, begin the dialog that the two Presidents talked about. President Putin said I think the ABM Treaty is still the centerpiece of the strategic framework, and we said, let us talk about this. Let us explore this and let us explore a lot of other things that relate to our strategic relationship. We have put proliferation and non-proliferation, counter-proliferation activities into that strategic framework. So, in the very near future, Igor Ivanov and Don Rumsfeld and Sergei Ivanov will be setting up these groups of experts to explore these issues under the overall direction of the Foreign Ministry and the Secretary of State’s office.

Senator Hagel. And that will include such things as you mentioned in your testimony, missile defense, offensive nuclear weapons, proliferation, essentially framing up the world that we live in today in the year 2001, not in the year 1972.

Secretary Powell. Yes.

Senator Hagel. Thank you.

Further on in your testimony, you talked about the Presidents also agreeing to continuing their search for common solutions in the Balkans, Middle East, and so on. Then you complete this paragraph discussing common interests in developing the resources of the Caspian Basin. Our colleague, Senator Lugar, talked about the Ukraine.

I would like to now broaden that a bit to Central Asia. Could you tell this committee what you have in mind in moving forward on the President’s thoughts here on focusing on that very critical part of the world?

Secretary Powell. It is a very critical part of the world. What I found in my discussions with my Russian colleagues and the President found in discussions with President Putin is that they are very concerned about that whole southern underbelly of the Russian Federation. We have nations that are coming out in that part of the world with no tradition of democracy, with a tendency toward authoritarian kinds of rulers. There is great potential for instability in that part of the world, terrorism, narcotrafficking, and we have to work with Russia to see if we can find common ways of approaching the problems of that region.

It is also the source of energy, the source of oil, and we have to make sure that those resources can be tapped in a way where the wealth goes to the people of those nations, and that the energy can be brought out in ways that are not going through strategic points of strangle-hold that we might subsequently or in the future regret
that we did not think about this more carefully. So, this was a subject of discussion between the two Presidents and it will be one of the major areas of discussion and exploration with the Russians as we move forward.

Senator HAGEL. I hope that will include, as I assume that you imply in your analysis and explanation, that we are taking the long view of that area.

Secretary POWELL. Yes.

Senator HAGEL. I think many of us are concerned—you and I have talked about this—that we get maneuvered out of that area not just on energy resources, geopolitical, strategic interests. Ukraine I think is a very key area, as Senator Lugar pointed out. You have responded to that.

That leads me a bit in a different direction, but I think it is still key. I have got a minute or so left. That is the ILSA [Iran-Libya Sanctions Act] sanctions. I know this hearing is not about ILSA, but the issues that you have reflected on I think include Iran. We cannot talk about the Caspian Sea without talking about Iran. I know it is a delicate, difficult issue.

But I would hope the State Department is going to put some effort into exploring possibilities here and not just roll over a 5-year deal and say, well, come back and see us.

I would also hope that we could explore separating Libya and Iran on this. I do not think that makes much sense for a lot of reasons. The long view for the United States is we cannot afford to be maneuvered out of that area.

The last question I would have is global climate change. You mentioned that in your testimony. Could you tell this committee a bit about what you intend to do at the Bonn KP–6 meeting next month, and then anything that you would care to add regarding the Marrakech KP–7 meeting in November?

Secretary POWELL. On ILSA, we are exploring some options with respect to the length of the rollover period. As you know, we have benefited from your thoughts and guidance on this, and we are working with other Members of Congress now on that subject. It is a tough one with a lot of strong views one way or the other.

On Kyoto, the President made it clear that he was committing the United States to working within the Kyoto process even though the process to date has produced a protocol in 1997 that we no longer find acceptable and we cannot move forward on that protocol. We will be sending our delegations to KP–6 and subsequently the KP–7 and even before then to meetings in The Hague at the end of this month with some of the ideas the President presented in his speech the Monday before he went to Europe on how we are going to use technology, how we are going to use the elements in the National Energy Plan to start to deal with the problem of global warming. We are hard at work within the administration right now, and there will be meetings today, frankly, to come up with some additional ideas that will show leadership on the part of the United States at KP–6 and then take it into KP–7.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kerry.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Secretary, welcome. It is great to have you here.
Secretary Powell. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Kerry. If I could just follow up on that quickly. It is not the area where I really want to spend the most time, but if I could just ask quickly, will the administration submit a plan specifically to KP-6?

