Report to Congress
on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions,
Through 30 June 2001
The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hereby submits this report
in response to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the
FY 97 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires:
“(a) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence
shall submit to Congress a report on
(1) the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months
of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production
of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons,
and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions; and
(2) trends in the acquisition of such technology by such countries.”
At the DCI’s request, the DCI Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation,
and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) drafted this report and coordinated it
throughout the Intelligence Community. As directed by Section 721,
subsection (b) of the Act, it is unclassified. As such, the report
does not present the details of the Intelligence Community’s assessments
of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional munitions programs
that are available in other classified reports and briefings for the Congress.
As required by Section 721 of the FY 97 Intelligence Authorization
Act, the following are summaries by country of acquisition activities
(solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that
occurred from 1 January through 30 June 2001. We have excluded countries
that already have substantial WMD programs, such as China and Russia,
as well as countries that demonstrated little WMD acquisition activity
Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire WMD
and ACW technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting
to develop a domestic capability to produce various types of weapons—chemical,
biological, and nuclear—and their delivery systems. During
the reporting period, the evidence indicates determined Iranian efforts
to acquire WMD- and ACW-related equipment, materials, and technology focused
primarily on entities in Russia, China, North Korea, and Western Europe.
Iran, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) States party, already has manufactured
and stockpiled chemical weapons — including blister, blood, choking,
and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver
them. During the first half of 2001, Tehran continued to seek production
technology, training, expertise, equipment, and chemicals from entities
in Russia and China that could be used to help Iran reach its goal of
having an indigenous nerve agent production capability.
Tehran continued its efforts to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical
materials, equipment, and expertise from abroad—primarily from entities
in Russia and Western Europe—ostensibly for civilian uses.
We judge that this equipment and know-how could be applied to Iran’s
biological warfare (BW) program. Iran probably began its offensive
BW program during the Iran-Iraq war, and it may have some limited capability
for BW deployment.
Iran also sought nuclear-related equipment, material, and technical expertise
from a variety of sources, especially in Russia. Russia is continuing
its work on the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power reactor
at Bushehr that will be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards. In addition, Russian entities continued to interact
with Iranian research centers on various other nuclear fuel cycle activities.
These projects will help Iran augment its nuclear technology infrastructure,
which in turn would be useful in supporting nuclear weapons-related research
and development. The expertise and technology gained, along with
the commercial channels and contacts established—particularly through
the Bushehr nuclear power plant project—could be used to advance
Iran’s nuclear weapons research and development program.
Beginning in January 1998, the Russian Government took a number of steps
to increase its oversight of entities involved in dealings with Iran and
other states of proliferation concern. In 1999, it pushed a new
export control law through the Duma. Russian firms, however, faced
economic pressures to circumvent these controls and did so in some cases.
The Russian Government, moreover, failed to enforce its export controls
in some cases regarding Iran. A component of the Russian Ministry
of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) contracted with Iran to provide equipment clearly
intended for Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS). Some
key equipment was to have been delivered in late 2000 but continues to
be held up as a result of US protests. AVLIS technology could provide
Iran the means to produce weapons-grade uranium.
China pledged in October 1997 to halt cooperation on a uranium conversion
facility (UCF) and to forego any new nuclear cooperation with Iran but
said it would complete cooperation on two nuclear projects: a small research
reactor and a zirconium production facility at Esfahan that Iran will
use to produce cladding for reactor fuel.
As a party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
Iran is required to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but safeguards
are not required for the zirconium plant or its products.
Iran has attempted to use its civilian nuclear energy program, which
is quite modest in scope, to justify its efforts to establish domestically
or otherwise acquire assorted nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities. Such
capabilities, however, can support fissile material production for a weapons
program, and we believe it is this objective that drives Iran’s
efforts to acquire relevant facilities. For example, Iran has sought
to obtain turnkey facilities, such as the UCF, that ostensibly would be
used to support fuel production for the Bushehr power plant. But
the UCF could be used in any number of ways to support fissile material
production needed for a nuclear weapon—specifically, production
of uranium hexafluoride for use as a feedstock for uranium enrichment
operations and production of uranium compounds suitable for use as fuel
in a plutonium production reactor. In addition, we suspect that
Tehran most likely is interested in acquiring foreign fissile material
and technology for weapons development as part of its overall nuclear
During the first six months of 2001, entities in Russia, North Korea,
and China continued to supply crucial ballistic missile–related
equipment, technology, and expertise to Iran. Tehran is using assistance
from foreign suppliers and entities to support current development and
production programs and to achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient
in the production of ballistic missiles. Iran already is producing
Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and is in the late stages
of developing the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).
