REPORT

on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy
(C5-0194/2001 – 2001/2007(INI))

Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy

Rapporteur: Elmar Brok
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At the sitting of 18 January 2001 the President of Parliament announced that the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy had been authorised to draw up an own-initiative report, pursuant to Rule 163 of the Rules of Procedure and with a view to the annual debate pursuant to Article 21 of the EU Treaty, on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy).

By letter of 4 May 2001 the Council forwarded to Parliament its annual report on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Communities; this document was submitted to Parliament pursuant to point H, paragraph 40, of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999 (7853/2001 – 2001/2007(INI)).

At the sitting of 14 May 2001 the President of Parliament announced that she had referred this document to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy as the committee responsible (C5-0194/2001).


It considered the draft report at its meetings of 9/10 July and 8-10 October 2001.

At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 42 votes to 3, with 1 abstention.

The following were present for the vote: Elmar Brok, chairman and rapporteur; Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne, vice-chairman; Alexandros Alavanos (for Pedro Marset Campos), Danielle Auroi (for Per Gahrton), Alexandros Baltas, Bastiaan Belder, André Brie, Gunilla Carlsson, Carlos Carnero González (for Rosa M. Diez González), Maria Carrilho (for Klaus Hänsch), Daniel Marc Cohn-Bendit, John Walls Cushman, Joseph Daul (for The Lord Bethell), Véronique De Keyser, Andrew Nicholas Duff (for Francesco Rutelli), Olivier Dupuis (for Emma Bonino), Pere Esteve, Pernille Frahm (for Luigi Vinci), Monica Frassoni (for Elisabeth Schroeder), Michael Gahler, Alfred Gomolka, Bertel Haarder, Giorgos Katiforis (for Magdalene Hoff), Efstratios Korakas, Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou (for Geoffrey Van Orden pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Joost Lagendijk, Alain Lamassoure, Hanja Maij-Weggen (for Ingo Friedrich), Minerva Melpomeni Malliori (for Gary Titley pursuant to Rule 53(2)), Cecilia Malström (for Paavo Väyrynen), Mario Mantovani (for Philippe Morillon pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Ioannis Marinos (for José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Linda McAvan, José Maria Mendiluce Pereiro (for Raimon Obiols i Germá), Emilio Menéndez del Valle, Arie M. Oostlander, Hans-Gert Poettering, Jacques F. Poos, Jannis Sakellariou, Amalia Sartori, Jürgen Schröder, Ioannis Souladakis, Maj Britt Theorin (for Hannes Swoboda), Johan Van Hecke, Jan Marinus Wiersma and Christos Zacharakis.

The report was tabled on 11 October 2001.

The deadline for tabling amendments will be indicated in the draft agenda for the relevant part-session.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

European Parliament resolution on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy (C5-0194/2001 - (2001/2007(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the 2000 annual report from the Council, submitted to Parliament on 4 May 2001 pursuant to point H, paragraph 40, of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999, on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of the European Communities (C5-0194/2001),

– having regard to Article 21 of the EU Treaty and Article 103(3),

– having regard to its resolution of 30 November 2000 on the progress achieved in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy ¹,

– having regard to the European Council report to the European Parliament on the progress achieved by the Union in 2000, submitted pursuant to Article 4 of the EU Treaty,

– having regard to the Presidency report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy (9526/1/01),

– having regard to the EU programme, adopted by the Göteborg European Council, for the prevention of violent conflicts (9537/1/01),

– having regard to Rule 163 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy (A5-0332/2001),

A. having regard to the horrific terror attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America and the changed security-policy situation that has resulted,

B. having regard to the newly created decision-making machinery under European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), set up following the Nice European Council,

C. welcoming the Commission’s reform efforts seeking to bring traditional means of Community action into line with the requirements of an effective and coherent EU foreign policy, which have produced, for example, ‘EuropeAid’, to administer EU cooperation programmes as a whole, including development aid, the ‘Rapid Reaction Mechanism’ (RRM), to provide initial funding for civil crisis management measures, and the measures to set up an integrated external service,

D. acknowledging the Council’s willingness to link budgetary decisions on the Union’s external aid more closely to the foreign policy goals and priorities agreed in advance and to hold a proper keynote debate on that subject in January of each year,

E. noting that the new civil and military crisis management machinery has been set up under European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) but that provision of the projected military capabilities in accordance with the ‘headline goal’ laid down in Helsinki is still overdue,

F. looking to the EU and NATO to agree on joint operations planning and the provision of NATO resources and capabilities, without undermining the decision-making autonomy of the two organisations,

G. having regard to the first official EU-NATO ministerial meeting, held in Budapest on 30 May 2001, and acknowledging the fruitful cooperation between the EU and NATO in crisis management in the western Balkans, especially in southern Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,

H. welcoming the EU programme adopted by the Göteborg European Council for the prevention of armed conflicts and endorsing the shift in the EU’s substantive aspirations after Nice, whereby future EU foreign policy is to be built on the twin pillars of ‘conflict prevention’ and (civil and military) ‘crisis management’,

I. renewing its earlier call in connection with the annual CFSP debate for the Commission and Council likewise to submit an annual report on the progress achieved in conflict prevention and crisis management using civil resources, which should make a qualitative assessment of actual progress on the ground and not merely specify the number of measures undertaken,

J. acknowledging that, by sending EU observers (EUMM) to parts of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and arranging European monitoring of observers in the occupied territories in the Middle East, the EU is making an important contribution to measures to build confidence between the parties to the respective conflicts,

K. whereas the effectiveness of joint strategies must be improved by creating a closer tie-in to practical measures; whereas, above all, their implementation must be goal oriented so as to enable common positions and joint actions to be adopted by majority vote,

L. whereas the troika under the Swedish Presidency visited North Korea in early May 2001 to prevent the incipient moves towards détente between North and South Korea from stopping short and to offer EU support to help bring about a lasting peace settlement for the Korean peninsula; whereas Parliament is making its own contribution by establishing parliamentary relations with North Korea,

M. having regard to the visit to Kaliningrad in July 2001 by a joint parliamentary delegation from Poland, Lithuania, Russia, and the European Parliament,
**CFSP trends in the years 2000 and 2001**

1. Recognises, now that the CFSP bodies and tools have finally been put in place in accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam, that the EU is, for the first time, trying to give effectively expression to the political will to develop a distinctive foreign policy profile and the ability to act on its own initiative in crisis situations;

2. Acknowledges that, as the crises have intensified in the western Balkans and the Middle East, the EU has assumed a diplomatic mediation role with the aim of linking short-term operational crisis management measures to long-term prospects;

3. Applauds the personal commitment of the High Representative, Mr Solana, and the Member of the Commission responsible for external relations, Chris Patten, to the reform of the EU’s external relations now under way and, although the pillar structure is still in place, their joint efforts to provide consistency and coherence in European foreign and security policy; continues nevertheless to support its goal of consolidating the office of high representative within the Commission by requiring the High Representative to be accountable to both the Council and Parliament;

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**Progress in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)**

4. Hopes that a decision on the operational readiness of a European ‘Rapid Reaction Force’ can be reached no later than the December 2001 Laeken European Council; hopes in that connection that despite restrictive budget policies sufficient financial resources can be raised to overcome the strategic imperfections of an effective ESDP and achieve the EU’s own headline goal;

5. Looks to Turkey, as a member of NATO and a candidate country for membership of the EU, to respect the decision-making autonomy of the EU as such and to refrain from further blocking the provision of NATO resources and capabilities; welcomes Turkey’s willingness to take part in EU crisis management measures;

6. Calls for a strong parliamentary dimension to the ESDP both by fostering a security and defence policy culture within the EP and by intensifying cooperation between the EP and the national parliaments; recommends, therefore, that:

   - a standing delegation from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy be set up to handle relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, of which the EP is already an associate member, and

   - the chairmen of the foreign affairs and defence committees of the national parliaments and the EP hold joint meetings and the conference thus constituted be expanded to include other members of the committees concerned so as to make it politically representative;
7. Looks to the Member States to conduct an intensive debate on the new security threats and, without prejudice to existing disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, work out a common European attitude to the US missile defence system;

8. Considers that combating international terrorism must become a central component of European foreign and security policy, with aspects of external security having to be combined with those of internal security; calls on the Commission and the Council to draw up a comprehensive common strategy on combating terrorism making use of all capabilities of Europol and Eurojust, which should have an improved legal basis and a greater operability; advocates that in the course of a sustained campaign to combat terrorism, EU Member States urgently step up their efforts to improve exchanges of intelligence agency information, against money laundering, drug trafficking and computer crime. Notes in that connection that the close alliance with both the United States and other major geo-politically crucial powers will be necessary; the United Nations and its Security Council would be an important platform for a comprehensive and global anti-terror alliance;

