EUROPEANIZING SECURITY?
NATO and an Integrating Europe

Edited by
Carl Lankowski
Simon Serfaty
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FOREWORD

This AICGS Research Report is about the implications of European integration for European security arrangements. It is animated by a simple premise: the process of remaking Europe after the tragedy of two major wars and the long, armed truce that was the Cold War, was well underway by the time the Soviet Union flew apart in 1991. If that is the case, then Europe’s radically altered security environment cannot be the only important factor prompting efforts to define a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) in the post-Cold War period. The other important factor is the process of European integration. In reconstructing the perceptions and motivations that preceded the recent discourse on ESDI and governs the strategies that have flowed from them in the 1990s, the authors’ contributions reveal much about whether, in what sense, and how much “identity” has been achieved in European security and defense matters. Since national policy communities continue to be the primary sites for formulating and articulating perceptions and attitudes relevant to security and defense issues, the accounts that follow are country-based and highlight country-specific connotations and associations.

The mandate given to the authors included an invitation to pay special attention to the Western European Union (WEU) in describing and evaluating whatever tendencies existed toward the europeanization of security arrangements. This is neither because we are devoted to this institution, nor that we expect the WEU to play a central role in these arrangements in the future. Rather, the WEU’s centrality to our topic has been long established in the diplomacy of European integration as a marker for a perceived absence. It is not so much what the WEU is, as the gap it represents, that deserves attention. The WEU is a simulacrum of aspirations as yet unrealized, though heavily documented in official and informal discussions for a decade and a half.

In the chapters that follow, the job of examining national policy communities is accomplished by focusing on five European countries—all members of both the EU and the WEU—whose experience exemplifies the major forces at work in producing the ESDI phenomenon and in delimiting the range of choice for its functioning and formal expression. The chapters are written by seasoned country experts.

The most central fact of West Europe’s security architecture since World War II is the transatlantic link. For that reason, we open with a chapter by Michael Brenner (Matthew Ridgway Center for International Strategic Studies, University of Pittsburgh) on American views of ESDI. From there we examine the French and German cases. If ESDI is a pearl of integration, then France and Germany together are the oyster out of which it is produced and the U.S. provides the necessary grit to catalyze the production of that gem of European politics. Yves Boyer (Foundation for Strategic Research, Paris) and Matthias Jopp (Institute for European Policy, Bonn) provide the chapters on France and Germany, respectively. By virtue of its “special relationship” with the United States, one would have to expect that Great Britain would feel especially in-
tense cross-pressures with respect to ESDI in the 1990s, and so an essay on that country, written by Paul Cornish (Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge), is also included. The Mediterranean countries confront an additional set of issues. Spain, a relatively new EU member, is evaluated by Antonio Marquina (Institute for International Security and Cooperation Studies, University of Madrid), and Italy as one of the founders, presented by Gianni Bonvicini (Institute for International Affairs, Rome). We offer an analysis from the perspective of the WEU itself, by Guido Lenzi, director of that institution’s Security Studies Institute. Europe’s security situation has never been static, but it has become intensely dynamic since 1991. By way of concluding these essays, Simon Serfaty explores security Europeanization from the point of view of the mainspring of that dynamism, the parallel enlargements of NATO and the EU.

The following comments are designed to provide less a unified narrative than some basic context for the essays. To a considerable degree, ESDI is an exercise in individuation from a prior unity. Beginning with its Marshall Plan diplomacy, the U.S. has played a key role in establishing both Europe’s unity and its subsequent individuation. The Franco-German diplomatic revolution that gave rise to the dynamic project of regional integration came from America’s support for German rearmament in the months leading up to NATO’s launch. In a bold move whose purpose was to turn adversity to advantage, French statesmen quickly moved from Foreign Minister Schuman’s scheme of economic integration (the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC) to advance a plan for West European military integration in the form of Minister Rene Pleven’s European Defense Community (EDC). When that project failed in the French National Assembly, a European fallback arrangement was cobbled together on short notice to facilitate Germany’s absorption into NATO. With this in mind, in 1954 the moribund Brussels Treaty Organization was transformed into the Western European Union. But once the WEU performed its function of placing limits on German armament and in that way reassured that country’s nervous neighbors, the organization was anesthetized in favor of the crucial American connection expressed by NATO.

Of course, that unity was never perfect, either organizationally or politically. Nor would one expect it to be. The discourse on ESDI that eventually emerged in the mid-1990s is a vector of forces mobilized on several different tracks. There is first a geopolitical track in which Europeans seek to define and defend European interests in contrast to those of the Americans. Decrying the “exorbitant privileges” that took the U.S. beyond leadership into the role of a hegemon in both economic and political-military affairs, President Charles DeGaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military command in 1967, while remaining a member of the alliance. Half a generation later in the mid-1980s, Washington’s combination of harsh rhetoric, an ambitious nuclear modernization program, efforts to create a comprehensive shield against strategic missile attack (the Strategic Defense Initiative = SDI), and Washington-Moscow bilateral negotiations involving potentially radical force reductions, traumatized the Europeans. One or both of their fears about Europe’s positioning in the bipolar
world seemed on the verge of realization. On the one hand, Washington’s global interests supported America’s evolving war-fighting doctrine that seemed to anticipate an extension of hostilities to Europe from regional hotspots, e.g., from the Middle East or Central America. On the other hand, the missile shield contemplated by the Reagan Administration could serve to decouple the U.S. from Europe in a crisis. In either case, the underlying rationale for American leadership in European defense matters appeared to be undermined. In this situation, the Europeans were willing to signal some differentiation from the American position.

By 1984, the EC Ten could draw upon almost a decade and a half of experience with European Political Cooperation (EPC), a coordinating exercise that, among other things, provided a framework for developing joint positions in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). During the debate over the Euro-missiles, France was thrust in the unaccustomed role of fretting not about German militarism, but worrying about what its leaders perceived as the danger of passivism, implying a possible Rapallo-like Russo-German rapprochement, a break-out from the double NATO-EC corset. In this situation, the French followed a two-track policy of their own. Mitterrand addressed the Bundestag with an appeal to deploy weapons that the French themselves would not take. At the same time, Franco-German solidarity was advertised as belonging to a smaller circle than NATO’s, as suggested by projects such as the Franco-German Corps and photo opportunities that placed Kohl and Mitterrand together in Verdun, if not in Normandy. The contributions of Yves Boyer and Matthias Jopp demonstrate that in this context, “princes” Mitterrand and Kohl sought out the WEU in the hope that their caress would awaken Europe’s sleeping beauty.

Another contributing factor in establishing a platform for ESDI is the mighty engine of economic integration. Europe’s debut as a “trading state” was already well underway with the customs union established by the EEC. Even before that process was completed, the EEC Six negotiated collectively with the United States and the rest of the capitalist world in the GATT Kennedy Round of tariff cutting in the 1960s. Economic integration was propelled further by the internal market reform launched by the Single European Act and ratified in 1987, a broad program that embraced new policy areas. The success of the internal market program generated momentum for the most ambitious step, Economic and Monetary Union, mandated by the (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union, ratified in 1993, and provisionally culminating in the launch of the EU’s currency, the euro, on January 1, 1999. If the internal market program raised awareness about the distinctiveness of European standards, EMU is adding a powerful symbolic dimension to the reality and perceptions of inclusion in a common endeavor, even prior to the introduction of euro currency, scheduled for 2002.

Even prior to the end of the Cold War, neat separation of economic and security issues could not always be achieved easily. With the admission of Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986, the weight of the Mediterranean in the EU’s political calculus was magnified. Accordingly, Maastricht also pulled foreign policy and security (CFSP) under the organizational umbrella of regional integration along with immigration and asylum issues, albeit initially on an inter-
governmental basis. The CFSP provisions are flanked by an explicit treaty reference to the WEU as a possible instrument of policy implementation and a corresponding statement by the WEU expressing its willingness to cooperate with the EU.

A third element contributing to a sense of “Europeanness” that seemed to require some differentiation from the Americans came from an entirely unexpected source. Washington’s bellicosity and technological resolve pushed the Soviets to the wall and may have been partially responsible for their dramatic change of course in the arms control field under President Gorbachev. But NATO’s nuclear modernization program, whose political meaning consisted in responding to Europe’s decoupling trauma, fed into a domestic political dynamic that pointed to the antipodes of the Cold War in the West. The transeuropean peace movement, especially strong in Germany, the Netherlands and England, provided a platform for “the successor generation” to fashion its international identity. It is symptomatic of the sensibilities of young Europe in the 1980s that the formation of Germany’s Green Party at the national level is intimately and ironically connected with the advance of European regional integration that forms an essential part of the backdrop for ESDI after a further period of gestation. For Germany’s Greens became a party at the national level on the basis of their performance in the first direct elections to the European Parliament, in June 1979. Topping their electoral list was Petra Kelly, stepdaughter of an American Air Force colonel who met and married Petra’s mother while serving a tour of duty in Germany. After graduating from American University in Washington, D.C., Kelly took a position with the European Community in its newly created consumer affairs division, left the Social Democratic Party when the German government began its ambitious nuclear power program in the wake of the first oil shocks, and eventually assumed a leading role in Germany’s most politicized environmental umbrella group, BBU (Federal Association of Environmental Citizens Initiatives). The Greens’ European platform was scathing in its criticism of European integration, but its reasoning is revealing: at that time the Greens saw the project of regional integration as far too complicit with and embedded in Cold War structures. “Brussels” was remote from the citizen, supported the bipolarity in international relations and with it the policy Edward Thompson labeled nuclear “exterminism,” and was oblivious to quality of life issues (environment, social welfare), in favor of the EC’s blind commitment to a purely market logic.

The end of the Cold War immediately raised questions about the organization of European security. To begin, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union there was speculation about America’s interest in playing a continuing role in Europe. The de-coupling trauma was back with a new twist. A European identity in security and defense could now develop in part as an insurance policy against eventual American withdrawal from the continent. At the same time, such an effort could advertise European determination to shoulder part of the security burden. At the same time, other political underpinnings of the American presence were revealed with greater clarity. Even in the absence of “Article 5 events,” i.e., a military attack that almost all observers wrote off as
unrealistic, American presence at least provided psychological assurance, especially for small states party to increasingly ambitious integrative schemes connecting an even bigger Germany with her neighbors. Hence, European ambivalence about ESDI refers in part to its fundamentally incalculable collateral political costs.

Still, other forces supported ESDI, at least indirectly. Consider the ’68 generation, represented by the German Greens. Over time, they warmed to integration in the EU context and a European identity in world politics. The evolution of treaties governing the process “constitutionalized” issues that were of great concern to them, such as environmental policy. The EU conferred a symbolically rich, if substantively weak EU citizenship and that connected with a second appeal: an expression of internationalism that set them apart from the radical and hard right. For many who dreamt of a world that radically reduced the role of militaries, European integration appealed as a “working peace system” based on “soft power” that could form the basis of a European collective security system. Significantly, after less than six months as a party of national government, at least a large minority of Greens seemed ready to tolerate, if not embrace, a European military capacity.

Moving in the same direction, the EU can advance and uphold European consumer, social and environmental standards globally. In many instances, there is common ground with the United States, though defending these interests sometimes involves the partners in disputes, for example in the recent cases of trade in hormone-treated beef, genetically modified organisms, and materials suspected of carrying BSE disease. Hovering behind these differences is an attachment to a putative European social model that contrasts with the image of America’s allegedly “anti-social” model. Nor is the European New Left happy with the United States sanctions policies, preferences on trade-offs involving human rights and development issues, and crisis management. In short, for many in the first generation born after the war, the EU shortly before the beginning of the twenty first century has come to symbolize a “born again” Europe. This is a Europe that could complete its purifying rite of de-Americanizing exorcism by establishing its identity in all policy spheres.

Almost all the essays in this volume point to the June 1996 NATO summit in Berlin as the point of provisional equilibration of positions of all the main players in the ESDI drama. The Berlin formulae based on Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) CNATO-WEU double-hatting, unified but detachable forces, and the like worked because none of the parties desired to foreclose any options. For some Europeans, the outcome opened a door for a future European capability while demonstrating European effort to take on burdens. For the Americans it represented a stratagem to differentiate risks in a gesture to a Congress skeptical about committing U.S. ground forces to long term and exposed operations in the Balkans.

It remains to be seen just how stable the Berlin equilibrium will be. The partners may be moving in different directions. One point of divergence concerns the reorganization of the Alliance’s command structure to better reflect new threat scenarios and an enhanced European role. The issue that once again
put France and the United States on opposite sides of a dispute involved assignment of a senior regional command, in this case covering the Mediterranean, to a European. When that did not happen and the French government also lost its bid to expand the list of first round NATO accession candidates from central and eastern Europe, France balked at carrying through with its stated intention to rejoin NATO’s integrated military command. Meanwhile, impressed with the global character of possible contingencies and having no confidence in a UN force, the Americans are pushing for a de-territorialization of the Alliance. For their part, the Europeans are taking up the security and defense provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, due to come into force in June 1999. The treaty authorizes the appointment of a secretary-general to give voice to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Also authorized is a strategic planning cell that can present options. Common strategies, adopted by consensus in the European Council, can lead to implementing decisions taken by qualified majority voting. The December 1998 Anglo-French summit in St. Mâlo demonstrates that the Berlin equilibrium continues to hold promise for reconciling British and continental views. As Paul Cornish points out in his essay on Britain, however, the reconciliation of approaches to ESDI may be more rhetorical than substantive.

NATO enlargement is an accomplished fact, as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were welcomed in March 1999. In his optimistic assessment, Simon Serfaty argues that enlightened interest on both sides of the Atlantic should lead to strategy of dual enlargement that produces gains all around. Certainly, enlargement mixes the cards anew for the relationship among and between NATO and the EU and provides opportunities for new synergies. But enlightenment is defined in terms of the domain of action and not every player may share an Euro-Atlantic vision. Only time will tell whether the specific character of NATO enlargement contributes to, stretches out, or actually acts as a barrier to EU expansion.

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Carl Lankowski
Research Director

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Gianni Bonvicini is director of the Institute for International Affairs in Rome.

Yves Boyer is deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris.

Michael Brenner is professor of International Relations and faculty associate at the Matthew Ridgway Center for International Strategic Studies, University of Pittsburgh.

Paul Cornish is Newton Sheehy Lecturer in International Relations at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge.

Matthias Jopp is director of the Institute for European Policy in Bonn.

Carl Lankowski is research director at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C.


Antonio Marquina is director of the Institute for International Security and Cooperation Studies, University of Madrid.

Simon Serfaty is director of European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.
THE UNITED STATES
AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
Michael Brenner

To consider official U.S. attitudes toward a prospective European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) is to encounter the deep ambivalence that marks American thinking about the country’s place in post-Cold War Europe. It is most pronounced with regard to new terms for sharing duties and prerogatives with allies.

American ambivalence shows itself in the wavering attitude toward the development of ESDI. Declared support for the concept is seemingly qualified if not contradicted in practice. This lack of consistency should not be interpreted as deception or bad faith, much less the working-out of some crafty U.S. design for manipulating the processes for shaping Europe’s renovated, and new, security architecture. Rather, it expresses the divergent impulses of U.S. policymakers; themselves affected by larger forces at work in the body politic.

At the level of principle, there has been a readily discernible American position in favor of more thoroughgoing defense cooperation among its European allies. Equally important, two presidents have entrusted them with the main responsibility for the historic undertaking of solidifying economic and political reform in eastern Europe. A clear policy line can be traced from James Baker’s Berlin speech of December 1989 heralding a new transatlantic partnership through its ringing reaffirmation in President Clinton’s declaration at the Brussels Town Hall in January 1994, giving his blessing to the Maastricht process, to the president’s punctuation of the message in Paris in May 1997, where he called on the West Europeans to seize control of the continent’s fate by pursuing their special mission to bring the East Europeans into the democratic, free market fold.

At the same time, there has been an undeniable reluctance to yield the United States’ primacy over major aspects of the broadened European security agenda. It goes along with frequent displays of skepticism tinged with anxiety when the allies move to give concrete form to their distinct security identity or show signs of a readiness to lay down a policy line that varies from Washington’s. The American conviction that the United States’ superior discernment and practiced diplomatic hand warrants deference from allies remains, albeit expressed with more circumspection than in the past and reserved for those matters the United States deems of particular importance. Moreover, ceding to the West Europeans’ implicit authority to share the diplomatic field of action is something that sits uneasily with many American policymakers; President Clinton being the most notable exception. It follows that Washington should have second thoughts when an ESDI threatens to take autonomous organizational form, presumes a distinctly “European” interest or viewpoint separate from that of the “West” (thereby, from the United States) or poses a potential challenge to American leadership on issues Washington is accustomed to seeing as
its special preserve, e.g., nuclear arms control with Russia, the Arab/Israeli peace process/conflict, or stability in the Persian Gulf.

A deconstruction of the term ESDI reveals the reasons for the United States’ irresolution. It also spotlights the cleavages that divide the European allies and their own ambivalence about developing a security identity.

WHAT IS (WHO ARE) EUROPE?

The “Europe” in ESDI formulations has a double significance. For one thing, politically it defines America’s allies in contradistinction to the United States. For another, it designates western European countries, specifically members of the European Union, as “Europe.” Both formulations presume that the fifteen have a strategic position in common that warrants affirmation.

What is the justification for such self-designation? How is it perceived from Washington? Geography is the most benign basis for drawing a line of demarcation between the European allies and the United States, its transatlantic partner. The geographic facts are incontrovertible. Normally, geography is closely associated with strategic interest, as common usage of the term “geostrategic” indicates. Promoters of ESDI are not of one mind, though, as to whether, or to what degree, geography figures in their calculation of strategic interest. French officials are most forthright in declaring that “Europe” has a strategic perspective different from that of the United States that should be developed and asserted. President Chirac’s repeated references to the new multipolar structure of the international system conveys the idea that it is political nature for Europe to cultivate its independence, (although he is unclear where the strategic geography of France ends and “Europe” begins.) Yet there is only an oblique suggestion that France (or “Europe”) has strategic interests fundamentally different from those of the United States.

The joint Sino-French declaration signed by President Chirac and President Jiang Zemin in Beijing in May 1997 that pledged them “to engage in reinforced cooperation, to foster the march toward multipolarity . . . and to oppose any attempt at domination in world affairs” came closest to proclaiming France’s strategic independence. That grandiloquent gesture carries the message that France sees independence as a national interest in its own right. That said, Paris usually places the stress on the need and virtue for “Europe” to have influence on policies to achieve broadly shared interests commensurate with its size, putative sovereignty and geography. Sub-strategic interests, whether over Iran, the Middle East or the Balkans, are more likely to differ. It is in regard to those that European separateness is said to be normal and necessary.

Other West European governments are more hesitant to claim a strategic identity. Nevertheless, there is no gainsaying the growing belief that the United States’ allies do have outlooks and preferences that do not match America’s.
Their readiness to take an independent tack in dealings with Iran and attempts to insert themselves into Arab-Israeli diplomacy are cases in point. Even on dealing with Russia there are those in every allied capital who foresee the possibility that frictions might arise in the future as to the best way to prevent a reversion to conflictual patterns in “East-West” relations. Some German officials have been especially forthright on this score. Former Defense Minister Volker Rühe repeatedly has made the linkage between NATO’s enlargement, its ‘Europeanization’ and the imperative to maintain cordial relations with Moscow. The top priority, Rühe avowed in 1996, was “to prepare new structures for the Europeanization of NATO,” because “a lot of NATO structures still mirror the Cold War and the fixed situation between East and West.” A Europeanized alliance would be more palatable in Moscow since “it is not the old NATO that is expanding. It is a new NATO that is opening.”

Geography figures in transatlantic differences of strategic perspective in another respect. The U.S. remains an avowedly global power. Most of its European allies’ security outlook is restricted to the European continent and its periphery. That is unlikely to change dramatically or quickly in the foreseeable future, whatever the outcome of the ESDI and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) projects. An ESDI of (western) Europe, about Europe, for (western) Europe, is less attractive than an ESDI that is of Europe, about the wider international system and for the West.

The self-conscious U.S. image as a European power is sharpened by the high stakes Washington sees itself as having in Europe’s security, progress and stability. It gains further credence from the global reach of the United States’ strategic interests. For the argument is made that the U.S. thereby is in a position to understand the linkages, often intangible, between what transpires in Europe and the West’s (read United States’) ability to contend successfully with security challenges elsewhere. Credibility, moral authority and prestige are elements of strength and influence that are supposedly generalizable. Thus, Washington was more sensitive than its allies were to how the West’s performance in dealing with the conflicts of the ex-Yugoslavia might affect the readiness of other parties, in other parts of the world, to threaten peace and stability. The Clinton presidency, although noticeably less attentive than its predecessors to the importance of maintaining respect for American power, nonetheless was disturbed by the deleterious effects of the West’s fumbling, discordant intervention in Bosnia: on alliance cohesion, on the West’s reputation as the defender of human rights, and on its perceived readiness to meet commitments.

More specifically, it was concerned lest the West’s callousness toward the fate of Europe’s largest indigenous Muslim community aggravate tensions with the Islamic world. The European allies’ relative equanimity about this danger struck Washington policymakers as incongruous given their anxious discourse on the new security threats emanating from political instability to the south. That some European commentators find it odd that Washington should be attentive to Turkish sensitivities about events in the Balkans, and seek to explain it in
terms of veiled American ambitions in the region, is testimony to a serious gap in strategic thinking. Blinkered allied interpretations of Bosnia’s significance underscored for American officials their counterparts’ fragmented sense of strategic geography. The common tendency of European statesmen and strategic analysts to refer to Bosnia as some remote entity at the distant edges of the allies’ security interests baffled Americans. For the latter, the Balkans is in their allies’ backyard. How could the United States devolve serious security responsibilities onto their European partners, with confidence that they were being placed in safe hands, when a devastating four-year war could be treated as a matter of marginal concern? Two successive U.S. administrations had placed custody for common Western interests with their allies. By their performance, they failed to warrant that trust—in American minds.

SECURITY & DEFENSE

The United States is well aware that opinions vary widely among western European capitals as to what security functions an ESDI could or should serve. These variations, along with the dim prospects for their early or complete resolution, were on prominent display at the intergovernmental conference (IGC) summit meeting in Amsterdam. They evoke both disquiet and reassurance among American officials. They are disconcerted by the uncertainty as to whether the allies are preparing themselves to assume the duties that Washington would like to see them perform. They are simultaneously reassured that the U.S. and NATO will not have to contend with a rival for dealing with the more serious security issues that touch major U.S. interests. Among this medley of reactions to a European lack of consensus there is also anxiety. The already noticeable gap between ambitions and capabilities could curtail American influence without contributing anything effective or useful of the Europeans’ own in advancing common Western interests. The EU’s dismal performance in Yugoslavia prior to the Dayton Accords is cited as the telling example of European initiative going wrong at a cost to everyone—albeit in that instance there was no American resistance to the allies’ staking a claim to leadership.

In truth, most American officials have low expectations for their allies’ handling of security issues. Washington sees them as more likely to mess up than not. Only a few have faith that a devolution of responsibilities does not run the risk of western interests being compromised. The president is numbered among them. He, like most others who take an optimistic view of CFSP/ESDI, are dedicated to holding in check American commitments overseas and harbors doubts as to either the country’s ability to act as global hegemon or the need for its straining to do so. Clinton’s genuine support for an expanded ESDI notwithstanding, the United States will still strive to maintain paramountcy on matters that really count: managing the strategic relationship with Russia, above all. On less vital matters, ambivalence persists.
ESDI creates opportunities and advantages for the United States that should not be obscured by these cautionary maxims. The Berlin accords should be read as a good faith attempt to open possibilities for realizing the goal of a better equilibrated transatlantic alliance while leaving large margins of uncertainty as to whether a stable new balance had been found and whether envisaged arrangements would prove effective when activated.

The Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) deliberations were at least as much about principles and status, as they were about performance. From Washington’s perspective, the overriding purpose was to find a way for the Clinton Administration to reconcile its genuine wish to satisfy the Europeans’ avowed desire to achieve an ESDI (along with the American interest in having allies able to shoulder a wider range and heavier share of alliance burdens), on the one hand, with the keen concern to do nothing that seriously compromises NATO’s integrated command (deemed the essential ingredient for successful joint operations), on the other. In other words, “finding a rational way of squaring subsidiarity with the higher-order demands of solidarity”—to use Alyson Bailes’ phraseology. The compromise eventually fashioned offers a formula that suffices to meet these American interests even though it does not quell entirely the uneasiness felt about what will happen when and if the agreed provisions are put to the test.

The meaning attached to the security that West European governments are pledging themselves to provide on an institutionalized basis is vague. There are objective reasons for this. Their core interests face no present or foreseeable threat. Such military challenges as might arise will be in peripheral areas and probably involve parties not immediately hostile to them.

On paper, the European allies have provided one answer to this dilemma by drafting a document that encompasses an omnibus set of roles and missions. The Petersberg Declaration is remarkable for the very broad scope of military actions it enumerates. They cover everything from use of combat forces in crisis management to humanitarian operations, and everything in-between. However, thinking about what the Western European Union should be readying itself to do varies considerably. Prevailing opinion in both Bonn and London quite clearly sees the WEU performing essentially low-grade security tasks of the kind that the allies can undertake confidently without involving the U.S., as the contributions by Mathias Jopp and Paul Cornish make clear. In essence, they are peacekeeping functions defined: enforcing cease-fires, monitoring truces and securing the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The German policy is geographically as well as functionally restricted. Bonn’s opposition to a collective, WEU mandated and managed, mission to Albania in 1997 reveals both continued reticence about sending the Bundeswehr abroad and careful discrimination in deciding when it is worth doing so. As Mathias Jopp has explained, the German preference is to act directly through NATO, in close formation with the U.S., to tackle security problems that might entail hostilities. There is a place for “Europe” in that collaboration. The perceived need is for
the European allies to have an equal voice in setting alliance policy: establishing goals; devising a strategy; and laying down guidelines for its execution.

Volker Rühe has stated this view with characteristic bluntness: “Not everything can stay as it is. Nobody is entitled to claim disproportionate influence in the new political and strategic environment.”\textsuperscript{10} There is mounting evidence that henceforth Germany will follow an American lead only when Bonn’s reading of circumstances indicate its rightness (circumstances that include the German judgment as to the correct policy course) and not out of deference to Washington’s titular position as head of the alliance. The talk is of entente as opposed to submission. This truth seems to be only slowly dawning on American policymakers. The Kohl government’s continued promotion of NATO as the West’s multilateral security agency of choice had partially obscured the evolution of thinking in Bonn about how matters of collective interest should be addressed within that framework. The Nuremberg Charter, the schematic outline of a joint Franco-German design for Europe’s security future, has been hailed for boldly declaring that NATO should be its centerpiece, guaranteeing Europe’s strategic defense.\textsuperscript{11} The statement is rightly interpreted as a success for a German diplomacy dedicated to reconciling France to NATO. It should be equally noteworthy for its implied aim of reconciling the United States with a Europeanized NATO. Bonn’s backing of the French claim to the command of AFSOUTH is a straw in the wind.

France has a quite different idea of what an ESDI means in practical terms. Its vision of the WEU’s future is more ambitious, even audacious. The term “Europe puissance” conveys that. Paris does not make the crisp distinction between hard and soft security tasks in its conception of those the WEU should prepare itself to perform. It clearly would like the organization to seize every opportunity to establish its authority and competence. It should not be geographically limited to Europe. Diplomatically, France aims at creating conditions in which the European allies exert maximum influence in shaping the field of action whether that be in the Balkans, the Mahgreb, the Middle East, or even in dealing with Russia and the CIS. By that is meant: defining the problem, setting its terms of reference, formulating responses, and carrying out a diplomatic strategy. In this perspective, the building of a distinctly European military capability is adjunct to a larger end of gaining more control over France’s/Europe’s strategic environment. Politically, the French conception points to the imperative of “Europe” striving for a unity of analysis and will to action whether that leads to independent action or speaking with one voice within alliance councils.

It is exactly this latter prospect that most troubles American officials as they sort out the prospective effects of the building boom in European security architecture. For the most part, they disparage the French master plan as a delusion. They see it as having small chance of winning adherence from other European allies despite rhetorical support from Spain, Germany and Italy (with qualification). When push comes to shove, they believe there is overwhelming support for working with the United States through NATO. They go on to
assert with only somewhat less confidence that the American position will prevail on questions of major consequence. In support of the latter claim, they marshal the evidence of the Gulf, NATO enlargement, and, more ambiguously, Yugoslavia. This confident prognosis leaves unaddressed the issue of how much remains of the old instinct to fall in behind Uncle Sam when security problems of a lesser magnitude, soft security issues, are on the table or, more important, when the issues are ones of diplomatically managing relations that have not reached crisis proportions. It is on these matters that thinking about a new transatlantic balance has yet to crystallize.

On one security issue, the U.S. does have definite views about what it expects from its European allies; that is, extending the boundaries of a democratically based community of peace to embrace the former communist lands of eastern Europe. American officials never tire of stressing the point that the U.S. smiles upon the bold initiative outlined in the Maastricht Treaty because they expect a unifying western Europe “to play an active and constructive role” in knitting together the two ends of the continent. In this context, they make clear that they envisage the benign reach of the EU as extending beyond the immediately contiguous and convenient neighbors in Central Europe. As Strobe Talbott, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, candidly has put it: some in Europe “resist vehemently the idea that any nations to the east of what might be called ‘traditional’ Europe can ever be part of a larger, 21st century Europe.” Citing Turkey, he went on to say “We believe that view is quite wrong and potentially quite dangerous.”

IDENTITY

Identity is an odd term to use in reference to security policy. It conceals more than it reveals. As such it is well suited for the ambiguous enterprise that is developing a western European capacity to act in full concert on security matters. Unresolved questions abound. They are ones of institutional form, political direction, resources, and strategic vision. The inability to date of the allies to disentangle these intertwined issues, and to agree on how to deal with them, contributes to the United States’ own lack of clarity and consistency in its attitudes toward ESDI.

What does the U.S. want it to be?; what ESDI would it accept?; how would it react to its acquiring a character that Washington finds unwelcome?

To the first, one can provide a reasonably coherent, if not finely detailed answer. A rough American design for an ESDI, with ties to the U.S. and NATO, is made up of the following elements. First, above all, is the preservation of NATO’s primacy as the preferred instrument for addressing issues of military security and as the forum of choice for policy deliberation. The cornerstone of official American thinking about European security arrangements, it reflects two ideas of central importance to the United States. One is that it retain a droit de regard across the span of European security matters. The
American voice must be routinely heard so as to ensure that right, and thereby to ensure that American interests be respected. The other is that the United States’ exceptional value to European security, material and political, requires that it not be marginalized in the management of the continent’s affairs.

Second, any ESDI should develop within NATO, not outside it. By so doing, a double purpose is served. The U.S. safeguards for itself a measure of influence over when and how her European allies might act in unison—whether without the U.S. or in parallel with it. In addition, alliance capabilities thereby can be made available for such missions, improving the odds on their being performed successfully. Third, it follows that CJTF be the centerpiece for an “in-house” ESDI. In Washington’s eyes, the Berlin accords responded flexibly and generously to the allies’ wish to have contingent arrangements in place to organize and command military operations on their own when and if necessary. It has the further attraction of giving the U.S. a say, via the North Atlantic Council, on the questions of “when” and “if.”

Fourth, any institutionalization of ESDI that threatens to present the United States with a unified allied position as a matter of course is anathema. In the American view, whether there is an independent, common allied position should depend on the course of collective deliberations that include the U.S. It should not be presumed in advance. Therefore, there is deep skepticism bordering on aversion to the proposals for placing the WEU under instruction of the EU Council—Even if that arrangement falls short of its full integration as the defense arm of the Union. Preexisting structures that enable the allies to act on concert are not at issue; predetermination of a European policy is.

Fifth, an ESDI is potentially beneficial if it facilitates the activation of otherwise hesitant allies’ readiness to participate in military operations. Specifically, if Europeanization legitimizes the use of force and makes the deployment of German soldiers abroad more acceptable to the German public, that would be a definite plus. Europe’s positive image among the German public complements, rather than competes with, the Atlantic connection in this respect. That said, there is an undercurrent of concern that Germany’s healthy federalizing impulse lends credence and political strength to suspect French ambitions for a European entity that rivals the U.S. The intricacy, as well as the delicacy of that relationship, reinforces the American disposition to follow the course of prudent restraint on issues of EU structure and its inner workings.

Finally, American goodwill toward the Maastricht project is not conditioned on the exclusion of defense from its integrative institutions. But that judgment is simplified by strong doubts that the Franco-German plan for bringing WEU under EU direction will be implemented.

What Can ESDI do for the United States?

What do American officials and politicians mean when they speak of greater allied burden-sharing in the security realm? In the Cold War days, it meant contributing to the collective defense by raising their military spending and/or
helping the U.S. defray the costs of its extensive overseas deployments. At a policy level, there was the additional desire that the West Europeans support American diplomacy in areas (the Middle East, the Persian Gulf) where the U.S. saw itself doing the hard slogging or where they made a contribution only when it was commercially convenient, such as with the dissemination of nuclear materials and technology.

Now, more is expected. The lead role that the United States has envisaged for its allies in serving as mentor and economic patron for eastern Europe has already been noted. In the expansive conception of that role, the allies also would assume primary responsibility as custodians of public order. It was neither coincidence nor simple convenience that led the Bush Administration, and then its successor, to curb the interventionist impulses of the U.S. and encourage the EU to act as mediator in Yugoslavia. That preference remains undiminished American leadership at Dayton and in IFOR/SFOR notwithstanding. It is confirmed by the Clinton Administration’s invitation to its European partners to stay on in Bosnia and to take charge of SFOR after the scheduled pull-out of American troops in June 1998. For the U.S., it is both natural and desirable that they tend to the communal rivalries and nationality disputes that are the continent’s most troubling sources of latent conflict. Furthermore, when in an optimistic frame of mind, U.S. officials see WEU as a vehicle that assists the allies in overcoming their reluctance to act “out-of-area.”

Looking beyond Europe, there is a general disposition that the allies should be encouraged to extend the range of their strategic vision to other regions. The complaint most often heard in official Washington is that the West Europeans follow the path of least resistance in leaving the United States to parry threats whether it be that posed to Persian Gulf’s oil and tenuous stability by the ambitions of Iran or Iraq, or that of China as it strives to attain great power status in East Asia. Pronounced differences exist on how to deal with each. Those with Paris and Bonn are most acute. What most irks Americans is the lack of strategic thinking and constant lack of strategic responsibility on the part of the allies. They are seen as willfully ignoring the security dangers of Iran’s arms build-up or China’s reckless nuclear export policies and muscle-flexing in the South China Sea. They do so in full knowledge that the U.S. is bearing the onus of providing a military counterforce and confronting Tehran and Beijing over actions that could upset international order. France’s and Germany’s policy of distancing themselves from American policy while garnering lucrative commercial contracts is interpreted in Washington as a type of free-riding that borders on the hypocritical. Talk of building an ESDI that enables Europe to take center stage internationally rings hollow in this context of policies characterized by sins of omission and acts of non-feasibility.

The West Europeans are to be encouraged to take seriously their own avowed commitment to a world role since they then would be forced to face up to strategic issues and choices. Whether, after so doing, they will act in tandem, or at least in parallel with the U.S., is an open question. The dubious expectation in
Washington is that they would eventually take a position reasonably close to that of the U.S. At the very least, they no longer could evade so casually the kind of tough trade-offs that the U.S. is called upon to make routinely. Hence, an ESDI that fails to broaden the allies’ strategic horizon will be looked at askance by Washington.

There is a matching set of skeptical perceptions on the European side. Most troubling is what one stout Atlanticist has called “the vast potential for political fragmentation in the United States.” Indeed, it is among European advocates of a strong transatlantic partnership that signs of a distracted, erratic America are most disturbing, for two reasons. Doubts about the U.S. create uncertainty where surety is most needed as the West Europeans make their own multifaceted adjustment to new conditions: deepening their institutions, extending them eastwards, forging a workable relationship with a Russia in flux. Those doubts are fed by a number of trends in the American body politic: the spread of an insular neo-isolationism in Congress and the country at large; the yielding to parochial ways of defining U.S. national interests; and the corrosive effects on the presidency of unbridled partisanship and around-the-calendar electioneering. Moreover, American inconstancy coupled with unilateralism is grist for the mill of those promoting the idea of a much more self-sufficient western Europe.

These trends in the allies’ more independent-minded attitude toward the United States’ alliance leadership are underestimated in American foreign policy circles. For the most part, there are a number of reasons for this. For one thing, the ingrained doubts that the Europeans will manage to “get their act together” in the foreseeable future lead Americans to slight the significance of formal goal-setting and vague utterances about more self-reliance. They assume that the allies cannot or will not pose a serious challenge to U.S. leadership until they have demonstrated their competence to act on their own. A second, related reason lies in the belief that when it really counts the United States’ exceptional strengths will have to be called on, allowing Washington pretty much to set the terms for joint enterprises. (This proposition, that those crisis situations are only going to arise at long intervals and that allied habits of greater independence will not take deep root in the interval, may well be incorrect.) Third, official Washington is confident that the U.S. has secured its future position of prominence in European affairs via NATO enlargement. That is the trump that prevents American exclusion from any meaningful action on matters of consequence, makes the United States the linchpin of a continental security system, and perpetuates the superior status of its preferred security organization.

Fourth, the appraisal is made that a European strategic conception would have to precede an act of institution building; a formalized commitment will not suffice to bring it forth. The French strategy of enunciating the principle, and then using that leverage to bring national policies in line with it, is thought destined to be frustrated. Therefore, Washington has taken a relatively relaxed view of moves to incorporate WEU into the EU, even in the face of German co-sponsorship of the French inspired idea.
Finally, relatively few in Washington pay close sustained attention to the intense interplay that accompanies the union-building project. The ins-and-outs of intra-European community politics are viewed at a bemused intellectual distance. The skeptical downplaying of a drama seen as “so much sound and fury signifying nobody quite knows what” has the ancillary effect of devaluing what is said by European leaders as a source of clues as to what Western European governments are likely to do, even, what they truly believe.

INSTITUTIONALIZING AN ESDI

How and where are the underlying strains between the United States and its European allies likely to manifest themselves and what are latent sources of frictions?

The most obvious point to make on this score is that an ESDI becomes most contentious when identity looks to being institutionalized. Within NATO, a modicum of institutionalization is acceptable to the U.S. Washington has given the nod to a cataloguing of European command elements and linking them in a parallel, but not separate command structure. That is the organizational concomitant to procedures for approving and activating alliance assets for use by the allies. There is a fine line between taking contingent measures to prepare for CJTF mandated operations, on the one hand, and devising structures that reify the idea of an ESDI that divides the alliance into two military and political categories, on the other. It is a differentiation that Washington will strive to maintain.

