REPORT


Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy

Rapporteur: Arie M. Oostlander
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At the sitting of 21 January 2000 the President of Parliament announced that the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy had been authorised to draw up an own-initiative report, pursuant to Rule 163 of the Rules of Procedure, on the Implementation of the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia and that the Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs had been asked for its opinion.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy had appointed Arie M. Oostlander rapporteur at its meeting of 23 September 1999.

The Committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 24 May, 11 July, 9 October and 22 November 2000.

At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 31 votes to 1, with 14 abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: Elmar Brok, chairman; Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne and Catherine Lalumière, vice-chairmen; Arie M. Oostlander, rapporteur; Danielle Auroi (for Daniel Marc Cohn-Bendit), Alexandros Baltas, Bastiaan Belder, The Lord Bethell, Andre Brie, Michael Cashman (for Rosa M. Díez González), Paul Couteaux (for Luís Queiró), Olivier Dupuis (for Francesco Enrico Speroni), Glyn Ford (for Jan Marinus Wiersma pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Ingo Friedrich, Michael Gahler, Per Gahrton, Georges Garot (for Jannis Sakellariou), Jas Gawronski, Vitaliano Gemelli (for Silvio Berlusconi), Vasco Graça Moura (for Gunilla Carlsson), Bertel Haarder, Klaus Hänsch, Magdalene Hoff, Christoph Werner Konrad (for Alfred Gomolka), Jan Joost Lagendijk, Alain Lamassoure, Cecilia Malmström (for Pere Esteve), Pedro Marset Campos, Hugues Martin, Linda McAvan, Emilio Menéndez del Valle, Raimon Obiols i Germà, Jacques F. Poos, Lennart Sacrédeus (for Geoffrey Van Orden), José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra, Jacques Santer, Jürgen Schröder, Elisabeth Schroedter, Ioannis Souladakis, Ursula Stenzel, Hannes Swoboda, Gary Titley, Johan Van Hecke, Paavo Väyrynen, Matti Wuori and Christos Zacharakis.

The opinion of the Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs is attached.

The report was tabled on 29 November 2000.

The deadline for tabling amendments will be indicated in the draft agenda for the relevant part-session.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION


The European Parliament,

- having regard to the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia adopted by the European Council at Cologne on 4 June 1999¹,

- having regard to the work programmes of the Finnish, Portuguese and French Council Presidencies, 1999-2000, for the implementation of this strategy, and to the reports on the implementation submitted by the Finnish and Portuguese Presidencies,

- having regard to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the European Union and Russia, which entered into force on 1 December 1997,

- having regard to the conclusions of the European Councils at Cologne 3-4 June 1999, Helsinki 10-11 December 1999 and Santa Maria da Feira 19-20 June 2000,

- having regard to the Commission communication 'A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the European Union' (COM(1998) 589 - C4-0067/1999) and to the Action Plan for the Northern Dimension, endorsed at Feira,

- having regard to the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 10-11 July 2000,

- having regard to the Commission proposals to the Biarritz European Council of 13-14 October 2000 to guarantee long-term EU energy independence,

- having regard to the joint statements of the EU-Russia summits at Helsinki, on 22 October 1999, and at Moscow, on 29 May 2000,

- having regard to Russia's Medium Term Strategy for Development of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the European Union 2000-2010, presented at the Helsinki EU-Russia summit,

- having regard to the Commission evaluation of the Tacis Country Programme in Russia on behalf of the EC-SCR Evaluation Unit, January 2000, and the Commission evaluation of the Tacis European Senior Service Network, October 1999,

- having regard to the NATO-Russia Founding Act, adopted at Paris on 27 May 1997,

- having regard to its numerous resolutions on the war in Chechnya,

- having regard to its resolution of 4 May 1999 on the Commission communication 'A

¹ OJ L 157, 24.06.1999, p. 1
Northern Dimension for the Policies of the European Union\(^1\),
- having regard to its resolution of 5 May 1999 on the Common Strategy towards the Russian Federation\(^2\),
- having regard to Rule 163 of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy and the opinion of the Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs (A5-0363/2000),

A. whereas comprehensive cooperation between the European Union and Russia represents a decisive contribution to security and stability on the European continent now that the division of Europe has been overcome and particular importance is therefore attached to the EU strategy for a deeper relationship with Russia and to the action plan,

B. whereas recognition of the democratic order and protection for human and minority rights forms the basis for such a deeper relationship and the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in Russia must therefore have priority,

C. whereas the Union's relationship with Russia is crucial for the pursuit of social, economic and political security in Europe and whereas a range of shared values, against which Russia also wishes to be measured, makes it possible to significantly deepen this relationship,

D. recalling that the Member States and the Tacis Committee are bound by the Common Strategy, that Member States should align their policies towards Russia with the Common Strategy, and that close co-ordination between EU Institutions and Member States is strictly necessary,

E. taking note of the fact that the adoption of the Common Strategy was not accompanied by any decision to match the objectives pursued with an increase in the available financial resources,

F. whereas Tacis remains virtually the only EU instrument available in the Russian Federation, with Russia the largest beneficiary among the New Independent States, and whereas the influence of Tacis on socially and economically balanced development in the country is minimal and the significance of expanding education and science programmes for democratic consolidation has not been sufficiently considered to date,

G. whereas the Tacis budget allocated to Russia only constitutes a fraction of the EU budget for other regions bordering the European Union and this does not reflect Russia's significance,

H. whereas the appropriations available for Russia under the Tacis programme should primarily be focused on the creation and stabilisation of civil society and on checks and

\(^1\) OJ C 279, 1.10.1999, p. 31
\(^2\) OJ C 279, 1.10.1999, p. 224
balances mechanisms in this still unstable society,

I. whereas support for the establishment and full implementation of the rule of law and the proper functioning of democracy, good governance in federalism and the development of a civil society should be a major problem to be addressed in the Tacis programme,

J. whereas the European Senior Service Network (ESSN), through which retired EU managers and civil servants have transferred knowledge and know-how to the newly privatised sector in Russia in a direct and speedy manner, has proved to be a highly efficient Tacis programme, but this programme is not receiving the funds that it merits,