9. Notes that NATO remains indispensable for collective security in Europe; the OSCE also plays an important role to play in the European security structure;

10. Stresses that in the field of conflict prevention the EP should establish the same contacts with the OSCE as it has established with the NATO for the ESDP;

11. Regrets that the transfer of the WEU Institute for Security Studies to the European Union in the form of a Joint Action adopted by the Council on 20 July 2001 without consulting or informing the European Parliament, and the fact that it is understood by the Council as a pure instrument of the Member States rather than as a scientific Community agency; considers that in view of the Institute's research function it should have been founded as an agency under standard Community legislative procedure;

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Conflict prevention and crisis management

12. Believes that the EU should strictly enforce the principle of conditionality when mediating in crisis situations;

13. Maintains, therefore, that the Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) should not be applied to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia unless constitutional reform and a lasting end to military activities on both sides are successfully accomplished;

14. Appeals to all states not to supply arms to Macedonia, and instead of arming that country to contribute to its economic and social development;

15. Acknowledges that EU crisis management has proved more effective in the Macedonian crisis but notes that the EU was slow to intervene and missed the opportunity for early conflict prevention;
16. Criticises the fact that responsibilities for the many and varied forms of EU involvement in the western Balkans continue to be fragmented and calls for a more transparent unified leadership structure to be established both for conflict mediation and for reconstruction measures, with the duties of the Special Envoy on the Stability Pact perhaps being incorporated into this uniform leadership structure, and a more efficient and rapid processing of aid measures;

17. Regrets that economic aid to south-east Europe is too slow and too modest;

18. Supports the ‘road-map’ proposed by the Mitchell Commission for the resumption of the Middle East peace process and repeats its call for a freeze on settlement building and the sending of international observers to the occupied territories;

19. Recommends that implementation of the association agreement with Israel and financial aid for the Palestinian Authority should be closely linked to the recommendations of the Mitchell Commission;

20. Calls on the Council, the Commission and the Member States to proceed without delay with drawing up a consistent European Union policy on the countries of the Middle East having as its principal objective the establishment of the rule of law and democracy in all countries of the region;

21. Believes that giving priority to the Barcelona Process would absolutely enhance conflict prevention and crisis management and restore political and social peace in the Mediterranean area and calls for a rapid flow of resources to be provided under the MEDA Programme; regrets that the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is directly linked to the situation in the Middle East therefore suffering from the repercussions of the present deadlock of the peace process;

22. Takes the view that a European foreign policy based on conflict prevention should increasingly address itself to matters with implications across the board, for example energy and water supplies and the trade in drugs, diamonds, and small arms, and also, wherever possible, promote regional cooperation so as to build greater mutual trust between countries and strengthen economic integration;

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Strategic partnerships

23. Believes that enlargement of the EU and NATO will do much to preserve peace and stability in Europe and foster cooperation between Europe and its neighbours; however, leaves each candidate country free to decide whether to apply for NATO membership;

24. Points once again to the significance of relations with Russia, and welcomes the medium-term strategy for developing relations between the Russian Federation and the EU proposed by the Russian government in October 1999; considers that practical cooperation issues, for example in the energy sector or in the field of security or regarding Russian participation in EU-led military crisis management operations, should have pride of place believes that the dialogue on Kaliningrad should be continued; takes the view that critical
scrutiny must continue to be brought to bear on the situation of the independent media in Russia and continuing pressure exerted to bring about a political and humanitarian solution to the Chechnya question;

25. Recommends that a coherent and comprehensive long-term policy be devised for the Caucasus region with a view to contributing to the stability and the development of the whole area;

26. Welcomes the invitation from the Göteborg European Council for Ukraine and Moldova to join the European Conference; hopes that incorporation of the partnership with Ukraine within a multilateral forum of that kind will assist Ukraine’s efforts to promote democratic development, respect human rights and the rule of law, and implement market-oriented economic reforms; considers it necessary, in view of the failure of the EU and Ukraine to agree on their long-term relations, to link the Ukraine closely to Europe by establishing an EU-Ukraine free-trade area;