Iran has built and publicly displayed prototypes for the Shahab‑3
and has tested the Shahab-3 three times—July 1998, July 2000, and
September 2000. In addition, Iran has publicly acknowledged the
development of a Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic
missile than the Shahab-3 but later categorizing it as solely a space
launch vehicle with no military applications. Iran’s Defense
Minister also has publicly mentioned plans for a “Shahab-5”.
Such statements, made against the backdrop of sustained cooperation with
Russian, North Korean, and Chinese entities, strongly suggest that Tehran
intends to develop a longer-range ballistic missile capability.
Iran continues to seek and acquire conventional weapons and production
technologies primarily from Russia and China. Since Russia’s
public abrogation of the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement in November
2000, Iran has expressed interest in acquiring a variety of Russian air,
naval and ground weapons. In an effort to lay the groundwork for
new arms sales, representatives of the Russian and Iranian governments
have exchanged high-level visits during negotiations for a new framework
agreement. Until that agreement is concluded, Russia will continue
to deliver on existing contracts, but few new weapons contracts are likely
to be completed. Iran and Russia did agree on the transfer of additional
Mi-8, Mi-17, and Mi-171 transport helicopters, for which the new military-technical
cooperation agreement may not have been needed.
Baghdad has refused since December 1998 to allow United Nations inspectors
into Iraq as required by Security Council Resolution 687. In spite
of ongoing UN efforts to establish a follow-on inspection regime comprising
the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and
the IAEA’s Iraq Action Team, no UN inspections occurred during this
reporting period. Moreover, the automated video monitoring systemsinstalled
by the UN at known and suspect WMD facilities in Iraq are still not operating.
Having lost this on-the-ground access, it is more difficult for the UN
or the US to accurately assess the current state of Iraq’s WMD programs.
Given Iraq’s past behavior, it is likely that Baghdad has used
the intervening period to reconstitute prohibited programs. We assess
that since the suspension of UN inspections in December of 1998, Baghdad
has had the capability to reinitiate its CW programs within a few weeks
to months. Iraq’s failure to submit an accurate Full, Final,
and Complete Disclosure (FFCD) in either 1995 or 1997, coupled with its
extensive concealment efforts, suggest that the BW program hascontinued.
Without an inspection-monitoring program, however, it is more difficult
to determine the current status of these programs.
Since the Gulf war, Iraq has rebuilt key portions of its chemical production
infrastructure for industrial and commercial use, as well as its missile
production facilities. Iraq has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use
items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This
equipment—in principle subject to UN scrutiny—also could be
diverted for WMD purposes. Since the suspension of UN inspections
in December 1998, the risk of diversion has increased. After Desert
Fox, Baghdad again instituted a reconstruction effort on those facilities
destroyed by the US bombing, including several critical missile production
complexes and former dual-use CW production facilities. In addition,
Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual-use equipment at CW-related
facilities. Some of these facilities could be converted fairly quickly
for production of CW agents.
UNSCOM reported to the Security Council in December 1998 that Iraq also
continued to withhold information related to its CW program. For
example, Baghdad seized from UNSCOM inspectors an Iraqi Air Force document
discovered by UNSCOM that indicated that Iraq had not consumed as many
CW munitions during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s as had been declared
by Baghdad. This discrepancy indicates that Iraq may have hidden
an additional 6,000 CW munitions.
In 1995, Iraq admitted to having an offensive BW program and submitted
the first in a series of FFCDs that were supposed to have revealed the
full scope of its BW program. According to UNSCOM, these disclosures
are incomplete and filled with inaccuracies. Since the full scope
and nature of Iraq’s BW program was not verified, UNSCOM has assessed
that Iraq maintains a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that
could be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any time.
