Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty

On December 13, President George W. Bush announced that the United States will withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the first time in modern history that the United States has renounced a major international accord. The long-established ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of national defenses against a ballistic missile attack and has been considered as a cornerstone of strategic stability throughout the Cold War.

The Bush Administration and the ABM Treaty

The change of administration in Washington in early 2001 resulted in a shift in the U.S. position towards the future of the ABM Treaty. The new administration of President George W. Bush left no no doubt that the U.S. is moving ahead with missile defense testing and deployment, but pledged close consultations to allay concerns by Russia, China and European allies.

In his speech on May 1, 2001 at the National Defense University in Washington President Bush stated that the United States is both determined to deploy a missile defense system and no longer interested in preserving the ABM Treaty. He also signalled a departure from the basic principles of Cold War security and its aftermath period. Other senior officials also announced that the administration views the ABM treaty in its current form as no longer relevant.

Both sea-launched missiles and lasers mounted on airplanes are prohibited by the ABM Treaty. In other words, the ABM Treaty prohibits testing and development of some elements of the envisioned multi-layered anti-missile shield. In June, President Bush indicated that the wants to more fully explore the intercept-on-launch (or boost-phase) technology which is also constrained by the treaty. In any event, the ABM Treaty allows for agreement on additional national missile defense test sites unless such test sites constitute de-facto deployment of national anti-missile capabilities. The administration's official stance is not to modify the ABM Treaty, but to seek negotiations with Russia over a completely new security framework that would replace the treaty and permit the development of a missile shield.  A white paper prepared for Congress and distributed to U.S. embassies abroad gives a comprehensive description on the Bush administration's missile defense policy. The main theme of this paper is that the United States intends to move beyond the ABM Treaty and the strategy of mutual assured destruction and is seeking a new approach to deterrence that includes both offenses and defenses. 

In a letter to Congress sent in November, fifty-one American Nobel Laureates urged the administration to leave the ABM Treaty intact. They addressed the technical feasibility of NMD, writing that while effective missile defense may be feasible under laboratory conditions, it would be far more difficult to design a system that provides effective protection against a surprise attack using varying countermeasures.

Consultations on Strategic Stability, Ministerial Level

Lubljana Summit, June 16, 2001

President Bush's visit to Europe in June failed to gain support for a unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in order to enable deployment of a missile defense. The highlight of the trip was Bush’s informal meeting with Russian President Putin in Slovenia. After the meeting Putin sounded more amenable to compromise, suggesting the possibility of minor amendments to permit U.S. research and development. On the other hand Putin recapitulated Russia's longstanding position that Russia has the right to withdraw from START I if the United States unilaterally breaks the ABM Treaty.

Genoa Summit, July 22-23, 2001

At the July summit of the leaders of the top industrialized nations in Genoa, Italy, a series of bilateral consultations began. Before the summit, On July 18, Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov indicated readiness for a more intensive dialogue with the United States on the proposed new strategic framework. Russia needs more clarity from the United States on plans for a missile defense shield. On the summit, Bush and Putin agreed to link talks on the American missile-defense shield with efforts to reduce each country's nuclear arsenals. 

Crawford Summit, November 13-15, 2001

At the summit meeting in Washington and Texas, U.S. President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin did not reach an agreement on how to reduce nuclear stockpiles or the future of missile defenses and the ABM Treaty. Putin presented a more flexible position, signaling that he ultimately might be willing to allow testing that is banned by the treaty. Both leaders vowed to reduce nuclear arsenals by two-thirds, but did not agree on whether the weapons would be destroyed and whether the reductions would be permanent. Meanwhile in New York, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly approved a draft resolution calling on Russia and the United States to strenghten the ABM Treaty.

United States Pulls Out of ABM Treaty

On December 13, President Bush announced that the United States will withdraw from the ABM Treaty in six months. The decision came after Secretary of State Colin Powell, visiting Moscow in recent days, was unable to bridge differences with Russian president Vladimir Putin. According to U.S. senior officials, negotiations between the U.S. and Russia failed because the Bush administration was unwilling to discuss each missile test with Moscow in advance, and because Russia refused any change that would allow unrestricted testing.