Secretary Powell. I am not sure how far along we will be, since it is only a few weeks away, whether I can say it is a fully fleshed out plan of every idea we have or whether we will be in a position, more likely I think, to indicate to KP-6 where we are heading as opposed to a complete plan. That is what we are working on now. But I think we are going to try to go beyond where the President was in his speech just before he went to Europe.

Senator Kerry. As you know, the Kyoto Protocol and the entire approach has moved away from the voluntary reductions embraced by President Bush in 1992 to mandatory. Will your plan embrace mandatory emissions reductions?

Secretary Powell. I do not know yet. As the President indicated, he is looking at market-based options as part of our consideration. Nothing was taken off the table for our analysis and consideration. But at the moment, I am not aware of any mandatory based options that we are going to lay before KP-6.

Senator Kerry. Fair enough.

I know you do not need to be reminded, but just for the public record, I would remind everybody that all of the discussions of the last years have embraced market-driven solutions, emissions trading, various measurements of sequestration, and sinks and so forth. But they certainly embraced the notion that nothing will happen without mandatory. So, obviously, I think that is a critical question.

Secretary Powell. I understand.

Senator Kerry. Wearing my hat as chairman of the Sub-committee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, if I can for a minute, now that you have briefed the allies on national missile defense [NMD] and had a meeting with the Russian President, are there immediate plans with respect to the Chinese particularly and our Asian allies in terms of the NMD program? Will the President meet prior to Asian-Pacific Economic Conference [APEC] with President Jiang Zemin or other Chinese leaders?

Secretary Powell. I do not know if the President will have a chance to meet with Jiang Zemin before Shanghai. It is a question of scheduling, but there are no plans that I know of for a meeting before then. I may well have an opportunity to meet with Chinese leaders before Shanghai and we are looking at that now.

Senator Kerry. Obviously, you do not need urging from us, but I would, nevertheless, respectfully urge you that I think time is important in the context of how that relationship is perceived, and I would hope that that would be something you would embrace sooner rather than later.

Secretary Powell. As you know, Assistant Secretary Kelly did go to China to brief in May on our way of looking at the new strategic framework, and I have spoken to every Asian leader who has passed through my office recently. I had the Pakistani Foreign Minister yesterday. I also had the Japanese Foreign Minister this week and had a chance to discuss it with her. And Ambassador
Armitage, Deputy Secretary Armitage, visited India as part of his travels on national missile defense.

Senator Kerry. I would love to pursue that with you a little bit, Mr. Secretary, if we could, perhaps privately at some point.

But on another subject, the North Koreans rejected the notion of any conventional force discussions. How will that affect your approach and where do you think that places the talks?

Secretary Powell. I do not think it derails the talks in any way. They have essentially said they do not think this is something they want to talk about at this point. But I think all things should be in the agenda, and we are in contact with them and I expect discussions to begin soon.

I think it is hard to move forward in this relationship with North Korea, this set of discussions with North Korea, without ultimately getting to the conventional force standoff that exists on the peninsula. It is sucking up a huge amount of their resources, resources they cannot really afford to apply to that. This is a country that is broke. It is destitute. It is starving. The last thing they need is this kind of force presence lurking over the peninsula and lurking over South Korea. So, in due course, it is a subject that has to be discussed.

Senator Kerry. And you, obviously, intend to pursue those talks then as soon as possible and practical?

Secretary Powell. Yes.

Senator Kerry. Let me come back, if I may, to missile defense in Europe and a few questions. In answer to the chairman’s question about limited defense, which I think is a very, very important definition and an important concept, that raises another question which is this new strategic framework that has been talked about. If indeed the defense is limited—and I think it ought to be and I am glad to hear you say it is—how do you possibly talk about getting rid of MAD, mutual assured destruction?