K. whereas the ability of the Commission Delegation in Moscow to play an effective role in the context of EU assistance programmes in Russia is severely constrained by long bureaucratic procedures and misunderstandings caused by various factors such as over-centralised decision-making procedures, on both sides resulting in delays and leading to non-optimal decisions,

L. whereas Russia and the Union not only have great common interests in trade, investments, raw materials, energy, science, culture, the mass media, technology, infrastructure, environment, nuclear safety and the fight against organised crime, but also in seeking a certain degree of convergence in their respective foreign, security and defence policies, particularly in the Balkans, the South-Caucasian republics, Central Asia and the Middle East,

M. whereas the common strategy with Russia includes a series of joint instruments for a European security concept, forms of dialogue, joint conflict prevention measures and disarmament talks, including special mechanisms to develop joint initiatives with regard to specific third countries and regions and, hitherto, very little has been done to underpin these possibilities with specific actions,

N. whereas the EU Northern Dimension policy has hitherto been underused, even though it includes important approaches to issues of cooperation with Russia in a spirit of partnership with regard to the enclave of Kaliningrad and cross-border cooperation between Russia and the Baltic States; whereas this policy should be fully utilised in promoting prosperity, stability and security and in protecting the environment in the Baltic Sea and Barents regions and in the Arctic; whereas the Kaliningrad region in particular should not remain an impoverished and unstable enclave within an enlarged Union,

O. whereas developing the huge oil and gas resources in North West Russia and the Barents Sea area and developing the infrastructure for transporting the oil and gas to the European market would, as a part of the Northern Dimension policy, contribute significantly to the security of energy supply to the EU,

P. whereas the safety of Russian, EU and third country citizens as well as nature and in particular the oceans demand urgent action to bring the hazards represented by poorly maintained nuclear installations, submarines and waste dumps in North-Western Russia under control and whereas the 'Kursk' tragedy is a stark reminder of these hazards; whereas co-operation activities in this field require an appropriate legal base, appropriate resources as well as improved willingness and interest on the Russian side and further co-ordination
between donors,

Q. whereas, in the light of the accidents of the 'Kursk' nuclear submarine and the Moscow TV tower, Russia's technological infrastructure requires radical improvement, and there are therefore greater opportunities for cooperation,

R. whereas under the US disarmament programme Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) specific programmes for dismantling ballistic missile submarines were developed, as well as possibilities for an extension of CTR to general-purpose submarines that pose even larger environmental threats to Northern Europe; whereas the US Congress is only willing to provide half of the funding necessary for CTR continuation;

S. whereas the proposals put forward in the Russian-Lithuanian Nida Initiative are of great value to the Northern Dimension Action Plan,

T. whereas the President of the European Commission has proposed strengthened EU/Russia energy cooperation at the Biarritz European Council, guaranteeing EU energy independence while offering Russia a key role in the EU future strategy on energy supply,

U. whereas Vice-Prime Minister Khristenko and Foreign Minister Ivanov have responded positively to the Commission’s energy proposals, provided that Russian efforts to increase energy production and export to Europe are supported by European investment and technology transfers, particularly in the Barents Sea, Komi region and the Caspian Sea basin,

V. whereas the joint declaration between the Community and the three Caucasus republics issued at their summit meeting of 22 June 1999 established a clear link between continued EU support and conflict resolution, and whereas it is to be hoped that the Community will make decisive use of this momentum in order to deploy its considerable instruments and resources to play an even stronger role in the various peace efforts,

W. whereas President Putin and the new government have initiated important reforms, however, the implementation of these reforms and their coherence will have to be judged at a later stage,

X. pointing out, in this regard, that the independence of the judiciary must be strictly enforced being one of the prerequisites of a modern state,

Y. whereas the Finnish Presidency initiated structured co-operation between the Union and Russia in the field of justice and home affairs at the EU-Russia Summit in Helsinki (22 October 1999) and an EU-Russia Conference in Moscow (16 December 1999) on co-operation in the combat against organised cross-border crime,

Z. whereas an anti-terrorism Centre was set up in Moscow by the CIS Summit of 21 June 2000,

AA. whereas Russian civil society suffers from a tendency for national TV operations to be concentrated in few hands, leading to a one-sided supply of information,
BB. whereas the Russian civil society is in a new process of formation following a long period of totalitarianism and absence of freedoms and suffers from important deficiencies and restrictions in the legal, political and economic system, with churches and religious (charity) organisations being particularly vulnerable as to their registration, taxation, property and freedom of access to the public sphere,

CC. whereas it is EU policy to support regional co-operation as an instrument to create a just international order and good neighbourly relations based on common principles, norms and values,

DD. whereas, however, it is necessary to ensure that co-operation is entirely voluntary and that no country is subjected to any kind of undue pressure when it considers, agrees to or implements co-operative arrangements,

EE. whereas, according to a declaration by the CIS Summit in Moscow on 21 June 2000, a free-trade area within the CIS should be set up before the end of 2000, but no measures have yet been embarked on in this connection,

FF. whereas in connection with its military campaign in Chechnya, Russia has contravened principles of humanitarian law and failed to honour commitments made in the frameworks of the OSCE and the Council of Europe;

GG. whereas, in the absence of a full and independent investigation, new appalling reports as to the conduct of Russian troops in Chechnya are emerging,

HH. whereas following an urgency resolution adopted by the European Parliament proposing to freeze Tacis assistance except for projects promoting democratic values and following the invitation to suspend the ratification of the EU – Russia Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement and the according decision in principle at the Helsinki European Council, these measures were taken; whereas the practical effects of these measures unfortunately have been limited and their impact on Russian policy-making probably insignificant; whereas the restrictive measures are now being revoked;

II. whereas generally little coherence exists between the policy responses towards Russia of the EU and its Member States and those of other key actors like the USA and Japan,

JJ. whereas, given that Russia is in a political union with Belarus, it is appropriate in the interest of Russia’s democratic legitimacy for President Putin and the Russian government to point out clearly and consistently the comprehensive need for democratic progress and reforms in Belarus, not least in the light of the report submitted by the parliamentary troika from the EU, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Minsk on 16 October 2000,