The EU Connection

The plan advanced in March 1997 jointly by Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac for integrating the WEU into the European Union displeased American officials. It lent political impetus to ideas already incorporated in preliminary drafts prepared for the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). The Clinton Administration’s muted response owed to the expectation that the initiative would fall short. Washington’s restraint in not mounting a campaign to block it, of the sort it undertook in the early 1990s, also shows how far American thinking about ESDI has evolved. The U.S. feels its position in post-Cold War Europe less threatened (in part because it now holds a more attenuated conception of that position); is constantly more sympathetic to the European allies doing more for and among themselves; and, in addition, sees the locus of thinking among European governments as settling at a point that provides adequate space for the United States. Washington correctly foresaw that the Franco-German plan would be substantially watered down at the culminating IGC summit in Amsterdam, and its main elements shelved for the time being.

The United States, however, is not so sanguine as to assume that further attempts to subordinate WEU to the EU will not be made. Nor is the U.S. neutral about the issues WEU subordination raises of how and where an ESDI
will develop. A WEU that takes political direction from the EU Council (stage 2 in the Kohl/Chirac plan) or its incorporation as the Union’s defense arm (stage 3), would have troubling consequences for the supposedly historic milestone reached in the Berlin Accords. A WEU answerable to, and an instrument of the EU (whether via direction by the Council of Ministers of a still organizationally autonomous WEU or a WEU whose secretariat has been fused with the Council’s pre-existing CFSP secretariat) is seen to have several harmful effects. At the level of military organization, such an arrangement could disrupt the collaboration now underway between NATO and WEU to establish matching CJTF planning staffs that will expedite any envisaged “hand-over” and to work out scenarios for such contingent situations. It threatens to transform that process into dealings between two autonomous institutions each with its own purposes, political interests, and operational controls.

Admittedly, WEU’s present organizational autonomy allows for such a rivalry to develop. The existing arrangement, though, gives the WEU considerable latitude in deciding how much actual autonomy it seeks to exercise and enables it to build a working relationship with NATO as a functional sub-set of the larger transatlantic entity. Both flexibility in modulating that relationship and the WEU’s voluntary deference would be curbed were it constitutionally an integral part of the EU. New diplomatic reality, too, would be created. The formal commitment of EU governments to define a common EU position on matters of security and defense increases the chances that the unwelcome European caucus will become a fixture within the North Atlantic alliance. Even were skepticism about the likelihood of the fifteen being able to agree among themselves to prove justified, the formal obligation to strain toward a consensus could well rigidify and distort NATO’s own processes of deliberation and decision.

Finally, extending the EU’s range to cover security and defense is seen as working against Washington’s desired objective that the allies ready themselves to take on larger duties. The Union’s decision-making procedures are notorious for being cumbersome and slow. Moreover, the consensus-building process they serve tends to produce compromise outcomes expressing the lowest common denominator of agreement. These traits are antithetical to the demands of security policy which place premiums on timely, decisive action suited to the particulars of a given situation rather than first meeting the test of political acceptability among a diverse membership. Execution of policy will suffer equally from the EU’s standard modus operandi. On both counts, Washington officials cite the product of the EU’s CFSP as presaging what is likely to emerge from a formal ESDI.

Incorporating WEU into the EU is opposed by the U.S. for another reason. Doing so would strengthen the hand of France in its unremitting efforts to impress its stamp on an ESDI and the Union’s CFSP generally. American officials continue to see a real, if immeasurable, risk that an ESDI formed within the EU would be prey to “Euro-nationalist” forces led by France. It affects how they
look at the variations in plans, for turning the WEU into the EU’s defense arm. As President Chirac has put the French position: “the priority is to make of the European Council the supreme guiding and decision-making body in the field of security and defense.” His logic is clear. France worries about two things: the American domineering instinct along with its belligerent style, and German pacifism. An ESDI under direct control by the intergovernmental Council would strengthen Europe in the transatlantic relationship, thereby curbing the United States’ unhealthy propensities. At the same time, it reduces the risk that French conviction and thinking would be muted were the Council’s secretariat to gain in importance through a merger with the WEU secretariat. The deeper the institutionalization, the greater the chances that a softer German-type philosophy might prevail.

Washington is agnostic on the fine points of how a WEU might be amalgamated with the EU were such an unwelcome development to prove unavoidable. In that eventuality, one American interest would be in having a European interlocutor valuable. Who decides for Europe? and who speaks for Europe? are two questions on the minds of American officials when they imagine dealing with a more or less unitary group of allies. Policy emanating directly from member governments is likely to be more definitive. That is a plus for the U.S. insofar as it truly wishes to see a common European position. The two hypothetical benefits, from an American point of view, would be a greater readiness to make commitments and to run risks, and a simplification of the diplomacy required to manage a balanced transatlantic relationship. There is, though, a potential downside as well. A more unified Europe would be more willful and better able to resist an American policy lead where there are serious differences. Again, we should note that American officials’ fears in this regard are moderated by skepticism that the European allies will forge a unitary set of security policies any time soon. Differences of outlook, philosophy and individual issues will not easily be overcome by invoking the mantra of ESDI, whatever its structure. Opportunities will continue to exist for the U.S. to exercise influence by approaching partner governments on a bilateral basis.

**NATO Enlargement**

The initiative to extend NATO membership to include eastern European countries, along with its attendant creation of a Permanent Joint Council embracing Russia, has multiple consequences for an ESDI. Above all, it relegates plans for affirming the West Europeans’ security identity to a lower order of importance. NATO is now destined to become the continent’s paramount security forum. It is there that the most serious security issues will be deliberated upon, there that crucial decisions will be taken, and there that membership will provide coveted status and acceptance for the East Europeans.

Second, it institutionalizes a prominent place for the U.S. in Europe’s future security arrangements. That clearly was one American objective in pressing for enlargement. It goes along with the publicly stated goals of projecting stability
and establishing a secure environment for the entrenching of democracy in the former Communist lands. But it is inaccurate to ascribe to American policymakers the aim of using NATO as the integrating agent for a broad transatlantic or Eurasian community as some French commentators would have it. Were liberalization in Russia, and the other successor states to the Soviet Union (as well in eastern Europeans) to succeed, then the basis may well be laid for extending the West’s own Kantian community far to the East. But no one in Washington is so sanguine as to believe either that it will happen soon or that NATO can take on the lion’s share of the responsibility for advancing that worthy objective. What NATO’s enlargement does do is to declare unmistakably that the United States is the critical member of that Kantian community, which should be the overriding fact of international life for western Europeans.

Finally, and most important, NATO’s extension magnifies the importance of the alliance’s renovation. Its confirmation as Europe’s preeminent security body means that its internal structures (military and political) and procedures will directly influence dealings across the continent. Relations among the western powers, including the link made between NATO and various expressions of an ESDI, will evolve in a markedly different setting from that which existed when NATO was a more exclusive club. The presence of new members from eastern Europe is only one change; the ensconcing of Russia as a legitimate presence within NATO’s political space will prove a more radical change. The former’s most noticeable effect is likely to be a marginal strengthening of the United States’ position. In the minds of East European leaders, the gap between their exalted image of the U.S. and their jaundiced, history tinged view of the West Europeans remains a wide one.

Formalizing a set of consultative arrangements with Russia within NATO cannot but loosen collective discipline among the old members. That discipline already had been shown wanting in egregious ways during the course of the Yugoslav conflicts. The sense of lost solidarity and purpose in dealing with post-Cold War conditions in Europe was not restored by IFOR. As for the more ambitious, if not unreasonable, idea that the alliance act as a diplomatic formation in addressing issues of world order farther afield (whether in managing growing Chinese power or addressing continued dangers in the Persian Gulf) no coherent, sustained attempt was even made to implement it. In the light of France’s rhetorical alignment with China to block an alleged American drive for global hegemony, and serious, more general transatlantic frictions on other issues (e.g., Iran), the Western concert seems likely to fare poorly in the new, hyper-extended NATO.

The NATO-Russia council creates ample opportunity, even incentive, for allied governments to enlist the Russians by one means or another in stratagems to influence the outcome of debates among themselves. Those debates will cover the gamut of issues on the emerging security agenda: *inter alia*, security arrangements for non-members; unresolved Balkan tensions; the handling of trouble-spots on Europe’s periphery; and how NATO’s existing organs
relate to newly created ones. The form and character of an ESDI will be inseparable from the larger process of adaptation. The present American conception of the new NATO downplays the significance of its institutional innovations for the conduct of business among traditional allies. Specifically with regard to ESDI, the logic that leads to the strong preference for its developing with NATO remains intact. In truth, however, Clinton Administration officials have not systematically thought through all the implications of enlargement.

The possibility that some of the United States’ European allies might seek to exploit the Russian presence to curtail American influence while augmenting their own has not been something American officials worry much about. Their underestimating of that potential problem conforms to their generally relaxed attitude about ESDI. Can that attitude reinforced in the new NATO context by the Clinton Administration’s upbeat approach to NATO enlargement. To the extent that the issue has been considered by Clinton Administration officials, it is couched in terms of potential Russian mischief-making in seeking to sow discord among the allies. The response is an optimistic combination of confidence that Moscow would not jeopardize its keenly sought special status by misbehaving and faith that the allies will neither be so feckless as to play into manipulative Russian hands or resist the need to chastise it for abuse of its privileges.

Furthermore, the U.S. is quite comfortable in its own bilateral relationship with Russia. After all, Washington officials are long accustomed to dealing with Moscow on strategic questions dating back to the Cold War days; there is an exceptional personal tie of trust and cordiality with President Yeltsin; and not least, they are fully aware that the Kremlin takes pride in a privileged relationship with the U.S. that exalts its diminished sense of status and self-esteem. For the West Europeans, Russo-American entente evokes old anxieties about a revived condominium of power dominating the new forum. Thus, both America and its European allies approach the brave new world created by NATO enlargement with mutual apprehensions about each other that can not be dispelled without a candid dialogue, and shared orientation as to where their alliance is now headed.

Washington officials are no more troubled, and even less sensitive to the intrusion of EU politics into NATO bodies. Yet spillover effects indeed, outright linkage stratagems already are in evidence. We had a foretaste of what is to come in the jockeying over extending membership invitations to Slovenia and Romania. The extent of support for each surprised the Clinton Administration. It was slow to appreciate the political calculations being made in some allied capitals that saw the membership issue primarily in terms of trade-offs on compelling EU matters and only secondarily in terms of what the decision meant for NATO’s expanded security mission. The carry-over of the EU’s recent practice of balancing gestures of support to the East with matching gestures to the “South” was one aspect of the community’s new-found political culture grafted onto NATO. So too is the practice of trading concessions, recip-
rocal back-scratching, that bestows benefits as earned favors as much as on their merits. More concretely, there was the connection between the contentious debate over EMU and candidates for NATO enlargement. Some of those backing France’s promotion of Rumania did so in part as a *quid pro quo* for strenuous French efforts to include them as inaugural members of EMU. Germany, for its part, added its name to the sponsorship of Romania (as well as to Slovenia), despite its distinct lack of enthusiasm for the idea, at the height of the EMU crisis created by the left’s victory in the French elections and the crisis in Bonn over its struggle to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria. Characteristically, the Kohl government came down on the side of France in the NATO debate only when it became evident that the Clinton Administration was intent on throwing a roadblock in the path of the Romanian and Slovenian candidacies. Even the British subordinated strategic judgment to the expediencies of EU politics by setting aside their better judgment and making sympathetic noises about Slovenia so as to garner some credits in Rome, and elsewhere, usable in arranging their special status in the community.

To say that Washington was shocked by this pattern of adulterating the historic undertaking NATO enlargement represents with extraneous considerations from another sphere of action would be an exaggeration. But it is a fair statement that the United States has yet to comprehend fully the auguries for an alliance future wherein the security currency is devalued relative to other currencies in the multidimensional exchange market that western diplomacy has become.\(^1\)

Washington cannot gainsay the objective reality that the meaning of a hypothetical European caucus takes on added dimension in the new setting. That truth will in all probability ensure that the ESDI question will grow in importance and contentiousness, albeit as much for its indirect effects on a more intricate game of European diplomacy, as for its intrinsic value as the EU’s military arm.

ENDNOTES


The varied historical meanings of the designation “Europe” are explored by Gerard Delanty in *Inventing Europe* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995).

Joint Communique issued by President Jacques Chirac and President Jiang Zemin, Beijing, May 1997 reported in *The Financial Times* (May 8, 1997). This key passage matches nearly word for word the communique issued by President Yeltsin and President Zemin a few months earlier.

Interview appearing in *The Financial Times* (February 23, 1997), Q. Peel, “Rühe’s Mission to Europeanise NATO.” Rühe’s comments in the same vein were made in Berlin on October 14 in assessing the outlook for NATO enlargement and were reported in *The Week in Germany* (October 19, 1996). Karl Lamers, foreign policy spokesman for the CDU party made a nearly identical statement the previous October. “Why does NATO enlargement pose a problem for Russia?” asked Lamers. “Its [Russia’s] point of reference is, of course, not the European members of the Alliance but America, which Russia secretly admires but also secretly fears.”

It is noteworthy that this sentiment has been expressed even by some reputed for their breadth of strategic vision; see, for example, Christoph Bertram, *Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995). Bertram provides a cogent, compelling critique of NATO’s misguided and maladroit role in the Yugoslav conflict which he interprets as stemming from basic incompatibilities between the alliance shaped by the Cold War and the very different challenges it now faces. However, rather than making the case for a redoubled effort at adjusting its missions and methods, Bertram concludes that NATO should refrain from “out of area” military actions “because its members cannot be counted upon to stand together in any ‘out-of-area’ crisis” (pg. 3). His answer to the question of what new common purpose will keep the Alliance intact and effective is “providing a network of reassurance” across Europe, i.e., enlargement. The implications for the West’s ability to act in concert to address unconventional military challenges in Europe or conventional ones on its periphery are not addressed.


This longstanding conviction was reiterated in a policy document issued by Chancellor Kohl’s CDU parliamentary party in July 1997. It declared: “Bosnia has made clear that effective conflict resolution in Europe is possible at the present time only with the active involvement of the United States.” *Auf dem Weg in das nächste Jahrtausend: Die transatlantische Partnerschaft bewahren und stärken.* Klaus Francke. Arbeitsgruppe Außenpolitik CDU/ESU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag June 10, 1997.


The “Common Strategic Concept” was adopted by the Franco-German Defense and Security Council at its meeting in Nuremberg on December 9, 1996. Extensive excerpts were published in *Le Monde* (January 25, 1997).


The plan was presented at the Franco-German bilateral summit in Freiberg, Germany on February 27, 1997.

The proposals made and positions taken by EU governments in preparation for Amsterdam are schematically represented in full detail in the *European Union CFSP Forum*, IEP, Bonn, 3&4/96.

Address to WEU Assembly, December 5, 1996.

I am grateful to John Roper for elucidating the conjectured relationship of the WEU with the Council of Ministers and the CFSP Secretariat.

The EU’s characteristic *modus operandi* is of a fundamentally different order from that of NATO’s. Its features are set by the community’s distinctive purpose and institutional culture.
The EU serves to improve the economic well-being of its members. Acting collectively, they generate more “utility” than could the participating countries acting singly. The pivot of EU politics is the distribution of the benefits generated. The range of interactions encompassed, along with the multitude of economic utilities provided, allows for elaborate patterns of deal-making. Every government has a reasonable expectation of obtaining benefits that it covets most in a form most convenient to it. Moreover, the bargaining that produces mutual satisfaction does not seriously jeopardize the performance of integrated economic markets and institutions. NATO’s utilities, by contrast, are both finite (rather than being ever expandable) and more sensitive to willfully self-interested behavior that places individual status and position above organization function. Concentrating on how the limited emoluments available get distributed (e.g., command posts) can impair functioning directly by compromising performance and indirectly by draining energy and attention from the Alliance’s strategic purposes. To make judgment and commitment on the Alliance’s substance contingent on the receipt of national payoffs (e.g., admission of favored candidates) is to avoid rather than confront those important differences over proximate objectives, strategies and methods that deserve full, candid debate.
WHITHER CORE EUROPE?
FRANCE AND THE EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION:
ISSUES AND CHOICES
Yves Boyer

For forty years, the centerpiece of French diplomacy has been the European construction. Characterized by many ups and downs, the process has gone through various stages. Whatever the difficulties were, however, they never compromised the dynamism of the project for which France has been a chief architect. Today, the European construction is becoming a complex network of interrelated policies whose implementation is transforming the nature of the Union. Particularly, the introduction of a single currency, the euro, and the objective of “enhanced cooperation” among a core group of countries within the European Union (EU), add qualitatively new dimensions to the Union. Moreover, this transformation occurs at a time when membership in the EU will expand, which, however welcome, requires money, time, complex compromises, and resolve.

Monetary union, enlargement of the Union and the building of a powerful integrated core of countries within the EU will have profound consequences for the architecture of Europe, as well as for the relationship between the EU and external powers. A transformation such as this implies profound consequences for the character of each member of the Union. France, for example, must find a balance between the many internal adjustments programmed by EU policy promoted by its leaders and the sense that the country’s integrity, as a nation, has to be preserved. It must continue to display its Frenchness, the *sine qua non* for its active and leading role in the EU, while acknowledging that the end result of the EU’s internal development will certainly affect its identity in ways far from being clearly assessed. Indeed, it comes at a time when France finds itself in the grip of a complex and severe internal political and societal crisis amplified by growing doubts about the benefits of the European construction, as it is now being pursued. Brussels no longer appears able to bring unambiguously positive solutions. Rather, part of public opinion contributes to exacerbate the French internal crisis.

I. THE FRENCH APPROACH TO THE EU’S TRANSFORMATION

In order to adapt the EU’s institutions to deepen integration of its members, a prerequisite for success in meeting the challenge of expanding membership from fifteen to twenty-six states, an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) was opened in Turin in the spring of 1996. French views on the IGC were seldom heard in the months before the conference started. This attitude should not, however, be attributed to disinterest, but rather was the byproduct of the election of a new president in the spring of 1995 and the aggravation of the political, economic and societal difficulties in France.
Gradually, however, a few themes surfaced, giving indications about French aims. The first one was related to a question of principle. The government set itself against a drift in the motives and rationale underlying the process of European integration since its inception. Paris would fight against the dilution of the EU in a kind of free market zone with à la carte obligations as sought by the Tory government in Britain. For the French, the European construction is above all a political project aimed at the creation of an unprecedented historical union, “the most innovative regional integration ever seen in history,” between countries which have been at war with each other so many times and which now confront challenges implying common, integrated and homogenous policies, including in the fields of defense and foreign affairs. Thus, the French maintained their opposition to the “soft” European Union favored at that time by the British. On the contrary, they adhere to the traditional French program for Europe: to deepen the European construction to forge a power (l’Europe puissance) possessing various means of asserting its interests and of making its voice heard and respected on the world stage, including military forces. There is a strong consensus on that objective in France. Without significant political dissident voices, the French consensus may be found in what Alain Juppe advocated when he was foreign minister in the Balladur government. He conceived of the EU evolving in two circles: one open to new members agreeing on basic common policies and another inner circle of more integrated countries (“le cercle des solidarités renforcées”). One of Paris’ objectives at the IGC was to achieve precisely this vision, a vision that also inspired the Jospin Government that took office after the spring 1997 parliamentary elections.

In the IGC framework, the French maintained that previous EU enlargements brought together countries less homogeneous in their aspirations than the initial six signatories of the Rome treaty. The enlargement process to eastern and central Europe would probably reinforce these centrifugal forces in the EU. Accordingly, a central task of the IGC should consist of defining mechanisms that allow countries such as Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, and Spain to pursue “reinforced cooperation.” This was the purpose and the meaning of the joint letter sent to all members of the EU by President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl on December 7, 1995. With this letter, the Franco-German tandem sought to sustain its role as the driving force and standard setter of European integration.

Franco-German Relations

The Franco-German relationship is very complex and underlies every significant advance in the European construction since its beginning in the late 1950s. In the words of one French commentator, “when France and Germany unravel, Europe falls apart.” The partnership’s intrinsic importance transcends the European Union, even if the EU articulates its achievements. Its functioning has never been easy. Two very different countries “have had the political and
historical wit to make a considerable and persistent effort to set their positions on a convergent course.”

Following a brief disruption of the Franco-German dialogue with the election of Jacques Chirac, that dialogue has regained its intensity and its normal course. According to British commentators, never suspected of viewing the development of the Franco-German entente too positively, “the profound doubts Germany had about Chirac’s ‘Europeaness’ when he became president have gone, and with them the sense of wobble within the Franco-German alliance.”

To avoid any potential mischief, Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac agreed in June 1996 to hold informal meetings every six weeks to review issues debated within the framework of the Intergovernmental Conference.

The centrality of the Franco-German tandem has understandably sometimes given rise to irritations expressed by other members of the Union, causing French and German leaders to frequently insist that the tandem “shall lead, not dominate.” To avoid reciprocal misunderstandings on sensitive issues such as the relationship with Eastern and Central Europe or Russia, where France (traumatized by historical precedents dating to the Napoleonic and the inter-war periods) constantly suspects Germany of “infidelity,” common initiatives have been taken jointly by Paris and Bonn. Thus, France was made a party to the “Weimar Triangle” associating Germany and Poland. Similarly, in October 1997, when France and Russia decided to hold annual bilateral summit meetings “to coordinate policies on mutual problems,” Paris was seen to preclude any political mismatch between France and Germany and proposed to associate Bonn with their common endeavor.

The Franco-German dialogue is also seriously encroaching on defense issues. To realize their commitments in that field the two countries agreed in 1982 to create a Franco-German defense commission. In 1987, a common brigade was formed with units of both armies. Drawing lessons from the functioning of this brigade, Bonn and Paris later decided to expand their project with the creation, officially announced during a bilateral summit in La Rochelle in 1992, of the Eurocorps. Having “a European vocation” from the outset, the Eurocorps was defined as being for “the common defense of the allies according to Article 5 of the Washington treaty or the Brussels treaty.” For Paris, this initiative arose from various motives, above all the desire to keep open the possibility that Europe could develop its own defense, an aim that could have been ruined by NATO’s efforts to develop, at the same time, multinational units. An agreement regarding the use of the Eurocorps was signed with NATO, between SACEUR, the General Inspekteur of the Bundeswehr and the French Chief of Staff on January 21, 1993. To explicitly link the creation of the Eurocorps with the gradual building of a European defense identity, a similar agreement was signed on November 22, 1993, with the WEU. This move was possible since the 1992 WEU Petersberg Declaration agreed to assign military units to perform specific tasks explicitly defined in the declaration. Outside the integrated military structure, the Eurocorps “will allow Europe to possess its own military capac-
Europeanizing Security? NATO and an Integrating Europe

At a later stage, German and France were joined by Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg.

Political and military guidance governing the use of the Eurocorps are provided by a Comité commun (common committee) formed by the chief of staff and the political director of the foreign ministry of each participating country. To a certain extent this body is similar to what was agreed upon at NATO’s June 1996 Berlin summit with the creation of the PCG (Policy Coordination Group). The multinational staff of the Eurocorps (about 350 people) is able to integrate into NATO’s chain of command as well as to direct, in the framework of the WEU, an autonomous mission outside Europe.

A further step was taken between the two countries when Jacques Chirac and Helmut Kohl, during a bilateral summit in Nuremberg on December 9, 1996, agreed to a “common strategic concept,” a charter guiding subsequent deepening of their defense relationship. If criticisms were quite harsh when the agreement was debated in the French National Assembly the following month, they were directed not so much at the agreement itself, but rather at the prospect of its supposed content leading to “a drift towards submission to the U.S. and to NATO,” as stated by Laurent Fabius, a former prime minister. According to some commentators, the document was the result of a compromise in which France confirmed its willingness to get closer to NATO, while Germany gave up some of its past taboos about the French nuclear deterrent and force projection, particularly in the Mediterranean area.

Paris also used the framework of the Franco-German special relationship to launch initiatives promoting the WEU as the future defense component of the EU. Article J4 of the Maastricht Treaty did not go as far as expected, but Paris maintained the pressure for moving in that direction and progress was achieved subsequently. After the Amsterdam Treaty that brought the IGC to a close, Jacques Chirac declared that “we have made considerable progress regarding European defense in moving the EU and the WEU closer to each other.”

Regarding defense procurement, discussions are proceeding somewhat more slowly between the two countries. At the junction of defense procurement and defense policy lies the development of autonomous European intelligence capacities, a project strongly advocated by Paris. France has consequently developed the Helios I reconnaissance satellite with Spanish and Italian participation. It’s effort to develop a Franco-German successor, Helios II, and an electronic reconnaissance satellite, Horus, was unsuccessful. Even if Chancellor Kohl agreed to participate in the two programs that would have enhanced European capacities in crisis assessment, the German contribution to Helios II was cancelled largely because of the severe cutback in the German defense budget, which has declined sharply since 1990.

As a whole, one can say that in defense matters there is a powerful paradox in the Franco-German cooperation. On one hand, practically all the ingredients are present for a genuine and extensive common policy in military affairs. The closeness of the relations, the scope of the bilateral agreements and the
intensity of the cooperation are second to none. On the other hand, there is still an inherent contradiction in Bonn on those matters. The Germans must simultaneously manage their allegiance to the U.S. (the provider of German security during the Cold War) and their commitment to direct, with France, the European construction, which implies a common security and defense policy by and for the Europeans themselves, on an equal footing with the United States. Germany is torn between “Atlanticism” and “Europeanism,” provoking a lot of wrangling in Germany and requiring from the French a long and tenacious resolve to drag the Germans in. The formation of a SPD-Green national government in October 1998 will probably lead Germany to downplay its role in the fabric of the EU’s defense identity.

Besides defense issues, there are currently at least two other “hot topics” on the Franco-German agenda: EU institutional reform and the implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

**EU Reform and the Franco-German Tandem**

France and Germany called for new flexibility in the functioning of the Union to allow members so motivated to deepen their cooperation without risking a veto from reluctant partners, advocating the development within the Union of “enhanced solidarity” (*solidarités renforcées*). At a joint news conference held by the French and German foreign ministers to advocate this demand for injecting new flexibility into EU decision-making, Klaus Kinkel stated that “the French and Germans are closing ranks and we hope that our German-French tandem will be a stimulus for further European integration.”\(^{23}\) With the British attitude in mind, they hinted that if this proposal were to be rebuffed, “enhanced cooperation” could go ahead outside the EU, if necessary. The French minister for European affairs pointedly asked his European colleagues whether enhanced cooperation “shall be developed within the Union or outside? Will you risk that it is increasingly implemented outside the Union?”\(^{24}\) Implicit in this position is the feeling that the future of the EU lies in the development of concentric circles reflecting different types of integration and commitments. In an EU of twenty-five to twenty-six members one will probably see the development of a core of about five to seven countries, including France and Germany, determined to progress towards building *l’Europe puissance*.

Aside from this issue, after intense discussion, Bonn and Paris agreed on a position on the type of institutional reform needed by the EU. The European Council shall be the highest body for formulation and conduct of EU foreign and defense policy. A newly-created post, the *Haut Representant*, advocated by France, would represent the Union with a mandate from the Council, together with the presidency, particularly when “enhanced cooperation” necessitates common action. Regarding the transformation of the decision-making process of the EU, three topics have yet to be solved. First, the weighting of the votes. At present a qualified majority is obtained by the equivalent of 58 percent of the European population. With twelve members the percentage was 63 percent. In
an enlarged Union it would drop to the equivalent of less than 50 percent. It is thus necessary to correct this imbalance by increasing the weight of the most populous countries of the EU. Secondly, to respect the principle of subsidiary, national legislatures ought to be associated with the decision-making process, a goal proposed by the Irish presidency at the December 1996 EU summit in Dublin. Lastly, the number of commissioners should be reduced by approximately ten seats.\(^\text{25}\)

Regarding these goals, the results of the Amsterdam summit were in large part seen as disappointing. On various issues regarding the functioning of the EU, the Germans did not follow the French. Former President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing evoked it as “Amsterdam’s failure.”\(^\text{26}\) The government acknowledged the shortcomings of the treaty and hinted that unsolved issues required another round of discussion, particularly about institutional reforms: “the results of Amsterdam are inadequate; we have not built Europe for forty years in order to agree to it being dissolved in a vast jumble, to the detriment of its current and future members. The forthcoming enlargement must be preceded by a genuine institutional reform.”\(^\text{27}\)

The treaty signed in Amsterdam left wide open the questions of transforming the decision-making process of the EU to efficiently accommodate its enlargement. Nor was much achieved in the area of defense, thereby leaving open the final shape of the Union, where according to French preferences, concentric circles would define the project. At its center a fully integrated “little Europe” would coexist with a wider Union inspired by the British approach. At the same time when institutional issues were debated within the IGC, a crucial stake was emerging as the key issue regarding the fabric of EU, and more importantly the future of the Paris-Bonn axis: the currency issue.

**Towards a Common Currency**

The euro should bring strategic transformations in Europe itself between countries “in” and those “out” of the single currency system.\(^\text{28}\) The euro is “the final stage of the economic union and the first step of the political union.”\(^\text{29}\) It is an instrument of “political unity.”\(^\text{30}\) It is genuinely a political endeavor. As stated by the French foreign affairs minister, “it is the real unifying European project. . . it will create a new dynamic whose consequences are far from being appreciated.”\(^\text{31}\) German authorities expressed the same views, when Klaus Kinkel asserted that the euro “was a question of destiny for Europe.”\(^\text{32}\)

As usual, British commentators pointed out the normal disagreements between France and Germany during the negotiations about the euro:

the Germans want the planned stability pact to discipline the budget deficits of national governments by rules that are fixed and automatic; the French (and others) want rules that allow for political judgment. For the Germans monetary stability is an absolute priority; but the French
want something like an economic government for Europe which would promote stability and growth.\textsuperscript{33}

However, as pointed out by Karl Lamers with reference to the Stability Pact agreed at the EU’s summit in Dublin, “the struggle about the Stability Pact has revealed one more time that interdependence between France and Germany is ineluctable.”\textsuperscript{34}

The euro may become a key currency on world exchange markets with a positive influence on the stability of the international monetary system.\textsuperscript{35} According to Herve de Charrette, “Today there is a worldwide currency, the dollar, and few regional currencies. . . . Tomorrow there will be two worldwide currencies, the dollar and the euro.”\textsuperscript{36} A former member of the Bank of France monetary policy council and respected commentator on monetary issues in France, Jean Boissonnat, added, “we are developing the euro partly in order to put into question the privilege of the dollar, in the sense that due to the status of their currency, the United States is the only country in the world which does not pay the consequences of an undervalued currency, i.e., high interest rates.”\textsuperscript{37} The same attitude is manifested in Jospin’s Socialist government. Pierre Moscovici, European affairs minister, and Dominique Strauss-Kahn, economics minister, have extensively echoed H. de Charrette and Alain Juppé.

Despite the fact that the economic assessment report from the German government issued in January 29, 1997, stressed the commitment to respect the Maastricht’s criteria for being eligible to the euro, voices were heard in Germany saying that German authorities would seek a flexible interpretation of the Maastricht criteria for debt to enable its participation in economic and monetary union.\textsuperscript{38} Before the successful launch of the euro and prior to his election as German chancellor, Minister President Gerhard Schröder alluded to a possible delay in German participation in the euro. On two different occasions a former head of the Bundesbank, Karl Otto Pöhl, also expressed reservations about the way French officials were looking at monetary issues. In January 1997, at a Paris conference organized by the Compagnie financière Edmond de Rothschild, Pöhl strongly opposed the idea developed by the French to create a political body able to counterbalance the future euro, stating at the same time that “the introduction of the euro . . . will give Europe, both economically and politically, the stimulus to integration it needs to be able to play in the first division of the international political and economical league in the 21st century.”\textsuperscript{39} The day before he pointed out the difference of approach between France and Germany regarding the euro. In Pöhl’s view, Paris sees the euro as an instrument to break the hegemony of the U.S. dollar and possibly create a new reserve currency. This is in contrast to the German conception of the euro as a means to put an end to monetary fragmentation within the single market space. Pöhl’s statements provoked an immediate rebuke from Klaus Kinkel.\textsuperscript{40} Later the same year, German proponents of the euro were bolstered when the Green future foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, declared, “Germany’s Green party will
insist on maintaining support for the EMU if it forms a government with the SPD,” adding that “. . . if the euro does not come, the U.S. will define the development of a globalized economy in the 21st century.”

Indeed, as usual on key EU issues, the German-French tandem was put under strain when the newly-elected Jospin government expressed its desire to amend the purely monetary mechanism presiding over the management of the euro (the stability pact required countries to keep their deficit low or face financial penalties) with a kind of politico-economic body. Such proposals were rebuked by the Germans during a bilateral summit held in Poitiers in June 1997, opening a new psychodrama in the relationship. In the end, at another meeting in Weimar the following September, a compromise was reached. France agreed to abide by the stability pact rules and Germany acknowledged the need for an informal, although visible, meeting of economic and finance ministers of countries belonging to the euro zone. As pointed out by the French European affairs minister, “the Germans have acknowledged the legitimacy of an economic authority.” An informal forum to coordinate economic policy while preserving the independence of the European Central Bank is a fair compromise between the two countries. It can either work in the framework of the entire EU or within the framework of “enhanced cooperation” mechanisms as agreed upon within the scope of the Amsterdam Treaty.

II. THE FRENCH POSITION ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK

Tensions and contradictions within the western world make the anticipated adjustments in the European security architecture a slow and complicated process, bearing heavily on the potential outcomes of the IGC regarding EU foreign and security policy.

With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, western countries have downsized their defense efforts. At the beginning of the 1990s, peace dividends were eagerly expected from huge segments of the public and led to budgetary limitations in defense expenses in most NATO countries. The real reason for this move was economic recession. Continuing economic doldrums, particularly in Western Europe, led to a dramatic collapse in defense budgets and a consequent reduction in West European military capabilities. Major West European states such as the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and later France, reduced their defense budget while simultaneously trying to maintain many of the former missions assigned to their forces. This evolution may prove to be very worrying in the medium term as it significantly reduces the active forces immediately available for military operations at a time when the potential development of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the framework of the IGC could actually be reduced to an empty shell if it cannot be backed by significant and potent military forces. There is clearly now a danger that Europe may reach the point of structural disarma-
ment at a time when it has a specific role to play in maintaining global security. In the meantime, when economic recession was translated into cuts in defense budgets, new perceptions of risks and vulnerabilities also led to the reassessment of the role of military forces in international relations. Possible contingencies confronted by the European Union will likely require a diverse set of instruments, with the military playing a less central role than had been the case during the Cold War. Even when the use of military forces is contemplated, it would largely be in the framework of “operations other than war.” In contrast to the Cold War, when a consensus on the nature of the threat defined defense requirements in terms of equipment, structures and roles for the armed forces, the absence of a specific enemy directly threatening western values and interests casts doubt on the nature of military capabilities necessary to cope with an uncertain future.

When contemplating the use of force, it seems more than obvious that future instabilities will require neither the threat of nuclear retaliation (except for the ultimate defense of vital interests) nor the massive use of heavy armored forces to defeat an enemy the size of the former Warsaw Pact. On the contrary, new strategic parameters are modifying West European security perceptions and requirements for future military capabilities when, at the same time, technological evolution is opening the way to rapid transformations in the field of military affairs. Economic underdevelopment combined with a demographic explosion and fundamentalist movements are generating instabilities as conflicts deeply rooted in centuries-old hatred and rivalries are reappearing. This new and uncertain international landscape requires innovative adjustments in the configuration of military capabilities at the same time as peace dividends and competing economic and social financial demands are creating huge holes in the EU members’ military structures.

Regarding the framework for deployment of those European forces, Paris clearly needs to adapt. Prior to any radical transformations leading to a new security landscape in Europe, security institutions created during the Cold War will continue to play a role, taking into account the new balance of risks and responsibility between the U.S. and the EU. At some point, consolidation will be necessary because current institutions may contradict each other and no longer reflect the actual balance of power within the western alliance.

Among the reasons that explain the existence of many security institutions and mechanisms aimed at reducing tensions in Europe, there is probably a sense of hesitation, as well as a kind of competition between two political projects of Western European security. The U.S. aims at organizing the future European security architecture from “Vancouver to Vladivostock,” institutionalizing in the mind of many French supremacy, if not hegemony, by the U.S. This view has been perceived by American commentators such as William Pfaff, writing about NATO expansion:
the policy community [in the U.S.] has a vision of a future federative community of the democracies, in which NATO would be the integrating agent in Europe, Russia itself would eventually become a member and the United States would be at the helm of it all. It sees NATO not only expanding but evolving, becoming a trans-Atlantic and eventually—why not?—a Eurasian political, economic and trading community in which America would be the leading nation.\textsuperscript{44}

The other vision, a consensus position in France, aims at making the EU, or at least an EU grouping of some of its members that have developed closer relations and common mechanisms of foreign and security policy, a major player on the international scene possessing full sovereignty in the various dimensions of their security, including the defense component.

Proponents of these two paths have encountered an array of different organizations. Most of them have not yet found a role adapted to the post-Cold War era. Regarding NATO, first among the many issues that are affecting its development is the enlargement process, still undefined beyond the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in April 1999. Secondly, a debate is now unfolding over the issue of defining agreed missions for the alliance. Thirdly, the construction of a genuine European pillar within NATO may profoundly transform the alliance in ways not yet foreseen. When France announced at the North Atlantic Council of December 5, 1995, the intention, under certain conditions, to progressively join the integrated military structure, its move was also aimed at modifying the internal balance of the organization. As pointed out by the then French Defense Minister Charles Millon, “we intend to spark a new dynamic. . . . NATO’s renovation has already begun, but is still incomplete.”\textsuperscript{45}

This is particularly the case, as seen from Paris, regarding the implementation of the decisions reached at the Brussels summit of January 1994, about the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI). Within a renovated alliance, the European contribution to defense should become more visible and more efficient at both the political and operational level.\textsuperscript{46} This is the current aim of the French for the implementation of those reforms which should ground the CFSP on deeds rather than on words. To be sure, the EU defense component finds itself at a very early stage of its development, but is needed because “Europe must put an end to its impotence. It shall assert itself as a key player on the world stage, of a multipolar world that we have to develop in completing the job of erasing Yalta.”\textsuperscript{47} In that perspective, the WEU could play a catalytic role.