It seems to me that Mr. Putin made it very clear that if we proceed unilaterally, Russia will have no choice but to overwhelm. Overwhelming the system means you are in the same equation as we have been for 50 years. Even if you proceed multilaterally with agreement on the deployment, so that they are agreed to what you are doing and it is limited, i.e., a few missiles rogue, a few missiles accidental, a few missiles unauthorized, you still have the START II numbers and hopefully, depending on what your attitude is, the President’s attitude about START III, we negotiate down. But you are still left with thousands of more nuclear warheads pointed at each other which is mutual assured destruction.

So, have you explained this framework to the Europeans and perhaps could you even explain it to us now to understand how you do away with mutual assured destruction?

Secretary Powell. I am not clear whether we would go to START III limits or just make a unilateral judgment that we can go to some lower level. At the end of the day, nuclear deterrence is something you put in the mind of an enemy. You deter them because they believe they will receive an overwhelming strike in return for anything they do.

Senator Kerry. Which is mutual assured destruction.

Secretary Powell. Mutual assured destruction.
Senator Kerry. So, in other words, we would not be doing away with it.

Secretary Powell. You cannot entirely do away with what has been known as mutual assured destruction. Some would argue that the term “MAD” really came out of the mid-1970’s when you linked it to the conventional conflict in Europe that would start with a conventional war that we were starting to lose, and then somebody started to use tactical nuclear weapons, and then the whole thing spread to a strategic thermonuclear exchange, which was mutually assured destruction. Others would argue that what we are talking about now, which is no longer linked to that kind of a conflict, should go by a different term, but nevertheless, it means, in my judgment anyway, that you keep enough weapons so that you will always be able to deter anyone else who is planning to strike you.

If I were a Russian planner and I had a certain number of missiles—let us say it is START II, 3,000 to 3,500, that range—and I saw the Americans putting up a limited missile defense, and after I examined that defense, it looked like it was principally directed against some very, very unstable, irresponsible sorts of states, and it really could not affect very significantly my deterrent plans with a force level of 3,000 or 1,000—pick your number—and if I saw that that limited defense really did not significantly in any way, no matter how the Americans deployed it, no matter where they put it, whether it was sitting in Europe, whether it was sitting off the coast of some Asian country, it really could not affect more than a few of my missiles in my strike plan, it is not clear to me why I am going to start spending a lot of money to break out of START II or START III and start building up or MIRVing missiles again.

There is such transparency to what we will be doing, because of the nature of our system, because we are not hiding it, that it is not clear to me why a Russian planner could successfully walk in and say to Mr. Putin, hey, guess what. Rather than fixing our economy, rather than investing in this or investing in that, I have got a great idea. Let us double the size of our strategic force. Why? I do not think Mr. Putin, when faced with that, at the end of the day would give an answer that says, yes, let us spend the resources on that.

Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, I agree basically with that. Particularly I think that is why an argument can be made very forcefully that a multilateral approach to this with the kind of full consultation and shared abilities ultimately may be the best way to proceed.

But as you well know, there is a theory called “breakout,” and there are those in every country known as hard-liners or otherwise who are prepared to make trouble within their politics to argue that the potential for breakout has been developed, and therefore, strategic, long-term, careful planning requires them to maintain a similar capacity. That has certainly been the history of the cold war. Now, we are not in a cold war. Our hope is we can avoid that.

But the fear so many people have—and they have expressed it in Europe and Mr. Putin expressed it the other day—is that if the United States moves unilaterally in ways that cannot be fully interpreted, then you could wind up threatening the START I/START II system which finds its basis in the ABM Treaty itself. So, when
people declare the ABM Treaty dead and a preparedness to move unilaterally, I would assume you would say, absent the full evidence of what the system is going to be or that it is not something that other people say it is going to be, people are going to respond out of perceptions and fears and even—

Secretary Powell. And the way to capture those perceptions, those fears, that anxiety, those hard-liners in your regime that might want to push for breakout is to find a way to move to a new strategic framework together. That is what we want to do.