27. Encourages the Belgian Presidency, acting in the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement, to frame a common strategy for conflict prevention in Africa, focusing above all on the greater involvement of grass-roots organisations in all stages of development cooperation, as already provided for under the Cotonou Agreement; considers the EU common position of May 2001 as an encouraging step in that direction;

28. Is of the opinion, now that the EU has developed bilateral relations with the Rio Group and the different regional groups, that the time is right to build a strategic partnership with Latin America; a key part would be played in such a common strategy by efforts to support the peace process and foster social change in Colombia;

29. Considers it essential to extend the scope of transatlantic relations between the US and the EU beyond foreign and security policy issues and believes that closer cooperation, not least in the areas of trade, environment, internal security, and drug policy, together with international efforts to combat terrorism, will constitute a key building block of a transatlantic market; considers that as the two partners seek more actively to develop their respective regional integration systems, a more intensive transatlantic relationship will assume increasing importance;

30. Underlines that the EU should undertake everything possible to strengthen the peace-building capacity of the United Nations;

Global responsibility for peace, security, and sustainable development

31. Expects a stronger commitment from the EU in the Maghreb and Mashreq countries to supporting the process of economic and social modernisation, with a special emphasis on the social impact of those processes. That commitment should have built into it a comprehensive social dialogue, including a dialogue of religions, so as to create a common region of stability and peace; recommends that troika contacts be stepped up with Algeria to foster political dialogue encompassing all Algerians and takes the view that the outcome of the ongoing negotiations on an association agreement must be made conditional on a peaceful solution to the internal crisis;
32. Believes that the EU must step up contacts with groups in Afghanistan which, in contrast to the present regime, wish to create greater democracy and restore the right of women to take part in public life, receive an education and in general have their ordinary civil rights reinstated; recommends that greater attention be paid to circumstances in Chechnya, focusing among other things on a resolution of the conflict between Russia and Chechnya;

33. Takes the view, despite the continuing US sanctions against Iran on account of that country’s armaments policy, that the EU should support the reforming forces in Iranian society through a policy of gradual rapprochement; expects at all events from Iran a clear renunciation of support in any form for international terrorism before it will support a Commission negotiating mandate for a trade and cooperation agreement with Iran;

34. Believes that the political dialogue with Indonesia should be continued and calls for Community aid programmes to be coordinated more effectively with those of the Member States;

35. Considers it vital to develop relations with ASEAN and to step up the ASEM process in order to prevent conflicts (China/Taiwan and Korea), promote political stability, uphold human rights, and foster economic and cultural cooperation; welcomes, consequently, the strategic framework adopted by the EU Commission on 4 September 2001 for relations between the EU and Asia for the coming decade; calls for a joint parliamentary conference to be held within the next year before the ASEM IV meeting, without, at all events, participation by representatives from Burma;

36. Believes, in this respect, that relations should be strengthened, in particular with all the democratic countries in the continent whose role is a key factor for the development of human rights and fundamental liberties all over Asia;

37. Renews its call for a peaceful negotiated solution to the Kashmir question and appeals to the Council to use its influence on the parties to the conflict, India and Pakistan, to help bring this about;

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38. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission and the national parliaments.
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

I. Introduction

This annual report on the role of the European Union in the world is based on the Council report on the ‘main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP’ for the year 2000 (PESC 130 – 7853/01), which sets out the specific CFSP measures falling under the second pillar. Above all, however, it is seeking to gauge the extent to which the EU’s foreign and security bodies and tools have improved external crisis management and to determine how close the Union is to becoming a foreign policy player on the world stage.

Last year’s report was produced at a time when the new Treaty provisions agreed at Amsterdam were being put directly into effect. Javier Solana was appointed high representative, and a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit set up to assist him. The composition of the troika was changed so that it now consists of the Presidency, the High Representative, and the Member of the Commission responsible for external relations. Common strategies were adopted with Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean region, and new decision-making machinery was set up to deal with civil and military crisis management falling under the Petersberg tasks.

Assessment of the period since November 2000 now affords an opportunity to consider how far these new CFSP bodies and tools have in fact helped to give the EU a distinctive foreign policy profile and enabled it to act independently in crisis situations. A further question to study is how far the Commission has managed to bring consistency and coherence to European foreign and security policy.