The WEU as the Defense Component of the Union

French views regarding WEU have to be understood in the framework of providing the European Union with a defense component of its own. When the strategic situation in the West began to evolve significantly in the early 1980s and when the internal balance of power within the Atlantic alliance was evolving, Paris saw the WEU as a useful instrument to promote European coopera-
tion in defense. The French sustained their view after the end of the Cold War, but the WEU achieved even greater importance for Paris as the foundation of “l’Europe de la défense,” i.e., providing the European Union with a defense component of its own. Accordingly, French President Jacques Chirac compared his plan for upgrading the WEU to the promotion of the European Coal and Steel Community to the European Economic Community.48

If Paris’ goals have remained constant in that matter, its attitude about WEU functions have been characterized by flexibility and pragmatism, advocating that the organization take on successively more ambitious roles in the framework of France’s foreign and European policy. France used the WEU as a means to deepen the debate on general principles defining what a European defense posture could be and what it could require in terms of capacity and structures. Those debates were seen in Paris as a means to elaborate a “common grammar” on defense among WEU members, most of whom having, for so long, relinquished to NATO (i.e., the Americans) the task of thinking strategically in military affairs. Four objectives seem to be pursued by Paris in the WEU framework:

1) reinforcing the WEU’s operational planning cell to give it capacities to plan, from the beginning to end, any WEU military operations;
2) developing a comprehensive military space policy to provide Europe with an indigenous reconnaissance capability, a sine qua non for strategic autonomy. The aforementioned cooperation already developed between France and Germany, probably in conjunction with Spain and Italy, should meet the objective of creating a space-based European intelligence system;
3) lending coherence to the different multinational forces already existing among West Europeans: Eurocorps, Euromarfor, Eurofor, EAFG. France will offer proposals for better articulating these forces with the WEU; and
4) continuing to bolster European efforts to build a European defense industrial base.

Paris thinks that to fulfill those tasks, the WEU should be integrated into the overall structure of the EU. Early in 1997 France and Germany, backed by Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and Spain, proposed a protocol to the Maastricht Treaty that would incorporate the WEU in the framework of the EU. The idea underlying this proposal was to develop EU responsibility in order to escape dependence on NATO and the United States. Several stages are envisaged in the document, the last of which is to end around 2010 with the total fusion between the two organizations.49 This proposal was met by a fierce counterattack from the British foreign secretary who declared that the proposal “risked undercutting the alliance and provoking Russia.”50 NATO still appeared to be
the key element of granting security to Western Europe for most France’s partners within the EU, whatever their doubts about the long term.

At the same time, unforeseen by most observers, London made a significant gesture in December 1998, in closing the gap with France on security affairs. On December 4, at St. Mâlo during a Franco-British summit, London and Paris agreed that “the [European] Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.” London’s endorsement seems largely the result of a strategic reorientation prompted by lessons drawn by the Blair government from the 1992-94 crisis with Washington arising out of events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tony Blair’s rhetoric suggests that British attitudes towards the EU were evolving rapidly. In January 1999 he hinted that he will propose membership in the common currency. A month before, in defense matters he decided to close the gap with France, opening the way to a significant rapprochement with Paris.

French Ambiguities about NATO

For Paris, the implementation of the decisions regarding EDSI reached at NATO’s Brussels summit of January 1994 require concretization. Three points were emphasized by the French:

1) NATO’s command structure has to be transformed to take into account new military and geopolitical realities. France played an active role in this transformation, advocating the appointment of Europeans to head regional commands. There are actually fewer European NATO commanders at the level of regional commands now than when France left the integrated command in 1966.

2) The political and military decision-making process of the alliance requires adaptation. Paris desires revaluation of the role of the sixteen defense and foreign affairs ministers, including more frequent consultation at the level of the North Atlantic Council. At the same time, the Military Committee should be called to play a greater role in providing the NAC with military advice.

3) Mechanisms allowing European use of NATO assets for joint military operations need to be defined. The operations in question are those specified in the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration. Within a reformed alliance, the European contribution to defense should become more visible and more efficient at both the political and the operational level. “Europeanization” of the alliance should be “effective not only at the outset of an operation but during peacetime as well. It should be articulated not only at the operational stage, but also at the level of contingency planning, preparation and decision-making at the political-military level.” In this respect, little has been made in assigning future tasks to a deputy SACEUR.
gional commands remains a sensitive issue with the insistence, first of the French president and later by its prime minister, Lionel Jospin, that AFSOUTH be in the hands of a European.

While acknowledging the continued direct subordination of the 6th Fleet attached directly to SACEUR, President Chirac added:

of course there are U.S. responsibilities in the area, but they are not more important than the European. . . . France considers that Europe’s interest, Europe’s strategic interest in the Mediterranean justifies European leadership of the Southern command. This is a very important question for France, because one cannot mention Europe’s defense identity if it is not translated into command of relevant areas.55

This issue was hotly debated among U.S. and French officials. In early January 1997, President Chirac’s foreign policy advisor outlined French proposals about restructuring NATO’s chain of command during a trip to Washington. The concept involved a regional command in Naples with a European commander alongside which there would be a functional command with an officer having control over allied naval forces in the Mediterranean.56 Later, according to press reports, when meeting U.S. Secretary of State Albright in Paris, the French president said that Paris would seek a compromise with Washington by April or May, but if no agreement could be found, France would refrain from returning to NATO’s integrated military structure.57

A solution supported by the U.S. and some European countries but rejected by France put this contentious issue on hold for five to six years. In the meantime, a compromise envisioned finding a greater role for the Europeans in AFSOUTH.58 On March 14, 1997, the Clinton Administration agreed to back a plan aimed at creating a new ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) for handling crises in the alliance’s southern rim. According to U.S. commentators, “while a step down in the hierarchy from the regional headquarters in Naples, this ARRC would offer considerable scope for France and neighboring allies to cement their military links in actual operations.”59

However, it was reported that Secretary of Defense William Cohen declared there could be no guarantee that Washington would relinquish the top post even in a future review.60 For its part, the spokesman of the French foreign affairs ministry reacted by declaring that Washington’s proposal was being studied in Paris, but that in the absence of a solution to AFSOUTH, Paris would not change its relationship with NATO. The proposal is far from meeting French expectations of a genuine transformation of NATO in accordance to the principles agreed in 1994. Indeed, in early July before a NATO summit, both the French president and prime minister declared that Paris would freeze its decision to move into the integrated military structure of the Atlantic Alliance until a
genuine “Europeanization” of NATO occurred, turning the AFSOUTH dispute into a symbol of U.S. intransigence.

III. CONCLUSIONS

A new EU landscape seems to be shaping up, however imperceptibly, based on a kind of complex deal between Paris and Bonn. In October 1995, when President Chirac altered his economic policy despite high political and social costs, he confirmed French commitment to launching the single currency, much to Germany’s satisfaction. On the other hand, a few weeks later, when Paris announced its new policy toward NATO, and emphasized, at the same time, the necessity to establish a European defense component in NATO, this move was backed strongly but quietly by Bonn. Paris and Bonn also hinted that their relationship could no longer rest exclusively on the development of the EU. Integration could also progress among some countries within the EU, such as exemplified by the creation of a single currency, even if theoretically it remained open to all.

A London-Paris tandem in defense matters may correspond now to the Berlin-Paris tandem in economic and monetary affairs. The rapprochement in these matters may be slow between the two capitals, but it reveals that despite past, present and future difficulties, the EU is on the right track.

ENDNOTES

1 See Hervé de Charrette speech at the Senate Paris, March 19, 1997.
3 Hubert Védrine, Conférence des Ambassadeurs, speech made by the foreign affairs minister, Paris, August 28, 1997.
6 On that topic see: Hervé de Charrette’s speech before the European Movement, Paris, June 26, 1996.
7 In 1996, France and German GNP represented 47 percent of EU’s total GNP, and 38 percent of the EU’s population.
10 The Economist, April 4, 1996.
12 The “Weimar Triangle” was informally set up in 1991 when during a trilateral meeting of French, German and Polish foreign affairs ministers, Paris and Bonn acknowledged that Warsaw was their principal partner in central and eastern Europe.
“Yeltsin, Kohl, and Chirac form elite club,” David Buchan, *Financial Times*, October 10-11, 1997. This tripartite summit plan, which excludes Britain, was announced during a meeting of the Council of Europe held in Strasbourg.


Report by the defense ministers of France and Germany to the Franco-German council, La Rochelle, May 22, 1992.

An army unit, the *Eurocorps* has naval and air components however.


Jean Boissonat, interview, *Le Monde*, January 28, 1997. As a leading economist, Jean Boissonat has been a member of the monetary policy board of the Bank of France.


Hervé de Charrette, speech with French businessmen, Singapour, February 14, 1997.


“Germany seeks flexible debt criteria for EMU,” *Financial Times*, March 18, 1997. “New German doubts on EMU spark attacks on 2 currencies” Tom Buerkle, *International Herald Tribune*, March 18, 1997. Under the Maastricht treaty countries can qualify for EMU if their stock of debt is below 60 percent of GNP or falling at a satisfactory rate. Public sector deficit shall be no more than 3 percent of GDP.

Klaus Kinkel, ibid.


Joschka Fischer, quoted by the Financial Times “German Green leader backs the EMU”, August 8, 1997.


Charles Millon, op. cit.


Charles Millon, op. cit.

Charles Millon, op. cit.


John Fitchett, op. cit.
GERMANY AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
Matthias Jopp

1. INTRODUCTION

From a German point of view two multilateral institutions are of overriding importance: the EU, as the basic framework for German economic and foreign policy, and increasingly also security policy; and NATO, as the most viable defense organization and unitary framework for maintaining the transatlantic link. Against that background of alliance, and most of all, integration policy, the WEU plays an instrumental, but only temporary role, linking the EU and NATO, in order to develop, over time, a European security and defense policy in close cooperation with NATO, and to eventually transform the EU into the second pillar of the alliance. Given these objectives, German thinking has been enormously constant in the last five decades from the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) in the early fifties through the Genscher-Colombo Initiative in the early eighties, up to the Maastricht process and the proposal of a three-phase merger of the WEU and the EU tabled at the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) leading to the Amsterdam Treaty. As the construction of a closer integrated Europe is not possible without France, another factor that constantly plays a role is the special Franco-German relationship. German decision-makers have always tried to seek compromises with France on the issue of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) either for bilateral and European reasons or for reasons of alliance policy.

This paper analyses German attitudes towards the WEU from the mid-fifties to the second half of the nineties. It argues that, without losing sight of the long-term objective of an EC/EU defense policy, German views on the WEU and the conceptions linked to it varied for more or less pragmatic considerations, depending on the state of affairs in European integration, as well as the changes in the transatlantic context and the general security environment.

2. GERMAN WEU POLICIES IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD

The Sixties and Seventies

After the failure of the European Defense Community (which caused much frustration in Germany), the WEU paved the way for Germany’s membership in NATO and also offered the possibility to reassure France through the establishment of a regime for controlling German rearmament. The WEU then helped to settle the Franco-German dispute over the Saarland question and provided in the sixties and early seventies a useful European framework for consultation with Britain before it joined the EEC in 1973.

When the French withdrew from NATO’s integrated military structure, the WEU became a forum for discussing security issues with France. But when French Foreign Minister Jobert proposed an upgrading of the WEU in 1973,
during the Near East crisis, it was rejected by the German government. The government did not wish to undertake any moves that could be perceived as undermining NATO, since the country heavily depended on security guarantees of NATO and the U.S. This situation also motivated Germany to avoid any defense implications of the Elysée Treaty of 1963. On the whole, in the sixties and seventies, the WEU was not seen as a useful security institution in Germany. To the contrary, the foreign ministry felt more and more that the WEU’s control function was an anachronism after two decades of Germany being a reliable ally of the West.³

The WEU as a Substitute Institution in the Eighties

The situation changed in the early eighties. Germany rediscovered the WEU as a substitute for integration policy, albeit to a very limited extent. As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, tensions grew between the two superpowers, and the new Reagan Administration returned to confrontational rhetoric in foreign and security policy. This was perceived in Germany as threatening the fruits of the détente era and the CSCE process—the second instrument of German foreign and security policy alongside defense and solidarity in the framework of the alliance. Germany sought an effective European framework strong enough to preserve détente, or at least prevent a breakdown of détente in Europe due to East-West rivalry in other parts of the world. This was one of the most important motives behind the Genscher-Colombo Initiative of 1981, which aimed at including security issues in the European Political Cooperation (EPC). Participation of defense ministers in meetings of this foreign policy coordination mechanism among EC governments was a corollary.⁴

The initiative failed primarily because of resistance from Ireland, Denmark and Greece. But neither Britain nor France wished to see alliance matters discussed in an EC/EPC framework nor did they want to treat defense issues in a framework close to the supranational mechanisms of the EC.⁵ The unfolding debate on INF deployment caused harsh criticism of NATO’s military strategy among experts and in the wider public in Germany. The traditional consensus on security policy began to erode and the anti-nuclear peace movement grew. Hence, for reasons of additional legitimization of the alliance, German diplomacy continued its efforts to “Europeanize” security policy. But it remained very difficult to achieve any progress in the EPC/EC framework until 1986, when the ratification of the Single European Act injected political and economic aspects of security into the legal basis of the EPC.⁶

France, concerned over German pacifism and the risk of neutralism in its eastern glacis, initiated in early 1984 the reactivation of the WEU as a forum for discussing and developing a European security and defense policy outside the EC framework. This was clearly a second-best option for Germany and even then only if the remaining restrictions and controls on German arms production were removed (agreed on the basis of France’s proposal at a summer
1984 WEU meeting). Joining the French initiative also eased French concerns and demonstrated that Germany would remain firmly anchored in the West.

The Rome Declaration of October 1984 on the so-called reactivation of the WEU addressed the relevant issues from a German point of view. The WEU should serve the function of a forum for consultation among its members on arms control and disarmament, East-West policies and the European contribution for the strengthening of the alliance. The German government was keen to avoid upsetting the U.S., and therefore kept the American ally informed about plans to reactivate the WEU. Germany also believed that the WEU could be useful in bringing France closer to NATO.

From a German point of view, the WEU should not have any military function. It should work as a forum for developing common views and for speaking with a single European voice. The objective was to increase the political weight of the Europeans in alliance affairs and to provide a cover for particular German interests in the East-West context. In order to achieve this goal, the foreign and defense ministers were supposed to meet regularly in the WEU Council framework. However, the idea did not work perfectly in practice. France quickly lost interest in the WEU, and German, as well as French, ministers were not always present at WEU Ministerial Council meetings.

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Nor did a single voice emerge when the Europeans tried to coordinate their views on the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the U.S. bombing raids on Libya (1984 and 1986). In the case of SDI, the U.S. had made it clear to West European capitals that it did not wish to see a joint European reaction, which had its impact not only on Britain. Europeans thus avoided speaking with one voice, even though most of them shared the concern that the implementation of the planned SDI project could result in dividing the strategic homogeneity of the alliance, leaving the Europeans somewhat out in the cold.

The WEU again attracted some attention when, after the bilateral summit in Reykjavik in 1986, the superpowers returned to the path of détente and started to negotiate on nuclear disarmament. In Germany, fears of strategic decoupling from the U.S. began to spread. In France, concerns over the “incertitudes allemandes” and over developments in the strategic glacis again came to the forefront. On the one hand, both France and Britain were concerned about a possible devaluation of nuclear deterrence, but on the other hand, they felt that there was an opportunity to strengthen their role as nuclear powers. French Prime Minister Chirac proposed a charter on European security interests to be concluded in the WEU. The German government, which supported the idea, favored a less ambitious “platform” instead, since it did not see in the WEU as a solid enough basis for a weighty document.

The platform for European security interests, concluded at the WEU ministerial meeting in The Hague in 1987, came too late to have any relevant impact on developments in nuclear disarmament. It did, however, express basic concerns and demands of Germany and other European partners. The docu-
ment underlined the importance of nuclear deterrence and the maintenance of strategic coupling with the United States. It also stressed the need for a workable verification regime for any arms control agreement and hinted at the need for reducing the massive conventional threat, a consequence of steps towards nuclear disarmament.\(^9\)

For the rest of the eighties the WEU remained in the shadow of NATO, because most WEU countries wished to avoid upsetting the Americans or undermining NATO. From the German point of view, the accession of Spain and Portugal to the WEU in 1988 was important for integrating the two new EC members into the process of defining a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the alliance.

On the whole, German policy in the Cold War period can be summarized as follows: whereas in the sixties and the seventies the WEU was perceived as being rather useless or even an instrument of discrimination against Germany, in the eighties, the country discovered the WEU as a substitute organization for developing a European political identity in security and defense matters so long as this was not possible in the EC/EPC the preferred organizational framework. German WEU policies also served the purpose of reassuring France and trying to bring this important neighbor, and also Spain, closer to NATO (since the WEU’s relationship with the North Atlantic Alliance was rather close on the basis of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty). All of this had, first of all, to do with alliance diplomacy and problems of integration policy without any meaning in a practical military sense.

3. THE WEU AS A VEHICLE OF INTEGRATION POLICY

The Maastricht Process

The velvet revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, the breakup of the Soviet Empire and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself radically altered the parameters of German foreign and security policies and European integration at the beginning of the nineties.\(^{10}\) Most of all, united Germany became a fully sovereign state. For the first time in its history, the Federal Republic was no longer exposed to any direct military threat and began to feel less dependent on American security guarantees, albeit not less committed to NATO and the partnership with the U.S., whose strong support had enabled German unification.\(^{11}\)

Under the new security conditions, old ideas resurfaced which had first been aired in the 1950s. Though nobody in Germany was thinking in terms of relaunching the failed EDC, it appeared to be much more realistic to deal with security and defense integration. From that perspective, German policymakers discovered the WEU as an instrument of integration policy. Hence, it was important not only to establish a political European Union with a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that would include a defense policy dimension, but also to establish a treaty-based link between the EU and the WEU.
In the Maastricht negotiations the Kohl-Genscher government tried to make unification more acceptable to its European partners in the West and the East, most notably France, by clearly signaling its readiness to become more integrated into the economic and political structures of European integration.\textsuperscript{12} Secondly, it tried to use the widespread concerns over the new Germany as a catalyst for building a federal Europe by speeding up political unification, which lagged far behind economic and monetary integration. This was a logical consequence of the traditional German belief that integration needed over time to be advanced in all relevant policy fields, including foreign policy, security and defense. German willingness to bind itself to international institutions meshed with French interests which, in contrast to the British, aimed at tying the bigger German neighbor closer to European structures. It was clear that deeper integration could only be achieved together with France and that both countries had to play the role of a driving force of integration.

On political union and European defense the Kohl government was prepared to go much further than the Mitterrand government. The latter made big attempts to bridge Gaullist principles and integration policies, but insisted on the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, the leading role of the European Council in CFSP matters, and the operational development of the WEU. From a German point of view it was important, however, that France shared the view that the Union, in the longer term, should develop a common defense policy and a common defense.

For the German government, the WEU was a transitory solution, a vehicle for transporting security and defense into the Union over time. France had a greater interest in the WEU as such because of its purely intergovernmental nature and its relative distance from communitarian mechanisms in the EC framework. Problems caused French ambitions to conceive of the WEU as an instrument of a rather autonomous European defense policy and to downgrade American influence on European security. The German government insisted on the WEU’s complementary nature to NATO and that the WEU had to fulfill both functions: as a defense component of European integration and as a way of strengthening the alliance.

Since London primarily stressed the function of the WEU as a pillar of the alliance, Bonn played the role of a mediator between British interests and French ambitions.\textsuperscript{13} The German government understood very well American concerns about European defense, as expressed via bilateral channels on several occasions during the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty. But in contrast to the Cold War era, Germany felt free to pursue the development of a European defense policy as a long-term objective, not jeopardizing or undermining NATO, since its realization should take place within the alliance and not outside of it.

Article J4 of the Maastricht Treaty on the development of a “common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense” was rather open to interpretation and, as a consequence of this, the following years were marked by permanent rows between Britain and France over the WEU’s European or
Atlantic vocation. Whenever it could, France tried to promote the WEU and put a brake on NATO’s transformation towards an organization assuming new missions beyond collective defense. Germany’s interests were twofold: first, to preserve the Atlantic alliance as the traditionally most viable security organization and the most important institutional link with the U.S.; and second, to support a moderate development of the WEU to keep the special relationship with France functioning and, through that, to facilitate NATO’s transformation.

The Petersberg Declaration was agreed among WEU members in June 1992 in order to clarify the military-political objectives of the WEU’s operational development as agreed in Maastricht. Formally the declaration granted the WEU broader competencies in crisis management than the Oslo NAC Communiqué for NATO. That this happened under the WEU Presidency of the Federal Republic of Germany, a country which neither had any interventionist tradition nor any preparedness at that time to seriously contribute to peacekeeping and “tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking,” was somewhat curious. However, the German government had three objectives when negotiating the Petersberg Declaration: first, to satisfy French demands with the hope of facilitating the definition of NATO’s new roles; second, to give European crisis management a formal basis as a response to the new strategic environment, but to leave the commitment for participation in military operations open according to national decisions and constitutional provisions (Petersberg principle); and finally, to use the Petersberg Declaration as a package deal for the enlargement of the WEU to include observers and associate members for reasons of the double function of the WEU (as a pillar of NATO and a defense arm of the European Union) and also to launch the first step for opening up the WEU to Central and East European EU associate members.

Tensions between the Mitterrand government and the Bush Administration remained high throughout 1992. One of the difficulties had to do with the Eurocorps and with the French interest in this multinational formation as an independent force outside of NATO, only loosely assigned/answerable to the WEU. Chancellor Kohl, by contrast, saw the Eurocorps as a nucleus for a European army, which was never thought of as something separate from the alliance (following the model of the EDC of the fifties). After difficult negotiations and various bilateral meetings, it was possible in the end of 1992 to agree on making the Eurocorps also available to NATO in times of crisis. Hence, Bonn felt itself confirmed in the belief that its policy helped to draw France closer to NATO. Further evidence for this was seen in the results of the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels when all NATO allies, including the U.S., confirmed the importance of a European Security and Defense Identity and agreed on developing closer operational links between the WEU and NATO.
The Vision and the Reality of Amsterdam

Whereas the relationship between the WEU and NATO seemed to improve, the link between the EU and the WEU did not work. The only operation that the WEU undertook on the basis of Article J4 of the Maastricht Treaty was the police operation in Mostar, supporting the EU administration of this city. The other activities in the management of the Yugoslav crisis, monitoring the embargo in the Adriatic and the embargo control assistance mission on the Danube, were autonomous WEU operations. The almost complete lack of mandates given to the WEU by the EU derived to a large extent from the vague definition of common defense policy in the Maastricht Treaty. The IGC revisions to the Treaty on European Union, started in March/April 1996, took up the task of correcting this situation by proposing to define more clearly a European defense policy and to tie the EU and the WEU more closely to one another.

In the IGC of 1996/97, which led to the Amsterdam Treaty, the German government had three main objectives with respect to the WEU: giving the EU the political responsibility in crisis management by incorporating the Petersburg tasks into the new treaty; subjecting the WEU to the guidelines of the European Council in order to confine the WEU’s autonomy in decision-making; and writing into the treaty a timetable for the step by step integration of the WEU into the Union.

Concerning the first objective, it was important that this definition of a common defense policy of the Union would be supported by the neutral and non-aligned countries, Sweden and Finland in particular. This facilitated reaching an agreement on this point among the EU member states. It also had its domestic impact since it furthered the rapprochement of the position of the German Social Democrats with that of the government.

The third objective, the plan for merging the WEU with the EU, was also supported by France and four other countries (Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg), and in the course of the intergovernmental conference, the so-called “six nations proposal” even found partial support among the nine full members of the WEU. The whole merger plan, initially designed in the German foreign ministry, was based on a three-phase model. In the first phase, it aimed at stronger cooperation between the WEU and the EU; in the second phase, at a transfer of activities and bodies of the WEU to the EU; and in its third and final phase, at superceding the WEU treaty with the inclusion of an Article V commitment into the EU treaty or a defense protocol attached to the treaty. In order to make this plan more acceptable to all EU members, a unanimous decision on each successive phase was foreseen. In addition, Germany and France were in favor of a flexible solution that would have allowed those members of NATO who wished to do so to move ahead with defense integration. However, there was no agreement among EU members on either a flexible solution or on the three-phase plan.

Leaving the tactical considerations linked to the introduction of this proposal into the IGC aside, and also the rather predictable failure of the plan as such, the
question of the rationality behind the proposal is much more interesting with a view to German thinking on the WEU and ESDI. In a longer term perspective the German government wants to concentrate decision making on European defense policy in one institution, the EU, in order to set an end to the present double track system, which opens up the possibility of blocking policies by playing one institution against the other. One example of this was the experience during the crisis in Africa’s Great Lakes region, when the British first agreed with the EU in requesting a WEU role and later blocked any further work of the WEU on the issue. A second advantage of an EU-WEU merger consists in enabling the EU to develop a truly comprehensive security policy by having the full range of political, diplomatic, economic and military instruments at its direct disposal. In contrast to the WEU, such a security and defense policy would enjoy rather widespread support in the German public and in many other EU member states.

Thirdly, there are important advantages from the point of view of integration policy. According to the vision of a federal construction of Europe, which is still rather deeply rooted in the German political class, integration should be completed also in the defense policy field. Closely related to this vision of a Union as a fully-fledged international actor is avoiding the creation of different zones of security within an enlarged Union. It would mean, in a strong sense, a coincidence of EU and NATO membership of all present and future EU countries or, in a weaker sense, an implicit strengthening of the security of the whole Union through an EU treaty-based defense commitment of a larger group of NATO countries within the Union.

Additionally, from the angle of transatlantic relations and alliance policies, the EU, through the absorption of the WEU, would become the second (political) pillar of the Atlantic alliance with the European NATO forces, the Eurocorps and other multinational formations forming the military part of that pillar. The sheer weight of the EU would facilitate the transformation of the alliance towards a binary structure, more in line with the redistribution of political power in the post-Cold War era and more healthy for the transatlantic relationship than the present predominance of the United States in European security.

Finally, there are also some neorealistic interests attached to the merger model since Germany plays an even greater role in the EU than in NATO or in the WEU, in which France and Britain, due to their interventionist traditions and power projection capabilities, have a great influence in practical military questions. Hence, upgrading the EU in security and defense policy would strengthen Germany’s central position as an important partner of the U.S. in Europe.

However, the German vision of the EU as a security and defense community was and is confronted with a number of problems or dilemmas. First, Britain is opposed to any merger of the WEU and the EU. The Blair government obviously thinks along the lines of its predecessor and seems to be placing great emphasis on NATO and a revitalization of the special relationship with the United States. Secondly, the variability of full memberships of the EU and
the WEU is a stumbling block for integrating the WEU into the Union. Denmark holds views not so different from those of Britain, and for the neutral and non-aligned countries, the introduction of a mutual assistance clause into the framework of the EU treaty is obviously, for the time being, a step too far. Last but not least, the U.S. is against an absorption of the WEU by the EU either because of eventual backdoor commitments for EU countries who are not members of NATO, or because of the perceived risk of caucusing or ganging up of the Europeans in NATO, once the EU becomes the European pillar of the alliance.

Given these obstacles, an incorporation of the WEU into the Union seems to be rather unrealistic at present. However, the German thinking is long term and process-oriented. It counts on the dynamics of European integration and possible changes in the position of certain countries over time. The British government, for example, accepted compromises in Amsterdam, in contrast to its position in Maastricht, on a much closer institutional link between the EU and the WEU, and it has not excluded accepting further steps in the next intergovernmental conference.

With a view to American concerns, it can be argued that some sort of a backdoor commitment already existed for the EU as a whole, whether all members of the EU are NATO members or not. It is all but inconceivable that NATO and the U.S. would simply stand aside doing nothing in the event of a serious attack against a non-allied EU member.25 The argument of caucusing or ganging up is also not shared by German foreign policy officials, since the American experience stems very much from negotiations with the EU in the framework of the GATT/WTO. But, defense and alliance affairs are qualitatively different from the economic sphere so it would be misleading to assume a similar inflexibility and stiffness of European positions in the defense field. Finally, as far as the neutral and nonaligned countries are concerned, it is a fact that some of them have taken the six nations proposal into serious consideration. In Finland and Austria, NATO’s transformation and enlargement policy has triggered a yet unfinished debate on the pros and cons of joining NATO, and this may lead in some years to a change in the security policy of these countries, leading to a much greater openness towards European defense and NATO membership.

4. PRAGMATIC CONCEPTIONS

The WEU as a Bridge

The far-reaching proposal on a WEU-EU merger has certainly helped consensus-building among EU members in Amsterdam on the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks into the new treaty and the extension of the European Council’s guidelines to the WEU. Moreover, the new treaty includes a protocol on closer working relations between the EU and WEU and the possibility of CFSP decision-making by consensus with constructive abstention. It also allows for the full participation of neutral and nonaligned EU members in decisions, planning and implementation with respect to Petersberg missions. Assuming that
the Amsterdam Treaty will be ratified, its stipulations in Article 7 provide a rather good basis for the continuation and strengthening of the second best option, the concept of the WEU as a bridge or interface between the EU and NATO in the case of European crisis management.\textsuperscript{26}

This concept requires a close political link between the WEU and the EU and a close operational link with NATO. The idea is that the EU, which has the authority and broad-based legitimacy for decision-making in European crisis management, would use the WEU as a bridge for drawing on NATO structures and forces. It includes the hope of getting access, in such a case, to American assets, such as satellite intelligence or big airlift capacities that the Europeans do not sufficiently possess. Since it is the basic interest of the foreign and defense ministries to try to always have the Americans on board in a crisis management situation, the concept of the WEU as a bridge comes into play should an IFOR/SFOR-type mission with American participation not be possible. But, and that is important from a German point of view, when using the WEU in such a case as a bridge, Germany would expect support for military action from the North Atlantic Council, including the U.S. and the highest allied commander, SACEUR.

This concept had no real basis until the political agreement among all NATO countries at the alliance’s January 1994 summit to support ESDI, to make available, under particular circumstances, NATO structures and collective assets, and to develop the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) for facilitating European crisis management. The WEU’s role as a bridge or interface was concretized two and a half years later with the decision of the NAC meeting in June 1996 in Berlin (for which German diplomacy had worked hard) to implement the CJTF concept and to include, as far as Petersberg missions are concerned, the WEU into NATO’s contingency planning.\textsuperscript{27}

Far beyond its purely operational dimension, this concept is politically meaningful in bridging the different interests in ESDI between the Americans and the British on the one side and the French on the other. Of course, the best case for ESDI with and within NATO would have been France’s reintegration into NATO’s military structure. For this reason and also because of the special Franco-German relationship, the German government openly supported French claims on the regional command of AFSOUTH. Since France did not get what it wanted (or pretended to want) the whole process of this country’s rapprochement with NATO has come to a complete standstill. With France now stressing the autonomous development of the WEU it has again become more difficult to implement NATO’s Berlin decisions. But it was questionable anyway whether the military reintegration of France into NATO had a realistic chance, particularly with a view to the completely new domestic situation in France with a weakened president and a strong socialist government. The new government is sharpening its profile in foreign and defense policy and obviously believes in a stronger position of France outside of NATO’s integrated military structure. It seems to be continuing a policy developed in the last years of Mitterrand’s
presidency of trying to keep all options open with respect to the WEU, NATO and coalitions of the willing inside or outside of established military structures.\textsuperscript{28} By far, this does not mean that the bridge concept is outmoded, but it does mean that for awhile there will be no easy way towards ESDI with NATO, due to the complexity of the concept’s political nature.

A further important political function of the WEU is the bridge it forms to Central and East European countries. Since the 1992 Petersberg Declaration and, most notably, the WEU’s May 1994 Kirchberg Declaration, German foreign policy is placing great emphasis on the role of the WEU for bringing EU accession candidates closer to Atlantic security structures and for including them in the development of ESDI with a EU defense policy perspective. Until the completion of EU and NATO enlargement, the WEU will be seen as a unitarian organization for discussing security problems among Europeans in a wider framework through the regular participation of associate partners in WEU Council meetings.

This policy has even increased in importance. On the one hand, there is the fact that many Central and East European countries are very much oriented toward NATO and the United States. This requires improving their acquaintance with European procedures and thinking, in order to prevent a weakening of ESDI in the process of NATO enlargement. On the other hand, after NATO’s June 1997 decision in Madrid to admit Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary by mid-1999, the WEU has been viewed increasingly as an umbrella for those left out in order to mitigate the potential negative effects caused by the differentiation in the process of enlargement. That is also why Germany, when holding the WEU presidency in the second half of 1997, not only invested in improving cooperation of the WEU with the EU and NATO, but also attached great importance to strengthening the possibilities of participation of the ten associate partners in the WEU.\textsuperscript{29}

**The Autonomous Option**

There exists, of course, the option of autonomous WEU operations on behalf of the EU without drawing on NATO structures and assets.\textsuperscript{30} This option has played a great role in the past ten years of the WEU’s history and has even gained in importance due to the reorientation of French policy. However, from a German point of view, autonomous WEU operations are limited to smaller operations or minor crisis management. This includes embargo controls or police operations in peace-building and missions that would be closely linked to the EU’s crisis management policy. Therefore it is particularly in humanitarian and rescue operations where future possibilities are envisaged for enhanced EU-WEU cooperation and action in international crises. For all other types of operations, i.e., the Petersberg tasks such as robust peace-keeping and the use of combat forces in crisis management (enforcement operations), the Kohl-Kinkel government opted in favor of a NATO operation or a European-led
operation drawing on NATO forces and CJTFs because of a clear preference for acting within well established military structures.

Given the narrow basis of European autonomy, any greater effort would require the maintenance and improvement of European armaments industries and the development of at least some strategic assets such as satellites, big airlift capacities and other types of weaponry. It is for this reason that the government is developing, with other partners, the Eurofighter. It is also showing a great interest in the satellite program with France and is in favor of cooperation between WEU nations, Russia, and Ukraine in the field of long-haul air transport. The problem is that this policy meets rather strict limits due to the lack of financial resources and a political climate in Germany that works against costly procurement programs. The only way out of the dilemma would appear to be initiation of a European armaments policy in order to rationalize and combine European defense industries, prevent the growth in the technological gap vis-à-vis U.S. defense industries and make the transatlantic arms trade a better functioning two-way street. Since there is still no consensus among WEU partners on these objectives, the government pursues a gradualist bottom-up and top-down strategy through flexible and selective bilateral and multilateral cooperation and by promoting the step-by-step creation of a European Armaments Agency.

5. OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Until 1994 the German government looked at the WEU primarily from a political angle. It was not in favor of using the WEU militarily, preferring to assign it atypical missions, such as the police and customs operation on the Danube. It was rather reluctant vis-à-vis French initiatives to upgrade the WEU as a defense organization.

In the period 1994-1998, the German position became much more pragmatic in questions of the WEU’s operational development. Improvements in the WEU’s military structures and capacities in order were deemed necessary to enable this organization to mount effective military operations and to fulfill its function as a bridge and an autonomous agent. These included staging exercises and developing a better culture of cooperation and confidence within the WEU. There were three concrete reasons for this shift towards a more pragmatic-realist policy. First, following NATO’s Berlin decisions, both the WEU and NATO have been working on the implementation of the CJTF concept. Second, the WEU exercise CRISEX 1995/96 has revealed a variety of deficiencies in the WEU’s command, control and coordination procedures which need to be overcome if the possibility of action on behalf of the Union is to become meaningful. Thirdly, it is important that France has moved closer to NATO since 1994/95. This was a precondition for the German defense ministry and the military to invest more in the WEU. Although the reintegration of France into NATO’s military structures has not yet been achieved, France seems
interested in continuing to work with the other allies in the relevant military bodies of NATO.

It is against the background of these events that the Kohl government agreed with its WEU partners to refine the mandate for the WEU’s military planning cell, to set up an intelligence section in the planning cell and a situation center in the secretariat, and to strengthen the role of military advice within the WEU. Finally, like the British government, it accepted the establishment of a WEU military committee, following an initiative of Belgium and France. Unthinkable a few years ago, establishing such a committee has also much to do with policies of a symbolic nature designed to make the WEU more attractive to the military. In principle, the foreign ministry and, even more so, the defense ministry do not wish to see any unnecessary duplication of structures already existing in NATO. This policy implies that any sort of military integration or a military committee that would be comparable to the one of NATO will be denied the WEU. France, by contrast, wants a European general staff and a military headquarters for the WEU. From a German point of view, it is more important to develop the horizontal links between the EU, the WEU and NATO as well as between the WEU and the various multinational force formations which can be made available to the WEU. Hence, it is not in the German interest to work for a vertical deepening of European military structures in a way that would lead to an oversized and unnecessary buildup of the WEU outside of NATO.

Apart from the question of the operational development of the WEU, there is also the one of Germany’s own readiness to contribute militarily to crisis management. Much has changed in the course of the 1990s in Germany’s attitude towards crisis management and, over the years, the country has been clearly moving towards “normality,” even if it is the normality of a reluctant partner. The turning point was the July 1994 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe that nothing in the Basic Law prohibits the participation of German forces in out-of-area missions in the framework of activities of collective security. This decision has put an end to using a restrictive interpretation of the Basic Law as an excuse for not being able to send troops abroad, or as an instrument of blocking policy in the domestic struggle over the issue. The decision of Karlsruhe also has made clear that participating in crisis management is not a juridical but essentially a political problem (which it always was), involving public opinion and the thinking in Germany’s party landscape.

Ordinary citizens are in favor of a European foreign, security and defense policy, but many do not yet like to draw the conclusion that this may imply military involvement in a crisis region, whether it is in Africa, the Middle East or elsewhere. It will take time to overcome traditional thinking, primarily oriented towards territorial defense and concerned about security developments in Central and Eastern Europe, notably Russia. Although the Kinkel foreign ministry, which was mostly in line with the chancellery, thought very much in global terms, it remained cautious or reactive when it came to international
crises that raised the specter of using military force. The defense ministry was even more hesitant and clearly preferred to act in the NATO framework, should it become necessary.

In almost any imaginable cases, the participation of German forces in crisis management will require approval of the Bundestag. Significant pacifist elements find a home in both the Social Democratic and the Green parties, and the Social Democrats have made clear that out of area operations of the Bundeswehr should only take place on the basis of a clear UN mandate.39 Much will also depend on the circumstances and the assessment of the risks. And, there is the fact that decisions on deploying forces in crisis regions have become more difficult in times of serious budgetary constraints.