KK. whereas it is essential to continue to contribute to the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow, with the aim of helping Russia to make the best use of the knowledge of its scientists and prevent the transfer of know-how on weapons of mass destruction to states representing an international safety risk,
LL. whereas the lack of information on the EU, its policies and the enlargement process may be a source of suspicion and misunderstanding while the possibilities of in-depth information to political and opinion makers as well as to the large public (e.g. by European radio and television broadcasting in Russian language) are often neglected,

MM. whereas study exchanges between Russian and EU universities are of great importance for future mutual understanding and whereas existing (Schengen) visa regimes seriously impede such exchanges,

On Principles and Instruments

1. Affirms its determination to continue the EU-Russia strategic partnership with an optimal depth and width, in spite of crises and setbacks;

2. Stresses that the EU Strategy towards Russia should concentrate on fostering the process of democratisation of state and society, a political system based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, the freedom of the press, as well as the federalisation of the Russian administration;

3. Supports a double-track strategy of explicitly condemning human rights violations and the disproportionate use of force, like in the case of Chechnya, while collaborating with Russia in order to strengthen the rule of law and democratic structures of State and society using all instruments at its disposal, e.g. the Common Strategy, the Action Plan, Tacis and to encourage the Russian side to contribute its part to the success;

4. Calls upon the Russian Government to give free and effective access to the International Committee of the Red Cross and ECHO to all places of detention in Chechnya and neighbouring areas, notably in the alleged "filtration camps", in order to ensure treatment of all detainees in conformity with international law;

5. Supports the conviction rising amongst Russian authorities that no purely military solution to the Chechen conflict exists and that war criminals should be brought to justice;

6. Urges, in this respect, the Russian government to set up an independent inquiry committee with the aim of investigating all the human rights violations that have taken place during the conflict;

7. Asks the Council to be aware of the role the Union has to play in the restoration of the rule of law, living conditions and stability in the Caucasus region;

8. Further to its assent to the ratification of the Scientific and Technological Co-operation Agreement with Russia, calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote science and technology projects forging close links between the Union and Russia;

9. Demands that the budgets destined to Russia be adapted both to the objectives of the Common Strategy and to the priority that Russia has been given as a real strategic partner of the Union;
10. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to turn the EU Northern Dimension policy into a coherent programme with its own budget line;

11. Calls on the Commission, in the context of the Northern Dimension, to create a special plan for regional and cross-border cooperation with Russia for the Kaliningrad region and the eastern border of the Baltic States, in order to bring about a solution to the border treaties situation and at the same time to make the Kaliningrad enclave into a pilot region for cross-border cooperation with Russia;

12. Calls upon the Commission and the Commissioner responsible for external relations, who in accordance with declaration 32 to the Amsterdam Treaty should be Vice President of the Commission, to take very determinedly the Commission’s role as a policy initiator, with the High Representative for the CFSP being responsible for co-ordination with the Council and the Member States;

13. Calls on the Commission and the Council to pay special attention to the Medium-Term Russian Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010);

On Tacis and Co-operation on Specific Issues

14. Calls on the Commission to direct existing Tacis support – particularly in the creation and reinforcement of the structures of civil society, independent media and social security structures – towards close co-operative partnership rather than assistance, as well as to reinforce support for the achievement of a state based fully on the rule of law, a functioning democracy, the development of civil society, and the practices of a democratic federal state, taking account of its highly efficient European Senior Service Network;

15. Calls on the Commission to make greater provision for the social dimension of the Tacis programme, so that particular attention can be devoted to projects which will have tangible long-term economic benefits for Russia, as well as addressing the most deprived people, the elderly, orphans, juvenile delinquents and young people by seeking special ways of promoting and strengthening cooperation in programmes designed to increase social protection and combat poverty;

16. Calls on the Commission to ensure that instruments and programmes for cooperation and exchanges between NGOs and groups within civil society, universities, etc., are introduced swiftly and effectively in order to promote shared values, the exchange of ideas and experiences and the development of an open society;

17. Urges the Commission and the Russian government to jointly explore further ways of cooperating in eliminating nuclear hazards, to find or create appropriate legal bases and to pursue rapid conclusion of the negotiations on an international agreement establishing the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian Federation (MNEPR);
18. Calls on the Commission and the Council to significantly contribute to joint efforts as to the decommissioning of obsolete submarines in Russia's Northern Fleet;

19. Calls on the Commission and the Council to investigate the possibilities for increasing assistance in the storage of nuclear waste on the Kola Peninsula, as well as in upgrading nuclear reactors according to the standards of the IAEA in case no other alternatives exist;

20. Welcomes the Commission's proposals as to greater co-operation on rehabilitating production and transport installations in the Komi and Caspian Sea regions, as well as to exploit the gas reserves in the Barents Sea; considers that the new energy strategy should be planned and executed in close co-operation with all countries concerned;

21. Calls on the Commission to extend EU support to European law centres at Russian universities and academic institutes, and to promote awareness of the effects of EU-enlargement on the structure of commercial and other relations between Russia and the CEECs;

22. Calls on the Commission and the Member States, through their bilateral programmes, to raise environmental awareness and to help Russia prioritise such policy;

23. Calls on the Commission to investigate the possibilities of promoting Russian-language radio and television programmes on the EU, its policies and its enlargement in the Russian Federation;

24. Calls on the Commission and the Council to adapt current (Schengen) visa policies in order to provide Russian students with sufficient time to participate in exchange programmes, as well as to considerably broaden opportunities to study in EU Member States;

25. Calls on the Commissioners responsible for enlargement and external relations to initiate economic cooperation projects involving Kaliningrad and surrounding regions;

26. Requests Russian, Lithuanian and Polish authorities to co-operate with the Commission in order to find creative solutions to the legal and juridical problems that complicate the design of an appropriate regime for the movement of goods and people between an enlarged Union, Kaliningrad and other regions;

27. Calls on the Commission to continue Tacis support to train civil servants in the field of justice and home affairs, so as to strengthen the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary;

On the Delegation of the European Commission in Russia

28. Calls on the Commission to upgrade its Delegation in Russia in order to carry out its assistance programmes more effectively, taking into account the specific features of the Union's relationship with Russia;