Iraq also has continued dual-use research that could improve BW agent
R&D capabilities. With the absence of a monitoring regime and
Iraq’s growing industrial self-sufficiency, we remain concerned
that Iraq may again be producing biological warfare agents.
Iraq has worked on its L-29 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which
involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from
Eastern Europe. In the past, Iraq has conducted flights of the L-29,
possibly to test system improvements or to train new pilots. These
refurbished trainer aircraft are believed to have been modified for delivery
of chemical or, more likely, biological warfare agents.
We believe that Iraq has probably continued at least low-level theoretical
R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source
of fissile material remains Iraq’s most significant obstacle to
being able to produce a nuclear weapon. Although we were already
concerned about a reconstituted nuclear weapons program, our concerns
increased in September 2000 when Saddam publicly exhorted his "Nuclear
Mujahidin" to "defeat the enemy." The Intelligence Community
remains concerned that Baghdad may be attempting to acquire materials
that could aid in reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
Iraq continues to pursue development of SRBM systems that are not prohibited
by the United Nations and may be expanding to longer-range systems.
Pursuit of UN-permitted missiles continues to allow Baghdad to develop
technological improvements and infrastructure that could be applied to
a longer-range missile program. We believe that development of the
liquid-propellant Al-Samoud SRBM probably is maturing and that a low-level
operational capability could be achieved in the near term — which
is further suggested by the appearance of four Al Samoud transporter-erector-launchers
(TELs) with airframes at the 31 December 2000 Al Aqsa parade. The
solid-propellant missile development program may now be receiving a higher
priority, and development of the Ababil-100 SRBM – two such airframes
and TELs were paraded on 31 December—and possibly longer range systems
may be moving ahead rapidly. If economic sanctions against Iraq
were lifted, Baghdad probably would increase its attempts to acquire missile-related
items from foreign sources, regardless of any future UN monitoring and
continuing restrictions on long-range ballistic missile programs.
Iraq probably retains a small, covert force of Scud-type missiles.
Iraq’s ACW acquisitions remain low due to the generally successful
enforcement of the UN arms embargo. Baghdad has acquired smaller
arms and components for larger arms, such as spare parts for aircraft
and air defense systems, primarily over porous land borders via a thriving
gray arms market. Iraq also acquires some dual-use and production items
through the Oil For Food program. Iraq continues to aggressively
seek ACW equipment and technology.
During this time frame, North Korea continued procurement of raw materials
and components for its ballistic missile programs from various foreign
sources, especially through North Korean firms based in China. We
assess that North Korea is capable of producing and delivering via missile
warheads or other munitions a wide variety of chemical agents and possibly
some biological agents.
During the second half of 2001, P’yongyang continued its attempts
to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its nuclear
program. We assess that North Korea has produced enough plutonium
for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons. Spent fuel
rods canned in accordance with the 1994 Agreed Framework contain enough
plutonium for several more weapons.
In April 2001, P’yongyang signed a Defense Industry Cooperation
Agreement with Russia, laying the groundwork for potential arms sales
and transfers to North Korea. Actual sales and deliveries, however,
will be dependent on P’yongyang’s ability to pay.
Libya is continuing its efforts to obtain ballistic missile–related
equipment, materials, technology, and expertise from foreign sources.
Outside assistance—particularly Serbian, Indian, North Korean and
Chinese—is critical to its ballistic missile development programs,
and the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 has allowed Tripoli to expand
its procurement effort. Libya’s current capability probably
remains limited to its Scud B missiles, but with continued foreign assistance
it will probably achieve an MRBM capability—a long-desired
goal—or extended-range Scud capability.
Libya remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals
and other key CW-related equipment. Following the suspension of
UN sanctions in April 1999, Tripoli reestablished contacts with sources
of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals abroad, primarily in Western
Europe. Libya still appears to have a goal of establishing an offensive
CW capability and an indigenous production capability for weapons. Evidence
suggests Libya also is seeking to acquire the capability to develop and
produce BW agents.
Libya—an NPT party with full scope IAEA safeguards—continues
to develop its nuclear research and development program but would still
require significant foreign assistance to advance a nuclear weapons option.