U.S. Documents and Statements

Russian Reaction

Chinese Reaction

United Nations

United Nations' Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that the end of the ABM Treaty "may provoke an arms race, especially in the missile area, and further undermine disarmament and non-proliferation regimes." In early February, the U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Eric Javits, told the plenary session that unenforceable and ineffective arms control treaties would not not make any positive contribution to international peace and security, but "may impede or prevent realistic and quite appropriate preparations for individual or collective self-defense."


For background on international views on the American missile defense program please visit the
Subsection on International Positions

Clinton's Limited NMD and the ABM Treaty

From the American standpoint, preservation of the ABM Treaty means preservation of U.S. vulnerability, while it is strategically disadvantageous to perpetuate the doctrine of MAD which is drawn up in the ABM Treaty. It requires the United States to leave itself exposed to the threat of missile attack and coercive diplomacy from countries like North Korea, Iraq, Iran and, perhaps at some time in the future, China. U.S. President George W. Bush has made his stance clear in calling for a comprehensive national missile defence system. However, the Clinton Administration had sought to work within the constraints of a modified treaty, based on the argument that the U.S. should seek security through arms control negotiations. 

The ABM-TMD Demarkation Negotiations 

A 1997 agreement between Russia and United States on the ABM Treaty, the so-called demarcation agreement, allowed both countries to test and develop theater missile defense systems with certain speed and altitude restrictions. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States initiated negotiations in 1993 to resolve the ABM Treaty succession question. The U.S. used this opportunity to renegotiate the treaty in order to add a technical distinction between ABM systems which are limited by the treaty and and theater missile defense system which are not. The Clinton administration sought to pave the way for it planned land-based theater defense systems (Patriot, THAAD). In May 1995, the United States and Russia reached an initial, legally non-binding agreement that permitted the deployment of an effective TMD without violating the ABM Treaty. On September 23, 1996, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeniy Primakov agreed toproceed with negotiations on so-called higher-velocity theater anti-missile systems.

On September 26, 1997, the United States signed agreements with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine providing for succession to the ABM Treaty by those four states. Other agreements clarified the demarcation between ABM and TMD systems. However, there is no guarantee that any agreement reached will ever enter into force. The demarcation agreements have still not been ratified by the U.S. Senate, which has expressed  disapproval of them. 

Limited National Missile Defense

In January 1999 the Clinton Administration approached Moscow with a another request to modify the ABM Treaty so that it would permit the deployment of a limited NMD system. This would have involved amending the treaty to permit the U.S. to change the location of its designated missile defense site as well as the treaty's restrictions on early-warning and ABM engagement radars.   In addition, the proposal reversed the treaty's prohibition of the use of space-based sensors. In June 1999, President Yeltsin agreed to commence bilateral talks on maintaining the ABM Treaty. The United States and Russia also agreed to continue talks on a new START III agreement, which would establish lower strategic nuclear missile ceilings than the 1993 START II, which had not entered into force. The talks started in August 1999, but have not shown any progress since then. 

To reach Russian consent on modifications,  in early 2000 Washington encouraged Moscow to preserve its strategic nuclear capability so that the US could overcome the proposed limited NMD system. In May 2000, negotiation documents from the U.S. ABM talks with Russia were leaked to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists magazine. In these "talking points" for ABM Treaty negotiations, the United States proposed that Russia maintains enough nuclear warheads on high-alert ICBMs for an annihilating counterattack in case of a surprise disarming nuclear first strike by the USA.

On June 3-5, 2000, Presidents Clinton and Putin held a summit meting in Moscow in which issues of strategic stability were discussed. Little or no progress was achieved on the key issues of missile defense and ABM Treaty modification. Later that year, at the United Nations Millennium Summit in New York September 6, both presidents adopted a Joint Statement on a "Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative", an agreement that covers cooperative efforts on theater missile defense, early warning information, missile non-proliferation measures, and confidence and transparency-building measures. The two leaders committed their nations to the establishment of a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) to coordinate data supplied by U.S. and Russian satellites.
By mid-August 2000, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen had still to submit his national missile defence Deployment Readiness Review (DRR) to President Clinton. There was strong speculation that the President was considering authorizing preparatory work for the construction during the next year of an NMD phased-array X-band radar complex on the Alaskan island of Shemya; a group of international public lawyers had already suggested a legal reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty. According to them, the president was allowed to authorize construction at an initial anti-missile site in Alaska without violating the ABM Treaty, a move described in reports as a "limited green light" for subsequent deployment. Later he could even move forward toward missile defense deployment while avoiding the announcement of a formal withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and crushing prospects of arms control. On September 1, when President Clinton defered the deployment decision to his successor, he also announced that he would not authorise preparatory work in Alaska.