Senator Kerry. I thank the Secretary.

The Chairman. The time is up.

The Senator from Oregon, Senator Smith.

Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it is good to have you back before this committee.

Secretary Powell. Thank you, Senator Smith.

Senator Smith. We are under new management, but we have a good man as the chairman, just as we had a good man as our former chairman, and I am a friend of them both.

Mr. Secretary, I was intrigued by your comment that NATO does not go away because people keep wanting to join it. I just returned from the North Atlantic Assembly in Vilnius, Lithuania. I returned from that very much aware that the NATO that protected my childhood and won the cold war is not the NATO that we have today, that it is evolving, it is changing.

I think I shared with you, when you visited me in my office, that when I asked military leaders to compare their experience between the gulf war, in which they served with you, versus the Kosovo conflict, in which they performed under the umbrella of NATO, they would never say on the record what they said to me in the office, I suppose. But they, with no exceptions, said do not ever make us do it that way again.

The point they were making is, under the NATO approach, you could never separate the politics from the military objective. You literally had Presidents and Prime Ministers and Chancellors picking bombing targets and you had a NATO announcing ahead of time it would not use ground troops. We were just going to do this in a sanitary way from 50,000 feet. I talked to a lot of military folks who just said, if you are going to do it that way, do not do it.

I come back from this Vilnius experience believing that NATO is becoming an auxiliary of the United Nations, that the alliance, while everybody wants to join, everybody is coming with an agenda, and it has nothing to do with defense anymore. It has to do with European politics and European ego.

My concern with the European Security and Defense Program [ESDP], for example, is that it introduces a new and dangerous level of bureaucracy and politics to an institution already overburdened with it. It further complicates NATO’s effectiveness because the memberships will always be different. I think it creates a Potemkin village because the budgets are always declining.

So, I am really looking to where the administration thinks NATO is going.

Having told you my fears, I will admit my surprise when President Bush met with Prime Minister Blair at Camp David and an-
nounced that we are just fine with ESDP. Maybe we are. Maybe what we are saying is that we know this is a belly flop that is going to happen and we are willing to watch it, but we think it unwise to stop it.

Is that what the administration is saying? Because I must tell you I have genuine fear about NATO’s effectiveness if we are just a debating society that is willing to substitute words for weapons. Secretary POWELL. On Kosovo, I think if there had been the right kind of political leadership, the battle probably could have been fought another way without taking things off the table.

But NATO, at the end of the day, is a consensus organization, where now 19 sovereign heads of state make a consensus decision as to what it will do. It was not like Desert Storm where essentially President Bush for one said I am going to do it and come with me and got the U.N. to come with him and then like-minded nations joined a coalition that was essentially led directly by the United States without that kind of consensus requirement.

But I would not say that it is incapable of action. Right now, as we sit here, NATO, all 19 nations represented in Brussels, is making judgments as to what they will do or not do in Macedonia. So, I think it can be made to work with proper leadership with all countries coming together in response to that leadership.

I also think that with respect to ESDP, this is a useful initiative on the part of the Europeans. We have encouraged them for years to be able to do something on their own and do not always turn around and look at us. I have heard members of this body say why does it always have to be us. Well, with ESDP, NATO gets first choice. Any crisis that comes along, if NATO wants it, if the United States wants to lead it, be involved in it, it is NATO’s to do. If, for one reason or another, the United States feels, or NATO as an alliance feels, this is something within the capability of the Europeans to handle, so let them handle it, then the ESDP can do that.

Now, whether or not they ever put forward the capability so that they could do it effectively remains to be seen. We are not wishing for a belly flop. I want it to be successful, and they are determined to move in this direction. Since the Europeans felt that they wanted to move in this direction and, to some extent, it was because of the way they saw themselves in the Kosovo experience—they were not able to do things as the European Union—then I think we should encourage them to move in this direction as long as it does not take away from the value of NATO and the primacy of NATO for first call on response and as long as they add capability.