29. Calls on the Commission to investigate the possibilities for a significant delegation of competencies to this Delegation, including an increased use of lump sum budgets in
particular for civil society and democratisation projects, to the Delegation of the European Commission in Russia, whereas the Delegation should have sufficient EU staff to manage these budgets;

On Administrative Reforms in Russia

30. Supports President Putin's efforts to restore the authority of the state and to reform the federation; however, pleads for a proper balance between the legislative and executive powers and for the application of proper methods which \emph{inter alia} respect the mandate of the federal courts and the principle of decentralised government, instead of strengthening presidential powers;

31. Applauds the tax reforms, which are crucial for achieving and sustaining balance in the public finances;

32. Supports all efforts on the part of Russia and calls for active EU participation with a view to ensuring that effective action is taken to combat organised crime and corruption, which is endemic in Russia and creates obstacles to the country's economic development and its relations with the European Union;

33. Calls on Russia to complete its ratification of, and to fully implement, the international conventions listed in the EU Action Plan on Common Action for the Russian Federation on Combating Organised Crime;

34. Points to the fact that Russian criminal law on money-laundering needs revision and more effective implementation;

35. Calls on the Russian government and the Duma to provide an adequate and fair legal framework for the freedom of activity, registration and taxation of NGOs and churches, and to guarantee free access for religious organisations to the public sphere;

On Foreign Policy

36. Considers that more of a shared perspective between EU and Russian foreign policies should be sought on the basis of common principles and responsibilities;

37. Calls on the Commission to draft a South-Eastern Dimension policy for the Caucasus in which the interests of Russia and the new States in the Caucasus region, which emerged following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, are duly taken into account, in order to restore a stable and just international order in the area;

38. Supports regional co-operation that is genuinely voluntary, mutually beneficial and compatible with the legitimate interests of third countries;

39. Calls on Russia to ratify the already signed border agreement with Lithuania and to sign and ratify the border agreements with Estonia and Latvia, which have been initialled;

40. Welcomes the Presidency Conclusions of the Feira Council, underlining that Russia as well as other countries may be invited to take part in EU-led operations;
41. Requests the Council to study Russian proposals aimed at increasing shared security on the continent while maintaining full solidarity and common security within the framework of NATO;

42. Calls on the Commission and the Council to continue their support for Russia's pursuit of membership of the WTO;

43. Requires to be consulted before the Council proposes to the European Council a prolongation of this Common Strategy or any review or adaptation of it;

44. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Member States, the Russian State Duma and Federal Government.
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

BACKGROUND

1. The Common Strategy on Russia was adopted by the Cologne European Council and will apply until July 2003. It consolidates further the end of the Cold War, offers co-operation in numerous areas of common interest for the creation of peace, stability and prosperity in Europe on the basis of common values and shared objectives. The Common Strategy on Russia is the first such strategy to have been adopted and it has been followed by Common Strategies on Ukraine and the Mediterranean. The Russia strategy may become a model for future Common Strategies, e.g. on Moldova and Indonesia, and its implementation is likely to have an influence on the way in which other Common Strategies will be implemented.

2. Whereas the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) is very much focused on economic relations, including many technical provisions, the Common Strategy especially raises the profile of political and security-related aspects of the relationship with Russia. However, for the time being, the capacity of the Common Strategy to enhance EU-Russia relations is limited by the fact that Tacis remains virtually the only – even steadily decreasing - budget involved.

3. Nevertheless, the Common Strategy offers a number of advantages in comparison with the existing PCA:

- A cross-pillar approach;
- An obligation to Member States to harmonise their bilateral programmes;
- Strengthened co-ordination between the EU and international organisations;
- Introduction of majority voting under the Second Pillar, and
- Greater coherence of EU policy towards Russia.

A disadvantage of the strategy is that the cross-pillar structure leads to some confusion of responsibilities. A high level of co-ordination is called for, particularly from the Commission, the High Representative for the CFSP and the EU Presidency. Since intergovernmentalism has frequently been a source of great misery in EU foreign policy, Community competencies should be safeguarded against the potential tendency of the Council to take control. All in all, the Common Strategy should be regarded as a unique opportunity to enter into a genuine long-term relationship with Russia.

INTRODUCTION

4. Russia’s political culture is marked by 70 years of totalitarian rule, preceded by an autocratic monarchy. Unfortunately, a lack of individual rights, legal nihilism, the lust for power, arbitrariness and weak, corruptible legal institutions form part of the heritage. So the fundamental task is to establish the rule of law, to implement it fully and to guarantee that democracy is functioning properly. President Putin considers his primary task is to restore law and order. In contrast to "the dictatorship of the proletariat", Mr. Putin speaks of "the dictatorship of the law", which is not exactly the best formulation. This expression nevertheless has the merit of being easily understood in the Russian political environment. However, it raises doubt about
the President's willingness to strengthen democracy at the same time as an integral part of *l'état de droit*. It remains to be seen whether the attacks on Russia's free press, such as the persecution of Mr. Babitski and the arrest of Mr. Gussinsky of the *Media Most* publishing company, were of an incidental or structural character. In this context, the question to what extent the President had a hand in the measures taken is important.

The EU has a strong interest to support the remedying of current flaws in the democratic system in Russia, which, moreover, is anchored in the Judeo-Christian and humanistic values shared by the EU Member States.

5. The Federation as a whole is weak. Russia suffers from a fundamental lack of cohesion, with due consequences for its foreign and defence policy. Although a federation in name, the real federalisation of Russia is still a hazy process in which regions play on the central authorities' failure to exercise their powers. More than a quarter of regional legislation is contradictory to federal law.

6. President Putin's intention to impose the powers of the Federation against the will of certain regional political and economic actors can only be supported. The powers of the newly appointed seven Presidential Representatives remain somewhat vague though. It is still to early to tell whether the role of these "governors-general" will be limited to carrying out certain technical-administrative tasks, or whether their offices imply a political dimension. If so, democratic controls are necessary. If not, in line with President Putin's promise of a "dictatorship of the law", the broadening of the Federal Court's mandate could provide a guarantee against arbitrary exercise of power. The EU should encourage the choice of healthy structures.

7. A diversity of contacts aimed at the transfer of know-how, as well as programmes promoting democracy and civil society are of great importance. The numerous twinning arrangements between cities and municipalities in Russia and the European Union play a key role in this. In particular, small-scale, broad-based support to the creation of a real civil society will help Russia on its chosen path towards a social market economy. Support is needed for the creation of a good legal framework for civil society organisations and activities.

8. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian production has decreased by half, living conditions have deteriorated greatly, and in Russia's cities a class of oligarchs and other extremely wealthy people has emerged. Many Russians feel that this was imposed upon them, if not by the West, then at least by Western advisors. Current economic plans designed by President Putin's think-tank, the *Centre for Strategic Research* are promising, but still vague and not implemented.

9. The Millennium speech by Interim President Putin (as he then was) is an honest analysis of the socio-economic situation in which Russia finds itself. In other speeches as well, he chiefly states what the Russians themselves must do and does not blame the West for Russia's misfortunes. Others will not solve Russia's problems. In a patriotic spirit, he appeals to Russians to put their shoulders to the wheel, adopting an attitude earlier found in Europe and Japan just after the Second World War. It is a positive sign that Mr. Putin's staff comprises young, rather reform and market-economy minded experts. He also searches for broad parliamentary support for his measures.
10. Since the rouble crisis of August 1998, EU policy towards Russia seems principally to have been a matter of crisis management. In spite of crises and setbacks, it is time to search for common starting points to provide our strategic partnership with an optimal depth and width in the long term.

EU ACTIVITIES IN RUSSIA

11. Almost all EU projects in Russia form part of the Tacis programme. The Common Strategy does not involve any new budget line. One should be aware that the Tacis budget is not at all in proportion to the amounts set aside for EU external policy at the EU's Southern borders and seas and in other parts of the world. Yet, the EU-Russia relationship is obviously of crucial importance to the pursuit of security and a just political order in Europe. Our efforts towards Russia must be perceived as consolidating the end of the Cold War. First and foremost, Russia is a European country, bordering the EU. It is an important trading partner and, in particular, an important supplier of raw materials and energy, especially gas, to Europe. Enlargement will make contacts more important still. A real partnership, as aimed at by the Common Strategy, requires considerably more resources than those currently committed. Your rapporteur therefore calls for re-consideration of the budgets earmarked for Russia.

12. In January 2000, the new Tacis regulation for the years 2000-2006 entered into force. At the same time, the EU reacted to events in Chechnya by drastically reducing Tacis aid to Russia and limiting it to projects promoting democratic values. However, no ongoing projects were interrupted and the partial freeze of Tacis aid had in fact no short-term effect worth mentioning apart from that of disrupting planning activities. The Feira European Council paved the way for the return to fully normal relations with Russia and an additional Tacis programme for Russia, worth € 58 million, will bring total funding from the 2000 budget up to the € 92 million originally foreseen. In line with the original plans, € 6 million from the Baltic Region budget line will also be used for Russia.

It should be noted that the Union's response to the Russian warfare in Chechnya was not co-ordinated with the responses of the USA, Japan and other key actors on the international scene. As part of the restrictive measures taken by the EU, it was decided to hold up ratification of a newly negotiated EU-Russia Scientific and Technological Co-operation Agreement. This appears only to have left extra room for expansion of US-Russia co-operation in this sphere, while damaging the EU's own interests. In conclusion, the experience gained provide ample food for thought on how sanctions should be used, or not be used, as an instrument in relations with third countries.

13. A most adequate enumeration of EU interests in Russia is provided by the Russian Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000-2010). It advocates:

- Strengthening EU common positions in the world;
- Furthering trade and investment;
- A long-term and stable supply of energy and raw materials;
- The use of Russian science, research and technology;
- Developing infrastructure networks and information systems;
- Care for the environment and safe nuclear power;
- Use of the Euro as a foreign currency reserve of the Bank of Russia;
- Co-operation as to the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI).

The Delegation of the European Commission in Moscow

15. Despite the huge challenges it faces, the Delegation in Moscow has rather limited staff and resources, especially in comparison with Delegations in Japan and the USA. A better balance - which is more in accordance with EU foreign policy priorities - is needed. Whereas Member States' embassies frequently have a lump sum at their disposal to spend on local projects, the Delegation has to refer back to the Tacis committee or the Commission services in Brussels for every decision of a financial character, with the exception of the so-called BISTRO facility. Burdensome procedures lead to long delays, misunderstandings and unacceptable discrepancies between commitments and actual payments.

16. As a remedy, much more decision-making powers, not least in relation to civil society and democracy projects, should be delegated to the Delegation. The Delegation in Moscow has recently been chosen as a pilot Delegation for deconcentration of responsibilities. It is strongly to be hoped that this will solve the current problems.

GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

The Northern Dimension

17. The EU Northern Dimension policy comes down to infrastructure, environment and energy projects, the promotion of trade and social contacts, the fight against crime and the development of cross-border co-operation. Projects are set out in a Northern Dimension Action Plan, endorsed by the Feira European Council. In February 2000, Lithuania and Russia submitted a list of projects with a request for EU subsidies (the Nida Initiative).

18. The Northern Dimension has hitherto been under-used, in spite of the efforts made at the time of the Finnish Presidency and its high potential. Its basic weakness is the lack of a budget line. The deepening of this policy, e.g. in the environmental field, will probably have greater effects than can ever be achieved through internal EU policies. The recent Kursk tragedy re-emphasised the EU’s strong interest in addressing the Russian nuclear problem in the Arctic region, including the dismantling of obsolete nuclear submarines. Joint efforts by military experts might be feasible if security concerns can be overcome.

19. Furthermore, some Russian-built nuclear reactors could be upgraded in accordance with the standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency using home-grown knowledge supplemented with Western know-how and assistance. It should be investigated to what extent management and discipline, rather than technological deficiencies cause risks.

20. Russia still underestimates the importance of environmental protection, and acts as if pollution problems only exist in densely populated regions. It is the Union’s task to raise the environmental awareness, and to help Russia prioritise such policy. The recent merging of the
Natural Resources Ministry and the State Committee for Ecology is not a step in the right direction.