The Antiballistic Missile Treaty and Protocols

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is a bilateral treaty, drawn up and signed by the United States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War in 1972. The ABM Treaty was intended to discourage a first-strike nuclear attack by either side, because without defenses an attacker would face certain annihilation in a retaliatory strike. In turn, defensive countermeasures might upset any offensive balance between the two major nuclear powers. The ABM Treaty, along with its counterpart SALT that dealt with strategic offensive weapons, preserved nuclear deterrence or mutual assured destruction (MAD) between the two superpowers. It stabilized the strategic balance by avoiding an arms race between offensive and defensive forces in which one superpower would try to prevent the other from making itself invulnerable. 

The treaty permits each side to deploy two very limited ABM systems, so called "theater" ABM sites to protect each of their capital cities and one selceted ICBM launch area. At each site there may be no more than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers. Later, in 1974, this provision was modified to limit each side to 100 interceptors at one ABM site. The treaty deals with traditional anti-missile technologies (missiles, launchers and radars) as well as more sophisticated system such as lasers. Precise quantitative and qualitative limits are imposed on the ABM systems that are allowed to be deployed. The number and technical characteristics of radar and other system components are spelled out in detail in the treaty itself as well as in the agreed upon statements. Both parties also agreed to limit the qualitative improvement of their ABM technology. This policy prohibits the development, testing, transfering and deploying of sea-based, air-based,  space-based or mobile land-based ABM systems and components.

Standing Consultative Commission Documents

The treaty announced the establishment of a bilateral U.S.-Soviet working group (SCC - Standing Consultative Commission) to promote its objectives and implementation. The commission was established during the first SALT II negotiating session of in December 21, 1972. 

ABM Treaty Review

Article XIV of the Treaty calls for review of the The ABM Treaty has to be reviewed at five-year intervals. The first review was conducted in fall 1977.

Congressional Documents

Hearings and Resolutions


  • NMD Deployment Criteria Act, H. R. 2786 ("To provide deployment criteria for the National Missile Defense system, and to provide for operationally realistic testing of the National Defense system against countermeasures"), August 2, 2001 (pdf)
  • NMD Deployment Criteria Act of 2000 , H. R. 5066 ("To provide deployment criteria for the National Missile Defense system, and to provide for operationally realistic testing of the National Defense system against countermeasures"), June 27, 2000 (pdf)
  • Freedom From Mutually Assured Destruction Act of 1999, H. R. 2022 ("To prohibit compliance by the executive branch with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1997 multilateral Memorandum of Understanding related to that treaty", June 7, 1999