We have made this point to them repeatedly. If capability is not added and 2 years from now they declare this force operational and the first time somebody blows the whistle, it is not able to perform, then it will have failed.

Senator SMITH. Well, I am on record as supporting their effort as well under the conditions you described. But at some point, when budgets continue to diminish, we got to call humbug on this because it seems to me Petersburg tasks frankly do not contribute much. But if they are more empowered politically in their own budgetary processes to contribute to NATO by setting up a separate institution that works with NATO, well, fine. But that is not where the money is going. I just think some of us need to say here
in very provocative terms, which I am intentionally being provocative, look, words, institution building, are fine, but they do not deter aggression and they do not make tyrants tremble.

Secretary Powell. I will use your statement very effectively. Thank you.

Senator Smith. Thank you. I invite you to. I urge you to.

I voted with Joe Biden on everything President Clinton wanted. I even voted with John McCain when we tried to get him to pull back on——

The Chairman. And that is even more radical than voting with Biden.

Senator Smith [continuing]. Because I wanted to be able to say to my kids when holocausts are produced, when ethnic cleansing goes on, I do not want to be sitting on my hands. I appreciate the leadership you gave to this new administration saying we went in together, we will go out together.

My concern about going out together is this. The Europeans are afraid of new states in Europe, little states developing in Europe. So, they do not want to have anything to do with an independent Kosovo because they think that leads to other things. I understand that.

The people on the ground, the Serbs, are saying we want it back or in some form still have a claim. The Kosovar Albanians want only independence. Our policy I felt under the last administration—and I said this before in earlier hearings—seems to be we just hope that you all can get along and that something will evolve that will get us out of here.

It seems to me the only way out is ultimately for us to pick a side and say this is the outcome, and it has to be one of the outcomes desired by the people who have to live there. The Kosovar Albanians are only going to accept independence. If we go along with the Europeans on autonomy, that means there is no way out because we will have to enforce autonomy because that is not what anybody on the ground wants. It seems to me we need to begin forcing the debate to say independence is how this is resolved if we ever want to get out of there.

So, that is my own belief, and if you want to object to it——

Secretary Powell. Let me just say you captured the sentiment I think of the Kosovar Albanians quite accurately.

We are concerned that there may be a rush to independence that could be very unfortunate in current circumstances in light of the current situation. So, we are focusing on the upcoming election in November. Let us use that election and the democratic processes associated with that election to start capturing the aspirations of these people and start putting in place institutions of government, and let us at least hold out the hope that they might be able to find some arrangement with Serbia that will allow them to stay within that. Let us not rule it out yet.

I would not in any way suggest that you did not accurately capture the feeling of Kosovar Albanians, but we think it would be premature right now to say that is what is going to happen. Let us have the election first. Let us take this time to have the election.
Senator Smith. I think the Europeans need to get used to the idea of independence unless they want to use ESDP in a very formal way there in about 50 years.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, one other thought I had coming back from central Europe. I fear that with respect to NATO enlargement and particularly EU enlargement, we are saying nice things to these folks and have no intention of expansion. With the Irish vote recently to object to European expansion to countries we have already admitted to NATO, I came away thinking how do we help these people who want to transition from communism to capitalism.

It occurred to me that maybe they, instead of trying to join the European Union—I mean, they just left socialism. Why do they want to go back into a reduced form of it? It seems to me that there ought to be a central European Union that has lower taxes, less regulatory burden, a union of nations there that can produce something that will give them a sense of a place at the table that they may never get as supplicants to the European Union because they are not going to be admitted. I think they are just blowing smoke. I think we should start being honest with people and maybe help some of these countries to develop some trading relationships that will help them develop more quickly from communism to freedom.

So, I throw that out for your consideration because it seems to me what the European Union needs is a central European competitor.

Secretary Powell. The President spoke strongly in support of expansion of the European Union. I had not given thought to a central European Union. I would have to give it some thought to give you an informed answer, Senator.

The Chairman. One of the things, as usual, being an Irishman, the Europeans overruled the Irish and said that in 2002 that they would make the decision. But I am a skeptic as well as you, and we will see what happens.

