

A common European security and defence policy after Cologne and Helsinki

[A5-0339/2000](#)

European Parliament resolution on the establishment of a common European security and defence policy after Cologne and Helsinki (2000/2005(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the motions for resolutions tabled by:

(a) Salvador Garriga Polledo on the creation of a European Civilian Peace Corps (B5-0361/1999),

(b) Jorge Salvador Hernández Mollar on promoting relations with the Maghreb region in the interests of European security and defence (B5-0114/2000),

- having regard to the Treaty on European Union and in particular Article 17 thereof,

- having regard to the decisions on the European security and defence identity (ESDI) adopted at the 1996 Berlin North Atlantic Council and at the Atlantic Alliance Summits held in Madrid (1997) and Washington (1999),

- having regard to the declarations adopted at the European Councils at Cologne (3-4 June 1999), Helsinki (10-11 December 1999), Lisbon (23-24 March 2000) and Feira (19-20 June 2000) on the establishment of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) in its civilian and military dimensions,

- having regard to the meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers in Oporto (15 and 16 May 2000) and Marseille (13 November 2000) preparing for the transfer of some of the WEU's tasks to the European Union,

- having regard to the contributions announced by the European Union Member States at the Capabilities Commitment Conference held in Brussels on 20 November 2000 and the additional contributions announced on the following day by a number of countries seeking to join the Union and the European NATO member countries that do not belong to the Union,

- having regard to the current Intergovernmental Conference and its discussions on enhanced cooperation,

- having regard to the Council Decisions of 10 May 1999 concerning

(a) the arrangements for enhanced cooperation between the European Union and the Western European Union (1999/404/CFSP)⁽¹⁾,

(b) the practical arrangements for the participation of all the Member States in tasks pursuant to Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union for which the Union avails itself of the WEU (1999/321/CFSP)⁽²⁾,

- having regard to the Council Decisions of 14 February 2000

(a) setting up the Interim Political and Security Committee (2000/143/CFSP)⁽³⁾,

(b) setting up the Interim Military Body (2000/144/CFSP)⁽⁴⁾,

(c) on the secondment of national experts in the military field to the General Secretariat of the Council during an interim period (2000/145/CFSP)⁽⁵⁾,

- having regard to the Council Decision of 22 May 2000 setting up a Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management (2000/354/CFSP)⁽⁶⁾,

- having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council for a regulation creating the Rapid Reaction Facility (COM(2000) 119 - C5-0272/2000 - 2000/0081(CNS))⁽⁷⁾,

- having regard to its resolution of 15 May 1997 on the Commission Communication on the challenges facing the European defence-related industry, a contribution for action at European level (COM(1996) 10 - C4-0093/1996)⁽⁸⁾,

- having regard to its resolution of 28 January 1999 on the Commission Communication on implementing European Union strategy on defence-related industries (COM(1997) 583 - C4-0223/1998)⁽⁹⁾,

- having regard to its resolution of 15 June 2000 on the establishment of a common European Security and Defence policy with a view to the European Council in Feira⁽¹⁰⁾,

- having regard to its resolution of 6 September 2000 on EU external action priorities⁽¹¹⁾,

- having regard to the amendments adopted by Parliament on 16 November 2000⁽¹²⁾ to the proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (COM(2000) 30 - C5-0057/2000 - [2000/0032\(COD\)](#)),

- having regard to Rule 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy and the opinion of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs ([A 5-0339/2000](#)),

A. whereas the European Union and its Member States have a platform of shared values and interests, which they are duty bound to protect in a spirit of mutual solidarity,

B. whereas, with the end of the Cold War, the distinction between security and defence has tended to become blurred, and a security and defence policy implies the use of civilian as well as military means of diverting and managing crises threatening the interests and values of a State or group of States such as the European Union,

C. stating again that, as regards defence in the conventional sense, i.e. territorial defence, the common European Security and Defence policy (CESDP) does not seek to compete with the Atlantic Alliance, which today remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members, or to set up a standing European army,

D. noting nevertheless that Member States are linked by mutual political solidarity (Article 11(2) TEU), which in itself already contributes to security, and, when the time comes, will lead to a position in which the CFSP will also guarantee its Member States' borders as the external borders of the Union,