However, the participation of German officers in AWACS planes over Bosnian airspace, the sending of Luftwaffe Tornadoes to provide aircover for the UN protection forces in Bosnia, the dispatch of a logistical Bundeswehr contingent to Somalia and, finally, Bundeswehr participation in IFOR and SFOR, have made German participation in crisis management more visible. These activities have helped to broaden the understanding in the wider public on the issue of out-of-area missions. But it will definitely be a long road towards seeing some of the Bundeswehr’s 50,000-strong reaction forces participating in enforcement measures of a Gulf-type operation.

Apart from the latter exceptional case, there exists a widespread consensus within the political circles that Germany and Europe have a responsibility for international security. It is clear that this may involve, as a last resort, the use of military means in crisis management for the sake of greater effectiveness of a European policy, acting jointly with Americans in crisis management for the sake of global stability and Western unity.40 Since American readiness for solving Europe’s security problems cannot always be taken for granted, there is a perceived need to develop the WEU operationally for enabling European crisis management.

6. PROSPECTS

German policy will certainly continue to balance the interests involved in ESDI in the Bonn-Paris-London triangle,41 to develop the concept of the WEU as a bridge between the EU and NATO and to work for the vision of a more fully fledged EU security and defense policy as a pillar of the alliance. The motives for this are based on the ambition to complete European integration in the security and defense fields and to strengthen the EU’s influence in Euro-Atlantic security and international affairs. The greater pragmatism in German foreign policy may facilitate finding compromises with the relevant partners on particular issues, and united Germany’s new self-perception of its own centrality in Europe42 may make foreign policy officials more relaxed, even if implementation of the long-term vision is not around the corner.
Will a different policy be launched by the new government made up of the Social Democrats and the Greens, who together have won the September 1998 general elections? For their part, the Social Democrats had already adjusted their position to that of the Kohl government in recent years. They are in favor of implementing NATO’s CJTF concept, and want to integrate the WEU into the CFSP for transforming the alliance into a binary structure with the EU as its second pillar.

The Greens, who have underlined in the past their very critical views on military alliances, will have to reconcile party fundamentalism with the day to day imperatives of security and defense policy, if they really wish to share power in a coalition government with the Social Democrats. Since the prime focus of the Green agenda is environment and the ecological restructuring of the German economy, they may swiftly sooner rather than later turn out to be pragmatic if it comes to decisions on international crisis management. In addition, should the leader of the Green Bundestag faction, Joschka Fischer, become foreign minister, he will stand for strengthening EU-integration and keeping Germany embedded in NATO. It is, therefore, predictable that the basic lines of German foreign and security policy will be maintained and that Germany will stick to its international commitments, continuing with the preference for acting in established multilateral frameworks and avoiding any self-inflicted isolation. Most of all and irrespective of the precise political constellations within the incoming new government, German foreign policy concentrate its attention on developing a true “European” security policy based on the European Union.

The more important question is whether the new CFSP, as agreed in Amsterdam, will work and whether a European security and crisis management policy will materialize. Here, there is some new ground for optimism, resulting from signs of a U-turn in the British position on the issue of a European defense policy. Should this become more concrete and be followed by a new direction in UK policy in favor of an EU-WEU security and defense policy, the prospect for developing ESDI at least on the institutional side will be rather positive. Finding a solution for the institutional problem will not automatically produce a European identity in security and defense policy. But, it will provide the basis for tying Europeans closer together than before and that may well lead to a greater readiness to share responsibility for global stability and security with the U.S. Much will also depend on the United States’ policy towards Europe. Since a European security and defense identity cannot be developed without U.S. support, the Americans are challenged to seriously reconsider whether they really want a reliable Europe as a security partner or not.
ENDNOTES

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4 See Draft on a European Act, submitted by the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, November 6, 1981, EC Bulletin, No. 11/1981. The Draft was formulated in a rather cautious way in order not to upset other EC partners. It mentioned only the possibility that the Council could meet in a different configuration and that the European Council could decide on the formation of other ministerial meetings (para. 4.1 and 4.3).


8 See Draft on a European Act, submitted by the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, November 6, 1981, EC Bulletin, No. 11/1981. The Draft was formulated in a rather cautious way in order not to upset other EC partners. It mentioned only the possibility that the Council could meet in a different configuration and that the European Council could decide on the formation of other ministerial meetings (para. 4.1 and 4.3).


12 See Karl Kaiser and Hanns W. Maull (eds.), Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Band 1 Grundlagen, München (Oldenbourg) 1994.


29 See Daerr, op. cit., p. 74.
31 The WEU exercise CRISEX had been held in three phases and aimed at a trial of WEU’s politico-military procedures within the Brussels headquarters between it and a headquarters in Metz (France) and a mobile headquarters of the Eurocorps in Lanzarote (Canary Islands).
33 See Erfurt Declaration, op.cit., paragraph 30 and Paris Declaration, WEU Council of Ministers May 13, Europe Documents, No. 2036, May 17, 1997, which states in paragraph 31 that a military committee shall be established “consisting of the chiefs of defense’ staff represented, in permanent session, by the military delegates group under a permanent chairman.”
34 The most important multinational forces answerable to WEU (FAWEUs) are the Eurocorps with about 60,000 troops, in which France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and Luxemburg participate, EUROFOR and EUROMAFOR in which Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy participate with Naval forces and a land component which has a joint headquarters in Northern Italy.
38 See the conclusion of the congress of the Social Democratic Party on December 3, 1997 in Hanover on “Außen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik” Paragraph 7 and 8.
42 See the conclusion on the SPD Party Congress of December 1997, op. cit., paragraph 7.
1. INTRODUCTION

In spite of the relative stability that has been sustained in western Europe since 1945, the evolution of a peacetime defense and security order was not always a model of amity and cooperation. During the Cold War, members of the western alliance quarreled frequently and often bitterly over the character of the various institutions they had created to provide for West Europe’s security, and over the style of the deterrence and defense posture they had adopted. But in spite of these periodic bouts of argument, two assumptions remained more or less intact. One was that the Anglo-North American alliance of the Second World War had left an invaluable legacy: the nucleus of a peacetime passive security community, around which West Europe’s democracies could gradually consolidate. Another was that all members of this community were vulnerable, either militarily or ideologically, to aggression or subversion by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

With the ending of the Cold War in the late 1980s, and with no appreciable external threat to concentrate the political mind and unify the military effort, the European defense and security debate became more astringent than ever, as many traditions, assumptions and institutions seemed to cave in on themselves. This was an especially awkward moment for NATO, and for several years it seemed that this highly successful, close-knit and seemingly durable politico-military alliance might join its former adversaries in the archives of the twentieth century. The Warsaw Pact toiled along until its collapse on July 1, 1991, and within six months the Soviet Union had followed suit. Arguably, by the end of 1991, NATO was no longer threatened and had therefore lost its basic, Cold War raison d’être.

Yet NATO survived the turbulence of the early 1990s, largely because North American and West European allies, perhaps recognizing what they were about to lose, were able to cobble together a new, post-Cold War politico-military consensus. This new consensus lacks much of the conviction and urgency of the Cold War years, while retaining some of its volatility; the whole edifice may yet be undermined by dissatisfied allies. But by the late 1990s NATO had, quite plainly, been re-energized and, with its new lease of life, has now managed to devise a passably effective rationale and modus operandi, with which it could continue to serve the needs of European security well into the next millennium.1

However fragile it may still be, the construction of this new consensus, upon which “NATO redivivus” might be hung, can be explained by a near-convergence of views among the four protagonists in the post-Cold War European and transatlantic security debate, the so-called “Quad” of key NATO members; the United States, France, Germany and Britain. The U.S. grew
steadily more accepting of the idea of closer cooperation among its West European allies in matters of defense and security, even to the extent of developing appropriate European institutions. France’s so-called *rapprochement* with NATO can only be described as a revolution in the politics of western defense and security. Germany acted as a vital lubricant in the whole process of reassessment and redefinition, and was particularly adept at appearing to be both “Europeanist” and “Atlanticist.” The principal concern of this chapter, however, is with the part played by Britain.

British governments have traditionally been ardent supporters of NATO and the transatlantic connection, and equally wary or even destructive of European initiatives in these areas (particularly those initiatives which contained or even hinted at the word “federalism”). But, what was most striking about British policy in the 1990s was the evolution of a new, seemingly more positive perception of the role of the Western European Union (WEU) in the overall scheme of European defense and security. NATO’s survival, it might be argued, has required a degree of compromise between various competing demands, and the WEU has, in several cases, been the vehicle by which to achieve such compromise. By steadfastly supporting NATO, while at the same professing the value of an enhanced WEU, Britain may have appeared rather schizophrenic in its approach; both a voice for caution and conservatism while simultaneously projecting the WEU as an agent for change. This chapter proceeds from a generous interpretation of British policy, arguing that policy was not only well-reasoned, but also creative, and certainly instrumental in the achievement of the new, post-Cold War consensus such as it is in Euro-Atlantic defense and security. But it might, conversely, be argued that there was nothing remotely schizophrenic or even imaginative about British policy, and that what took place in Whitehall was no more than a disingenuous and cynical attempt to derail change, particularly where “Europeanist” pretensions were detected. Indeed, to understand fully both the creative and the destructive features of British policy towards European defense and security particularly where the WEU is concerned it is necessary to grasp that for Whitehall the WEU was both a tool and a prophylactic. It is also essential to note that Whitehall has no romantic attachment to the WEU. If the organization becomes obsolete, or if British goals can be achieved more easily without the WEU, then it could be dropped altogether.

The chapter begins with an account of NATO’s post-Cold War credibility crisis; why did so many analysts and commentators assume that NATO’s end was nigh? The remainder of the chapter shows how NATO emerged, if not intact then surprisingly healthy, from this mêlée, and examines Britain’s role, direct and indirect, in this feat of adaptation and survival. Part three examines Britain’s influence on the debate during the early 1990s, particularly where the role of the WEU and the goals of NATO reform are concerned. Part four “Berlin and Madrid” describes the first results of the process of reform and adaptation, and suggests certain key features of the “new,” post-Cold War NATO.
Part five looks in more detail at the role of the WEU and the EU in this inchoate new security order. Change has not been confined to European security structures and ideas. On May 1, 1997, the Conservative administration suffered a landslide defeat by “New Labour”; part six asks whether British approaches to the European security debate changed after this point. The chapter concludes with a summary of the key features of the British position and with the comment that, whatever the strengths and potential of the reformed NATO, the whole edifice of post-Cold War European security will only be as strong and durable as its weakest and least fashionable element; a coherent and identifiable European “identity” in matters of defense and security.

2. NATO’S CREDIBILITY CRISIS

For much of the 1990s, NATO has faced a persistent assault from those commentators who first predicted, and latterly became stubbornly attached to, the alliance’s demise after the breaching of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the unraveling of the Cold War. NATO’s adaptation and survival has clearly confounded such predictions. However, it is fair to say that NATO’s survival could not have been taken for granted, and that there are still justifiable concerns about the alliance’s role after the Cold War.

The components of NATO’s post-Cold War credibility crisis ranged from the contingent to the more fundamental. In the first place, NATO suffered from serious disagreements among the allies over their involvement in former Yugoslavia. The early 1990s saw charges of indecisiveness, lack of leadership, and institutional obsolescence flying around Europe and back and forth across the Atlantic. As disagreement deepened over the Yugoslavia crisis, the transatlantic security partnership looked for a while to be on its last legs. The partnership endured its most serious assault in November 1994 when, as a result of Congressional pressure, the Clinton Administration announced that it would no longer help to enforce the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian government. Britain and France protested that their lightly-armed troops deployed on UNPROFOR peacekeeping tasks would be made vulnerable to Bosnian Serb attack. This prompted the leader writer of the normally phlegmatic Economist newspaper to ask whether NATO governments would look back on this “bombshell” as “their first formal parting of the ways,” and “the beginning of a rift that fatally weakened their alliance.” Some months later, the U.S. announcement was described with even more finality by one U.S. analyst as “the last straw, breaking the back of allied unity.” While its operational credibility was being questioned, NATO also had to respond to another sort of challenge from a number of actual or supposed rival institutions. The CSCE/OSCE has determinedly established a niche for itself in the spectrum of Europe’s supposedly interlocking security institutions. And the prospect of a European “identity” or “expression” in matters of defense and security steadily became, for some NATO members, much more than the relatively peripheral matter it had been during

55
the Cold War; the EU and the WEU both secured their place at the negotiating table.

NATO also suffered from the more general credibility crisis affecting national defense planning after the Cold War. Demands for cost-cutting and expectations of a so-called “peace dividend,” ran high in the early 1990s. Defense ministries and military planners faced the discomfiting prospect of retrenchment somehow becoming constant practice, rather than an occasional treasury-led spasm. The reluctance to continue large-scale defense spending was, to a large degree, a function of the difficulty faced by NATO’s members in identifying an enemy. In an international environment in which “threats” would no longer be clear and unambiguous, and in which military planners would have to be content with the somewhat more nebulous notion of “risks,” the scale and quality of armed forces required by a modern state became, conceptually and politically, an open question. The “threatless alliance” became an increasingly accurate description, and an increasingly awkward paradox, difficult to support politically and financially. “There is broad consensus,” wrote one analyst, echoing Stalin’s scornful dismissal of the force of religious opposition to him, “that an ill-defined uncertainty and unpredictability are the paramount threats to stability. But how many divisions does uncertainty have, and why are current alliances essential to counter it?”

The assumed relationship between threat perceptions and budgetary planning presented an awkward dilemma after the Cold War; “there is no longer any substantial political support for military planning based on specific threats. . . . But there is no obvious way to set spending levels or design a force structure without reference to a specific threat.”

Arguably the biggest challenge to NATO’s credibility came in the form of heightening tension between two conflicting approaches to the locus and essential character of European defense and security. Almost as soon as the Berlin Wall was breached, pressure began to mount particularly from France for a “Europeanist” (rather than “Atlanticist”) approach to European security after the Cold War. The conflict between the “Atlanticists” and the “Europeanists” over the basic character of Europe’s security and who should pay for it had been a perennial feature of NATO politics during the Cold War. But for some observers, the end of the Cold War was a watershed in institutional terms, and for them the uncertainty and mounting intra-alliance disagreement of the early 1990s could only point towards Europeanization of security thinking and practice.

Traditionally the champion of Europeanism, France saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to shift the locus of European security planning and organization back to Europe. This had a familiar enough ring to it. France, it will be remembered, had withdrawn from the alliance’s integrated military structure in 1966, had ever since questioned U.S. dominance in European security structures and had been deeply suspicious of the idea that the sovereign French government’s duties of national defense could properly be subsumed
into a collective effort. And after the Cold War, it was not long before France began to speak of European defense cooperation outside NATO “in more far-reaching terms than ever before.” The U.S. response to this latest heresy was curt. In March 1991 Cin an act reminiscent of U.S. Secretary of State Dulles’ December 1953 warning of an “agonizing reappraisal” of the United States’ commitment to European security if European allies did not begin to work together. U.S. Under Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew sent his “Note” to European capitals. Bartholomew made it plain that while the United States would welcome a European voice in NATO, it was still uneasy about the prospect of a European security caucus within the Alliance, possibly based on the WEU, which could browbeat the United States.

Britain, on the other hand, carried the Atlanticist standard and argued that the basic character of NATO and the U.S. involvement in Europe should be nurtured in uncertain times. At the time, the only point of agreement between both sides was that defense cooperation should not be a matter for supranational policies but should remain inter-governmental. The result was the compromise offered in the December 1991 Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty created the inter-governmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one of the three “pillars” of the EU and spoke of the “eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.” The WEU was brought back into the picture to become, in an imprecise but politically flexible formula, “the defense component of the European Union and . . . a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.”

The developing Atlanticist/Europeanist tension was probably best illustrated by the rush to provide Europe with a new, multinational intervention force. In May 1991 NATO’s Defense Planning Committee envisaged NATO’s Allied Command Europe (ACE) fielding a large army corps to deal with conflicts and crises in and around Europe. The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), located firmly within NATO’s hierarchy and commanded by a British general, duly came into being on October 2, 1992. The ARRC produced an agitated response from France and Germany who saw it, not merely as conspiracy to give the British the best jobs but, more seriously, as pre-empting any moves towards creating a genuinely European force. The result was the Franco-German Eurocorps founded in October 1991 formally established two years later and made operational by late 1995. Heated discussion took place, with the Eurocorps vilified as the cause of divided loyalties and the weakening of NATO, and a carefully crafted compromise was needed before the debate could advance. In May 1992 Malcolm Rifkind, the British Defense Minister, reluctantly accepted that the Eurocorps might, after all, be suitable for WEU operations and need not be considered untouchable by NATO. The following month in the “Petersberg Declaration,” the WEU Council of Ministers began to draw up a list of WEU missions, but took pains to point out that WEU missions would be “fully compatible” with the primary commitment to NATO’s collective defense structure. The Eurocorps controversy was largely calmed in Janu-
ary 1993 when French and German Chiefs of Staff struck an agreement with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) over the relationship between NATO and the *Eurocorps.*

3. BRITAIN, THE WEU AND NATO

Even in the midst of deep disagreement, such as that surrounding the function and command of the *Eurocorps*, it was plainly not impossible to find some workable arrangement. NATO seems to have been extraordinarily adept at institutional self-preservation of this sort. Just as the transatlantic security partnership has been no stranger to disagreements and controversies, so it has also been versatile enough for a way to be found out of the various dilemmas with which it has been confronted. Britain’s staunch support for the alliance, coupled with what has appeared to be an increasingly constructive assessment of the role of the WEU, contributed in several ways to NATO’s latest feat of survival.

Since 1945, Britain’s view of West European defense and security cooperation, particularly when institutional pretensions have been detected, has been variously indifferent and skeptical, cautiously tolerant and openly hostile. The explanations are simple enough. There is, first, a deeply embedded reluctance to “surrender sovereignty” over Britain’s armed forces to “Brussels,” or some other faceless, unaccountable concoction. More important still, almost as an article of faith every British postwar government has stressed the need to sustain U.S. interest in and conventional military commitment to West European defense and security. Although not without its critics, this became the established objective of Whitehall and informed official British thinking about, and responses to, proposals to “Europeanize” the defense and security of Western Europe. Britain’s advocacy of the Atlantic relationship and the primacy of NATO are also thought to have brought other benefits. Britain’s influence and interests were nurtured by a privileged position within the alliance, a position which was “disproportionate to [Britain’s] actual political and economic power.”

As a founder member, Britain has always been legally committed to the WEU, and bound by its treaty. But Britain’s practical support for the forum was always somewhat tepid. Whitehall typically saw the WEU as a means to some other end, rather than as a goal in its own right. It is useful to reflect here that the WEU only came about because the Churchill government saw an urgent need to prevent Washington’s threatened “agonizing reappraisal” of the U.S. commitment to Western Europe in 1954/55, in the aftermath of the European Defense Community fiasco. The last-minute proposal made by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was to reanimate the defunct Western Union Defense Organization—the antecedent to NATO, based on the 1948 Brussels Treaty—rename it WEU, and modify its founding treaty. WEU would then provide the sought-after institutional framework in which to capture and exploit the military potential of a rearmed West Germany, and would demonstrate to the Americans that their European allies were, after all, capable of
cooperating in vital matters of defense and security. Once born, however, the WEU had to endure thirty years or so of benign neglect from its parent. And even when, after the reactivation of the WEU in the Rome Declaration of October 27, 1984, Britain became more engaged in the WEU, there was no real change in Whitehall’s basic approach; the forum continued to be viewed as a means to some other end, constructively or otherwise.

Britain’s view of the WEU became more complex in the early 1990s, and Britain became altogether more engaged in the workings of the forum. Arguably, however, Britain continued to see the WEU as an instrument, rather than an end in itself. For Britain, the WEU offered the opportunity to shape the debate over the West European security “architecture” by emphasizing, or imposing upon the debate, certain political, institutional and military characteristics. Politically, the WEU would serve as a model for European defense and security cooperation that would be, above all, inter-governmental rather than anything more integrationist or even “federalist.” The established British view was that the operational deployment of military force, involving the likely death and injury of servicemen and women, should be one of the defining privileges and responsibilities of modern, liberal democratic government. In the exercise of that privilege, government has a duty of care to its armed forces and is accountable in that regard to the electorate, via parliament and the electoral process. It follows, by this view, that the privilege should not be granted to any body which, through its own inadequacies or its constitutional immaturity, is not able credibly to execute the duty of care, and to be fully accountable.

Institutionally, the British government also came to see in the WEU a means to ensure that European defense and security cooperation would not drift too far geographically and conceptually from the Atlantic. The WEU would become, if not the European institution for which the French in particular had called, then a bridge between NATO (still the paramount forum for western defense and security) and whatever arrangement the West Europeans were able to muster. With this in mind, the British approach had, and still has, no room for the merger of the WEU with the European Union, the particular preference of the Germans. Finally, militarily, the British could conceive of a WEU which would have some operational utility without rivaling NATO. But the organization would be used only for lower-scale military tasks, would not create its own bureaucracy and command structure to rival NATO, and would rely on forces “double-hatted” from NATO rather than assigned separately by member governments.10

Britain’s assessment of the potential of the WEU shaped the broader debate over European security and the role of NATO, and acted as a countervailing weight to restrain the more extravagant aspirations of some European allies. British caution regarding the potential of the WEU was seen in the compromise, referred to earlier, by which the Eurocorps deadlock was broken after May 1992. The Eurocorps had not been received with much composure in London and Washington, where the term “Franco-German corps” was initially
used in preference. In spite of the undoubted good intentions of the French and Germans, the concern was that the Eurocorps might divide the transatlantic security partnership at its vital point; U.S.-European military cooperation under one, unified NATO command structure. Malcolm Rifkind’s May 1992 compromise, it will be recalled, was to include the Eurocorps among “the forces made available to the WEU.” The WEU Council of Ministers (an intergovernmental body), working to plans prepared by a WEU Planning Cell, would be able to deploy forces such as the Eurocorps, the UK-Netherlands Amphibious Force and even the airmobile multinational division of ARRC. But, tellingly, Rifkind could conceive of WEU-inspired and controlled operations only in situations “when NATO chose not be engaged, for instance in humanitarian operations.”¹¹ This constraint on the WEU’s scope of action was reflected in the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992, and fuelled subsequent debate over a possible division of labor between NATO and WEU.

January 1994 saw speculation begin to mount regarding Britain’s real intentions in the European security debate. Following the NATO summit meeting in Brussels, a trilateral meeting took place in London on January 26 between Rifkind, François Léotard and Volker Rühe (British, French and German defense ministers respectively). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss European defense cooperation in the light of the Brussels summit and the launch of the CJTF idea. But with the French and Germans having agreed one year earlier to place Eurocorps under SACEUR’s operational command in time of conflict, and with Belgium and Spain having joined the Franco-German initiative, Britain was also by now anxious to ensure it was not “left on the sidelines” as the initiative gained momentum and respectability.¹² In the United States, the meeting was reported as firm evidence of a “distinct shift in the [British] government’s view of European defense initiatives and underlined its anxiety to play a central role in European defense plans,” demonstrating that Britain was now “eager” to join France and Germany in developing the WEU as “the European Union’s defense wing.”¹³ Later in the year, sections of the British media were also sensing a new era of Euro-enthusiasm in Whitehall, with the British position being described boldly as a “change of tack.” Following the reported release by Rifkind of “a secret paper recommending a more explicit European defense policy” in the summer, Britain was reported to be in favor of a strengthened West European defense and security identity, albeit one still firmly compatible with NATO.¹⁴

But whatever the outward appearance of British policy towards European security and defense cooperation, the underlying motive remained obscure. The British government’s March 1995 memorandum on the EU’s forthcoming intergovernmental conference acted as an antidote to the previous year’s “Europhoria.”¹⁵ The memorandum wasted little time before insisting upon the “overriding continuing importance of NATO” and expressing the British government’s “firm view that European nations should develop arrangements for the future that will ensure that, consistent with our NATO obligations, Europe collectively
is able to shoulder more effectively its share of the burden of promoting security and stability on the European continent, on its periphery and beyond.” In the British view, the reactivated WEN had always been intended to be a means to improve the European contribution to NATO’s “European Pillar” (note that “European Pillar” and WEN were not necessarily synonymous) and thereby share the burden of security more fairly with the United States. The negotiations which led to the Maastricht Treaty required a more subtle formulation, and so Whitehall had come to accept the idea of a WEN with a “dual capacity;” able to contribute to the European pillar of NATO and serve as “the defense component of the European Union.” The memorandum also insisted on NATO’s exclusive role in collective defense (Article 5) tasks, and cautioned against the “wasteful” creation of new institutions. The United States was committed to Europe and would not remove its troops, “unless forced to do so by its European allies.” Defense cooperation within Europe, in whatever forum, should be inter-governmental, and on no account should the WEN be folded into the EU.

In many respects, therefore, the memorandum was simply a restatement of established British views, and as such pricked the 1994 bubble. But the memorandum also contained another important and more novel contribution in the form of an idea—a “task-based planning” which could not only underpin Britain’s long-standing, pro-NATO position, but could also contribute to the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security compromise. The document described a “new strategic environment” in which military forces would be less likely to be used for traditional territorial defense operations, and more likely to find themselves involved in “lesser crisis management tasks” such as peace support operations and humanitarian relief (the type of mission described in the WEN’s June 1992 Petersberg tasks). In order to respond effectively to these missions, and in order to prevent non-membership of this or that institution from obstructing a state’s will to join in the response, political and military flexibility would be essential. Institutional allegiances would matter less than prompt and effective management of the task in hand, with the ability to produce a rapid, operational response to inherently unpredictable crises and tasks. By happy coincidence, however, this new thinking would not be to NATO’s detriment. NATO’s core task of Article 5 collective defense would remain unchanged and unchallenged. But as far as non-Article 5, or even non-combat military operations were concerned, there was nothing in the new, task-oriented thinking which necessarily excluded NATO from planning and conducting such “lesser crisis management tasks.” For this reason, the new British approach rejected a NATO/WEN division of labor (except, of course, as far as full-scale collective defense was concerned):

we must avoid the trap of adopting simple assumptions that combat operations are for NATO and non-combat operations are for the WEN which would place unnecessary constraints on the flex-
Within a matter of weeks, however, it was clear that the debate over the role of the WEU and the course and character of European defense and security cooperation was by no means resolved, and that the British approach could not be accepted in many quarters. With Britain and several other WEU members “adamant that any future security mechanisms complement NATO activities,” the ministerial meeting of WEU members, associates, observers, and associate partners in Lisbon in May 1995 “failed to mask differences over the future shape of European security” and “revealed sharp differences over the effort to create a common European security architecture.” Furthermore, if there were still disagreements to be had between Britain and her European allies, it also became apparent that the implications of the task-based planning approach had not even been understood fully throughout Whitehall, particularly as regards the goal of avoiding a division of labor between institutions, or between the two “pillars” of NATO. In February 1996, following a meeting with Rühe in London, Britain’s Defense Minister Michael Portillo commented that Britain would be willing to see “Europe” carry out “the ‘simpler military tasks’ such as peacekeeping, guarding humanitarian aid and disaster relief on its own, and that this would gain favor in the U.S.” But later the same month, British Prime Minister John Major, apparently more in tune with the new thinking, was to be heard once again denouncing the idea of “endowing the EU with a military dimension by merging it gradually with the WEU.” Conversely, the British Foreign Secretary’s reported comments after the June 1996 Berlin agreement suggested something similar to the NATO/WEU, combat/non-combat distinction which was supposed to have been made unfashionable by the task-based planning idea.

Another revealing contribution to the evolving discussion on European security institutions was made in March 1996, in a paper setting out the British government’s negotiating agenda for the EU inter-governmental conference. The paper confirmed all the trends outlined above; indeed, the entire March 1995 memorandum was included as an annex to the new paper. The British government’s view of the character, object, form, and instruments of European defense and security cooperation were all laid out. Thus, any European cooperation should be a matter for governments; there should be no role for the European Commission, the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice. The object of any such cooperation should be to complement, rather than rival, NATO, described as “the bedrock of European security.” Europeans could “act on their own when necessary,” but this meant dealing only with smaller peacekeeping and humanitarian crises, and even then only when the United States and Canada chose not to participate. Averse to creating more institutions to serve this need, the WEU already provided “the best framework for the further development of this [European] cooperation.” With its members, asso-
ciate members, observers, and associate partners, the WEU involved twenty-seven Western, Central and Eastern European states (agreement on Slovenia’s associate partnership in June 1996 subsequently increased the number to twenty-eight). A “reinforced partnership” between the two European institutions would mean the WEU could “act on requests” from the European Union, and would therefore complement “the contribution that the EU can make to security with its own political and economic instruments.” And finally, the WEU would be able to “draw on alliance assets and facilities for use in European-led operations” through the developing CJTF scheme. At least as far as London was concerned, the scene was now set for the North Atlantic Council meeting in Berlin in June 1996.

4. BERLIN AND MADRID

Berlin, June 1996

The NAC ministerial in Berlin in June 1996 provides additional confirmation of the alliance’s adaptability, and could prove to have been its most accomplished act yet of self-preservation. In Berlin, the idea was finally accepted of establishing the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, and the further development of the “Combined Joint Task Force” (CJTF) concept was authorized. After the Berlin ministerial, the Economist could write more happily of “genuine good cheer in Berlin,” and Hervé de Charette, France’s foreign minister was seemingly delighted that “For the first time in the history of the Atlantic alliance, Europe can express its defense identity.”

The Berlin communiqué of June 3, 1996 could prove to have been a turning point in the development of European security ideas and institutions after the Cold War. The communiqué touched upon all the issues facing NATO: the situation in former Yugoslavia and the conduct of IFOR; the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction; outreach through NACC and PFP, and the enlargement timetable; relations with Russia and Ukraine; the role of the OSCE; the Middle East peace process; and disarmament and arms control. But it was the “decisive step forward in making the Alliance increasingly flexible and effective to meet new challenges,” the apparent “completion” of the CJTF concept and the stress laid upon “the development of the [ESDI] within the Alliance” which caused most excitement. At long last, the architectural competition looked to be over, and relieved journalists could report that NATO foreign ministers “had just agreed to free the European members of NATO from their transatlantic shackles.”

The communiqué generated a considerable amount of political and military planning work in the months before the December 1996 meeting of the NAC. Outstanding disagreements would, it was hoped, be resolved before the next NATO summit meeting in Madrid in July 1997.

The communiqué endorsed the continuing “internal adaptation” of NATO and, using by now familiar language, welcomed the CJTF concept as a means
to deploy “more flexible and mobile” forces for “new missions, NATO contingency operations” and “operations led by the WEU.” Since, in NATO usage, “contingency operations” could include both Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions, CJTF had clearly by this stage become something of an omnibus concept, capable of meeting traditional and new requirements alike. In this respect, the concept was also consistent with the evolving British position. The most significant part of the document was paragraph seven, which set out the three “fundamental objectives” underpinning the adaptation process. Here, too, London would have been reasonably content with the outcome.

The first objective was to maintain the ability to act in collective defense while at the same time developing the means to “undertake new roles in changing circumstances.” With this in mind, headquarters and forces would have to be more deployable and mobile, and capable of being sustained in theatre for “extended periods.” There would also be “increased participation of [PFP] countries” and the integration of new members into the military structure. But whoever took part, there could only be one force structure to meet all tasks and missions. Thus, adaptation would provide the ability “to mount NATO non-Article 5 operations, guided by the concept of one system capable of performing multiple functions,” and the Alliance would need a “single multinational command structure,” rather than one for Article 5 and another for non-Article 5 tasks. The CJTF concept would be “central to our approach for assembling forces for contingency operations” (i.e., both Article 5 and non-Article 5). And the whole adaptation process would be “consistent with the goal of building [ESDI] within NATO,” enabling “all European Allies to play a larger role in NATO’s military and command structures and, as appropriate, in contingency operations undertaken by the Alliance.” The second objective which also stressed the need for effective political and military cooperation across the Atlantic, referring to the “continued involvement of the North American Allies across the command and force structure.”

Third, NATO’s internal adaptation would see the development of ESDI within NATO. CJTF would be vital to this end, leading to “the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.” Forces, assets and headquarters would be identified which could be used for WEU-led operations, subject to various conditions. To affirm NATO’s primacy, any forces so identified would be described as “separable but not separate,” their availability would be “subject to decision by the NAC,” and their use would be monitored and kept under review by the NAC. In conjunction with the development of the CJTF concept, NATO’s command structure would be further adapted. Certain NATO personnel would be “double-hatted” in order to create “multinational European command arrangements” which were both “identifiable” as European, yet firmly part of the NATO structure.
Once the dust had settled, however, it became evident that interpretations of the Berlin communiqué were not uniform across the alliance. The communiqué was generally received favorably by national governments, albeit for varying reasons. The responses of the three main European allies ranged from the lingering radical Europeanism of Paris, through Bonn’s anxiety to show that the agreement held something for everyone, to the conservative Atlanticism of London. But for the alliance as a whole, the long-awaited post-Cold War consensus, on the role of NATO and the purpose of its internal adaptation program, was by no means as watertight as might have been supposed. Significant differences of opinion remained, particularly between France and Britain. The continuing Franco-U.S. spat over NATO’s southern command sounded another note of caution. The central question remained: how could the evolving command structure and force posture allow for the expression of “ESDI within NATO?” France had wanted the Berlin communiqué to describe ESDI as a “permanent and visible” part of NATO, but even this relatively temperate form of words was too much for some other delegations to accept.26

Britain was reported as having gone along “quite happily” with the ministerial, although there had, clearly, been moments of friction when British officials had felt compelled to defend the importance of NATO and the U.S. connection and to deflate any extravagant claims for European self-sufficiency in defense and security. According to Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, “There was a suggestion at one stage that there should be a separate European command structure . . . It did not survive, nor did it deserve to . . . NATO continues to be the only credible force when it comes to combat operations or operations of any scale.” Similarly, Michael Portillo, now discarding the Euro-phoria he had hinted at just months earlier, dismissed the suggestion that the goal of the adaptation was to provide the EU with a discrete military identity. Portillo reportedly “insisted that neither NATO nor the WEU could submit itself to policies made by the EU; the WEU is not, and will not be, a European substitute for NATO.”27 Addressing the WEU Assembly in Paris immediately after the Berlin ministerial, Rifkind argued that the challenge had been to find, in one strategic concept, a way to bring Atlanticism and Europeanism together. NATO’s internal adaptation had met the challenge; “we can now develop a European defense identity without weakening NATO.”28 The British media were also cautious in their interpretation of the communiqué: the Europeans had by no means been given a free hand to use NATO strategic assets since much of this equipment was U.S.-owned, and “what the U.S. gives, it can take away;” the new arrangement was, in part, merely an expedient to enable agreement between the French and Americans over the enlargement issue; and the agreement contained “many potential pitfalls.”29

Some officials were rather bullish about NATO’s prospects after the Berlin ministerial. In a speech in London early in October 1996, Britain’s ambassador to NATO was impressed by the high morale now pervading the alliance;
“NATO feels like an organization with a role and a future.” Part of NATO’s success he attributed to the internal reforms—an unglamorous, but “radical” part (and one of the most important) of NATO’s post-Cold War agenda. The significance of the internal adaptation process lay in what the ambassador saw as “the best news on the defense front in the last decade—the chance to reconcile a genuine European defense capability with a reformed and still central NATO. The secret lies in building the [ESDI] within NATO, using NATO assets and skills for WEU operations, rather than trying forlornly to build it elsewhere.” The WEU lay at the center of the new ESDI-within-NATO formula, in an arrangement which could not work if the EU IGC decided in 1997 to “subordinate” the WEU to the EU. This enduring and predictable British view would have elicited an equally predictable response from those European allies who saw some form of merger between the two institutions as a real prospect. And with one other comment, concerning the broader debate about the very substance of “ESDI within NATO,” the ambassador was perhaps too quick to claim victory. One of the “key ingredients” in the “culture change” within the alliance he saw as France’s “readiness to see the [ESDI] embedded in NATO.” Before too long, however, it would become clear that, as far as Paris was concerned, “embedded” did not mean “dependent.”

Preparing for the Summit

In November 1996 the alliance’s chiefs of staff, meeting as the Military Committee (MC), produced their final recommendations for restructuring NATO’s command structure. They recommended a reduction in the overall number of NATO headquarters from sixty-five to about twenty. As far as Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) was concerned, it was accepted that there should continue to be three Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs). But on the vexed question of NATO command in Europe, the defense chiefs could only recommend that the NAC select one of two options, both of which assumed the retention of a fully integrated U.S.-European command structure. The first, and most radical, option was to reduce the MSC level to two functional commands (for convenience and fairness, but for no other territorial rationale, one in the north of Europe and the other in the south) which would each have all the appearance of a permanent CJTF-headquarters. The second option was to retain the existing territorial MSC structure (northwest, center and south). Most NATO members preferred the first alternative, but the United States (and SHAPE itself) preferred the second, and the debate continued. Within SHAPE, it was argued that only with three MSCs would SACEUR be able to meet his mission to ensure the collective defense capability while being able to mount two non-Article 5 (CJTF) operations simultaneously. Without this capability, it was felt that ESDI-within-NATO would amount to very little. Furthermore, a three-MSC structure would be one which could accommodate NATO’s new members without further restructuring.
In the view of one British commentator, former Chief of the Defense Staff Michael Carver, the MC “solution” was no such thing. Carver’s argument was, essentially, that obsessive attachment to the integrated command structure had blinded the Long Term Study into NATO’s command structure to the logic of post-Cold War European security. A proper debate over territorial versus functional command could not be had if the only outcomes to be contemplated were those which could fit within and validate the integrated command structure. Carver endorsed a more radical solution—known in NATO jargon as “binarism,” an idea which had earlier been examined and dismissed by which a straightforward U.S.-European division would be imposed upon the alliance’s command structure, doing away with the shibboleth of integration and the turf battles of recent memory; “all NATO’s integrated commands should be abolished . . . U.S. forces stationed in Europe or its surrounding waters should be solely under U.S. national command . . . within the North Atlantic Alliance a European operational and training command should be formed, with subordinate land, air and naval commands, incorporating the forces of those European members of the Alliance who wished to join it.”34 Carver’s view was apostasy for Whitehall, where the Atlanticist orthodoxy remained in force.