You have been kind with your time. I would like to conclude with two very brief comments.

As you know, just for the record, you know Bruce Blair at the Center for Defense Information [CDI]. He indicates that the Russian planners do fear a defense because he thinks that their survivable forces may only be in the 100 to 150 range right now. So, it is something at least people who are very pro-defense folks are raising.

Even if the Russians—and I agree with you—are not likely to, in the scenario you laid out where the Defense Minister goes in and says to Putin, by the way, we have got 3,500 warheads and, by the way, the Americans can shoot down 20, so let us go ahead and blow up our agreements with them, I think you are probably right. But the Chinese only have 18.

Secretary Powell. And they are planning to increase no matter what we do.

The Chairman. By the way, in terms of political decisions, was the decision not to go to Baghdad not a political decision?

Secretary Powell. All decisions with respect to war at the end of the day are political choices.
The CHAIRMAN. That is the only point I want to make. That is not a criticism. It really is not. And I have never second-guessed that decision.

Secretary POWELL. I will be happy to defend it all over again.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no. There is no need to.

My only point is whether it was World War II and Eisenhower trying to hold the alliance together and the political decision was made as to when to invade, where to invade, and how to invade, I am not so sure that we ever get to a point where ultimately great generals also are not great politicians in the best sense of the word. I mean that sincerely. And you are one of them.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, in fact, I think it was Clausewitz who said war is politics by other means. I was not suggesting you can ever divorce it completely. But, man, I think we commingled it badly.

The CHAIRMAN. One thing I would like to close with—and it will take less than 60 seconds—in the New York Times it was reported, I think yesterday or Sunday, that the administration is considering pulling out of the monitoring system that exists, the monitoring system to detect and identify nuclear weapons tests. Apparently some have suggested that continued participation in this system amounts to implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

I hope you will consider, if you have not already—my guess is you have—explaining to those folks at the White House that this is a needless concern. The CTBT cannot come into force unless the United States ratifies it and establishing an international monitoring system does not prejudice our right to determine when or whether we become part of that. So, I hope you weigh in on it.

Secretary POWELL. I do understand that point, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you do. I just wanted it for the record.

I thank you very, very much. Do you have a concluding comment?

Senator SMITH. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator PERCY. Just one quick closing comment as the former chairman of this great committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Surely, Senator.

Senator PERCY. May I just simply say that in all of my 18 years in the Senate, I have never seen such an outstanding and as large a group of staff members sitting behind the Senators.

The CHAIRMAN. We need more help than you needed, Senator.

Senator PERCY. I would like to also say to the audience that I cannot remember a hearing held in the years I was chairman of this committee where we had such an enthusiastic and fine, outstanding group of people in attendance and the people outside the hearing room waiting—I cannot remember that.

But I know we all appreciate very much the wonderful service of this man. We thank you.

I do want to say to all of you, come to the Georgetown Waterfront Park meeting tonight.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
RESPONSES OF SECRETARY COLIN L. POWELL TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JESSE HELMS

Question. Should the EU have one permanent seat at the UN Security Council, rather than two (Britain and France)? Shouldn’t the other seat go to Japan, given its large contributions to the UN?

Answer. The Administration supports reform and judicious, limited expansion of the Security Council to reflect more accurately current political and economic realities. The United States is an active participant in the UN deliberations on this issue. Over several decades, through Administrations of both political parties, we have maintained our support for the addition of Germany and Japan to the Security Council as permanent members. Any restructuring of the Council will require an amendment to the UN Charter with ratification by at least two-thirds of the UN member states, including the five permanent members of the Security Council. It is unlikely either Britain or France would support a revised Council structure that resulted in the loss of its permanent seat to accommodate a seat for the European Union. It is U.S. policy not to agree to grant the EU a vote on the Security Council either of or in addition to those wielded by EU member states. Progress in the OEWG has been limited and there is no realistic prospect of reaching consensus on reform of the Security Council in the near term.