I. CFSP trends in the years 2000 and 2001 – first tests as a crisis manager

The conclusion that can be drawn in mid-2001 is that, perhaps for the first time in the history of the CFSP, an EU foreign and security policy concept, which can be summed up by the terms ‘conflict prevention and crisis management’ and is founded on the common political will to act at the operational level, is visibly in evidence.

As the crises have intensified in the Balkans and the Middle East, the EU has assumed a diplomatic mediation role enabling it to link short-term operational crisis management measures to long-term prospects.

Middle East

Given that the High Representative, Mr Solana, attended the Sharm el Sheikh Summit on 17 October 2000, is serving as the EU representative on the Mitchell Commission, and has been engaging in the diplomatic talks together with the Swedish Presidency, it can be said for the first time that the EU has changed from ‘payer’ to ‘player’. By coordinating EU observers in the occupied territories, and thanks to the continual diplomatic efforts of the Special Envoy Mr Moratino, the EU has demonstrated its aspiration to step into the diplomatic gap opened up in the early days of the new Bush Administration and, for the first time, to mediate in a crisis and be taken seriously in that role. When it took this action, it had its financial assistance to the Palestinian authority (EUR 300 m a year together with the Member States) and its trading relations with Israel very much in mind.
Macedonia

The dual crisis in southern Serbia (Prêsevo valley) and Macedonia since February or March 2001 has been the first to put EU crisis management to the test. Whereas in the former case NATO and Kfor have shouldered the main crisis management responsibilities, as far as Macedonia is concerned, the EU has rapidly progressed to become the new protagonist, as evidenced by Mr Solana’s shuttle diplomacy between Brussels and Skopje. The Macedonian case has shown that the EU can succeed as a crisis manager if:

- the different EU players, ranging from the Presidency and the High Representative Javier Solana to Chris Patten, the Member of the Commission responsible for external relations, and including the EU Special Representative for the Stability Pact, Bodo Hombach, act coherently and take a high profile;

- when dealing with the parties to a conflict, in this case the Macedonian Government, it has a clear message to give, in this instance linking support for the struggle against the Albanian rebels to the demand to open a dialogue on political reforms;

- operational crisis management measures are undertaken. EUMM teams have thus been sent to north-west Macedonia, as has a EuropeAid team, to set up aid and assistance projects in regions where Albanians make up the majority of the population. Financial assistance is being granted for the planned South Eastern University in Tetova;

- a long-term strategy is in place for the region in conflict. On 9 April 2001, for example, the Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) was signed with Macedonia, which has also been incorporated into the Stability Pact;

- if political and military cooperation between NATO and the EU works. Checks on the border between Kosovo and Macedonia, for instance, have been improved by the British and Swedish reinforcements sent to strengthen Kfor, and a European NATO contingent has been sent to collect Albanian NLA weapons parallel to the parliamentary debate on a constitutional reform in Macedonia.

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Apart from those crisis situations, the EU has demonstrated its determination to intervene in the foreign policy field as a long-term strategic player on the world stage, with the USA where possible but without it if it is unwilling or not yet ready to do so.

This point applies, for example, to the visit paid to North Korea by the troika (Mr Persson, Mr Solana, and Chris Patten) in early May during the Swedish Council Presidency with a view to preventing a hiatus in the détente between North and South Korea and to lending EU support to a permanent peaceful solution to the division of the Korean peninsula.
It applies in particular to the development of a strategic relationship between the EU and Russia, building on the partnership and cooperation agreement, with pressure continuing to be exerted on Russia with regard to Chechnya.

The issue of strategic cooperation with Russia, a future direct neighbour of the EU, acquires especial importance when seen against the background of the decision, to be taken in 2002, on the further expansion of NATO and the debate opened by the US about a new missile defence system. Cooperation on issues relating to European security policy and energy supplies are of major mutual interest.

This process, whereby the EU assumes a greater willingness and a broader capability to take on responsibility for conflict prevention and crisis management, began with the ‘Energy for Democracy’ Programme designed to support the democratic opposition to and to offset the sanctions against the Milosevic regime in Serbia and was fully rewarded with the democratic upheaval in Serbia following the presidential election in September and the general elections in December 2000.