**Kaliningrad**

21. Kaliningrad has long been a militarised exclave and since the dissolution of the Soviet Union it has been in a very poor state, with high unemployment and a great deal of crime. Surprisingly, the future of Kaliningrad is not given high priority among Russian policy-makers. However, to the EU, the prospect of an impoverished, unstable enclave within its borders is a highly unattractive one.

22. The Feira European Council's call on the Commission to present proposals in relation to Kaliningrad should therefore be welcomed. With a view to the future EU membership of Poland and Lithuania and the implementation of the Schengen (soon to be EU) acquis, a number of legal and juridical questions must and can be answered about trade, travel and transport over the Oblast’s borders. Isolation of the Kaliningrad region is in the interest of neither side. On the contrary, Kaliningrad is ideally placed to serve as a pilot project for deeper cross-border cooperation with Russia.

**The South-Eastern Dimension**

23. The future of Southern Russia, between the Black and the Caspian Seas, is just as important a concern for the EU as the Northern Dimension, albeit for other reasons. In the Southern Dimension, security issues of all kinds come to the fore.

24. After the first war, Chechnya had the opportunity to achieve virtual independence, like Tatarstan. It threw away that chance by falling into anarchy and becoming a centre for heavily armed kidnappers. Nevertheless, it is true that Russian undertakings to support the reconstruction of Chechnya have never been fulfilled. Russia was probably not in a position to give such undertakings political priority. The **Shari'a** was introduced by Maskhadov as the supreme law. Oil was drained off massively from pipelines to hundreds of illegal refineries. Owing to his lack of control over Chechnya and the various sections of society, Maskhadov's legitimacy fell rapidly in Russian eyes. There was little doubt as to the reason for Russia's intervention. Criticism on the respect for the rule of law at this stage first of all concerned Chechen authorities. However, the way in which the intervention was done remains unacceptable. The use of force was clearly excessive.

25. President Putin’s policy to restore Russian rule in Chechnya gained overwhelming support in the population of the federation. By exaggerating the threatening character of the situation, Russia became in a sense the victim of its own propaganda. It may take some time before Russia realises the impact of its actions. Russian authorities nevertheless admit that war crimes were committed, and that no military solution exists. Clearly, Russian soldiers and officers who committed war crimes must be brought to justice. Russia has to be reminded of its commitments in this respect.

26. The partisan war could however continue for years. Meanwhile, North of the river Terek a socio-economic reconstruction and political normalisation process, including the election of Chechen representatives, is underway. Once hostilities have ended, the EU will have to consider
how and under what conditions it can contribute to stability and reconstruction in the region. The Commission should draw up a Southern Dimension policy which can serve as a basis for an EU contribution to reconstruction in Chechnya and to the stabilisation of the Caucasus region in its entirety.

27. The EU South-Eastern Dimension policy should draw inspiration from the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. One might consider offering the South-Caucasian republics Stability and Association Agreements, or even membership of the European Conference for co-operation in Second and Third Pillar issues. (It should, however, be kept in mind that Russia gives preference to the OSCE). The EU is already involved in promoting South-Caucasian infrastructure and oil pipelines projects (INOGATE, TRACECA), where Russia has asked its interests to be taken into account. Initiatives could be developed in finding a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

28. Major policy initiatives could be created with a view to combat drug trafficking and gunrunning, particularly across the permeable Georgia-Chechnya border. In the context of the Partnership for Peace, bilateral co-operation between individual NATO Member States and countries in the region was launched for the retraining of former OMON (special security forces) and former border troops. Given the fact that there are still Russian federal border troops on the external borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia must be involved in this.

A POSSIBLE CONSISTENCY WITH RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY?

29. In terms of foreign policy, the new Russian government seems to be going its own way. Mr. Putin will neither resume the pro-Western approach favoured by former Foreign Affairs Minister Kozyrev in the first half of the 1990s, nor will he follow the old-fashioned nationalist ideas of the communists. He combines a search for co-operation with the West with a policy stressing Russia’s sovereignty and national interests. Some characterise the agenda and style of Mr. Putin's policies as "Gaulism with a Russian face". Russia clearly demonstrates its interest in a politically united Europe speaking with one voice and takes much interest in the ESDI.

30. Striving after convergence in EU and Russian foreign policies sharply contrasts with the Cold War logic, where Russia was perceived as "the friend of our enemies". With the Common Strategy, Russia and the EU may pursue the same values, and it is extremely worthwhile to elaborate on the perspectives for policy convergence.

31. Russia is a close partner in the implementation of the South-Eastern Europe Stability Pact, despite deep divides, which once more were highlighted during the Kosovo crisis. Opinions differed as to the nature of the stability desired (emphasis on balance of power or on a just international order). Still, Russia and the EU share a strong interest in stability in the Balkans. They therefore should try to agree on principles and methods, including the use of sanctions.

32. The EU should not reject regional co-operation between the Newly Independent States (NIS), out of unfounded fears of a re-arising Soviet Union. The current level of commercial and economic co-operation is very low. Despite the fact that hundreds of treaties and declarations have been signed, only a dozen or so are actually being implemented. It is EU policy in other parts of the world to promote regional co-operation and this should apply to the NIS area too.
The voluntary character of such co-operation is, however, an absolutely necessary precondition. Any attempt to play on the internal divisions or economic or other weaknesses of countries in order to secure their support for integrative policies must be firmly rejected.

33. To Russia, Central Asia is a hotbed of potential instability, of violent Islamist movements threatening other parts of the world as well, with the continuous threat of the Taleban regime smouldering behind. Afghanistan is a "rogue state" to Russia and the EU. A democratic, stable and prosperous Central Asia is a matter of common concern.

Security co-operation

34. Before the Kosovo crisis, contacts in the framework of the Russia-NATO Founding Act proved that a more intensive, pragmatic co-operation could be developed in a range of areas. After Russia's distancing of itself from Nato in connection with the Kosovo crisis, a return to the trend of progressive deepening of the relationship has occurred. Among the common interests, that of combating international terrorism and violent Islamism based in the Caucasus region and in Central Asia should be noted.