EU COOPERATION ON POLITICAL LIBERTIES

Question. How will you get the EU to act in a more honorable and cooperative fashion in dealing with us, especially on issues of political liberties worldwide where the Western democracies ought to be sticking together?

Answer. We have regular and detailed discussions with the EU and its member states about political and other freedoms around the world. Although individual EU member state views may differ at times—both from ours and those of other EU members—the EU as a whole shares our objective to encourage the development of pluralist democracies with respect for human rights. We regularly work with the EU in the OSCE and other fora, for example, to advance our common human rights objectives.

BELARUS

Question 1. When discussing the vision of a Europe that is both whole and free, one must not overlook the ongoing struggle for freedom in Belarus. Presidential elections are scheduled for September 2001 in Belarus. What are the U.S. and its European allies doing to ensure that these elections will occur, and that they will be free and fair?

Answer. As the last dictator in Europe, Aleksandr Lukashenko has backed himself into a corner. He and his regime are shunned by the Euro-Atlantic community. Free and fair presidential elections present a way forward. A repetition of the undemocratic practices used to rig last year’s parliamentary elections, which were not recognized by the U.S. and our European partners, will only further isolate Belarus. Together with the EU and OSCE, we are calling on the Belarusian authorities to carry out free and fair presidential elections and end intimidation of the opposition and independent media. We strongly support efforts by the OSCE, represented in Minsk by Ambassador Wieck, head of the Advisory and Monitoring Group, to ensure Belarus fulfills its commitment as an OSCE participating State to establish proper conditions for conducting free and fair elections. An international and domestic observation and monitoring program are essential, but alone do not make elections free and fair. We communicate forcefully and clearly that improvement in relations with the Euro-Atlantic community requires a return to democracy and an end to the climate of fear. Half measures or continuation of repressive policies will only prolong and deepen Belarus’ isolation. We have also made our position clear to the Russian government, which, as of now, continues to support Lukashenko’s dictatorship.

Question 2. What is being done to support the democratic opposition in Belarus?

Answer. In addition to political and moral support, we are providing over $12 million in democracy programs in FY 2001 to support the Belarusian democratic forces in their efforts to build a civil society, independent media and a democratic political system.

Question. Given that section 244(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. section 1254) explicitly permits TPS designation of any part of a foreign state
(italics mine), please provide the State Department’s rationale for opposing TPS for Chechnya.

Answer. The State Department is in the process of developing a formal position on TPS for Chechnya. We are reviewing the situation in Chechnya, in order to determine whether a recommendation in favor of TPS is warranted. We will inform you of the outcome as soon as we have developed a formal position.

The TPS statute does provide that TPS may be granted to “part of a country.” The USG has done so previously, designating Kosovo for TPS in 1998. We will continue to consider this issue in close consultation with the Department of Justice.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LIBERTAD ACT OF 1996

Question 1. Has WHA informed you of its findings of fact with respect to GSM?

Answer. The WHA bureau and the Office of the Legal Adviser, along with other interested bureaus, have been implementing their responsibilities under Title IV of the Libertad Act. They will present each case for decision upon completion of the investigation and analysis of the applicable facts and law, as required by Title IV.

Question 2. What, if any, additional information is needed for you to make a determination in this case?

Answer. The Department of State has a long-standing practice of not commenting publicly on the specifics of Libertad Act cases. In accordance with the requirements of Title IV of the Libertad Act, each case is to be presented for decision upon completion of an investigation and analysis of the facts and the legal standards contained in Title IV. I have conveyed this request to the WHA bureau and to the Legal Adviser.

Question 3. Will you ask your Legal Adviser and Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs to present the facts in this case so that you can apply the law without delay?

Answer. I have asked the Legal Adviser and the Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, working with other responsible bureaus, to bring this matter to a conclusion and to ensure that the law is implemented.

Question. In light of NATO’s scathing review of our Allies’ failing to fulfill their force goals, what can we expect, of value to the Alliance, from the EU’s effort to establish a security policy and military capability separate from that of the North Atlantic Alliance?

Answer. We have made clear that a fundamental basis for our support for the European Security and Defense Policy is an expectation that it will result in a real increase in European military capabilities.

