**Introduction**

What is the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)? Is it an attempt to fulfill the long-standing dream of a federal Europe with its own independent army and defence policy? Or is it simply another compromise amongst Europeans to allow NATO to survive and link its military operations to the civilian and diplomatic resources available in the EU? This paper will address these questions by first of all providing a comparative brief sketch of the EU’s role in defence and security in 1997 and the situation reached by mid 2001. It will then look at the methodological and theoretical issues involved in analysing ESDP.

The report argues that recent academic explanations of ESDP have tended to rely on combining highly contested assumptions taken from neo-realism, neo-functionalism with bilateral relationships and transatlantic security factors. The paper points out that the academic discourse has failed to sufficiently test the neo-realist and neo-functionalist assumptions and has fallen short of examining the interplay of domestic, institutional and external factors on the evolution of EU Member States’ position vis-à-vis ESDP during 1998-2001. The ‘national interests’ of EU Member States have been conceptualised as a series of bargains at the international level by excluding a discussion of domestic and transgovernmental influences.

In section 3, an analysis of the evolution of ESDP, from the end of 1998 to mid 2001, will be provided. It will be demonstrated that the piecemeal nature of the policy-making process has created a situation in which the political and military processes are out of step. Rather than elected politicians providing political guidelines for military planning, EU/NATO Chiefs of Staff and other non-elected military experts have played a key role in shaping the political doctrine underpinning ESDP.

**1. The Role of the EU in Security and Defence in 1997 and ESDP at mid 2001: a Comparative Sketch.**

ESDP is both a political and legal concept. It captures a number of decisions taken by EU Member States, both on a bilateral and multilateral basis, beginning from the autumn of 1998 at St. Malo and culminating in the Nice Treaty. The French Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy, adopted at Nice, is one of the most authoritative documents on ESDP at the time of writing. It states that the aims of the efforts made over the past two years, at Cologne, Helsinki and Feira European Councils are as follows:
at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in the security and defence field.\textsuperscript{3}

As this statement implies ESDP is an expression of the desire of the EU to develop military and civilian capabilities to project its power regionally and globally, potentially autonomously from NATO. Implicitly, ESDP is about finding a new ‘burden sharing’ between NATO and the EU in the security/defence areas. This means co-operation in making NATO a more flexible military organisation capable of undertaking ‘peace-enforcement’ operations, whilst at the same time allowing EU member states to have more control over their own multilateral forces and the conduct of military operations. Another goal is the restructuring of the European defence industry, so as to develop a stronger European high technology industrial sector.

To fully appreciate the significance of the EU/WEU/NATO decisions taken during 1998-2000, a brief comparison is made between the role that the EU played in security and defence in 1997 and its role in mid 2001.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c|c}
\hline
\textbf{EU's Role in Security: 1997} & \\
\hline
2\textsuperscript{nd} Pillar: CFSP/CDP & 1\textsuperscript{st} Pillar \\
\hline
European Council & European Commission \\
Presidency-Troika & Foreign Policy \\
General Secretariat & \\
COREPER: Working groups & \\
\hline
Political Committee/Po. Co. & \\
Policy & Planning Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) & \\
\hline
General Affairs Council & \\
Secretary-General/High Representative of CFSP & \\
\hline
Foreign Policy Tools: & \\
Joint Actions, Common Positions, Common Strategies & \\
\hline
WEU: & \\
Military & Political Committees \\
Planning Cell for Petersberg Tasks \\
Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) \\
Maastricht Centre \\
Western European Armament Group \\
Assembly & Institute & \\
\hline
15 EU Member States & 10 Member States \\
18 Associates & Observers & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

In 1997, the EU was organised in a three pillars structure. Pillar I dealt with economic, social and environmental policies, more or less related to the European Single Market. Pillar II was responsible for Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and pillar III with Justice and Home Affairs issues. Defence matters were exercised through a link between Pillar II and the Western European Union (WEU), what was known as the ‘Common Defence Policy’ (CDP). The WEU was tasked to act as a ‘bridge’ between the EU and NATO.

If we assume that ‘security’ is a broad concept that goes beyond hard-core defence issues to do with the armed forces and defence spending, then it could be argued that the EU played a role in security more through Pillar I than Pillar II. The Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaties gave CFSP a number
of policy instruments (joint actions, common positions, declarations, common strategies) and created new political structures under Pillar II: the Political Committee (PC); the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER); the EPC Secretariat, the post of Secretary General/High Representatives for CFSP and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, (PPEWEU). It also established Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and ‘constructive abstentions’ in order to provide greater flexibility for CFSP. The Treaties called for a closer relationship between the EU and the WEU, a security organisation established in 1954 out of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, whilst safeguarding its autonomy.

Nevertheless, the reality was that EU Member States had been reluctant to use these instruments and to co-ordinate their foreign, security and defence policies within the EU framework. EU Member States had been partly unwilling, and partly unable, to make full use of the WEU. At the end of 1997, the WEU, in fact, had only played a limited role in European defence, and NATO remained the dominant European defence organisation despite the introduction of two political/military concepts – European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) - to create a new burden sharing between the two bodies.

In contrast to the situation under Pillar II, the EC/EU exercised a heavy weight in the world through its external trade policy, also known as the Common Commerce Policy (CCP) and development co-operation policy. In fact, many specialists considered the external economic relations and external economic policies to be the core of EU foreign policy. They argue that the EC has politicised foreign trade and that there has been a growth of foreign economic policy outside of the European theatre to include Central America, Southern Africa, Asia-Pacific and inter-regional relations. With regards to development co-operation policy, the European Union and its Member States are the world’s biggest donors of development aid. In 1998, the EU Development Aid amounted to over $27.6 billion, of which $6.6 billion went to Least Developed Countries.

Partly because of this incongruence between the EU’s role in foreign economic/aid development policies and security/defence policies and partly because of the frustration over the working relationship that had come into being between NATO and the WEU, some EU Member States developed ad-hoc arrangements in order to co-ordinate their defence policies and respond to external crises. This development can be seen, on the one hand, in the formation of multinational corps such as the Eurocorps, Eurofor and Euromarfor and, on the other, in the creation of ad hoc coalitions of the ‘willing’ to deal with external crises: the Contact Group and ‘Operation Alba’.

The Nice Treaty and ESDP
The Nice Treaty signed by the Heads of States on March 10, 2001 modified some of the sections contained in the Amsterdam Treaty related to CFSP and added a number of annexes dealing with ESDP, whose implementation are not subject to Treaty Ratification. These annexes are known as the French Presidency Report on ESDP. As a result the role that the EU plays in security and defence has changed, though the three pillars structure has been maintained. In a simplified format, the key differences between the situation in 1997 and mid 2001 are as follows:

First, the defence aspects of Europe's common foreign and security policy will no longer be framed by the Western European Union, but by the EU itself. In the Treaty of Nice it was agreed that most of the functions of the WEU would be transferred to the EU. This has meant the setting up of new military and political structures in the EU. The military structures are: the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The new political body is the Political Security Committee (PSC).

Secondly, the EU has decided to develop an EU military force of up to 60,000 troops able to be deployed at 60 days notice and with the ability to sustain itself for at least one year. This force has to be able to undertake a large spectrum of tasks ranging from peace-keeping to peace-making. The force is being developed by integrating the Eurocorps and other multilateral defence formations and by undertaking significant changes in the EU Member States procurement strategies in military/defence capabilities, an initiative named the ‘Headline Goal’.

Thirdly, arrangements are being worked out for EU-NATO consultation and for involvement of non-EU NATO member candidate countries and other partners in EU-led crisis management operations.
The exact nature of these arrangements remains a contentious issue at the time of writing. This is because, as will be described in the next section, there have been conflicting agendas driving ESDP. Some EU member states wanted the EU to have the military and political capabilities to act autonomously from NATO. Other countries, however, wanted the EU to ‘borrow’ both NATO operational planning capabilities and put the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) under both the command of NATO and the EU.

Fourthly, the EU is to take full responsibility in the area of conflict prevention and an agreement has been reached to strengthen EU capabilities for civilian aspects of crisis management. These include the establishment of a police force of 5,000 police officers to be operational by 2003, measures to strengthen the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. In addition, the treaty introduces a number of changes that have an indirect effect on CFSP and ESDP. Some of these changes have been advanced because the EU has decided to enlarge its membership to other member states. The changes relate to clauses on Enhanced Co-operation, Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), vote weighting and unanimity principles in certain areas.

**Enhanced Cooperation**

‘Enhanced Cooperation’ allows groups of states the right to push ahead in a specific policy area without the consensus of all EU Member States. In the current EU of 15 Member States a simple majority is required, whereas in a larger Union, as stipulated by the Nice Treaty, the use of an enhanced cooperation mechanism will be agreed with less than a simple majority of states. The Nice Treaty incorporates Enhanced Co-operation in CFSP but this is limited to common positions and joint actions, which need to be based on prior unanimous decisions. The area of military co-operation is excluded from the application.

There is currently an unresolved debate on the interpretation of this decision. Some commentators argue that the rules established for the introduction of Enhanced Cooperation in CFSP are in contradictions with other articles of the current treaty that ensure that a Member State can have a veto on the decision to use Qualified Majority Voting.

**Vote Weighting**

The Nice Treaty introduces changes in the vote weighting that will make it more difficult to achieve a qualified majority voting and accordingly easier to gather a blocking minority.

**Unanimity Principles in certain areas**
The Nice Treaty removes the requirement for the need of unanimity for opening negotiations and requires unanimity in the acceptance of the agreement only under specific circumstances. It introduces Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) when the agreement is required for the implementation of a Joint Action or Common Action.\textsuperscript{23}

How are we to understand the significance of these decisions? Simon Duke argues that there was no progress on defence at Nice,\textsuperscript{24} others believe that at Nice there was a ‘Brusselsisation’ of EU Member States’ Foreign and Security and Defence policies.\textsuperscript{25} There are also those who believe that the creation of an RRF is about undermining NATO.

As section 3 of this paper explains, the Nice Treaty achieved remarkable decisions in the area of defence that would have been unthinkable only a few years ago. In contrast to Duke’s analysis, I would argue that the most significant steps have been made in the creation of the RRF and the setting of the ‘Headline’ Goals.

In contrast to those who see ESDP as dooming NATO to failure, the creation of the RRF is a decision that has the potential to strengthen the Western Alliance in that it is about modernising EU Member States’ forces so that they can contribute to the US efforts to undertake military operations in areas outside Europe. Since NATO lacks civilian capabilities to undertake new types of ‘complex emergencies’, a link with the EU could give it a new breath of life.

However, it is also clear that some EU Member States would prefer to use the RRF to have the ability to undertake ad-hoc coalitions of the willing in crisis management operations and bypass established multilateral frameworks such as NATO, the OSCE and the UN.

On the question of ‘Brusselsisation’, there is some evidence that some steps in that direction have been taken through the creation of new military and political bodies in Pillar II. The establishment of the Military Staff and Military Committee demonstrates the rise of the military in the EU and a shows a willingness to use the EU’s civilian capabilities to project military power overseas. Nevertheless there remain some open questions on the commitment of EU member states to give a real weight to these new structures and to resolve the problems of ‘coherence’ that exits between the different pillars.\textsuperscript{26}

As the next section will demonstrate, a full answer to the question of the significance of the ESDP decisions taken at the Nice Summit has to take into account both long and short-term trends, something that most analysts have so far failed to do. It will also need to test more thoroughly underlying theoretical frameworks and consider alternative approaches.
2. ESDP: Theoretical and Methodological Issues.

This section outlines some of the challenges confronting those seeking to understand ESDP and provides an overview of dominant theoretical approaches used to explain the development of the EU as a foreign policy and security actor, from the 1970s onwards. It summarises some of the dominant hypotheses present in current explanations and discusses alternatives approaches.

There are a number of theoretical challenges for those scholars and analysts who want to capture ESDP. The complexity of the issue lies in a number of factors. The majority of the current literature on ESDP has not been driven by a desire to clarify theoretical frameworks. Hence, certain underlying and controversial assumptions about the nature of the European security order have been taken for granted.

The complexity of ESDP requires that it be analysed on a variety of levels. It is necessary to take into account dynamics that range from the existence of bi-lateral/special-relationship’ relationships, the interaction between EU and NATO to the specific decision-making mechanisms present in them that allow Member States to co-ordinate their foreign, defence and security policies. Moreover one must seek to conceptualise how domestic, transgovernmental and transnational actors influence the formulation of EU and NATO policies. The impact of external developments has also to be taken into account. Finally, the ‘S’, and ‘D’ that constitute ESDP are controversial concepts in themselves. They span a number of different phenomena: from the fulfillment of basic human needs, to migration movements and terrorist threats. The elements constituting ESDP are highly controversial issues in EU capitals and amongst academics.

1970s - 1997: Dominant Approaches to Understand the EU’s Security and Defence Policies

Prior to 1998, there was little consensus on how to study the EU’s security and defence roles. One can, however, identify some literatures that explicitly sought to conceptualise the relationship between the EC/EU integration process and foreign/security/defence policies by situating the analysis within a theoretical framework. These contributions reflected some of the historical developments of the period. Simplifying substantially, from the 1970s to the early 1980s, writers followed two distinct approaches: neo-realism or neo-functionalism. The neo-realists emphasised that development in the EC could not be understood without taking into account the changed structure of the international system. Kenneth Waltz was one of the key exponents of this view. He reinterpreted classical realists’ propositions on the working of the balance of power as a factor in determining states’ behaviour in international relations. For Waltz the balance of power was overarching determinant of a state’s
behaviour on the international scene. From this approach, defence and security matters belonged to the realm of ‘high politics’ and were not susceptible to integrationist dynamics. EC politics were driven by nation states’ search for maximising ‘relative gains’.\(^{28}\)

Neo-functionalists, in contrast, conceptualised integration as resulting from an institutionalised pattern of interest politics, played out within international organisations. There was a ‘spill-over’ effect - a process whereby members of an integration scheme attempted to resolve their dissatisfaction with their attainment of the agreed collective goal, by resorting to collaboration in another sector. From the neo-functionalist perspective, a tendency was created that was favourable to the establishment of a common foreign policy.\(^{29}\)

From the late 1980s and during the first part of the 1990s, a substantial amount of literature emerged analysing the relationship between the EU/WEU and CFSP/CDP, reflecting again actual development in the field. One school stressed that although both ‘neo-realism’ and ‘neo-functionalism’ contributed some useful insights into the development of CDP, there were substantial limitations to both approaches. It was argued that the gaps in the theory could only be filled by taking into account Moravcsik’s work on ‘intergovernmental institutionalism’.\(^{30}\) Moravcsik’s writing in the early 1990s was an attempt to demonstrate how a revised ‘realist’ perspective could account for EU bargaining. His approach reaffirmed the centrality of power and interest, which had been a central tenet of realist explanations of the international system in the early-post war period.\(^{31}\) But he argued that interest is determined not simply by the balance of power, as neo-realists argued, but also by the preferences of domestic political actors, which are the outcome of political processes in the domestic polity. His approach was based on three principles: 1) intergovernmentalism, 2) lowest-common-denominator bargaining, and 3) strict limits on future transfers of sovereignty.\(^{32}\) From this perspective, the key shapers of EU policy-making were located at the national level, though there were transnational dynamics in operation. (Interestingly later, Moravcsik revised his approach to assign an important role to institutions as facilitators of positive sum bargaining).

Another school focused on seeking to understand the link between CFSP/CDP by stressing that despite the tenuous relationship between the two policies and organisations there were integrationist dynamics in operation.\(^{33}\) There were also those who argued that the dynamics of European security lay in the bargaining process between, on the one hand, NATO and the WEU and, on the other, in attempts by European Member States and North American partners to work out a new burden sharing arrangement. Thus for example, R. F. Laird, developed the concept of ‘caucuses’ to capture a set of bilateral/trilateral relationship among European member states in the Western Alliance.\(^{34}\) Other analysts sought to combine the insight of integration theory with regime theory.\(^{35}\) Finally, there were those who used the concept of ‘presence’ or ‘actorness’ to understand the EU’s external role.\(^{36}\)
**Current Explanation of ESDP**

Although many articles have been written on ESDP, until now, the majority have tended to focus on a description of some of the key decisions and specific issues - such as military capabilities, the transatlantic relationship - rather than providing an overall explanation for the dynamics behind ESDP. The exceptions have tended either to discuss ESDP as a subsection of the IGC 2000 in order to analyse the long-term impact of the Nice Treaty on the evolution of the EU, or have stressed the role of bi-lateral relations, external factors (the Kosovo crisis) and the process of EU economic and monetary integration.

One example is the work of Professor Jolyon Howorth. In a report entitled *European Integration and Defence: the ultimate challenge?*, he argues that there are three key factors that shaped the development of ESDP: the degree of political will generated since the Franco-British St. Malo Summit in December 1998; the emergence of a transatlantic understanding that, on the one hand, NATO had to rely on the generation of a significant European military capability and that, on the other, the EU needed to maintain a defence industrial base; and the UK commitment behind the ESDP project. In his account, Howorth states that Britain and other Atlanticists accepted the necessity of constructing ESDP as the price to save the Western Alliance. Although he admits that there were differences of opinions and long-term aims in Paris and London, he maintains that the Franco-British understanding was crucial for the decisions taken up to the autumn of 2000.

Other authors have highlighted the importance of the impact of the Kosovo crisis on EU leaders. Alyson Bailes, for example, argues that Britain and France were frustrated by the fact the EU could not get its act together and that lack of military capabilities prevented it from playing a more crucial role in the crisis. Some EU member states agreed with the use of force but they would have preferred to have a more extensive use of diplomatic tools. Despite these differences, EU member states reached a consensus that in order to have a say in a crisis situation, the EU needed extra military capabilities.

To summarise the dominant approaches outlined so far, let us draw out schematically some of the key assumptions and discuss their unique contributions to and potential pitfalls in adopting them for future research.

**Neo-realism**

Neo-realism would argue that to understand ESDP we will need to look at the changing nature of the balance of power and how member states’ search for relative gains influenced the bargaining process at the EU/NATO level.
The problem in adopting such hypotheses is that we will treat states as unitary actors in pursuit of self-help and by so doing we create a black box around any role that domestic politics can have on the dynamics of the international system. We would also have to take for granted the neo-realist assumption that the international system is anarchic, driven by self-help. This definition of the anarchic nature of the system is highly questionable, as many commentators have pointed out.\textsuperscript{45}

\textit{Liberal intergovernmentalism}

To simplify a complex subject area, only Moravcsik’s work will be discussed here because of his influence in the area of EU integration theory. From his contribution, the hypothesis could be derived that ESDP is the product of bargains amongst EU Member States that are driven by domestic politics. Although EU/NATO institutions influenced the process, one has to look at the formation of national preferences in the context of the domestic politics of the member states. It is at this level that the dynamics for the decision to develop ESDP lie.

The advantage of this hypothesis is that it includes the role of domestic politics in its analysis, rather than removing it, as neo-realism does. However, there remains a problem with this approach. As some commentators have pointed out, Moravcsik’s conceptualisation of domestic politics is one of a relatively insulated domain. It might well be that there are transnational groups operating at the national level for whom allegiance to the nation state is not of prime importance. Hence, it is problematic to assume that domestic decisions are insulated from the influence of regional/international politics.\textsuperscript{46}

\textit{Neo-functionalism}

From neo-functionalists’ writings, the hypothesis could be derived that ESDP is the result of ‘the spill-over’ effect from economic integration. The increased level of co-operation in the economic and monetary union, exemplified by the EMU project, influenced the emergence of ESDP. Neo-functionalists would therefore give a primary role to an analysis of how economic and monetary decisions shaped the debate about military/security issues.

The weakness of this hypothesis is that it does not explain why a more marked level of integration in the military security field did not develop under the SEA or the Maastricht /Amsterdam Treaties and why it is only at the end of the 1990s that the integration has taken place. The primacy of economic factors cannot be taken for granted, it has to be proven via empirical investigation. Some studies have been carried out in the area of armaments but not for the overall policies covered under ESDP as it
developed during 1998-2001. Since the contribution of neo-functionalism is highly contested, supporters of these explanations will have to undertake more in-detail empirical analysis.

**Neo-institutionalists**

Neo-institutionalists would explain ESDP by emphasising the impact of international institutions on the foreign policies of EU/NATO Member States. Their working hypothesis would assume that the creation of a number of working groups, fora and bodies set up under EPC, and later CFSP, coupled with interaction between NATO/WEU via a number of working groups and exchanges created a pattern of mutual understanding among Member States on foreign and defence issues. These norms and understanding were responsible for the decision to integrate defence into the EU.

One criticism of this hypothesis is that it assumes that international organisations are primary factors in the evolution of EU/NATO policies and so fails to explain satisfactorily the relationship between domestic factors and supranational ones. This is because neo-institutionalists, like Keohane, writing from the late 1980s onward, share with neo-realists the assumption that anarchy is an essential feature of the international system and that states can be conceptualised as rational self-interested actors. This has meant that some neo-institutionalists accept a priori the predominance of the balance of power and institutions in shaping a state’s behaviour, thus failing to explain the dynamics of interest formation within national, international and transnational policy making fora.

**Bilateral Relations**

Contemporary writers, like Howorth, argue that ESDP is the product of bilateral, ‘special relationships’. Although Howorth does not ground his argument theoretically, there is a body of literature, such as Laird’s work in the 1980s on ‘caucuses’, that could potentially be used to understand the role of ‘bilateral relations’ in alliance politics.

The problem with these hypotheses is that they elevate bilateral relations above other factors in an a priori manner and fail to situate the specificity of bilateral relationship in the context of their historical evolution. Thus, for example, Howorth reviews the Franco-British and Franco-German relationships in the late 1990s, without taking into account whether these so-called ‘special relationships’ are the outcome of purely short-term dynamics or longer-term ones. Thus, although he discusses some of the differences in outlook and interests that underline such relationships, he merely puts the two phenomena on the same level, despite the fact that in post-war European history, the Franco-British ‘special relationship’ is a recent development, whereas the Franco-German relationship has stronger historical roots. He also fails to provide sufficient arguments to demonstrate how ‘special’ the Franco-British relationship in the security/defence area is.
Moreover, Howorth conceptualises ‘special relationships’ by discussing the ‘national interest’ of France, Germany and Britain. He treats the ‘national interest’ as though it was already coherently formulated and then bargained out within EU/NATO bodies. By so doing he fails to engage with the possibility that such an ‘understanding’ might be the product of particularistic interests within policy-making bodies in France, Germany and Britain.

Nevertheless, any analysis of ESDP should take into account the role of bilateral relations since there is some evidence that they help create informal-policy-making networks.49

**External factors: the role of the United States and regional/international crises**

In the discussions prior to the 1990s and in more recent literature, there is an understanding that the United States and external crises play a significant role in shaping the emergence of the EU’s role in security and defence.

**ESDP and the United States**

One hypothesis suggests that ESDP is the product of increased divergences between the EU and NATO member states. ESDP would not have happened if there had not been the rows in the early 1990s over the level of military and diplomatic engagements in the crises in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and, more recently, over the extent of NATO’s military action in Kosovo.

Another hypothesis would be that ESDP is a way of strengthening transatlantic relations and thereby keeping the US involved in European affairs. From this approach, ESDP is about the US relinquishing some of its military roles in Europe so that Europeans can take on low-level, low-intensity military tasks in their own immediate backyard (Eastern Europe and Middle East), whilst the US will remain heavily involved in article 5 and ‘peace-enforcement’ activities. From this perspective, there are no contradictions between ESDP and the US presence in Europe.

Despite these differences, from a theoretical perspective, it is clear that the nature of the US as traditional ‘hegemonic power’ in the EU security area has to be taken into account. Neo-realists explain the US role in Europe as that of a benign hegemonic power and have tended to discuss the collapse of the Soviet Union as potentially leading to a US withdrawal from Europe. Neo-institutionalists have provided a different set of explanations. They argue that the US might stay engaged in the security field, despite the end of the Soviet threat, because there are institutional interests at stake in keeping the Western Alliance alive.
**External Crises**

Current explanations have pointed to the importance of external crises in shaping the evolution of ESDP. However, with the exception of neo-realisms, the other dominant approaches of intergovernmental liberalism and neo-institutionalism, do not conceptualise the role of external crises in the pattern of co-operation among Member States and international organisations. This is because most of their work has been focused on the role of international organisations responsible for economic co-operation, rather than military/defence co-operation.

Neo-realists state that international crises marked by the emergence of new ‘threats’ will reinforce co-operation amongst member states but that ultimately there will never be a substitute for the Soviet threat and therefore international relations will be characterised by the collapse of military alliances, such as NATO.\(^5\)

From this brief overview it seems that, whilst we need to take into account the current approaches used to explain ESDP, there are some limitations to the explanations provided by the neo-realist, neo-functionalist and neo-institutionalist approaches. These approaches fail to successfully conceptualise the interrelationships between domestic dynamics, international institutions and external factors. In other words, the methodology adopted excludes a priori the possibility that there might be transnational, and transgovernmental factors in operation and underplays the role of domestic factors.

From preliminary results discussed in the next section, the current explanations do not successfully clarify the reasons why there is incongruence between the military and political processes driving ESDP. Although the Nice Treaty incorporated a number of key decisions taken by the EU/WEU and NATO Councils, the agreement reached did not provide political guidelines for the development of a military role for the EU. In fact, the military and political doctrines that are shaping the evolution of ESDP are being defined in a piecemeal manner by the EU/NATO Chiefs of staff and military experts rather than being formulated by political institutions such as the European Council, the EP and national parliamentary structures.

The following research questions might therefore be worth exploring. Could there be a coalition of forces among the different EU/NATO member states at a different level of the policy-making structures that are driving the process and have different political agendas? Could it be that the construction of the ESDP project is influenced not purely by external dynamics and institutional interests but also by the existence of different understandings and belief systems amongst actors as to the overall aims of the ESDP project, as constructivists would argue? In other words, would it be more
useful to adopt research questions that do not assume that the key factors shaping ESDP are to be found in the dichotomy of national versus supranational and material versus ideological factors?

There are a number of alternative approaches available both within International Relations and Integration Theory that could help us bridge the gap between the different levels of analysis and overcome such dichotomies. These approaches range from transgovernmental coalitions, policy networks, multi-level governance to constructivism and historical/sociological institutionalism.  

The advantages of these approaches over neo-institutionalism, intergovernmental liberalism and neo-functionalism are that they allow us to conceptualise the evolution of ESDP by looking at the roles of a variety of actors located both at the national, supranational and transgovernmental levels without assuming a priori that there is a hierarchy among the different levels of analyses. The validity of these approaches has already been demonstrated by a number of studies on European defence covering other historical periods.


This section discusses the political and military nature of the decision-making process leading up to the Nice Summit. It argues that despite a number of very significant decisions regarding the merging of most of the functions of the WEU into the EU - the establishment of new political and military structures under the EU and the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force -, EU member states failed to agree on the political doctrine that should inform the tasks of the new established bodies and military force. Because of this failure, the Chiefs of Defence Staff and NATO/EU military staff have played a disproportionate role in defining the political doctrine that should underpin ESDP. This is a reversal of normal policy-making procedures in that it should be up to political leaders to agree on ‘where’ and ‘how’ the RRF should be used. There should be an agreed political doctrine that informs military thinking and not the reverse.

During December 1998, in two separate initiatives, driven by Franco-German and Franco-British bilateral relations, efforts to improve the European Union’s role in security and defence were undertaken. At Potsdam, on 1st December 1998, France and Germany announced that they were in the process of defining CSFP and CDP. They reaffirmed their commitment to integrate the WEU into the EU and emphasised the importance of equipping the EU with military and operational means of its own. These means were to be developed from either the WEU, multinational forces, such as the Eurocorps, or via capabilities made available by NATO, as agreed at the North Atlantic Council at
Berlin in June 1996. At the same both countries urged the need for the mobilisation of conflict
prevention measures. At the British-French summit at St. Malo, 3-4 December 1998, Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Lionel
Jospin, signalled a new direction in European defence. The St. Malo declaration stated that the EU needed “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military force, the means to decide
to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”. The aim was to
ensure that the EU could “take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is
not engaged”. To achieve this goal the declaration stated that:

the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations,
Sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessarily
duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations
with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable
military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO’s European pillar or
national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).

In addition, it argued that “Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new
risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and
technology.”

Analysts consider the declaration a turning point in the British position toward European defence. For
the first time, the British government agreed to the integration of the WEU and EU. Three factors
have been put forward to explain this change. First, the decision was part of the coming into power of
the Labour Party. Tony Blair believed that the country had to show leadership in Europe and since it
had opted out of the Euro project and of the Schengen agreement, it chose defence as the area in
which it could demonstrate its ‘European credentials’. Second, there were officials in the Foreign
Office who were concerned about America’s commitment to European defence. They argued that to
maintain the USA engaged in Europe, Britain had to persuade European allies to build up their own
military capabilities to have a better ‘burden sharing’. Third, the negotiations took place at a time when
the Blair government was urging for military action in Kosovo. The French and British military were
collaborating closely in the build up of the Kosovo ‘extraction force’. The positive experience fuelled
enthusiasm within the MoD for European defence. Charles Grant, the Director of the Centre for
European Reform, publicly expressed the type of thinking current at the time within the lower echelons
of government and amongst Tony Blair’s advisers. He proposed that Britain should take a lead in
negotiating a compromise between France and the United States and by so doing lead on this issue in
Europe. In Grant’s view Britain had to contribute to the restructuring of the European defence
industry and proposed that the WEU be abolished, its political functions would be merged with the EU,
becoming a ‘fourth pillar’, and its military functions would be subsumed into NATO.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that at this stage, there were no talks of developing a European Rapid Reaction Force. Rather, the negotiations were confined to discussion on already existing capabilities either under NATO, national or multinational forces. It remained unclear what was meant by ‘autonomous’ capabilities.

The German Presidency and the impact of the Kosovo war

During mid December 1998 - March 1999, Germany used its EU Presidency to push forward work on ESDP. It clearly framed some of the key areas that had to be addressed to put flesh on the bones of the Franco-British proposals at St. Malo. The German Presidency outlined some guiding principles that included the statement that for CFSP to be a credible policy the EU should not just be endowed with military capabilities but also with appropriate decision-making bodies.  

The negotiations for ESDP were shaped by the outbreak of the Kosovo war. There are different types of analysis of the impact. Most interestingly, Alyson Bailes, former Political Director at the WEU, argued that the Kosovo war played a key factor in galvanising support for some of the key decisions taken at the European Council on 4 June 1999. She maintained that Britain and France were frustrated by Europe’s inability to get its political act together and that the two countries agreed that not having direct access to military capabilities was a key factor in the EU’s weak performance in the crisis. She admitted that although NATO’s bombing campaign had loyal support, there were some countries that thought that there could have been a more truly European way of making peace on the continent. In other words, some officials in European national capitals believed that the EU could have intervened and resolved the crisis differently from NATO. Driven by these diverging perspectives, an agreement was established that military capabilities had to be put at the EU’s disposal.

Thus, although the Kosovo war acted as a catalyst for the debate on the nature of the EU’s role in defence, there remained a variety of views present on how military means should be developed and what the relationship between military and political tools should be. It appears that different lessons were drawn by different EU Member States. Some countries simply agreed that the use of force was the only way to resolve the Kosovo crisis and that force was to be used in a commensurate way. Others, such as French and Italian officials located in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, resented the Anglo-American leadership in the handling of the Kosovo crisis and thought that the Alliance was saved from a disaster because of extensive diplomatic efforts undertaken after the air bombing campaign had begun.
Steps to give the EU a military capability and appropriate military structures during the first six months of 1999 were undertaken by France and Germany in close co-operation with NATO. At Toulouse, on 29 March 1999, they pledged to turn the Eurocorps into a rapid reaction force that would be tailored for use outside the NATO area and whose headquarters would be available to command international peacekeeping operations.\(^{61}\) Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg also agreed to participate in restructuring their forces to make them more mobile. At the NATO Summit in April 1999, the Allies announced the formal linkage between the military initiatives undertaken by European allies and NATO’s internal military restructuring process. This was formalised in the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). DCI involved the modernisation of the Alliance’s military forces for ‘out-of-area’ and ‘peace-enforcement’ tasks.\(^{62}\) As Secretary of State Strobe Talbott admitted, DCI was mostly about “transport and logistics, about getting forces to the area of operation and keeping them fed and equipped”.\(^{63}\)

At the NATO Summit in April 1999, a compromise was also achieved on the political side. For sometime, the Clinton Administration had lobbied to give NATO a stronger role in crisis management outside its zone, the so-called ‘out-of-area’ and ‘peace-enforcement’ tasks. US officials were keen to ensure that conflict management and ‘peace-enforcement’, without necessarily a UN mandate, became one of the primary activities of the Alliance. However, although the Kosovo war was launched with a dubious UN mandate, European Allies refused to officially underwrite, in the drafting of the new Strategic Concept, the practice of undertaking NATO’s ‘peace-enforcement’ operations without a UN mandate. Thus, the official communiqué reaffirmed both the importance of the defence aspect of the alliance and new conflict management tasks. At the same time, NATO’s Allies acknowledged the developments toward ESDP, particularly the resolve of the EU to have the capacity for autonomous action.\(^{64}\) Most importantly, those actors pushing for ESDP won a number of key concessions from the United States. As the communiqué stated, NATO capabilities were to be put at the disposal of the EU:

a) assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations.
b) The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;
c) Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, further developing the role of DSACEUR in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;
d) The further adaptation of NATO’s defence planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.\(^{65}\)
After winning major concessions at the NATO Summit in April 1999, EU member states focused their efforts on defining the nature of ESDP more precisely. The efforts resulted in the Cologne Summit (3-4 June 1999). The summit, whilst reaffirming the agreement that the EU be given the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, set up a precise time-table for action. EU leaders decided that by the end of 2000, the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose. The Summit approved the German Presidency’s proposal for a number of steps be taken including the establishment of regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the General Affairs Council, including Defence Ministers as appropriate; the PSC and the EU Military Staff committees, a Situation Centre and the transfer of the Satellite Centre and the Institute for Security Studies over to the EU. The importance of strengthening the industrial and technological base of defence was also mentioned.

Whilst in EU capitals a debate emerged about the exact tasks of the political structures and their relationship with NATO, in November 1999 France and Germany proposed the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of up to 50,000 to 60,000 men, able to be deployed at 60 days notice. One French and one British Headquarters was to be made available as an option for commanding EU-led operations. At this stage, the exact relationship between the RRF and NATO was not clarified.

The Franco-British initiative was quickly approved at the EU Helsinki Council on 10-11 December 1999. A Common Headline Goal involving the development by the year 2003 of RRF was announced. On the political front, it was agreed that political and military bodies would be established as of March 2000. As a response to these efforts, and partly to counteract the emphasis placed upon the development of RRF, ‘neutral’ EU member states, particularly the Nordic EU Member States, insisted on the introduction of measures to strengthen the ‘non-military crisis management of the European Union’.

Despite the ambitious timetable agreed, the precise work of the Military Committee and the steps to be taken to develop military capabilities were not defined. There was also no mentioning of the political and military doctrine that would drive the establishment and objectives of the new military and political committees. It was left to the Ministries of Defence (MoDs), NATO/EU Chiefs of Defence Staff and their military experts to refine the proposals announced at Cologne.

In fact, two months later, at the EU Defence Ministers meeting at Sintra, important decisions were taken to define the exact nature of military doctrine underpinning ESDP. A ‘Food for Thought Paper’ was presented. It declared that the Headline Goal expressed at Helsinki represented a political commitment by Member states but that “it includes insufficient detail for the purposes of military planning, raising questions such as where EU-led task forces might be expected to operate, with whom, and how often.” To remedy this lack, the paper set out a number of assumptions for the
planning of the Headline Goal. In the section entitled: ‘Articulation of key planning assumptions’ it argued that EU member states “will carry out tasks in and around Europe but have to be able to respond to crisis world-wide”. It also affirmed that EU member states would be involved in undertaking “complex peace enforcement task in a joint environment in or around Europe”. The paper also set a timetable leading to a Capabilities Pledging Conference to be convened by the end of 2000.

The importance of this paper is that it turns the normal policy-making process on its head. Normally, it should be up to Head of State and national parliaments to define what the political framework for planning forces should be. The assumptions mentioned in the ‘Food for Thought’ paper are political in nature and should have been elaborated in the EU Council Meetings in collaboration with national parliaments. It seems that the EU Ministries of Defence were trying to patch up a compromise on issues upon which the Heads of State and the EU Foreign Ministries could not agree.