E. whereas the CESDP does not affect the individual nature of the Member States' security and defence policy nor the obligations arising for some of them from their membership of NATO or the WEU,

F. whereas the debate on European security and defence, which began in Pörschach, has gathered impetus with the NATO military intervention in Kosovo, by making the people of the European Union aware of their inability to resolve large-scale crises,

G. noting that this conflict highlighted the gaps and deficiencies in the European Union and its Member States, firstly in crisis prevention by civilian means and then in their military crisis-management resources and capabilities,

H. welcoming, therefore, the European Union's prompt action which, in the form of the declarations by the Cologne, Helsinki, Lisbon and Feira European Councils, established the principles and modalities of a common

European security and defence policy (CESDP) concentrating mainly on preventing, managing and finding the way out of crises threatening international stability and security,

I. pointing out that the efforts of the Union and its Member States to establish a credible common European security and defence policy are intended to strengthen the CFSP, enabling the Union to deploy the full gamut of financial, diplomatic, civilian and military instruments at its disposal to achieve its aims and to exercise a more effective influence on the outcome of international crises, given that recourse to military means is only a last resort solution,

J. whereas the European Union's declared intention of using the CFSP and the CESDP to take its place as a major player in international politics will help revitalise and ensure fairer burden and responsibility sharing within the Atlantic Alliance, will lend substance to the concept of the European security and defence identity (ESDI) and will play an important part in preserving international security,

K. welcoming the decisions already taken by a number of Member States to restructure their armed forces and acquire effective and, in some cases, common equipment, with a view to the establishment of the European Rapid Reaction Force, as decided at the Cologne and Helsinki European Councils, in respect of which the Capabilities Commitment Conference is the first practical step,

L. insisting that Member States should devote the same effort to achieving the goals they have set themselves regarding civilian crisis management, in particular to establish a rapidly deployable European police force, and to introduce comprehensive crisis -prevention and -management measures which are adequately financed and designed to support civil society in areas of tension,

M. noting that there are still gaps which need to be stopped, in both institutional and equipment terms, if the Union is to have a credible conflict-prevention and crisis -management capability by the year 2003,

N. regretting that the CESDP is being set up without control by the European Parliament, which is not involved in its formulation; insisting also on the need for parliamentary scrutiny and democratic accountability of CESDP, involving national parliaments vis -à-vis the governments of the Member States,

O. noting in particular that the national parliaments, which are responsible for adopting the defence budgets of the Member States, are not yet able to obtain a global and coherent view of the CESDP,

P. stressing the importance of the principles of transparency and accountability in the field of security and defence policy,

Q. recalling that an agreement between the European Parliament and the Council is required to authorise access to the documents specified in Council Decision 2000/527/EC of 14 August 2000⁽¹³⁾,

1. Believes that a common European security and defence policy is not an end in itself but an instrument to further the goals of the Union's foreign policy and may be used only to attain specific goals clearly defined by the Council in liaison with the Commission and with the support of the European Parliament;

2. Reaffirms therefore that the CESDP will broaden the Union's options for conducting its foreign policy;

3. Welcomes the latest Presidency report on strengthening the common European security and defence policy adopted at the Feira European Council, and urges the European Union not to relax its efforts but to continue developing the civilian and military aspects of the CESDP, *inter alia* by taking the political and institutional decisions required to make it fully operational;

4. Notes that the CESDP will be fully effective only when it is directed by a clearly designated authority, which is able to coordinate all available resources, both civilian and military; considers it is necessary to evaluate on a regular basis the new structures once they are put in place;

5. Calls therefore on the forthcoming European Councils to take the decisions required to make the CESDP fully operational in 2003, as decided at the Cologne European Council;

6. Restates its belief that crises should be resolved initially by civilian means, but does not rule out the use of force when diplomatic means have been exhausted, provided that the use of force is in accordance with the founding principles of the European Union and the constitutions of its Member States and with the principles of the United Nations Charter and the OSCE;

7. Underlines the fact that, in accordance with international law, there should be an appropriate mandate from the UN Security Council authorising the use of military force; aware, however, of the possibility of a deadlock in the Security Council, stresses the need for reform of the UN institutions; considers that, pending these reforms, and in the absence of a mandate as a result of a deadlock in the Security Council, the international community, of which the European Union is a part, should only be able to intervene militarily in urgent cases at the express request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

8. Emphasises finally the need for the European Union to draw up the principles and legal bases for it to act either by civilian or military means or a combination of both on the territory of non-Community states in which a crisis is occurring;

I. Developing the civilian instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management

9. Approves the guidelines contained in the report drawn up at Feira for strengthening the European Union's capabilities in the civilian aspects of conflict prevention as well as crisis management so as to:

(a) prevent the eruption or escalation of conflicts,

(b) consolidate peace and internal stability in periods of transition, and

(c) ensure complementarity between the civilian and military aspects of crisis management in order to cover the full range of Petersberg tasks (humanitarian missions, including rescue tasks; peace-keeping missions, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making);

10. Supports the objective set by the Member States at Feira of supplying by 2003 by voluntary cooperation a 5000-strong European police force for conflict prevention or crisis management, military units not being suitable for law and order operations; notes also that Member States have undertaken, within that global target, to meet emergencies by deploying an initial contingent of 1000 police officers within 30 days;

11. Welcomes also the Commission's proposal to set up a Rapid Reaction (financial) Facility to allow the Union to take emergency action and urges the Council to adopt the Regulation to that effect without delay;

12. Emphasises that this diversification and strengthening of the European Union's intervention capability in crisis areas must go hand in hand with action to restore and consolidate the rule of law, democracy, civil society, an independent judicial system, local administration and the economy in those areas, to allow a return to normal life at the earliest opportunity and to ensure democratic security in the area concerned;

13. Calls on the Commission and Council to give their attention to conflict prevention and developing an operational concept calling on the resources of the European Union, of its Member States, of NATO, and of other players such as the UN, the OSCE and other regional organisations, as well as the media and civil society;

14. Underlines in this context that the EU should cooperate also with the specialised NGO forums;

15. Considers that the first stage in establishing a conflict-prevention policy is to develop the European Union's intelligence-gathering and -analysis capacities so as to detect the earliest signs of any crisis;

16. Stresses that this policy will rely on:

(a) the loyal cooperation of all Member States, who will have to make all their resources available to the Union,

(b) the strengthening of the PPEWU (Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit) which, at present, does not have the manpower or resources to perform its early warning task, let alone its other tasks, and

(c) the strengthening of the appropriate departments in the Council and the Commission, which must pool their information and analyses;

17. Emphasises that preventive intervention should be tailored to the nature of the crisis in question and may involve the use of a range of measures from diplomatic pressure to positive action to strengthen civil society, without ruling out coercive action, ranging from political and economic sanctions to threats of the use of force;

18. Believes that there must be a clear distinction in non-military crisis management between purely civilian operations (humanitarian, observation, mediation, reconstruction etc.), which could be carried out by a European civilian peace corps, and police operations, which could be the prelude to escalation in the use of coercion or take place after a conflict;

19. Considers it vital that the appropriate Council bodies (Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management, the Situation Centre and the Crisis cell(s)) should cooperate closely with their counterparts at the Commission (in particular the Crisis Coordination Unit and ECHO) under a clearly designated authority so as to avoid the duplication of effort and ensure the effectiveness of Union action;

20. Repeats its request in its above-mentioned resolution of 15 June 2000 to set other headline goals than those relating to the police force, in respect, for example, of groups of specialists in the fields of the rule of law, the monitoring of elections, observation of situations, humanitarian aid and civil protection;

21. Calls on the Commission to list the civilian instruments now existing or yet to be set up, with a view to preventing and managing crises and emerging from them on the best terms;

22. Calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Council, to produce a public annual report on EU conflict prevention, which lists the policies adopted, instruments used and programmes supported; proposes that criteria be established for their evaluation as well as for the lessons to be learned from them;

II. Developing the Union's military assets and capacities

23. Notes that the Kosovo conflict revealed the weakness of European countries in crisis intervention, not only in their civilian but also in their military capacities;

24. Restates its support for the headline goal set at Cologne and Helsinki of establishing a 50 - 60 000 strong Rapid Reaction Force by 2003 to be mobilised within 60 days and deployable for a year with the necessary air and maritime support and which should have its own command, intelligence and operational-planning capabilities;