We are confident that EU countries are indeed working toward this goal. There is one pool of European forces. The increase in capabilities which ESDP will bring about will also strengthen NATO.

The development of ESDP will also increase the range of options available to the United States and its Allies to react to an increasingly diverse and unpredictable range of crises.

Question. Will this EU initiative introduce into the architecture of Euro-Atlantic security little more than new institutions that will complicate, if not undercut NATO decision making?

Answer. We are confident that EU countries are indeed working toward the goal of bringing about a real increase in European military capabilities through ESDP. NATO and the EU have agreed that the EU would only act when the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. In other words, it would always be NATO that decides first whether it chooses to respond to a particular crisis.

NATO and the EU also share the goal of avoiding any unnecessary duplication of NATO assets and capabilities in the course of implementing ESDP.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY COLIN L. POWELL TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE ABM TREATY

Question 1. Why and how would the testing of a missile defense system break the ABM Treaty?

Answer. As I mentioned during my testimony on June 20, development and testing in our Missile Defense program will, in time, “bump up” against the provisions of the ABM Treaty. The Department of Defense review of missile defense is still underway, and since no decisions have been made yet regarding the testing necessary...
for the remainder of Fiscal Year (FY) 2001 and FY 2002, it is premature to speculate on what testing would conflict with the ABM Treaty.

Question 2. Would the ballistic testing from AEGIS ships violate the ABM Treaty? Would the testing of the Airborne Laser (ABL) on a theater ballistic missile be a violation of the ABM Treaty?

Answer. Both the Navy Area and Navy Theater Wide (NTW) theater missile defense (TMD) systems, which incorporate the SPY-1 radar, were determined in the mid-1990s by the United States to be compliant with the ABM Treaty. Were the Department of Defense (DoD) to seek to upgrade either of these TMD systems, such testing would be reviewed again for compliance with the ABM Treaty’s Article VI(a) prohibition on giving non-ABM systems the capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and on testing such a system “in an ABM mode.” The testing of an otherwise-compliant Navy Area or NTW against theater range ballistic missiles is not constrained by the ABM Treaty.

The ABL development program has not yet progressed to the point where a determination has been required concerning the ABM Treaty compliance of the prototype ABL. Assuming that the ABL program is deemed compliant with respect to use as a theater ballistic missile defense system, its testing against theater-range ballistic missiles would not be constrained by the ABM Treaty. Providing the ABL with the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, or testing the ABL in an ABM mode, would raise compliance issues.

Question 3. Will the planned flight test between the Marshall Islands and Vandenberg AFB violate the ABM Treaty? At what point, either during research and development or during the planned Integrated Flight Tests (IFTs), would we violate the ABM Treaty?

Answer. The ABM Treaty permits the testing of fixed land-based ABM systems and their ABM components from agreed ABM test ranges. It is the State Department’s understanding that, as currently configured, the BMDO program of Integrated Flight Tests (IFTs)—including IFT-6 scheduled for Fall 2001—involving fixed land-based ABM components has been determined within the Department of Defense (DoD) as consistent with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. “Research” is not constrained by the ABM Treaty. Individual tests of the missile defense programs must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. If DoD determines that modifications are required in the testing program for the fixed land-based missile defense system, then the modified flight-tests would have to be reviewed.

Question 4. Would the Administration oppose the deployment of a missile defense system if it does not pass adequate tests? Will you participate in the decision-making process of such a system, considering the level of diplomacy required to ensure such a system actually improves global security? Would the Administration deploy a missile defense system if, in your judgement, it decreases global security?

Answer. The President has stated that we have no interest in deploying a missile defense system that does not work.

As the President’s primary foreign policy adviser, I will of course be actively participating in the decision-making process regarding missile defense deployment, and in addressing the global diplomatic and security issues that would be affected by a Presidential deployment decision.

We believe that deployment of limited missile defenses would increase global security by enhancing our ability to deter irresponsible behavior by rogue states. Should our deterrence efforts nevertheless fail, we will then be in a better position to defend the United States, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies.