I. INTRODUCTION

1. European defence today stands at a crossroads. As NATO continues to redefine its roles and missions in the post Cold War era, it has become clear that the Alliance is most likely to become involved in operations outside the territory of its member states, operations that do not arise from the Article 5 guarantee of collective defence. As a result, the NATO allies, as early as 1994, created arrangements for using alliance capabilities in operations that do not involve all of the allies. At the same time, the European Union, since late 1998 has proceeded to create its own European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which would give the EU the ability to take military action when NATO as a whole is not
engaged.

2. But the steps taken by the EU have not been without controversy. Some strong proponents of greater EU integration have characterised ESDP as a process that will free Europe from its dependence on the United States for its security or as a step that will help bring about a closer union among the 15 EU member states, four of which are not members of NATO. Some friends of NATO, in turn, have reacted to ESDP as a threat to Alliance unity, a Trojan horse that will undermine the transatlantic link that has helped protect the European democracies for a half-century and facilitated the reconciliation that permitted development of the EU. While both North Americans and Europeans welcome any effort by the Europeans to shoulder a greater share of their defence burden, there is some concern that most of the effort in ESDP has been on building new institutions to rival NATO, while few resources have been put toward developing the capabilities that would enable the Europeans to undertake missions on their own. Those who disagree with this assertion point to the EU’s commitment to meeting the capabilities needed for the Headline Goal.

3. The EU’s Helsinki summit in December 1999 marked an important step forward for ESDP. The EU agreed to a Headline Goal to create by 2003 a corps-strength rapid reaction force deployable within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year, with appropriate air and naval elements. For the EU governments, this would enable them to implement the ambitions of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the May 1999 Cologne Summit by providing the EU with the capabilities for a common EU policy on security and defence.

4. The May 2000 EU summit in Feira set out the permanent institutional structures that are to govern ESDP, which are discussed as part of Chapter VI:

   o Ultimate responsibility will rest with the EU General Affairs Council, which normally consists of the foreign ministers of the 15 EU countries. This is similar to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) when it consists of foreign ministers during its semi-annual ministerial-level meetings. This structure means that ESDP is an intergovernmental process; that is, it will operate based on consensus of the 15 member governments, rather than the communitarian method of interplay between the Council, European Commission and European Parliament.

   o The Political and Security Committee (known by its French acronym, COPS), will have specific responsibility for ESDP. It consists of permanent representatives holding ambassadorial rank, similar to the permanent representatives to the NAC but of lower seniority, and it is chaired by the ambassador representing the country that holds the EU’s rotating presidency.

   o An EU Military Committee, comprised of flag officers, advises the EU on military matters. It is similar to the Military Committee at NATO, and most countries have designated their representative to the NATO Military
Committee to sit on its EU equivalent.

- An EU Military Staff informs and prepares the deliberations of the Military Committee and the COPS on defence issues, similar to the role played by the International Military Staff (IMS) at NATO.
- The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, will play an essential role in the future EU defence organisation and serves as chairman of the COPS, especially during a crisis. Already, Mr Solana has organised a Policy Unit, consisting of civilian experts who report to him and advise him on defence issues, and containing a Situation Centre, which reports both to Mr Solana and the Military Staff.
- The creation of these institutions is meant to develop the relevant competencies for ESDP, and not to duplicate an institutional structure that already exists within NATO. These nascent institutions will allow the EU and NATO to maximise their co-operative working relationship.

5. At a November 2000 Capabilities Commitment Conference, EU members pledged the forces needed to fulfil the Headline Goal, but some shortcomings still exist and are discussed in greater detail in Chapter III. At the December 2000 Nice Summit, France, which held the EU presidency, issued a report setting out the goals and decision-making procedures for the ESDP. The French proposal gives the EU autonomy in taking decisions on possible future security missions, which will be limited to the Petersberg tasks, which include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace enforcement.

6. The Nice Summit conclusions reveal that the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force would depend on NATO for its planning capabilities, which are discussed further in Chapter V. The EU Military Staff would have no planning capabilities of its own, and NATO would be the preferred option to engage in a mission. Although this outcome addresses many fears that ESDP would develop apart from NATO, there are still unresolved issues regarding the role of the non-EU European allies (Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and Turkey) in the process, which are discussed at greater length in Chapter IV.

7. Additionally, there are several other questions surrounding ESDP that will be addressed in this report. While much talk has centred around the mechanisms of ESDP, not enough thought has gone into describing what ESDP is supposed to do, and Chapter II will examine the basic question of "what for?" At the same time, while there has been much work done on the intergovernmental side of ESDP, there has been little talk of mechanisms for exercising legislative oversight of the process. Chapter VII will review some of the proposals for parliamentary oversight.
II. WHAT FOR?

8. Before examining the institutions and mechanisms being erected by the EU, it is important to first explore the rationale behind ESDP, to ask "what for?" Is defence simply the next step for the integration of a union that already has developed a common market, a common customs union, and a common currency? Is ESDP ultimately to become a way for European countries to assume complete responsibility for their common defence and end their reliance on the transatlantic link? Is ESDP merely a glorified international police force that will undertake operations that are too minor for Washington to bother with, such as the WEU missions in the former Yugoslavia? Is ESDP an insurance policy for European countries against the day when the United States declines to get involved in an operation that is important to the security of the Europeans?

9. In part, the impetus for ESDP has arisen out of an increased desire for Europe to make itself heard in world affairs, sometimes referred to as "one voice for Europe." That being said, a political will has materialised among Europe's leaders, illustrated in particular with the St. Malo initiative in 1998, where Tony Blair, the UK prime minister, ended Britain's reluctance to give the EU a meaningful role in Europe's security. The need for some military capabilities to lend credibility to European policies has been widely recognised.

10. ESDP is also a pragmatic response to the crises in the Balkans. In particular, it was given impetus when European countries were unable to quickly assemble enough troops to man the NATO peacekeeping force, which entered Kosovo in June 1999. Also, Europe's subsidiary role to the United States in the bombing campaign against Serbia proved that although the EU members spend an amount equal to 60% of the US defence budget, they were only getting a fraction of the capability that such spending would imply. The reason, according to some members of the European Parliament, is that in Europe many structures are redundant, equipment is not standard, the rate of modernisation is not the same, and there is little joint procurement.