25. Welcomes the contributions announced by the Member States, the candidate countries, and the European NATO allies that do not belong to the EU at the Capabilities Commitment Conference held on 20 and 21 November 2000 with a view to attaining the above goal; calls on the High Representative for the CFSP to report regularly to Parliament on the manner in which the countries concerned are honouring those commitments, so as to enable MEPs and members of the national parliaments to oversee the moves to set up the European Rapid Reaction Force;

26. Welcomes the Member States' stated willingness to attain this ambitious objective by reorganising their armed forces as appropriate;

27. Calls on the Member States in their procurement policies to draw on the lessons of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the WEU audit, the NATO Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the conclusions of the Capabilities Commitment Conference;

28. Draws attention to the weaknesses or failures of European countries in the fields of communications, command, control and information (C³I), strategic mobility (heavy airlift, in-flight refuelling), intelligence gathering, penetration of enemy air defences, all-weather, day and night attack capability, precision-guided munitions and cruise missiles, as revealed by the Kosovo conflict;

29. Proposes therefore that, following the Capabilities Commitment Conference, Member States should seek to remedy the deficiencies, as they have just done in the strategic air transport field (Airbus A400M), for air-to-air missiles (Meteor), cruise missiles (Scalp/Storm Shadow) and reconnaissance and navigation satellites;
30. Considers however that the consolidation of the military equipment procurement process in Europe cannot be undertaken on the sole basis of individual or multilateral projects and that a substantial, joint long-range planning effort is still needed;
31. Proposes therefore that the Member States assess their long-term needs, distinguishing between the short (2003/2005), medium (2010/2012) and long term (2020/2025), so that the necessary strategic, industrial and budgetary options may be taken when appropriate;
32. Notes that the establishment of a European Union rapid reaction capability will raise the problem of the professionalisation of the Member States' armed forces, a process on which some have already embarked, and maintains that each State must take its own decisions on this matter, in the light of its political and social traditions and the role it wishes to play in crisis management;
33. Believes it essential for EU Member States to increase their naval aviation intervention capabilities based on the aircraft carriers possessed by four of them, in view of the importance of sea communications for the Union's trade and the scope they offer for performing Petersberg tasks, as the operations over former Yugoslavia have shown; calls on the Member States concerned, when replacing their aircraft carriers, to seek to achieve interoperability with a view to having available, in case of need, a homogeneous naval aviation intervention force;
34. Calls also for the countries of Europe to pool their carrier escort and support assets either in the form of special task forces or as part of EUROMARFOR, which is due to be open to all the Member States, in order to give proper protection to European aircraft carriers;
35. Supports the idea of developing adequate capacity for air and sea transport, in-flight refuelling, CSAR⁽¹⁴⁾ operations, control of airspace (AEW&C⁽¹⁵⁾) and, at a later stage, battlefield control and satellite, aircraft and drone intelligence gathering;
36. Notes that the forces at present answerable to the WEU (FAWEU) and the European Air Group will be among the forces available to the European Union and that it will be possible to call upon them for the European Rapid Reaction Force; calls for these various forces, which in themselves are instruments for strengthened cooperation, to be open to Member States wishing to participate in them;
37. Calls on the European Union to take over the long-haul air transport agreement concluded on 30 June 1997 between the WEU and Ukraine and considers that a similar agreement could be concluded with Russia in order to bolster the Member States' transport and force projection capabilities;
38. Refers to its resolutions of 15 May 1997 and 28 January 1999 on European defence industry cooperation and notes with satisfaction the framework agreement signed at Farnborough on 27 July 2000 between six European countries, which will facilitate the restructuring of the defence industries in Europe, as called for in those resolutions;
39. Calls for candidate countries to be allowed wherever possible to play a full part in European armaments cooperation;
40. Reminds nevertheless defence industries as well as EU Member States and the candidate countries that, in the interest of the CESDP, arms exports must be controlled and restricted;
41. Calls for the European Union to acquire a genuine space policy covering the civilian and military aspects of the use of space and for it to combine its national and multinational military resources in a Common European Union Space Command (CEUSC); considers, however, that the objective of this new policy should not be to put weapons in orbit but rather to develop observation, listening and navigation systems;
42. Welcomes, from that point of view, the fact that the European Union and the European Space Agency moved closer together on 16 November 2000 with a view to laying down a two-pronged European space strategy

focusing on navigation (Galileo) and observation systems (GMES initiative, or global monitoring of environmental security);