From the end of 1999 until the spring of 2000, there was in fact an intense transatlantic debate about the exact relationship between ESDP and NATO. There were two opposite views. On the one hand, Britain and the United States insisted that NATO started discussions with the EU over their military relationship. On the other, French officials opposed the establishment of formal contacts between the two organisations until the EU had its military and political committees in place. The French position expressed in unambiguous terms a sentiment, present in some other European capitals, that the strength of NATO would jostle the emerging ESDP into adopting structures, procedures and policies replicating the US vision of the world. In other words, the Europeans would be unable to think through independently the nature of ESDP. On the other side of the Atlantic, French objections were interpreted as another attempt to ‘decouple’ ESDP from NATO structures.

Since the beginning of negotiations on ESDP in late 1998, the US administration had three main concerns, which were captured by US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in a speech mentioning the ‘3 Ds’: no decoupling, no duplication and no discrimination. Decoupling referred to the fear that Europeans would develop their security and defence policies within the EU only, thus leaving NATO. Duplication expressed the American worry that the EU would start duplicating NATO tasks, structures and military capabilities. Discrimination referred to policies that the EU might adapt that would discriminate against non-EU NATO member states, particularly Turkey.

To try to reassure the US on some of the military aspects, the ‘Food for thought paper’ suggested that DSACEUR would normally participate as appropriate in the EUMC, although it would not be as a member. It was also proposed that the EUMS would not itself act as operation headquarters. The roles of the EUMS were to “co-ordinate and stimulate the development of European military
capabilities, developing an appropriate relationship with NATO’s force planning process.”; “organise and co-ordinate operating procedures with national, multination and NATO HQs available to the EU”; “liaise with national HQs, European multinational force HQs and NATO”.71

All of these measures were proposed to shape a close relationship with NATO in which the EU would not seek to be ‘autonomous’ in its decision-making process. Most significantly, the paper implied that the EU would not have its own operational and military capabilities to undertake military operations. The type of new co-operation envisaged was highlighted by the decision in early January 2000 to allow the Eurocorps to take over the command of NATO peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo.72

The intense negotiations and discussions among the EU Ministers of Defence led to a compromise on the NATO-EU relationship at Santa Mara de Feira, 19-20 June 2000. At the Summit it was announced that four ad-hoc working groups were to be set up on the capabilities goals and to prepare the ground for permanent arrangements between the two organisations. The ad-hoc working groups were to cover security issues, capability goals, the modalities for EU access to NATO assets, and the definition of permanent consultation arrangements.73

Despite the fact that at the European Council at Santa Maria de Feira important steps were taken to strengthen the ‘civilian aspects’ of crisis management (to include the establishment of a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, a co-ordination mechanism - full interaction with the Commission services - a database on civilian police capabilities and the concrete targets for civilian police: 5,000 police officers for international missions),74 from July-December 2000, it was the definition of Military Capabilities that progressed the fastest.

On 22 September 2000, an informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers took place at Ecouen, in which a precise Catalogue of Forces was discussed. The EU’s interim military had drafted on 28 July a preliminary version of the catalogue of forces and precise capacities. The day before the meeting of the Defence Ministers, EU Chiefs of Staff drafted a more complete version of the catalogue. The document included four basic hypotheses or scenarios, which allowed the EU MoDs to define the “Petersberg Tasks” as ranging from peace-enforcement to low level intensity rescue operations. The hypotheses were:

- Separation by force of the belligerent parties
- Prevention of conflicts
- Humanitarian aid
- Evacuation of nationals.75
This was a *redefinition* of the planning for the ‘Petersberg tasks’ because, although the 1992 WEU Petersberg declaration described such tasks as including ‘tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’, in reality the planning undertaken by WEU military staff had been limited to low-level military operations – that is, not involving the separation by force of the belligerent parties. In fact, by the summer of 1999, the WEU had been engaged militarily only in mine-sweeping operations (Gulf wars), monitoring and enforcement of UN sanctions at sea (Adriatic and Danube in former Yugoslavia) and in managing low level policing operations in Mostar (Bosnia-Herzegovina).  

At the meeting it was also agreed that a Conference on Capacity Commitment would also take place on November 20, 2000. A few months later, at that conference, EU Member states committed themselves, on a voluntary basis, to making national contributions corresponding to the rapid reaction capabilities identified to attain the Headline Goal. EU Member States explained that they would be able to meet the Headline Goal that they had assigned to themselves. And in one aspect, the agreement even exceeded expectations. In fact, they engaged to constitute a pool of more than 100,000 persons and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels. (the 100,000 persons exceeded the 60,000 originally mentioned in the previous communiqués)  

From this brief overview of decisions taken from St. Malo to Nice, it can be observed that the EU Council at Cologne (3-4 June 1999) decided to give the EU a military force but it failed to define the political and military doctrine that should guide it. It appears that the failure to do so was the result of the existence of divergent agendas behind the development of the force. Hence, during the second half of 1999 and the early part of 2000, a row erupted between France and the United States. Because of this, the EU/NATO Military Chiefs of Staff and planners, with the support of some EU Defence Ministries, were able to set the agenda about the political doctrine shaping the establishment of the RRF.  

The guidelines of this political doctrine were presented at the EU Defence Ministers’ meetings in February 2000 as the ‘Food for Thought’ Paper. The paper identified the *type and scope* of the RRF operations. It stated that the EU should plan for operations for “complex peace enforcement tasks” in and around Europe. In other words, it went beyond the simple ‘Petersberg Tasks’ that the WEU had traditionally planned and made clear that they could be deployed beyond European borders. These views were then included in the hypotheses and scenarios underlying the planning for the catalogues of forces discussed at Ecouen by EU Defence Ministers in September 2000.
These preliminary findings indicate that the political and military decision-making processes are not running in parallel. There is the danger that the piecemeal approach adopted to achieve ESDP is preventing a full and open discussion about the political aims of ESDP. The ‘technical proposals’ developed by Chiefs of Defence Staff and military experts to define the tasks of the European Rapid Reaction Force are playing a disproportionate role in shaping the definition of the political goals of ESDP.