NATO’s foreign and defense ministers also preferred a less adventurous approach. In their final communiqué of 1996, foreign ministers noted that the two command structure models proposed by the MC would both require “future assessment and subsequent political consideration.” They also rejected the “binarist” idea, confirming that the goal of the command structure review remained a “renovated, single multilateral command structure.”35 Meeting one week after their foreign ministry colleagues, NATO’s defense ministers directed the MC to refine its proposals in time for the regular NAC ministerial meetings in Sintra, Portugal on May 29, 1997. As far as the defense ministers were concerned, the MC should address the following issues in particular:

- the capability and military effectiveness of each of the two command structure alternatives;
- the resource implications of each alternative model;
- the relationship between the various levels of command;
- the type, numbers, locations and responsibilities of sub-regional level headquarters (i.e., the former MSC and PSC command levels);
- guidelines for the rotation among Alliance members of key command posts.36

Work on these and related issues continued into 1997. Tentative agreement on the role and responsibilities of the Deputy SACEUR (DSACEUR) was reached fairly early in the year. The spat between France and the United States, however, continued to overshadow the work of NATO’s international and military staffs, with French officials beginning to warn that France, in a fit of pique, might renege on its rapprochement.37 By early March 1997, it
seemed that a compromise might be possible. In line with a German proposal, the United States was reportedly willing to discuss the possibility of surrendering command of Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), or sharing the post with a European officer, albeit not for five years. But no sooner was the Franco-U.S. tension beginning to relax, than another intra-alliance disagreement threatened to impede the work being carried out. Turkey, realizing that its membership of the alliance effectively gave it some leverage over the enlargement process, had been probing to see whether the threat of a veto could be used to improve its chances of entry into the European Union. Possibly for similar motives, Ankara also began to insist upon being involved in planning any WEU missions which would require the use of NATO assets. Turkey, merely an associate member of WEU by virtue of its membership of NATO, would thereby come closer to the defense and security discussions of the EU/WEU; a prospect which Greece (a full member of the EU, the WEU and NATO) could not contemplate with much composure.

Madrid, July 1997

Differences among the allies could not be resolved by July 1997 and the Madrid Summit proved to be something of a damp squib as far as NATO’s internal adaptation was concerned. Disagreements developed between Britain and Spain over Gibraltar, between Spain and Portugal over the seas around the Canaries, and between Greece and Turkey over the rights to certain islands in the Aegean. But it was the continued Franco-U.S. disagreement which did most to sour the atmosphere at Madrid and prevent final agreement on a new command structure for NATO. The United States remained firmly resistant to French requests for a reorganization (and “Europeanization”) of NATO’s command arrangements in the Mediterranean, and dismissed French (and other allies’) calls for Romania and Slovenia to be included in the first tranche of enlargement. France, by now with a Socialist government containing some “notable anti-Americans” and others who “still hanker after a separate European defense organization, outside NATO,” remained equally stubborn. Having attached conditions (regarding AFSOUTH and enlargement) to its reintegration into NATO, and having seen those conditions rejected at Madrid, France’s only face-saving option was to postpone reintegration indefinitely. President Chirac left Madrid calling for NATO to be made “lighter, cheaper, more flexible and more effective,” and for a “new balance between Europe and America over the leadership of the alliance.” But just as France had managed to salvage something of its enlargement agenda (by having Romania and Slovenia referred to in glowing terms in the Madrid Declaration), so there was some hope that, after a suitable cooling-off period, the internal adaptation process might be resumed with the final version of NATO’s new command structure document (MC 324) being approved in December 1997. The prospect of NATO’s DSACEUR (who would also command WEU-led CJTF operations) becoming, in time, a rotational post which France could eventually fill (assuming reintegra-
 tion into NATO) was thought to be one way to persuade France to soften her stance. And France was also quietly keen to keep the lines of communication open, and to ensure that the internal adaptation process did not stall completely. Not only did France agree at Madrid to continue attending defense ministerial and MC meetings, she also praised the development to date of ESDI-within-NATO and promised to take part in CJTF operations. Whatever the difficulties over the command structure review, it seemed that the force posture review was looked upon more favorably in Paris.

5. THE “EUROPEAN PILLAR”

“ESDI-within-NATO” could yet prove to be the political formula with which to bind together Atlanticism and Europeanism in matters of defense and security. Plainly though, there remain differences among allies over what the formula could or should produce. For its part, the WEU could prove to be the institutional equivalent, by linking NATO to the CFSP of the EU. There are, as with “ESDI-within-NATO,” sharply different expectations of how, when and for what reason the WEU should develop. But if the delicately-crafted Berlin compromise is to be preserved, some means to draw together conflicting political and institutional aspirations for European defense and security will be essential. This section asks how the slowly evolving CFSP, with the WEU acting as a bridge between it and NATO, could contribute to the emerging Euro-Atlantic defense and security order.

**Common Foreign and Security Policy**

There is a widely-held feeling, particularly in Britain, that foreign and security affairs are (or should be) beyond the competence of the inward-oriented, commerce-driven EU. By this view, the CFSP is, at best, an example of the EU biting off more than it can chew or, at worst, proof that “Brussels” has developed sinister aspirations to super-statehood. But the EU, and the European Community before it, is by no means new to practical international politics. With an “external policy” covering commercial and economic matters, the EU has been “from its inception an international phenomenon.” There has also been cautious willingness to cooperate (on an informal, ad hoc basis) in more traditional foreign policy areas through the consultation mechanism known as European Political Cooperation (EPC). In time, even the EC Commission became more involved in what was essentially an intergovernmental process. When it was accepted that the Commission could not reasonably be excluded from discussion of foreign economic policy, the October 1981 London Report admitted the Commission to full association with EPC. The 1986 Single European Act gave EPC a basis in EC law and attempted to bring the process closer to the objectives and procedures of the EC. The November 1993 ratification of the Maastricht TEU replaced EPC with the CFSP, which became one of the three “pillars” of the new European Union. Some in the Commission, and some
member governments, hoped that the TEU would result in a merger of EC and EPC in a “political union,” with a fully integrated foreign and security policymaking machinery, but CFSP remained an inter-governmental process. The Commission’s role was enhanced, but cautiously so; the Commission was given a right of initiative in matters of foreign and security policy, but this was not an exclusive right (as in other, EC-driven policy areas) and was to be shared with member governments.

In terms of its antecedents and its place within the EU, the CFSP is clearly not the upstart some would suggest. Nevertheless, the development of the CFSP has been slow and often controversial. The CFSP is an intergovernmental pillar, but it also pays homage to the integrationist goals of the European movement. There is, not surprisingly, widespread confusion as to the character of the CFSP and this must be partly the fault of the TEU which relied too much upon obscure, inaccessible distinctions between “foreign,” “security” and “defense” policies. The result was a very complex and often confusing arrangement (particularly in the process known as “joint action”), which is usually discussed more in terms of its potential than its achievement to date; “As it has developed since [the TEU], CFSP is not a policy, or even a set of policies, but rather a consultation mechanism between governments and EU institutions.” Some see CFSP as merely the depository of peripheral cooperative efforts on the lowest common denominator, while others see it as vitally important to the EU, possible even the “cause” which could revitalize and boost the Union into the next century. As it stands, however, the CFSP has very few satisfied followers, and must face extensive reforms and improvements before it can be taken more seriously, and exploited more fully.

Attempts to nudge CFSP into the world of security and defense have been supervised closely and critically by certain governments (particularly the British), but by early 1999 had achieved relatively little. The mandate for CFSP included “all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense” (TEU Art. J.4.1). Yet the flagship of CFSP—the “joint action process”Cwas not to be applied to defense-related matters; “Issues having defense implications dealt with under this Article shall not be subject to the [joint-action] procedures set out in Article J.3.” (TEU Art. J.4.3). The role of the WEU was similarly unclear. The Maastricht Treaty described the WEU as “an integral part of the development of the Union” (TEU Art. J.4.2), and called for it to be developed as “the defense component of the [EU] and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance” (TEU, Annex 30).

The early development of the CFSP was dismally slow, as was reflected in a December 1994 report on CFSP commissioned by Hans van den Broek, the Commissioner for external political relations. The report condemned the “inertia and impotence of the CFSP and WEU” as the “inward and outward reflection of a lack of capacity or will to act, particularly as regards the threat and/or use of force by the Union.” Rather than concede defeat, however, the report
robustly (and ambitiously) recommended a “central capacity for analysis and planning” in all matters relating to CFSP and defense, and commented on the “twin perils of blinkered concentration on hastily conceived ‘joint actions’ on the one hand and sterile bureaucratization on the other.”

After this slow start, performance in 1995 was little better, at least in the view of the European Parliament (EP). The EP has the right, under TEU Article J.7, to hold an annual debate on the implementation of the CFSP. The EP’s May 1996 report covered the second of these debates, referring to the implementation of CFSP in 1995. The EP was deeply unimpressed. On the subject of the relationship between CFSP and a Common Defense Policy (CDP) and Common Defense (CD), the EP argued that “progress in framing a [CDP] and developing a European security system, in which the EU has a central role to play, is essential to the Union if it is to have an effective CFSP in the coming years. . . . without a [CDP] and a common system of deterrence the Union will never be able to implement a CFSP.” Yet the record of achievement in 1995 was not good. The EP found “little development of the CFSP instruments and such precarious progress towards the framing of a [CDP],” and judged that “The implementation of the CFSP took a step backward in 1995.”

The EP report was passed to the Commission for information, and it may have been this document which prompted a sober reassessment of the potential of CFSP by DG1A, the Commission directorate leading on CFSP matters. In a briefing paper issued the following month, DG1A appeared willing to accept more modest goals for CFSP (a less charitable interpretation would be that DG1A was clutching at straws): CFSP was still useful as a foreign policy mechanism, but more as the legal basis for financing and implementing UN Security Council sanctions, for example, than as an instrument of policymaking; Commission input into CFSP should be preserved, and in this vein the idea of a Presidency/Commission “tandem” might maintain the “visibility” of the CFSP; finally, DG1A wanted qualified majority voting to be the norm for CFSP except in military matters, which was prevented by the TEU. Some months later, a Commission official closely involved in the CFSP accepted that the TEU’s “high hopes” for a CFSP “have not been realized.”

Whatever his reservations about the implementation of CFSP, Hans van den Broek had no time for skeptics even among his own officials. In early May 1996 the Commissioner was to be found arguing for a more prominent “European” role in matters of defense and security, particularly as regards the follow-on to IFOR in Bosnia. Van den Broek’s proposal, it was reported, “would imply a sharp acceleration in the EU’s so far tortuous efforts to develop a fully-fledged foreign and security policy, and it is likely to provoke intensive debate on both sides of the Atlantic.” The most revealing aspect of this episode, however, is that “intensive debate” was not provoked; the proposal seemed to sink without trace in the approach to the WEU and NATO meetings which followed soon after. When WEU foreign and defense ministers met in Birmingham on May 7, 1996, they stressed the need to develop the WEU’s operational
capabilities which they saw as “a prerequisite for an effective and credible European defense capability to carry out the Petersberg tasks” (i.e., not NATO Article 5-level operations). From the WEU’s point of view, therefore, a “Europe-only” follow-on to IFOR in Bosnia was not a real possibility. But, for the “van den Broek school,” there was worse to come. The following month, speaking after the Berlin NATO ministerial, Britain’s Foreign Secretary was of the view that the WEU’s new role “did not include combat missions.” And the EU was hardly noticed during the June NATO meetings; both the foreign and defense ministers communiqués made many references to ESDI, the “Euro-Atlantic area,” and “European Allies,” but barely one reference to the EU. WEU officials and supporters, on the other hand, are fond of pointing out that the Berlin communiqué refers to the WEU a flattering twenty-nine times.

By the mid-1990s, even within the EU’s own institutions, a degree of polite skepticism had set in regarding the EU’s capacity to organize its own security and defense. In London, politeness in this matter was considered too great a concession. Nevertheless, it was difficult to imagine either the complete marginalization of the EU in Europe’s evolving security architecture, or a NATO-derived European defense “identity” which, averse to combat, had little if any “hard” military significance and over which the EU would, in any case, have no real political control, beyond the capacity merely to “request” the WEU to conduct this or that operation. There was much in the 1996 Berlin agreement to make independent-minded Europeans uneasy, particularly the extent to which the “new” NATO, its operations and even those of the WEU, would be controlled and shaped by Washington. And there was still some momentum behind the formal development of the defense and security aspects of CFSP. With CDP and CD established as “eventual” EU goals in the Maastricht Treaty, the 1996-97 IGC could hardly have avoided discussion of security and defense issues. Media coverage of the IGC discussion was thin, but the following issues were among those debated in and around the conference:

• a proposal to include the WEU’s Petersberg humanitarian and rescue tasks as EU treaty commitments;
• whether political control of a “European” CJTF should be in the hands of the EU’s Council of Ministers rather than the WEU’s;
• whether an EU “request” for WEU military action should necessarily go through a second ministerial filter at the WEU;
• the introduction of a “flexibility clause” to allow some members to proceed (in specific actions or in general integration), while others opt for “constructive abstention;”
• the modification of decision-making process to reduce the emphasis on consensus; and whether, in time, the WEU should be folded completely into the EU.
Given that there remained substantial opposition in Europe to the suggestion of an EU defense expression outside NATO and a merger of the WEU and EU, and that the principal interest of the IGC was in devising ways and means for the EU to expand eastwards, it would have been unwise to expect much movement on CFSP at the Amsterdam summit. The final stages of the IGC descended into acrimony and the outcome, the “Draft Treaty of Amsterdam,” was the subject of ridicule even before it appeared. The document was poorly drafted and muddled in many places, to the irritation of several EU governments. There would, plainly be a great deal of work to do before a final text of the treaty could be signed by governments towards the end of 1997. As far as CFSP was concerned, the member states set themselves goals rather more cautious and modest than those declared in the TEU, and were evidently anxious to retain the intergovernmental character of CFSP:

The [CFSP] shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The Union shall foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide.

When it enters into force in summer 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty will contain a protocol on “enhanced cooperation” between the EU and the WEU, and will include the possibility of a future merger. The treaty will also establish the post of High Representative for CFSP, together with early warning and policy planning capabilities. As far as EU/WEU military missions are concerned, the decision-making process will continue along lines laid down at Maastricht and the missions themselves will be at the lower end of the spectrum: “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”

WEUcBridging the Gap

The development and implementation of CFSP remains hesitant and fraught with disagreement. This makes it difficult to judge whether the WEU could satisfy the need for a bridge between the EU/CFSP and NATO. Nevertheless, the WEU has been very active, developing its organizational and operational capability and improving its relations with NATO and the EU. The WEU has been contributing to the European defense and security debate for many years, such that to give the British government all the credit for the recent renaissance of the institution would be unreasonable.
After its revival in the Brussels Treaty of 1954, the WEU was reinvigorated for the second time by the Rome Declaration of October 1984, largely to improve Europe’s showing in the transatlantic burden-sharing debate. But the most significant moment in the WEU’s trajectory came in 1987, with publication in The Hague of the *Platform on European Security Interests*. Indeed, it is arguably in this document, rather than in the suspiciously enlightened nature of British policy towards Europe, that the beginnings of compromise between Europeanism and Atlanticism can best be traced. Concerned at the Reagan Administration’s “unilateral” arms control successes at the Reykjavik Summit and with the INF Treaty, on October 27, 1987, the nine WEU member states came together to add impetus to the regeneration of the WEU which had begun in 1984, and to ensure that Western European perspectives were not overlooked during U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

The Hague Platform stated boldly that “We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defense,” and set the goal of a “more cohesive European defense identity.” But the Platform also acknowledged the commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty, insisting that:

> the security of the Western European countries can only be assured in close association with our North American allies. The security of the Alliance [i.e., NATO] is indivisible. The partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic rests on the twin foundations of shared values and interests. Just as the commitment of the North American democracies is vital to Europe’s security, a free, independent and increasingly more united Western Europe is vital to the security of North America.

This form of words, combined with the fact that the French government, as a member of the WEU, had also joined the Hague Platform, suggested a constructive and responsible approach to U.S.-European security relations. At the very least, the favorable U.S. response to the Platform demonstrated Washington’s conditional acceptance of European defense and security cooperation. But one former Secretary-General of the WEU sensed a far greater achievement, arguing that the Platform had the effect of “turning American opinion around in favor of the emerging European Security and Defense Identity.”

Yet, in spite of confident assertions made in Rome and The Hague, the WEU continued to languish in relative obscurity for some years. In 1991, however, when WEU members annexed their declaration to the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU became a full member of the post-Cold War European security debating society. Very soon, the WEU organized a number of small-scale military and policing operations and began preparing for more. A WEU Planning Cell, with an Intelligence Section and a Situation Center were established in Brussels at WEU headquarters and a satellite intelligence center was estab-
lished at Torrejon in Spain. WEU staff drew up lists of WEU-answerable forces, and examined the case for a WEU “Humanitarian Task Force.” WEU planning staff prepared draft contingency plans, as well as a Strategic Mobility Concept to facilitate Petersberg missions. U.S. critics could therefore be reassured that their European allies were indeed thinking beyond their own territorial defense. In December 1995 the WEU began its own twelve-month command post exercise CRISEX 95/96 in which the WEU was notionally mandated by the UN (though not, significantly, “requested” by the EU) to ensure safe delivery of humanitarian aid to a fictional country.

Political and military relations between WEU and NATO were also improved, with a long-awaited mechanism for classified document exchange being agreed in May 1996, and with regular meetings between WEU and NATO civilian and military staff. In May 1998, NATO and WEU Councils agreed on a package of consultation arrangements, “covering all stages from the emergence of a crisis through to closure,” which should be finalized by the time of the April 1999 NATO Summit in Washington. Having contributed several papers to NATO’s CJTF consultation process, the WEU passed six contingency plans for a WEU-led CJTF to NATO, for examination by NATO’s military planners. NATO’s first full CJTF exercise took place in 1998, and the Alliance promised that its second CJTF exercise would try out one of the WEU options. A NATO/WEU joint crisis management exercise CCMX/CRISEX is to be carried out in 2000.

The EU has also been the target of WEU affections. In late 1993 EU and WEU Councils agreed various cooperative measures such as a mechanism for the exchange of unclassified information, harmonization of meeting dates, venues and work programs, and limited attendance at each other’s meetings. Relations between the WEU and the European Commission were also developed. In October 1994 the General Affairs Council of the EU made its first formal request to the WEU for assistance, leading to WEU management of the international policing of Mostar. During 1995 the WEU also contributed a paper to the IGC preparatory phase. More broadly, the WEU also makes an important contribution to western outreach to Central and Eastern Europe through its Associate Partnership scheme, and provides a convenient base for the EU’s former neutral states as they move tentatively towards more formal membership of a European defense and security order. The WEU has therefore achieved a great deal in a short time, and furthermore with a staff of less than 300 and a budget of about £28 million, a roughly 4 percent that of NATO.

The WEU has clearly developed a significant, if small-scale, staff-operational capability, and its political profile and value have been increasing steadily. Questions remain, however, about the WEU’s relations with NATO (the document exchange agreement, for example, has its limitations), and about the precise way in which a WEU-led CJTF would be equipped, conducted, monitored and concluded. There may also be doubts about the propriety and wisdom of this development, given the possibility that small-scale operations could ex-
pand and that the WEU still has at its core Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty, a wholly unambiguous collective defense commitment.\textsuperscript{69} And without a firmer impression of the prospects for CFSP, it is next to impossible to judge the WEU against its most important task of using the agreed ESDI-within-NATO formula to build a convincing relationship between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists. Whatever the reservations, however, the WEU should at least make possible a working compromise between these two approaches to European security, and between integrationism and inter-governmentalism as styles of cooperation. There is, \textit{prima facie}, no reason to suppose that the WEU will \textbf{not} serve CFSP adequately, as and when CFSP develops. And it may even be, to take up the argument used by the European Parliament and others, that the WEU could hasten the development and consolidation of CFSP.

6. NEW LABOUR

Before and after the May 1997 election, Labour’s approach to European security, and in particular its view on NATO, was broadly consistent with Conservative policies. Rather than challenge established thinking, Labour’s main defense and security “plank” in the election was the promise to conduct a “strategic defense review” soon after coming to power. Nevertheless, there is merit in a brief examination of Labour’s policy statements, not least because a pre-election hint of Euro-phoria had, by autumn 1997 at the latest, given way to a traditionally Atlanticist, pro-NATO position with which the Conservative opposition could have little quarrel. In other words, in broad policy terms it is reasonable to assume that the change of government has had little effect on Britain’s involvement in the European security debate.

It is in Labour’s position paper for the 1996 EU IGC that the greatest Euro-enthusiasm Europeanism can be found:

The governments of Europe should act together to prevent conflict, oppose aggression, defend human rights, promote development and trade and tackle international crime and terrorism. The Labour Party strongly supports concerted action in the field of international security in its broadest sense. Coordinated approaches by the European powers through the [CFSP] machinery could both (sic) provide a common basis for joint diplomatic and economic measures to prevent future conflicts and tragedies.\textsuperscript{70}

Thereafter, the document becomes steadily more traditionalist. Labour declared its reluctance to see the United States end its military presence in Europe but argued that since the United States would not always be “willing or able” to commit forces “in response to threats to European interests,” then “it is desirable” that the nations of Europe develop a capacity to coordinate military operations in support of common policies.” That said, Labour could not support the
idea of a “European army,” nor the broader notion of endowing the EU with some form of “military competence”; “To give Brussels [sic] a defense role would involve expensive and unnecessary duplication of effort . . .” Instead, Labour would prefer to see the WEU developed further as “the European pillar of NATO.” The merger of the WEU and the EU was rejected, but relations between the institutions should nevertheless be improved.  

Labour’s 1997 election manifesto document echoed the party’s earlier position. “Labour has always been a staunch supporter of NATO,” the document declared, and reiterated Labour’s support for:

- a stronger European component to the alliance. While Labour does not support the establishment of a European army or proposals to give the [EU] a military competence, we are committed to greater European defense cooperation. We believe that efforts to develop a common defense policy should concentrate on strengthening the [WEU] as the European contribution to NATO.

But with the May 1997 election won, Labour was able to discard even the slightest hint of Europeanism. In a speech on European security in September 1997, the Labour government’s Defense Secretary George Robertson barely found time to mention the EU and defense cooperation outside the NATO framework. The speech was robustly and unequivocally pro-NATO and pro-Atlanticist; there could be no real challenge to NATO’s primacy in matters of defense and security. Furthermore, as well as its military role, NATO had now become “a primary vehicle for political activity,” echoing the Harmel Doctrine of 1967. Later the same month, in a speech on the strategic defense review, Robertson again ignored the EU while proclaiming the cause of NATO:

The end of the Cold War does not mean that NATO’s job is finished . . . NATO has already shown that it is the security organization best suited to respond to likely challenges. It provides a vital transatlantic link, not just at the political level but also through the engagement of American forces on the European continent. That was the cornerstone of European security throughout the Cold War. The United States has also made it quite clear that it expects its European Allies properly to share the burden of European security. For the future NATO provides a means to bind a community of nations, committed to promoting shared values and defending common interests, to deter and insure against new security risks in Europe.

Given the Labour government’s enthusiasm for the Atlanticist, intergovernmentalist cause, the events of autumn 1998 came as something a shock to many seasoned observers of the European security scene. For a moment, the Blair government appeared to have changed its mind on this most
fundamental of issues. Teetering on the edge of a Europeanist volte face, it seemed that the 1997 election campaign rhetoric might, after all, have had some substance. For the first months of 1998, it was the NATO enlargement issue, and the ratification debate in the U.S. Senate, which dominated the news. But then, in the late summer, with the situation in Kosovo deteriorating and with the need for external intervention (probably by NATO) looking ever more likely, the Austrian government sprang a surprise.

As holders of the presidency of the EU, Vienna took the opportunity to propose a meeting of EU defense ministers. Not only would this be the first ever ministerial session of this sort, it would have as its goal the re-examination of ideas for a common EU defense. The possibility of an eventual EU/WEU merger came back into discussion; the awkwardly-phrased Amsterdam Treaty would not be, it seemed, the last, semi-coherent word on the subject of an EU defense and security identity. The real surprise, though, lay not in the Austrian proposal, but in the British government’s willingness, apparently to give due “consideration” to it, and to treat it with something other than contempt. Yet within one month, in what some critics saw at best as a self-contradiction and at worst as a desperate maneuver to deflect the Europeanist resurgence, the familiar features of the British position were reconfirmed. Shortly before the October EU summit meeting in Pörtschach, Austria, Prime Minister Blair reportedly “made plain that he was ready to drop Britain’s longstanding objections to the EU having a defense capability.” But this capability was not to be seen as the kernel of a European army, would see no role for the European Commission, and would in no sense rival NATO. In other words, while some fresh thinking in matters of European defense and security might be welcomed, the British government remained firmly attached to its familiar inhibitions and its preference for the ESDI-within-NATO formula agreed at the June 1996 Berlin NAC ministerial.

But one possibility remained up for discussion. Could the Berlin formula, and with it the primacy of NATO and the transatlantic link, be better pursued by cutting out the WEU “middle-man” altogether? Would it be worth sacrificing the WEU in order that an EU defense and security effort could be encouraged which would be not only effective but also supportive to NATO and the Atlanticist cause? Although the British government continued to reject the possibility of a complete merger of the WEU and EU (the French preference), the precise intent of the “Blair initiative” remained somewhat opaque: should the WEU continue to have an independent existence? Or should the functions of the WEU be divided somehow, possibly with its political activities being passed to the EU’s Council of Ministers, and its military functions being taken over by NATO?

The Anglo-French summit meeting in St Mâlo in early December failed to put an end to the speculation. In their declaration, Prime Minister Blair and President Chirac spoke of the need to make a “reality” of the Amsterdam Treaty, which would include the “full and rapid implementation of the provisions on
CFSP.” Both leaders could once again envisage the “progressive framing of a common defense policy,” albeit in a decidedly intergovernmental framework, making use of the European Council, the General Affairs Council and meetings of Defense Ministers. The EU, they said, should set itself the goal of a “capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces,” and in so doing contribute to the “vitality of a modernized Atlantic Alliance.” In other words, the basic tenets of the 1996 NAC Berlin ministerial were again broadly endorsed, and it was difficult to see in the British position a fundamental change of direction. For many observers, the true test of British intentions was the fate of the WEU, but here the outcome was inconclusive. Blair and Chirac acknowledged that, as the EU developed its capacity for action, using military means drawn either from NATO or from “national or multinational means outside the NATO framework,” account would have to be taken of the “existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU.” But beyond this vaguely ominous statement, the future of the WEU was left undecided.79

The WEU’s place in the “institutional meccano”80 of European security was touched on at the “NATO at 50” conference in London in early March 1999. French Defense Minister Alain Richard took a clear enough line: “the future offers a greater role for the [EU], which will be called on to take on the capabilities and role of the WEU.” His German colleague, Rudolf Scharping, took a similar view, referring enthusiastically to the prospect of a “rapid merger of the WEU and EU.”81 Blair, however, avoided the issue by insisting that European defense should be more about capabilities than about “institutional fixes.” He was noticeably more forthcoming in excluding the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice from any EU defense and security decision-making.82 Speaking the following day, Britain’s Defense Minister George Robertson was similarly wary of the obsession with “the narrow and sterile institutional debate.” Robertson argued that the WEU should be used to build upon the arrangements made at Berlin in 1996, but otherwise had little to say directly about the WEU’s prospects.83

By early spring 1999, it was plain that a revolution in the Labour government’s approach to European defense and security cooperation had not, after all, taken place. Many familiar preferences and prejudices remained. If there was an element of Europeanism in the British position, it was embedded somewhere in the idea of developing a European capability in matters of defense and security, rather than continuing to be obsessed with identity and institutional arrangements. But the product would, as ever in the British view, have to be unequivocally intergovernmental and would have to serve the greater good of the transatlantic partnership.

7. CONCLUSION

Since the end of the Cold War, the British government’s approach to the European security debate has been broadly consistent. This approach has been
defined as much by what Whitehall has rejected and sought to undermine, as by its preferences. The British have rejected the following ideas:

- A division between NATO and the WEU in which the former carries responsibility for Article 5 tasks, and the latter for non-Article 5 tasks (known as “bifurcation”);
- A division between NATO and the WEU in which the former conducts combat operations and the latter conducts non-combat operations;
- A division along geographic lines, with North Americans and Europeans making their own respective defense security arrangements within a much looser, political alliance (known as “binarism”);
- The duplication of institutions through the development of an independent EU military command structure and discrete military capability;
- A role in matters of defense and security for either the European Commission, the European Parliament of the Court of Justice;
- The full-scale merger of the WEU and the EU.

At the same time, Britain has been anxious to promote the following causes:

- The maintenance of the transatlantic, U.S.-European defense and security link;
- NATO’s primacy among the West’s security and defense institutions;
- The need for European allies to cooperate in order to complement and reinforce NATO;
- The need for any European cooperation to be inter-governmental in character.

In the end, the British preference has been for a NATO which cements the U.S.-European alliance and which functions on both political and military levels. In military matters, Britain’s preference is for a NATO which can cover the whole spectrum of military activity, from combat to non-combat, Article 5 and non-Article 5. The EU (or any other institution) should not be allowed to challenge NATO’s primacy. But at the same time, NATO’s European members should be willing to collaborate among themselves to make the alliance more effective and equal. In this regard, the WEU has been at the fore of British thinking. Provided the WEU is kept institutionally separate from the EU, the opportunity arises for European allies to cooperate in an institution which is manifestly not the EU, which is intergovernmental in character, subordinate to NATO and which should complement the alliance’s activities and on occasion take assistance from it.
But the WEU became much more than a means to make the British position coherent and persuasive. In part a result of Britain’s advocacy of the institution, the WEU also assumed a crucial part in the broader European security debate. Britain’s expectations of the WEU and the organization’s future remain in the balance. As far as the relations between the various institutions are concerned, much is possible, and in practical terms, little if anything has been foreclosed. What is vital is that the Euro-Atlantic security relationship with a lean and ambitious NATO on one hand, and a rather more flabby but no less ambitious EU on the other be allowed to develop and mature. At an early stage, the WEU took on the appearance, and some of the substance, of a European security and defense institution, but its main role was to lubricate the relationship between NATO and the EU. By early 1999 it appeared that the British government, the erstwhile champion of the WEU, might have lost some of its interest in and attachment to the institution. But this is merely to reiterate that what has motivated successive post-Cold War governments has been the pursuit of Atlanticism and intergovernmentalism in the creation of a European Security and Defense Identity, rather than some vague and romantic attachment to the WEU. Conservative and Labour governments have been remarkably consistent in seeing the WEU as a means to an end. They have also been consistent in their preference for “task” or “capability” based planning, and in their preference for action rather than institutional juggling. Furthermore, both have been adept at seizing media attention with “distinct shifts” in policy, which before long prove to be a repackaging of shared ideas and goals; the parallels between the coverage (and content) of ostensible policy changes in early 1994 and late 1998 are striking.

By the end of the first post-Cold War decade, the central features of British policy on European security and defense had been firmly established, and were common to both parties of government. Other European governments remained as adamant and consistent in their views and preferences, with the result that many familiar tensions remained unresolved. The degree to which these disagreements can be resolved with depend on the outcome of the NATO Summit meeting in April 1999, the WEU Ministerial in May, and the meeting of the European Council in June. Judging by events of the past decade, and by the degree to which differing views have become entrenched, the most likely outcome is a continuation of the imperfect compromise etched out during 1996 and 1997. It remains to be seen precisely where the WEU will fit in to any new or adapted security system. But given that it has so far acted as a crucial “passe-partout” in the development of a European defense and security framework in which NATO’s primacy remains largely unchallenged, it would certainly be unwise to discard the WEU and its achievements too hastily.

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ENDNOTES

1 I have elsewhere described NATO’s new rationale and modus operandi as an alliance based on “choice” (rather than necessity), “capability” (rather than “threat”), and as a “virtual alliance” (rather than one territorially defined). See my Partnership in Crisis: the U.S., Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO (London: Cassell, 1997).


7 The agreement was to place Eurocorps (including, therefore, its French contingent) under SACEUR’s operational command in time of conflict. Previously, French troops taking part in NATO collective defense would have been merely under SACEUR’s operational control. France’s preference for control ensured that the initiative behind, and ultimate command of, the deployment of French soldiers rested with the French government.


16 FCO, Memorandum, para.17.


20 “[Rifkind’s] Understanding was that the Scope of the WEU ‘Did Not Include Combat Missions,’” “U.S. and Europe Agree NATO Role,” The Times, June 4, 1996.


23 “NATO Acquires a European Identity,” The Economist, June 8, 1996.

24 Quoted in “Defense Deal Keeps All the Parties Happy,” The Independent, June 4, 1996.


26 “U.S. and Europe Agree NATO Role,” The Times, June 4, 1996.

27 “Defense Deal Keeps All the Parties Happy,” The Independent, June 4, 1996.


By now, a new suite of labels had emerged: Major NATO Command was replaced with “Strategic Command;” MSC with “Regional Command;” and Principal Subordinate Command (PSC) and sub-PSC either with “Joint Sub-Regional Command,” or “Component Command” (i.e., single-service). To avoid confusion, the old terms will be used for the remainder of this chapter.


Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.


NATO Communiqué M-NAC-2(96) 165, December 10, 1996.

NATO Communiqué M-NAC(DM)-3(96)172, December 18, 1996.


Unexpectedly, relations between Greece and Turkey took a step forward at Madrid, with the signature of a non-aggression pact; “Greece and Turkey Surprise with Peace Pact,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 16, 1997. The Anglo-Spanish disagreement has also since been calmed.


See S. Nuttall, “The Commission and Foreign Policy-making,” in Edwards and Spence (eds), The European Commission.


For an assessment of various proposals to improve CFSP see C. Grant, Strength in numbers: Europe’s foreign and defense policy (London: Centre for European Reform, 1996).


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54 DG1A Briefing Note IA/A/CMR D(96) June 21, 1996.
58 “U.S. and Europe Agree NATO Role,” The Times, June 4, 1996.
62 Draft Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.7, para.1. (Emphasis added; to highlight the stress on intergovernmental co-operation). *The TEU had used “eventual” rather than “progressive;” the latter term suggests dynamism, but is more open-ended.
63 Draft Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.7, para.2.


P. Schmidt, “ESDI: A German Analysis,” in Barry (ed.), Reforging the Transatlantic Relationship, p.44.
ITALY AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
Gianni Bonvicini

The Western European Union (WEU) has never played a primary role in Italy’s foreign and security policy, but has emerged sporadically as the focus of political discussion and occasional initiative. More precisely, three main periods can be identified: in 1984, when the WEU was revived after a long period of hibernation that had begun in the fall of 1954; in 1991, concurrent with the Anglo-Italian declaration prior to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty; and in 1997, on the eve of the June European summit in Amsterdam and prior to the revisions of the Maastricht Treaty.

In short, the WEU has stood in the wings with respect to the more crucial issues of NATO and the security and defense aspects of European political integration. For this reason, the WEU must be set in these two key contexts in order to understand how it has been used by Italy’s government. Nevertheless, the history and evolution of Italian attitude towards the WEU represents a good case study for the understanding of some of the more significant elements of Italian foreign and security policy in the context of the process of European integration. It can also be of use for the analysis of the current Italian role within Europe, both for its fundamental principles and contradictions.

If we look at the history of Italy’s participation in the WEU, we can fix some of the basic characteristics of this interplay between continuity and contradictions. Italy’s picture emerges as one of a medium size power having played the role of founder for all European institutions (including the WEU), but at the same time with a clear fear of remaining excluded from any new initiative launched by the Franco-German duo. In the defense and security field, Italy is a strong and convinced advocate of an autonomous European initiative in building a defense community, but at the same time it is more dependent than others on the American influence on the continent. Italy advances a specific security interest in the Mediterranean and occasionally plays a rather important role in it, but at the same time it does not have the strength to convince its European partners to provide the necessary cover for its action in the region, where it remains compressed between the conflicting American and French national interests.

If these are the contradictions of the past, there is also no doubt that, today, the future of European security and defense is destined to play an even more significant role in Italy, owing to the profound changes of the past few years affecting the country’s geopolitical and geostrategic situation. With the end of the Cold War, Italy has rapidly become a complete “frontier” country, due to the addition of the eastern front to the traditional southern one. Italy stands at the crossroads of two of the most crucial crisis areas in Europe: the Balkans and the Mediterranean. At the same time, Italy has also recently recognized in the Albanian case the diminished security coverage offered by the traditional
international organizations: the UN, NATO, OSCE and the European Union (EU).

The greater external security exposure, accompanied by a weaker multilateral coverage, has forced Italy to revise its security policy options in both the domestic and European perspectives. The search for a more credible and effective alternative in military terms, whether it be NATO, CFSP (the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union) or the WEU, is becoming a vital political concern. Even today, the WEU represents one of the possible options for Italy, although not necessarily the dominant one.

1. THE MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY CHOICES IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

There is an abundance of literature that considers Italian foreign policy since the end of World War II to be the fruit of two fundamental choices: its staunch fidelity to the project of European integration (the ECSC in 1952, and the EEC since 1957) and its membership in the Atlantic alliance. Once Italy took these steps, for almost thirty years it avoided raising questions of different or added choices with respect to these two key pillars of its foreign policy. Italy has followed with great constancy, though with a certain measure of passivity, the great debates which have accompanied the vicissitudes of the Atlantic alliance and the European Community, always siding with the proponents of the most orthodox views.

This attitude, which continued almost uninterruptedly until the early 1980s, was born of the historical reasons that had dictated Italy’s choices in the postwar period and of its particular domestic political situation. In essence, the strategy of the postwar government headed by Alcide De Gasperi centered around the following objectives:

• to rejoin the ranks of the nations of Western Europe and sit at the same table with those who count (also in order to overcome the status of defeated country). This desire is one of the constants in Italian foreign policy and serves as the source of frustration/reaction which has distinguished many Italian policy moves (the so-called “non-exclusion principle”);4
• to thwart domestic debate on foreign policy, particularly on security matters. In effect, a “national” foreign policy floating free of the mighty anchor of the emerging western multilateral system could become a source of serious domestic instability, because of Italy’s vivid nationalistic past and the presence of an anti-West Communist Party. In other words, De Gasperi wanted to be free to get on with the task of the country’s economic reconstruction without having to deal with the added problem of foreign policy and security; NATO was also an excellent excuse to justify the maintenance and reconstruction of the Italian army;
• to erect an insurmountable ideological barrier against the communist opposition. In political terms, Italy’s anchorage to the West acted simultaneously as an obstacle to the ambitions of the communist Left to assert itself as a credible government alternative with respect to the Christian Democrats and the moderate Left (the Socialists from the 1960s) and as an irresistible lure for the communists to seek to justify their democratic “legitimation” and to be able to participate, albeit indirectly, in governing the country (the “national solidarity” government of the late 1970s).