11. ESDP can fill a real need in European defence, but it should not and need not become a rival to NATO. That means that the EU should not aim to become a collective defence organisation. NATO has ably filled that role for 50 years, and NATO plays an irreplaceable role in linking the democracies of Europe and North America to defend their systems and values against any future threat. ESDP should seek to give the European democracies the capability to take military action when a threat arises to the stability of Europe and when NATO as a whole is not engaged. The EU should have the ability to make decisions about intervention and have recourse to the assets needed to undertake a crisis management operation along the lines of those envisioned in the Petersberg tasks, which include humanitarian and rescue tasks.
peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

12. The decision of whether the EU should intervene in a crisis must ultimately rest with the 15 member states. However, according to decisions taken in Nice, as soon as a crisis emerges, the EU must intensify regular dialogue and consultation with NATO and with other European nations, especially the non-EU European allies. Inevitably, military capabilities are at the heart of the ESDP and are the test of EU credibility in this domain. The ultimate success or failure of ESDP will depend on whether member states develop the military capabilities needed, beginning with those needed for the Headline Goal.

13. While ESDP will inevitably help deepen the process of European integration, this is likely to remain an intergovernmental process. Only democratically elected governments and parliaments have the legitimacy to undertake a military operation and thereby put their citizens at risk. There is no European army, no power for the European Commission, and no transfer of sovereignty from the 15 member states. Every EU member retains its right to participate (or not) in a EU operation or a EU exercise and its right to contribute (or not) to the Headline Goal. ESDP is a common policy, with the aim of creating a common ground that will rely on strong national policies.

14. ESDP is not designed to create a military superpower. ESDP is part of a comprehensive strategy driven by the EU to deal with potential crises by using a wide spectrum of political, economic and social tools. This strategy pertains to crisis management and not to collective defence, which will remain the sole prerogative of NATO.

15. What remains to be defined are the limits of ESDP and the Petersberg tasks. At least one EU official, speaking to the Assembly's International Secretariat, averred that a possible ground invasion of Serbia during the 1999 Kosovo campaign would have constituted a task of combat forces in crisis management and therefore been a legitimate mission for the EU. For the time-being, the lack of European military capability makes this a theoretical argument for that particular scenario, but the EU countries and the NATO allies may confront such a question in the future. It is important that the links between the EU and NATO be open and wide-ranging to ensure that such future decisions are taken in a way that ensures the security of all of the NATO allies and guards against asking the EU to undertake an operation it is not prepared for.

16. In addition, it will be necessary to indicate more clearly the geographical areas where the EU force may intervene. Otherwise, it would be impossible to plan accurately for the transport, logistics and communication needed for the operation. Such clarification is also necessary in the relationship with NATO, which seems unlikely to act in Africa and Asia, but became actively engaged in the Balkans.

17. Since Belgium assumed the EU Presidency at the beginning of
July, it has declared that the establishment of a defence identity will be a high priority during its six-month term. The Belgians are also committed to making the development of that identity as transparent as possible so as to bolster public support for ESDP. This leadership manifests itself at a crucial time as the second capabilities conference will take place under its leadership in November 2001.

18. The new Administration in Washington supports the development of ESDP, one that is not independent of NATO, but will enable the Europeans to act when the United States is engaged elsewhere or does not wish to commit troops. The basis for the US Administration's support for ESDP rests on three factors: 1. ESDP will help correct the existing imbalance of capabilities within the Alliance; 2. European integration as a force will foster support for increased defence spending in European countries; 3. ESDP will not create separate forces.

III. EU FORCE PLEDGES

A. ANALYSIS OF THE HEADLINE GOAL

19. In December 1999, during their Helsinki Summit, the 15 members of the EU endorsed a Headline Goal, which, for the first time, formally outlined the Union's military objectives. The Headline Goal states that by 2003, the EU will be able to deploy a Rapid Reaction Force to its full strength of up to 60,000 troops within 60 days and be capable of sustaining it for a period of one year for the purposes of the Petersberg tasks, with appropriate naval and air elements. The Headline Goal specifically outlines the need for self-sustainability, with access to necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, and other combat support facilities across all services.

20. Regarding roles and missions, the Headline Goal essentially provides a framework for the EU to establish a limited military crisis management tool, which fills a gap that has arisen in European security between civilian crisis management and higher-end peacekeeping enforcement tasks. Until now, the more demanding of these Petersberg tasks have been undertaken by NATO. The WEU and EU have limited themselves to lower-end military tasks. The EU Rapid Reaction Force will not conduct operations in relation to common defence, though most of the national units that comprise the EU force would also be available to carry out a NATO Article 5 operation. Instead, the force is intended for operations where NATO as a whole would not become involved. Initially, the Rapid Reaction Force might conduct operations that remain below NATO's threshold, such as disaster relief, evacuation of EU citizens from unstable countries,
humanitarian aid, and traditional peacekeeping, but not engage in peace enforcement. The Rapporteur wishes to stress that contrary to some accounts, the ESDP framework does not envision the creation of a separate force. The forces pledged to ESDP will remain available to carry out collective defence or other NATO operations. Likewise, the corps-sized capability envisioned for ESDP should not be compared with the mighty power that NATO could muster if one of its members came under attack. ESDP and the European Rapid Reaction Force will have nowhere near the capability to ensure the collective defence of its members; therefore, the Headline Goal should not be criticised for not having everything NATO possesses.

21. The 50,000 to 60,000 service men and women that will form the Rapid Reaction Force, will not be newly recruited, but will be drawn from existing national forces. They will constitute neither a "European Army," nor a standing force, although on EU missions they may wear an EU insignia. The size of the force, around 15 brigades or 50,000 to 60,000 troops, is not a random figure but is based upon recent expeditionary operations, such as KFOR (50,000) and IFOR (60,000). The Chief of Staff of the permanent EU Military Staff, British Maj. Gen. Graham Messervy-Whiting, indicated that this figure is not static. As the EU's military dimension expands, the size of the force might grow accordingly. While some observers, noting the need to rotate troops deployed abroad, state that the EU force will have to comprise 120,000 or 180,000 troops, it is important to remember that troop rotation will be done in accordance with national practice, as discussed in the following section. The Headline Goal simply calls for a force of 50,000 to 60,000 to be deployed at any one time.

22. Any decision taken by the EU to deploy the Rapid Reaction Force will not bind all 15 members to participate, nor will operations be exclusive to the 15 members alone. The EU will incorporate mechanisms to enable other non-EU countries to participate, which is discussed in further detail in Chapter IV. The Headline Goal does not explicitly define the geographical parameters for deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force. Unlike NATO, the EU Rapid Reaction Force is not limited to deployment in a specified region and, according to the EU, could be sent outside of Europe under mandate of, for example, the UN or OSCE. The benefits of using the force have been described in terms of Europeans being able to demonstrate a unified and stronger commitment to international crises, such as that of East Timor or Sierra Leone.

B. FORCE PLEDGES AND FULFILLING THE GOAL

23. In order to be capable of undertaking the full range of Petersberg tasks, the EU has compiled a "capability catalogue". This catalogue, in accordance with agreements made at the May 2000 Feira summit, was compiled with the assistance of NATO, and lists the military capabilities, assets and forces that the EU would require in order to fulfil the Petersberg tasks and meet the
objectives of the Headline Goal. The above-mentioned 50,000 to
60,000 troops are included in the catalogue, as well as some 400
combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels. The capability document is a
classified document, and the exact requirements for the force have
not been published.

24. In November 2000, the EU held its first Capabilities Pledging
Conference in Brussels. During this meeting, the 15 member states
pledged to make available various military assets and capabilities
in accordance with the capability catalogue. Essentially this
conference established how close the EU was to achieving the
objectives of the Headline Goal and what capability shortfalls
remain.

25. All force commitments pledged during the conference were set out
in a "force catalogue". The Germans pledged the largest number of
troops at 13,500, followed by the United Kingdom with a pledge of
12,500, and the French with 12,000. Italy and Spain each pledged
6,000. The Netherlands committed 5,000 troops and Greece
pledged 3,500. Austria and Finland pledged 2,000 respectively and
Sweden 1,500. Belgium, Ireland and Portugal each pledged 1,000.
Finally, Luxembourg made a pledge of 500 troops. In addition,
Turkey, a non-EU country, pledged 7,000 troops, subject to the
country's demand to be included in the ESDP process, and other
EU candidate states pledged smaller contingents. Only Denmark
did not pledge troops on the understanding that it would be likely
to provide part of a "Nordic Contingency"; this was in keeping with
Denmark's decision to "opt out" of EU defence matters. (Denmark's
"opt-out" unfortunately deprives the union of considerable Danish
experience and expertise in peace operations and detracts from the
political cohesion of EU operations.)

26. The above number of troops is not a figure that includes force mix
or force rotation, requirements that have led some observers to
offer higher numbers for the Headline Goal commitment.
Recognising that different missions might require troops with
different abilities, member countries have offered the EU access to
a total pool of 100,000 troops. It is important to have this larger
number of troops available as it enables commanders to select the
right mix from a larger pool of forces for a specific operation of up
to 60,000 troops. For example, heavy artillery units might not be
called upon for low-end policing missions, but might make up part
of the overall pool. In relation to this, the UK stated it would be
ready to provide 12,500 troops at any one time, but this number
would be drawn from a wider pool of 20,000.

27. Secondly, the figure of 50,000 to 60,000 does not include troops
for force rotation, which is done to allow units to work, train and
rest adequately over a sustained period of time. Readers may have
seen figures as large as 180,000 for the estimated size of the Rapid
Reaction Force. This figure includes force rotation and is based on
a 3:1 rotation. That is to say, one unit would be deployed while the
second unit trains and the third unit rests. This figure is unhelpful,
however, as not all nations rotate their forces in this manner.
British troops, for example, spend two years at home after every
six-month deployment. The French work in 16-month cycles, built upon four months of deployment, eight months of preparation and four months on alert. Britain and France are among the European countries furthest along in restructuring their militaries; as a result, they plan to have a large proportion of their troops available for deployment. For example, Britain plans to have all of its 77,000 army troops available in a pool for overseas missions, while France plans to have a pool of 100,000 of its 138,000 soldiers available for deployment at some point.

28. In terms of military equipment, wide ranges of assets were made available. The British pledged attack helicopters, air defence assets, 72 combat aircraft, Royal Navy aircraft, 18 ships (including one aircraft carrier, two nuclear-powered submarines and up to four destroyers and frigates), as well as an amphibious task group with a helicopter landing ship and an amphibious brigade. France is contributing armoured forces, engineering units, reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles, two AWACS and 12 ships, including its new aircraft carrier. France has also ordered two amphibious assault ships capable of carrying 20 transport helicopters for use by the Rapid Reaction Force. The Belgians have promised a squadron of F-16 combat aircraft and a number of naval vessels.

29. Germany pledged one heavy or light brigade (according to nature of the mission), or elements of an airmobile brigade, some 20 naval vessels, plus adequate tactical and logistic support assets, including Tornado aircraft and 30 C-160s and one A-310 transport. Italy will contribute 19 naval vessels, including the Garibaldi STOVL and 2 San Giorgio-class LPDs, 22 fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, an amphibious battalion, COMSUBIN Special Forces personnel, and two Harbour Authority coastal patrol boats. Italy will also offer 47 combat and support aircraft, including Tornado IDS, six C-130Js and 10 G-222s (later C-27Js), and two B-707TT tankers. The Netherlands pledged two vessels and one to two squadrons of combat aircraft. Spain contributed one light infantry battalion, which at high readiness would be available as an immediate reaction force, as well as one ship and five squadrons of aircraft, including three fighter squadrons. Spain has also offered the EU a divisional headquarters to co-ordinate any humanitarian operations and a brigade headquarters for other operations.

30. Non-EU countries, including NATO allies and EU candidate countries, were invited to pledge contributions to the capability catalogue. These included Turkey, which pledged a mechanised infantry brigade, two F-16 squadrons, eight warship, including two frigates and two submarines, and two C-130 transport aircraft. The EU noted that on first impression the capabilities and assets pledged by this group of non-EU countries constituted an important first step, in particular in building a working relationship between the EU and this group of countries. However, the EU did not feel that the pledges would significantly rectify the shortfalls described below. For most EU countries, the real problem in relation to meeting the requirements of the capability catalogue will be in providing military assets and modern technologies that are either in
their developmental stage, or simply do not yet exist.

C. OVERCOMING THE SHORTFALLS

31. During the Capabilities Pledging Conference, the 15 EU members surpassed their goal for the number of ground troops. This is not surprising, as the 15 countries field more than 2 million active-duty servicemen and women. While the armies of many EU countries contain large numbers of conscripts, there are still hundreds of thousands of professional troops. The United Kingdom and France alone field more 170,000 soldiers that would be available for overseas rotations. However, the conference did reinforce a stark, but enduring reality. While European countries possess a vast number of troops, they lack many necessary key military capabilities and assets, which would ensure easy deployment, full mobility, secure and interoperable communications and sustainability in field via access to adequate supplies. These capabilities are necessary to ensure the EU Rapid Reaction Force can project decisive force beyond their borders. Many members of the EU indicated large shortfalls in relation to the capability catalogue.

32. These shortfalls did not come as a surprise. European capability deficits were catalogued through the WEU Audit of Assets and Capabilities and NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative in 1999. Indeed, NATO had identified shortfalls years prior to this date. Not surprisingly, the capabilities conference acknowledged a very similar set of shortfalls as the WEU Audit and the DCI. Six of the seven capabilities necessary to ensure the EU’s effective engagement in crisis management are the same as the capabilities and assets identified by the DCI as being key areas for improvement within the Alliance. Furthermore, one of the four NATO-EU ad hoc working groups established at Feira specifically handles capabilities and provides a forum through which both organisations can consider a combined approach.

33. Key strategic capability gaps highlighted by the commitment conference include strategic shortfalls in air and transport, intelligence collection assets and command-and-control assets. Tactical shortfalls include suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD), combat search and rescue, precision-guided munitions, cruise missiles and medical capabilities. The report by Giovanni Lorenzo Forcieri for the Subcommittee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities considers many of these capability shortfalls. However, one shortage specific to the EU is that of satellites. The EU will need to develop an intelligence policy and capability autonomous of the United States. This issue has proven controversial, as the United States believes that such development of such capability could duplicate existing NATO intelligence resources, especially considering resource limitations and the fact that NATO and the EU are developing a security agreement that will allow them to share intelligence.

34. Although it is unlikely the EU would develop an equivalent to the
US Central Intelligence Agency, it would aim to reduce its reliance on the United States, especially in the field of satellite imagery. According to the EU's objectives for its ESDP, plans have been made to incorporate the WEU Satellite Centre in Torrejón, Spain, into the EU at the end of 2001. The centre should become an EU agency (as opposed to being incorporated into the EU), which would preserve the current access arrangements for non-EU members of NATO and the applicant countries to the EU. Plans have also been made to draw on other national assets possessed by France and the United Kingdom to provide an EU capability.

35. The Torrejón Satellite Centre uses a wide range of images, from broad images with 10-meter resolution for large areas to the recently launched IKONOS satellite with 1-meter resolution. Officials said that 78% of the requests for projects were in support of operations carrying out the Petersberg tasks envisioned for ESDP, indicating that the centre could play an important role in that EU effort. The remainder of work tends to be arms control and other treaty verification work. Given the shortfalls in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance that the EU faces in trying to meet the Headline Goal, a small additional investment in the Satellite Centre, especially in the field of communications technology in order to allow for quicker, more secure and more dependable information dissemination, could yield a great increase in capabilities.

36. In order to meet some of its capability shortfalls in other areas, European countries are looking to find purely European solutions. The joint development and purchase of the A400M large aircraft by seven European countries is a case in point. However, if the EU is to be capable of acting autonomously from the United States in the very near future, larger assets, such as transport aircraft must be acquired quickly. Arguably, to meet all of the major strategic capability shortfalls by the Headline Goal target date of 2003, the EU would not be able to find a European solution to all shortfalls and would have to purchase or lease at least some equipment from the United States. For example, the A400M will not come into service until 2007, four years after the proposed completion of the Headline Goal. Similar large aircraft, such as the US C-17, are already in production. The British government has overcome this problem by leasing four C-17 aircraft from the US, while committing to the eventual development and purchase of 25 A400M aircraft.

37. Given the high costs associated with development of ESDP, the Rapporteur wishes to raise an important point concerning procurement and spending. Declining, or at best, stagnant defence budgets make it difficult to meet the Headline Goal, unless spending priorities are substantially adjusted. This process will require careful consideration in co-operation with the NATO defence planning processes in order to promote optimum synergies.

38. A Capability Improvement Conference is due to take place in Belgium in November 2001. At this conference, countries will consider how to quickly acquire the capabilities and assets they do
not possess in order to fulfil the requirements of the Headline Goal. Certainly, in order to overcome many of the shortfalls in the long-term, Europeans will have to rationalise their limited defence budgets, as discussed in last year’s report by Paul Helminger for the Economic Committee. They also will have to participate in an increased number of joint and co-operative military equipment programmes, as discussed in Mr Forcieri’s report. A central issue of debate is how far the EU itself should develop one distinct capability shortfall within the EU, which is military planning. This will be considered in chapter V.

IV. INCLUSION OF NON-EU NATO ALLIES

39. One of the most controversial aspects of ESDP since the December 1999 Helsinki summit has been how the European NATO allies outside of the EU will be included in ESDP. The “European pillar” of defence had originally been perceived as the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), consisting of the 17 European members of NATO; however, a functioning ESDI was never developed within NATO. While some at NATO still use the term ESDI, this identity never moved beyond the talking stage.

40. Instead, European defence has rapidly evolved as the ESDP within the European Union, giving the EU a political-military tool in its inventory of instruments. ESDP brings into European defence four formerly “neutral countries” that have considerable experience in peacekeeping, the kind of experience that will be essential in carrying out the Petersberg tasks. The rapid development of ESDP within the EU, however, has led to the spectre of discrimination against the six European allies who are not EU members. The role of these six countries in the emerging security and defence policy of the EU, has emerged as a contentious issue in the current debate.

41. As was discussed in last year’s subcommittee report, the Western European Union (WEU) had provided an innovative range of arrangements to enable broad participation in European defence matters. The 10-member WEU, nearly all of whose activities have been subsumed into the EU, established mechanisms for including non-EU European members of NATO (associate members), neutral EU members (observers, a group that included Denmark because it declined WEU membership), and EU candidates (associate partners). The non-EU European members of NATO were given the right to “fully participate” in its activities. All functions of the WEU were formally transferred to the EU on July 1. The WEU now exists virtually in name only, though its 10 member states still have a collective-defence commitment to one another, embodied in Article 5 of the Modified Brussels Treaty (1948/1954).

42. All EU members agree that non-EU members cannot have the same rights as EU members, particularly when it comes to making a
decision about whether the EU will undertake an operation. There is a dispute, though, that centres on whether the non-EU allies should be regarded as a distinct category of states that would benefit from standing institutional relations with the EU and what those relations should cover. Since NATO's support is critical to ESDP, and the six non-EU allies are in a position within NATO to withhold that support, it would be wrong to exclude them from the EU debate.

43. On the other side, France suggests that the relevant group of countries to be associated with it should be a larger group of 15, including all recognised candidates for the European Union. The French underline that the day-to-day work of the Political and Security Committee (COPS) and other relevant EU structures will have much more to do with the elaboration of joint EU foreign-policy positions, than with the sort of crisis-management decisions that would call for formal consultation with NATO and its European members.

44. That being said, the EU has offered the following arrangements for including the six non-EU European allies (Norway, Turkey, Iceland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland) in ESDP:

   o NATO members would have the right to participate in any EU operation using Alliance assets - and almost all EU actions are expected to use NATO assets such as planning processes, operational headquarters or surveillance - and could be invited to join operations that do not use Alliance assets;
   o All non-EU countries participating in an operation with "significant" military forces would join a political/military committee of contributors with the same rights as participating EU members, though the EU alone would make the initial decision to undertake an operation;
   o Non-EU NATO members would have a say on potential operations in their own regions;
   o There is provision for military liaison with the EU Military Staff.

45. The EU also set a schedule for twice-yearly workshop-style crisis-management exercises, which would include the six non-EU European NATO allies by 2003, and agreed to finalise crisis decision-making and command mechanisms by year-end.

46. The EU members agreed on the new institutional arrangements linking the EU to NATO at the Feira Summit, respecting EU decision-making autonomy and its single institutional framework. Accordingly, it was decided that there would be a single inclusive structure in which all the countries concerned - European allies and EU applicants -- can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU. Within this structure, there will be exchanges with the non-EU European NATO members where required, as in the case of management of EU-led operations that use NATO assets and capabilities.

47. These principles have led to some difficulties because non-EU countries have only consultative rights until an operation is
launched. Turkey, a long-standing NATO member, fears that it will suddenly be excluded from decisions affecting European security. Onur Oymen, the Turkish ambassador to NATO, said Turkey's position was special because "13 of the possible 16 scenarios for future crises, which might cause the EU defence force to be deployed, are in the country's sphere of interest." Furthermore, Ankara regards itself as a pillar of European security in NATO and wants a say in all ESDP decisions. Consequently, Ankara is opposed to the EU having automatic access to NATO planning facilities and the presumption of availability of its assets and capabilities - such as reconnaissance systems and transport planes - in times of crisis if the matter of its involvement in ESDP is not settled to its own satisfaction. The other five non-EU European allies have not voiced objections over the proposed inclusion arrangements.

48. During this Subcommittee's visit to Turkey in December 2000, Faruk Logoglu, Turkey's Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, said "We have not been satisfied by the degree of participation offered by the EU. Nice is insufficient. In peacetime, it is not participation, only consultation, and that is not enough. We want to say 'yes' to ESDP, but it must be good enough for Turkey." While Mr Logoglu allowed that the 15 EU members ultimately must make the final decision on whether the EU would act in a crisis, he said that Turkey must be involved in all aspects of the "decision-shaping and decision-making process" leading up to that decision.

49. Turkey claims that at the NATO summit in Washington in April 1999, it was promised the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led crisis response operations, through "case-by-case" decisions by the North Atlantic Council. In addition, at the Washington summit it was agreed that the relationship between NATO and the EU would be "built on mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU and within the WEU" (it took three years to negotiate the existing NATO-WEU agreement), and therefore provide more, not less, participation. These WEU mechanisms allow for participation in the EU military operations by non-EU NATO members. Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem stressed that the problem is not only the country's insistence on protecting its vital security interests, but rather the fact that the Nice Summit ignored the decisions made by NATO in Washington. In search for a settlement, Turkey put forward at a NATO foreign ministers' meeting in December 2000 a proposal to limit non-EU European NATO members' right to participate in ESDP to cases of vital security interest or geographic proximity.

50. The Turkish government believes that ESDP is being developed by the EU in a parallel and competitive structure to NATO, undermining NATO's primary role in European security and defence. The Turkish government stresses that the new Strategic Concept of NATO adopted at the Washington Summit in 1999, beside Article 5 missions, refers to crisis response operations as one of the Alliances responsibilities.
51. Turkish officials also noted that non-Article 5 missions - those in which the EU might become involved because they do not entail collective defence - can escalate into Article 5 missions if a NATO member is attacked. For example, if the EU were to undertake an operation without the approval of all NATO members, and the adversary attacked a NATO member that participated, the non-EU Allies might be compelled to come to their ally's defence without having approved the original mission. Foreign ministry officials stated that assured access by the EU to NATO planning capabilities is contingent upon assured access of all NATO Allies to the planning and preparation of operations in which those NATO capabilities are used. The planning of an operation is important because it defines the rules of engagement and how soldiers protect themselves, "which is highly political." They said that all Allies must have a role in matters affecting their vital security interests, and it is not politically acceptable for the EU to use NATO assets without asking Turkish views on the matter at hand.

52. Ahead of the Budapest NATO Summit in May 2001, Turkey stressed two objectives. In a document styled as a "non-paper" Turkey said it wanted "more consultations through extra meetings" between the 15 member states and the six non-EU NATO countries. It also demanded the right to second officers from the six to take part in all ESDP related work in the EU Military Staff as well as the full participation of non-EU European Allies in exercises.

53. In late May, during intense diplomatic efforts by United Kingdom and the United States in Istanbul, it appeared that an "understanding" between Turkey and NATO was reached, leaving it up to the EU to respond to NATO's proposals. Under the "understanding," consultations between the 15 EU member states and the six non-EU NATO countries would be increased but not to the level of full participation that Turkey had demanded. NATO would also differentiate between strategic and non-strategic assets it will make available to the EU and where those assets would be deployed. There is an informal agreement from which the Aegean Sea area, and Cyprus would be exempt. To access strategic assets the EU would require approval from the North Atlantic Council, giving Turkey a *de facto* veto on ESDP operations when NATO assets are required. Ankara dropped its bid for a seat on EU's new Political and Security Committee, but secured an arrangement, which would provide the six non-EU NATO Allies with an ability to send "interlocutors" to meet periodically (semi-annually) and in the event of crises with the new Committee. However, Turkey still demanded to be part of all EU military exercises and to have a forceful say once the EU decides to plan an operation. This would be done by Committees of Contributors, which would be called to plan and execute crisis operations, on consensus basis.

54. According to the Nice proposals, non-EU troop contributing nations' rights in a given EU-led operation are limited to the role of the Committee of Contributors, which will be responsible only for the day-to-day conduct of the operation. The decisions with regard
to the operational planning, the political control and strategic
direction of an operation will be the responsibility of the Political
and Security Committee, composed of EU members.

55. In early June the Turkish government rejected the British-US
paper, claiming that it "did not fully address Turkey's security
needs." While the Turkish government and the Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs endorsed the acceptance of the carefully balanced
package, the Turkish General Staff rejected the deal, voicing
concerns about EU's assured access to NATO operational planning
and about security pledges vis-à-vis Cyprus. Since the proposed
agreement was rejected, the impasse between Turkey and the EU
has grown, souring the relationship between the two parties. The
issue of Cypriot membership in the EU and Ankara's continued
opposition to the island's accession have put a further strain on the
relations between Turkey and the EU.

56. If Turkey continues to refuse to allow the EU to have assured
access to NATO capabilities, it will strengthen the hand of those
who would have the EU develop such capabilities independent of
NATO by demonstrating that NATO cannot be relied upon. This
would distance ESDP from NATO and lead to duplication of assets
and planning facilities. This, in turn, would reduce the input of
Turkey and other non-EU Allies into ESDP. While they will have
the automatic right of participation in any operation that involves
NATO assets, and the automatic right to a full decision-making
role if they participate, they would not enjoy such rights in an
operation that does not use NATO assets. The current Turkish
position could lead Turkey to enjoy a lesser role in ESDP, which
would be a regrettable position for a country that has been a loyal
ally for almost 50 years. Moreover, NATO planning for EU
operations would also be in Turkish interests, as it will take into
consideration the views and capabilities of all Allies and provide
maximum transparency.

57. The longer the impasse between the EU and Turkey continues, the
greater the fear the EU could be pushed down the path neither the
United States, the EU itself, nor Turkey want. Lack of compromise
could lead to duplicating capabilities in order to free the EU from
Turkey's objections. At a time of strained budgetary resources, EU
countries cannot afford duplication of assets, especially if Europe is
to flex its muscle while remaining firmly committed to NATO.

V. DISPUTES OVER PLANNING

A. DEFINITIONS OF PLANNING

58. National governments and their armed services engage in many
types of military planning. For the purposes of this paper three will
be considered: operational planning, defence planning, and force
planning.

59. Operational planning, according to the armed services, is defined as all planning relating to an operation and takes place at three main levels: strategic, operational and tactical. It can be further divided into *advance planning* (long-term) and *crisis response planning* (short-term). Advance planning is conducted by the armed services around potential security risks and based around various scenarios and eventualities, involving, for example, both real and fictitious adversaries. Crisis response planning is conducted once an actual threat or crisis has been identified. For example, following the March 1999 decision to strike Serbia during the Kosovo crisis, NATO and SHAPE conducted crisis response planning for the air campaign over Kosovo. All operational planning can be conducted at a national level or through NATO and SHAPE.

60. A second type of military planning is that of defence planning. Within defence planning, there are many disciplines. These disciplines include, for example, infrastructure planning, armaments planning, nuclear planning, and communications planning. Defence planning is conducted at both a national level and an intergovernmental level via NATO. Under the auspices of NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), Qllies have sought to find methods of co-ordinating the work of the disciplines, which tend to develop and progress separately from one another. Today, NATO is working to establish methods to find interoperability and commonality within the defence planning disciplines.

61. NATO force planning focuses on co-ordinating the member armed forces to ensure that they have the correct capabilities and assets to carry out the Alliance's Strategic Concept. A full description of NATO's force planning process was provided in last year's report of the Sub-committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities. Essentially, the process is a biennial advisory mechanism based upon Ministerial Guidance from NATO member country Defence Ministers. This guidance lays out broad priorities and areas of concern for NATO, which is then translated into national Force Goals. Each nation agrees to its Force Goals which enable it to meet its national objectives while assisting the Alliance in its overall objectives.

**B. OPTIONS FOR EU MILITARY PLANNING**

62. One of the most contentious issues facing the establishment of a military dimension within the EU is that of EU access to NATO's military planning capabilities and assets, mainly in operational planning, but also force planning. The central problem focuses around interpretation by both institutions of the concepts of "autonomy" and "assured access". While the EU wishes to establish its own autonomous military capability, it has limited operational planning capabilities of its own and no force planning mechanisms. Furthermore, the establishment of the ESDP, and with it an autonomous decision-making capability, was endorsed by NATO on the understanding that the EU would use NATO planning.
mechanisms, specifically operational planning at SHAPE and the NATO force planning process, to prevent duplication and take advantage of NATO's considerable expertise.

63. NATO and the EU are now deadlocked in discussions over options for EU access to NATO's operational military planning capabilities. The EU has stated it requires "guaranteed permanent access (legally binding automatic access) to the Alliance's military planning capabilities, specifically its military headquarters (SHAPE) when conducting EU-led operations." This is because, in practical terms, the EU Military Staff will be small, (about half the size of NATO's International Military Staff), and will possess no structure like SHAPE (which has about 2,500 staff) upon which to draw its expertise. This is a large capability that should not be duplicated. In addition, Turkey modified its previous position that access to NATO capabilities and assets is to be agreed on a case-by-case basis.

64. Should a decision regarding EU access to NATO planning facilities be delayed further, there is a risk that this will create the incentive for the EU to find its own solution, and start to create truly autonomous planning facilities, specifically its own operational headquarters. If EU access to NATO planning were based upon the NAC's case-by-case approval, an option preferred by Turkey, the EU's political objectives (ESDP) would not be truly autonomous. At the May 2001 NAC meeting, no agreement could be reached on modalities for EU access. Until this central problem can be resolved, NATO and the EU have decided to proceed in other areas (building capabilities, for example), working on the basis that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.

65. Your Rapporteur believes that requiring the NAC to issue case-by-case approval is contrary to the very concept of a presumption of availability. A presumption of availability does not require a positive decision to ensure availability. A presumption of availability presumes that the capabilities will be made available unless a decision is made to revoke this availability.

66. The type of planning that the EUMS envisages it will conduct is limited to the strategic level and is known as advanced, strategic-level planning. This very limited EUMS planning capability is intended only to enable the military staff to advise the Council in its selection of an operation commander. The operation commander, for example the Deputy SACEUR or Deputy SACLANT, would then choose the operational headquarters, which would begin operational and tactical level planning. These two levels of planning could be conducted at SHAPE or national joint headquarters, like the British Permanent Joint Headquarters at Northwood or its French counterpart at Creil. This type of operational planning would not be undertaken by the EU.

67. The principal task of the EUMS is to provide in-house military expertise to the EU Military Committee. The EUMS represents a small advisory body that will assist the EU Council bodies discussed above in exercising political control and strategic direction of Petersberg operations. The EUMS will have a
maximum size of around 100 officers, with 20 to 30 reinforcement posts to be filled on a case-by-case basis for demanding crisis management operations. This is still approximately half the size of the NATO International Military Staff and can in no way be compared to SHAPE.

68. With regard to force planning, the EU has been discussing the possibility of using NATO force planning capabilities for over a year, and both the EU and NATO have stated the need to make use of structures which already exist. While the EU is attempting to match its capabilities to the requirements of its potential roles and missions, as outlined in the Petersburg tasks, this process does not constitute a detailed force planning process like that at NATO.

69. During a recent visit to SHAPE by the Sub-committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities, General Ralston noted the possible negative outcomes of duplicating planning resources which already exist at SHAPE: 1. It would be wasteful, and the European countries need to devote resources to developing capabilities, not a planning staff; 2. Having two planning options in a crisis would lead to confusion among decision-makers; 3. It could lead to a case where the EU plans to use a unit that is already committed to a NATO operation. A SHAPE planner later noted, "In these days of limited budgets, I want more forces to plan for, rather than more staff to plan with."

70. SHAPE officials said that NATO would offer planning assistance to the EU through Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS), a unit of 70 officers from the 17 NATO countries in the integrated military command that offers planning support to both SHAPE and NATO's Atlantic Command. The CJPS was organised in 1997 to plan all Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) activities and is the core staff to support NATO's European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The CJPS conducts strategic operations planning, including planning for European-led operations, and supports the Deputy SACEUR (DSACEUR), always a European officer, in his role as supreme commander of European-led operations. The CJPS would also provide planning support to the commander of an individual operation and the EU military staff. DSACEUR would have an "accounting role", ensuring that forces pledged to one operation are not counted for another. A SHAPE-EU task force is currently looking at how to ensure EU access to operations planning, the role of DSACEUR and the NATO command structure in ESDP, adaptation of NATO defence planning to incorporated EU requirements, and how to incorporate the four EU neutrals into SHAPE and CJPS.

71. At the Gothenburg EU summit, measures were taken to test the readiness of the EU to undertake crisis-related military operations through the establishment of the Exercise Policy. The Exercise Policy will seek to ensure that command structures, capabilities, procedures and arrangements with NATO are sufficient. These exercises will not utilise troops, but will involve all levels of the command structure. There will be two types of exercises: those using NATO assets and capabilities and those that do not.
72. Related to the issue of planning is access to NATO assets, specifically, the hardware that either NATO or national governments own that the EU will need to implement its operations. NATO has very few assets that are property of the organisation—most are owned by national governments. Still, the EU is interested in solidifying its access to NATO's AWACS planes and its command-and-control capabilities. While the institutional sketch of ESDP has been developed and progress was made in discussions at the Gothenburg summit, the long-awaited agreement between NATO and the EU on access to NATO assets has yet to be reached. As the deadline for limited operational capability approaches at the end of the year, this will remain an increasingly important item to be negotiated. There is also the question of mixed assets, those jointly owned but not by all Alliance members, to be resolved.

VI. CONTROL OF ESDP

73. An important question for ESDP is who will exercise the ultimate authority over its operations. The EU is a unique amalgam of an international organisation and a confederation, and a mixture of communitarian and intergovernmental decision-making procedures. Currently, the European Council is the ultimate authority over ESDP, meaning that it is a common policy of 15 countries, with little or no role for the European Commission and the European Parliament. It is important to note that ESDP will be under the control of democratically elected heads of state and government, and financial control will rest with the national parliaments that decide how much to contribute to the Initiative.

74. ESDP is an outgrowth of the EU's efforts to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and gives a defence dimension to what has been a rather toothless endeavour. The appointment of Javier Solana as Head of the General Secretariat of the Council and High Representative for CFSP, as well as Secretary General of the WEU, gave greater visibility to this effort. His task is to assist the member governments by contributing to the formulation, development and implementation of political decisions and to represent the governments in discussions with third countries.

75. To ensure a more coherent approach towards regions that are of vital interest to the EU, there is also the Commissioner for External Relations, Christopher Patten. Essentially, he is the Commission's interface with the EU's General Affairs Council and the Commission's interlocutor with Mr Solana. The treaties that govern the EU stipulate that the Commission is to be fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP field, but they do not address ESDP. The Commission's foreign policy role, first and foremost,
deals with the delivery of external assistance, but also using its resources and civilian expertise to assist EU crisis management operations.

76. ESDP is run by the General Affairs Council, made up of foreign ministers from the 15 member countries. The Political and Security Committee monitors the international situation, contributes to the formulation of policies by giving the Council opinions (either at the latter's request or on its own initiative) and also oversees the implementation of the policies that are agreed. In accordance with the Presidency each term, the EU member governments also hold informal defence ministerial meetings twice a year, as with the North Atlantic Council, so as to achieve objectives for a quickly operational force and fulfilment of the Headline Goal.

77. EU defence ministers announced the leadership of the EU Military Staff at their April 2001 meeting. Gen. Gustav Haggland of Finland was named Chairman of the Military Committee, and as such the EU's Chief military adviser. German Lt. Gen. Klaus Schuwirth was named the Head of the permanent Military Staff, and Major General Messervy-Whiting became his Chief of Staff. Ministers announced that ESDP would have a "limited operational capability" by the end of 2001, though this was to fall short of the ultimate Headline Goal, envisioned for 2003.

78. At a joint meeting in May 2001 between EU defence ministers and those of the six non-EU European members of NATO, the EU ministers set a timetable for EU military exercises in 2002, though involving only command-and-control procedures, rather than troops in the field. The two exercises will allow the EU defence ministers to assess the operational capability of the ESDP structures. The ministers announced that they foresee joint exercises with NATO in 2003, assuming a formal NATO-EU agreement will be in place.