35. In the aftermath of the US-Russia Summit in Moscow (3-6 June 2000), President Putin made some sensational statements in relation to the US National Missile Defence plans. Mr. Putin admitted that US arguments about "rogue states" capable of launching missile attacks are well founded. However, as an alternative to the US plans, he proposed co-operation on a pan-European missile defence system aimed at countering threats from specific "rogue states" only and therefore presumably compatible with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. For this to work, such a system should be deployed in Europe and Russia, close to the relevant states.

This and similar Russian proposals aimed at strengthening common security on the European continent should be seriously considered. Reaching consensus on the identification of the "rogue states" may, however, prove difficult. Also, relations within NATO should in no way be damaged.

RUSSIA AND EU/NATO ENLARGEMENT

36. Russia has no ambition to join the EU, and the EU is also not ready to deal with such a request. Nevertheless, there is a common interest in developing close relations in a number of areas.

Russia clearly wants to participate in the European structures on its own terms. From our perspective, Russia belongs to Europe and has a very rich capacity to contribute to Europe's cultural and economic development. Europe has every interest in a democratic, stable and economically prosperous Russia. For that reason we should not draw a new line between Eastern and Western blocs and sideline Russia, but involve Russia as much as possible in a close partnership. In the trade area, Russia itself can prevent alienation by adapting as much as possible to the acquis communautaire. Partly to facilitate this, the Commission should extend its support to European law centres in university cities all over the Federation.

37. In contrast to NATO enlargement, EU, or even WEU enlargement have never encountered Russian objections. However, there is concern as to the possible consequences of EU
enlargement, specifically in the field of trade. At present CEEC-Russia relations seem to suffer from the prospect of a new dividing line between them. Such fears may turn out to be exaggerated. Overall, tariffs will most likely decrease after enlargement. Legal and practical solutions to trade and visa problems after EU-enlargement worrying Russia can be found. Russia is aware that Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic States will benefit from EU accession. Furthermore, the EU may exert a moderating influence on anti-Russian sentiments in Central and Eastern Europe.

38. Whereas the development of a security component in EU structures might worry Russia, we must stress that initiatives taken by the Cologne, Helsinki and Feira European Councils only concern Petersberg tasks. The High Representative for the CFSP has always stressed that collective defence remains a NATO task. It is important to ensure that an enlarged EU works even more closely with Russia. In this context, Russia's wish to be associated with the evolving ESDI should be considered positively. The Council has already declared that Russia may be invited to participate in future Petersberg operations.

CONCLUSION

39. It is time for the EU and Russia to distance themselves from the reflexes dating from the Cold War era. As set out in the Common Strategy, EU policy towards Russia should go far beyond purely economic and technical co-operation. Russia, the EU and NATO should try to reach convergence of their policies in dealing with the common challenges of security and peace. Their shared values and the OSCE principles, as spelled out for example in the Charter of Paris, provide an indispensable basis for these attempts.

40. We are not yet certain about President Putin's orientation. However, his efforts to reform the country and its economy should be supported. Constructive criticism as to the effective observance of the rule of law at the Federal and regional levels is necessary and useful. Besides, EU-assistance in several fields will prove to be in the interest of both sides.
19 September 2000

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON CITIZENS' FREEDOMS AND RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy


Draftsman: Margot Keßler

PROCEDURE

At its meeting of 11 April 2000 the Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs appointed Margot Keßler draftsman.

It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 29 August 2000 and 19 September 2000.

At the last meeting it adopted the following conclusions unanimously.

The following were present for the vote: Robert J.E. Evans, acting chairman; Margot Keßler, draftsman; Mary Elizabeth Banotti, Maria Berger (for Mr Olivier Duhamel), Alima Boumediene-Thiery, Michael Cashman, Charlotte Cederschiöld, Thierry Cornillet, Gérard M.J. Deprez, Evelyne Gebhardt (for Mr Joke Swiebel), Anna Karamanou, Ewa Klamt, Hartmut Nassauer, William Francis Newton Dunn (for Mr Daniel J. Hannan), Arie M. Oostlander (for Mr Timothy Kirkhope), Elena Ornella Paciotti, Hubert Pirker, Patsy Sörensen, Anna Terrón i Cusí, and Gianni Vattimo.
SUMMARY EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

The main beneficiaries of the chaotic transformation of the Russian economy into a sub-standard market economy are essentially the same people who ran the black market in consumer goods in the former Soviet Union and typically enabled heads of industry to extricate themselves from supply and production bottlenecks by offering a functioning parallel economy.

The grave deficiencies in law enforcement and administration, the social origins of organised crime, the high level of its acceptance by the general public, together with its well-nigh symbiotic relationship with the authorities, confront the Russian Federation with a major problem. The impact of these regulatory deficiencies, corruption and organised crime on Russia's economy includes, but is not confined to, low rates of investment, massive flight of capital and widespread abuse of property rights. The need to act is clearly beyond question.

The Russian Federation is, fortunately, aware of the problem. The latest policy statements, issued at the highest political level, acknowledge that the 'orgy of crime' represents a preponderant obstacle to economic reform. The Russian Government's newly announced economic programme consequently insists on sweeping reforms of the entire judicial and legal apparatus.

2. THE EU'S INTEREST IN COMBATING RUSSIA'S ORGANISED CRIME

Any action taken by the EU to support the Russian Federation in its efforts to create public order, guarantee internal security and establish a functioning judicial system can only be welcomed. An unstable Russia represents a manifest danger to the whole of Europe. And since the Amsterdam Treaty one of the Union's primary objectives has in any event been to create an area of freedom, security and justice (TEU, Article 29). But that objective can only be achieved effectively on the basis of cross-border international cooperation, and will require not just close cooperation between EU Member States, but also EU cooperation with third-party states. That applies in particular to efforts to combat organised crime, which of course represents one of the most pressing problems. Europol only recently announced that Russian organised crime had already established a presence in 11 Member States. Such crime, operating mainly in drug and human trafficking, motor-vehicle theft, trafficking in illegal immigrants and money laundering, poses a direct threat to democratic society in Western Europe, and should therefore also be combated by the EU directly. In that connection attention must be drawn to the need to support Europol in its fight against Russian organised crime in the Member States with all available resources, and in particular to promote cooperation between Europol and the Russian authorities, as set out in the EU common strategy on Russia.