Another fundamental reason underlies De Gasperi’s choice of his unwavering faith in the process of European political integration as the only true antidote to the nationalist policies that had wrought so much damage in Italy and throughout Europe.

2. THE VICISSITUDES OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY (EDC) AND THE “NON-ALTERNATIVE” REPRESENTED BY THE WEU

De Gasperi’s full support of the first European defense project (the EDC, 1952) and his disappointment at its shelving by the French Parliament stemmed from his convictions in European integration and avoiding the nationalist policies of the past. Advised in those years by Altiero Spinelli, leader of the then rather influential Italian Federalists, De Gasperi was able to:

• overcome the misgivings of the Italian armed forces, who were reluctant to join with the armies of the other EDC countries they had fought against (the French) or from whom they had separated (the Germans); and

• skirt the strong communist (and socialist) opposition by promoting an initiative to add to the original EDC a political dimension represented by the project of an European Political Community (EPC), the famous article 38 of the EDC Treaty, which established an ad hoc assembly to draft the political section of the treaty itself. This pro-federalist approach was to be a constant in Italy’s European policy for many years to come. It represented an ideological factor that responded to the deepest Italian national interest. This idea of a political union almost always came to the fore whenever questions relative to the definition of a common security and defense policy were on the agenda.

Among other things, the disappointing experience of the EDC opened the chapter on Italy’s European policy involving difficult relations with France, precisely over the crucial questions of common defense. In particular, funda-
mental divergences arose over NATO, in which the French wanted to distance themselves from the United States, and also over the European security initiatives following the fall of the EDC. Notable among the Franco-Italian disagreements were those regarding the Fouchet plan (1961-63), when the Italians sided with the Benelux countries in defense of European orthodoxy and good relations with Washington, and in 1981 and 1983, when the French opposed a strong pro-Community version of the Gensher-Colombo plan (see below). These suspicions and misunderstandings have carried over to the present.

It must finally be observed that the Italian debate on European security is wholly unrelated to the role of the WEU in its first three decades. The 1954 decision to renew the Treaty of Brussels as a substitute for the defunct EDC has left barely a trace in the annals of Italian foreign policy. “Sleeping Beauty,” as the WEU was scornfully termed, did not represent a feasible alternative to the EDC in Italy’s European outlook, and there was no apparent opposition to its immediate and substantial “devolution,” transferring to NATO all its competencies and operational programs. Consequently, in the years that followed, attention was entirely focused on NATO. In domestic politics the camps divided into pro-Americans (supporters of NATO) and anti-Americans. No one dreamed of taking up sides for or against the WEU.

The only real significance attributed to the WEU was that of playing the British card within Europe. The presence of Great Britain in the WEU was a good argument for proponents of enlarging the EC to admit the United Kingdom, contrary to the Gaullist policy of France. One of the major champions of an enlarged EC was, rather unexpectedly, Altiero Spinelli, one of Italy’s greatest Europeanists. Some time after being nominated commissioner in Brussels in 1970, Spinelli decided to appoint, in the face of total opposition from his own colleagues, a British head of cabinet. This “Trojan horse” as originally evoked by the Gaullists was transformed, from the Italian perspective, into a valuable ally to thwart French attempts to impose its own leadership and to reinforce an Atlantic vision of Europe—the only way to overcome Washington’s misgivings over greater European autonomy in the field of security. Despite the many delusions Great Britain would give Italy on European integration issues, and because of which an authentic Anglo-Italian alliance was never able to take shape, this fundamental idea was to be revived in 1991 precisely with regard to the WEU and its relations with the European Union.

3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION (EPC) AND EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY

With the WEU shunted aside to await revitalization at a propitious moment, which no one then was able to foresee, Italy followed other avenues to contribute to strengthening European security policies. The first avenue involved adding a security dimension to the EPC, which was founded in 1970. For a variety of reasons, Italy deemed the exercise of foreign policy within the
EPC to be of major significance. On one hand, this completed the Italian ideological blueprint, which viewed the addition of a political dimension to economic integration as completing the journey towards European unification; on the other, this furnished good coverage for Italian foreign policy, especially in very delicate areas such as the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

The 1981 initiative of Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo and his German counterpart Dietrich Genscher to add security policy to the EPC, completing the British initiative of October of that same year (the London Report), sprang from this fundamental conviction. But, unlike the British, the two foreign ministers wanted to “communitarize” the EPC, also in terms of the new security aspects just decided in London. The operation failed, not only because of the expected British opposition, but also because of French reluctance to support an initiative which did not cast France as the key player and which, in any case, strayed too far from France’s “autonomist” vision of security matters. The Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart which followed in June 1983 catalogued these obstacles and wound up a partial failure.

The second avenue pursued by Italian political forces involved supporting Altiero Spinelli, then a member of the European Parliament in the ranks of the Italian Communist Party in favor of a strong initiative to revise the Treaty of Rome. Approved by a wide majority of the European Parliament in February 1984, the “New Treaty” openly took up the problem of European defense. European defense thus became a competence of the Union, without passing through the WEU, and stood as one of the most innovative aspects of the parliamentary project. Although the New Treaty remained a dead letter, it must be recognized for having clearly asserted the issue of common defense.

These two initiatives, conceived in the early 1980s and conducted concurrently, one at the government level, the other within the European Parliament, were important for having openly faced the problem emerging in those years about the role of the European Community in the security field. This is the period of maturation of what might be called the “European syndrome” — Europe’s seeing itself as simultaneously the subject and the object of international security policy. These were the years in which the Euromissiles were deployed, parallel to the opening of talks between the United States and the USSR on an INF Treaty. Europe, which had made the difficult decision to accept the Euromissiles on its soil, felt excluded from the Moscow-Washington dialogue and sought the means to reassert itself.

4. TOWARDS REVITALIZATION OF THE WEU

From this state of affairs came the thrust to revitalize the WEU, with Italy in the forefront. Council President Bettino Craxi and Defense Minister Giovanni Spadolini played most of their European cards to achieve this. It was no coincidence that the meeting of the WEU Council to propose its revival was held in Rome (October 26-27, 1984). Italy’s commitment to this cause continued in
the following years, from its contribution to drafting the WEU Platform (1987) to negotiations with the British in 1991 to insert this document into the Maastricht Treaty. There were various reasons for Italy’s about-face on the WEU, an institution which until then, as we have noted, had never really found a place in Italy’s political debate.

**Italy’s Growing Role in Foreign Policy and Security Matters and the Urgent Need to Find Better Multilateral Coverage**

The early 1980s were marked by what has been labeled “an emerging profile of Italian foreign policy.” Without explicitly announcing a new foreign policy strategy, Italy began to emerge from the state of passivity it had consciously adopted in the postwar period in the wake of its two key choices, NATO and the EC. The new commitments pertained in particular to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, from the 1981 Treaty on Malta’s neutrality to participation in the Sinai peacekeeping operation, from missions in Lebanon to the interventions to sweep mines from the Red Sea and the naval control of the Persian Gulf.

It must be noted that Italy also showed a strong commitment on the European front. The most important action involved approving the deployment of 120 Cruise missiles at Comiso in 1983, a decision which paved the way for the analogous choice by the German Bundestag. This meant the effective deployment of Euromissiles in Western Europe. If, on the one hand, these various actions helped Italy rediscover a certain measure of freedom in national foreign policy, on the other, they forced Italy to reassess the role of Europe in providing the necessary international security coverage, particularly in out-of-area operations, in which NATO seemed to lack competence, while the WEU, theoretically, faced no obstacles. Of course, this debate was conducted largely on paper, since the WEU still lacked the possibility of becoming operative, at least until the Petersberg agreement in 1992.

**Relations With the USA in the Mediterranean**

The increasing Italian role in the Mediterranean soon came into conflict with Washington’s policy in the region. Aside from Washington’s conduct in the Middle East, on which there already existed a broad critical European front (European Council, Venice, 1980), Italy found itself enmeshed in the thorny Libyan question, on which agreement with Washington had proved futile. The first American bombardment of Tripoli in 1984 found Italy exposed on the front line, and a European Community reply seemed impossible, due to the lack of competencies in the security field. It was precisely this want of European coverage that forced Italy to endorse every initiative that might help build greater European security, including revival of the WEU. In the Mediterranean the overwhelming American presence could not be challenged without the backing of Europe.
Fear of the Rise of an Extra-WEU “Directoire”

As early as 1984, at the time of the WEU’s revival, Defense Minister Spadolini expressed in a memorandum the need to elude the perils of a Franco-Anglo-German “directoire” on European security and arms cooperation matters, a kind of trilateral “core” of a future military set up in Europe. In the following years this risk disappeared and the Italian fear focused instead on the birth of a bilateral Franco-German “directoire.” This factor also worked in favor of revitalizing Europe. On June 19, 1987, the announcement of implementation of the clauses in the Elysée Treaty regarding military cooperation between France and Germany triggered acute concern in Italian political and even more in military circles, which, since the creation of the Franco-German Brigade saw the tangible threat of a “directoire” looming in the defense field.

As we will see, the question of the “directoire” was to become even more crucial in recent times. But even then it provoked what we might term a “conditioned reflex” of Italian foreign policy: the attempt to communitarize the emerging extra-Community initiatives of the Franco-German duo. The alternative was to attempt to counteract the problem by relying on the British and allying with them. Based on this line of reasoning, at that time the preferable alternative was to strengthen the WEU and have it assimilate the Franco-German military agreement.

Failure of the Previous Community Initiatives, Slow Developments Within the Community and the Search for a Quicker Alternative

These considerations certainly played a role in the attempt, not only by Italy but also by the majority of its European partners, to bank on reviving the WEU rather than await the maturation of a Community security and defense project, which seemed quite remote. In fact the maximum achievable on the European level was inclusion of Art. 30 in the 1986 Single European Act, which yet again made mention of only the political and economic aspects of security (with a pointed exclusion of any military dimension). So, for Italy as well, the WEU alternative represented an authentic short-cut to overcoming the objections of reluctant Community partners (Ireland and Denmark) and to launching effectively the debate on European defense.

Agreement Among the Italian Political Forces on the European Option

It must finally be observed that placing certain bets on Europe rather than placing them all on NATO responded to certain necessities of Italian domestic policy. Europe was the issue that had brought the Communists close to government, so that in 1977 a parliamentary motion on foreign and European policy was approved in common by the government parties and the Communists, displaying a kind of bipartisan attitude on European issues. This led directly to the establishment of the national solidarity government, with the Communists as part of the parliamentary majority, but still excluded from the government. This pro-European approach by the Communists, albeit with certain temporary
interruptions when Italy joined the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, had helped make Italian foreign policy very stable. In fact, even on divisive issues such as the deployment of the Euromissiles in 1983, the Communist opposition proved much softer than expected.14 Adopting a more emphatic European approach on international security questions also aided the strategy of progressive rapprochement among the Italian political forces.

5. RELATIONS WITH WEU, NATO AND THE EU ON THE EVE OF MAASTRICHT

The support accorded the WEU was expressed in every phase of the negotiations which preceded the opening of the Conference on the Maastricht Treaty (1990-91). Some months before, the Italian position underwent an apparent change of course from its habitual Community orthodoxy. Leading Italian politicians and diplomats, in fact, did approach the United Kingdom at the climax of the debate on the place of the WEU within the nascent European Union.

It is widely known that this still open question regards relations between the WEU and the EU on one side and between the WEU and NATO on the other.15 More precisely, the question revolves around whether the WEU should become part of the EU or occupy an autonomous position with respect to it. It is just as widely known that the British have taken a stand in favor of the latter option. On October 4, 1991, the eve of the European Council of Maastricht, Italy and the United Kingdom signed a joint declaration founded on recognition of the special relationship between Western Europe and North America, a relationship which found its true expression in the Atlantic alliance as the “key element of European identity.”16 The reform of NATO and the development of a European defense identity were termed “complementary.” The WEU was to be assigned the task of developing the European dimension in the field of defense, in other words, the “defense” component of the political Union, as well as the European pillar of the alliance. The WEU would have to take into account the decisions of both the European Council and the alliance. In short, the WEU was to act as a “bridge.”

In opposition to the Anglo-Italian stance, a letter signed by Mitterrand and Kohl on October 14, 1991 reiterated the intention of incorporating the WEU into the EU. The Franco-German letter called for creation of an organic linkage between the European Union and the WEU through close cooperation and, in certain areas, a merger of the two institutions. With regard to cooperation between the Atlantic alliance and the WEU, this was to be developed on the basis of the statement issued by the North Atlantic Council in June 1991 in Copenhagen and of the dual principle of transparency and complementarity.

The Italian move took its Community partners somewhat by surprise, since it contrasted with Italy’s oft-expressed integrationist policy. The actual goal of the Italian move was to win the British over to the formulation expressed in the Maastricht Treaty, in which both positions are present, although in terms of
wording the Franco-German formulation of the WEU as an “integral part of the EU” prevails. The truth is that the WEU has continued to live autonomously even after ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, and on the eve of the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) the problem re-emerged in its entirety.

The reasons behind the Italian position can be traced back to the old fear of once more being crushed by Franco-German dominance. This suspicion was fanned by the decision of Bonn and Paris to transform the bilateral brigade into a corps, to be called the Eurocorps, to signify its openness to accepting other members, but whose bilateral character remained preeminent.

Logically speaking, Italy should have remained true to its longstanding philosophy, which was to communitarize the bilateral agreement between Germany and France and stand as a link for a broad coalition of states anxious to achieve the same objective. From this standpoint, agreement with the British, notoriously opposed to any form of “communitarization,” caused this type of reasoning to lose all credibility. So the Italian move was actually governed more by the fear of Franco-German dominance than by Community logic. So much so that, in the following months, the Italian government refused the invitations of France and Germany to join the Eurocorps. In numerous circles, particularly those close to Italy’s defense establishment, the greatest apprehension was over French dominance—the demand to create a “star-shaped structure” in the defense sector, with France always at its center.

6. ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WEU AFTER MAASTRICHT

The period between the coming into effect of the Maastricht Treaty and preparation of the new Intergovernmental Conference, which opened on June 16, 1997 in Amsterdam, was distinguished by a series of extraordinary events for Italian foreign policy and equally sweeping consequences for the way security issues are handled.

Compared to the past, the most relevant aspect certainly involves Italy’s experimentation with a period of partial marginalization from the European and international scene. The first signs of difficulty were manifested over monetary issues, with Italy’s withdrawal from the EMS in the summer of 1992 and the belated discovery of a huge public debt which moved Italy farther away from adherence to the Maastricht macroeconomic convergence criteria necessary to participate in the euro. But unexpected consequences of exclusion or self-exclusion also emerged in other sectors: in the soft security sector, with the difficulties of entering into the Schengen border agreement signed in 1990 by Italy’s principal historical partners in Europe; in the political security sector, with Italy’s exclusion from the Contact Group on Bosnia in early 1994; and finally, the isolated position Italy found itself occupying vis-à-vis the Americans and the Germans on the question of reforming the Security Council (Ger-
many being a partner of vital importance both for the euro and for development of the political pillar of European Union, including the security aspects).  

The feeling of being less indispensable than in the past was confirmed by the facts and led Italy to pursue, at times alone or in contrast with its European partners (like in the case of the reforming of the Security Council), solutions that would protect it from further harm in the foreign policy and security arena. Once again, the “principle of non-exclusion” was triggered as Italy sought to keep from being ostracized from further initiatives, particularly those on the European chessboard. This is the key to understanding the current government’s obsession with participating in the euro, whatever the cost, seeing this as a credit to permit participation in other European initiatives in sectors beyond the economic arena.

These external difficulties were accompanied by a period of profound transformation in domestic politics. In only a few years’ time, the government shifted from center-right (Berlusconi) to center-left (Prodi). Fluctuations and revisions in foreign and security policy were a consequence. Above all, the tangible risk of marginalization combined with the domestic political instability led to a questioning of some of the basic assumptions of Italian foreign policy.

In fact, if the multilateral framework continues to be considered the best way of serving Italian national interests, the perception of a certain marginalization could foster the emergence of unilateral positions. In the near future we might witness the emergence of demands which contrast with both Italy’s original integrationist motives in the EU and the firm preference for a multilateral approach in foreign policy. The combination of European and Italian internal crises has, in fact, helped midwife the birth of new kinds of political tendencies:

1) neo-mercantilist. Proponents of this approach still have in mind the relative advantage for a trade policy with the competitive devaluation of the lira. They continue to oppose Maastricht’s macroeconomic convergence criteria. Supporters of this tendency cut across political lines and numerous sectors of small- and medium-size enterprises.

2) neo-nationalist. This approach emphasizes the geopolitical interests of Italy and reopens some of the disputed issues of the past, for example, that of the Italian minorities in Slovenia and Croatia. Proponents of this tendency include right-wing political forces and certain prominent intellectual circles.

3) neo-neutralist. Advocates of this approach would like to see only a minor engagement of Italy in the western camp, favoring instead, a full assignment of authority to the UN Supporters of this idea belong to the refounded Communist Party.

The common elements of these three approaches include a policy for Italy’s progressive disengagement from Europe and support for greater autonomy in
international affairs, including the security field. For the time being, these positions do not represent real alternatives to Italy’s traditional attachment to the EU, but if European interests were perceived to clash with Italy’s vital interests, they could gain strength.

The European option was also weakened by the WEU’s scant success in managing the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. The operation got off to a good start following speedy approval of the WEU’s operational tasks in Petersberg in the fall of 1992, combined with hopes for an effective revival of the WEU as the armed division of an EU able to impart political directives. But the degeneration of the Bosnian conflict soon revealed the limits of the WEU, which lacked the power to achieve more than the naval control of the Adriatic and the Danube and the reorganization of the police forces in Mostar.

Once again the question of the WEU’s place within either NATO or the EU was opened, to the progressive detriment of the latter hypothesis. The 1996 agreement on the CJTF signed in Berlin did nothing to increase the chances for the WEU’s integration into the EU. Interpretations of this agreement are widely divergent. Some consider it the starting point for a more autonomous role for Europe; others, on the contrary, see it marking the end of Europe’s role, since every decision on the responsibility to be assigned to Europe in the security field depends on the political will of the Atlantic alliance.22

Recently, Italy has directly experienced the disappointments growing out of the scant operational effectiveness of the WEU. In meeting the challenge of the Albanian crisis and deciding the peacekeeping intervention, the WEU option rapidly dissolved as a tangible possibility. The hostile stand of Germany to military engagement in Albania has removed almost entirely the European coverage of the military mission. Paradoxically, Italy was forced to turn to France, utilizing Eurofor and Euromar, the two initiatives parallel to the Eurocorps that were conceived in 1995.


One might have thought that the emergence of greater skepticism in Italy about the WEU’s capacity to shoulder the burden of European military operations would have shifted the country farther away from its past integrationist attitudes and, in light of Amsterdam, made it more prudent on the subject of strengthening this institution.23 In reality, with a government fully engaged to regain the country’s lost credibility and reverse the process of marginalization from Europe, the chances for a less pro-integrationist policy in the security field were rather nonexistent. The poor performance of the WEU and its institutional inconsistency did not represent a good argument to be used against its reinforcement. On the contrary, in view of the Intergovernmental Conference
in Amsterdam, the combination of these mutually contradictory factors led Italy once again to follow tradition in favor of strengthening European defense institutions, backing, in this case, the strongest option.

Italy had therefore decided to support a joint document of the six founding states of the European Community, together with Spain. This document, presented at the ministerial meeting in Rome on March 25, 1997, called for a three-phase plan for the progressive absorption of the WEU into the EU and had to be approved by the other European partners in Amsterdam. The key passage for the credibility of this plan was that of deciding the final date for its implementation. But in order to avoid a crossfire on it from the very beginning, the duration of the entire transition phase was left blank in the document. Only on the eve of Amsterdam, the presidency, with the agreement of the other proponents, suggested to fix the deadline for at least the first phase at five years, as foreseen by Art. N in the treaty’s revision.

Italy having adopted this advanced position, it is clear that, unlike on the eve of Maastricht, there was neither margin nor temptation for any kind of mediation or compromise with the United Kingdom. The only viable policy was that of endorsing wholeheartedly the desire expressed, until then, by France and Germany to absorb the WEU into the Union. In addition, Italy called for a certain measure of “communitarization” of European defense policy. The proposal to have the WEU disappear might have furthered a gradual shift in this direction.

Unfortunately in Amsterdam the worst possible scenario took place. A weak Dutch presidency, wishing to close the IGC on time at any cost, and an ambiguous German position on the real necessity to reinforce the political pillar of the Union (as Germany had been declaring in the previous months) left Italy completely alone in fighting the battle for the institutional upgrading of the WEU and the defense pillar of the Union. No mention of the five year deadline for the revision of Art. J.7 on the defense tasks of the Union appeared in the final text, nor was any suggestion to further communitarize European security policy accepted. The collapse of the “European spirit” in Amsterdam and the defeat of the strong institutional option has created a degree of embarrassment in political and diplomatic circles of Italy. The temptation to move away from the traditional path of Europe again regained some support inside the government and in the opposition, but a nationalistic option is not yet there.

Italy still senses acutely the real risk that the absence of strong European institutions might generate trends towards new “directoires” to meet the proliferation of local crises in Europe and the Mediterranean. Belonging to a “directoire” of Southern European countries in the Mediterranean to deal, even if successfully, with the Albanian crisis is not an attractive prospect for Italy, since it could spell Italy’s exclusion from the “directoires” that might be established in Central Europe. This would also leave France completely free to advance its “stellar” policy that Italy has so often opposed (only to contradict itself by agreeing to participate in Eurofor and Euromar, thereby making them
operative for the military campaign in Albania, as noted above). In addition, antagonism with France persists over the NATO AFSOUTH command. Italy is, at least tactically, in conflict with its own pro-Europe policy, since it has sided more with the American positions than with those of France and Germany.

At the same time, it is certainly inopportune for Italy to act in concert with the United States in the Mediterranean, since Italy has no chance at all of being able to influence the design or control of American policies and actions in the region. For a weak country like Italy, still experiencing a period of humiliating marginalization, the persistence of a strong multilateral system still represents the only real guarantee against the risk of exclusion. Italy also knows very well how disruptive exclusion from Europe can be internally. An equation between exclusion and secession (or internal disruption), as proposed by the Northern League, is easy to draw. Therefore the only credible option remains the old strategy towards Europe. The effort to be part of the euro is certainly in line with that strategy. It represents the only way out from past marginalization at European and international levels and responds to a deep Italian national interest.

Once again, it seems that the only foreign policy strategy for Italy is to bank on the Community option rather than face the situation of uncertainty and crisis it has had to experience the past few years with regard to its foreign and security policy. The WEU is certainly not, for the time being, the primary objective of this action, but rather a European Union in full control of its common security and defense policy. But in order to achieve that, and this is more clear after Amsterdam, first it has to move through the doors of full economic and monetary integration. The rest might follow.

ENDNOTES

SPAIN AND THE “EUROPEANIZATION” OF SECURITY
Antonio Marquina

In 1996, the new Spanish government led by Partido Popular (Popular Party), approved in the Spanish Cortes the military integration of Spain into NATO, with the support of other parliamentary groups with the exception Izquierda Unida (United Left). With this, an anomalous period was closed that started when Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) took office in 1982.

TRADITIONAL INTERESTS OF SPAIN

Spain’s traditional security and defense interests have been focused in the Mediterranean. European issues were neglected since the beginning of the century. Spain participated directly in neither the First World War nor the Second World War. However, since the Second World War it was clear that Spain could no longer isolate itself from European security developments. In October 1940, Spain became a secret ally of the Axis after its adherence to the “Steel Pact.” The Tripartite Pact was postponed in deference to Italy and Germany. These agreements implied significant Spanish servility during the war in favor of the Axis countries.1

During the Cold War Spain was integrated indirectly into the European security framework by the way of the 1953 U.S.-Spanish agreements on military bases in Spain. These agreements were conditioned by two provisions: 1) establishing military bases for European, not Spanish, defense; and 2) involving Spanish armed forces in cases of war in Europe.2

This unbalanced situation persisted throughout Franco’s regime. The Spanish government tried to integrate Spain into NATO, but political objections from some states prevented this. The Spanish government maintained the following rationale: given that the military bases were to serve European defense, the integration of Spain into NATO was logical. When this could not be achieved, Spain requested a defense treaty with the U.S. However, this was not possible either due to U.S. Senate opposition. As a consequence, Spain asked for a military and economic aid package from the U.S. in order to enable Spain to fulfill its defense commitments. This last request was not accepted either. All this provoked strong tensions between the two governments that have simmered ever since the renewal of the agreements in 1963. The U.S. decision was predicated upon the so-called “threat from the South,” referring to the consequences of the turbulent process of decolonization in Morocco, along with Algeria’s decolonization and new political orientation. The Spanish government concluded that it could not count on U.S. support in coping with this new kind of threat.3

Spanish interests were concentrated in the western Mediterranean. Spain even tried to establish some form of defense for the Mediterranean prior to the signature of the U.S.-Spanish Agreements. Once the agreements were signed,
a Mediterranean pact or conference was proposed. Later on, a Pact for the Western Mediterranean was considered. This approach allowed Spain to address proximate threats, while highlighting the importance of Spain.⁴

**THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY AND SPANISH INTEGRATION INTO NATO**

This approach was maintained after 1974, with the restoration of democracy in Spain. The shameful consequences of Western Sahara decolonization especially influenced the perception of threats coming from North Africa.⁵ Nevertheless, Spain looked for normalization of its situation in the European context, and the Spanish government, led by Calvo Sotelo, integrated Spain into NATO against the PSOE’s Third-World-posture on security and defense policy. PSOE favored traditional Spanish isolation and highlighted the fear that nuclear weapons inspired. This approach changed what all the surveys had indicated: major popular support for the integration of Spain into NATO.⁶

Once PSOE took office in 1982, the government conducted a referendum to decide whether Spain should remain a member of NATO (not whether it should leave NATO, as stipulated in PSOE’s electoral program). The government won the referendum and Spain remained a NATO member, though, like the French, excluded itself from the Integrated Military Structure (IMS).⁷

Once the NATO issue was more or less settled, PSOE enhanced Spanish integration into the WEU while reducing U.S. military presence in Spain (one of the conditions of the NATO referendum), and advocated Gorbachev’s initiative on elimination of intermediate range nuclear forces (INF). Conversations on the Coordination Agreement with the Atlantic alliance also began.

The Spanish government’s security and defense policy guidelines were clearly both nationalistic and European. In the depths of the Cold War, Atlanticism was astonishingly dismissed. The government explained that, as a rearguard country, Spain’s military integration in the Atlantic Alliance was not necessary. Spain would be integrated in neither the NATO chain of command, nor NATO’s commands covering different geographic areas of responsibility. Spain also reserved for itself any decision on the deployment of military forces. Planning and missions of Spanish forces under Spanish command would be developed in coordination with the allied command.

The Spanish contribution should be established within the sphere of Spanish strategic interest. The missions of Spanish armed forces in the Atlantic alliance were to be:

- defense of Spanish territory;
- control of air space and defense of the Spanish area of responsibility;
- naval and air operations in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean;
• control of Gibraltar Strait and its access;
• use of Spanish territory as a transit zone and area of logistic support.

These missions and the conception of Spanish territory were very parochial and quite static. Defensive solidarity with the front-line countries was not apparent.

At the same time, the Spanish government tried to strengthen European integration in security and defense matters, taking part in the building of the European Defense Pillar. But the WEU negotiations complicated the Spanish defense model and the talks on reducing the U.S. military presence in Spain. The idea of automatism of military duties, linked to the concept of border defense, made the Spanish project even more complicated, since it was based on developing the role of Spain as a rearguard country in European defense. Besides, the 1987 Hague Declaration, which emphasized the irreplaceable role that the U.S. conventional and nuclear forces played in the defense of Europe, complicated negotiations over the reduction of the U.S. military presence and non-nuclearization of Spain.

In the WEU Assembly, Spain was criticized regarding the ambiguity of its commitments to European defense. In any case, Spain’s European and nationalist orientation included a feeling that Spain was on the periphery of Europe, along with unilateralism regarding the defense of Spanish territories in North Africa. The interest in the Mediterranean, particularly the western Mediterranean, was in itself highlighted by the creation of strategic reflection groups, together with France and Italy.

**AFTER THE COLD WAR**

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact produced some important changes in security and defense planning. The need to make progress in European defense was made clear, as was the need to cope with the challenge of German unification. Both pointed to enhancing European integration by way of a Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP). From this perspective, the emphasis on WEU is understandable. And it was clearly visible during the Gulf War. The Spanish government saw the crisis over Kuwait as a chance to strengthen political coordination within the EC and within the WEU.

In a step considered important for institutionalizing the WEU, Spain, along with Italy and Belgium, proposed that France assume the presidency of a new military WEU staff they advocated. In the end, France did not accept the honor due to heavy opposition from the British and doubts by the Germans. Within the WEU framework, Spain contributed warships to enforce the embargo and blockade of Iraq. This was the first time in this century that Spanish warships crossed the Suez Canal, a move that allowed Spain to enhance its Europeanist credentials. However, the consequences of Spain’s parochial model were evident as it proved impossible to deploy other military forces, given logistic constraints.
This political orientation was tested in 1991 during the talks leading to the Maastricht Treaty. The Spanish government considered the WEU a transitory organization whose real role consisted in preparing the way for a global, European defense policy, based on an enhanced operational capacity. In this regard, Spain supported the French-German initiative as opposed to the British-Italian one, as the latter did not include a clear global policy for the defense of Europe outside the Atlantic alliance.

On the other hand, CSCE was considered to be a key component of the new European architecture, functioning as a basic framework for developing shared security and confidence measures, peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention, democratic consolidation, crisis management and disarmament. The Spanish government was committed in principle to creating appropriate mechanisms and developing resources for this organization. In this context and with regard to NATO, Spain increased its involvement in different institutions and in the negotiation of different coordination agreements.9

Notably, Spain proposed the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) initiative in February 1990. Several months later the 5+4 Group initiative, (Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) was announced, with the objective of achieving an area of stability, security and cooperation within the western Mediterranean. But these initiatives were truncated because of U.S. opposition to the CSCM and the launching of the Madrid Peace Conference for the Middle East. In the case of the 5+4 Group (later 5+5), the internal situation in Algeria and the international sanctions on Libya stymied the process.10

Perhaps the most important aspect of the new Spanish security and defense policy was the support given to the UN peacekeeping operations. This was a turning point. Spain moved away from a nationalist and pro-European approach, towards a more global approach in international security.

Consistent with this approach, the National Defense Directive 1/92, promulgated by the president of the Spanish government on March 27, 1992, defined a new peace and security model. In this directive three categories of intervention contingencies are adduced:

• contingencies deriving from the exercise of Spain’s own sovereignty;
• those resulting from the interdependence of Spain with its neighboring countries, as well as the area defined in the international commitments, paying special attention to the European dimension of security and defense and to the Atlantic alliance;
• those defined by UN actions, in which Spain would take part actively as a committed member.11

The distinction between the European dimension of security and defense and the Atlantic alliance was maintained only temporarily, as step by step, Spanish rapprochement with NATO grew at the expense of opposing the WEU to
NATO. This, however, did not mean that articulating European defense more or less exclusively within NATO was accepted by the Spanish government from the beginning.

Spain’s delay in joining the Franco-German *Eurocorps* initiative is attributable to pressures from France and the U.S. France wanted a quick incorporation of Spain. The U.S. looked at this initiative with suspicion and considered it a stratagem to weaken NATO. Within Spain, the armed forces expressed doubts. Stationing the unit 2000 kilometers away from Madrid created technical and operational problems. On the other hand, the missions to be undertaken within the WEU framework were not apparent and there was no enthusiasm for a third way in security affairs. The Spanish government also concluded that the *Eurocorps* created coordination problems with NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and had no specified role. Spanish doubts produced serious irritation in France. The matter was finally resolved when the prime minister announced Spain’s participation at the urging of France. The Spanish army had no objection, seeing in it a way of securing a role in the defense of Europe, until then quite limited, as well as a means of obtaining funds to maintain a unit.

The final decision to bring the mechanized brigade from Cordoba was taken in late 1993, after the new French government had announced a new approach to NATO, and when the *Eurocorps* idea began to restrict the integration possibilities of new members. On the other hand, *Eurocorps* membership meant a clear military integration in operational terms. Consequently, Spain’s *Eurocorps* participation created an anomaly with respect to the government’s approach to NATO.

Another meaningful step came on December 7, 1992, with the proposal of Spain, France and Italy to build a “preplanned European aeronaval force ready to respond to mission requests from the WEU, composed of stand-by units designated by each of the participating WEU countries.” The proposal was originally Italian, whose government wanted to balance the creation of *Eurocorps*, in which it did not participate. Strong opposition from the U.K. and Holland to a pre-planned aero-maritime force open to other WEU members, but mainly composed of military elements from France, Italy and Spain, meant that these three countries withdrew the original idea in October 1993. A new proposal was floated in which two forces were to be created: the European Rapid Task Force (EUROFOR) and the EuroMaritime Force (EUROMARFOR). According to the communiqué of the three defense ministers’ meeting in Seville on November 24, 1994, “these initiatives wanted to show the willingness of France, Italy and Spain to work towards a Europe with its own military capability.” The proposal was presented at the WEU ministerial meeting held in May 1995, in which EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR were declared forces answerable, in order of priority, to the WEU, NATO and the UN.12
MEDITERRANEAN ORIENTATION

This pro-European orientation of the Spanish government was balanced by a new approach to NATO. Spain’s hopes for the WEU were not satisfied, and in 1993, taking cognizance of NATO’s attention to its other borderland in Central Europe, the Spanish government proposed a greater NATO role in the Mediterranean in order to promote stability in the area. The treatment of the Mediterranean issue in the NATO Strategic Concept was clearly asymmetrical with regard to the treatment and the perception of risks coming from Central Europe.

The Spanish proposal got the initial support from the Mediterranean allies, although it had to overcome U.K. opposition and convince the U.S. In paragraph 22 of the declaration made after the Brussels summit of January 10-11, 1994, the heads of state and government affirmed their conviction that security in Europe was contingent on security in the Mediterranean. A Middle East settlement was welcome because it would have a positive impact on the overall situation in the Mediterranean, providing a platform on which dialogue, understanding and confidence-building measures among the states of the region could be promoted. The North Atlantic Council was asked to review the overall situation.

With this initiative, the Spanish government contradicted the opinion held by a good part of the administration and the ruling PSOE that security problems in the Mediterranean were not military ones, and that the introduction of military or political-military components constituted a discordant factor in the new approach to the Mediterranean. Spain had previously promoted the dialogue between the WEU and the Maghreb states, but this approach was a consequence of the socialist government’s position with regard to European integration.

Spain had also supported the inclusion of a paragraph on the Mediterranean in the CSCE final document of the 1992 Helsinki Summit. It affirmed that economic, social, political and security events in this region could have repercussions throughout Europe. The Committee of Senior Officials had to examine the patterns of possible contributions to CSCE from non-participant Mediterranean states. The CSCE Chairman in Office was tasked with enhancing contacts with these states. They were to be invited to future conferences in the hope that they would actively contribute to security and cooperation issues.

Some clarification of Spain’s position came in 1994-1995. Within the WEU, Spain advocated relaunching the dialogue with Maghreb states. The Spanish orientation, largely shared by the rest of the WEU members, focused on the following points:

- to achieve stability in the Mediterranean region, WEU action should be framed by a global security concept encompassing political, economic, social, environmental and military dimensions;
- the WEU should plan for military contingencies in accordance with EU programs, policies and statements in the non-military domain;
• the WEU should avoid any strategy of confrontation that assumed threats originating in the South;
• the approach should be based on dialogue aimed at achieving better knowledge and mutual understanding; and
• this dialogue should promote, among the parties from North Africa as a priority, those principles considered suitable to contribute to Mediterranean security and stability as a whole, especially: peaceful settlement of disputes, transparency of military activities and doctrines, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, and sufficiency in conventional weapons.  

During the double WEU and EU Spanish presidency in 1995, the WEU was asked to provide a contribution to the booming Intergovernmental Conference, scheduled to start in the spring of 1996. Spain also advocated defining a common security concept for the twenty-seven WEU countries at this juncture.

Meanwhile, during the first half of 1994, the Spanish government worked in the NATO context for the intensification of dialogue and the implementation of confidence building measures in order to reduce tensions, prevent conflicts, and reduce risks in the Mediterranean. But the Spanish proposal did not find favor in France, which preferred an exclusively European approach. Nor did Italy demonstrate enthusiasm.

Later, in September 1994, an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers was held in Seville, marked by the novelty of the attendance of the French defense minister. Spain presented a proposal for cooperation with some North African states, advocating establishment of contacts, explaining the objectives and NATO activities, holding out the possibility of joint participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and the possibility of inviting military observers to allied exercises.

On November 25, 1994 the North Atlantic Council approved a NATO report providing a schedule of NATO activities for the Mediterranean non-member states of NATO. On February 8, 1995, the Permanent Council approved a document supporting implementation of dialogue and cooperation measures. On February 24, 1995, contacts were taken up separately with Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia. On its own account, Spain established similar contacts at the beginning of March with the ambassadors of these states in Madrid and in the capitals of these states.

All this took place as the Spanish government warmed to the concept of NATO forces earmarked for European missions in CJTFs. Spain had already put its “eggs in two different baskets,” the WEU and NATO. Meanwhile France, due to its non-participation in the IMS, was much more cautious.

Likewise within the OSCE, Spanish ideas of strengthening economic and security relations with the states located at the southern shore of the Mediterranean were welcomed at the Budapest Conference on December 5-6, 1994. The summit established a communication link between the OSCE and the Medi-
terranean non-members states in the organization. This communication was organized through the creation of a contact group that would meet periodically and hold consultations at the highest level among the states’ authorities, the General Secretary and the OSCE troika.¹⁹

Along with Italy and France, Spain supported Egypt’s initiative to create a Mediterranean forum. It was launched in Alexandria on July 3-4, 1994. But the most important initiative was the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona, convened to address “the new political, economic and social issues on both sides of the Mediterranean” which “constitute common challenges calling for a coordinated overall response.” Approved on November 28, 1996, the Barcelona declaration contains three chapters:

- Political and Security Partnership
- Economic and Financial Partnership
- Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs.