The suspension of UN sanctions has accelerated the pace of procurement
efforts in Libya’s drive to rejuvenate its ostensibly civilian nuclear
program. In January and November 2000, for example, Tripoli and
Moscow renewed talks on cooperation at the Tajura Nuclear Research Center
and discussed a potential power reactor deal. Should such civil-sector
work come to fruition, Libya could gain opportunities to pursue technologies
that could be diverted for military purposes.
Following the suspension of UN sanctions, Libya has negotiated—and
completed—contracts with Russian firms for conventional weapons,
munitions, and upgrades and refurbishment for its existing inventory of
Syria sought CW-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources
during the reporting period. Damascus already has a stockpile
of the nerve agent sarin, and it would appear that Syria is trying to
develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents. Syria remains dependent
on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor
chemicals and key production equipment. It is highly probable that
Syria also is developing an offensive BW capability.
Syria—an NPT signatory with full-scope IAEA safeguards—has
a nuclear research center at Dayr Al Jajar. In January 2000, Russia
approved a draft cooperative program with Damascus that included cooperation
on civil nuclear power. Broader access to Russian expertise could
provide opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities,
should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons. We will continue to
monitor Syria’s nuclear R&D program for any signs of weapons
During the first half of 2001, Damascus continued work on establishing
a solid-propellant rocket motor development and production capability
with help from outside countries. Foreign equipment
and assistance to its liquid-propellant missile program—primarily
from North Korean entities, but also from firms in Russia—have been
and will continue to be essential for Syria’s effort. Damascus
also continued its efforts to assemble—probably with considerable
North Korean assistance—liquid-fueled Scud C missiles.
Syria continues to acquire relatively small quantities ofACW—mainly
from Russia, other FSU suppliers, China and Iran. But Damascus’
outstanding debt to Russia and inability to fund large purchases have
hampered negotiations for the large quantity of equipment Syria needs
to revitalize its aging defense forces. Damascus is interested in
acquiring Russian SA-10 and SA-11 air defense systems, MiG-29 and Su-27
fighters, and T-80 or T-90 main battle tanks, as well as upgrades for
the aircraft, armored weapons, and air defense systems already in its
inventory. Syria’s Defense Minister met with high-level Russian
officials in Moscow in May 2001 to negotiate a new military-technical
cooperation agreement or arms contracts and address the debt issue, but
no new agreements have been completed
In the WMD arena, Sudan, a CWC States Party, has been developing the
capability to produce chemical weapons for many years. In this pursuit,
it historically has obtained help from entities in other countries, principally
Iraq. Sudan may be interested in a BW program as well.
During the reporting period, Sudan sought to acquire a variety of military
equipment from various sources. Khartoum is seeking older, less
expensive ACW and conventional weapons that nonetheless are advanced compared
with the capabilities of the weapons possessed by its opponents and their
supporters in neighboring countries in the long-running civil war.
We remain concerned that Sudan may seek a ballistic missile capability
in the future.
India continues its nuclear weapons development program, for which its
underground nuclear tests in May 1998 were a significant milestone.
The acquisition of foreign equipment will benefit New Delhi in its efforts
to develop and produce more sophisticated nuclear weapons. During
this reporting period, India continued to obtain foreign assistance for
its civilian nuclear power program, primarily from Russia.
India continues to rely on foreign assistance for key missile technologies,
where it still lacks engineering or production expertise. Entities
in Russia and Western Europe remained the primary conduits of missile-related
and dual-use technology transfers during the first half of 2001.
India also continues an across-the-board modernization of its armed forces
through ACW acquisitions, mostly from Russia, although many of its key
programs have been plagued by delays. New Delhi received the first
two MiG-21-93 fighter aircraft, and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited will
now begin the licensed upgrade of 123 more aircraft. During the
reporting period, New Delhi concluded an $800 million contract with Russia
for 310 T-90S main battle tanks, as well as a smaller contract for KA-31
helicopters. India is in negotiations with Russia for nuclear
submarines and an aircraft carrier, and it also continues to explore options
for leasing or purchasing several AEW systems. New Delhi also signed
a $270 million contract with Israel for the Barak-1 missile defense systems.
The Indian air force has reopened the competition for jet trainer aircraft
and is considering bids from the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Russia,
and the United Kingdom.