III. Structures and instruments

The substantial progress made in the creation of new structures for military and non-military crisis management under the aegis of the High Representative under the second pillar was significant for the newly developed profile of the EU as a crisis manager, as were the efforts made by the Commission to reform and recast traditional Community instruments.

The Solana-Patten Joint Paper submitted to the Nice European Council, entitled ‘Improving the coherence and effectiveness of measures taken by the European Union in the field of crisis prevention’, was the visible expression thereof.

ESDP structures

With the signing of the Treaty of Nice, essential functions of the WEU were transferred to the EU (Article 17) and the Political and Security Committee enshrined in the EC Treaty (Article 25). That committee is entrusted with a key role in day-to-day operational management, since it is to exercise political control and strategic leadership in crisis management operations. In that role, it is to be supported by the EU Military Committee under the chairmanship of the Finnish General Gustav Hägglund, who is in turn supported by an EU Military HQ, which is currently occupied principally in making preparations for the expansion of the EU Rapid Reaction Force.

A new venture is the EU’s situation centre (Joint Situation Centre/SitCen), staffed by military and civilian personnel and reporting to the High Representative but also supporting the Political and Security Committee. SitCen maintains contacts with the situation centres in NATO, the OSCE and the UN. Mr Solana works with his own Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which is
currently concentrating its endeavours on the crises in the Balkans and the Middle East.

Since December 2000, in addition to Sit/Cen and the Policy Unit, Mr Solana has also been able to call upon the reformed EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), which was active as long ago as 1991 as an observer principally in Croatia and Bosnia (when it was known as the ECMM).

An Advisory Committee, consisting of experts from national ministries, was set up to deal with the civilian aspects of crisis management, with a remit to put forward proposals for the international operations involving police forces, judges, lawyers and administrative experts. The top priority is to attain the objective of having 5 000 police officers available for missions, of whom 1000 must be ready for action within 30 days.

**ESDP capabilities**

While the establishment of new decision-making structures for EU crisis management is now virtually complete, the issue of the provision of the planned military capabilities remains open.

The headline goal laid down in Helsinki remains applicable: the capability to station 60 000 troops within 60 days for at least one year in crisis areas. In November 2000, in Brussels, the EU Defence Ministers announced the contribution that each country could make. In the interim, the Member States have compiled a ‘Helsinki Progress Catalogue’. A decision about the European Rapid Reaction Force is due to be taken at the latest at the Laeken European Council in December 2001.

The European Parliament urges clarification above all on two crucial issues:

Firstly, agreement between the EU and NATO about joint operations planning and the provision of NATO establishments for autonomous EU operations. That is currently still outstanding because of Turkish objections.

Secondly, the Member States must decide which of the strategic shortcomings it wishes to solve jointly in the first instance: strategic transport capabilities, strategic reconnaissance, military command and control structures or shortcomings in the field of logistics.

Given the financial weakness of most national defence budgets, the Member States need to resolve the contradiction between aspirations and reality.

In addition, in the missile-defence debate initiated by the USA, they must develop a common European stance *vis-à-vis* the new threats, for example international terrorism and its support by rogue States.

**Community instruments**

It was important for the sustainability of the new quality of the EU’s diplomatic presence that, in the first pillar too, since entering office, Chris Patten, the Member of
the Commission with special responsibility for external affairs, should continuously reform these traditional Community instruments and adapt them to meet the requirements of an effective and coherent EU foreign policy, as well as adding new ones.

Within the Commission, the internal structures of the External Relations DG were reformed and adapted to comply with those of the second pillar, inter alia via the creation of a separate CFSP Directorate and a Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Division. The eventual goal is the creation of an integrated external service involving all external relations DGs, all external relations departments, and all delegations1. However, the main achievement was the modernisation of the management structures for the administration of all EU cooperation programmes, including development aid, and their combination under one roof, with the founding early in 2001 of the EuropeAid Office for Cooperation, in order to dovetail short- and long-term conflict management measures more effectively.

Finally, at the end of February 2001, with the support of the European Parliament, the new Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) was set up in order to enable the Commission to make funds rapidly available for civilian crisis management measures (EUR 20 m in 2001 and EUR 25 m in 2002 in the PDB). The aim is to tackle the notorious problem of the cumbersome authorisation procedure to which the European Parliament has repeatedly referred.