43. Points out that establishing an operational CESDP will require adherence to a common political vision and the identification of common interests, but emphasises at the same time that its effectiveness will rely on the acquisition by Member States of homogeneous intervention capabilities and the development of advanced technologies; calls, therefore, for the establishment of a common defence research policy; considers that European research centres should take defence aspects into account in their programmes;

44. Points out that all these efforts to improve the Union's military capacity and assets will remain inadequate if the Union does not adopt a strategy for the use of force, as part of its common foreign policy, and if its Institutions have not undergone the necessary adaptation;

III. Institutional questions arising from the establishment of a common European security and defence policy

45. Refers, as regards the decision-making structures of the CESDP, to its above-mentioned resolution of 15 June 2000 and hopes that the COPS will be chaired by the High Representative for the CFSP, that a Council of Ministers of Defence will be set up and that the latter, should the need arise, will take part in the General Affairs Council;

46. Again expresses its concern over the effectiveness of the interim bodies set up on 1 March 2000 and over the coherence, in the present situation, between civilian and military operations the European Union might decide upon;

47. Points out that the setting up of the new bodies was not accompanied by any strengthened powers of coordination and initiative for the High Representative for the CFSP, by any clear demarcation of functions between him and the Commissioner responsible for external relations, or full coordination with all other parties involved, so as to establish a clear chain of command from the level at which political initiatives are taken to that of action on the ground;

48. Reiterates therefore the demand, expressed in its resolution of 13 April 2000 setting out its proposals for the IGC⁽⁴⁶⁾, that the positions of High Representative for the CFSP and Commissioner responsible for External Relations be merged in due course into a specially appointed Vice-President of the Commission;

49. Believes furthermore that the effectiveness of the CESDP will be closely linked to improving the operation of the CFSP and that, for this purpose, the Union must also have the capacity not only to gather but also to analyse intelligence; notes that, under the decisions taken by the WEU Council on 13 November 2000, the Torrejon Satellite Centre and the WEU Security Studies Institute are to be transferred to the European Union in 2001 in the form of agencies; believes that, when that happens, the future role of these two bodies will need to be clearly defined to ensure not least that they work in support of the PPEWU, which will have to be provided with increased human resources to enable it completely to perform its planning and analysis tasks;

50. Hopes that the Nice European Council will set up the definitive CESDP bodies (COPS, Military Committee and Military Staff), will clearly define their respective responsibilities and decision-making powers, and give the impetus required for improving the operation of the CFSP in general and the CESDP in particular, with regard to speeding up and clarifying the decision-making process;

51. Calls, in addition to the establishment of these permanent CESDP bodies, for the Nice European Council to establish the principle, on the basis of the WEAG, the WEAO or the OCCAR, of a European Armaments Agency attached to the Military Committee, responsible for devising and managing common research programmes and planning investment and joint procurement spending;

52. Believes that the Council should consider the budgetary aspects of the CESDP, in particular by providing for the cost of transferring the WEU functions required for the performance of Petersberg tasks; also believes that the cost of Petersberg tasks should be apportioned between the Member States according to the GNP scale; calls for each Member State's contribution in civilian and military resources to the performance of those tasks to be taken into account in the apportionment process;

53. Calls, at all events, for any Member State not wishing to take part in a task to be required, by reason of the mutual solidarity linking the Member States, to make a financial contribution to be divided between the participating States;

54. Considers that Petersberg tasks should in the long term be funded from the general budget of the European Union, which would require a revision of Article 28 of the TEU and of the Financial Perspective;

55. Asks, in view of the inherent cost of establishing the CESDP, the Council and the Member States not to rule out *a priori* the possibility of increasing budgetary appropriations, given the need for such a measure to ensure the credibility of the Union, provided that it does not cast doubt on the social and economic priorities of the Union and its Member States;

56. Hopes that the efforts to pool the military resources and capabilities of the Member States under the CESDP will serve to rationalise military spending, thus affording an opportunity for possible budget savings;

57. Underlines that further development of military tasks should in no way lead to a reduction by Member States of Community spending in non-military areas, in particular those areas which deal with civil crisis management, human rights and democracy, development assistance and humanitarian aid;

58. Notes that cooperation between the European Union and NATO is working well, as instanced by the first joint meeting of COPS and the North Atlantic Council held on 19 September 2000;

59. Supports the guiding principles and detailed procedures for the involvement of candidate countries and European members of NATO which are not members of the EU in crisis-management tasks undertaken by the European Union, as agreed at the Feira European Council;

60. Recalls in this connection that:

(a) in the case of operations decided upon by the Council of the European Union which require the use of NATO assets and capabilities, European States which are members of NATO but not of the EU may take part if they so wish and will then have the same rights and obligations as the Member States of the European Union, from the planning to the day-to-day conduct of those operations;

(b) in the case of operations decided upon by the Council of the European Union not making use of NATO assets and capabilities, European States which are members of NATO but not of the EU may be invited to take part in such operations with the same rights and obligations as Member States of the European Union, as stated above; notes that the same will apply to any candidate country and any other State, such as Russia or the Ukraine, which are invited to take part by the Council;

61. Welcomes, in that context, the additional capacity commitments which several European member countries of NATO who are not members of the European Union undertook, at the Capabilities Commitment Conference, to make available to the Union for its Petersberg tasks;

62. Points out that the Washington Declaration adopted on 23 April 1999 at the Atlantic Alliance summit established the principle that the European Union should have easy access to NATO collective assets and capabilities for operations in which NATO was not militarily engaged as an alliance, which in particular implies guaranteed access to NATO planning capabilities and a presumption of the availability of NATO assets and capabilities which would be identified in advance for use by the European Union;

63. Notes that any declaration which called into question the European Union's ability to call on NATO assets and capabilities in case of need could only encourage it to duplicate some of them, which would not be in the interests of any of the partners;

64. Notes that the Oporto meeting of the Council of Ministers of the WEU and that in Marseille paved the way for the transfer to the European Union of the WEU's functions required for performing Petersberg tasks, that this has implications for the structure of that organisation and its future, and that this raises the question of the future of its founding Treaty; notes the "transition plan" adopted by the WEU military committee on 17 October 2000 which seeks, while the permanent structures of the European Union take shape, to ensure continuity in crisis

management; notes that the WEU Military Staff with its Planning Cell and Situation Centre will disappear once its counterpart is set up in its final form within the EU;

65. Notes that two of the residual tasks of the WEU, mutual assistance (Article V) and arms cooperation via the WEAG, could be the subject of strengthened cooperation if, after the IGC, they also covered security and defence;

66. Notes that the Union is beginning to assume the last residual task of the WEU, to provide a broader security forum, as the former has decided to undertake regular contacts with the candidate countries and the European members of NATO which are not members of the EU;

67. Proposes, therefore, that the modified Brussels Treaty, which was concluded for a 50 year period, should be denounced under the procedure laid down in Article XII thereof, once the residual tasks of the WEU are performed by the European Union, which should lead to the dissolution of the WEU in 2004;

68. Calls on the Union's institutions, with a view to developing the civilian, politico-military and parliamentary aspects of the CESDP and to the run-down of the WEU, to recruit the latter's staff - those working both in its secretariat and for the Assembly, in order to benefit from their professional skills;

IV. The parliamentary dimension of the CESDP

69. Refers to its resolution of 15 June 2000 mentioned above on the parliamentary dimension of the CESDP, and strongly regrets the absence of this dimension from the Council's deliberations;

70. Refers in particular to its proposal that, within the framework of the CESDP and on the basis of experience with COSAC, a European parliamentary body for security and defence should be set up to correspond to the broader framework of European security;

71. Believes that this parliamentary dimension must, at all events, be developed within the European Union framework and, with its current powers, be able to assume the supervisory function carried out by the WEU Assembly;

72. Proposes that Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, which requires the European Parliament to hold an annual debate on the CFSP, should be amended specifically to include the CESDP and that, in that context, the Council should report to it on the progress made in implementing this policy, including the efforts of the Member States to help achieve the target for 2003;