Chinese entities continued to provide significant assistance to Pakistan’s
ballistic missile program during the reporting period. With Chinese
assistance, Pakistan is moving toward serial production of solid-propellant
SRBMs, such as the Shaheen-I and Haider-I. Pakistan flight-tested
the Shaheen-I in 1999 and plans to flight-test the Haider-I in 2001.
Successful development of the two-stage Shaheen-II MRBM will require continued
Chinese assistance or assistance from other potential sources.
Pakistan continued to acquire nuclear-related and dual-use equipment
and materials from various sources—principally in Western Europe.
Islamabad has a well-developed nuclear weapons program, as evidenced by
its first nuclear weapons tests in late May 1998. Acquisition of nuclear-related
goods from foreign sources will remain important if Pakistan chooses to
develop more advanced nuclear weapons. China, which has provided
extensive support in the past to Islamabad’s nuclear weapons and
ballistic missile programs, in May 1996 pledged that it would not provide
assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in any state, including
Pakistan. We cannot rule out, however, some unspecified contacts
between Chinese entities and entities involved in Pakistan’s nuclear
Pakistan continues to rely on China and France for its ACW requirements.
Islamabad received delivery of upgraded Mirage IIIs from France, and negotiated
to purchase an additional 40 F-7 fighters from China
During the first half of 2001, Egypt continued its long-standing relationship
with North Korea on ballistic missiles. Cairo continues to maintain
a deployed force ofScudBs and Cs. Egypt's ACW acquisition is aimed
at modernizing its Soviet-era equipment and acquiring newer, mostly US
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism
The threat of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) materials appears to be rising—particularly since
the 11 September attacks. Several of the 30 designated foreign terrorist
organizations and other non-state actors worldwide have expressed interest
in CBRN—although terrorists probably will continue to favor proven
conventional tactics such as bombings and shootings.
- CBRN information and technology is more widely available, especially
from sources like the Internet and the former Soviet Union.
- Increased publicity surrounding the anthrax incidents since the 11
September attacks has highlighted the vulnerability of civilian and
government targets to CBRN attacks.
- Usama Bin Ladin and groups aligned with him have shown interest in
staging unconventional attacks and Bin Ladin has sought CBRN materials
and resources to further this goal. Bin Ladin and his organization
continue to make public statements about unconventional weapons, which
could be an attempt to justify the use of such weapons.
- Since the early 1990s, Bin Ladin has pursued the development of chemical
and biological weapons within his organization as well as demonstrating
a longstanding interest in nuclear materials.
- A senior Bin Ladin associate on trial in Egypt in 1999 claimed his
group had chemical and biological weapons. He also admitted that
various plans for terrorist acts were contained on a computer seized
Among CBRN materials, terrorist groups are most interested in chemicals
such as cyanide salts to contaminate food and water supplies or to assassinate
individuals. Terrorist groups also have expressed interest in many
other toxic industrial chemicals—most of which are relatively easy
to acquire and handle—and traditional chemical agents, including
chlorine and phosgene and some groups have discussed nerve agents.
- We see lesser interest in biological materials that appears focused
on agents for use in small-scale poisonings or assassinations.
- Although the potential devastation from nuclear terrorism is high,
we have no credible reporting on terrorists successfully acquiring nuclear
weapons or sufficient material to make them. Gaps in our reporting,
however, make this an issue of ongoing concern.
In 1988, Osama Bin Ladin stated that he considered acquiring weapons
of mass destruction a “religious duty”, and recent press reports
claim that Bin Ladin has nuclear weapons to use as a deterrent against
the United States. A government witness—Jamal Ahmad
Fadl-- in the trial of four men recently convicted of supporting the al
Qa’ida bombings of the American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya
testified last February that al Qa’ida had been trying to acquire
fissile material since the early 1990s. More recently, we have uncovered
rudimentary diagrams of nuclear weapons inside a suspected al Qa’ida
safehouse in Kabul. These diagrams, while crude, describe essential
components—uranium and high explosives—common to nuclear weapons.
Despite improvements in Russia’s economy, the state-run defense,
biotechnology, and nuclear industries remain strapped for funds, even
as Moscow looks to them for badly needed foreign exchange through exports.