Research Reports

The Bush Administration, Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty

  • The ABM Treaty: The End of One Saga and the Start of Another, Nikolai Sokov, PONARS Policy Memo No. 218, December 2001 (pdf)
    The withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could lead into a new era of uncertainty. The next several years appear particularly delicate and require careful handling. Prudence dictates a cautious attitude toward the traditional elements of the U.S.-Russian political-military relationship nuclear deterrence and existing arms control treaties.
  • Über den Raketenzaun blicken: Einschätzung des Bush-Putin-Gipfels in Crawford, Bernd Kubbig, HSFK, Raketenabwehrforschung International, November 2001
    After the September terrorist attacks, the Bush administration has reinforced its hardline position on missile defense. The Texas summit has not been completely successful in winning Russian consent for the project. The United States should now review its rogue state threat analysis and focus on multilateral solutions to prevent terrorist access of weapons-usable fissile material. For the Europeans it is time to become more involved in the missile defense debate.
  • Vor dem Bush/Putin-Gipfel: Raketenabwehr und ABM-Vertrag im Zeichen des Terrors, Bernd Kubbig, HSFK, Raketenabwehrforschung International, Bulletin No. 27, Autumn 2001 (also pdf)
    Missile defense is the key element in the Bush administration's comprehensive strategic reorientation. Such a transition has to be managed with care, while a rush to abandon the ABM Treaty would be damaging for international security. Contrary to its own political rhetoric, the Bush administration does not intend to end the logic of mutually assured destruction, but strenghten it.
  • Assessing Prospects for Development of U.S.-Russian Strategic Relations, Gennady Khromov, August 1, 2001
    Besides the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the United States has not proposed anything concrete to Russia. No official viewpoint has been expressed on how limited or robust the missile defense architecture. Washington is also still undecided on the appropriate level of U.S. nuclear arsenal, while it is not willing to conclude legally binding agreements on nuclear arms reductions. While the U.S. cannot develop an effective missile defense in the foreseeable future, the remaining Russian nuclear weapons will protect Russian national security. The responsibility for future international destabilization lies on the United States alone.
  • The Bush Administration's National Missile Defense Proposal, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers Backgrounder, August 1, 2001
    Focuses on three aspects of the Bush administration's missile defense plan: the creation of a test bed facility in Ft. Greely, the use of national missile defense radar concurrently with air defense radar; and the use of Aegis radar in a national missile defense capacity. 
  • Beyond Missile Defense: Countering Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Michael O'Hanlon, Brookings Policy Brief, August 2001 (also in pdf)
    President Bush is correct to declare the current ABM Treaty inappropriate for the modern era, and to leave no doubt that his administration intends to move beyond the treaty and build a missile defense system when possible. In addition to eventually building a ballistic missile defense, America should also enhance safeguards at its borders, increase protection for critical infrastructure, improve the intelligence community, seek to expand cooperative threat reduction programs with Russia and North Korea, and consider developing a national cruise missile defense.

  • Mission Impossible, Spurgeon Keeny, Arms Control Today, July/August 2001 
    Before trying to persuade the world to accept a treaty-busting NMD, Bush should first revisit the value of such a system compared with its real costs to American security. Since START I and II substantially reduce and stabilize Russian strategic forces, which are the only threat that could destroy the United States, Bush should instead take his new friend Putin up on the offer of a joint cooperative effort to eliminate incipient threats before they emerge.

  • How the ABM Treaty Obstructs Missile Defense, Baker Spring, Heritage Foundation, July 10, 2001 (also pdf)
    Restrictions in the ABM Treaty ban a wide variety of missile defense testing and development activities. The Bush Administration should explain in detail what could be done to ensure the protection of America and its allies and how continued enforcement of the ABM Treaty stands in the way of this action.

  • Toward the Common Good: Building a New U.S.-Russian Relationship, Eastwest Institute, July 2001 (pdf) 
    Recommends that Russia should be made a part of the research and development effort on ballistic missile defense, ensuring that Moscow derives benefits from any alteration to the ABM Treaty. The U.S. and Russia should immediately begin talks on an interim nuclear arrangement featuring lower levels of offensive weapons complemented with defensive systems. 

  • The Significance of Joint Missile Surveillance, John Steinbruner, CISS Occasional Paper, July 2001 (pdf)
    The funding for the Moscow-based joint center for the exchange of missile data is now under under threat by the Bush administration. This paper examines its utility in helping Russia and America to move away from continued reliance on rapid-reaction nuclear deterrent forces, which could also play a role in reducing concerns about the potential impact of a missile defense system. 

  • Star Wars Revisited, Michelle Ciarrocca and William Hartung, Foreign Policy in Focus, June 2001 (also pdf)
    The Bush administration's ambitious missile defense proposal does not take into account the reality of missile defense programs under development. Monetary and political costs of deploying a comprehensive NMD outweigh the benefits. 
  • The Failure Of The ABM Treaty, Adam Garfinkle, Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 25, 2001
    The Bush Administration is right about the ABM Treaty. The treaty is not just passe, rather it has become an obstacle to strategic stability, not a cornerstone of it. 

  • The ABM Treaty: Critical Then and Now, John Rhinelander, CDI Issuebrief, May 24, 2001
    The ABM Treaty is a flexible agreement that was written to be amended by the parties. It was amended in 1974 and 1997 and could be amended again to allow for a limited NMD. Realistic operational testing will not likely conflict with the ABM Treaty during the Bush administration's first term in office, unless the president decides to pursue a crash program. The ABM Treaty is not a relic of the Cold War, but retains a central place in the international security system. 