3. DEVELOPMENTS IN COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA ON JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS

Cooperation between the EU and the Russian Federation on justice and home affairs is still in the initial stages. The 24 June 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and the Russian Federation had already prefigured cooperation on preventing criminal offences (Article 84), with the emphasis on combating...
unlawful immigration, economic crime, including corruption, unlawful trade in goods, including industrial wastes, counterfeiting and unlawful trade in narcotics and psychotropic substances. And in the EU’s action plan on combating organised crime of 28 April 1997\(^1\), attention is drawn to the need to cooperate with Russia in particular.

But real dialogue was not opened until 1999 with the EU’s 4 June 1999 Common Strategy on Russia\(^2\). In that paper, reference is made to the existence of a joint interest in cooperation to combat organised crime, to be achieved by setting up the necessary operational structures and establishing the mechanisms indispensable to cooperation between relevant departments. The EU also declares its readiness to ‘offer its expertise, particularly in the development of legislation and competent institutions’. The measures to be adopted against different forms of organised crime, in particular money laundering and human and drug trafficking, are to receive practical implementation in the form of a plan for joint actions with Russia.

4. THE ACTION PLAN

The European Union action plan on common action for the Russian Federation on combating organised crime\(^3\), adopted earlier this year by the Council, is aimed at giving practical implementation to the cooperation already prefigured in the EU Common Strategy on Russia.

For the purpose of achieving effective judicial cooperation, the Russian Federation is urged to ratify a number of existing international agreements in this area. In addition, the need to pinpoint priority questions is to be addressed jointly, central Russian Federation contact points are to be identified, and contacts established between them and the appropriate authorities in the Member States and within the European judicial network. The EU has also agreed to support the Russian Federation by holding lectures and training seminars, providing a manual and drawing up rules of procedure.

Similarly, improvements are to be made with cooperation on bringing criminal proceedings, with relevant priorities being determined jointly and regularly reviewed. Technical, operational and strategic information and intelligence are to be exchanged, provided that data-protection principles can be complied with. Here too, training seminars and lectures are to be arranged and information exchanged between criminal-law enforcement agencies. There are also plans to improve cooperation between national liaison officers from Member States in the Russian Federation.

5. ASSESSMENT:

The Council’s underlying intention of using this action plan to support the Russian Federation in its efforts to combat organised crime cannot but be supported unreservedly. An encouraging feature is that relatively specific action is prefigured in the matter of professional training and retraining. The downside however is the absence of any comprehensive strategy. It must be forcefully asserted in that connection that the Russian Federation’s internal administration and criminal prosecution system are plagued with rampant abuses. But no adequate acknowledgement of that state of affairs is to be found in the action plan. The plan rests content

\(^1\) OJ C 251, 15 August 1997, p.1  
\(^2\) OJ C 157, 24 June 1999, p.1  
\(^3\) OJ C 106, 13 April 2000, p. 5
with making non-specific general statements when referring to all such problems. It is in that connection in particular that serious consideration should be given to the option of making support conditional on independent action by the Russian Federation to combat and eradicate such abuses.

The clause in the Agreement requiring the Russian Federation to accede to the relevant international instruments strikes the rapporteur as especially important. It should however be urged that a firm deadline be agreed with the Russian Federation by which such instruments should have been acceded to.

Special attention must at all events be paid to problems unique to the Russian legal system. The Russian Federation should be required to review individual criminal-law cases and judicial regulation of criminal-law proceedings, and in particular to compare the regulatory provisions applicable to money-laundering with the corresponding EU provisions, and, if regulatory loopholes are identified, to make the necessary adjustments.

Special urgency attaches in that connection to the need to regulate data protection. To the extent that EU-Russian Federation cooperation will require systematic data transfers, these should not be initiated until the Russian Federation can guarantee the European citizen the same standards of data protection as does the EU itself. The rapporteur shares Member-State concern in that connection, and welcomes its acknowledgement in the action plan.

In the matter of cooperation on criminal proceedings, the proposed arrangements for training and re-training, technical support and information exchanges undoubtedly amount to an intelligent input to combating crime. The passing-on of know-how makes a good, relatively low-cost contribution to crime-prevention. Another welcome feature is the recognition the action plan accords to the need to coordinate the different activities. The plethora of bilateral and joint actions, programmes, policies and other instruments typically defies efforts to grasp it as a whole, but it will be absolutely essential to coordinate all such operations with each other in an effective, targeted drive against organised crime.

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that continuous assessment of the effectiveness of the proposed measures as a whole, adjustments being made as necessary, will be absolutely essential. The continuous monitoring arrangements to be established for that purpose can as such be supported unreservedly. The rapporteur moreover urges the Council to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about its monitoring activities and the practical results achieved.

CONCLUSIONS

The Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs calls on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments in its report:

(The European Parliament,)

1. Endorses the Council's efforts to support the Russian Federation in combating crime;
2. Acknowledges the need for the operations envisaged in the European Union action plan on common action for the Russian Federation on combating organised crime¹, but regrets the absence of a comprehensive strategy;

3. Points out that a prerequisite for effective cooperation is that the Russian Federation must operate with a functioning internal criminal law system, but that the need to make good the absence of the necessary infrastructure is not sufficiently recognised in the action plan;

4. Recognises that the Russian Federation must at all events be supported in combating and eliminating internal abuses, but insists also that appropriate initiatives by the Russian Federation itself are at the same time a fundamental precondition for lending it continuing support;

5. Insists that before any data can be systematically transferred to the Russian Federation, European Union data-protection standards must be guaranteed;

6. Affirms that accession by the Russian Federation to the international instruments referred to in the European Union action plan on common action for the Russian Federation on combating organised crime will be indispensable, and consequently urges Russia to ratify the said instruments as promptly as possible;

7. Draws attention to the need to monitor the enforcement of Russian criminal law, in particular as it applies to money-laundering, and to ensure that it is complied with;

8. Agrees that Community programmes such as TACIS should continue to be used to support new training arrangements for administration officials;

9. Considers supervision of the measures envisaged and monitoring of their implementation as indispensable, and urges the Council to keep the European Parliament regularly informed of the results of the assessment procedures stipulated in the European Union action plan on common action for the Russian Federation on combating organised crime.

¹ OJ C 106, 13 April 2000, p. 5