We remain very concerned about the proliferation implications of such
sales in several areas. Monitoring Russian proliferation behavior,
therefore, will remain a very high priority.
Russian entities during the reporting period continued to supply a variety
of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to countries
such as Iran, India, China, and Libya. Iran’s earlier success
in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities has helped to
accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, and continuing Russian
assistance likely supports Iranian efforts to develop new missiles and
increase Tehran's self-sufficiency in missile production.
Russia also remained a key supplier for civilian nuclear programs in
Iran, primarily focused on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project.
With respect to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Russian assistance
enhances Iran’s ability to support a nuclear weapons development
effort, even though the ostensible purpose of most of this assistance
is for civilian applications. Despite Iran’s NPT status, the
United States is convinced Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
The Intelligence Community will be closely monitoring Tehran’s nuclear
cooperation with Moscow for any direct assistance in support of a nuclear
In January 2000, Moscow approved a draft cooperative program with Syria
that included civil use of nuclear power. Broader access to Russian
scientists and Russia’s large nuclear infrastructure could provide
opportunities to solicit fissile material production expertise and other
nuclear-related assistance if Syria decided to pursue nuclear weapons.
In addition, Russia supplied India with material for its civilian nuclear
program during this reporting period.
President Putin in May 2000 amended the presidential decree on nuclear
exports to allow the export in exceptional cases of nuclear materials,
technology, and equipment to countries that do not have full-scope IAEA
safeguards. The move could clear the way for expanding nuclear exports
to certain countries that do not have full-scope safeguards, such as India.
During the first half of 2001, Russian entities remained a significant
source of dual-use biotechnology, chemicals, production technology,
and equipment for Iran. Russia’s biological and chemical expertise
makes it an attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information
and training on BW and CW agent production processes.
Russia continues to be a major supplier of conventional arms. Following
Moscow’s abrogation of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement in November
2000, Russian officials stated that they see Iran to be a significant
source of potential revenue from arms sales, and believe Tehran can become
Russia’s third largest conventional arms customer after China and
India. In early 2001, Russia was the primary source of ACW for China,
Iran, Libya, and Sudan, and one of the largest sources for India.
Russia continues to be the main supplier of technology and equipment
to India and China’s naval nuclear propulsion programs. In
addition, Russia has discussed leasing nuclear-powered attack submarines
The Russian Government’s commitment, willingness, and ability to
curb proliferation-related transfers remain uncertain. The export
control bureaucracy was reorganized again as part of President Putin’s
broader government reorganization in May 2000. The Federal Service
for Currency and Export Controls (VEK) was abolished and its functions
assumed by a new department in the Ministry of Economic Development and
Trade. VEK was tasked with drafting the implementing decrees for
Russia’s July 1999 export control law; by the end of the reporting
period, seven of these decrees had been approved, and four—including
two control lists—were still awaiting presidential signature.
However, the enacted legislation will have little impact on several of
the export control system’s key shortfalls, including weak enforcement
and insufficient penalties for violations.
Export enforcement continues to need improvement. In February 2000,
Sergey Ivanov, then Secretary of Russia’s Security Council, said
that during 1998-99 the government had obtained convictions for unauthorized
technology transfers in three cases. The Russian press has reported
on cases where advanced equipment is simply described as something else
in the export documentation and is exported. Enterprises sometimes
falsely declare goods to avoid government taxes.
Throughout the first half of 2001, North Korea continued to export significant
ballistic missile–related equipment, components, materials, and
technical expertise to countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North
Africa. P’yongyang attaches a high priority to the development
and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related technology.
Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology are one of the North’s
major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued missile development
During this reporting period, Beijing continued to take a very narrow
interpretation of its bilateral nonproliferation commitments with the
United States. In the case of missile-related transfers, Beijing
has on several occasions pledged not to sell Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR) Category I systems but has not recognized the regime’s
key technology annex. China is not a member of the MTCR.
In November 2000, China committed not to assist, in any way, any country
in the development of ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver
nuclear weapons, and to enact at an early date a comprehensive missile-related
export control system.
During the reporting period, Chinese entities provided Pakistan with
missile-related technical assistance. Pakistan has been moving toward
domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs with Chinese help.