73. Believes in general that it would be useful if the IGC amended the relevant provisions of the Treaty to take account of the existence of the CESDP alongside the CFSP, which would better demarcate the powers of the Union and those of its institutions;

74. Regrets the unilateral decision taken by the Council on 14 August 2000 establishing very restrictive access to documents, and insists that an agreement on this question should be reached between Parliament and the Council in order to enable the CESDP to function properly, and at the same time guaranteeing Parliament the possibility of exercising the rights conferred on it by the Treaty;

75. Welcomes the cooperation which has begun with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and provides a European and transatlantic forum for discussing security and defence matters;

76. Believes that it would be desirable, at the present stage, to adapt its own structures to take account of the existence of the CESDP and better control its development;

77. Proposes, therefore, to set up a special administrative unit of its own to assist its Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy in its work concerning the CESDP and to facilitate the work of the Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, which will have to become a permanent delegation;

V. Transatlantic relations

78. Emphasises that the European Union's efforts to establish the CESDP are compatible with the development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO and aim to establish genuine partnership in all fields - political, economic and military - with the United States and Canada;

79. Is aware that the establishment of a balanced partnership between the European Union and the United States in security and defence and hence in foreign policy requires a reappraisal of each side's position in order to meet this new challenge which will alter the roles that each of the partners has held since 1945;

80. Regrets to note that the developments set in train at Cologne and Helsinki have not always been seen in their proper light in the United States and that an information effort is required to avoid any misunderstanding; proposes therefore that the Commission Delegation to Washington, in close coordination with the Presidency of the Union and the High Representative for the CFSP, should conduct an information effort directed towards US political leaders; also calls on its Delegation for relations with the United States Congress to raise the matter regularly with members of the US Congress;

81. Considers that the European Union and the United States, as partners with shared values and interests, need to conduct a sustained dialogue on the great strategic questions, such as the balance of power after the disarmament treaties, and on the major international policy and security issues;

82. Hopes that specialist European institutes will be used to provide Members of Parliament and European officials assigned to the CESDP with the training they will need to carry out their duties;

83. Calls on the Commission and Council to examine the possibility of setting up a European Security College at Union level to provide common European training for civilian and military leaders in the institutions of the European Union and its Member States, which would thus foster a common culture in the security and defence fields;

84. Considers it vital for the European Union to adopt an information policy to explain to the public in the Member States and neighbouring non-Community countries the aims of the Common European Security and Defence Policy that it is seeking to establish; believes that this task should be undertaken jointly by the European Parliament, the Council Presidency, the High Representative for the CFSP and the Commission;

85. Calls for a wide-ranging democratic debate to be organised on the issues of European security and defence, and for the European Parliament and national parliaments to participate; invites the Council and the Commission, within their respective spheres of competence, to draw up a White Paper on European security, to enable them to pool their thoughts on the short and medium term dangers threatening our continent and to set out guidelines for political action on European Union civil and military interventions;

86. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, of the candidate countries and the European members of NATO which are not members of the EU and of the United States and Canada, the WEU Council, Assembly and Secretary-General, the NATO Secretary-General and Parliamentary Assembly and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

⁽¹⁾ OJ L 153, 19.6.1999, p.1.

⁽²⁾ OJ L 123, 13.5.1999, p.14.

⁽³⁾ OJ L 49, 22.2.2000, p. 1.

⁽⁴⁾ OJ L 49, 22.2.2000, p. 2.

⁽⁵⁾ OJ L 49, 22.2.2000, p. 3.

⁽⁶⁾ OJ L 127, 27.5.2000, p.1.

⁽⁷⁾ OJ C 311E, 31.10.2000, p. 213.

⁽⁸⁾ OJ C 167, 2.6.1997, p. 99.

⁽⁹⁾ OJ C 128, 7.5.1999, p. 86.

⁽¹⁰⁾ Texts Adopted, Item 5.

⁽¹¹⁾ Texts Adopted, Item 9.

⁽¹²⁾ Texts Adopted, Item 5.

⁽¹³⁾ OJ L 212, 23.8.2000, p. 9.

⁽¹⁴⁾ Combat Search and Rescue.

⁽¹⁵⁾ Airborne Early Warning & Control Systems.

⁽¹⁶⁾ Texts Adopted, Item 7.