Although the first chapter is somewhat unbalanced due to an almost exclusive emphasis on nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the declaration as a whole confronts the problems of Mediterranean security in a comprehensive and appropriate manner, since the main challenges of the Mediterranean are not military.²⁰

**THE EU INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE**

Spain’s position on European security during the Intergovernmental Conference for the review of the Maastricht Treaty deserves to be highlighted in this account of its evolving security policy. The initial Spanish document of March 1995, entitled “The Intergovernmental Conference of 1996: bases for reflection” considered that the development of a genuine European Security and Defense Identity would be a gradual process. Along with France, Germany and Belgium, Spain has supported the idea of giving a truly defensive capability to EU. Consequently, Spain has advocated the integration of the WEU in the EU.

The reflection paper advocated an increasing use of the concentration mechanism for presenting common positions in international organizations and conferences. It also promoted more frequent use of the system of common actions established in the CFSP. In the three years since the Maastricht Treaty came into force, this mechanism had only been applied once for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

In the defense area, the redefinition of the relations between the EU and the WEU was promoted, with three basic options: including defense as an integral part of the EU, maintaining the status quo, or enhancing a gradual process of convergence. Resolving issues such as financing the defense structure, parliamentary control, the number and identity of the participant states, the rela-
tions of multinational military units with the WEU and the EU, and the possibility of creating a common market of weapons and relations with NATO were going to depend on adopting one of these three options.

Some months into the reflection process, few states supported WEU autonomy. The EU states that were not WEU members considered full integration impossible, but the majority of the EU states, Spain among them, considered the gradual integration of the WEU into the EU a necessary step toward establishing a European Security and Defense Identity. Two elements of Europe’s defense vocation were adduced: territorial defense (Article V) and new dimensions in defense (Petersberg missions).

To be sure, all this created some problems. It was necessary to reconcile consensual decision making in the EU with the capacity to act effectively. Possibilities for flexibility and variable geometry in security and defense matters required careful examination, as did everything related to a possible internal market for defense products. Despite notable disagreements and different foci on European security and defense policies, the reflection group, chaired by Spain, continued in this line.

After the PSOE was defeated in the March 1996 elections, the outgoing government issued a report laying out the positions defining the Spanish approach. According to this document, Spain supported the gradual development of ESDI and the establishment of mechanisms that would enable a European response to crisis, including military operations designed to complement the political, as well as economic and humanitarian measures that were agreed through the CFSP. Achieving this would require enhancing the WEU’s operational capacity, particularly the improvement of procedures for making use of NATO assets. With respect to the reflection group’s deliberations over defense, Spain fought to keep decision-making intergovernmental in nature and advocated the application of the consensus rule. This did not exclude the introduction of flexible elements. For example, the PSOE government held the view that no country should veto the use of military action agreed by a willing majority of member states. But the outgoing government also held open the possibility of granting supranational organizations responsibilities in the defense area at some point in the future. Regarding relations between the WEU and the EU, the outgoing government advocated continued improvement, at the same time respecting the national defense policies of each member state. Nevertheless, Spain supported the gradual integration of the WEU into the EU, much in the same way that it supported the development of a European operational capacity. Finally, Spain considered the improvement of EU performance in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations fundamental.

PUBLIC OPINION

If a major reorientation of Spanish security policy was registered under the PSOE government, so too has Spanish public opinion changed its position. Anti-
American and anti-NATO feeling was very strong during the 1980s. The PSOE’s public relations campaigns since 1978 contributed significantly to altering this feeling and in changing the orientation of the majority of the Spanish people in favor of NATO. This public relations offensive played an important role in PSOE’s victory at the polls in the 1982 general elections.

International politics occupied a very low priority for the average Spanish citizen, but the subject of NATO represented a mobilizing element of first order. In this context, anti-Americanism grew in a significant way. In opinion polls taken before and after the 1986 referendum on NATO membership, a very high percentage of Spanish citizens considered the United States a threat to world peace (40 percent in April 1987 versus 28 percent in March 1996). However, only 15 percent considered the Soviet Union to be a threat in 1987. Anti-Americanism grew in a significant way. In opinion polls taken before and after the 1986 referendum on NATO membership, a very high percentage of Spanish citizens considered the United States a threat to world peace (40 percent in April 1987 versus 28 percent in March 1996). However, only 15 percent considered the Soviet Union to be a threat in 1987. This was evident even at an official level during President Reagan’s visit to Madrid, when the PSOE offered negative commentary on U.S. policy. The relationship between the PSOE and the U.S. Embassy was also estranged during these years.

Slowly the situation began to change. The unconditional support of Spain’s Socialist government for U.S. military deployment in the Persian Gulf during the Kuwait crisis and war undoubtedly effected a rapprochement. Most of the media, especially the television channels, strongly influenced or possibly even controlled by the government and the PSOE, contributed to transforming Spanish public opinion. This can be observed in the polls. From 1990 a progressive change can be observed (see Table 1).

Table 1. Which Country Do You Consider a Threat to World Peace?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>General Population</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Countries</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The United States is perceived progressively less as a threat by public opinion, moving in four years from 21.7 percent to 8.8 percent. On the contrary, Russia moves from 9.2 percent to 17.1 percent. The leaders, however, have a more consistent opinion.
With regard to NATO, position in favor has slowly risen, while the opposition has diminished. Nevertheless, a significant percentage of people, 35.5 percent, still view Spanish membership in NATO negatively (see table 2).

Table 2. Do You Approve of Spanish Permanent Membership in NATO?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Population</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>90.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, NATO is not considered a factor that reduces the Spanish security (see table 3).

Table 3. Do you feel that membership in NATO has increased or decreased Spanish security?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Population</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of the Above</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**THE POPULAR PARTY GOVERNMENT**

The Popular Party won the general elections of March 3, 1996. Its defense and security proposals were outlined in the electoral program. For our purposes we can underline the following points:

1) National defense and security should be based on the notion of defensive self-sufficiency.
2) European security cannot be defined in military terms and a broader concept of security is necessary.
3) A close link with NATO is also required. In this regard it proposed increased participation of Spanish military forces in the military structure, in which Spain was already participating, even though the revision of its military integration in the alliance was not mentioned.
4) Spain should support the enlargement of European security institutions to incorporate the new democracies of Eastern Europe.
5) Spain should be in favor of increasing the operational and political capacity of the WEU. In this sense, it should try to support the
creation of integrated and multinational military units. The WEU should be able to take the lead in crisis management as well as humanitarian and peacekeeping operations under its own initiative. The WEU should gradually be integrated into the EU.

6) Participation in European military initiatives should neither negatively affect NATO efficiency nor produce unnecessary duplications. Spanish forces assigned to NATO should be the same ones assigned to WEU, the Eurocorps and other possible future European initiatives.

7) Security in the Mediterranean, especially in its central and western areas, should be given priority.25

The Popular Party wanted to address the defense of national interests fundamentally and emphatically. In this regard, the Popular Party was quite critical towards the policies developed by the Socialist government with regard to both peacekeeping operations and the European Union. Along with its electoral program, the new government focused its efforts on two points: the full integration of Spain into NATO’s Integrated Military Structure and the professionalization of the Spanish armed services.

The Atlantic alliance itself was going through an adaptation and reorganization process of its command and force structure in order to deal with newly defined missions. Along with this, there was the challenge of eastern enlargement. NATO enlargement would marginalize Spain’s role within NATO. In this context, Spain’s full participation in the decision-making process was necessary to ensure its position among the most important European states. Priority was therefore given to Spain’s inclusion from the beginning in the new model that was being created.

The full integration of Spain into NATO was debated in the legislature on November 13-14, 1996, and the government received the support of all parties except Izquierda Unida (United Left). The parliament’s resolution approving Spanish integration into NATO’s military structure maintained the non-nuclear status of Spain and established the following conditions:

• NATO’s structure should mark a fresh beginning; it should be uniquely tailored to present and future needs: multinational, reduced and flexible.
• Spain should have command and operational responsibilities in accordance with its military contribution and political weight.
• ESDI should be clearly articulated in the new structure. The structure should establish the European Pillar of the alliance.
• The legitimate security interests of the Central and Eastern European countries should be taken in consideration.26

Following passage, the Spanish government has negotiated with those goals in mind. Developing ESDI within the Atlantic alliance without antagonizing either the WEU or NATO has received special attention. Spain ac-
cepts a range of possible situations. If, for example, NATO decided not to intervene in a particular crisis, the WEU would not be precluded from doing so. The WEU would also be expected to make a contribution to NATO military planning.

The problem is how to develop the WEU’s operational role. Spain perceives that other countries, like the U.K., support WEU operations in theory, but block almost every considered practical initiative. On the other hand, France is excessively nationalistic, to the point of obstructing any advance. Though Spain still intends to enhance WEU operational and political capacities, Spanish initiatives on the WEU have decreased in number and importance under the new government. Spain’s desire to harmonize the WEU and NATO roles does not mean relegating the WEU solely to minor missions. In some geographical areas there are real possibilities of significant crisis or armed conflict, such as in the eastern Mediterranean. In a situation like this, NATO involvement would be essential. But there is also the possibility of a crisis when the WEU could intervene, for instance the recent crisis in Albania, in which the impact was primarily European, including refugee streams to Italy. In this kind of scenario, everything depends on political will.

Regarding the command structure, Spain considers a new distribution of competencies unavoidable, giving greater visibility to Europe. In this sense, Spain understands and supports the theory behind the French position on AFSOUTH, and has diplomatically supported some possible solutions, such as the idea of command rotation.

Regarding the question of Spanish territories and geographic limits of the commands, Spain desired a subregional command with the following characteristics:

1) It must cover all Spanish territory, including the Canary Islands, the access to the Strait of Gibraltar and the Balearic Archipelago.
2) It should incorporate a joint and combined command with sufficient capacity to organize operations.
3) It must include a CJTF element for crisis management, humanitarian and minor peacekeeping operations in the subregion.
4) It must not be divided between SACEUR and SACLANT, although both could contribute to missions carried out in the Canary Islands and its maritime corridor connecting the Iberian Peninsula and the Canary Islands.
5) To encourage allied cohesion, a rotation policy at the highest level and key positions in the chain of command is essential.

These desires demonstrate that Spain believed that the transformation of the post-Cold War strategic environment also transformed its own role in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR and SFOR). In this way, it has achieved another goal: public opinion showed support for the armed
alliance. If, during the Cold War, Spain was a peripheral country whose principal missions were NATO reinforcement, the new security concerns of the post-Cold War era made it a frontline country. The risks associated with North Africa amplified the country’s military, political and geopolitical contributions. It followed that the command should reflect possible Spanish deployment of forces in North Africa. Though Portugal and Britain expressed reservations about Spain’s claim, the Spanish government considered accommodation possible.\textsuperscript{27}

To begin, the economic, political, social, and military links established with countries of the Maghreb should weigh in any NATO reorganization plan. Military factors undergirded Spanish proposals.

The Iberian Peninsula and North Africa, and the area bounded by the Balearic Archipelago, Gibraltar Strait and the Canary Islands is a geo-strategic unity. It is an important zone for East-West maritime traffic affecting Europe and NATO. The proximity of North Africa makes it a zone of important future North-South action. Furthermore, Spain’s geographic situation facilitates projections of land into sea and sea into land. Consequently, a set of military naval, air and land forces is needed in order to counteract the risks. Similarly, bases, land facilities, and command and control centers are required in the proximity of the possible operational theatre.

Spain has maintained air and naval bases, radar installations and surveillance satellites (Helios) in the area, and ATBM’s (F-100 frigates) will be positioned there soon. Between the Canary Islands and the Strait of Gibraltar, Spain can set up a combat carrier group, the \textit{Principe de Asturias} Carrier, and F-18 squadrons with in-air refueling. To this it can add training areas, naval and air maneuvers, and year-round amphibious landing capabilities.

All of the large and expensive infrastructure existing in southern Spain would be available for NATO use. For these reasons, Spain considers it logical, given the geographical proximity as well as the military assets available, that the subregional command that will be assigned to Spain should be able to manage the operations and exercises in this area, except in the case of direct management by AFSOUTH. In the opinion of the Spanish authorities, no convincing military rationale exists to support subordinating these kind of operations to SACLANT.

On the other hand, Spain had accepted the permanence of IBERLANT in the new military structure, even with its loss of relevance after the Cold War. From a military point of view, the logical way to operate would have been to include all of the Iberian Peninsula in SACEUR, as was the case with Norway, Britain and other islands in Northern Europe. Moreover, SACLANT could have access to North African coasts through the Combined Joint Command, which includes CJTF.\textsuperscript{28}

The final result of the negotiation of the subregional command has not entirely satisfied Spanish expectations. The Canary Islands have been left out of the peninsular Spanish territory and the attribution of a CJTF command is
still pending. Spain believes this possibility to be feasible, considering the great
difference between the number of east and west Mediterranean commands.

With regard to enlargement, in addition to Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary, Spain also favored the inclusion of Romania, Slovenia and Bulgaria
as soon as they are ready. Spain is not interested in a NATO looking to the
North, leaving a vacuum in the South. Taking ESDI seriously, these countries
have to become members of the WEU and the EU as well. In the medium term,
Spain does not favor variable geometry or different approaches to defense and
security, approaches that in its view weaken the whole structure. In addition,
there is no room for neutrality. On the other hand, Spain perceives NATO en-
largement as a source of complications. For instance, if we consider military
exercises, greater distances are involved and there is also the likelihood that
less attention will be paid to the Mediterranean.

In general, the new government is of the opinion that European integration
cannot be accomplished without inclusion of a common defense policy. In the
IGC Spain supported integration of the WEU into the EU, as well as the inclu-
sion of the Petersberg missions (humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, and
crisis management) in the treaty, though with the proviso that only WEU mem-
bers would participate fully in the contingency planning and decision making
process. This last question was resolved in the Amsterdam Treaty. All EU mem-
bers contributing to the Petersberg missions will participate fully and equally
in the decision making process and planning. In the same vein, the Anzar gov-
ernment considers the European Council to be the appropriate master of the
WEU in matters of security and defense.

That said, the OSCE is considered a key element in the future of the contin-
ent. Its inclusivity facilitates a special pan-European contribution to security.
Nevertheless, the Spanish government does not want to antagonize relations
between NATO and the OSCE. Because they have different capacities and ob-
jectives, the organizations are compatible, even complementary. The role of
OSCE is conflict prevention and development of collective security. At present,
the OSCE’s lack of coercive capacities reduces the possibilities for conflict
prevention. Decision-making by consensus is a further distinct obstacle hin-
dering the performance of the organization. Spain is not alone in not favoring a
model in which the OSCE gives implementation mandates to the great powers.
Spain placed great hopes in this organization after the end of the Cold War, but
slowly changed its position. Currently the OSCE is considered a security fo-
rum that complements other European security organizations. It is in the con-
text of this understanding that Spain actively participates in OSCE initiatives
on conflict prevention, disarmament and arms control.29

Spain has maintained its position of lending active support to the UN. In
this respect, Spain is fulfilling National Defense Directive 1/92, mandating an
active role in UN peace, disarmament and arms control initiatives, as well as in
its peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. In fact, Spain has participated in
different peacekeeping operations carried out by the UN, including the opera
forces in an environment of opposition to compulsory military service. Nevertheless, the new Popular Party government wanted to envelop these operations in a nationalistic aura, criticizing the former Socialist government. Under the PSOE, participation in such UN operations submerged the identity of Spanish forces in multinational organizations, and was restricted to involvement in European contingencies, with the partial exception made in Latin America. Moreover, deployment was made to appear as non-military as possible and the PSOE government never hinted at Spain’s specific national objectives.30

Be that as it may, the readiness of the new Spanish government to send peacekeeping and humanitarian forces to Zaire, supporting French initiatives, or the peacekeeping forces sent to Albania in 1997 have in some ways followed former patterns. Likewise, we must not forget that the Spanish parliament approved a resolution on October 24, 1995, directing that “Spanish participation in peacekeeping operations will be carried out under UN authority and under request of its Security Council.” Ironically, this resolution will not be applied to possible operations in Kosovo.

ENDNOTES


3 Idem, 697-779.


6 See Leopoldo Calvo Sotel. Memoria viva de la transición (Barcelona, 1990), 177.

7 See for the debates among the Spanish political parties, Antonio Marquina “Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy since Democratization,” in Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy, ed. Kenneth Maxwell (Boulder, CO, 1991) 19-63. The three conditions established by the government in the question to be voted in the NATO referendum were the prohibition of the introduction, installation or storage of nuclear weapons on Spanish soil, the progressive reduction in the U.S. military presence, and non-integration in NATO military structure.


9 Idem, 380-5.


Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Helsinki Summit Declaration, 1992, section X.


We can also mention, however, the abuse of secret diplomacy by the U.S. Embassy in Madrid during these years.


Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Pleno y Diputación Permanente, Comunicación del Gobierno, al amparo de lo dispuesto en el artículo 196 del Reglamento sobre la participación de España en la Alianza Atlántica renovada, VI Legislatura, n 38, 39, 1996.
Regarding the Portuguese objections, Spain considers that the Spanish contribution to the possible contingencies in North Africa are beyond all comparison to that of Portugal, from a military, political, economic, and geostrategic point of view. The UK, on its behalf, tried to take advantage of the discussion on commands to obtain from Spain the end of the restrictions to air traffic in the Gibraltar airfield. Spain considered this pretension unacceptable for various reasons. The landing ground was built in a territory never given up in Utrecht treaty. The UN doctrine for decolonization of Gibraltar, established in different resolutions, is clear: There is a matter of territorial integrity of Spain, and Spain has to take into account the interests of the Gibraltarians. The Spanish Government has presented several proposals in this regard, but the different British governments have refused to enter into practical negotiations on the sovereignty issue. In theory they accepted this kind of negotiations (Lisbon Declaration, 1980. Brussels Declaration, 1984).


A wise man? Once said that when one comes to a fork in the road, one must take it. This is the situation in which Europe finds itself, at the crossroads of reform in NATO and the EU, not necessarily because it has moved forward, but because history has once again caught up with it, after half a century of convenient and effective American strategic predominance.

With the disappearance of ideological barriers, the world as a whole may not have become safe for democracy, but European history must resume its course, carrying with it ambitions not dissimilar from those of 1945, which in turn echoed those of 1919. The international environment, however, has radically changed in the meantime, so much so that the collapse of the Soviet empire must be attributed to its inability to adapt and evolve rather than to any overwhelming military or political might of its counterpart. This environmental mutation also explains why the vanquished are not made accountable for their actions, and why the victors are still squabbling about what to do next. No ill feelings should linger this time, as opportunities emerge for a renewed Concert of Nations.

By their very nature security architectures in Europe as elsewhere, are radically affected by systemic alterations under way. Security tends to expand from collective (territorial) defense to a broader (cooperative) concept. This expansion is promoted by international law, which has evolved to the point of asserting a right of intervention in domestic matters, under appropriate conditions. The world government invoked by the drafters of the UN Charter remains an ideal to strive for, not a prescription for institutional reform. Max Weber would be pleased to see how the Anglo-Saxon common law approach competes with the Latin positive law tradition, as the residual Third World watches and waits.

In military terms, particularly for such integrated structures as NATO, all of this implies a decisive shift from strategic uniformity to tactical task-sharing, which imposes not only command and logistical adjustments, but also a more extensive allied consultative process on a continental and global scale. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the freedom recovered by Central and Eastern European countries have radically changed the signposts for the transatlantic alliance, and call for a relationship more adaptable to the new security environment.

Rhetorically, the U.S. has always been, and still is, supportive of European integration and of a more significant European role in international affairs. After World War II, the Marshall Plan and OECD presupposed a decisive European effort to reconcile and cooperate. The Western European Union (WEU) was the first response, soon followed by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and EURATOM, and by the attempted European Defense Community (EDC), all actively supported by the U.S. It was the growing Soviet
threat, with the Berlin blockade and the pressures on Greece and Turkey that laid bare European shortcomings and persuaded Washington to stem the return of the boys home. The Atlantic alliance was transformed from a political pact into an integrated military structure, the first such arrangement ever in times of formal peace. Throughout the many postwar vagaries of a “troubled partnership,” Washington continued to call out for a more visible European role in international affairs: with the “equal partnership” evoked by Kennedy in 1962, the “Year of Europe” proclaimed by Kissinger in 1973, as well as with the burden-sharing debate in the 1980s. In the end, nuclear confrontation helped preserve an American presence on the western tip of the Old World until the collapse of the bipolar confrontation.

Things have evolved very quickly since then, and changes in political attitudes, postures and mentalities have occurred with analysts, practitioners and institutions alike hardly able to keep up. Some rearrangement of the furniture in the “common European home” is clearly overdue. This does not in itself indicate any erosion of the internal resolve in matters lying at the core of the alliance, but it indicates the fraying of its coherence as a political actor on the broader world scene, which will eventually diminish the influence of each of its members.

Since the fall of the Wall, contrary to every logical assumption and in spite of repeated European declarations, the demise of the WEU has often been announced. Yet it has two suitors: both the June 1996 NATO Council in Berlin and the 1991 EU Maastricht Treaty pointed to the WEU as the instrument to achieve a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). In 1997 the Amsterdam and Madrid summits were expected to establish transatlantic relations on a firmer yet more adaptable footing; instead, they concentrated respectively on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the enlargement puzzle. The reorganization of European security is nevertheless in motion. Presumably it will not be so much engineered from above, as a result of the stratification of concrete responses to specific needs as they arise. Regardless of the institutional interrelationship that will finally emerge, more specific and distinct European security responsibilities shall find their place, with the WEU as their instrument, at the intersection of the reform processes under way in both NATO and the EU. The WEU already constitutes the operational instrument at the disposal of both, rather than the hinge between them.

The EU has progressed very hesitantly in acquiring a shared sense of purpose, if not a common voice, on the international scene. However, NATO is not making matters any easier for the emergence of a European identity. The matter will not be solved until the U.S. decides whether it should take advantage of its present lone superpower status and consolidate its presence farther afield, brushing aside the admonitions of Washington and Monroe, or whether it will be content with keeping the upper hand only during the present time of transition.

In the meantime, spurred by events, the EU must gradually develop a more visible and convincing political profile to restore its credibility as an actor in
European and world affairs. To do so, it has to supplement its undeniable economic and social gravitational pull with a military projection capability of its own for crisis prevention, conflict management and political stabilization purposes. Anticipating such European evolution, NATO should articulate its capabilities in ways that allow the most appropriate flexibility, sharing roles and responsibilities among allies.

**A SYSTEMIC CHANGE?**

After the end of the bipolar relationship with its clear-cut predicaments, the challenges to national and international security have become multifaceted and ambiguous, many of them of a domestic nature, and therefore unforeseeable. They affect every country, regardless of its political or geographic situation. Their causes must be addressed early on, lest their consequences become intractable. Security is more than ever synonymous with predictability, transparency, and accountability, rather than with the balance of powers and nuclear deterrence. Preventive diplomacy, rather than coercive enforcement, has become an essential requirement, since events have demonstrated that it is when matters get out of hand that it is most difficult for the international community to contain and reabsorb them.\(^3\) No alliance can assert ready-made responses to unforeseeable circumstances.\(^4\) Even the process of institutional enlargement, although in itself a factor of stabilization, will make it more difficult to reach agreement on the seriousness and range of any specific threat. On the other hand, in the pervasive cyberworld conditions, the challenges acquire a transnational dimension beyond the reach of individual governments.

In what has been dubbed “glocalism” (a mixture of globalism and localism), the functions of the nation-state are diminished, eroded as they are from above by global communications and financial flows as much as from below by renewed aspirations to communitarianism and self-determination of the most varied kind. Nevertheless, state structures remain the building blocks of international relations, essential as they are also for decision making, both nationally and internationally. Increasingly, vital national interests are best protected multilaterally.

While the much invoked new world order, under the guidance of some yet unspecified leadership, is still in the making, ad hoc cooperative arrangements have become an acceptable way to reconstitute not only the effectiveness, but also the legitimacy and resulting credibility of any international intervention. International relations are essentially back at what Dean Acheson termed in 1945 “the creation,” a renewed attempt to reorganize international cohabitation other than by the age-old balance of power, possibly with a new form of the concert of nations. It will not be the ideal world government that the founding fathers of the United Nations had in mind, but rather a sort of participatory multilateralism.
In Europe in particular, ambiguous risks and challenges do not lend themselves any longer to the pre-established responses that NATO’s integrated military structure provided. The common overwhelming threat having vanished, new circumstances call for diversified, adaptable reactions that NATO and the EU/WEU should decide together and enact separately. Overall western solidarity and institutional coherence must be reconciled with the necessary flexibility of response. In non-Article 5 (territorial defense) contingencies, neither of the two components of the transatlantic equation need prevail. Both Europe and North America have become indispensable for the political credibility of any western negotiating or operational initiative.

In what has been described as an era of controlled improvisation, it is not new institutional structures/architectures that are called for, but managerial skills in order to downsize and outsource international responsibilities, just like any good multinational firm. The essential purpose should be to apportion individual responsibilities, in a division of labor that would tailor specific responses to specific circumstances as they arise. The main purpose should be to unscramble rather than further interlock the existing institutions, and obtain a pluralized and multi-layered framework, which would involve the most appropriate mix of preventive, reactive and proactive responses. As NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stressed, “it is synergies rather than hierarchies that are called for.”

In the perception of international political and security matters, a gap is looming ahead which could gradually set apart the decision makers from their electorates. Now that clear dangers have receded, a degree of renationalization of defense policies is normal, and may even enlist a more informed public awareness about individual national responsibilities. The radical structural reforms of armed forces in most allied countries are all in the direction of greater flexibility for rapid deployment in a multinational mode. Budgetary constraints combine with a political reluctance to intervene unilaterally, in the recognition that in the present circumstances cooperative security has no alternative and is in the best national interest of every nation. Some reappropriation of national decision making could prove in the end beneficial to overall solidarity, taking into account that, in many future situations, convergence and compatibility of behavior should usefully replace the Cold War commonality of responses.

Whilst affirming their role as a common denominator and catalyzer in many international equation, even the U.S. is reasserting its own national interests. The difference of approach between the U.S. and most of its major European partners has become obvious, especially in Bosnia. There the Europeans were in the non-coercive business, bent on hands-on interventions of a humanitarian and peace-building nature; the Americans took a more decisive crisis-solving and peace-enforcement posture, despite shunning the deployment of ground troops. Under the pressure of unconventional international events, different political approaches and military attitudes may emerge even within a well-tempered alliance such as NATO. They need not produce strains since, in situations that lie beyond Article 5, they could be usefully combined.
NATO AND EU RESPONSES

Something happened at the end of 1991 that went unrecognized: simultaneously, NATO and the EU decided to respond single-handedly to the requirements of the new democracies emerging from the wasteland of Soviet rule. With the “new strategic concept” approved at the NATO Ministerial in November, and the passage of the Maastricht Treaty in December, the two organizations added a political dimension to their integrated structures, in the military and socio-economic fields. A well-intentioned competition was thus launched between two very different organizations reaching out to the new European democracies, with scant attention to their complementarity in their parallel progression at different speeds. In the light of the results of their separate June and July 1997 summits, particularly with respect to their different enlargement propositions, they must now be coordinated and synchronized. Otherwise a pileup or a contradiction of purposes could result that would detract from their declared purpose of reconciling and reuniting Europeans, regardless of their geopolitical situation and institutional affiliation.

Ideally international security agreements should have intervened last in Central and Eastern Europe in order to underpin socio-economic achievements resulting from the various national political and institutional consolidation processes. Washington’s determination reversed the process, and NATO surged ahead with the Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiatives. NATO’s enlargement is simpler to manage institutionally (especially since it will not entail substantial forward deployments) than the EU’s more comprehensive three-pillared process can ever be regarding the admission of new members.9

Ironically, NATO is coping with a review of its command structures, implying a degree of disintegration, just as the EU is struggling with the strictures of further economic and political integration. In promoting itself as an instrument of political reconciliation and stabilization on a continental scale,10 NATO will have to diversify its commitments and its very structure. Some11 even argue that in undertaking too many roles the alliance will not only be watered down as a military pact, but will also see its political commitments erode. It is certainly changing its role and image.12

There is no denying that the enlargement process responds to very real requirements of the Central and Eastern Europeans. It can equally be claimed that it reassures even those whose aspirations to membership have so far been denied, and that it will be vindicated in the end even in terms of attracting Russia, rather than antagonizing it. But to the extent that NATO’s expansion does not take into account the EU’s own enlargement process spelled out in the “Agenda 2000,” made public by the European Commission in mid-July 1997, in the end it may prove incomplete and possibly counterproductive. If it were to substitute for, instead of promoting, self-reliance among Europeans, it could perpetuate American entanglement rather than provide the catalyzing effect that Washington declaredly pursues. In the absence of concurring contributions,
NATO’s enlargement may even become an additional variable in the already complicated equations of European transition. Besides, an increased American role may reawaken in Congress a post-Wilsonian retrenchment syndrome in the face of budgetary and security guarantees that have not yet been spelled out conclusively. However, since politics like nature abhor a void, NATO’s enlargement to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, however insufficient and in need of a more coherent presentation, constituted the necessary quick-fix response in the presence of an insufficient effort from Western Europe.

The EU’s precise texture is still in the making, but its achievements cannot be dismissed: successive sectoral integrations all the way to a single market powerfully contributed to the breaking down of ancient animosities; the tearing down of borders promoted irreversible trade and interpersonal freedom of exchange; common agricultural, industrial, social and structural policies, however disputed, produced intersecting solidarities. Resistances persist to further progress of the community ideal, which has now reached the national sanctuaries of monetary and foreign and security policies. For the foreseeable future, the result will not be the establishment of the United States of Europe according to the blueprint of the U.S. Federalist Papers. Yet, even as things stand, a Union manifestly exists and operates, venturing in uncharted constitutional territories lying between nationality and supra-nationality.

However, the past achievements and novel ambitions of the EU have reached the point where a more coherent response must be articulated reconciling its internal integration and external projection processes: deepening its decision-making mechanisms and widening its membership must still be reconciled, not because they are contradictory, which they are not, but because up to now it was thought that they could not be undertaken simultaneously. In its relations with candidate countries, the EU has adhered to the strict conditionalities it has established both in the economic and in the political and institutional domains. Political criteria, which include democratic institutions, human rights, and respect for minorities, will be interpreted strictly; economic criteria, involving a market economy, adequate financial and administrative norms, and compatibility with the EU, should be considered more flexibly.

With some foresight, the then foreign ministers of Italy and the United Kingdom, Andreatta and Hurd, suggested in 1994 that the three pillars on which the integration process rests be somewhat separated to accommodate the needs of Central and Eastern European applicants. They would be involved in some aspects of the second pillar’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (as well as in the third pillar’s law enforcement and judicial cooperation) before they are called upon to meet the much more demanding economic criteria of the first pillar. This distinction must be made within the flexibilities that the Amsterdam Ministerial has accepted, as the indispensable tool to reconcile the deepening and enlargement processes. Thus, the enhanced cooperation mechanisms should not apply only to the member states, but should also extend to any candidate state.
Meanwhile, the enlargement issue has acquired its own momentum. It must now be politically and operationally organized within a more coherent EU-NATO relationship. Some have considered it ironic that security reassurances are provided to those that need them least, while those who need them most are left waiting. The point is that the NATO membership offered to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary constitutes a political recognition of their domestic achievements. As things stand, extending the alliance farther eastwards may instead produce reactions that could defeat the very purpose of enlargement. Some have even argued that it should be initially up to the WEU to reach out to countries like the Baltic States, thereby keeping the hard edge of NATO away from sensitive contact points, while encouraging and supporting every possible sub-regional cooperation.

The importance of military deterrence persists, but it may be usefully supplemented by political and economic enticements, with security assurances complementing rather than replacing the indispensable institution-building process. Russia itself is slowly discovering that power, influence, and prosperity are largely a matter of economic opportunities and are not to be found at the end of a gun. In any case, if anything were to go dangerously wrong in Russia, there would still be sufficient time for revamping some new Truman Doctrine.

**NATO AND WEU: THE OPERATIONAL CONNECTION**

At its June 1996 Berlin Ministerial, NATO established the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept, thereby loosening the allied integrated structure. In order to adapt to non-Article 5 (collective defense) circumstances that would not require the full deployment of its military might, NATO conceded that some of its assets and capabilities could be put at the disposal of ad hoc multinational forces emanating from NATO itself or under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. The WEU has now become an integral part of NATO’s European posture. But the alliance has yet to assimilate the EU-WEU connection and may even get in its way, which is not a prospect leading to a more balanced transatlantic relationship.

In any case, NATO has been slow in reforming its operational structure, not only in terms of allowing greater responsibilities and visibility to European commanders, but also in the reduction of the number and locations of subregional commands (the AFSOUTH issue being only the most publicized instance). In this context, it would be wrong to assume that the WEU can exist as a clone of NATO. The modified Brussels Treaty continues to provide an essential mutual defense commitment for the ten countries that are full members of the WEU. The ten will constitute the hard core of the EU as it enlarges, acting both as a political stimulant and as the operational instrument for the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In 1992, at the Petersberg Ministerial, the WEU defined the military tasks it wished to undertake, which, while not excluding combat capabilities, are for the moment understood to entail...
missions mainly on the interposition, monitoring, and humanitarian end of the military spectrum. It is in the peace-support operations and law-enforcement aspects that the WEU can best be employed. Generic plans, in the form of illustrative missions, have been sent to NATO for CJTF planning purposes. Correspondingly, the WEU has gone some way in improving its operational mechanisms. It has reinforced its planning cell, established a situation center and satellite center, and tested their capabilities in controlled exercises. At their May 1997 Paris meeting, ministers also decided on the creation of a military committee that will constitute the WEU Council to interface with both the national chiefs of staff and with NATO. The WEU has also embarked on the concept of the “framework nation,” specifying the command and control arrangement to which European ad-hoc multinational forces could be entrusted.

It must be taken into account that, even if WEU were to remain the adjunct of NATO in terms of capabilities, the alliance cannot confer on the Europeans the political mandate to act, which can only emanate from the EU Council. In spite of the decision making capabilities conferred on it by the Brussels Treaty, the WEU cannot credibly take matters into its own hands, superceded as it has been by both NATO and the EU’s provisions. It is the connection with the EU established by Article J4 of the Maastricht Treaty, and now by Article 7 of the Amsterdam Treaty, that will determine the WEU’s ability to act. On the other hand, regardless of the future prospects of its CFSP, the European Union will not consider undertaking a full-fledged projection of force for combat-related or peace-enforcement purposes for some time: the overall European integration process is about institutional consolidation and socio-economic prosperity, and therefore essentially stresses the crisis prevention and management aspects of security matters. NATO must take the EU’s DNA into consideration in the division of tasks that circumstances may suggest.

The WEU’s legitimacy and credibility as a decision-making body will result from the interconnection between the operational links it establishes with NATO and the political relationship it develops with the EU. That is essentially why any blame for inaction in Albania cannot be laid at the doorstep of the WEU, whose decision would not have provided the multinational force with a sufficiently authoritative political underpinning which, after Maastricht, rests with the EU Council. The WEU is ready to go, but unable to act on its own. It could be sparked into action if NATO were to attribute to it the operational role (in Article 5 or non-Article 5 situations where the Atlantic Alliance deems it unnecessary to intervene) and/or if the EU decided to provide it with a political mandate. In the meantime, the WEU will continue to remain a useful institutional context in which to devise multinational force packages to use outside of established intra-allied commitments.
THE WEU AND THE EU: THE POLITICAL CONNECTION

The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) has found its place within NATO since 1994; it must now be filled with content by the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, by its Common Defense Policy and eventually by its Common Defense, as they will gradually evolve according to the ideal established by the Treaty on European Union. Under the pressure of circumstances, the process may even develop on parallel tracks rather than sequentially, with European defense operations occurring before a Common Defense Policy, let alone the CFSP, emerge as a coherent whole. It is Europe that must define and then extract from NATO its own politico-military livelihood in situations that will not require NATO’s involvement. In the end, the result will appear geometrically at the intersection of NATO and EU structural reforms as NATO downsizes its missions through CJTFs and as the EU enhances its own political and operational responsibilities with the gradual enactment of CFSP.

The Amsterdam summit was intended to wrap up the reform of EU structures, making them more efficient on the way to further integration and membership enlargement. To the disappointment of some and the relief of others, the task was not achieved conclusively. It could hardly have been otherwise in an endeavor that will remain a process of a very special kind, halfway between the intergovernmental and the communitarian. A lack of consensus persists on adding the WEU to the array of instruments that would turn the EU into a fully-fledged politico-military organization. However, in Amsterdam, the functional relationship between the EU and the WEU was explicitly reaffirmed as an element in the evolution toward a CFSP. The European Council is entrusted with providing common strategies; the Petersberg tasks have been inscribed in the EU Treaty; the principle of majority voting and differentiated commitments, not detracting from common political solidarity, is admitted, even though it does not apply to decisions with military or defense implications; and armaments industry cooperation is recognized as a common responsibility.

In response, with a ministerial declaration of its own, the WEU has restated that it “is an integral part of the development of the European Union, providing the Union with access to an operational capability,” adding that “cooperation between the WEU and NATO will continue to evolve, also taking into account the adaptation of the alliance.” In the meantime, the “WEU will develop its role as the European politico-military body for crisis management, contribute to the progressive framing of a common defense policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.” The terms of reference are established for whenever the necessary political will is mustered to set Europe in motion.

These further notches on the ratchet toward a united Europe, too modest to constitute a breakthrough, nevertheless maintain momentum, and should reassure in any case those who dread the emergence of a European caucus within NATO. Jean Monnet, the father of European integration, used to say that “Eu-
rope will emerge from a succession of crises: it will be the result of the solutions of these crises.” Nevertheless, the most significant lesson to be drawn from the Amsterdam Ministerial is that the much heralded European Security and Defense Identity is yet unable to grow in synch with, and may even be frustrated by NATO’s more ambitious structural reform and enlargement, a dysfunction that may in the end jeopardize both processes and which needs to be coherently addressed by both NATO and the EU.

In the meantime, a merger between the EU and the WEU is not in the cards, nor is it required. Some improved convergence could be achieved by establishing an instrumental subordination, with the EU providing the political impulsion. Reinforcing the link between CFSP and the operational capabilities of the WEU need not impair the autonomous decision-making capabilities of the latter, but would rather make them more coherent and relevant. The EU should set the sense of purpose, establishing shared vital interests and strategic priorities, in geographical and functional terms. They would constitute the overall political solidarity background against which any EU common action or common position would be measured. The WEU would constitute the organizing instrument for military coordination and operational guidance: it would establish military planning, elaborate decision mechanisms, prepare mission options and assess the operational feasibility of ad hoc task forces. Individual states would thus retain the initiative and, on the basis of national decision-making processes, decide whether and how to opt-in this dual political (EU) and operational (WEU) framework, instead of having to bail out of any impractical pre-established commitment. Even non-members of the WEU would be able to participate in such pragmatic coalitions among Europeans.