4. Conclusion

What is the significance of the decisions taken on ESDP during 1999-2000 for the future of European security? The long-standing aim of the Franco-German relationship and of other ‘integrationists’ to merge the WEU into the EU has been fulfilled. To the already existing ‘Brusselsisation’ of foreign policy issues, there is now the added dimension of defence. It is in fact apparent that the Military Committee and Military Staff, together with the establishment of the Rapid Reaction Force, have the potential of giving the EU a military muscle in the near future.

However, there are some contradictory trends in operation. Despite the fact that the 15 EU Member States agreed to the establishment of military structure and forces, there is no common political doctrine on how these tools should be used in periods of crisis. There are divergent opinions on the relationship to be established between the new military and political structures and NATO. Although the Rapid Reaction Force was created in order to strengthen the EU, it might well end up contributing more to the reorganisation of NATO and the creation of an ad-hoc ‘coalition of the willing’ rather than giving the EU an ‘autonomous’ military capability.

These contradictory trends are the result of the nature of the consensus achieved among the 15 EU and non-EU NATO Member States. The proposal put forward by Britain in late 1998, the St. Malo Declaration, was aimed to ensure that the EU Member States put more effort into building military forces capable of ‘out-of-area’ operations. However, the UK government and its Prime Minister did not appear to fully envisage the possibility that the EU would create a series of new political and military structures under the Second Pillar. The impetus for such steps was prompted by the impact of the Kosovo war on the attitudes of EU Member States. The Kosovo war raised the stakes in the transatlantic relationship and Franco-German views on defense gained wider support amongst not only Italian and Spanish politicians but also among the ‘neutrals’ (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden). This is the reason why from late 1999 onwards, the political and military aspects of ESDP have not proceeded in parallel. As a result, the NATO/EU Chiefs of Defence and their military staff have been able to play a disproportionate role in the definition of the political doctrine that is shaping ESDP.
Notes


3 EU Council, (4 December 2000) ibid

4 The Amsterdam Treaty was negotiated during 1996/1997 and did not enter in force until 1998. For an analysis of the Maastricht Treaty and the introduction of the Union, cf. De Schoutheete de Tervarent and W. Wessels (Eds) Contributions to the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.” See Title V, Article J.4 paragraph 2 of the Maastricht Treaty. The use of the term ‘request’, rather than instruct, demonstrates how hesitant EU leaders were in bringing the WEU and the EU closer together at the time. The Amsterdam Treaty reaffirmed that the WEU would remain an autonomous organisation. See: European Union (1997) European Union Consolidated Treaties. Brussels: European Union.


Kohl and President Mitterand on 14 October 1991. Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg joined the Eurocorps at a later date. Eurofor (Rapid Deployment Force) is a formation of land and air based forces established in May 1995 by France, Spain, Portugal and Italy. It has no pre-assigned forces. It is constituted only at times of crisis. Euromarfor (European Maritime Force) was established by France, Spain and Italy in May 1995.

11 European Communities (March 1991) op. cit.
12 Reprinted in Rutten, (M), (2001) op. cit. page 168 to 208.
13 EU Council, (4 December 2000) op. cit.
14 This point can be found Title V: Provision on a Common Foreign and Security Policy in Article 17 of the Nice Treaty that replaces Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty. Ibid.
15 The residual functions of the WEU concern collective self-defence obligations and the role of the WEAG ‘the European forum for armaments cooperation’. The collective self-defence obligations are contained in Article V of the Brussels Treaty. The article reads “If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power”. Another key ‘residual’ aspect that is under negotiation is the future of the WEU Assembly.
17 Presidency Report on ESDP, see Part I. Ibid.
20 Ibid, for full details see annex II: Strengthening of European Union Capabilities for civilian aspects of crisis management.
21 Also known as flexibility and closer co-operation. Article 27a can be found in Title V: Provision on a Common Foreign and Security of the Nice Treaty. European Union. (2001) op. cit.
22 The articles are 43-45 (Title VII) and Article 23(2) of existing provisions. Ibid and European Union, (1997).
24 Ibid.
26 The modified articles 24 can be found in Title V: Provision on a Common Foreign and Security of the Nice Treaty. European Union (2001) op. cit.
35 Moravcsik, A. (Winter 1991) op. cit.
42 Howorth, J. (November 2000). op.cit. page 93

53 Franco-German summit’ communiqué reproduced in Rutten, op.cit. page 4.

54 British-French summit St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998 reproduced in Rutten, op.cit. page 8-9.

55 ibid


60 Personal conversation with officials from MFAs.


64 see North Atlantic Council Summit, Washington, DC 24 April 1999 and The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, reproduced in Maartje, R, op.cit. paragraph 9 page 22.

65 ibid, paragraph 10, pp. 22-23.

66 European Council, Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, reprinted in Rutten, M. op.cit. page 40 to 45.

67 ibid, Franco-British summit communiqué reprinted at pp. 77-79.

68 The EU Council resolution called upon the establishment of an Action Plan which included the “strengthening the synergy and responsiveness of national, collective and NGO resources… enhancing and facilitating the EU’s contribution to, and activities within, other organisations, such as the UN and the OSCE whenever one of them is the lead organisation in a particular crisis, as well as EU autonomous actions” and ensuring coherence among EU’s pillar structures. Concrete steps involved, the development of a rapid reaction capability, what later came to known as the Rapid Reaction Facility; an inventory of national and collective resources; a database to be set up to maintain and share information on the pre-identified assets, capabilities and expertise within all areas to non-military crisis management; study of the lessons learnt to define concrete targets for EU Member States’ collective non-military response to international crises; the creation of a rapid financing mechanism such as the creation by the Commission of a Rapid Reaction Fund.


71 Meeting of EU defence ministers, Sintra 28 February 2000, The ‘Food for Thought’ paper on headline and capabilities goal. Rutten, M. op.cit. pp. 102-106. especially paragraphs 8 to 15


73 European Council, Santa da Feira, 19 – 20 June 2000, reprinted in ibid , pp. 120 to 139.

74 Ibid. On the civilian aspects of crisis management see section III; For the concrete targets for police see Presidency Report on ESDP. Op.cit. appendix 4.

75 22 September 2000: Informal meeting of EU defence ministers Ecouen, quoted in Rutten, M. op.cit. pp. 143-146.


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