Pakistan also needs continued Chinese assistance to support development
of the two-stage Shaheen-II MRBM. In addition, firms in China have
provided dual-use missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance
to several other countries of proliferation concern—such as Iran,
North Korea, and Libya.
In the nuclear area, China has made bilateral pledges to the United States
that go beyond its 1992 NPT commitment not to assist any country in the
acquisition or development of nuclear weapons. For example, in May
1996 Beijing pledged that it would not provide assistance to unsafeguarded
With respect to Pakistan, Chinese entities in the past provided extensive
support to unsafeguarded as well as safeguarded nuclear facilities, which
enhanced substantially Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability.
We cannot rule out some continued contacts between Chinese entities and
entities associated with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program subsequent
to Beijing’s 1996 pledge and during this reporting period.
In October 1997, China gave the United States assurances regarding its
nuclear cooperation with Iran. China agreed to end cooperation with
Iran on supply of a uranium conversion facility and undertake no new cooperation
with Iran after completion of two existing projects—a zero-power
reactor and a zirconium production plant. The Chinese appear to
have lived up to their UCF pledge, but we are aware of some interactions
between Chinese and Iranian entities that have raised questions about
its “no new nuclear cooperation” pledge. According to
the State Department, the Administration is seeking to address these questions
with appropriate Chinese authorities.
to the reporting period, Chinese firms had supplied dual-use CW-related
production equipment and technology to Iran. The US sanctions imposed
in May 1997 on seven Chinese entities for knowingly and materially contributing
to Iran’s CW program remain in effect. Evidence during the
current reporting period shows Iran continues to seek such assistance
from Chinese entities.
China is a primary supplier of advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan
and Iran, among others. Beijing and Islamabad also have negotiated
the sale of an additional 40 F-7 fighters for delivery to Pakistan.
Western countries continue to be a less important source of WMD- and
missile-related goods and materials. Iran and Libya continued to
approach entities in Western Europe to provide needed acquisitions for
their WMD and missile programs. Increasingly rigorous end effective
export controls and cooperation among supplier countries have led the
other foreign WMD and missile programs to look elsewhere for many controlled
items. However, proliferators and associated networks continue to
seek machine tools, spare parts for dual-use equipment, and widely available
materials, scientific equipment, and specialty metals. In addition,
several Western countries announced their willingness to negotiate ACW
sales to Libya.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues to change
in ways that make it more difficult to monitor and control, increasing
the risk of substantial surprise. Countries determined to maintain
WMD capabilities and the systems to deliver them are demonstrating greater
proficiency in the use of denial and deception efforts.
As in previous reports, proliferators have been placing significant emphasis
on increased self-sufficiency. In bolstering their domestic production
capabilities, and thereby reducing their dependence on others, they are
better able to insulate their programs against interdiction and disruption.
Although these indigenous capabilities may not always be a good substitute
for foreign imports—particularly for more advanced technologies—in
many cases they may prove to be adequate.
In addition, as their domestic capabilities grow, traditional
recipients of WMD and missile technology could emerge as new suppliers
of technology and expertise to other proliferators. We are increasingly
concerned about the growth of “secondary proliferation”
from maturing state-sponsored programs, such as those in India, Iran,
North Korea, and Pakistan. These countries and others are not members
of supplier groups such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Australia Group
and the Missile Technology Control Regime and do not adhere to their export
constraints. In addition, private companies, scientists, and engineers
from countries such as Russia, China, and India may be increasing their
involvement in WMD- and missile-related assistance, taking advantage of
weak or unenforceable national export controls and the growing availability
Some countries of proliferation concern are continuing efforts to develop
indigenous designs for advanced conventional weapons and expand production
capabilities, although most of these programs usually rely heavily on
foreign technical assistance. Many of these countries—unable
to obtain newer or more advanced arms—are pursuing upgrade programs
for existing inventories.
See page 15 below for a further discussion of possible interaction between
Chinese and Iranian entities with regard to the UCF.
Although the information contained in this section falls outside the parameters
of the current reporting period, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon and subsequent fears about possible terrorist
use of a chemical or biological agent against the United States or its
allies prompted us to include a section on non-state actors.