This multi-layered structure would preserve sovereign state prerogatives in security matters that do not yet lend themselves to supranational solutions. On the other hand, the Amsterdam summit established that enhanced cooperation among coalitions of the willing would not be obstructed by reluctant parties. The political solidarity of every EU member would be expected, however, including in the area of financial burden-sharing, in order to maintain and project the necessary broader credibility of CFSP. Flexible European ad hoc task forces will thus develop most effectively from pragmatic incremental impulses. A bottom-up process of aggregation of individual national interests and popular consensus would reach upwards for a top-down EU institutional recognition that would provide the EU with indispensable political legitimacy and credibility.

In the many non-Article 5 situations that may require a distinct European response, questions arise as to whether the linkage between NATO and the WEU, through their respective Articles 5 (with the resulting “congruence of membership” between the two organizations), must still be rigorously enforced; to what extent the status of associate, observer and associate partner in the WEU should be considered an impediment to participation in the European and Atlantic decision-making and force-planning processes; and whether a strict conformity with all of the “three pillars” of the EU should be imposed on
applicant countries, thereby hampering those who would be willing and able politically, but lagging behind in socio-economic matters, from contributing to European cooperative security endeavors, in the variable geometries that circumstances may require.

What should come under increasing scrutiny is how to disentangle security institutions rigorously interlocked in a hierarchical structure, making them more flexible and adaptable to the growing diversity of actual events. In this respect the WEU, positioned as it is between NATO and the EU, with a membership comprising twenty-eight countries, constitutes the most appropriate conduit for multilateral consultations, political exchanges and operational planning, preserving both NATO’s prerogatives for conflict resolution and the EU’s capabilities in crisis prevention.

THE TRANSATLANTIC WAY FORWARD

The reform and enlargement of European security structures demand a radical shift in political and strategic mentalities rather than a change in institutional structures. They require the involvement of public opinion, both nationally and transatlantically. With respect to the latter dimension, it must be emphasized that no traumatic separation from the United States, no creeping decoupling or hollowing of the Atlantic alliance, is looming. The United States is widely accepted as a European power. If anything, in security terms, the problem is the reverse. Most European governments would be quite content to continue with business as usual, with the United States running the whole show. When the U.S. digs in its heels about the limits of NATO reform, presses ahead with NATO enlargement or deals bipolarly with Moscow, it is essentially safeguarding U.S. primacy in European security. Only France demonstrates a will to stand up for Europe, in the sense of seeking increased European visibility in security issues which would facilitate the nation’s adjustment to the post-Cold War world, having an exceptionalism and global sense of mission that Americans are well placed to understand and share.

The sequence established by the Treaty on European Union (from CFSP to Common Defense Policy to Common Defense) will remain an ideal to strive for, not a blueprint barring other developments. Events have shown that national interests will continue to motivate the coming together of the willing and able, who will then seek institutional legitimization from above, by the UN, OSCE, NATO, the EU, or the WEU, as the case may be. This will not be a European Union á la carte, provided that the political solidarity of the fifteen members supports any enhanced cooperation among the willing few. In any case, it can be safely predicted that, whenever situations appear of such a gravity that they require the active intervention of all, the WEU ten or the EU fifteen will seek the involvement of the U.S. (and Canada) in NATO, to which they also belong.

An obvious U.S. impatience nevertheless persists about the implications of European integration in politico-military matters along the CFSP lines drawn up
at Maastricht. It is not a matter of troubled partnership, but rather a lingering feeling of persisting European inadequacies in a time of transition. U.S. leadership is called for by the Europeans themselves, who recognize its decisiveness and its proven credibility as a coalition builder. However, it should not steal the show to the extent of retarding European efforts toward greater defense integration. The penalty for the United States going it alone could well be a stifling of European political will and a depletion of European military budgets to the extent that even buying off the U.S. shelf will gradually become impossible.

The ambiguous current situations do not need a unilateral approach. The U.S. could make a point of using the Atlantic Alliance Treaty’s Article 4 provisions for consultations with allies, building coalitions instead of continuing to rely on its capacity to forge ahead alone. It would be a slower process, necessarily more differentiated and emphasizing persuasion over retribution, yet in the end more coherent and durable. In 1997 was celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan that compelled Europeans to integrate, which is what six of them started some forty years ago with the Rome Treaty that embarked on the roundabout road toward a united Europe. Back then, President Harry Truman told Belgian Prime Minister Paul Henri Spaak: “Now that you have signed the Brussels Modified Treaty we can start discussing the transatlantic relationship.” In more ways than one, history is a succession of new beginnings. The EU is a political project, designed to provide the missing European link to the chain of security institutions. It constitutes an absolute historical novelty; it needs time and encouragement, not impatience and suspicion. In North America as in Europe, the conviction must therefore spread that cooperative security mechanisms do not diminish national prerogatives, but instead amplify their reach and their effectiveness.

ENDNOTES

1 Even though, as Philip Gordon emphasizes, “strong support has long been the official U.S. position, (but) American interests in European integration are in fact ambiguous. American interests depend on the purposes to which European unity is put” (SAIS Review, Summer-Fall 1997).


3 One who should know, former U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade Warren Zimmerman, in his “Origins of a catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its destroyers,” (Times Books, 1996) puts it in the following way: “It’s rarely possible to win support for preventive action at a time when the circumstances that unambiguously justify such action have not yet arrived.” (Quoted by Michael Dobbs The Washington Post, Book World, November 17, 1996).


In his speech to the Defense Committee of the Belgian parliament, on April 22, 1997.

Indiscriminately, in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy, in UN permanent members Britain and France, and even in the USA.

As written in The Economist, “Learning NATO’s soldiering habits will seem child’s play compared with the obstacle course that awaits new recruits to the EU” (19 July 1997). Poland’s GDP per head is 31 percent of the EU average; for Hungary, it is 37 percent, while it stands at 55 percent in the Czech Republic, 59 percent in Slovenia, and 23 percent in Estonia. (Le Monde, July 18, 1997)

At the Madrid Summit, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright used Marshall-Plan rhetoric when she described the purpose of NATO’s enlargement as to “create an economy on a continental scale.”

In particular, the “Anti NATO Enlargement Coalition” of some 50 prominent figures, including Paul Nitze, Robert MacNamara and Sam Nunn.

In the International Herald Tribune of June 12, 1997, William Pfaff recognizes that some “are annoyed or made uneasy by American efforts to expand its role, and particularly by the effort to substitute NATO for the European Union as the body which sets European policy.” Not surprisingly, he is echoed mostly in France: Dominique Moïsi claimed that “Madrid celebrated the end of NATO,” (Interview in Corriere della Sera, July 10, 1997), while Pascal Boniface wrote that “NATO, Freed from the Constraints of Collective Defense, Accentuates Its Political Role; It Becomes Therefore the Instrument of American Influence in Europe” (Le Monde, July 10, 1997).

The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of enlargement as $125 billion over 15 years; Rand’s estimates range from 50 to 100 billion over 10 years, depending on the various alternatives.

In the 1993 Copenhagen summit.

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, in the International Herald Tribune of May 30, 1997, stated that “our aim is to bolster their democratic and economic reform process.”

Philip Gordon in “Does the WEU Have a Role ?” in the Washington Quarterly, Volume 20, No. 1, Winter 1997, argues that “near Russia’s borders - say, in Moldova or the Baltic States - [. . . ] the WEU would be not only an acceptable option, but actually more desirable than NATO because of the latter’s negative image in Moscow.”

Years ago, in his “Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984,” Andrej Amalrik lamented that the countries of Central Europe had been utilized by Moscow as a buffer rather than as a bridge.

Richard Holbrooke, “America, a European power,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 74, No. 2, March/April 1995. William Safire, “Europe can no longer be Europe without America.” International Herald Tribune, July 10, 1997 and James Baker, Le Monde, May 13, 1997, calls for “the need to modify the concept that America has of NATO and of its military structures.” In the same edition of the French daily, Alain Joxe of EHESS admonishes that “becoming structural allies of the USA in an operational sense without political agreement, and about tasks where each time the military mission is intimately linked to its political definition means accepting the role of a Foreign Legion of the American system.” In Défense Nationale of IFRI, Philippe Moreau Defarges adds that “the Alliance tends to become a collective security system, linking all the European states in a vast network of mutual obligations, under the surveillance of the US.”

According to WEU Secretary General José Cutileiro, “any common European operational capability must rest on the bedrock of a mutual defense commitment. Those states that are not bound by a commitment of this nature can make valuable military contributions, as is shown by the example of Ifor, but they cannot be integrated in all common endeavours to the same extent as those that are. To forgo this mutual defense commitment among Europeans and to limit our solidarity to ‘soft security tasks,’ as Petersberg operations are sometimes called, would be
shortsighted and selfdefeating” (Address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization, 3 June 1997).

20 Former WEU Secretary General, Willem van Eekelen, argued in the North Atlantic Assembly session in May that “international policing will be most required in the post-Cold War era and will tend to erase the boundaries between military functions and traditional police functions (. . .) under the auspices of the WEU and NATO.”

21 The formulation adopted at the Amsterdam summit (Article J7.1) is as follows: “The Common Foreign and Security Policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy (. . .) which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide.” The new Treaty also replaced the provision that “the Union will request the WEU” with “the Union will avail itself of the WEU” to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications. At the June 1997 Amsterdam summit, six countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, with which the Netherlands let it be known that it agreed) unsuccessfully submitted a paper on the gradual integration of the WEU into the EU, establishing three clear-cut phases.

22 Article 7.2.: “Questions referred to in this article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping.” This formal insertion in the EU Treaty should dispel any lingering suspicion about a half-hearted commitment by the so-called “neutrals” among the fifteen members, who have been very active in UN peacekeeping operations.

23 Declaration of the Western European Union on the role of the WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, issued in October 1997.

24 As WEU Secretary General Cutileiro stated in June 1997: “The European Security and Defense Identity is an abstract entity, a theoretical notion, that different countries consider differently. Some see it within the EU, others within NATO, others even in the WEU. To a certain extent it concretizes itself in each of them.”

25 The EU Commission’s “Agenda 2000” stresses that EU enlargement “must aim to make an additional stabilizing impact complementary to that of the enlargement of NATO.”

26 Article J 13.1: “Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions.” Article J 13.2 provides for qualified majority voting “when adopting joint actions, common positions or taken any other decision on the basis of a common strategy” and “when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or common position,” adding however that, those having military or defense implications are excluded.

27 Concerning respectively socio-economic matters, foreign and security issues, and legal and law enforcement questions.

28 Yet, the North Atlantic Council, in its Brussels declaration of January 11, 1994, formally recognized “Europe developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and taking on greater responsibility on defense matters,” and welcomed “the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and the launching of the European Union.”

29 Once again the French state it most forcefully because it is in France’s heritage to stand up for Europe while others are unable or unwilling to do so. Thierry de Montbrial, director of the I.F.R.I., argues that “the essential function of the Atlantic Alliance today is to preserve the commitment of the United States in Europe. This is in the interests of both. Still, it would be appropriate that this commitment does not become such a heavy presence as to keep indefinitely political Europe in an infant state” (Le Figaro, June 13, 1997). Daniel Vernet puts it as bluntly: “The Americans are not displeased that Europeans claim more responsibilities, provided that they do not ask for more power” (Le Monde, June 29-30, 1997).
Europeanizing Security? NATO and an Integrating Europe?

DUAL ENLARGEMENT: A FAMILY REUNION
Simon Serfaty

THE IDEA OF EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC IDEA

After World War II, the states of Europe were too weak and too wary to have any illusion of grandeur. Unlike what had been the case after the previous war, they knew all too well that their time had passed. In 1919, they had rejected the “principled” conditions set by the United States for their postwar involvement in and with Europe. When Americans waged war, the Europeans feared they did not merely want to defeat the enemy; they wanted to defeat war itself. Such messianic luxuries could not be afforded in a European continent that had been built around the imperatives of geography and the tragedies of history. In short, in 1919 Europeans had assumed that they might be better off on their own until Americans were ready to abandon the “romantic spirit” that inspired them. Because that condition was not acceptable, Americans, who had few reasons to stay anyway, went home.

In 1945, the states of Europe had no conditions to impose, and no will to resist the conditions imposed upon them. Absent any alternative (which Moscow could not provide), only the United States had the power, money and (hopefully) resolve they knew they needed for protection, reconstruction and, ultimately, reconciliation. Their occasional bursts of assertiveness responded to the early postwar equivocations of the Truman Administration and a related sense of desperation over their dependence on America. Europe’s “idea” of its own future was, therefore, an Atlantic idea that would commit the United States to security and stability in EuropeCan “invitation” which the United States accepted first with the Marshall Plan, and next with the North Atlantic Treaty and its organization, NATO.

The U.S. commitment, however, did not come without strings. Admittedly, the initial American vision of a single world order built on the principles of collective security was blurred by the turbulence of the postwar years in Central Europe (including the Berlin blockade and the Czech coup) and at the periphery (including the Aegean, the Persian Gulf, and most parts of the dying European empires). Yet, if the breakdown of the victorious Grand Alliance made peace in postwar Europe elusive, the construction of a new alliance structure might at least attend to a partial order in a Western European (and North Atlantic) area that would be protected from military expansion, ideological disruptions, and nationalist revival.

This latter goal was not limited to widespread apprehensions over another bout of German revanchisme. Memories of 1919 lingered, including memories of the years when the Weimar Republic had been abandoned to itself with heavy consequences for all. Now, the nationalisms of Europe, in and beyond Germany, could no longer be asserted at U.S. expense. Instead, they would be forced into one single “European” box, which the United States urged the Euro-
peans to build. This was the American “idea” of Europe’s future Can idea that would save the states of Europe from their worse instincts. Reconciliation within an integrated institutional structure would follow a reconstruction achieved with the generous U.S. support extended by the Marshall Plan, and guaranteed by the unprecedented U.S. protection provided through the North Atlantic Treaty and its organization.

By the standards imposed after the Cold War, many of the original members of the Atlantic alliance, including Portugal, would not have been admitted. Nor would any of the subsequent new members have qualified, for lack of democratic traditions, transparency in civil-military relations, and unresolved conflicts at their borders (including Greece and Turkey, but also, in some ways, Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1986). Membership responded to criteria that were often political, however, and from the beginning, therefore, the twelve countries that signed the Washington treaty in 1949 anticipated a process that aimed at widening their area and deepening their organization.

Both ideas, transatlantic and European, were not only compatible but also complementary. Europe’s commitment to conflict resolution and regional unity was a pre-condition for enforcing its Atlantic idea. Thus, the organization of a Western European Union (WEU) in 1948 was encouraged by the United States as an alternative to the specifically anti-German Anglo-French alliance signed at Dunkirk the previous year, and as evidence of Europe’s commitment to reconciliation now and self-help later. In effect, the U.S. objective of a strong and united Europe was an “exit strategy” that relied on the rise of a “third force” that would assume a progressively larger share of Europe’s security. Such a third force could not be built bilaterally with any single nation-state, including Great Britain, let alone France, even though each of these countries sought a “special relationship” with their senior partner across the Atlantic. Nor could any such third force be built around defeated Germany. Both the states in the West which Germany might help protect, and the state in the East which it might help contain, agreed that even divided, Germany was too dangerous to be re-armed, too restless to be neutralized, and too big to be reunified. Indeed, NATO as well as Europe would leave Germany’s better half without any exit from the West, with little hope that room could ever be found for the other half that had been abandoned to Soviet control.

During the Cold War, the institutions promoted with these two ideas gained a life of their own as they soon exceeded the expectations that had surrounded their birth on both sides of the Atlantic. With NATO, the United States achieved more than what was hoped, but at a cost higher than what had been projected. Secretary of State George Marshall’s downpayment on Europe’s future produced immense benefits, measured in the context of an increasingly stable and cohesive transatlantic community now worth over $2,500 billion of economic activities a year. The Atlantic ambition of bridging the “over there” of Europe was unnatural: America had not been born into the world to become a European power. But as it grew into a world power, it did become a Great Power in
Europe was a non-member, member state of the European community of states it had helped build after 1945, and to which it had become, in fact, more responsive than most EU members since 1957. Similarly, Jean Monnet’s highly speculative and political Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) resulted in the extraordinary (and largely unintended) growth of a European Community (EC) that used a bland and uninspiring Common Market between three defeated countries (Germany and Italy, but also, to an extent, France) and the three tiny Benelux states to blossom into a prosperous “union” of fifteen states that relinquished their sovereignty to an increasingly intrusive constitutional arrangement known as the *acquis communautaire*.

**The Political Dynamics of NATO and EU Enlargement**

Neither NATO nor the EU was born out of the Cold War. Yet, by making Germany’s division seemingly irreversible and by giving NATO the *raison d’être* the newly-born military organization needed, the Soviet threat played a central role in the establishment of both. Only after the Cold War ended meaning, the liberation of Eastern Europe, including Germany’s reunification, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union could the United States return to its earlier ideal of a “whole and free” Europe. Thus, for both NATO and the EU, the post-Cold War rationale for enlargement was the long-delayed goal that could not be fulfilled after World War I and had not been attempted after World War II.

Hopes that Europe’s time had come were part of the euphoria felt at Maastricht, in December 1991. Awareness that this was still America’s time was part of the hysteria resulting from Bosnia, in the summer of 1995. Between these two moments, the then-twelve members of “Europe” launched a strategy *tous azimuts* deepen, widen, and reform. To make the strategy even more difficult, it relied on a self-defeating attempt to force every new step in a fixed timetable. Yet, the dynamics of change in both institutions remained fundamentally more cumbersome for the EU than for NATO, and even though NATO’s decision to enlarge was not made by all sixteen members for another thirty months, until December 1995, its implementation proceeded at a more dynamic pace:

- After the Cold War no less (and possibly more) than after World War II, NATO continued to be driven by one member state, the United States, without which the organization could not emerge or endure. By comparison, after the Maastricht treaty no less (and possibly more) than after the Rome treaties, every EU decision on enlargement continued to depend on the explicit approval of all member states for each of the thirteen steps that precede the admission of new members.
- As had been shown nearly fifty years earlier with the initial draft of NSC-68 and NATO’s latter expansion to Greece and Turkey, the financial costs of NATO and its enlargement could be easily denied or fudged by minimizing the scope and urgency of the threat or maximizing the
allies’ projected contributions. Similarly, the political costs of NATO could be easily justified in the name of principles, both before and after ratification of an agreement, and before and after accession of the new members. By comparison, EU enlargement to the East required that budgetary questions and issues of institutional governance, made increasingly inadequate by the earlier expansion of the EC from six to fifteen members, be addressed and negotiated before another round of enlargement to twenty or more could take place.

- Drafted in simple language, the 1949 Washington Treaty was flexible and relatively undemanding. In any case, military aggression in Europe was not taken seriously, either because it was not expected (after World War II) or because there was no state left able to mount it (after the Cold War). By comparison, the 1957 Rome Treaty (and its subsequent revisions) was much more complex, as it permitted an ever larger and bulkier body of regulations and laws known as the acquis communautaire. Indeed, over the years that discipline had become too rigorous for many current members let alone for new ones.

- From the moment the question of NATO enlargement to the East was raised, the strategic interests and political sensitivities of nonmembers (especially Russia and the former Soviet republics Moscow used to dominate) were recognized as a matter of elementary prudence. By comparison, EU enlargement responded first to the political preferences and economic apprehensions of its own members, whose rights and privileges would be affected by the accession of new members. As shown with the bi-multilateral agreements signed by NATO with Russia and Ukraine five weeks before the Madrid Summit, the apprehensions of NATO nonmembers over a limited enlargement to three countries in Central Europe could be accommodated quickly. As shown by the failure of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Amsterdam a few days before Madrid, the resistance of EU members to an ill-defined and seemingly open-ended enlargement to the East would take more time, and another IGC, to be overcome.

- The NATO-wide public indifference to enlargement (but general support for NATO) was confirmed by a relatively easy and convincing ratification process in all sixteen NATO states. By comparison, a growing public ambivalence to the EU made it more difficult for EU governments to make the needed preliminary decisions over issues of costs and governance, without which enlargement could not proceed, despite a general public responsiveness to the principle of welcoming new members in the Union. Thus, national approval of the limited agreements signed by the fifteen EU states in Amsterdam took longer than ratification of the ambitious decisions announced by the sixteen NATO members a few weeks later in Madrid.
• Finally, while considerations of national interests determined the outcome of the enlargement debates for both institutions, the absence of direct threats to Europe’s security gave the NATO debate little urgency relative to the EU debate that raised vital issues of economic interest. Indeed, the EU choice of candidates was all the more delicate as non-membership in the EU might decisively define the boundaries of affluence in Europe, and hence its division.

During the Cold War, most countries in Western Europe had learned to live with these two institutions: some by staying stubbornly out of either (like Norway for the EU, and Ireland for NATO), others by moving at the margin of one or the other (like France for NATO since 1966, and Sweden for the EU until it became a member in 1995), and yet others by ignoring both (like Switzerland) or by being ignored by either (like Turkey) and both (like Austria). For all of them, as well as for the United States, NATO remained both less dangerous and less costly than any other arrangement.

After the Cold War, however, it was initially assumed that absent the Soviet threat, the alliance might unravel. Keeping it in business demanded, therefore, that new missions be found in and for an area expanded beyond its original North Atlantic dimension and unto the eastern part of the European continent. Thus, NATO enlargement was originally less concerned with gaining new members in the East, whose own priority was to gain EU membership, than with not losing some of its sixteen members in the West. On both sides of the Atlantic, however, the rise of new instabilities after 1991 ended quickly the early calls for a dissolution of NATO, especially as it became clear that expectations for the quick completion of “Europe” were not about to be met.

In Bosnia, in 1995, the absence of a readily available alternative to NATO confirmed its post-Cold War centrality as the primary security organization in and for Europe. More specifically, NATO remained the institution of choice to:

• maintain an American military presence in Europe which, above a minimum threshold of combat readiness, can help deter an outburst of Russian geopolitical revisionism, unlikely but still possible for years to come;
• provide a conduit for the participation of U.S. military power, including U.S. ground forces, in the organization of “coalitions of the willing” that can deter, manage and possibly end small conflicts in Europe;
• guarantee the security of the former Warsaw Pact countries against one another, not because of any explicit threat but because risks of postwar instabilities, whether home-made or imported, cannot be managed by the EU and its members alone;
• consolidate Germany’s confidence, as well as that of other states throughout Western Europe, in a security structure that remains, as had
been the case after the previous global war, more reliable and less controversial than any alternative;
• adopt, pursue and enforce common policies outside Europe, especially in the greater Middle East, where western interests converge even when they are not shared evenly; and
• prepare for, and respond to, issues that transcend state boundaries and concern societies on both sides of the Atlantic, including terrorism, environmental degradation, and, arguably most of all, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Entering 1995, NATO expansion to Central Europe could still be questioned reasonably on geopolitical and other “realist” grounds because the new security threat in Europe did not justify the risks that would be raised by enlargement, or because the enlargement of the EU was needed first to address the more immediate needs of non-NATO members. By 1996, however, after the NATO decision for enlargement had been announced, there was no turning back. The debate now echoed the post-World War I debate over U.S. membership in the League of Nations: Failure by the Clinton Administration to seek enlargement after the decision had been made, and failure by the U.S. Senate and other relevant national legislatures to ratify that decision after it had been announced, might have undermined NATO to the point of irrelevance. In short, now that the commitment had become the interest, the preratification debate over NATO enlargement, which had always been a debate about the institution, also became

• more than a debate about NATO but a debate about Europe, whose projects of unity were too ambitious to be completed any time soon;
• more than a debate about Europe but a debate about U.S. interests that were too significant to be left to Europeans alone; and
• more than a debate about the U.S. role in Europe but a debate about the U.S. role in the world, because much that involved Europe and U.S.-European relations was likely to spill over to the rest of the world.

For the EU and its members, expansion to the East could not be considered outside its exhaustive post-Cold War agenda: deepen in order to widen, widen in order to deepen, and reform in order to do both. Accordingly, moving the target date for enlargement from 2000 (as Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Jacques Chirac first pledged) to 2003 (as the European Commission suggested) to 2006 (as Agenda 2000 seemed to hint) reflected the complexity of an agenda that could not be fragmented with each decision delaying the others even as each deadline added urgency to the others. Central to that agenda was a huge wager over a single currency, the euro, that gambled the very future of Europe. Linked to the fate of the euro, enlargement also depended on the adoption of new rules of governance within and among EU institutions. These new rules
were difficult to negotiate because they might redefine the meaning of EU membership for nation-states that could rebel against an increasingly assertive European Commission, a predictably decisive European Central Bank, a strengthened Parliament, and even a rising WEU. In short, now as before the *acquis* is the key to what the EU does, and what the EU does at fifteen, and when is the key to what it will be willing to do with twenty members or more.

**CONVERGING PARALLELISMS: CONSTRUCTIVE PAUSES**

Both NATO and the EU are the flagships of the institution-based European structure developed by the United States with the states of Europe over a twelve-year period after 1945. This structure was shaped by economic, political, and strategic interests that emerged during the two World Wars and grew during the Cold War. Entering a new century, these interests are not matched in their totality anywhere else, except for the Western Hemisphere. What the states of Europe do and fail to do, on their own but also as members of the EU, has direct consequences for the United States. Admittedly, a more united and stronger Europe challenges U.S. leadership and influence, an hypothesis that will be tested again early in the twenty-first century with the rise of the euro as a global reserve currency. Yet such a challenge is moot compared to the risks raised for U.S. interests and ideals by a divided and weak Europe, a fact that was demonstrated throughout the twentieth century. In sum, the end of the Cold War has changed many things in Europe, but the U.S. commitment to European integration is a matter of U.S. interest now even more than it was after 1945.

Initiatives launched by the European states to complete their union impact vital U.S. interests, but they are not a U.S. responsibility. Moving at different speeds, aspiring to different needs, responding to different priorities, and aiming at different goals, EU enlargement is different from that of NATO, but it follows a logic that complements that of NATO. During the Cold War, Germany’s integration in a transatlantic defense community was a precondition for its participation in the European economic community that was started in 1958. After 1955, it took more than three decades for NATO to expand one more time, to Spain, whose inclusion in NATO as a charter member had been sought by many in the United States on geopolitical grounds. By comparison, “Europe” could be launched only with a small number of charter members that would be generally equal in size (France and Italy, plus half of Germany and the Benelux), politically homogeneous, physically contiguous, and, thanks to the Marshall aid, relatively affluent. But after that start at six, the logic of integration required that its space become ever wider, which it did as the European Community grew three times during the next thirty years: Britain, Denmark and Ireland in 1973; Greece in 1981; and Spain and Portugal in 1985. Only Ireland was not a member of NATO when it joined the EEC, and Spain’s entry in the EU guaranteed its NATO membership.
In short, even during the Cold War, both institutions and their enlargement complemented each other because each provided a dimension (security or economic) which the other could not be expected to cover as fully, and an identity (European or Atlantic) without which the other did not suffice. This is not meant to suggest that many on both sides of the Atlantic viewed these two institutions as mutually self-exclusive with the EU as an alternative to NATO, or with NATO as a conduit for U.S. leadership. Nor does the case for complementary imply that the EU could not play a security role, or that NATO did not have a political role. The mismanagement of allegedly “soft” security issues could always become a “hard” security problem, and EU effectiveness over both soft and hard security issues could often determine the effectiveness of NATO and vice-versa. Yet, pending changes in the postwar conditions that made the development of both institutions feasible and necessary, after 1949 (including the Soviet threat and Germany’s division) and since 1989 (including the Soviet collapse and Europe’s limitations), defense is a matter best left to NATO, prosperity an aspiration best assumed by the EU, and stability a necessity best satisfied through both institutions.

Now as before, NATO and EU enlargement also complete each other because membership in either institution (gained in its own right) can help compensate for non-membership in the other (denied for reasons of its own). During the Cold War, such instances were few and not truly significant except for Turkey, of course: who can tell what might have become of Turkey had it not found with NATO an institutional anchor in the West? In 1995, however, EU enlargement to Austria, Finland and Norway three countries that had found NATO membership neither possible nor desirable during the Cold War made such instances more common. In 1995, as the Central European states became the leading contenders for NATO membership, they also emerged as the leading contenders for EU membership. In 1996, as Slovakia’s bid for NATO membership was stalled on political grounds, its bid for EU membership was also delayed until late 1998 when political changes gave both bids new momentum. In 1997, the EU extended the institutional reach of the West with invitations to two smaller states in regions (the Baltic in the North and the Balkans in the Southeast) where NATO enlargement had been deemed less possible or desirable than in Central Europe.

Now even more than before, the logic of dual institutional enlargement holds that European members of either the EU or NATO are natural candidates for membership in the other institution: neither the reasons for abstention that kept the neutrals out of NATO (including Austria and Finland, but also Ireland and Sweden), nor the reasons for self-denial or denial that kept others out of the EU (Norway and Turkey respectively) still apply. In addition, the logic of dual enlargement holds that institutional vacuums can be avoided if states that do not meet the criteria for membership in one institution receive priority consideration for membership in the other as was the case with Turkey during the Cold War, and as is now the case with Romania and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria. In short,
neither institution should be used by the other as an alibi for delay, but either can help the other fill the gaps opened by non-membership and progressively achieves convergence of membership.

Finally, EU and NATO enlargement complement each other because the transparency of the related national debates can influence the transatlantic debate over the role of the United States in Europe and the EU, Europe’s role in NATO, and the future of the European nation-states in the EU. Thus, failure to enlarge the EU could have ramifications for NATO enlargement after 1999 as opponents of the latter would rely on the slow pace of the former to justify their position. Conversely, a decision to not keep the door open for NATO might encourage the EU to keep its own door closed for a while longer. Similarly, too, American calls that European states assume a larger share of the financial costs of NATO enlargement could cause more public debate in Europe over the high costs of EU enlargement. Finally, and perhaps most dangerously, more public debate over the merits of enlargement (What next?) could resurrect a public debate over the merits of the institution (What for?).

There will be some delay before NATO enlargement resumes after the April 1999 summit, and there will be further delays, too, before the EU completes its negotiations with a first group of five Eastern applicants (plus Cyprus and Malta). For NATO, the reasons that condition its first enlargement to the East are making the next stage more difficult, including concerns over costs, cohesion, reforms and, most of all, Russia. For the EU, delays are likely to result not only from its agenda (including Agenda 2000, the transition to the euro, and another IGC) but also from rising pressures to widen the groups of candidates and complete regional clusters of new members in the Baltic region (Latvia and Lithuania) and in Central Europe (Slovakia). For the institutional process to be kept both “credible and robust” as urged by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in early 1999, some road map will be needed. Thus, pending EU enlargement to the East, NATO could still target neutral EU states that are not NATO members, as well as European states in the Balkans whose only realistic hope for joining a Westerns institution is with NATO. Meanwhile, to avoid political exasperation among NATO allies that are not EU members (including the United States and the new NATO states in Central Europe), the EU could target Slovenia for fast-track membership as the smallest and most affluent of the current applicant states from the East. Such fast-track negotiations with Slovenia would confirm that the western door remain open for the EU and, by implication, NATO (which often targets Slovenia as the most likely next NATO member), and buy time for EU negotiations with other applicants for which the cost of the acquis is heavier (as for Poland) and the pull of its regional cluster more constraining (as for Slovakia in Central Europe, and even Latvia for the Baltic region). This approach would not delay the admission of larger applicants, especially Poland, but it would recognize that the issues raised by every applicant cannot all be resolved simultaneously, and that with regard to
the EU the certainty of future membership is sufficient to avoid the burdens of non-membership.

As the EU thus fragments its enlargement over the next three to seven years, new EU members would contend for NATO membership under changing regional conditions. Such changes, for the better or for the worse, would take many forms: within both institutions, in Russia after the post-Yeltsin election in 2000, but also in Ukraine, in the Balkans and elsewhere in Europe, and much more. Whatever form these changes take, they will modify the debate over further NATO enlargement to politically sensitive states like former Soviet republics (including the Balkan states and the Ukraine), just as the NATO debate changed after 1949 (making room progressively for the Federal Republic of Germany) and after 1989 (making room, also progressively, for Poland).

Finally, and completing this grand family reunion, the combined institutional enlargement and reforms of NATO would facilitate a review of transatlantic relations, including specific agreements over the coalitions of the willing that will enforce the new NATO strategy for out-of-area, out-of-Europe security threats, and the signing of a bi-multilateral agreement between the United States and the EU. There can be little significant and credible reform of NATO so long as “Europe” remains unfinished. Pending completion of this lofty goal, transatlantic unity outside the North Atlantic area will remain difficult to achieve: American and European interests in these areas are often the same, but they are not shared to the same extent. Moreover, while the Europeans hardly ever speak with a single voice, on these and other issues, differences among them are often lesser than differences between them and their senior partner across the Atlantic. In short, formulating a global strategy may not be useful, and could prove self-defeating so long as European countries do not agree on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and fail to develop a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), neither of which is likely to move quickly so long as other parts of the EU agenda have not been resolved, during the first half of the next decade. By that time, tooChat is by or around the fiftieth anniversary of the Rome Treaties, in 2007Can agreement between the United States and the EU, which would not need take the form of a treaty, would confirm both the reality of America as a genuine power in Europe, with no aspiration for EU membership, and the reality of the EU as a genuine interlocutor for the United States and worthy, therefore, of bilateral relations comparable to state-to-state relations. Only after the transatlantic dimensions of this enlarged common space between the NATO states, including the United States, and the EU states, would the question of Russia emerge, as NATO nears its 65th anniversary in 2014, an age of retirement anyway, and as the EU reaches its 60th anniversary, in 2017, another landmark of Europe’s often difficult past.
# NATO and EU Enlargement

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<td><strong>Regional Clusters</strong> (cont.)</td>
<td><strong>Regional Clusters</strong> (cont.):</td>
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<td><strong>Balkans</strong>?</td>
<td>Lithuania, Balkans?</td>
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<td><strong>NATO-EU-WEU</strong></td>
<td><strong>New NATO members</strong>: Bulgaria?</td>
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<td>2005-2007</td>
<td><strong>Regional Clusters</strong> (cont.)</td>
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<td><strong>Overlapping Membership</strong></td>
<td><strong>US-EU Agreement</strong></td>
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<td><strong>US-EU Agreement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong>?</td>
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## FAMILY REUNION

The making of an entangling transatlantic alliance between America and Europe, and of an ever closer European Union among an increasingly large number of states in Europe, hardly responds to a doctrine of historical inevitability. On the contrary, it points to the reversibility of history in response to geopolitical and geoeconomic imperatives that were dismissed after World War I, recognized after World War II, and reinforced during the Cold War. It is all too easy to imagine statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic who would not have dared launch, between 1947 and 1955, the initiatives that ultimately defined the institutional organization of Europe’s security. It is all too easy, too, to remember circumstances when, during the Cold War, states would have refuse to endure the costs of these early decisions. But it is more difficult, and certainly less comforting, to imagine what Europe would be like today without the post-war establishment of NATO and without the subsequent development of the EU—indeed, even to think of how the last fifty years would have played out had bilateral rivalries intruded into the bipolar framework imposed by the two superpowers.

The post-Cold War public debates about NATO and the EU have centered mainly on enlargement—what now and who’s next? Enlargement hijacked the
questions raised by the need for institutional reform and institutional convergence. What next and what else? As was the case during the Cold War, an implicit division of responsibilities between the two institutions define the transatlantic division of authority between the United States and Europe. In other words, standing in the way of any significant reform of NATO is Europe’s inability to assume the heavier load of out-of-area security responsibilities found in the East and beyond. Europe will not be complete so long as its military dimension has not been made commensurate with its economic and monetary dimensions. Pending the development of a credible European security identity within NATO and the EU, relations between the United States and Europe, as well as among the states of Europe, will remain torn between the bossiness of the one, the diffidence of the others, and the exasperation of all. The Anglo-French agreement at St. Mâlo in late 1998 pointed to two significant changes from the Cold War years. First, this was the first visible Anglo-French agreement on security issues since French President Charles de Gaulle had met at Rambouillet with Prime Minister Harold MacMillan in December 1962. Second, after St. Mâlo there was no U.S. attempt to undermine such an agreement, as was the case after Rambouillet, when President Kennedy promptly outbid de Gaulle during his own meeting with MacMillan at Nassau, a few days later. Now as before, a credible dialogue with the United States within NATO requires a united Europe that is strong. Now more than ever, such a dialogue points to a convergence of NATO and EU interests over a broad agenda of common security issues (including issues in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf), geographic priorities (including Russia and Ukraine, Turkey and Central Asia, and North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean), and global problems (terrorism, ecology, and societal transformation).

During the Cold War, too, institutional membership conditioned the division of Europe. Now, however, divisions are not only, or even mainly, inspired by NATO but also, and even primarily, by the EU. As NATO expands in and beyond 1999, membership may produce more security, but non-membership will not take much security away, if any. As the EU continues to expand, by and beyond 2003, membership will be expected to provide affluence more quickly than non-membership, which is the reason why EU members subordinate part of their sovereignty to the discipline of the acquis. Exceptions like Norway (and also Switzerland) are few: these are non-member members of the Union whose status is likely to be normalized in coming years anyway. As the EU moves on, ever larger and ever deeper, EU membership could create a “plastic wall” that will keep non-EU citizens out of EU countries and will produce the same inequalities that brought the iron curtain down.

Standing on the affluent and protected side of this plastic wall, the EU does not qualify as a sovereign state any more than NATO, either as a matter of fact (territory, population, government, force) or a state of mind (loyalty, identity, values, history). Yet, unlike NATO, the many prerogatives surrendered by the nation-states of Europe to their Union have transformed them into member...
states that stand half-way between the sovereign “I” of the nation and the institutional “We” of their emerging community. In Europe, then, the dynamics of institutional enlargement defines the new forms of spatial differentiation with the erosion of the once all-powerful territorial state.12 With the United States, the dynamics of dual enlargement define the new conditions of spatial integration with the redistribution of influence between the two institutions to which states on both sides of the Atlantic belong or wish to join. As the EU and NATO both deepen, widen, and reform with new missions, new members, and new rules of governance, they will both have to broaden and deepen their institutional relations to complete the common Euro-Atlantic space that is the most endearing legacy of the three global wars waged by the United States in and over Europe in the twentieth century.

ENDNOTES


9 Simon Serfaty, Memories of Europe’s Future, op. cit., p.71.