  • Remarks on National Missile Defense, Carl Levin, National Defense University Forum, May 11, 2001
    The main question related to missile defense is whether or not a deployment commitment would make the U.S. less or more secure. The ABM Treaty provides a mechanism for modifications to reflect changed circumstances, and modifications are neccessary for several reasons. In addition, no NMD system should be deployed before it has demonstrated that it is reliable and operationally effective. The land-based system architecture that is under development is the most mature technology. 

  • Helms, Gephardt React to Missile Defense Plan, Washington File, May 2, 2001 (pdf)
    Reactions on Bush's Mai 1 speech by Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms and Democratic Leader of the House of Representatives Richard Gephardt.

  • Top Pentagon Officials Make Case for Layered Missile Defense, Wade Boese, Arms Control Today, April 2001 
    Early clarification of the Bush administration's preference for a future layered missile defense unconstrained by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and consisting of multiple types of anti-ballistic missile systems, including sea-based systems.

  • Defending America: A Plan for a Limited National Missile Defense, James Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon, Brookings Policy Brief, February 2001
    Defending Americans against ballistic missile attacks does not require a large and expensive system or immediate treaty-busting actions. The Bush administration should emphasize boost-phase technologies, work hard to modify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to permit limited NMD systems, convince America's allies of the need for missile defense, and use the time before construction starts to negotiate basing arrangements for the boost-phase system and. Otherwise, building an NMD system could be worse than having no NMD system at all. 

  • Bush, Missile Defence, and the Atlantic Alliance, Philip Gordon, Survival, February 2001 (pdf)
    The Bush administration needs not only to choose carefully among competing technologies and architectures and to pursue agreement with Russia, but should also involve the European allies in its deliberations.

  • The U.S. Nuclear Debate: Issues of Concern, Theresa Hitchens, BASIC Paper, February 2001
    Under the congressionally Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush administration has an opportunity to reduce the U.S. arsenal, eliminate overkill in targeting, and lower of hair-trigger alert status and reach a more rational nuclear policy. But rapid pursuit of NMD technologies, nuclear modernization and undercutting the CTBT can undercut any progress.

  • National missile defences and arms control after Clinton's NMD decision, Daryl Kimball and Stephen Young, Disarmament Forum No. 1, 2001 (pdf)
    The technical and political shortcomings of NMD mean that the international community must make effective use of diplomacy, trade and assistance, and new mechanisms to control and reduce existing and potential ballistic missiles threats worldwide. Multilateral efforts to freeze and reduce the military missile capabilities of all states may be the most effective tool to address missile threats.

  • Confidence-building measures related to the ABM defense problem, Viacheslav Abroaimov, Disarmament Forum No. 1, 2001 (pdf)
    If two countries maintain relations of deterrence, then the development of a missile defense system by one of them introduces a disequilibrium in these relations. The attempt to introduce of confidence-building measures to substantiate the possibility of adaptation of the ABM Treaty to new realities will probably fail, yet confidence-building measures that keep the basic provisions of the ABM Treaty of 1972 unchanged would contribute to its enhancement.

President Clinton's Limited National Missile Defense

  • NMD in Run-Up to US Elections, Disarmament Diplomacy, October 2000
    National security advisers of Vice President Al Gore and Governor George Bush set out to both presidential candidates' positions on missile defense.

  • Cohen Stresses Need for NMD in Context of Arms Control, Susan Ellis, Washington File, September 26, 2000
    Defense Secretary William Cohen stressing his support for an NMD system in the context of arms control, because without arms control taken into account any defensive system can be overwhelmed just by proliferating the numbers of missiles.

  • NMD Continues to Dominate Nuclear Arms Control Issues, Disarmament Diplomacy, August 2000
    Discusses U.S. and international developments as well as the legal advice to President Clinton whether work on an unpermitted Alaskian facility is commensurate with basic ABM treaty obligations.