The RRM is designed to be used for initial funding in situations which threaten to turn into a crisis. Support for local and international non-governmental organisations is envisaged in particular, as well as the rapid dispatch of experts. The RRM was used for the first time in January 2001 for humanitarian aid in the Presevo valley in southern Serbia.

In April 2001, the Commission submitted a comprehensive conceptual proposal for Community policies to be retargeted on conflict prevention. This was taken up by the Swedish Presidency and led to the adoption at the Göteborg European Council in June 2001 of a programme for the prevention of violent conflicts.

In this way, the EU is emphasising the conceptual new thrust of its external policy after Nice, which is designed to be based on the two pillars of (civilian and military) conflict prevention and crisis management.

**IV. External policy priorities for the years 2001 and 2002**

The European Parliament supports the reform of the EU’s external relations initiated by the Council and Commission, partly with a view to making budgetary decisions relating to the Union’s external aid take greater account of previously agreed external policy objectives and priorities.

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1 See the Galeoto Quecedo report of 30 May 2001 on the Commission communication on the development of the external service (A5-0199/2001).
In so doing, the priorities previously established by the Council may constitute no more than an initial guideline which must be spelt out in greater detail jointly with the European Parliament.

- EU enlargement, together with stabilisation and cooperation in neighbouring regions
- gradual elimination of poverty and integration of the developing countries in the global economy
- conflict prevention and non-military crisis management
- cooperation with other major players.

To this must be added the new and important priority of combatting international terrorism.

The guiding debate on improving the coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s external policy measures, begun in the General Affairs Council in January 2001, and the report of the High Representative, Mr Solana, on common strategies must be continued jointly with the European Parliament.

The effectiveness of common strategies must be improved, with greater weight being given to practical measures. Above all, common strategies must be designed in such a way that common positions and joint actions may be adopted by majority vote (many Member States are still trying to avoid this procedure).

The Council’s monitoring reports to the Göteborg European Council on the implementation of common strategies for Russia and the Mediterranean spell out once again that they are too broadly based and insufficiently geared to operational objectives.

Acting in the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement, the Belgian Presidency should therefore develop a common strategy for a conflict prevention policy for Africa, central to which should be trade in small arms and in diamonds from crisis areas.

The predominant attention given by the EU to the Balkans and the Middle East as crisis regions during the period covered by the reports, together with the expansion of CFSP structures, continues to be of exceptional importance.

At the same time, however, the EU should direct its external policy attention, using the instruments it currently has at its disposal, to the following countries where a crisis may well occur:

**Ukraine**

The EU must continue to support Ukraine’s endeavours with regard to the development of democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and market-oriented economic reforms. The invitation to Ukraine and Moldova to join the European Conference is an important component in the incorporation of the partnership with Ukraine in a multilateral framework.
Consideration should be given to the question whether the European Economic Area (EEA) might be put to a new use to promote long-term stabilisation on the fringes of a Europe of 28, in order to place existing bilateral relations in a further multilateral context. This might provide a way to deepen relations with the **southern Caucasus** region.

**Algeria**

The troika contact with the Algerian Government should be stepped up with a view to overcoming the internal crisis in that country by means of a dialogue encompassing all Algerians. The EU must signal its willingness to support political, economic and social reforms. The outcome of the negotiations for an association agreement must be linked to a peaceful solution to the internal policy crisis.

**Iran**

Despite the continuation of the US sanctions against Iran because of that country’s armaments policy, the EU should support the reformist forces in Iranian society by means of a policy of gradual *rapprochement* and begin a comprehensive dialogue with Iran, based on the sectoral cooperation already introduced in the fields of energy supplies and campaigns to combat drugs, central to which might be a trade and cooperation agreement. However, Iran must distance itself from international terrorism and refuse its support to terrorist groups of all kinds.

**Indonesia**

The political dialogue with the Jakarta Government must be continued with a view to achieving a peaceful solution to the internal conflicts. The aid programmes set up by the EU and by the Member States must be better coordinated, and the necessary priorities laid down in a country strategy paper.

To guarantee the territorial integrity of Indonesia, the causes of separatism must be tackled and the inter-ethnic and interregional dialogue linked with an appropriate decentralisation programme. The ‘Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia’ Programme co-financed by the Commission (EUR 13.2 m) should be continued.

In Latin America, the EU should in particular continue to support the peace process in **Colombia**.