79. The European Council has already developed the civilian aspects of crisis management with a view to establishing a better balance among the various instruments available to the Union. It thus decided to set up, by 2003, a force of 5,000 police officers to carry out crisis management operations, 1,000 of which must be deployable within 30 days. Moreover, the European Council laid down a work programme embracing conflict prevention, the consolidation of peace and the internal stability of states, areas, or regions in crisis or threatened by crisis. This has been institutionalised with a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management and a mechanism to provide co-ordination between the EU's interim Situation Centre/Crisis Cell. The co-ordination between civilian and military crisis management, however, will remain a soft spot for years to come.

VII. PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT
80. One aspect of ESDP that has drawn little attention is the oversight role that will be played by democratically elected representatives. Popular support is necessary to give legitimacy to decisions such as how much of a society's resources should be spent on defence or whether to send its citizens into harm's way. Legislators elected directly by the people can reflect the popular will and serve as a check on policies that do not reflect the wishes of society.

81. On the initiative of the Belgian Defence Minister, a Eurobarometer survey was conducted in late 2000 to generate information about variations in public support for ESDP among the European public. The survey concluded that 73% of all Europeans were in favour of setting-up a supranational European force in one form or another. The most important implication of the survey is the finding that public opinion on ESDP is closely aligned with government positions on the European integration project more generally. Public opinion in countries more receptive to deeper European integration favours ESDP, while in countries where integration lacks popular support, ESDP too finds less public backing. Arguably, therefore, the attitudes to ESDP are shaped more by domestic discourse on the future of Europe than by considerations on how Europe should respond to its security challenges.

82. Despite the problem of legitimacy, the problem of the parliamentary dimension was not mentioned in the declarations from the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki Summits, which gave impetus to ESDP. According to the treaties that govern the EU, the European Parliament (EP) has no power to initiate legislation. Its role is confined to expressing its opinion to the country holding the rotating EU Presidency and being regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission about developments in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which did not originally have a defence dimension. Last year, the EP made a failed attempt to include ESDP as part of the agenda of the annual debate it is required to hold on CFSP, under Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union.

83. Some steps have already been taken toward integrating national parliamentary defence committees and the EP. The first Conference of Chairmen of the Defence Committees of the Parliaments of the Member States of the European Union took place in July 2000 in Paris. In February 2001, the EP was invited to attend this semi-annual Defence Chairmen's conference. A seminar in The Hague in May 2001 laid the groundwork for a third conference, held in Brussels in July 2001. The EP was included to deal with parliamentary scrutiny of the ESDP and funding of common structures and missions. The delegates from the EP, national parliaments from EU nations and members of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, were subsequently also joined by parliamentarians from EU applicant countries and representatives from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

84. The conference produced a Preliminary Draft Declaration and a
Final Draft Declaration, both of which, together with proposed amendments were sent to all participating parliaments for comments, which will be discussed at a follow-up conference in November, 2001. Both draft declarations called for a creation of an ad hoc security and defence assembly comprised of Members of the EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee and national MPs from EU countries. But while the Preliminary Draft Declaration called for a creation of a separate "pan-European forum" for discussion of ESDP matters with non-EU representatives, the Final Draft Declaration urged that non-EU representatives take part directly in the newly constituted assembly, according to association arrangements yet to be defined. This difference highlights that the final answer to the question of parliamentary oversight is contingent on the resolution of the impasse concerning the role of non-EU NATO members in ESDP.

85. The WEU Assembly has long served as the parliamentary dimension for European defence, bringing together representatives of the parliaments of 28 participating countries. Recognising the need for an interparliamentary assembly to oversee ESDP, the WEU Assembly in 2000 added the name Interim European Security and Defence Assembly to its title. Established by the 1948 Brussels Treaty, the WEU Assembly is a fixture that can only be abolished by a treaty amendment ratified by the 10 signatories. But with the WEU itself becoming nothing more than an administrative shell, an assembly that only oversees the WEU has become pointless. Adaptation of the Assembly of the WEU to a body closely linked to ESDP could provide appropriate parliamentary oversight of the emerging European defence and security policy. This solution offers both the benefit of existing WEU institutional infrastructure and human resources, as well as the savings of costs associated with creation of new institutional arrangements. Regardless of the institution chosen by the 15 EU member states, it is essential that national members of parliament and members of the European Parliament obtain sufficient information to form an opinion of the state of ESDP.

VIII. CONCLUSION

86. The effort by the EU to develop its European Security and Defence Policy holds real hope for filling a need in European security in the post-Cold War era. The Soviet threat that necessitated an emphasis on common defence has disappeared, but Europe faces areas of instability and crises to be managed. While the transatlantic link has served both Europe and North America, the new security environment requires additional tools. It is not surprising that European countries have recognised the need to be able to manage crises without having to depend on NATO in every case, and ESDP
could provide a valuable means to address such security challenges in the future. At the same time, it holds the potential of rectifying the long-standing imbalance in burden-sharing between the United States and the European Allies.

87. But while the idea is welcome, the execution will be difficult. Europe bearing a greater share of the defence burden is desirable, but undermining NATO would ultimately leave both sides worse off. Including the European Allies outside of the EU in ESDP is essential, because these countries have pledged their soldiers and their resources to help defend their NATO Allies, in some cases for more than a half-century. Because European defence budgets are limited, there must be a minimum of duplication of capabilities available at NATO, but the non-EU Allies must work with the EU to assure that both sides will have access to these assets.

88. ESDP will remain an intergovernmental process. As this Assembly has noted, only democratically elected governments and parliaments have the democratic legitimacy to send their citizens into harm's way; they must not abdicate this role. Thus, it is important that they are provided with ample information and, at the same time, are able to participate in multinational consensus building. A mixed body, (working at 28) and composed of national parliamentarians and a number of members of the EP, seems to be the best solution for the time-being.

89. Finally, it is essential that ESDP develop the defence capabilities that are needed for the European countries to carry out the missions that have become critical to European security. European countries will have to be able to get their forces to where they are needed, ensure they have what they need to accomplish their mission, and sustain them in the field as long as necessary to be successful. European countries must spend their defence budgets more effectively, on capabilities for today and not yesterday, and some must spend more. Ultimately, the success of ESDP will not be judged by the size of its staff, but on whether the European countries are willing to devote the resources needed to build effective forces for crisis management.