  • Toward an Agreement With Russia on Missile Defense, Senator Carl Levin, Arms Control Today, April 2000
    The strategic ramifications of deploying a missile defense can be offset when a cooperative arrangement would be reached with the Russians that would allow for a limited U.S. national missile defense while reducing the number of deployed strategic weapons below START II levels.

  • European Missile Defence: New Emphasis, New Roles, Mark Bromley, BASIC Paper, May 2000
    The European NATO states will possibly accept missile defences as a legitimate means of resolving real or supposed security threats. This policy change would undoubtedly be supported by the European defence industry and the U.S. administration eager to fend off the opposition to its own NMD plans. 

  • Russian Policy and the Potential for Agreement on Revising the ABM Treaty, Celeste Wallander, Harvard University Policy Memo, April 2000
    The key to understand the Russian potential for agreement on ABM Treaty modification requires an understanding of Russia's new security and military doctrines, the significance of nuclear weapons in defense policy, and the Putin administration's priorities for economic reform.

  • ABM Treaty Revision: A Challenge to Russian Security, Alexander Pikayev, Disarmament Diplomacy, March 2000
    In Russia, advocates of a cooperation with the United States argue that Moscow should agree the treaty modification sought by the Clinton administration to create a more favourable environment for developing Russo-Western cooperation. There is also a unilateralist school who thinks that neither side has a real interest in maintaining the current formal bilateral strategic arms control regime.

  • Is Arms Control Dead? Harold Brown and Stephen Pullinger, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2000
    The end of the Cold War has encouraged American political leaders to believe that arms control was irrelevant. Many conclude that the U.S. could win any future arms race that may develop in competition with an emerging China, a resurgent Russia, or any rogue state. But this perspective is dangerous, and the utility of arms control has not disappeared.

  • Deploying NMD: Not Whether, But How, Ivo Daalder, James Goldgeier and James Lindsay, Survival, vol. 42, No. 1, Spring 2000 (pdf)
    The question American policy makers are confronted with is not whether to build an NMD but how to do it without making the country less secure. It is neccessary to make deployment decisions based on realistic assessments of both the state of the technology and the nature of the threat. The United States should take steps that will enable it to deploy a limited NMD without upsetting the current strategic balance or jeopardising U.S. security.

  • Amerikanischer Unilateralismus: Ein Weltordnungsproblem, Harald Müller, HSFK, Raketenabwehrforschung International, Bulletin No. 10, Spring 2000 (also pdf)

  • Current plans for missile defence, John Pike and and Peter Voth, Disarmament Forum No. 1, 2001
    The question of missile defense is increasingly not whether the United States will deploy it, but rather what types of defence, and when. Even the deployment of a limited system would require revision or abandonment of the ABM Treaty, but the American anti-missile program may be long delayed. 

  • The Future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, ISIS Briefing Paper, November 1999

  • How a Limited National Missile Defense Would Impact the ABM Treaty, Lisbeth Gronlund and George Lewis, Arms Control Today, November 1999

  • National Missile Defense: Examining the Options, Charles V. Peña and Barbara Conry, Cato Policy Analysis, March 16, 1999 (pdf)
    A limited NMD is feasible, can be deployed at a reasonable cost and would not disrupt the strategic nuclear balance. The debate should not be whether or not to deploy NMD, but rather about the nature, capabilities and costs of a limited NMD system capable of protecting the United States against limited threats from rogue states.

  • The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty's Legal Status, Council for a Livable World, February 3, 1999
    Argues that legal analyses stating that the ABM Treaty is no longer valid are biased by ideology and wrong in their conclusions.

  • National Missile Defense, the ABM Treaty and the Future of START II, Arms Control Association, January 27, 1999
  • U.S. wants to adjust ABM accord, John Holum, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, January 22, 1999
  • The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the End of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: A Memorandum of Law, The Heritage Foundation, June 15, 1998 (also pdf)
  • Taking Aim at the ABM Treaty: THAAD and U.S. Security, John Pike and Marcus Corbin, Federation of Amercian Scientists (no date)
  • Ballistic Missile Defense for the Twenty-First Century. At the crossroads of Global Security, Charles Shotwell, Joginder Dhillon and Deborah Pollard (U.S. Air Force), (no date, ~1994) 

Demarcation Talks and ABM Treaty Succession

ABM Treaty "Talking Points"